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An Incident in Korea: A Case Study of U.S. Army Public Affairs Activities in Response to the Ingman Range Murders in 1981

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
This study examines the procedures of the Offices of Public Affairs assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division and higher headquarters as a result of the shootings at Ingman Range on June 5, 1981. This study further addresses the public-affairs strategies, planning and coordination between the 2nd Infantry Division headquarters, the Eighth U.S. Army, and the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C. While conducting a live-fire qualification course with M-16 rifles at Ingman Range, Camp Casey, South Korea, five U.S. soldiers were gunned down. Four were killed and one was seriously wounded. The individual initially arrested for the shootings was a black soldier from New Jersey who was apprehended at the range after becoming hysterical and claiming to have started a revolution. Two days later, another soldier was arrested who was also black. The victims of the shootings were white. The Ingman Range shootings presented many challenges to the 2nd Infantry Division Public Affairs Office. The newsworthiness of this incident dictated reporting the circumstances to the American public via the news media while appropriately providing information to the internal public of the Division in a manner that would diffuse ethnic and racial tension rather than aggravate it.

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AN INCIDENT IN KOREA: A CASE STUDY OF U.S. ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE TO THE INGMAN RANGE MURDERS IN 1981

by

Richard F. Machamer, Jr.

B.S., United States Military Academy, 1975

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table Of Figures ........................................................................................................ iii

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. iv

Chapter 1: Introduction

  Section I: The Ingman Range Incident ................................................................. 1
  Section II: Formulation of the Research Question ............................................. 3
  Section III: Assumptions ............................................................................... 4
  Section IV: Limitations ............................................................................... 4
  Section V: Significance of the Study ............................................................... 6
  Section VI: Organization of the Report ........................................................ 8

Chapter 2: Review of the Literature

  Section I: Written Sources ......................................................................... 10
  Section II: Interviews ............................................................................ 18

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

  Section I: Research Strategy ................................................................. 23
  Section II: Conduct of the Research ........................................................ 24

Chapter 4: Army Public Affairs

  Section I: The Requirement and Development of Army Public Affairs .......... 27
  Section II: Public Affairs Missions .............................................................. 31
  Section III: Public Affairs Organizations ..................................................... 43
  Section IV: The Public Affairs Officer .......................................................... 47
  Section V: Military-Media Relations in 1981 .............................................. 52

Chapter 5: The Ingman Range Incident ............................................................. 55
Chapter 6: The Public Affairs Actions

Section I: The Initial Public Affairs Actions ........................................... 70
Section II: Lacy Harrington Arrested ......................................................... 78
Section III: Bell Determined Insane .......................................................... 83
Section IV: Harrington Court Martial ......................................................... 86
Section V: Racial Aspects ........................................................................ 89

Chapter 7: Conclusions

Conclusion 1 ............................................................................................... 94
Conclusion 2 ............................................................................................... 96
Conclusion 3 ............................................................................................... 99
Conclusion 4 ............................................................................................... 100
Summary and Discussion .......................................................................... 102

References ................................................................................................. 106

Appendix A: Glossary ................................................................................ 114
Appendix B: Index ..................................................................................... 123
Appendix C: About the Author ................................................................. 130
TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1-5: Sketch of the Ingman Range .............................................. 56
Figure 2-5: View of the Ingman Range ............................................... 57
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Section I: The Ingman Range Incident

On June 6, 1981, a report appeared in the Baltimore Sun under the following headline:

"GI shoots 5 others in Korea; 4 killed"

This tragic event happened within the United States Army's 2nd Infantry Division serving in South Korea.

While conducting a live-fire qualification course with M-16 rifles at Ingman Range, Camp Casey, South Korea, on June 5, 1981, five U.S. soldiers were gunned down. Four were killed and one was seriously wounded. The individual initially arrested for the shootings was a black soldier from New Jersey who was apprehended at the range after becoming hysterical and claiming to have started a revolution.

Within an Army division, there are many staffs and agencies which have certain duties and responsibilities in response to such an occurrence.

The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command will collect physical and testimonial evidence to determine if criminal laws have been violated. If so, it will seek to identify and apprehend the perpetrators.

The staff organization in charge of personnel matters will notify the closest relatives, the next-of-kin, of the victims. It will arrange for military escort to transport the bodies to their place of burial in the United States.

The Chaplain Corps will offer comfort to the surviving relatives and friends.
The division's military medical facility and staff will care for the wounded and conduct autopsies on the deceased.

The division commander, the head of the organization, along with his staff and legal advisors, will determine if a criminal trial by court martial is warranted.

If so, the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate is responsible to conduct a fair and impartial trial, providing defense and prosecution counsels as well as the judge. The division commander appoints a jury of peers from within the division.

A tragedy such as this heavily impacts the members of the division. The commander has a responsibility to keep all members of his command informed as to what happened and what actions are being taken as a result of the incident. Also, the newsworthiness of this event dictates reporting the circumstances to the American public.

The Office of Public Affairs, a staff agency assigned at each division and higher headquarters, will assist the commander in keeping the unit's members and the public informed.

This study examines the procedures of the Offices of Public Affairs of the 2nd Infantry Division and higher headquarters as a result of the shootings at Ingman Range on June 5, 1981. This study further addresses the public affairs strategies, planning and coordination between the 2nd Infantry Division headquarters, the Eighth U.S. Army, and the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C.
Section II: Formulation of the Research Question

The research topic was suggested to the author by the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs [OCPA], United States Army on Dec. 18, 1990.

The current executive officer to the Chief of Public Affairs was assigned as the Public Affairs Officer, 2nd Infantry Division approximately two weeks after the Ingman Range incident occurred. Col. Michael Sullivan considered the public affairs aspects of this incident to be unique and worthy of documentation. A study of the public affairs actions during this incident would benefit students of public affairs and current practitioners (Personal conversation, Sullivan, Dec. 18, 1990).

Many of the public affairs problems, or issues, as a result of a catastrophic event are consistent with each event; for example, notification of the victims' next-of-kin prior to releasing their names to the public. The decisions made and actions taken, however, are usually unique to the organization, its people, its operating procedures and its overall situation at the time of the event.

Guidelines for future public affairs contingencies can be derived from the study of past cases. The decisions in planning and execution of public affairs actions regarding the Ingman Range incident can be evaluated and considered by future and current public affairs officers.

The primary research question which this study answers is how did the Army public affairs community handle the Ingman Range incident?

Subordinate questions which supplement the primary question are:
• What were the public affairs strategies and procedures? Why were they adopted?
• What factors influenced the decisions? How did these factors affect decisions?
• Did the strategies and procedures conform to the doctrinal principles of Army public affairs?

Section III: Assumptions

Military and media relations in combat situations have changed considerably since 1981; however, the procedures in peacetime with regard to accidents, criminal acts and access to military installations have remained relatively the same.

Current public affairs doctrine was applicable in 1981. Whenever possible, regulations which were current in 1981 and guidance to Army public affairs practitioners as existed in 1981 were used in this study.

Current course content at the Public Affairs Officers Course for public affairs peacetime operations has not changed since 1981.

Section IV: Limitations

A large portion of the evidence for this study was obtained from personal interviews with participants who were in key positions during the Ingman range incident. The event occurred 10 years ago. In some cases, memories were sketchy at best. Some of the interviewees had retained personal notes to which they were able to refer during the interview. In all cases, prior to conducting the interview, the author provided materials such as newspaper clippings of the incident to assist the interviewees in remembering details.
An attempt was made to access all Army files that were maintained concerning this incident. In some cases, files no longer existed. Army office files are usually destroyed after two years, as is the case at the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA). The daily log report that was kept by the 2nd Infantry Division Public Affairs Office was still available and provided to the author. Drafts of the news releases were also made available.

The research of news outlets for coverage of the Ingman Range incident was, for reasons explained in Chapter 3, limited to: The Washington Post, The Baltimore Sun, U.S. News and World Report, Time, Pacific Stars and Stripes and The Army Times. The author located mimeographed copies of additional reports from The Korean Herald, an English newspaper published in Seoul, South Korea; Star Bulletin, published in Honolulu; and Advertiser, also from Honolulu. (Author's note: For some articles, the page number of the article was not on the mimeographed copy.)

Key participants who may have provided additional evidence could not be located. There was no record of their whereabouts either in the Army World-Wide Locater system or the Army Reserve Locater system.

Not located were Lt. Craig Perringer, assistant public affairs officer, 2nd Infantry Division; Capt. Frank Applefeller, commander of the Headquarters Company, 2nd Engineer Battalion; Lt. Col. Takahido Ono, commander of the 2nd Engineer Battalion at the time of the incident; and Billy Fullerton, assistant public affairs officer, Eighth U.S. Army.

The study concentrates on the public affairs process during peacetime operations and not during war. There were many legal issues which
surfaced during the judicial proceedings of the Ingman Range murders. This thesis does not discuss the validity of legal actions that were taken.

The public affairs strategy and procedures used in the Ingman Range shooting incident would not necessarily be appropriate for other catastrophic incidents; for example, a crash of an Army helicopter with fatalities or an accident involving nuclear weapons. All events have characteristics, circumstances and motives which would be unique to the specific occurrence. In addition, procedures dictated by Army public affairs regulations can differ depending on the event. For example, news releases are handled differently with a murder than with a nuclear accident.

Section V: Significance of the Study

A discussion of what the study will accomplish is necessary in order to understand its significance.

The study provides an explanation of Army Public Affairs. This explanation includes:

- the philosophies which govern the public affairs process
- the doctrinal principles
- the experience levels and training programs of the practitioners
- the public affairs organizations.

The study identifies circumstances and factors which can both impede and support the public affairs process.

The study demonstrates the public affairs problems and issues which can develop when a catastrophic event occurs within a large military organization.
The study demonstrates why decisions were made in the public affairs process by evaluating the factors which influenced the decisions. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the courses of action adopted. Members of the civilian community who can benefit from the study include civilian public affairs/relations students, practitioners and journalists who currently work with, or may in the future, work in military public affairs offices.

Educators in public relations theories and techniques can evaluate Army public affairs programs and can gain insight to public affairs techniques which may vary between the military and civilian sector based on organizational differences.

For members of the military community, this study can serve as an instructional case study for the student of Army public affairs. It identifies issues that may apply to future public affairs actions in which they may be involved.

Unless directly associated with public affairs, many Army employees may not be familiar with the responsibilities and duties of a public affairs office. The study provides an explanation of another function of their military organization which they may not fully understand.

Service members and civilian employees whose duties are with division and higher level staffs can gain an understanding of factors which influence public affairs strategies and actions. Operational procedures in the organization which may cause problems in achieving public affairs goals can be evaluated and modified if necessary.
Section VI: Organization of the Report

This thesis contains seven chapters. An explanation of the contents of each chapter is provided below.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Background Information

The chapter introduces the study in Section I with the highlights of the Ingman Range shooting incident. The public affairs process in response to the incident provides the basis for the primary research question, which is discussed in Section II. The study is qualified in Section III, Significance of the Study. The remaining sections explain assumptions, limitations and the organization of the report.

Chapter 2: Review of the Literature

Section I provides an analysis of written sources used by the author for research: military and non-military; newspaper coverage; and documents obtained from 2nd Infantry Division’s files. Section II discusses evidence received through personal interviews. Highlights of information obtained from each interview pertinent to the research are presented.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

Section I explains the research strategy used by the author to answer the primary and subordinate research questions. It discusses the selection of the research strategy. Section II explains the procedures used to conduct the research.

Chapter 4: Army Public Affairs Process

Section 1 explains the requirements for military public affairs organizations and discusses the historical development of the Army public affairs organizations. Section II discusses the Army public affairs
organizational structures at various command levels. Section III explains the primary public affairs functions; command information, public information, and community relations. Section IV provides an analysis of Army public affairs practitioners; their development, training and experience. Section V discusses the military and news media relationship in 1981.

Chapter 5: The Ingman Range Incident

Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion of the Ingman Range incident. It explains the event from the time it occurred through the results of the accused’s trial by court martial.

Chapter 6: Army Public Affairs and the Ingman Range Incident

The chapter discusses the findings from the research. It details the following actions of the involved public affairs organizations:

- defining the public affairs strategies
- responding to news media inquiries
- reacting to unexpected developments
- reporting the trial by court martial
- diffusing racial hostilities

Chapter 7: Conclusions

Chapter 7 contains the author’s conclusions and discussions. The discussion portion for each conclusion and the summary answer the research questions.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Section I: Written Sources

Military Sources

*A Case Study Description of His Duties By a U.S. Army Public Affairs Officer*, by M.V. Sullivan, provides an overview of the Ingman Range incident. Sullivan was assigned as the 2nd Infantry Division Public Affairs Officer for one year starting in mid-June 1981. He describes several public affairs issues confronted during his assignment. Sullivan’s primary involvement with the Ingman Range incident occurred during the time between the incident and the trial by court martial.

"Do We Need PAOs" by Lt. Gen. C.M. Hall discusses Hall’s recommendations based on thirty years of military experience on the desired characteristics of a public affairs officer.

*Record Of Trial number 442125*, available from the Army Court of Military Review in Falls Church, Va., contains the record of trial of Private Lacy Harrington by a General Court Martial convened by the Commander, 2nd Infantry Division. The trial was conducted at Yongsan and Camp Casey, Republic of Korea on Sept. 3, 18, 22; Oct. 26, 29-31; and Nov. 1-4, 1981. In addition to ten volumes of transcript, documentary and photographic exhibits, the trial record contained three video cassettes of the hypnosis of Sgt. Bruce Cardinal and an audio tape of an interview conducted by the trial counsel with Sgt. Cardinal shortly after the shooting occurred. Sgt. Cardinal
stated under this questioning that Specialist Four Archie Bell had shot him on firing point number 7.

Criminal Investigation Division Report of Investigation number 0634-81-CID838-33340-5HIA, prepared by Camp Casey District, Seventh Region, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, is the final investigative report concerning the Ingman Range shootings. The 395-page report was obtained by the author through the Freedom of Information Act from the U.S. Army Crimes Record Center in Baltimore, Md. The purpose of obtaining the document was to determine if racial hatred was a motivation for the killings. The report concluded it was not. (Author's note: Prior to releasing the report, the date of preparation was removed.)

Army Regulation 360-5, Public Information (16 July 1979) and Army Regulation 360-81, Command Information Program Objectives and Policies (1 June 1978) were the Army public affairs rules and regulations regarding public information and command information. These regulations were in effect in June 1981. They have since been superseded. The regulations define Army policies; the responsibilities and delegation of those policies; program objectives; and rules governing procedures.

The Professional Development Guidebook (Sept. 1990), prepared by the Office, Chief of Public Affairs provides an explanation of the training programs available to the Army public affairs officer. It also discusses the philosophies of the professional development programs. The few differences in the program as it existed in June 1981 are addressed in the major text.
The 1990 Worldwide Public Affairs Offices Directory, prepared by the Office, Chief of Public Affairs, provided much of the needed information to locate public affairs participants in the Ingman Range incident.

Military Law: Student Text 27-1, prepared by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Ks., provides an explanation of the legal aspects of military law. The author found it necessary to discuss certain explanations of military legal proceedings to clarify the account of the Ingman Range shootings.

Field Manual No. 46-1: Public Affairs, provides an overview of Army public affairs from the Civil War to the present; public affairs principles, organizations and operations; and information restrictions.

The Public Affairs Handbook is a primary instruction text used in the Public Affairs Officers Course. The date of the manual is January 1983; however, instructors at the course informed the author that the principles discussed in the various articles of the manual had been part of the instruction in 1981. The articles in the handbook used for research are discussed below:

"Introduction To Public Affairs" by C.A. Wood defines public affairs; identifies the need for public affairs; the commander and the public affairs officer's responsibilities; and the purpose of the Public Affairs Handbook.

"Public Information" by W. Boer discusses methods to release information; media relations; media analysis and requirements; do's and don'ts; credibility; and ethics.

"Internal Information" by J.B. Kump discusses internal information programs. He identifies the internal audience and available internal
information tools.

"Community Relations" by J.M. Shelton defines the community relations process and the public affairs officer's responsibilities. He discusses the steps in developing a community relations program.

"Public Affairs Overseas" by E.T. Taylor and J.L. Vance discusses the policies and procedures of public affairs programs unique to military organizations based outside the United States.

"Public Opinion" by Wood defines public opinion. He discusses how public opinion is formed and influenced; motivation; and communication variables.

"Army Organization and Staff" by T.S. Catalano defines the Army staff organizations and the public affairs officer's role as a staff member.

"Public Affairs Activities in Adverse Situations" by Wood provides guidelines to respond to "bad news" situations such as accidents and incidents. Wood includes two case studies of similar incidents and compares the public affairs actions of both.

Public Affairs Officer Course: Program of Instruction for Course 76-46A and Public Affairs Officer Course: Student Guide, prepared by the Defense Information School, provide detailed explanations of subjects taught at the Public Affairs Officer's Course and the requirements necessary for successful completion of each subject.

Fundamentals of Staff Operations provides additional information on Army staffs and staff responsibilities.

Historical Background, not dated, prepared by the Office, Chief of Public Affairs, provides historical information on the development of Army
public affairs organizations.

