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Explanation of President Bush's new national security strategy and General Colin Powell's Base Force. Sources of strategy. Analysis of major unresolved issues, such as: unilateral U.S. capability for war at strategic, operational, and tactical levels; impact on DoD organizations and joint military operations, the industrial and manpower base. Chapter on changing requirements for the U.S. intelligence community. Chapter on impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Analysis of role on Congress in formulating the strategy and their response to date. Implications for maritime and nuclear forces. Regional assessment from perspective of Asia and Europe. Study concludes that the major stress points of new strategy are: industrial reconstitution, additional requirements for intelligence, and the role that will be played by allies and the Congress. Includes impact of August 1991 coup in Soviet Union and unilateral actions announced by President Bush at end of September 1991.
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INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
The United States has reached a milestone in the evolution of its post-Cold War security policy. On August 2, 1990, President George Bush unveiled a new national security strategy, renouncing many of the principles that guided U.S. defense policies for the past 40 years and charting a radically different approach to security in the future. This book analyzes the implications of the new strategy for U.S. forces and alliance relations, and examines the difficulties of transforming President Bush's vision into reality.

General (GEN) Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and a principal architect of the new strategy, cites two factors that helped dictate a sharp break with past security policy. The first is the "absolute, total demise of the Cold War." Powell argues that "The Cold War and all of its military totems are gone: the Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain, the Warsaw Pact, the Brezhnev Doctrine, all gone, tossed into the dustbin of history...." The second factor is that of plummeting defense budgets. Powell states that "with the Cold War ending, the American and other Western publics and their elected representatives are clamoring for, and rightfully expecting, reductions in defense spending" -- a steep downward trend "which will not be reversed."

However, while those changes highlight the need to recast U.S. defense policy, they will also make that task increasingly difficult. More than Cold War nostalgia prompted GEN Powell to lament the loss of "old tried and true buddies" such as the Warsaw Pact. From a strategic planning perspective, the Soviet threat of the past 40 years made life frightening, but also relatively simple. Most Americans agreed who the archenemy was. The task was to tailor U.S. foreign and defense policies to meet that challenge. Indeed, since the move toward "competitive strategies" began in the mid-1980s, the dominant trend in Department of Defense planning has been to shape U.S. programs ever more carefully to exploit Soviet weaknesses and channel U.S.-Soviet competition in favorable directions.

President Bush has broken with that trend. Under the new national security strategy, the U.S. will no longer focus on the requirement to fight the Soviet Union in a global scale, short warning, Europe-centered war. Instead, down-sized U.S. regional forces will be maintained in the Atlantic and Pacific areas, with a relatively small contingency force created to fight what President Bush calls "come as you are conflicts" in the Third World. To guard against the possible resurgence of the Soviet Cold War threat or the rise of some other powerful adversary, the U.S. will retain the ability to "reconstitute" the large-scale forces needed to deter (and, if necessary, defeat) that adversary in a global war. Reconstitution in this sense does not rely on
The mobilization of reserves; most reserve forces will be slashed under the new national security strategy. Rather, reconstitution involves creating "wholly new forces."

This strategy is unlikely to be implemented exactly as President Bush has outlined it. As he points out, Congress and the President share the responsibility for reshaping U.S. defenses. Unless President Bush can convince Congress to appropriate the funds necessary to restructure U.S. forces, and to enact other changes proposed by that new strategy, key elements of that strategy may never move beyond the realm of wishful thinking. U.S. allies in NATO and the Far East will also have an important say over the American military posture abroad.

Yet, neither is the new national security strategy doomed to failure. President Bush has taken a giant step toward freeing U.S. security policy from the dictates of the Cold War; the fate of that strategy depends on the military, foreign policy and budget issues it will raise, and on the way such issues are resolved in the domestic policymaking process and in negotiations with U.S. allies. What is new about the new national security strategy? What sort of factors will be crucial to its effectiveness and political viability?

NEW PRINCIPLES, NEW UNCERTAINTIES

The end of the Cold War has prompted an outpouring of analysis as to how American strategy ought to change. The new national security strategy advocated by President Bush does not go as far as some of these proposals in recasting the ends and means of U.S. policy. Nevertheless, Bush has proposed some important departures from the past.

One of the most striking changes in the new national security strategy is the decline in U.S. defense spending it would incorporate. That decline began prior to the Aspen speech: U.S. defense spending has been falling in real terms since the mid-1980s. Moreover, while Bush's strategy helped set the stage for further defense reductions, the actual cutbacks slated for FY 1991-95 were negotiated in the "budget summit" with Congress months after the Aspen speech. Congressional pressure for still deeper cuts has grown in the aftermath of the Soviet coup attempt of August, 1991. Nevertheless, the cuts already accommodated under the new strategy would accelerate a fundamental reallocation of U.S. resources. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney points out that under the new strategy, the U.S. defense budget will fall to less than four percent of the gross national product by Fiscal Year 1995, "the lowest level since before the attack on Pearl Harbor."