The Inspector General Brief "When Our Leaders Deal with the Media" provides suggestions by a Washington newspaper columnist on government's dealing with the media. The columnist was quoted by retired Brig. Gen. H.J. Dalton, former director of Air Force Public Affairs.

"The Military and the Media: A Problem of Perception" by D.S. Mahlberg was a research project conducted at the U.S. Army War College in 1974 which surveyed the attitudes of student officers towards the news media.

Non-Military Sources

Pacific Stars and Stripes, prepared by the Pacific Stars and Stripes in Tokyo, provides the history of the newspaper and its organizational procedures.

Principles of Information directed by Secretary of Defense Weinburger discusses the Department of Defense policies on the release of information to the public and assigns the primary responsibility for this to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

"The Professional Orientation of Military Public Affairs Officers" by L.F. Stephens discusses the history of Department of Defense public affairs; compares the military practitioner to civilian public relations personnel; and defines Army public affairs objectives in comparison to public relations. The article discusses the Army public affairs professional development, specifically training and experience.

"Professionalism of Army Public Affairs Personnel" by Stephens is the results of a survey and study conducted by Stephens. The purpose of his
study was to gather information on the Army public affairs practitioner which included professional preparation and experience; work environment and routine; sources of influence; and attitudes and values. The conclusions are highlighted in Section IV of Chapter 4, "The Public Affairs Officer."

Historical information of U.S. military public relations was obtained from Public Relations Principles, Cases, and Problems, by B.R. Canfield.

Case Study Research, by R.K. Yin, provides information to develop the research strategy for this study. In addition to identifying a case study as the preferred method to answer the type of research questions posed by this study, Yin provides guidelines and procedures to conduct a case study.

Communication Research: Issues and Methods by J.A. Anderson and Mass Media Research: An Introduction by R.D. Wimmer and J.R. Dominick provide additional information on the conduct of a case study.

The author used the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association as the style manual for this thesis.

"Outspoken General in Korea Removed," Facts on File, gave an account of the 1977 relief from duty of Lt. Gen. Singlaub as the executive officer of the American forces in Korea. The relief was due to Singlaub's public criticism of President Carter's decision to remove troops from South Korea.

Newspaper Coverage

The newspapers researched for this report and the reasons they were selected are discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 6, all newspaper accounts on the Ingman range incident are identified by headline, the name of the
newspaper, the page in the newspaper the story was placed, and the approximate column length of the article.

An examination of major newspaper coverage revealed the following:

1. Considering the sensational elements of the entire Ingman Range shooting episode; for example, mass murder, possible racial hatred as motivation; the accused determined to be insane; and hypnotically refreshed testimony which conflicted with original testimony, there appears to be very limited coverage in the *Washington Post* and *Baltimore Sun*. There was no coverage of the trial except for Harrington's conviction and sentence.

2. There was no coverage of this incident in *U.S. News and World Report* and *Time* magazines.

These indicators lead to another interesting question: Why was the coverage limited? The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study as research would have to include the inner workings of the news organizations; for example, their "gate keeping" procedures in 1981. However, the research conducted for this study can identify public affairs actions which may have contributed to limited coverage.

An additional question now becomes: What actions, if any, by the public affairs organizations, may have caused limited news coverage of the Ingman Range incident?

**Documents Obtained From 2nd Infantry Division Files**

**Public Affairs Log:** The 2nd Infantry Division Public Affairs Office maintained a comprehensive journal from June 5 to 19, 1981. This document was extremely valuable to the research. Entries identify many of the key public affairs participants. The journal discusses the media inquiries
and the responses. The log shows the vast amount of contact that was maintained among the 2nd Infantry Division, the Eighth U.S. Army and the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs. The journal highlights many of the public affairs issues that surfaced, to include notification of next-of-kin prior to release of information, the disagreements as to the content of news releases, and the concern about racial motivation and perception. This log served as the starting point for many of the interviews conducted by the author.

"Draft: News Release," not dated: The content of the news release draft indicates this was of the first news release after the incident occurred. It stated that four soldiers had been killed and one wounded on a rifle range. Another soldier was taken into custody. None of the victims were identified by name.

"Report: Psychiatric Evaluation with Legal Implications," June 6: The report of the initial medical evaluation of Bell stated he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

"Draft: 2d Release," not dated: Content of the draft release indicates it was of the news release made on June 6. It identifies Specialist Four Archie Bell, III, as the accused.

"Fact Sheet, Ingman Range Shooting," June 7: The fact sheet was a news release which provides details of Bell's alleged acts on the range. It is attached to a letter from Brig. Gen. Charles E. Teeter, the assistant division commander, who distributed a copy of the release to all subordinate unit commanders.
"Message: For MG Kingston From BG Roll," June 9: Message sent to Washington, D.C. informed Kingston that Private Harrington had been arrested for the murder of one of the victims.

"Message: For MG Kingston From BG Roll," June 12: Message sent to Washington D.C., informed Kingston the division's request for another psychiatric evaluation on Bell had been approved.

"Letter: To All 2nd Infantry Division Soldiers From Major General Kingston," June 16: Purpose of this letter was to diffuse rumors of the motivation for the Ingman Range murders.

"Draft News Release," June 18: The draft release states Bell was determined to be insane by an Army sanity board on June 17.

Section II: Interviews

The interviews are listed in the order they were conducted. They are identified by the name of the interviewee, the duty position he or she held in June 1981, unless specified otherwise, and the date the interview was conducted. The interview results are highlighted. Additional details from responses are found in Chapter 4. Author's note: All interviews were conducted in 1991.


Sullivan provided the chronology of the Ingman Range incident and identified many of the participants in the case. He highlighted the public affairs strategy concerning the incident after he became the PAO.

Majors Kirk and Thomas were not participants in the Ingman Range incident. They provided information on public affairs doctrine as presented at the Public Affairs Officer Course. They provided specific information on handling catastrophic events such as murder and racial incidents. They confirmed the principles as written in the Public Affairs Handbook, dated 1983, were the same in 1981.

Maj. Scott Albro, 2nd Infantry Division PAO, Apr. 19.

Albro was the 2ID PAO when the Ingman Range incident occurred. He provided specific information on the public affairs issues surrounding public affairs actions as a result of the shootings. He discussed the handling of news releases; the working relationship with the Eighth U.S. Army [EUSA] PAO; and the interactions between himself, the commanding general, the chief of staff, the staff judge advocate, and the Criminal Investigation Division agents.

Dennis Steele, Pacific Stars and Stripes reporter, May 8.

Steele indicated he did not cover the shooting incident. He did provide information of the working relationship with 2nd Infantry Division.

Weiskoph vaguely remembered the incident. He did not recall being a spokesman for that particular case. He provided information on the inner workings of OCPA and the responsibilities of an action officer.


Page was contacted during the planning of the medical evacuation of Bell to Eisenhower Army Medical Center at Fort Gordon. He provided information which highlighted the racial sensitivity of the issue.

Col. Jeff Cook, OCPA Action Officer, May 17.

Cook did not recall the incident. He provided additional names of people who may have been more involved than he.

Col. Sullivan, May 17 (follow-up).

Sullivan provided additional information on the construction of the news releases. He also discussed the limited media coverage by major U.S. newspapers of the Harrington court martial.

Mrs. Margaret Tackley, OCPA Action Officer, May 22.

Mrs. Tackley was the primary action officer for the Ingman Range incident. She stated she was not aware of the development of the initial news releases originating from Korea. She discussed her normal procedures in handling incidents similar to the Ingman Range shootings.
Staff Sgt. Bob Hubbert, Assistant to the 2nd Infantry Division PAO, May 22.

Hubbert discussed the working relationship with reporters from Pacific Stars and Stripes and the command information actions taken as a result of the incident.


Hyde discussed the working relationship between his office and the 2nd Infantry Division. He provided information on the release of Bell's medical board results to the media.

Milford Prewitt, reporter for the Baltimore Sun, May 28.

Prewitt did not recall the incident. The 2nd Infantry Division public affairs log indicated he called the PAO shortly after Harrington was arrested. Prewitt stated he would have recalled the incident if he had not thought he was getting complete information.

Col. C. Hilton Dunn, 2nd Engineer Battalion commander, May 28 (telephone) and June 8 (audio tape).

Dunn discussed the command involvement in handling the effects of the shootings.


Johnson provided information on aspects of the incident after he
assumed command of the division. He indicated the effects of the incident had almost completely vanished by the time he arrived.


Kingston discussed his guidance to the staff on handling the incident. He also discussed his guidance to Eighth U.S. Army public affairs personnel.

Col. Victor Bullock, Chief of Staff, 2nd Infantry Division, June 4 and July 12.

Bullock discussed the strategies in handling the effects of the incident. He provided information on the duties which members of the division staff performed during the incident.

Maj. Albro, July 13, (follow-up).

Albro verified the decisions made concerning the initial news releases. He discussed the ramifications when Bell was determined to be insane.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Section I: Research Strategy

A case study is the research strategy used to answer the research questions. The research questions presented require an explanatory approach. The preferred research strategies for this approach are case studies, histories and experiments (Yin, 1989, p. 18).

Further distinction among the preferred strategies is necessary to select the best of the three.

Histories are preferred when the researcher has limited evidence from only primary and secondary documents and cultural and physical artifacts (Yin, 1989, p. 19). Evidence for this study is more contemporary as it can contain evidence from documents and current reports from relevant participants in the decision making process.

Experiments are preferred when the researcher can manipulate behavior, either in a laboratory or field environment (Yin, 1989, p. 20). An experiment divorces a phenomenon from its context by controlling the context and focusing on selected variables (Yin, 1989, p. 23). The Ingman Range incident and the actions of the public affairs community are previously established and unchangeable. Control by the researcher of the circumstances which influenced the decision making processes cannot be done. Further, the public affairs process is investigated within its real life context.
The case study strategy has a distinct advantage over other strategies when "a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control." (Yin, 1989, p. 20).

"The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result." (Yin, 1989, p. 23)

The above discussion clearly establishes the case study strategy as the best method to answer the research questions.

Section II: Conduct of the Research

Three major areas of study were necessary to answer the research questions.

In order to establish the circumstances which directed the public affairs process, a complete historical account of the Ingman Range incident from the time the murders occurred in June 1981 through the trial by court martial in November 1981 was required. The historical background was obtained by studying the transcripts of the trial by court martial; the accounts by selected newspapers; and the record of investigation conducted by the Criminal Investigation Division. Col. Sullivan's case study report also contributed to the background information.

The news outlets selected for research and the reasons for the selection are provided below:

1. The Washington Post was selected as the major newspaper due to its
continuous coverage of national government and military affairs.

2. The Baltimore Sun was chosen for two reasons. Col. Sullivan indicated the Sun had shown a strong interest in the case. Further, Pvt. Harrington was from Baltimore.

3. U.S. News and World Report and Time were selected to determine coverage by national news magazines.

4. The Pacific Stars and Stripes was selected as it is the major news outlet for U.S. forces stationed in Southeast Asia and the Pacific areas.

5. The Army Times is a major weekly publication for the U.S. Army worldwide.

The Army public affairs processes had to be studied to provide the means to compare the public affairs actions taken during the Ingman Range incident against the recommended techniques as defined by doctrine, training and regulations. This information was obtained from discussions with instructors of the Public Affairs Officer Course and study of the training material and text provided to the public affairs student. Journal articles were obtained which contributed information on the training and experience levels of public affairs practitioners.

Government and Army regulations pertaining to public affairs and release of information were studied.

A description of the public affairs and Army staff organizations and the history of Army public affairs are included in the study to provide the knowledge necessary to comprehend the public affairs process within an Army division.

The third area of research, and most important to answer the research
questions, was to determine the 2nd Infantry Division public affairs strategy and actions as a result of the Ingman Range murders. To accomplish this, operational files pertaining to the incident were obtained. Interviews of the commanders and staff members of the organization were interviewed. The public affairs participants at 2nd Infantry Division; Eighth U.S. Army; and the Office, Chief of Public Affairs were also interviewed.

For all interviews, an attempt was made to corroborate statements made by verifying the statements with at least one other source. If verification could not be made, it is so stated in the conclusions found in Chapter 7.

The journal of events maintained by the 2nd Infantry Division Public Affairs Office from June 5 to June 18, 1981, provided the basis for the majority of interview questions. News releases, messages and letters provided additional insights in answers to the questions.

The research effort started in January 1991 and was complete by August 1991. The public affairs issues that occurred as a result of the Ingman range murders were analyzed and this study was prepared from August 1991 through October 1991.
CHAPTER 4
ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Section I: The Requirement for and Development of Army Public Affairs

(Author's note: Military publications such as Army regulations, field manuals and some texts have a unique page numbering system. The page number is identified by the chapter followed by a hyphen and the number of the page within the chapter. For example, page 12-3 cites page 3 of the 12th chapter of the publication.)

The mission of the United States military since the cold war is "to deter war, or, if deterrence fails, to reestablish peace through victory in combat whenever U.S. interests are challenged" (FM 25-100, 1988, p. 1-1).

Deterrence is achieved when a potential adversary perceives that its execution of an aggressive act will cause an unacceptable consequence (FM 46-1, 1986, p. 1).

A high state of combat readiness alone will not deter a potential adversary. The perception mentioned above has to be reinforced through communications. For a successful deterrence, the world must know and understand the capability of U.S. weapon's systems, military doctrine and the state of readiness of combat forces. Further, the will of the American people and politicians to resort to war in support of national interests must be clear to all concerned.

The Department of Defense, the State Department and the National Security Council each have organizational responsibility for communicating
to specific publics.

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD(PA)) is responsible for public information activities to the following public(s): the general American public; active duty and reserve component military personnel; the civilian employees of DoD; defense contractors and industry; and Congress, state legislatures, and government agencies (Stephens, 1978, pp. 19-20).

By establishing and maintaining information programs, OASD(PA) seeks public support by creating a "common ground of understanding with the public(s)" (Wood, 1983, p. 1-4).

The public has the right, mandated by the Constitution, to know the workings of their government. The United States follows the principle of the government being accountable to the governed (Wood, 1983, p. 1-4).

The defense establishment belongs to the American people. Taxpayers have invested dollars and the lives of their family members in this enterprise. Their elected representatives in Congress have the sole authority to raise and equip the military forces. These conditions mandate the public be informed on all matters relating to the national defense.

There must be information flow within an organization. At the time of this study, the Department of Defense employed more than 4 million people: 2 million active duty soldiers, 1.6 million reservists and 1.1 million civilians. DoD has long recognized the need to keep all employees informed of the inner workings of the organization. The organization would not survive without the full participation by its members on policies and procedures. Those members of the Department of Defense who wear a
military uniform are more regimented in procedures than their civilian coworkers; however, the Armed Forces still rely heavily on feedback from within. The military makes a conscious effort to maintain effectiveness by keeping all soldiers informed on the inner workings of the organizations to which they belong. As the military is now an all-volunteer force, this communication function has become much more critical than in past periods of mandatory service.

Military public information programs originated in 1777 when it was customary that a report be given to Congress, and indirectly to the public, by the Inspector General of the Army (OCPA Historical Background, not dated, p. 1).

Public information programs were emphasized again in 1858 when Abraham Lincoln said, "With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions."

Understanding the significance of public opinion, Lincoln, after being elected President, appointed a managing editor of a large newspaper as assistant secretary of war to handle the press and reporting to the public on the accomplishments of the Union Army (Stephens, 1978, p. 19).

Newspaper coverage of the military again escalated during the Spanish-American War in 1898. The Army acknowledged its responsibility to report to the public by having staffs provide daily bulletins to the press (Canfield, 1960, p. 355).

Public information was a minor function of the Army in the early 1900s until World War I when Secretary of War Newton D. Baker appointed
Maj. Douglas MacArthur as his press release officer. General Jack Pershing established a press section at the Allied Expeditionary Force headquarters in France. This press section became a permanent authorization to large Army headquarters and was a sub-organization to the military intelligence staff.

In 1935, Gen. MacArthur, by then Army Chief of Staff, appointed Alexander D. Surles to head the Press Relations Branch of the Army (Canfield, 1960, p. 355).

By the close of World War II, three separate informational agencies were on the War Department staff for the dissemination of information to the Army's publics: (1) Legislative and Liaison Division (liaison with the Congress); (2) Public Information Division (dealing with the public); and (3) Troop Information and Education Division (relations with the internal public of the Army). The organizational control of these organizations was centralized under the Office of Public Information (OCPA Historical Background, not dated, p. 2).

In 1950, the Legislative and Liaison Division was separated from the organization (Canfield, 1960, p. 360).

On July 1, 1976, the Office of the Chief of Public Information was redesignated as the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs. Within months, information offices at major commands and most installations were designated as public affairs offices (OCPA Historical Background, not dated, p. 4).

Currently, public affairs organizations are found at each major Army command level down to major installation, division and brigade (Catalano, 1983, p. 11-7).
The primary function performed by these public affairs staffs at each command headquarters is to provide the commander advice and counsel on public aspects of any and all matters within his or her areas of responsibility (Hall, 1981, p. 6).

Section II: Public Affairs Missions

Within the Department of Defense [DoD], public affairs includes the following functions (Wood, 1983, p. 2-3):

- Evaluating public opinion toward DoD and the Armed Forces.
- Evaluating the effectiveness of policies and actions of DoD and Armed Forces on issues involving public opinion.
- Making recommendations to DoD officials and officers in command concerning policies and actions which have an effect on public opinion.
- Conducting programs of information designed to keep all publics informed.

The Army's public affairs programs explain the Army's mission, organization and role in order to foster public support and maintain informed, motivated soldiers who are prepared for war. These programs fulfill the responsibility of the Army to keep the public informed on how it meets the requirement for national defense (Catalano, 1983, p. 11-3).

The external programs directed primarily to the American public are termed public information and community relations. The internal programs directed primarily to the service members and civilian employees
are called internal or command information. A brief description of each follows:

1. Command information - Communication between a commander and his/her military "family" with the intention of increasing productivity and mission accomplishment (Kump, 1983, p. 17-3).

2. Public information - The acquisition and dissemination of information and other materials directed toward the U.S. and other nations' publics via the civilian press, radio and other media of mass communication (Boer, 1983, p. 16-3).

3. Community relations - Ongoing relationship between a military community and a civilian community. Simply stated, it is public relations at the local level and having and keeping friends in the community (Shelton, 1983, p. 18-3).

These functions often overlap in practice; however, for simplicity and purposes of providing a background on how these functions are supposed to work, they are discussed separately. The discussion includes:

- definition
- task
- doctrine as formulated and presented primarily by the Department of Defense Information School
- operating rules and restrictions imposed by DoD and Army regulations
- aspects which apply at overseas locations.

The community relations function was not a critical part of the public affairs process reacting to the incident at Ingman Range, South Korea.
the incident occurred at an Army installation in the United States, community relations would have been of prime concern. This study focuses on the command information and public information issues that were facing the public affairs community. For that reason, community relations will be addressed only briefly with more in-depth discussion of public information and command information.

**Community Relations**

The U.S. military concept of community relations is driven by the notion that "the roots of public attitudes and opinions are found in the local community" (Shelton, 1983, p. 18-3).

Community relations is public relations at the community level between a military installation and its surrounding area. The geographical area is defined by the economic or social impact of the installation. It varies in size, but is usually within a 50-mile radius (Shelton, 1983, p. 18-3).

The military public affairs staff assists the installation commander in communicating with the local community (Shelton, 1983, p. 18-3).

The objectives are to integrate the military into the life of the community and inform the community of the role, missions and activities of the installation (Shelton, 1983, p. 18-4).

To accomplish these objectives, public affairs organizations use a variety of communication channels.

The most influential channel is participation by military members in community, church, athletic and social activities off the military installation within the civilian community. The opinions of the service held by the local population will be greatly influenced by these interactions.
A civilian advisory board is a group of key civilian leaders of the community and key military leaders of the installation. This group holds regular meetings and is another excellent channel of communication.

Most military public affairs offices operate a speaker's bureau. The speaker's bureau provides individuals employed by the Department of Defense to present speeches and presentations to local civic groups. These speeches may or may not be military related; however, the speaker will be identified as a member of the military establishment. This is another excellent way to get military exposure to the community (Shelton, 1983, p. 18-4).

Tours, exhibits, bands, color guards, open houses and planned programs such as Fort Riley Day at a Kansas State football game are just a few examples of techniques used by the installation and the community to foster public understanding, support and cooperation.

Community relations procedures at a U.S. military base in a foreign country are similar to those in the states. The most productive programs also involve face-to-face participation between service members and the local population. Additional opportunities exist with joint clean-up ventures, blood donor drives, and assistance in teaching English to the indigenous population.

Within the Army division and higher staffs, the commander can assign the responsibility for community relations to the Office of Civil Affairs. There is normally coordination between the civil affairs officer and the public affairs officers as both are trained in community relations.
Coordination outside the U.S. is particularly important between the military public affairs organization and the embassy public affairs staff. The embassy personnel normally have a better assessment of the cultural and political impacts of any planned community relations programs (Taylor & Vance, 1983, p. 26-7).

There is normally a local employee assigned to an overseas public affairs office. This person will act as a community relations advisor and also frequently will perform host-country media liaison functions (Taylor & Vance, 1983, p. 26-8).

**Command Information**

Command information is "communication between a commander and his/her military 'family' with the intention of increasing productivity and mission accomplishment." (Kump, 1983, p. 17-3). It is a command responsibility; a leadership and management tool (AR 360-81, 1976, p. 1-1). The communication process involves the acquisition, analysis, production and dissemination of information to the specific audience (FM 46-1, 1986, p. 13) which is composed of active duty members, reserves and national guard members, civilian employees, dependents, cadets (ROTC and academy), and other associated groups, such as those retired from active service.

The primary purpose of command information is to "motivate soldiers by helping them to understand the Army, their organization, the country in which they are assigned and their role in the scheme of things." (FM 46-1, 1976, p. 13).

It further reinforces in each member a sense of responsibility as a U.S. citizen and member of the Army, personal dedication to country and
dedication to duty. The program increases the member’s understanding of the principles of American democracy, national policies, external threats, and the role of the Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve (AR 360-81, 1976, p. 1-1).

At the national level, the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs [OASD-PA] executes the responsibility for command information through the Armed Forces Information Service [AFIS]. AFIS provides a variety of information pertaining to the total military interest which is disseminated throughout the Armed Forces through various media. (Kump, 1983, pp. 17-8 and 17-9).

The Department of the Army agency for public affairs is the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs [OCPA]. OCPA is responsible for:

- developing and coordinating policies and guidance
- implementing DoD command information directives and instructions
- procuring support materials for Army-wide use
- evaluating the overall effectiveness of command information programs (AR 360-81, 1976, p. 1-1).

At all Army headquarters below OCPA, each commander is responsible for his or her unit’s command information program. The public affairs staff assigned to the headquarters serves as the interpreter between the commander and the audience (Kump, 1983, p. 17-4).

The various communications channels used by the public affairs staff are fact sheets, base guides, flyers, pamphlets, display posters, radio, television and video-taped recordings.
The most important and best known is the unit or base newspaper. This publication contains limited commercial news, concentrating more on providing localized information on unit or base activities. The newspaper is a government publication; hence, it is more regulated than a privately owned and operated newspaper. There are various restrictions on editorial and political coverage (AR 360-81, 1976, pp. (2-0)-(2-8)).

The commander also relies heavily on his operational chain of command; i.e., direct communication from commander to subsequent commanders, to communicate to soldiers. This is normally done orally. In some circumstances, the public affairs office will assist the commander in providing written or videotaped information to insure clarity and uniform understanding across the command.

At overseas locations, command information is augmented by the Armed Forces Radio and Television Network and the Stars and Stripes newspaper (FM 46-1, 1986, p. 16).

Public Information

Public information is acquiring and disseminating information and other material directed toward the U.S. and other nations' publics via the civilian press, radio and other media of mass communication (Boer, 1983, p. 16-3 and FM 46-1, 1986, p. 16).

The primary task of Army public affairs professional development programs is to develop credible Army spokespersons. Credibility is achieved by public affairs officers having first-hand experience with the Army in the field (Professional Development, 1990, p. 2)
The Department of Defense Principles of Information as directed by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinburger which applied in 1981 were as follows:

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and members representing the press, radio and television may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy.

Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.

Information will only be classified or otherwise withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

The Department's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs.
"The Chief of Public Affairs has Army staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to DA public affairs plans and programs supporting public information" (AR 360-5, 1979, p. 2-0).

Commanders are responsible for the public information program within their respective commands and assigned public affairs area of responsibility (AR 360-5, 1979, p. 2-0).

The mission of the public affairs staff assigned to the commander is to perform as a communication liaison. The staff interprets the commander and the organization to the public and vice versa (Boer, 1983, p. 16-3). This applies whether dissemination of information to the public is on Army initiative or in response to an external request. The information is provided through written news releases, still pictures, motion picture films, question and answer interviews, speeches, audio or video taped recordings, articles for publication in printed media or for broadcast via radio or television, and oral responses to media queries" (AR 360-5, 1979, p. 1-1).

At the division level, the public affairs policy should limit all news spokesmen to the commander or the public affairs officer. If queried by the media, all others within the command should refer queries to the commander or the PAO (Boer, 1983, p. 16-5).

The over-riding policy on release of information to the public, routine or otherwise, is "maximum disclosure with minimum delay within constraints of security, accuracy, propriety and policy" (Boer, 1983, p. 16-3).

This policy is reinforced in the Public Affairs Officer's Course conducted by the Department of Defense Information School (Interview, Kirk, 1991).
The public affairs officer should have the commander's authority to release information of a routine nature. Information is generally releasable if it satisfies each of the following criteria:

- information is unclassified
- it is accurate
- there are no possible violations of personal privacy
- the echelon of command to which the public affairs officer is assigned is authorized to release the information (Boer, 1983, p. 16-3)
- the information is not specifically exempted by public law (5 USC 552), the Freedom of Information Act (AR 360-5, 1979, p. 1-1).

The Army requires that "unfavorable news will be released with the same care and speed as favorable news" (AR 360-5, 1979, p. 1-2).

H.J. Dalton, Jr., former director of Air Force Public Affairs, quoted columnist William Raspberry's suggestions to military leaders in dealing with the media:

When bad news is inevitable, tell it yourself - all of it, at once - and get it over with. Let the information dribble out in bits and pieces, and each dribble becomes a fresh news story... On that same point, you don't help yourself ... not to talk to us. It only turns routine news gathering into a challenge. Learn to think of the press the way you think of foul weather. It can make you uncomfortable; it seldom does what you expect; you can't control it... (Dalton, 1980, p. 2).

The PAO's responses to media reporters are generally on the record. The PAO should avoid discussing Department of Defense policy (Boer, 1983, p. 16-5) or any "matters which are the responsibility of any other
governmental agency (for example, foreign policy is a responsibility of the Department of State)” (AR 360-5, 1979, p. 1-2).

Additional guidelines to public affairs officers are:

• Tell the truth. Lt. Gen. Charles Hall wrote that a professional public affairs officer's response to a sensitive, tough situation should be "Tell the truth, tell it simply, straightforwardly and as quickly as possible" (Hall, 1981, p. 6).

• If you cannot comment, say why.

• If you do not know the answer to a question, say so, and find out the answer.

• Get the facts right and out.

• Do not lie.

• Do not speculate.

• Do not be partial to individual media representatives.

• Do not request story slants, withholding, or favors (Boer, 1983, p.16-14).

At overseas installations and units, the public information process changes drastically.

The designated spokesman for other than routine matters may be determined by the American embassy; for example, the senior member of the Internal Communication Agency (Taylor & Vance, 1983, p. 26-6). Public affairs officers should seek guidance from the embassy on release of information. They should be aware of any editorial positions of the foreign news media. There should be no favoritism shown to American journalists over foreign media organizations (Taylor & Vance, 1983, pp. 26-6 and 26-7).
Crime in the military is "bad news." The public affairs officer has certain objectives when bad news occurs:

- Retain public confidence in the command, in the service or in Department of Defense by providing proper and full information and emphasize that corrective steps, if necessary, are being taken.
- Preserve good media relations by treating media representatives honestly and fairly. Frankness and honesty are respected and usually result in sympathetic and unbiased reporting of bad news situations.
- Protect and promote the welfare of military personnel and their families' of victims right to privacy (Wood, 1983, p. 25-5).

The commander has three responsibilities in order for the public affairs officer to meet those objectives. He or she must safeguard all classified information; direct the release of all pertinent information; and allow media representatives access to the unit if compatible with security, safety and operations in progress (Wood, 1983, p. 25-5).

Public affairs officers should notify higher public affairs channels as bad news often results in regional or national news coverage. Further, higher public affairs offices, once informed, are better qualified to provide advice and assistance (Wood, 1983, p. 25-6).

Bad news cannot be suppressed. "As a minimum, the public affairs officer must research, respond, and react accordingly: get the facts, get them right, get them to higher headquarters, and get them out" (Wood, 1983, p. 25-9).

Criminal acts such as mass murder do not occur as often in the Army as in the civilian sector. This is primarily due to more control over the
individual soldier by authority figures and a stricter application of discipline. Media relations in such a situation place the military public affairs officer at a disadvantage he or she normally does not experience when a reporter is covering a routine military operation. A reporter is usually more experienced at covering judicial procedures in the event of criminal activity; hence, the reporter is more adept in criminal situations than the normal military public affairs officer (Interview, Kirk, 1991).

It is critical for the public affairs officer to be thoroughly familiar with the type of information that is or is not releasable to avoid prejudicing an investigation or any planned legal action.

The public affairs officer gets this familiarity through close contact with the division staff judge advocate and the provost marshal. Continuous coordination with these staff groups is paramount during a criminal investigation and/or trial (Interview, Kirk, 1991).

Section III: Public Affairs Organizations

Within Department of the Army, public affairs organization begins with the Office, Chief of Public Affairs [OCPA], based in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. OCPA has four divisions: Policy and Plans Division, Media Relations Division, Community Relations Division and Command Information Division.

Public affairs organizations are found at each major Army command headquarters to the division and installation levels (FM 46-1, 1986, p. 19).

The major Army command in South Korea is the Eighth United States Army [EUSA], based in Seoul, South Korea. EUSA has a public affairs office
headed by a U.S. Army colonel.

The 2nd Infantry Division is one of several organizations under operational control of EUSA.

The 2nd Infantry public affairs office in 1981 consisted of 18 personnel, a typical size public affairs office for a division. It was composed of the following positions (The rank of the person holding the position and brief duty description is included where necessary).

- Public Affairs Officer [PAO] (Captain)
- Deputy Public Affairs Officer (1st Lieutenant)
- Museum Technician (Captain) - Served as the curator of the 2nd Infantry Division Museum.
- Museum Aide (Corporal)
- Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (Master Sergeant) - Managed clerical and administrative matters. Supervised accountability for and maintenance of the assigned equipment and facilities.
- Editor (Staff sergeant) - Responsible for the news-editorial, graphic design, composition and layout of the division's 16-page, biweekly newspaper Indianhead.
- Korean Press Liaison Technician (Korean civilian) - Responsible for relations with the Korean press, electronic and print.
- Three U.S. Army Staff Photojournalists (Private First Class) - Responsible for photo and copy of division and civilian community activities.
- Four KATUSA Staff Photojournalists (Korean soldiers) - Responsible for editing, layout and composition of the four-page Korean language
section of the Indianhead.

- Photographic Laboratory Technician (Private First Class) - Processed photographs taken by assigned photojournalists.
- Clerk/Typist (Corporal)
- Two Drivers (Privates First Class) - Operated and maintained the vehicles assigned to the public affairs office (Sullivan, 1983, pp. 5-6).

The 2nd Infantry Division, like any Army division, is commanded by a major general. The commanding general has two assistant division commanders of the rank of brigadier general. One is responsible for maneuver and operations; one is responsible for logistics and maintenance.

A chief of staff, normally a colonel, "directs, supervises, and ensures coordination of the works of the staff, except in those specific areas reserved for the commander, thereby freeing the commander from routine details" (Fundamentals of, 1987, p. 23). The commanding general normally delegates command authority for the staffs to the chief of staff (Fundamentals of, 1987, p. 20).

There are three types of staff in a division. The personal staff work under the division commander's direct control instead of through the chief of staff. It normally includes the Command Sergeant Major, Inspector General, Staff Judge Advocate and the Chaplain.

The coordinating staff group are the principal staff assistants to the commander. Each member is responsible for a certain part of the division's operation. Examples are personnel, military intelligence, operations, logistics, and civil-military operations staffs. All are directly responsible to the chief of staff (Fundamentals of, 1987, pp. 20 and 24-25).
The public affairs office is part of the special staff group. Special staffs assist the commander in professional, technical and other functional areas. Other special staffs include the adjutant general, engineer, provost marshall and surgeon. Special staffs also report directly to the chief of staff (Fundamentals of 1987, pp. 26-29).

The PAO operates under two channels of communication. Public affairs matters normally flow through the operational chain of command, the official link between a headquarters, its staff and subordinate units. This channel is primarily used for transmission of orders and directives. The PAO also has the staff channel which is the staff-to-staff link between headquarters used for coordination and transmission of information.

To illustrate, orders and instructions for the 2nd Infantry Division commander come from the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army. These orders are passed to subordinate command headquarters and to the chief of staff, who assigns them to the responsible staffs. Public affairs information and guidance originate at the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs and are transmitted through the Public Affairs Office, Eighth U.S. Army to the Public Affairs Office, 2nd Infantry Division.

The 2nd Infantry Division public affairs officer works for and is responsible to the 2nd Infantry Division commander.

Coordination between channels at each level is critical. Headquarters within the chain can be bypassed, but the "headquarters bypassed as a result of a direct communication will be informed as soon as possible by the person that began the direct communication." (AR 360-5, 1979, p. 1-3).
Section IV: The Public Affairs Officer

Each Army officer is commissioned in a basic, or duty branch of service. These include infantry, armor, field artillery, intelligence, medical service, quartermaster, ordnance, air defense artillery, signal, military police and chaplain.