The strategy would also reduce the ability of the U.S. to use force as an instrument of policy. GEN Powell states that with the 25 percent cutback in U.S. force envisioned by the
strategy, the U.S. would be unable to fight the 1991 war against Iraq in the same manner as did before: "We probably could have done it, but it would have been a longer and much more difficult process."10

However, Powell argues that the U.S. is unlikely to need that ability. With much of the Iraqi army in ruins and the Soviet Union in disarray, Powell sees no threat looming in the next five years of the scale posed by Iraq in 1991. "Think hard about it," Powell has said. "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung."11 If this is threat assessment remains valid, the decline in U.S. military capabilities may not matter.

The proposed cutback in U.S. defenses may even bolster overall American power and influence in the realms most important in the post Cold War era. Paul Kennedy argues that by reducing defense spending, particularly in research and development (R&D), the U.S. could improve its economic competitiveness in a way that is more suitable for carrying out "a number one power's peacetime strategy."12 But it is not clear that all such cuts would be of equal benefit to the U.S. economy, or that if and when a future military threat emerges to U.S. interests an economic response could counter that threat.13 What is clear is that under the new national security strategy, the U.S. will become a declining military power in terms of overall force levels and defense expenditures, unable to use that power as it has in the past.

Whether the ends of U.S. policy will be scaled back accordingly is more problematic. The President's official statement of U.S. strategy, The National Security Strategy of the United States, declares that "we cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's problems."14 Yet, that document also identifies a set of objectives so global and inclusive as to suggest that there may be little decline in the scale of U.S. foreign commitments. The U.S. is supposed to "deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies," as well as "discourage military adventurism" and pursue a variety of other goals abroad.15

Within these general objectives, however, some specific U.S. defense commitments are bound to melt away. Just as the Soviet threat once helped the U.S. to define its interests abroad, so the decline of that threat will encourage U.S. decisionmakers to shed commitments that now seem anachronistic. But the strongest pressure to narrow U.S. ends will come from declining means. For example, President Bush has emphasized that "important American interests in Europe and the Pacific" make maintaining a forward presence there "an indispensable element of our strategy."16 Yet GEN Powell notes that with the cuts envisioned in the new strategy, that presence will have to be much smaller.17 Those reductions could limit the objectives pursued by the U.S. abroad.

The new national strategy would also recast what GEN Powell has called a central military strategic concept: deterrence.
Powell argues that "deterrence must continue to be the motivating and organizing concept for America's armed forces." However, with the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union (particularly after the failed coup of August, 1991), U.S. strategic nuclear targeting policy and other elements of strategic deterrence are in flux.

Conventional deterrence would change still more radically under the new strategy. For the past 40 years, U.S. active and reserve forces, backed up by the threat of nuclear escalation, were supposed to help deter Soviet attacks against American allies. The need for such deterrence has declined. However, if a renewed large-scale threat emerged, conventional deterrence would no longer be based on reserve and active forces in being. Apart from relatively small contingency and regional U.S. forces, deterrence would be based on the threat of reconstitution: that is, on the perceived willingness and ability of the U.S. to generate new forces on a scale (and with the speed) sufficient to defeat even Cold War-size threats. This new deterrent posture demands that "we and our allies must be able to reconstitute a credible defense faster that any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense." Indeed, "the ability to reconstitute is what allows us safely and selectively to scale back and restructure our forces in-being."

Would the U.S be able to reconstitute with the necessary speed and effectiveness? That depends in part on how vigorous the U.S. defense R&D base has been maintained, how strong an industrial base remains to transform those R&D initiatives into the mass production of weapons and platforms, and how quickly the manpower can be found to operate and maintain those advanced sorts of military systems. GEN Powell has already cited the U.S. defense industrial capability as the problem of greatest concern to the JCS, because the number of producers "of many of our critical military items is dwindling drastically and is shrinking to unacceptably low levels." Reversing that trend in the face of the much steeper overall spending cuts charted by the new strategy will be a major challenge.