Public affairs is a secondary speciality, or functional area. Other functional areas include logistics, operations and planning, contracting and procurement. Officers are assigned to a functional area in their fifth year of service (Professional Development, 1990, p. 2).

The officer will serve solely in his duty branch for the first five years of his or her military career, thereby gaining the experience of the field Army. He or she will then rotate assignments between the duty branch and functional area, spending the remainder of his or her career performing in both.

The policy of the Chief of Public Affairs does not allow officers to work solely, or single-track, in public affairs before promotion to lieutenant colonel which occurs normally after 15-20 years of service (Professional Development, 1990, p. 3).

A division public affairs officer is normally either a senior captain or major. The critical skills for an officer in this position are defined by the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs [OCPA]:

- Be a spokesperson.
- Obtain feedback at all levels and determine effectiveness of PA efforts on all audiences.
- Provide feedback to the commander of his public affairs efforts.
Set the record straight.
Assess public affairs issues for the commander and staff.
Integrate organizational goals into the public affairs effort.
Develop public affairs strategy and plans.
Publish an effective newspaper.
Assess public affairs impact of news media issues.
Identify emerging issues and develop public affairs plans for issues management.
Track impact of editorial issues/ideas/attitudes affecting unit and follow-up. (Professional Development, 1990, pp. 11 and 13)

Lt. Gen. Charles Hall, former commander of the Sixth U.S Army, further expanded the duties and the necessary characteristics of a military public affairs officer based on his 34 years experience as an officer. His list is provided to Army public affairs students and is reprinted here.

(1) The public affairs officer must be the institution's 'devil's advocate.' Once you have mastered the so-called PA skills, public affairs sorely needs people with the know-how and, if necessary, the guts not to complain but to advise what needs to be done when something of a public affairs nature will impact on the organization, and to tell the boss what he is doing is wrong, and why.

(2) The PAO, by virtue of his professional responsibility, must have access to the boss no matter where the PAO stands in the organization chart.

(3) The PAO must be a conduit allowing a two-way flow of information. Commanders learn to trust the PAO and should go to
him directly for public affairs advice. The PA professional should make it a point to pass public and press attitudes to the boss and earn that trust.

(4) The PAO must be honest on the home front and with the media and public.

(5) The PAO must be active and goal oriented. The objective is to make progress and to get information out in a full and factual way.

(6) The PAO should not surprise the boss. If you know something's going to blow, tell the commander well in advance, not when the shock wave is about to hit full force.

(7) Finally, the PAO will not be successful at making a bad program, product or organization look good. Nor should he be given that task (Hall, 1981, p. 7).

The educational requirements and opportunities for the Army public affairs officer are many and varied.

The basic qualifying course, the only mandatory course for all public affairs officers, is the Public Affairs Officers Course. The course (8 weeks long in 1981; has since expanded to 9-1/2 weeks) covers DoD policies and procedures, mass communications resources, principles of management in the areas of command information, community relations and public information, and basic news writing and photojournalism skills. Officers receive very little instruction in mass communication in society, media law, communication theory and research methods.

OCPA sponsors the Army Public Affairs Advanced Course, currently a ten-week course taught at the College of Journalism and Mass
Communications at the University of South Carolina. (In 1981, this course was eight weeks in duration and was taught at the University of Wisconsin.) This course concentrates on management of Army public affairs programs with emphasis on qualitative research methodology, data evaluation, strategic planning for public affairs policy and communication theory (Professional Development, 1990, p. 26).

Officers can apply for attendance at a reputable graduate school to earn a Master's Degree in a public affairs related discipline. If approved, the officer will attend graduate school with few or no military duties.

Another program conducted twice yearly is a professional development workshop. The week-long Senior Public Affairs Officers Course is a continuous professional development seminar for experienced military public affairs personnel (Professional Development, 1990, p. 21).

Dr. Loundes Stephens conducted a study of Army public affairs officers and practitioners in 1979 (Stephens, 1981, pp. 43-56). His study focused on "professional preparation and experience, work environment and routine, sources of influence, and attitudes and values." (Stephens, 1981, p. 44).

Survey questionnaires were mailed to 472 Army public affairs personnel. The return rate was 25 percent. Forty-seven percent of the respondents were Army civilian employees, 42 percent were active-duty Army officers, and 11 percent Reserve Component officers.

Stephens offered the following conclusions, presented by categories of the study's focus:

**Professionalism:** The average Army public affairs officer has an undergraduate degree in journalism or related field and is a graduate of the
basic public affairs officer course. The officer has two years of civilian or military public affairs experience.

Of the total respondents, none were members of the Public Relations Society of America; two had earned doctorate degrees. The civilian employees have a significantly higher degree of professional experience than their military counterparts. As stated earlier, the officer must balance a military career between his basic duty branch and public affairs (Stephens, 1981, p. 48)

**Work Environment:** Twenty-seven percent work primarily in public information, 16 percent in command information, and 5 percent in community relations. Twenty-one percent spend equal time in public information and command information and 16 percent spend equal time in public information and community relations.

Seventy percent stated they have as much influence as other staff members on the commander's decisions and 65 percent say that supervisors often accept the advice given by the public affairs officer (Stephens, 1981, p. 48).

**Sources of Influence:** The majority thought newspapers were more important than any other media for news and commentary on Army problems. Television is second to newspapers as a source of national and international news, but is third behind newspapers and specialized media as a source of information about problems facing the Army. Most preferred ABC nightly news as a source of reliable military news (36 percent) followed by NBC (28 percent), CBS (21 percent) and PBS (15 percent) (Stephens, 1981, p. 50).
Attitudes and Values: The most important ability for a public affairs officer is speedy analysis and interpretation of complex problems. Next in importance is reporting news which interest the audience, and third is investigating claims and statements made by the Army. Most are reluctant to discuss Army policy while it is being formulated.

Section V: Military-Media Relations in 1981

The military's attitude towards the news media in 1981 had its origins in the Vietnam War. Many senior military officers accused the news media of biased, negative reporting which resulted in the decline of public support for the war.

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of State, wrote in 1972:

The forces of division in America have received powerful support from the publicity provided by the information media. It is the support of media which has made possible the campaign of defamation which is now directed at virtually every institution of government and society...The Armed Forces...have been depicted as brutal, venal and oppressive. Such propaganda...has created an atmosphere of suspicion and cynicism destructive to national unity and morale (Wahlberg, 1974, p. 45).

In 1974, Lt. Col. Donald Mahlberg conducted a study of media perceptions held by military officers at the U.S. Army War College. He found the officers were highly critical of the press and its representatives
and either hostile toward or unappreciative of the constitutional role of the media (Mahlberg, 1974, p. 3)

On May 21, 1977, Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, chief of staff for American Forces in South Korea, was relieved of his position by President Carter. A *Washington Post* article published on May 19 quoted Singlaub strongly criticizing Carter’s plan to withdraw troops from South Korea.

Singlaub testified at a hearing before a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee on May 27, 1977. He stated that he assumed the reporter’s interview was for background information. He claimed to have been “mouse-trapped” by the reporter (*Facts on File*, 1977, pp. 403-404).

The severe implications of a general officer relieved of duties by the commander-in-chief would affect attitudes of members of the U.S. Army in Korea for years to follow.

Dennis Steele, a reporter with the *Pacific Stars and Stripes* from 1979 - 1981, commented on the military-media relations with units in South Korea during his tenure. He assessed the Army public affairs procedures as a “closed system.” The public affairs officers did not say any more than they had to. They did not cooperate any more than they had to. Cooperation was sometimes less than it should have been, he said. “We (the media) were considered antagonists, no matter what was going on” (*Interview*, Steele, May 8).

Lloyd Norman wrote in 1980 after attending many war college seminars that he observed a growing resentment among the students toward the free press and sensed an unspoken desire among students for the press to be censored or muzzled (Norman, 1980, p. 14).

53
The antagonistic rift between the military and the media became quite apparent on Oct. 25, 1983. The U.S. armed forces invaded the island of Grenada and denied the media access to the operation for 48 hours. The press created such a furor that the military decided to revise its policies toward media news coverage of future conflicts.
CHAPTER 5

THE INGMAN RANGE INCIDENT

This chapter provides an account of the Ingman Range shooting incident. This account is derived primarily from the transcripts of the trial by general court martial of Private First Class [PFC] Lacy Harrington.

Headquarters Company, 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division conducted an M-16 qualification exercise on June 5, 1981. The live-fire exercise took place at Ingman Range located 1/2 mile east of Camp Casey, South Korea (Camp Casey was the home base of the engineer battalion). Approximately forty soldiers participated in the exercise.

Ingman Range has an unusual layout for a rifle range. (Figure 5-1 is a diagram of Ingman Range.)

The control tower is located at the bottom of a ravine. To the front of the control tower, aligned side by side, are firing points 2, 3, 4 and 5. Firing point 1 is located on the side of the left hill forming the ravine. Firing points 6, 7 and 8 are located at various locations up the side of the right hill (Figure 5-2). Due to the higher elevations and terrain masking, firing points 1, 6, 7 and 8 cannot be observed from the control tower. During a live-fire exercise, three soldiers are present at each firing point; one who is firing the course from a foxhole and one who is recording the shooter’s score. Each firing point has a non-commissioned officer [NCO] present to insure safety rules are followed because of the limited visibility on the range from the control tower. He wears a white helmet for identification. At approximately 11:15 a.m., the first group of American soldiers began firing the exercise. Shortly after the shooting started, the controllers in the
FIGURE 5-1
Sketch of the Ingman Range.
Firing points are numbered from 1 - 8.
FIGURE 5-2

View of Ingman Range from the base of the range.
View shows firing points 5 - 8.
tower observed a white helmet rolling down the hill between firing points 6 and 7. The Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge [NCOIC] of the exercise called an immediate cease-fire on the range through a loud-speaker system.

The Safety NCO on firing point 6, Sergeant Bruce F. Cardinal, ran up the stairs to firing point 7 to investigate the problem. Upon reaching point 7, he was apparently shot and fell back down the hill. As he was receiving first aid from other soldiers, two black soldiers were seen walking down the stairs from firing point 7. Both appeared excited and when asked what happened, Specialist 4 Archie Bell indicated that there was a crazy man up there shooting people. He then fainted and was carried to a shady area near to the control tower. PFC Lacy Harrington, the other black soldier and roommate of Bell, went to the bleachers where the rest of the company soldiers were assembled.

The military police and agents of the Criminal Investigation Division [CID] arrived. The CID agents proceeded cautiously up the hill to firing point 7 and 8. They found 4 dead soldiers, 1 Hispanic and 3 white. All had been shot.

Bell, the soldier who had earlier fainted, revived and became hysterical. He started shouting in Arabic and English: "Alshalam me laycum (phonetic)... They are the devils. I did it... I've found out about the revolution... Study Islam, then you'll understand. I took the first step. The rest is up to you. I'm not crazy, believe me" (CID Report, not dated, p. 34).

Harrington later told the CID investigators that while he was firing at targets from the foxhole on firing point 7, Bell came part way down the stairs from point 8 and shot both the scorer and safety NCO on point 7. Bell
then threatened to shoot Harrington unless he remained quiet and went
down the stairs to the base of the range.

Bell was subsequently arrested for the murder of four soldiers and the
attempted murder of one soldier.

A psychiatric evaluation to determine the mental status of Bell was
conducted that evening. The medical board, consisting of three physicians,
concurred that as a result of mental disease or defect Bell lacked substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law (Gushwa, 1981, p. 6).

The wounded soldier, Sgt. Cardinal, was questioned by CID agents at
the hospital. He identified Bell as the soldier who shot him.

CID agents conducted a search of Bell and Harrington's room in the
barracks. They obtained a hard-bound book titled Our Saviour Has Arrived
by Elijah Muhammed, three photographs of Malcolm X, and an audio tape
of speeches by Malcolm X. Harrington informed the agents that all the
property belonged to Bell (CID Report, not dated, p. 31).

The 2nd Infantry Division command group and selected staff
members met on the evening of June 5 to discuss current information and
plan further actions in response to the incident. Present at the meeting were
the commanding general, Maj. Gen. Robert Kingston; the chief of staff, Col.
Victor Bullock; a CID representative; the provost marshall; the division
operations officer; the staff judge advocate; and the public affairs officer,
Capt. Scott Albro. One item of discussion was the content of the initial news
release (Interview, Albro, Apr. 19). From June 5, the staff met regularly on
an almost daily basis to discuss the Ingman range developments.
The public affairs office went to an around-the-clock schedule. Contact was initially made with the Eighth U.S. Army [EUSA] Public Affairs Office and the Office, Chief of Public Affairs [OCPA]. Daily telephone transmissions were made between these offices from June 5 to June 19 (Public Affairs Log, 1981).

On the night of June 5, media inquiries were received from the Korea Herald, the Associated Press, Mutual News Radio, ABC Radio, Cable News Network and the Army Times. The story was carried the next day in the Washington Post and Baltimore Sun.

Approximately two days after the incident, Maj. Gen. Kingston was called to the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Kingston was being considered for promotion to lieutenant general and assignment as commander of the Department of Defense Rapid Deployment Force. The division was commanded during Kingston's absence by Brig. Gen. Roll, the assistant division commander for maneuver.

On June 9, because of inconsistencies in Harrington's account of what happened on firing point 7 when compared to the ballistic evidence from one of the victim's body, CID agents requested Harrington's presence at their office. He was administered a polygraph test and was re-questioned. After four hours of interrogation, Harrington admitted that Bell had forced him to shoot the Safety NCO on firing point 7. He signed a statement to that effect. Harrington was arrested and charged with murder. Having previously indicated he did not require a lawyer during questioning, he was then assigned a military attorney.
On June 16, Maj. Gen. Kingston, having returned from Washington, D.C., wrote a letter to all soldiers in the 2nd Infantry Division (letter is found in Chapter 6). The purpose of the letter was to defuse rumors of racial hatred as motivation for the killings.

Due to written threats on Bell’s life received by the hospital, plans were made on or around June 18 to medically evacuate Bell to Eisenhower Medical Center, Fort Gordon, Ga. (Author’s note: The evacuation did not occur. Bell remained at the 201st Army Hospital.)

On or around the third week in July, Maj. Michael V. Sullivan arrived at the 2nd Infantry Division and assumed the duties as the public affairs officer (Interview, Sullivan, Feb. 23, 1991).

From June 23 to 27, an Article 32 investigation was conducted to investigate the charge of premeditated murder by Harrington. Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires a formal investigation before a case may be referred to trial by a general court martial, unless waived by the accused. "The purpose of the investigation is for the investigating officer (1) to make a thorough and impartial investigation into the truth of the charges; and (2) to make recommendations as to the disposition of the charges in the interest of justice and discipline" (Military Law, 1988, p. 1-29).

The CID agent in charge of the investigation testified at the hearing that the ballistic evidence from one of the victims indicated that he was shot from close range with the bullet traveling in an upward trajectory. The evidence conflicted with Harrington's original statement that Bell had shot the soldier from the stairs between firing points 7 and 8. For this reason, Harrington was re-interviewed on June 9 and admitted he (Harrington) had
been forced by Bell to shoot the soldier from the foxhole he occupied on firing point 7.

Three other witnesses present at the range on June 5 also testified. It should be pointed out that no one alive except Bell and Harrington actually saw the murders take place. Witnesses at the range could provide accurate information and clear identification only on what happened before and after the shootings.

The head of the Psychiatric Department at the 121st Army Hospital testified that Harrington was not suffering from mental disease or disorder then or at the time of the shootings.

A statement was made by the defense counsel on behalf of Harrington which said the admission made to the CID agents on June 9 was not of his own free will. According to the defense counsel, Harrington had been coerced into signing the written transcript of his statement.

The Article 32 investigating officer recommended the charge be referred to trial by a general court martial.

Bell was questioned by CID agents in his hospital room on June 25. Present during the questioning were his defense attorney and the trial counsel. Bell stated he shot the scorer and safety NCO on firing point 8; then traveled down to firing point 7 and shot the scorer and safety NCO there. He told Harrington to get out of the foxhole or he (Bell) would blow his head off. Bell remembered seeing Cardinal, but did not remember shooting him (CID Report, not dated, p. 78).

Cardinal, the wounded sergeant, was medically evacuated to Tripler Army Medical Center, Honolulu, Hawaii for further treatment and
rehabilitation. While there, he began to have doubts as to who actually shot him. On July 17, Cardinal was placed under hypnosis by Dr. John D. Shoberg, an Army psychiatrist. Participating in the session were Shoberg, Cardinal and an agent from CID. When questioned about his assailant while under hypnosis, Cardinal stated that Harrington, not Bell, had shot him. After the session, he again stated that Harrington had shot him from the foxhole on firing point 7.

As a result of this new evidence, another Article 32 investigation was conducted for the charge of attempted murder by Harrington.

Cardinal testified at the investigation on Aug. 21 that Harrington had shot him. The defense counsel requested to view the video tape of the hypnotic session conducted on July 17. The investigation reconvened on Aug. 24. Cardinal testified again that Harrington shot him. He (Cardinal) did not remember seeing Bell during the episode.

The defense counsel's argument was based primarily on Cardinal's original statements that he was certain Bell had shot him. This hypnotically refreshed testimony was highly controversial and questionable.

Harrington testified at the investigation that Bell shot Cardinal. Bell had told him (Harrington) to shut up or he (Bell) would shoot him, too.

The investigating officer recommended the additional charge be referred to trial by general court martial. His report stated: "The testimony of Sergeant Cardinal establishes the elements of proof to determine that PFC Harrington shot him." ("Investigating Officer's Report," 26 August 1981, p. 4; found in Record of Trial).
The general court martial convened on Sept. 3, 1981. Present were the trial judge, both counsels and the accused. Harrington requested a civilian lawyer from Baltimore to represent him and asked for a 30-day delay for the trial. The request was granted and the trial date was set for Oct. 5.

The lawyer from Baltimore made a written request which was received by the court on Sept. 18. He asked that the trial be postponed until the end of October. This request was granted and the trial was rescheduled for Oct. 26.

On Oct. 26, the court was informed the lawyer from Baltimore had withdrawn from the case. Harrington was satisfied to continue the trial with his detailed military lawyer. The court martial was scheduled to start on Oct. 28. Harrington was arraigned for the following charges:

Charge I: Violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 118.

Specification: In that Private E2 Lacy M. Harrington, US Army, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Engineer Battalion, 2d Infantry Division did, at Ingman Firing range, Camp Casey, Korea, on or about 5 June 1981, with premeditation, murder Sergeant E5 (name withheld), US Army, by means of shooting him with a rifle; said offense occurring outside the territorial limits of the United States, on an installation under the exclusive control of the United States Army and not being cognizable in a United States civilian court.

Charge II: Violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 80.

Specification: In that Private E2 Lacy M. Harrington, U.S. Army, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Engineer Battalion, 2d
Infantry Division did, at Ingman Firing Range, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea, on or about 5 June 1981, attempt to murder Sergeant E5 Bruce F. Cardinal, U.S. Army, by means of shooting at him with a rifle; said offense occurring outside the territorial limits of the United States, on an installation under the exclusive control of the United States Army and not being cognizable in a United States civilian court. (Record of Trial, 1981, p. 34).

On Oct. 29, a preliminary hearing was held to hear arguments from counsel on motions. The defense argued the following motions for dismissal of the charges:

1. Pre-trial advice was in error.
2. Harrington was denied the right to a speedy trial and had been in confinement since June 9.

These motions were denied.

The defense argued the following motions for the conduct of the trial:
1. Shoberg should not be allowed to testify at the trial. This motion was argued on the lack of the doctor's qualifications and the validity of hypnosis. Shoberg testified as to the validity of hypnosis. The motion was denied.
2. Sgt. Cardinal should not be allowed to testify at the trial. The defense argued that Cardinal had been wrongfully influenced to change his mind as to who shot him because Bell was found to be insane and would not be prosecuted. The counsel further argued that someone had tried to create doubts in Cardinal's mind which led to
the use of hypnosis. Cardinal testified and denied both arguments. The motion was denied.

3. All incriminating statements made by Harrington should be suppressed. The defense argued that the statement made by Harrington on June 9 stating he was forced to shoot a soldier was not made voluntarily. The three CID agents who conducted the questioning each testified on the procedures used during the questioning. Harrington testified the CID agents had made him sign the statement. He claimed he did not say what was written. The motion was denied.

4. The defense requested access to the results and findings of Bell's psychiatric board. The trial counsel stated it was unnecessary as the defense was planning to call Bell as a witness. The defense stated Bell had admitted shooting the four soldiers who were killed. The trial judge balanced the violation of Bell's privilege against self discrimination against the accused's right to a fair trial. The motion was denied.

5. The defense requested the trial judge to direct the convening authority to hire an hypnotic expert to assist the defense. The motion was denied.

Harrington pleaded "not guilty" to both charges.

The court reconvened on Oct. 30. Jury members were present and voir dire proceedings were conducted. Following this, the trial counsel opened the trial on the merits. Three witnesses testified: the doctor who performed
the autopsies; the Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge of the Ingman Range exercise on June 5; and Cardinal.

The prosecution's case continued on Oct. 31. Cardinal and the CID agents who conducted the investigation testified.

Nov. 1 was a Sunday. The trial was in recess. The jury used this time to view the three-hour video tape of the hypnotic session.

The prosecution rested its case on Nov. 2. The defense called several soldiers who were at the range when the shootings occurred and a number of CID agents.

The defense's eleventh witness to testify was Bell. In closed court session, the trial judge explained to Bell his partial immunity. Anything Bell said on the stand that day could not be used against him at any trial involving the death of the one soldier allegedly killed by Harrington or the wounding of Cardinal. Bell could still be tried for those acts. Bell did not have to answer any questions concerning the other three victims.

Bell testified he shot the soldier allegedly shot by Harrington and that Harrington shot Cardinal as they were moving down the steps from firing point 7.

The jury viewed Ingman Range on Nov. 3. After returning to the court room, the defense rested its case.

On Nov. 4, various witnesses for the prosecution and defense were recalled. The trial judge issued deliberation instructions to the jury at 3:56 p.m. The court closed as the jury started deliberation proceedings. The court reopened at 8:20 p.m. The jury found Harrington guilty of Charge I except for the words "with premeditation" and guilty of Charge II.
The jury then deliberated on Harrington's sentence from 8:57 p.m. to 10:01 p.m. Author's note: In military trials, the jury decides the appropriate punishment. The maximum punishment for charges is specified in the Manual for Courts Martial.

Harrington was sentenced to receive a Dishonorable Discharge from the service; confinement at hard labor for 20 years; forfeiture of all pay and allowances; and reduction to the grade of Private.

Three years later, on Oct. 18, 1984, the Court of Military Review stated after an appeal hearing, "We find the evidence of record is insufficient to support the appellant's conviction of unpremeditated murder" ("Opinion of the Court", p. 60; found in Record of Trial).

The failure to exclude the CID agent from participation in the hypnotic session and the lack of corroborating evidence lead us to conclude that the hypnosis performed in the case was not shown to be a reasonably reliable means of refreshing Sgt. Cardinal's memory. Sergeant Cardinal's hypnotically-refreshed testimony should not have been admitted in appellant's trial.

Since the hypnotically-refreshed testimony played a significant role in appellant's conviction for attempted murder (Charge II), that conviction cannot stand. A rehearing shall be ordered" ("Opinion of the Court", p. 9; found in Record of Trial).

The convening authority of Fort Leavenworth, Ks., where Harrington was confined, determined that a retrial was impractical and Charge II was also dismissed.

All rights, privileges, and property of which the accused had been
deprived, by virtue of the findings of guilty and the sentence so set, were restored.
CHAPTER 6
THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

Section I: Initial Public Affairs Actions
(June 5-8, 1981)

Coordination Between the Staffs

The shootings at Ingman Range occurred at approximately 11:15 a.m. on June 5. (Time in South Korea is 15 hours ahead of Washington, D.C. All times for this report are South Korean.)

The 2nd Infantry Division [2ID] Public Affairs Officer [PAO] was notified of the incident by telephone from the operations staff. The 2ID PAO notified the Eighth U.S. Army [EUSA] PAO that a shooting had taken place at Ingman Range and additional information would be sent as it became available (Interview, Albro, Apr. 19).

Direct calls from various media organizations to 2ID and EUSA started approximately 5:00 p.m. (Public Affairs Log, 1981, June 5 entry).

The first contact between the 2ID PAO and the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs [OCPA] in Washington, D.C. was made at 1:30 a.m. The 2ID PAO called for an update and was informed that OCPA had received inquiries from Cable News Network and Army Times.

Because of the time difference between Korea and the United States, the 2ID public affairs office began operating 24 hours a day. The PAO and his assistant literally lived in their office (Interview, Albro, Apr. 19).

A review of the 2ID Public Affairs Log shows that contact between the public affairs offices of 2ID, EUSA and OCPA occurred frequently during this
initial period. During the initial three day period, 2ID had six telephone contacts with OCPA and 15 with EUSA.

The action officer at OCPA for the Ingman Range incident, Margaret Tackley, stressed that maximum coordination among the three levels of staff was extremely important in order for all to know what was being said or done concerning the incident (Interview, Tackley, May 22). The three public affairs offices would receive similar inquiries from various news media organizations and coordination prevented possible misunderstandings and contradictions of released information.

**Initial Media Inquiries and Responses**

On June 6 and 7, the public affairs staffs received numerous questions from news media regarding the killing of four U.S. soldiers by another soldier. The incident involved a criminal investigation with fatalities. The guidelines for releasing information had to be followed correctly. In this case, the rules were:

- Do not release the victim's identification until next-of-kin were notified.
- Avoid speculation.
- Do not make comments that could prejudice any future legal action.
- Release only known facts.

OCPA and EUSA PAOs received most of the press inquiries and called 2ID for the responses. The 2ID PAO received very few direct inquiries from media organizations.

Initial questions or requests (Q) from media organizations are listed
below with the response (R):

Q: Desire interviews with soldier witnesses and pictures.
R: Not appropriate due to ongoing investigation (same request was made by the same news organization three times in 1 hour and 10 minutes).

Q: What time did the incident occur?
R: Approximately 11:15 a.m.

Q: What were the ranks of the soldiers involved?
R: No comment.

Q: Was the shooting intentional?
R: No comment.

Q: How far east of Camp Casey is the range?
R: Approximately 1-1/2 miles.

Q: Where is the headquarters of the 2nd Engineer Battalion?
R: Two miles north of Camp Casey at Camp Castle.

Q: Was there any history of similar Eighth U.S. Army incidents?
R: Unknown. We will research the question.

Q: Is Bell married?
R: No.

Q: How many soldiers were at the range?
R: Approximately 40 (Public Affairs Log, 1981, June 5 entry).

The PAO avoided comments on any aspect of the case which would identify the victims, would be speculative, or that could prejudice any future legal actions. If the question was appropriate to answer and the PAO did not know the answer, he indicated so.
The 2ID PAO was extremely cautious before authorizing the release of the victims' identifications. He maintained frequent contact with the 2ID Adjutant General's office, which was responsible for notification. For example, on June 6, the 2ID PAO was informed by EUSA PAO that the final notification to a victim's family had been made. Before releasing the name, the PAO directed the 2ID Adjutant General's office to independently confirm that information.

The victims were identified in news reports on June 7. All next-of-kin had been notified prior to the release.

**Formulating the Strategy**


According to Col. Hyde, Eighth U.S. Army [EUSA] PAO, Kingston had much experience with EUSA. He was the EUSA chief of staff prior to assuming command of the 2ID. Kingston had an understanding with Wickham that anything in the public affairs realm that affected 2ID would be handled, coordinated and directed by Kingston (Interview, Hyde, May 24).

"We had a commander of the 2nd Infantry Division who was on top of the whole thing. That's good. On the negative, he did not really wish the support of EUSA public affairs assets except just pass out things that had already been determined at the division level... It shackled us as to what we could do" (Interview, Hyde, May 24).
Col. Bullock, 2ID chief of staff, said the division wanted to handle the issue because "we were afraid of some spokesman sitting in Seoul (location of EUSA headquarters) releasing information that wasn't fact" (Interview, Bullock, July 8).

Builock directed his staff to continuously update one another as to what events transpired. He and certain staff members wrote a memorandum on the night of June 5 to all subordinate commanders. The letter provided all known information on the incident and emphasized avoiding speculation and rumors.

"The 2nd Infantry Division could take care of itself. That perception was initiated by Maj. Gen. Kingston in everything we did" (Interview, Bullock, July 8).

The division would speak for itself and would do so with one voice.

A command and staff meeting was held on June 5 after the incident. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the known facts of the incident and to plan the next actions. Formulating the public affairs strategy was part of the meeting agenda.

Maj. Gen. Kingston; Col. Bullock; the operations officer; the provost marshal; the staff judge advocate; representatives from the Criminal Investigation Division; and Capt. Scott Albro, the 2nd Infantry Division PAO, were present at the meeting.

Part of the public affairs strategy had previously been determined. The 2ID would handle all public affairs aspects. The staff was directed to coordinate all actions with the chief of staff. This directive applied to the PAO.
Maj. Gen. Kingston was currently being considered for promotion to Lieutenant General as well as command of the Rapid Deployment Force based at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. Kingston was due to leave Korea in two days for Washington D.C. to meet with the Army Chief of Staff on this matter.

Albro and Kingston discussed this matter in preparing the news release. According to Albro, the decision was made not to include the 2nd Infantry Division in the content of news releases. (Interviews, Albro, Apr. 19 and July 14).

The initial news release was brief. It stated that four soldiers had been killed and one wounded at Ingman Range. The release stated another soldier had been apprehended. All soldiers were assigned to the 2nd Engineer Battalion, Eighth U.S. Army (News Release Draft, June 5, 1981).

Albro said not including the 2nd Infantry Division in the release was done in an attempt to reduce the visibility on the division during the nomination proceedings of Kingston.

According to Col. Michael Sullivan, who replaced Albro as the 2ID PAO in Mid-June, he was told by Albro when he arrived to the division there had been a "strong inclination on the part of Wickham and others to minimize the attention on the division" (Interview, Sullivan, May 17).

The second news release was made on June 6 and identified Bell as the alleged shooter. The release stated:

Specialist Four Archie R. Bell, III, has been charged with four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. Bell was taken into custody yesterday after the shooting incident at Ingman Range, one-

A fact sheet was prepared on June 7 which provided details on all known releasable information. The fact sheet stated:

Four soldiers from HHC, 2d Engineer Battalion, were killed and one seriously wounded on June 5, 1981, when another soldier fired his weapon at other soldiers in his unit.

The soldier wounded in the shooting is recovering at 121 Hospital. He is in serious, but stable, condition.

Military authorities apprehended a suspect, Specialist Four Archie R. Bell, III, of HHC, 2nd Engineer Battalion. He has been charged with four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder.

The unit was conducting M-16 rifle qualification at Ingman Range, one-half mile east of Camp Casey. Bell was at the far right firing position with two other soldiers.

He is alleged to have shot the soldiers at his position. He then allegedly shot two other soldiers at the firing position immediately to the left of his position. After that, he allegedly shot and seriously wounded a fifth soldier who was walking towards his position.

Bell then proceeded to the vicinity of the range operations building where he apparently passed out. He was immediately
apprehended and later taken into custody by Military Police.

Bell, of Long Branch, N.J., is a 21-year-old generator mechanic. He arrived in Korea on May 8, 1981. He has a high school GED and no prior disciplinary problems. Additionally, he has received three letters of commendation from previous commanders.

Bell is currently in the custody of military authorities at 121 Hospital and is undergoing psychiatric evaluation (Fact Sheet, June 7, 1981).

On June 8, EUSA PAO informed the 2ID PAO there had been no further inquiries since 10 a.m. on June 7. An OCPA action officer also said the incident was receiving "very, very low-key attention" in the United States. The Washington Post had only a 2-inch story and the Washington Star did not carry it. There had been no further media inquiries for the past 18 hours (Public Affairs Log, 1981, June 8 entry).

Headlines of the newspaper stories which appeared during June 6-8 are shown below. The column length of each story is indicated (Author's note: Army Times is a weekly periodical. Its initial report of the incident was on June 15):

June 6

"GI shoots 5 others in Korea; 4 killed," Baltimore Sun, p. A-4, (2 inches).


"U.S. soldier kills 4 other GIs", Advertiser, Honolulu, (3 inches).
June 7


"For the Record," *Washington Post*, (1 inch).

"4 GIs slain on firing range," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, p. 1 (9 inches)

June 8

"GI charged in M-16 killings," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, p. 3 (9 inches).

June 15

"4 Soldiers Killed in Korea," *Army Times*, p. 2 (2 inches).

Section II: Lacy Harrington Arrested (June 9-10, 1981)

On June 9, PFC Lacy Harrington was brought to the Criminal Investigation Division's [CID] local field office for additional questioning. The ballistic evidence findings did not support Harrington's original statements made on June 5. Harrington was administered a polygraph test which indicated his original story was not completely true. After approximately four hours of questioning by CID agents, Harrington admitted that he shot the safety non-commissioned officer from the foxhole he occupied at firing point number 7. Harrington stated he had done this after being threatened by Bell to shoot the man or else Bell would shoot him [Harrington].

The news release on this new development was prepared by the 2ID PAO the night of June 9 and approved by the assistant division commander. It was passed to EUSA PAO. Col. Hyde recommended it not be released until the following morning. Albro concurred and so informed his chief of staff.
The news release stated:

Charges have been preferred against a second soldier in the shooting incident at Ingman Range on 5 June which claimed the lives of four soldiers and wounded another. The continuing investigation has resulted in PV2 Lacy M. Harrington, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Engineer Battalion, being charged with one count of murder. The charge alleges that PVT Harrington shot and killed (name withheld in this report).

Prior to this development, Sgt. (name withheld) had been listed as one of the four soldiers allegedly shot and killed by SP4 Archie R. Bell, III, of Long Branch, New Jersey. All soldiers involved are members of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Engineer Battalion.

Harrington, a single, 19-year-old equipment records and parts specialist, is being held in custody of military authorities at the Eighth United States Army Confinement Facility, Camp Humphreys, Korea. Bell remains in 121st Army Hospital in Seoul where he continues to undergo psychiatric evaluation. The investigation continues." (News Release Draft, June 10, 1981).

Additional ramifications from the the incident resulted after Harrington’s arrest. Both Harrington and Bell were black and were roommates. The victims were white, raising the possibility of a conspiracy motivated by racial hatred. (Also at this time, the results of Bell’s psychiatric evaluation were completed. Further discussed in the next section, Bell was determined to be insane.)
A further indication of the independent handling of the incident by 2ID was evident in EUSA PAO's request for information from 2ID:

EUSA: What was the relationship of Bell and Harrington?
2ID: Bell and Harrington were roommates.
EUSA: How long had they known each other?
EUSA: Was there a conspiracy?
2ID: Investigation continues. Further comment not appropriate.
EUSA: Who is Harrington charged with murdering?
2ID: Author's note: The question was answered. The name is withheld in this report.
EUSA: Where was Harrington at the time of the alleged offense?
2ID: Firing point 7.
EUSA: How did you find out Harrington shot (name withheld)?
2ID: As part of the continuing investigation (Public Affairs Log, 1981, June 10 entry).

Lt. Gen. Wickham, EUSA commander, had specific questions for 2ID to answer:

Q: Is there any racial organization involved?
A: Currently, there is no evidence of racial organization involvement.
Q: Is the command concerned about racial overtones?
A: The command is always concerned about race relations and has an excellent race relations/equal opportunity program. In serious
incidents, racial overtones should always be a consideration and this case is no exception.

Q: Will Harrington receive psychiatric evaluation?
A: Probably.

A reporter from the Associated Press called the EUSA PAO inquiring about the race of the soldiers involved. The Korea Herald contacted EUSA PAO and asked whether the shooting was racially motivated (Public Affairs Log, 1981, June 10 entry).

According to the story carried by the Herald:
Col. Richard Hyde said one aspect of the current investigation is to determine whether there was any racial motivation. He refused further comment on the subject except saying that the suspects under investigation are blacks and that the victims are whites ("Racial Motive," Korea Herald, June 12, 1981).

The Baltimore Sun contacted Tackley at OCPA also wanting to know if the incident was racially motivated. She responded that she had no information to answer the question. The Sun wanted to know if there had been previous racial problems in the unit. Her answer was no (Public Affairs Log, 1981, June 10 entry).

United Press International filed a story stating, "Racial hatred might have motivated the two black soldiers to shoot the dead soldiers, one source said. An official EUSA spokesman; however, downplayed the racial aspects and said 'comments on motive would be speculation and not appropriate'" (Public Affairs Log, 1981, June 11 entry).
After talking with 2ID PAO, Tackley received an inquiry from U.S. News and World Report as to the racial aspects. She responded the investigation was still in progress. The U.S. News representative indicated there would be some mention of the incident in the June 22nd issue. (Author’s note: Research of the U.S. News and World Report covering this time period revealed no coverage).

Headlines of the newspaper stories which appeared on this aspect of the incident were:

June 10.
"Medical Results On U.S. Soldier Expected Today," Korea Herald (5 inches).

June 11.
"2nd Soldier To be Charged For Shooting," Korea Times (6.5 inches)
"2nd GI Held For U.S. Army Shooting Spree," Korea Herald (5.5 inches).
"Baltimore soldier charged in Korea shootings," Baltimore Sun, p. C-5 (12 inches) (Author’s note: This was the first news report which identified the 2nd Infantry Division. The report stated, "The victims and two suspects were assigned to the 2d Engineer Battalion, assigned to the 2d Infantry Division, the only U.S. combat division in South Korea.")

June 12.
"2nd GI charged in killings," Pacific Stars and Stripes, p. 1 (6.5 inches).
"Racial Motive Being Probed In U.S. Army Shooting Case," Korea Herald (7 inches).

"2 GIs in Korea Charged in death of 4 Soldiers," Star Bulletin, Honolulu, p. 3 (3.5 inches).

June 22


Section III: Bell Determined Insane (June 10, 1981)

On the night of June 5, Archie Bell was evaluated by a psychiatric board composed of three Army doctors. Bell was diagnosed to be suffering from acute schizophrenia. The findings were:

a. At the time of the alleged offense the accused did, as a result of mental disease or defect, lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct.

b. At the time of the alleged offense, the accused did as a result of mental disease or defect, lack substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

c. The accused does possess sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceeding against him, but he does not possess sufficient mental capacity to intelligently cooperate in his defense.

The board recommended Bell be immediately hospitalized for treatment and further evaluation under full security (Gushwa, 1981, p. 3).

Research could not determine when the command structure of the 2nd Infantry Division [2ID] was made aware of the board results.
By June 10, the results were known by the public affairs staffs.

The Eighth U.S. Army [EUSA] public affairs officer, Col. Hyde, and the EUSA staff judge advocate [SJA] informed Albro they were recommending to the EUSA commander the board results be released to the public. EUSA's reason was the release would defuse the situation by eliminating speculation that the killings were motivated by solely racial hatred. The SJA indicated that the release of the information would not prejudice the case against Harrington.

Albro agreed with the recommendation; however, the 2nd Infantry Division's position was the results not be released.

According to Albro, his recommendation to release the information was disapproved. A recommendation that the information not be released was made by the 2nd Infantry Division SJA. Albro said the SJA, the chief of staff and others wanted the retain the option of legally prosecuting Bell (Interview, Albro, July 11).

Four soldiers in the division had been brutally executed for no justifiable reason. The results from Bell's psychiatric evaluation which indicated he would not be tried for the offense were not received favorably by the 2ID command structure and staff.

The EUSA staff, and to some extent Albro, were not privy to the 2nd Infantry Division's planned response to the medical board's initial findings.

Col. Bullock, the chief of staff, said the credibility of the division psychiatrist was not respected (Interview, Bullock, July 8).

In a message dated June 12 sent to Maj. Gen. Kingston, who was still in Washington DC, Brig. Gen. Roll, assistant division commander, informed
Kingston that the Office of the Surgeon General had "approved the division's request for another psychiatric evaluation of SP4 Bell and selected three competent psychiatrists to comprise the board" (Message, June 12, 1981).

To release the results of the initial psychiatric evaluation which could be overturned by a second evaluation could complicate future legal actions.

The report of the second evaluation was not located; however, the results were apparently similar. The 2ID news release on June 18 stated:

Specialist Four Archie R. Bell III, charged with four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder in the June 5 shooting incident at Ingman Range, was found by an Army sanity board on June 17 to be insane.

The board found that Bell was insane at the time of the alleged offenses, and that he does not possess sufficient mental capacity to intelligently cooperate in his own defense.

Bell will be transferred under armed guard to Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, Ga., for further treatment. Reports of investigation and charges on Bell will be forwarded to the general court martial convening authority, Fort Gordon, Georgia.

Private Lacy Harrington, charged with one count of murder in the Ingman Range incident, was also evaluated by a sanity board.

Harrington remains in the custody of military authorities at the Eighth U.S. Army Confinement Facility, Camp Humphreys, Korea.

The investigation continues (News Release Draft, June 18, 1981). The news media reported on June 19 that Bell was insane. Highlights
of the coverage are shown below:

**June 19**


"GI Said Insane In Shooting Case," *Korea Herald*, p. 8 (4.5 inches).

**June 20**

"GI ruled insane in Korea deaths," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, p. 8 (10 inches).

**June 29**

"Board Rules Soldier Insane in Killings," *Army Times*, p. 16 (3 inches).

The final entry made in the 2nd Infantry Division Public Affairs Log was on June 19. The military-media relations portion of the Ingman range incident were over for the time being. The situation had been defused and the process was now a legal matter.

Section IV: Harrington Court Martial

(Oct. 30 - Nov. 4, 1981)

Col. Michael Sullivan arrived at the 2nd Infantry Division, assigned as the public affairs officer, in mid-June 1981. (In 1981, Col. Sullivan’s rank was major).


Johnson said by the time he took command, the Ingman Range incident was no longer a major issue in the division; however, there was still a substantial amount of displeasure that Bell would not be tried.
Sullivan said a major reason causing the emotional impact of the Ingman Range incident to decrease over time was the division's continuous mission of defending South Korea. The division's soldiers were constantly performing military security operations. Also contributing were the internal actions taken by the operational chain of command (discussed in the next section) (Interview, Sullivan, Feb. 23).

Another factor to cause the awareness of the Ingman Range incident to fade was the troop rotation policy in Korea. Soldiers were assigned to the Eighth U.S. Army and 2nd Infantry Division for only one year. Over a few months period, a substantial number of soldiers in the 2nd Infantry Division in June 1981 would have departed.

According to Col. Bullock, the crisis was over after the Harrington arrest. He said the division was now in the process of going to trial. It was routine business (Interview, Bullock, July 8).

The primary missions given to Sullivan regarding the Ingman Range incident were to “keep it from rebubbling” and to stay abreast of the judicial proceedings in the case against Harrington (Interview, Sullivan, Feb. 23).

In August, Staff Sgt. Cardinal underwent hypnotic treatment to refresh his memory as to who shot him. He changed his original story that Bell had shot him and positively identified Harrington as his attacker. Harrington was subsequently charged with the attempted murder of Cardinal in addition to the previous charge of murder.

There was no record found of a news release from 2nd Infantry Division on this development nor was there any coverage of it in the
newspapers researched.

From July to October, Sullivan responded to many media inquiries as to when the trial was going to occur and why the delays. According to Sullivan, the *Baltimore Sun* and *Pacific Stars and Stripes* "kept the pot stirred" (Interview, Sullivan, Feb. 23).

The court martial of Harrington started on Oct. 30, 1981. Harrington was found guilty of both charges and was sentenced on Nov. 4, 1981.

Reporters from *United Press International* and *Pacific Stars and Stripes* were present in the courtroom to cover the trial (Sullivan, 1983, p. 31).

Col. Sullivan assessed the reporting of the trial by *Pacific Stars and Stripes*:

Witnesses' statements were, repeatedly, reported out of context and in very sensational terms. The racial issue surfaced, though neither the government nor the defense made it a significant element in the trial... the overall impression was of a courtroom alive with racial tension and passionately contradictory testimony... The press, or at least the *Pacific Stars and Stripes*... misrepresented what happened (Sullivan, 1983, pp. 32-33).

Staff Sgt. Hubbert, the assistant 2ID PAO, considered the military reporters of *Pacific Stars and Stripes* to be more concerned with being investigative reporters than with emphasizing the positive aspects of the military (Interview, Hubbert, May 22).
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The news coverage reported is listed below:

**Oct. 28**

**Nov. 2**

**Nov. 4**
"Hypnosis OK’d in GI murder trial," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, p. 8 (18 inches).

**Nov. 5**
"2nd suspect testifies in shooting of 5 GIs,” *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, p. 1 (12 inches).

**Nov. 6**
"2nd Div. GI convicted in rifle range killing; sentenced to 20 years,” *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, p. 8 (16 inches).


**Nov. 23**
“Murder Sentence Imposed,” *Army Times*, p. 2 (2 inches).

Section V: Racial Aspects

The racial implications of the Ingman Range incident affected the public affairs strategy in both public and internal information programs.
Public Information

A major concern was the chance that public perception of these murders would be based solely on two black soldiers murdering four white soldiers. Obviously, this perception could spark ideas of racial problems and hatred existing within the 2nd Infantry Division.

The public affairs officers at OCPA, EUSA and 2ID responded to media inquiries on racial motivation by stating that an investigation was ongoing to determine the motivation. That was an accurate statement.

The Criminal Investigation Division thoroughly researched Bell and Harrington's background with Islam and the teachings of Malcolm X. Many past associates of Bell and Harrington, in the United States and South Korea, were located and questioned (CID Report, not dated).

Lt. Col. C. Hilton Dunn was assigned as the commander of the 2nd Engineer Battalion shortly after the incident occurred. He conducted an internal investigation of his battalion to ascertain if any soldiers were affiliated with any black militant organizations or if racial problems existed within the unit that would have led Bell and Harrington to take the action they took.

Dunn stated that he could find no one who was affiliated with any militant group. He concluded that the incident was isolated; the action of "one guy with a crazy notion" (Interview, Dunn, May 28).

The races of the victims and alleged shooters did not appear in the news reports until after Harrington was arrested. There was no mention of race in the initial news release nor was it released verbally.
Some time during the second or third week in June, plans were made to evacuate Bell from Korea to the United States. A member of the second psychiatric board recommended Bell be sent to Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, Ga.

Tackley notified the public affairs officer at Fort Gordon, Lt. Col. Joseph Page, of the pending arrival of Bell. She stressed to Page the circumstances of the incident were "not racial." Tackley also called 2ID to insure Bell would be sent to Fort Gordon by military aircraft so that reporters and photographers could be avoided.

Page informed 2ID that Ft. Gordon would respond to inquiries by acknowledging that Bell was coming to Fort Gordon, but no further comment was appropriate until he actually arrived.

On June 23, Page was told that Bell would not be evacuated to Fort Gordon. Reasons for this are unknown.

Command Information

The racial implications of an incident such as the Ingman Range incident can destroy an organization. Feelings of hostility were evident, especially when the determination was made that Bell would not be tried.

During the period of heightened tensions, Maj. Gen. Kingston wrote a letter to all soldiers in the 2ID:

SUBJECT: Ingman Range Incident

TO: ALL 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION SOLDIERS

1. The incident which occurred on Ingman Range on 5 June has been a painful experience for all of us. There are many rumors in
circulation concerning the motivation of those accused in the incident. At this time no one knows the motivation for the shootings.

2. All 2nd Infantry Division soldiers are reminded that the combat readiness of our Division is not served by inaccurate information and rumors that would divide us. Ours is a great Division, one which has been made by the energy and cooperation of soldiers of all ethnic cultures. Together we have built our readiness for war, and with dignity and respect for each other, together we must keep the peace.

3. I am proud of the adult manner in which you are handling this tragedy; good judgment and restraint prevail. We have not, and we must not, deal with this situation in an unprofessional manner.

4. Let our prayers be filled with requests for strength and comfort for the bereaved families and for the souls of our fallen soldiers. May God bless you all.

    signed


Col. Bullock called the letter “superb.” He stated it had the “Barbed-Wire Bob” (Kingston’s nickname) flavor, yet still showed sympathy and emotion (Interview, Bullock, July 8).

    To what extent Kingston’s letter relieved the tensions throughout the division is beyond the scope of this report; however, it no doubt had some effect.

    Col. Dunn spent the first weeks of his command of 2nd Engineer Battalion counseling soldiers, both in groups and individually. One reason, as discussed previously, was to ascertain if he had a racial problem in the
battalion. Dunn was also attempting to defuse any racial hostility created by the Ingman Range incident.

According to Dunn, the best sedative for the battalion was to keep the soldiers busy. He deployed the unit on field maneuvers and remained in the field away from garrison environment for a considerable amount of time (Interview, Dunn, May 28).

Bullock said the division strategy was to “press on and not let an isolated incident influence the division” (Interview, Bullock, July 8).

The 2nd Infantry Division newspaper Indianhead carried one story on the incident on June 15. The article presented the facts of the case known at the time ("Four Killed," Indianhead, June 15, 1981).

SSG Bob Hubbert, the editor of Indianhead, said the command information strategy was to write a lot of squad and unit stories emphasizing small unit teamwork throughout the division (Interview, Hubbert, May 22).
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1

The Army public affairs actions with respect to next-of-kin notification procedures and initial inquiries on the Ingman Range criminal investigation were in accordance with directives and policies.

Discussion

The public affairs actions taken immediately following the shooting incident were critical. The initial responses to an unexpected incident such as what happened at Ingman Range are often more reactive than thoroughly planned. The responses often are further complicated because initial information is sketchy at best and has usually not been verified.

Army public affairs regulation and doctrine assist the public affairs officer during these periods by providing specific guidance on responding to media inquiries.

*Army Regulation 360-5* directs answering questions about the course of an accident or incident before official findings are available with the customary reply, "An investigation is being conducted to determine the cause" (*AR 360-5, 1979, p. 3-3*).

Beyond the initial response when official findings are available, the doctrine pertaining to public affairs officers' [PAO] responsibilities during a criminal investigation are limited. The guidance to PAOs is to seek advice from the Staff Judge Advocate [SJA].
Information that alludes to the accused’s innocence or guilt, directly or indirectly, cannot be released. Potential jurors who determine guilt or innocence cannot be influenced by information obtained outside the courtroom. The SJA counsels on information that falls into that category.

The 2nd Infantry Division [2ID] avoided prejudicing the legal proceedings from the Ingman Range incident with the following actions:

- The PAO did not answer questions beyond who, what, when and where. The terms “accused” and “allegedly” were used when referring to Bell.

- The 2ID strategy of “one spokesman, one voice” centralized the control of information at the division. Higher headquarters public affairs officers were primarily a conduit of information provided by the 2ID.

- The 2ID SJA recommended the results of Bell’s first psychiatric evaluation with legal ramifications not be released to the news media. Key leaders in the division perceived there were problems with the evaluation and planned to do a second evaluation. Whether this perception was correct or not is beyond the scope of this report. Had the second evaluation determined Bell to be mentally competent, an initial public release that he was insane could have wrongfully influenced potential jurors.

Army public affairs doctrine states that one of the criteria for releasing information is the information does not violate personal privacy.

Army Regulation 360-5 directs information on injured or deceased personnel will be made as soon as possible after next-of-kin have been
officially notified. (AR 360-5, 1979, p. 3-3).

The 2ID insured the victims' next of kin were officially notified by the Adjutant General's Office prior to releasing any information which could identify the soldiers, including their military ranks or the names.

Conclusion 2

One of the public affairs objectives after the Ingman Range shootings was to reduce the visibility of the 2nd Infantry Division because of Maj. Gen. Kingston's situation. A method used to achieve this objective was not to include any reference to the 2nd Infantry Division in news releases originated by the 2nd Infantry Division.

Discussion

Capt. Albro said the method was a deliberately planned action (Interviews, Albro, Apr. 19 and July 13). The accuracy of this statement was not conclusively verified. Col. Sullivan was not part of the planning as he was not yet assigned to the division. He stated he was informed of the action by Albro after he arrived in mid-June (Interview, Sullivan, May 17).

Col. Bullock, the chief of staff, stated he did not recall that aspect (Interview, Bullock, June 12). Albro verified that Bullock would not have known because the initial discussion was between him and Kingston only (Interview, Albro, July 13).

Col. Hyde, Eighth U.S. Army public affairs officer, did not recall that aspect of the strategy. He did say it was feasible (Interview, Hyde, May 24).

As discussed previously, the EUSA public affairs office was isolated from the 2nd Infantry Division public affairs planning.
Mrs. Tackley, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs action officer, said she did not recall a deliberate attempt to keep the identification of the 2nd Infantry Division out of the news (Interview, Tackley, May 22).

Maj. Gen. Kingston, now retired, would not comment on the subject (Interview, Kingston, June 4).

The news releases and the fact sheet prepared by the 21D did not identify the 2nd Infantry Division. None of the initial stories appearing in the print news media researched mentioned the 2nd Infantry Division. The 2nd Infantry Division was identified in a Baltimore Sun story by June 11.

The omission of the 2nd Infantry Division can be attributed as inadvertent or deliberate. Based on Albro’s statement and the news releases, the conclusion is it was deliberate.

The relationship between the administration and the Department of Defense towards the news media in 1981 was strained. This is evident from the military officers' overall attitudes towards the news media and the handling of the press during the 1982 Grenada invasion.

The attitudes of the American military in South Korea toward the media in 1981 were also strained as demonstrated by the comments of a reporter from the Pacific Stars and Stripes and the removal of a high ranking Army officer in Korea who claimed he was “mouse-trapped” by a journalist (Facts on File, 1977, p. 403).


There are two conceivable reasons Kingston would want to avoid sensational news media coverage of the 2nd Infantry Division sparked by
the Ingman Range murders. One is his career considerations and the other is being loyal to the division.

A commander would not want to jeopardize his soldiers' overall excellent record due to what was thought to have been an isolated, not so excellent, incident.

Albro and Hyde both thought the action was based equally on both reasons.

The risk involved with the strategy was, if the strategy was discovered by outside sources, the accusations of a limited cover-up by not telling the whole truth, could result. This could have been more damaging to Kingston than the Ingman Range incident.

In South Korea, the chances of the strategy being discovered or Kingston being associated with the 2nd Infantry Division by the public were minimal. Col. Hyde stated the U.S. news media at a distance were not familiar with the 2nd Infantry Division. They understood the U.S. Army had forces stationed in South Korea, but not much more beyond that (Interview, Hyde, May 24).

The 2nd Infantry Division strategy would not be a viable alternative had the incident occurred at an Army base in the United States due to local area interest and local news media coverage.

To what extent this strategy affected Kingston’s nomination proceedings is unknown. The 2nd Infantry Division was identified in a major newspaper’s article on June 11. Kingston was never associated with the Ingman Range incident in the news sources researched.
Pacific Stars and Stripes (1981) reported on June 28 that Kingston was nominated by President Reagan to command the Rapid Deployment Force. Army Times (July 6, 1981) reported the nomination had been approved on June 25.

Conclusion 3

Racial hostility within the division possibly leading to racial conflicts had to be defused. The various 2nd Infantry Division commanders' goal was to learn if racial hostility existed and if so, take corrective action by identifying soldiers associated with black militant organizations and counseling soldiers who may have developed racial hostilities as a result of the Ingman Range incident. The public affairs goal was to prevent speculation of racial motivation as the cause of the murders in the news media prior to the commanders' assessments. This goal was achieved.

Discussion

The response made to the media inquiries on racial motivation by the public affairs organizations was that an investigation is being conducted to determine the motivation for the killings.

This response was key for two reasons. First, it prevented speculation by journalists. Second, the response was factual. The commanders were investigating possible racial hostilities within their units. The Criminal Investigation Division was attempting to determine the motives of Bell and Harrington.

There were no follow-up stories in the news media pertaining to the motivation for the killings; therefore, it is unknown whether the results of
the racial investigation were made available to the news media. It is also unknown if the news media inquired as to the results of the investigation. Had there been follow-up news inquiries, a factual response on the results of the investigations could have been given.

Conclusion 4

The primary concerns of the 2nd Infantry Division public affairs office during the Harrington court martial proceedings were the possible reemergence of racial tensions in the division and the possible sensationalism of the trial by the news media, thereby sensationalizing the Ingman Range incident. To prevent these possible occurrences, the public affairs strategy was not to be proactive in releasing information on the trial to the news media.

Discussion

The Ingman Range incident had some visibility in the news media; but media interest by late October had, for the most part, disappeared.

The emotional ramifications within the division caused by the Ingman Range incident also had disappeared.

The mission given to the PAO upon assignment to the division in mid-June was to "keep it from rebubbling" and to stay aware of the legal proceedings with Harrington (Interview, Sullivan, Feb. 23).

To "keep it from rebubbling", in other words, was to prevent the possibility of the trial re-igniting racial tensions within the division by resurfacing the Ingman Range incident in the minds of soldiers.

Further, the trial of Harrington had circumstances somewhat out of
the ordinary. The major prosecution witness, Sgt. Cardinal, had changed his original account of who shot him after hypnosis. In addition, Bell, previously determined to be insane, was to appear and testify as a defense witness.

These circumstances were highly susceptible to sensationalism. The alternatives were:

- Attempt to limit the release of information through the news media to the public of the Harrington court martial to reduce the chance of the Ingman Range incident again becoming highly visible. The public included the soldiers assigned to the division.
- Adhere to Army public affairs guidance by releasing information through proactive measures, regardless of whether the information is favorable or unfavorable.

Sullivan wrote that the trial received intense media attention (Sullivan, 1983, p. 31).

Sullivan further stated, “We made a concentrated effort at being other than aggressive in informing them [the media] on the Harrington trial” (Interview, Sullivan, May 17).

*Pacific Stars and Stripes* was the only newspaper to report daily on the trial proceedings. The *Washington Post* reported on Nov. 5, 1981 the conviction and sentence of Harrington.

Sullivan was highly critical of the reporting and accused *Pacific Stars and Stripes* of attempting to sensationalize the trial (Sullivan, 1983, pp. 31-32).
As discussed in Chapter 4, not being proactive with the news media can be detrimental to future public affairs programs. However, in this case, the strategy by the 2nd Infantry Division, after balancing the concept of proactive and full disclosure against the division's interests to maintain stability and morale, was decided in favor of the division.

There were no indications that the Ingman Range incident resurfaced as a result of Pacific Stars and Stripes coverage.

Summary and Discussion

The research questions found in the first chapter of this report are repeated here:

- What were the public affairs strategies and procedures? Why were they adopted?
- What factors influenced the decisions? How did these factors affect decisions?
- Did the strategies and procedures conform to the doctrinal principles of Army public affairs?

Chapter 6 discussed the public affairs strategies and procedures. They were adopted because certain factors influenced the decisions which determined the strategies and procedures.

The Ingman Range incident was tragic, yet an isolated event in the 2nd Infantry Division. The principal leaders of the division believed the murders were committed by an insane soldier who formed a conspiracy with his roommate to kill whoever, regardless of their race, occupied Ingman Range firing points 7 and 8.
A primary concern of the division’s leaders was to insure the Ingman Range murders remained an isolated incident and was not sensationalized to the point where the division’s reputation would suffer. Along with this factor, the division commander was in an extremely critical position in the eyes of the public and the media as he was being considered for a higher and extremely important role in the Department of Defense.

Author’s note: To emphasize the importance of the job, as commander of the Rapid Deployment Force, Lt. Gen. Kingston was an influential American liaison with foreign dignitaries. For example, he was present on the reviewing stand with Anwar Sadat when Sadat was assassinated in 1981.

To reduce the visibility of the division during the days following the incident, the decision was made not to include the 2nd Infantry Division in the news releases.

By the time of the court martial in October and November 1981, the Ingman Range incident had for all purposes been forgotten. It was solely a legal matter and a jury, not the division, would decide if Harrington was guilty or not. However, the division leaders’ concern was that publicity of the trial could re-ignite hostile racial feelings among the soldiers of the division. To reduce the publicity, the strategy was not to be proactive in releasing information to the public and the media.

The Pacific Stars and Stripes did not need news releases; its reporter personally covered the trial and the division PAO was extremely critical of alleged sensational reporting.
Did the strategies and actions conform to Army public affairs doctrine and principles?

In handling the next-of-kin notification prior to the release of the victims' name and responses regarding the investigation, the answer is yes.

Stated again, the over-riding policy on the release of information to the public is "maximum disclosure with minimum delay within constraints of security, accuracy, propriety and policy (Boer, 1983, p. 16-3).

Not releasing the division's identification did not conform to this policy. Release of that information did not violate any measures of security, accuracy, propriety or policy.

Not being proactive in releasing information to the media on the court martial may fall within the constraints of security provided the only reason was to prevent racial hostility within the division. Racial problems due to hostility would be detrimental to the division's ability to perform its mission and therefore would be a security issue, especially as the division was responsible to deter and defend against possible attack from North Korea.

The last question (addressed in Chapter 2) was what actions, if any, by the public affairs organizations may have caused limited news coverage of the Ingman Range incident?

For several days after June 5, 1981, there was substantial news coverage of the Ingman Range incident in both the overseas and U.S. newspapers. Stories focused primarily on the facts of the incident.

The study assumed the news media failed to make the connection between Maj. Gen. Kingston's nomination with the fact that he was the
commander of the organization in which the incident occurred. Had that connection been made, coverage may have been greater and more speculative and sensational.

The limited news coverage during the trial has previously been discussed.

An additional factor which may have influenced the amount of news coverage was the news media and the public being more separated from the armed forces in South Korea than in the United States.

The public affairs organizations’ media relations actions in the Ingman Range incident were successful. The strategies employed accomplished the goals of the organization.

The division chain of command had more impact toward diffusing the racial tensions caused by the incident than the public affairs organizations’ command information program. That is to be expected in all tragic incidents. Command information programs will never be a successful substitute for strong leaders and commanders acting directly with their subordinates. Command information programs are only a tool; but an important tool, to assist commanders and should always be considered as such.
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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

Adjutant General: Special staff officer responsible for operational, technical and training activities for personnel services, administrative services, postal services and morale support activities.

Army command levels: The levels of Army command structure are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command level</th>
<th>Rank of Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps/Army</td>
<td>Lt. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Commands</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army Court of Military Review: A court composed of three civilian judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, which exercises the appellate functions over the armed forces as to the records of trials by court martial required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Armed Forces Information Service [AFIS]: Staff agency controlled by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) responsible to prepare and disseminate supporting material, including films and pamphlets, for each armed service's internal information programs.
Army Rank Structure (Enlisted): Rank structure for enlisted soldiers is shown from lowest to highest:

- Private (PVT)
- Private First Class (PFC)
- Corporal/Specialist Four *
- Sergeant**/Specialist Five *
- Staff Sergeant/ Specialist Six *
- Sergeant First Class (SFC)
- Master Sergeant (MSG)
- Sergeant Major
- Command Sergeant Major (CSM)

* Technical job positions are held by specialists.
** Sergeant and above are classified as Non-Commissioned Officers.

Army Rank Structure (Officers): Rank structure for officers is shown from lowest to highest:

- Second Lieutenant
- First Lieutenant
- Captain
- Major
- Lieutenant Colonel
- Colonel
- Brigadier General
- Major General
- Lieutenant General
General

General of the Army

**Article 32 Investigation:** A formal investigation conducted before an alleged violation of the Uniform code of Military Justice can be referred to trial by court martial. The purpose of the investigation is to make a thorough and impartial investigation into the truth of the charges and to make recommendation as to the disposition of the charges in the interest of justice and discipline.

**Battalion:** Unit composed of a headquarters and two or more companies or batteries.

**Brigadier General:** See Army Rank Structure (Officer).

**Captain:** See Army Rank Structure (Officer).

**Chaplain:** Provides pastoral ministry for unit personnel and colocated elements having no assigned chaplain. Ministers to casualties, hospitalized and confined personnel. Provides pastoral counselling to members of the command. Advises the commander and staff on matters about religion, morals and morale affected by religion.

**Chief of Staff:** Directs the execution of staff tasks, the efficient and prompt response of the staff, and the coordinated effort of the staff. Directs the efforts of both the coordinating and special staffs. (In smaller units, the executive officer performs this function.)

**Civil-Military Operations Officer:** Principal staff officer for the commander in all matters concerning the civilian impact on military operations and the political, economic and social effects of military operations on civilian personnel.
Colonel: See Army Rank Structure (Officer).

Command channels: See Operational Chain of Command.

Command information: See Internal Information.

Command Sergeant Major: See Army Rank Structure (Enlisted)

Community relations: An on-going relationship between a military community and a civilian community.

Corporal: See Army Rank Structure (Enlisted).

Criminal Investigation Division [CID]: The criminal investigation agency responsible to the U.S. Army to provide the personnel and equipment to collect evidence and conduct lawful investigations of alleged offenses as specified by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The agency is not responsible for law enforcement activities; the Military Police perform enforcement functions.

Dishonorable Discharge: Formal release from military service without honor. It can only be given a soldier upon his conviction and sentence by a general court martial.

Division: The largest US Army organization that trains and fights as a team. The division consists of a relatively fixed command, staff, combat support and combat service support structure to which ten maneuver battalions are assigned. A division has from 13,000 to 17,000 soldiers assigned.

DoD: Department of Defense.

Eighth United States Army [EUSA]: A major Army command organization with headquarters in Seoul, South Korea. U.S. Army units under operational control of EUSA include the 2nd Infantry Division, 1st
Signal Brigade, 19th Support Command and 501st Military Intelligence Brigade.

**Engineer officer:** Special staff officer who determines the requirements for engineer support at all levels; recommends to the commander the allocation of engineer resources; and exercises staff supervision over engineer operations.

**Executive officer:** Staff officer at the battalion and brigade level who performs similar functions as chief of staff at division level (See Chief of Staff).

**First Lieutenant:** See Army Rank Structure (Officer).

**General court martial:** One of the three types of military court martial. The general court martial is the highest court the military can convene to dispose of charges and consists of not fewer than five members, not including the military judge. It must be convened by a general court martial convening authority (usually a division or installation or higher commander). A general court martial may adjudge death; dismissal (officers only); dishonorable or bad conduct discharges; confinement for life; total forfeiture of all pay and allowances; and reduction to the lowest enlisted rank (enlisted personnel only). The maximum punishment for the offense as specified by the Manual for Courts Martial limits the maximum punishment the general court martial may adjudge.

**Inspector General:** Staff member who inquires into and reports on matters about the performance of the mission, state of discipline, efficiency, and economy by conducting inspections, investigations, surveys and studies.
as directed by the commander and as prescribed by law and regulations. Monitors trends, both positive and negative, in all activities. Is a confidential advisor to the commander.

**Internal information:** Communication between a commander and his/her military "family" with the intention of increasing productivity and mission accomplishment. The services refer to this function by different names (the U.S. Army uses the term "Command Information," while all others use "Internal Information").

**KATUSA:** Korean Army Augmentation To The U.S. Army. These soldiers are Korean Army soldiers that serve in U.S. Army units stationed in South Korea. KATUSAs account for between 15 and 18 percent of the 2nd Infantry Division total personnel strength.

- **Lieutenant Colonel:** See Army Rank Structure (Officer).
- **Lieutenant General:** See Army Rank Structure (Officer).
- **Logistics Officer:** Principal staff officer to the commander in matters of supply, maintenance, transportation and services.

**M-16 Rifle:** 5.56-mm, magazine-fed, gas-operated, shoulder-fired weapon. It is designed for either semiautomatic or automatic fire. Fires a 5.56 caliber (diameter of the projectile) bullet with a maximum effective range of 460 meters.

- **Major General:** See Army Rank Structure (Officer)
- **Master Sergeant:** See Army Rank Structure (Enlisted)
- **Military Intelligence Officer:** Principal staff officer for the commander on all intelligence matters. Acquires intelligence information and data; analyzes and evaluates the information and data; and presents the
assessment evaluation and recommendations to the commander.

**Lieutenant General:** See Army Rank Structure (Officer).

**Non-Commissioned Officer [NCO]:** Enlisted soldier in the U.S. Army with the rank of Sergeant or above.

**NCOIC:** Non-Commissioned Officer.

**OASD(PA):** Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

**Office of the Chief of Public Affairs [OCPA]:** The Department of the Army agency responsible for all public affairs activities throughout the Army. The Chief of Public Affairs is a brigadier general and head of the organization.

**Operational chain of command:** The established hierarchy of command delegations through which the commander discharges his responsibilities. Through this chain, or command channel, the commander holds each subordinate commander responsible for all that the subordinate unit does or fails to do.

**Operations Officer:** Principal staff officer for the commander in matters concerning operations, plans, organization and training.

**Pacific Stars and Stripes:** Daily newspaper sponsored by the Department of Defense for United States Armed Forces serving in the Pacific. Stripes employs both military and civilian personnel as reporters, editors and productionists.

**PAO:** Public Affairs Officer.

**Personal staff:** Staff members who work under the immediate control of the commander and assist him directly instead of working through the
chief of staff or executive officer.

**Personnel Staff Officer:** Principal staff officer for the commander on all matters concerning human resources. Monitors and assesses personnel administration and management.

**Private:** See Army Rank Structure (Enlisted).

**Private First Class:** See Army Rank Structure (Enlisted).

**Provost Marshal:** Special staff advisor to the commander on military police operations.

**Public information:** The dissemination of information and other material to the public(s) via press, radio, television and other media of mass communication.

**Sergeant:** See Army Rank Structure (Enlisted).

**Staff Sergeant:** See Army Rank Structure (Enlisted).

**Staff channels:** The staff-to-staff links between headquarters for coordination and transmission of information.

**Staff Judge Advocate (SJA):** Staff member who provides legal advice to the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, service members, and other authorized persons in all matters involving military law, domestic law, foreign law, status-of-forces agreements, international law, and the law of armed conflict. The SJA supervises the administration of military justice and other legal matters in the command.

**Surgeon:** Special staff officer responsible to advise the commander on health services of the command and of the occupied or friendly territory within the command's area of responsibility.
Uniform Code of Military Justice: Federal law enacted by Congress which provides the code of laws governing the conduct of all persons in the Armed Forces or subject to military law.

Voir Dire: French for "to say truly." Procedure of questioning potential jurors in a legal trial to discover any prejudices or personal information that might influence a juror's decision.
APPENDIX B
INDEX

Action Officer, 20, 71, 77, 97
Adjutant General, 114, 46, 73, 96
Air Force Public Affairs, 14, 40
Albro, Maj. Scott, 19, 22, 59, 70, 74-75, 78, 84, 96-98
Allied Expeditionary Force, 30
American Broadcasting Companies (ABC/ABC Radio), 51, 60
American Psychological Association, 15
Anderson, J.A., 15
Applefeller, Capt. Frank, 5
Armed Forces Information Service (AFIS), 36, 114
Armed Forces Radio and Television Network, 37
Army Chief of Staff (see Chief of Staff)
Army command levels (see Operational Chain of Command)
Army Court of Military Review, 10, 114
Army hospitals, 20, 61-62, 79, 85, 91
Army National Guard, 36
Army Public Affairs Advanced Course, 49
Army Public Affairs (see also public affairs), 3-4, 6-9, 10-15, 22, 25, 27, 37, 43,
48-50, 53, 94-96, 101-102, 104
Army Regulation 360-5, 11, 94-95
Army Regulation 360-81, 11
Army Reserve Locator system, 5
Army sanity board, 18, 85
Army staff organizations, 13, 25
Army Times, 5, 25, 60, 70, 77-78, 83, 86, 89, 99
Army World-Wide Locator system, 5
Article 32 investigation, 61, 63, 116
Article 80, UCMJ, 64
Article 118, UCMJ, 64
Associated Press, 60, 81
Baker, Secretary of War Newton D., 29
Baltimore Sun, 1, 5, 16, 21, 25, 60, 77-78, 81-82, 88, 97
battalion, 5, 21, 55, 64, 72, 75-76, 79, 82, 90, 92-93, 114, 116, 118
Bell, III, Specialist Four Archie, 11, 17-18, 20-22, 58-63, 65-67, 72, 75-80, 83-87,
90-91, 95, 99, 101
Boer, W., 12, 32, 37, 39-41, 104
brigade, 30, 114, 118
Bullock, Col. Victor, 22, 59, 74, 84, 87, 92-93, 96
Cable News Network, 60, 70
Camp Casey, 1, 10-11, 55, 64-65, 72, 76
Camp Castle, 72
Camp Humphreys, 79, 85
Canfield, B.R., 15, 29-30
Carter, President Jimmy, 15, 53
Case Study Research, 15
Catalano, T.S., 13, 30-31
Chaplain Corps, 1, 45, 47, 116
Chief of Public Affairs, 2-3, 5, 11-13, 17, 26, 30, 36, 39, 43, 46-47, 60, 70, 97, 120
Chief of Staff, 19, 22, 30, 45-46, 52-53, 59, 73-75, 78, 84, 96, 116, 118, 121
Civil War, 12, 29
Civil-Military Operations Officer, 116
civilian advisory board, 34
Cold War, 27
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), 51
command information, 9, 11, 21, 32-33, 35-37, 43, 49, 51, 91, 93, 105, 117, 119
Command Information Division, 43
Command Information Program Objectives and Policies, 11
Command Sergeant Major, 45, 115, 117
Commanding General, 19, 22, 45-46, 59, 73
community relations, 9, 13, 31-35, 43, 49, 51, 117
Community Relations Division, 43
Constitution of the United States, 28
Cook, Col. Jeff, 20
court martial, 2, 9, 10, 20, 24, 55, 61-64, 68, 85-86, 88, 100-101, 103-104, 114, 116-118
Court of Military Review, 10, 68, 114
Criminal Investigation Division (CID), 1, 11, 19, 24, 58-63, 66-68, 74, 78, 90, 99, 117
Dalton, Jr., Brig. Gen. H.J., 14, 40
Department of Defense (DoD), 14, 27-28, 31-32, 34, 36, 38-40, 42, 49, 60, 97, 103, 117, 120
Department of Defense Information School, 13, 32, 39
Department of Defense Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), 60, 75, 99, 103
Department of State, 41
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, 44
Dishonorable Discharge, 68, 117
division, 1-3, 5, 7-8, 10-11, 16-19, 21-22, 24-26, 30, 34, 39, 43-47, 52, 55, 58-61, 64-65, 70, 73-75, 78, 82-87, 90-93, 95-105, 114, 117-119
Dominick, J.R., 15
Dunn, Lt. Col. C. Hilton, 21, 90, 92-93
Eighth U.S. Army [EUSA] Public Affairs Office, 46, 60
Eighth U.S. Army Confinement Facility, 79, 85
Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), 2, 5, 17, 19, 21-22, 26, 43-44, 46, 60, 70-75, 77-81, 84-85, 87, 90, 96, 117
Eisenhower Army Medical Center, 20, 85, 91
Engineer Officer, 118
ethics, 12
Executive Officer, 3, 15, 116, 118, 121
Facts on File, 15, 53, 97
1st Signal Brigade, 117
501st Military Intelligence Brigade, 118
Fort Gordon, 20, 61, 85, 91
Fort Leavenworth, 12, 68
Fort Riley, 34
Freedom of Information Act, 11, 38, 40
Fullerton, Billy, 5
Fundamentals of Staff Operations, 13
General court martial (see court martial)
Grenada, 54, 97
Harrington, Private First Class [PFC] Lacy, 10, 16, 18, 20-21, 25, 55, 58-68, 78-81, 84-88, 90, 99-101, 103
Headquarters Company, 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, 5, 55, 76
Honolulu Advertiser, 5, 77
Honolulu Star Bulletin, 5, 77, 83
Hubbert, Staff Sgt. Bob, 21, 88, 93
Hyde, Col. Richard, 21, 73, 78, 81, 84, 96, 98
Indianhead, 44-45, 93
information programs, 12, 28-29, 36, 89, 105, 114
Ingram Range, 1-6, 8-12, 24-26, 32, 55, 59, 67, 70-71, 75-76, 79, 85-87, 89, 91, 93-96, 98-105
The Inspector General Brief, 14
Inspector General of the Army, 14, 29, 45, 118
Internal Communication Agency, 41
internal information, 12, 89, 114, 117, 119
Islam, 58, 90
Johnson, Maj. Gen. James, 21, 86-87
Kansas State University, 34

125
Kirk, Maj. Peter D., 19, 39, 43
Korea, 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 32, 43-44, 53, 55, 60, 64-65, 70, 75-83, 85-87, 90-91, 97-98, 104-105, 117, 119
Korea Herald, 5, 60, 81-83, 86
Korea Times, 82
Korean Army Augmentation To The U.S. Army (KATUSA), 44, 119, 119
Korean Press Liaison Technician, 44
Kump, J.B., 12, 32, 35-36
Legislative and Liaison Division, 30
Lincoln, Abraham, 29
Logistics Officer, 119
M-16 rifle, 1, 55, 76, 78, 119
M-16 qualification exercise, 55
MacArthur, Maj. & Gen. Douglas, 30
MacDill Air Force Base, 75
Mahlberg, Lt. Col. Donald S., 14, 52-53
Malcolm X, 59, 90
Manual for Courts Martial, 68, 118
media, 4, 9, 12, 14-16, 20-21, 32, 35-37, 39-43, 48-49, 51-54, 60, 70-71, 77, 85, 88, 90, 94-95, 97-105, 121
media analysis, 12
media relations, 4, 12, 42-43, 105
Media Relations Division, 43
Military Intelligence Officer, 30, 119
Military Police, 47, 58, 77, 82, 117, 121
Muhammed, Elijah, 59
Museum Aide, 44
Museum Technician, 44
Mutual News Radio, 60
National Broadcasting Company (NBC), 51
National Security Council, 27
news coverage, 16, 42, 54, 89, 104-105
news releases, 5-6, 17, 19-20, 22, 26, 39, 75, 96-97, 103
newspapers (see also by individual titles), 4-5, 8, 14-16, 20, 24, 29, 37, 44, 48, 51, 77, 82, 88, 93, 98, 101, 104, 120
1990 Worldwide Public Affairs Offices Directory, 12
19th Support Command, 118
Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge, 44, 58
Norman, Lloyd, 53
notification of next-of-kin, 17
Office of Civil Affairs, 34
Office of Public Affairs, 2

126
Office of Public Information, 30
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD-PA), 28, 36, 120
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA), 2-3, 5, 11-13, 17, 20, 26, 29-30, 36, 43, 46-47, 49, 60, 70-71, 77, 81, 90, 97, 120
Office of the Chief of Public Information, 30
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 2
121st Army Hospital, 62, 79
Ono, Lt. Col. Takahido, 5
Operational Chain of Command, 30, 37, 46, 87, 114, 117, 120
Operations Officer, 59, 74, 116, 120
Our Saviour Has Arrived, 59
Pacific Stars and Stripes, 5, 14, 19, 21, 25, 37, 53, 78, 82, 86, 88-89, 97, 99, 101-103, 120
Pentagon, 43, 60
Perringer, Lt. Craig, 5
Pershing, General Jack, 30
Photographic Laboratory Technician, 45
Policy and Plans Division, 43
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), 51
Press Relations Branch of the Army, 30
Prewitt, Milford, 21
Principles of Information, 14, 38
The Professional Development Guidebook, 11
propaganda, 38, 52
Provost Marshal, 43, 74, 121
psychiatric evaluation, 17-18, 59, 77, 79, 81, 84-85, 95
public affairs (see also Army Public Affairs), 2-28, 30-53, 59-61, 70-74, 77, 80-81, 84, 86, 89-91, 94-97, 99-102, 104-105, 114, 120
Public Affairs Handbook, 12, 19
Public Affairs Log, 16, 21, 60, 70, 72, 77, 80-81, 86
Public Affairs Office, 2nd Infantry Division, 46
Public Affairs Officer (PAO), 3, 5, 10-13, 15, 18-21, 25, 39-44, 46-52, 59, 61, 70-75, 77-78, 80-82, 84, 86, 88, 91, 94-96, 100, 103, 120
Public Affairs Officer Course, 4, 12-13, 19, 25, 39, 49-51
public affairs programs, 7, 13, 31, 38, 50, 102
public information, 9, 11-12, 28-33, 37, 39, 41, 49, 51, 90, 121
Public Information Division, 30
public opinion, 13, 29, 31
public relations, 7, 14-15, 32-33, 51
Public Relations Society of America, 51
Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 15
racial issues, 9, 11, 16-17, 19-20, 61, 79-84, 88-93, 99-100, 103-105
Raspberry, William, 40
Reagan, President Ronald, 99
Record Of Trial number 442125, 10
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), 35
Roll, Brig. Gen., 18, 60, 84
Sadat, Anwar, 103
2nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, 5, 21, 55, 64, 72, 75-76, 79, 82, 90, 92
2nd Infantry Division (2ID), 1-3, 5, 8, 10, 16-19, 21-22, 26, 44-46, 55, 59, 61, 70-71, 73-75, 77-78, 80, 82-93, 95-100, 102-103, 117, 119
2nd Infantry Division Adjutant General, 73
2nd Infantry Division Museum, 44
Secretary of State, 52
Senior Public Affairs Officers Course, 50
Shelton, J.M., 13, 32-34
Shoberg, Dr. John D., 63, 65
Sixth U.S Army, 48
South Korea (see Korea)
Spanish-American War in 1898, 29
speaker's bureau, 34
Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), 2, 19, 43, 45, 59, 74, 84, 94-95, 121
Stars and Stripes (see Pacific Stars and Stripes)
State Department, 27
Steele, Dennis, 19, 53
Stephens, Dr. Loundes F., 14, 28-29, 50-51
strategic planning, 50
Sullivan, Maj. & Col. Michael, 3, 10, 18, 20, 24-25, 45, 61, 75, 86-88, 96, 100-101
Surles, Alexander D., 30
Tackley, Margaret, 20, 71, 81-82, 91, 97
Taylor, E.T., 13, 35, 41
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell, 52
Teeter, Brig. Gen. Charles E., 17
Time, 3, 5, 9-10, 16, 22, 24-25, 28, 51, 62, 67, 70, 72, 79-80, 82-83, 85-87, 91-93, 103
Tokyo, Japan, 14
trial (also see court martial), 2, 9, 10, 16, 24, 43, 55, 61-68, 87-89, 100-101, 103, 105, 116, 122
Tripler Army Medical Center, 62
Troop Information and Education Division, 30
201st Army Hospital, 61
APPENDIX C
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Maj. Richard F. Machamer, Jr. was commissioned in the U.S. Army as an armor officer in 1975 from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He has had a myriad of assignments in armor units, including platoon leader, company commander and battalion executive officer. At the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Ca., Machamer was assigned to the Operations Group, providing video and audio accounts of the training battalions' performance during their 14-day rotations.

Machamer is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Public Affairs Officer Course, and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Ks.

Upon completion of graduate schooling at Kansas State University, Machamer will be assigned to the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C.
AN INCIDENT IN KOREA: A CASE STUDY OF
U.S. ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE TO
THE INGMAN RANGE MURDERS IN 1981

by

Richard F. Machamer, Jr.

B.S., United States Military Academy, 1975

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AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

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requirements for the degree

MASTER OF SCIENCE

A.Q. Miller School of Journalism and Mass Communications
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1991
ABSTRACT

On June 6, 1981, a report appeared in the Baltimore Sun under the following headline:

"GI shoots 5 others in Korea; 4 killed"

This tragic event happened within the United States Army's 2nd Infantry Division serving in South Korea.

While conducting a live-fire qualification course with M-16 rifles at Ingman Range, Camp Casey, South Korea on June 5, 1981, five U.S. soldiers were gunned down. Four were killed and one was seriously wounded. The individual initially arrested for the shootings was a black soldier from New Jersey who was apprehended at the range after becoming hysterical and claiming to have started a revolution.

Two days later, another soldier was arrested. He was also a black soldier. The victims of the shootings were white.

The Ingman Range shootings presented many challenges to the 2nd Infantry Division Public Affairs Office. The newsworthiness of this incident dictated reporting the circumstances to the American public via the news media. The internal public of the division likewise had to be kept informed of the situation.

Specific public affairs issues included coordination between levels of Army public affairs staffs from the division to Department of the Army; initial responses to an onslaught of media inquiries; public attention focussed on the 2nd Infantry Division at the time of the incident; possible racial hostilities as a result of the incident translating to racial conflict within the division; and the news media attention on the accused's trial by court martial.
This study examines the procedures of the Offices of Public Affairs assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division and higher headquarters as a result of the shootings at Ingman Range on June 5, 1981. This study further addresses the public affairs strategies, planning and coordination between the 2nd Infantry Division headquarters, the Eighth U.S. Army, and the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C.