Moreover, even if the industrial and manpower base exists for reconstitution in two years, can the U.S. count on having two years of warning? The authors of the new strategy recognize that this reliance on speedy reconstitution puts a special burden on our intelligence. However, the U.S. has suffered failures of both tactical and strategic warning in the past, and may so again in the future. The difference is that the increased dependence of the U.S. on warning and intelligence will also come at a time of declining force levels and defense spending. A smaller U.S. military will be less capable of withstanding the initial setbacks caused by failures of intelligence. This casts a different light on Secretary Cheney's point that under the new strategy, U.S. defense spending as a percentage of gross national product will fall to the lowest level since the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
Even if warning is received, the question remains as to whether the U.S. would respond in a timely and effective fashion. GEN George Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, notes that "warning time isn't warning time unless you exploit it; otherwise it is wasted time."21 A number of factors could create special difficulties for beginning the reconstitution process sufficiently early. First, while reconstitution depends on early in the emergence of a threat, warning indicators at time are likely to be ambiguous. Unless the appearance of an obvious villain makes it easy to identify the rise of a hostile regime in the Soviet Union or elsewhere, the recognition of such a threat could be a long and politically disputatious process.

The expense of reconstitution will mitigate against reacting against such ambiguous warning indicators. To build wholly new U.S. forces to help meet a large-scale threat would be enormously costly. Even if current deficit concerns persist, Congress would almost certainly agree to appropriate increased defense funds once that threat became apparent. However, because reconstitution demands an early response, the President might have to ask Congress for such funds when the severity of the threat was still unclear, and when the importance of that threat relative to domestic spending needs was open to honest disagreement.

This reluctance to act could be reinforced by the perceived danger of doing so. If policymakers confront a potential adversary, they may fear that U.S. defensive preparations could be interpreted as a hostile act, thereby provoking the adversary to build up his own forces and increasing the danger of war. Administration officials and members of Congress who wanted to avoid such a "spiral" of conflict might argue against reconstitution.22 Yet, because reconstitution depends on a prompt, large-scale response to the emergence of a potential threat, any such delay could render the U.S. response concept ineffective (and perhaps even encourage a truly aggressive adversary to behave more recklessly).

CRITICAL ISSUES

To cite these problems is not to argue that they are insoluble. For example, GEN Butler has offered a promising approach to the issue of responding to ambiguous warning, wherein U.S. decisionmakers would be given a set of "graduated deterrence responses" to chose from rather than facing an all-or nothing choice.23 Nevertheless, the new national security strategy raises a number of issues that merit further analysis. This book does not attempt to judge whether the strategy ought to be adopted. Rather, the chapters that follow assess the potential impact the President's proposal on U.S. forces and alliance relations, and examine the difficulties that could arise in implementing his plan for the post-Cold War era.
The ability of the defense industrial and manpower base to support reconstitution is crucial for the new strategy. After describing the strategy in detail, Jim Tritten examines that reconstitution issue and the larger problems surrounding it. The strategy will also depend on new intelligence and warning requirements. Tom Grassey examines those requirements and the ability of the U.S. to meet them.

Another topic meriting further consideration is effect the new strategy will have on forces in being, now and in the future. President Bush has argued that the U.S. must recast its forces to meet the needs of the post-Cold War era, rather than merely downsizing its current forces. But exactly how the new national security strategy would affect U.S. military capabilities remains to be seen. Now that the war against Iraq has provided a test of U.S. military effectiveness, albeit with weapons built for the Cold War, Mike Poccalpyko examines the lessons that are being learned—-and mislearned—-in the evolution of U.S. forces. Congress will also have an important say over those forces and the implementation of the national security strategy as a whole. Paul Stockton analyzes the initial congressional response to the strategy and the outlook for future action on Capitol Hill. As outlined by President Bush, the new strategy could have a particularly strong impact on maritime forces. Sam Tangredi examines that impact, while Bruce MacDonald analyzes how the strategy (together with changes within the Soviet Union) will affect nuclear forces.

That strategy is less explicit in recasting the ends, rather than the means, of U.S. policy. The recognition that the U.S. no longer needs to build its strategy around the Soviet threat lies at the heart of the strategy. Nevertheless, President Bush has yet to clarify how U.S. foreign defense commitments and allied relationships will be recast accordingly, or how the shrinking of U.S. forward deployments under the strategy may contribute (perhaps inadvertently) to such changes. Ed Olson examines the implications of the new national security strategy for the U.S. and Asia. Jan Breemer performs a similar analysis for Europe. In the Conclusion, Jim Wirtz reviews the factors most critical to the fate of strategy, and examines how the problems raised by Bush's proposal may eventually be resolved.

NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.

(2) "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium" (as delivered), Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, CO), The White House, August 2, 1990.

(3) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Washington Chapter of the Armed Forces
Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)—The Shoreham Hotel, 14 December 1990," as delivered, p. 13.

(4) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the 72nd Annual National Convention of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, August 30, 1990," as delivered, pp. 6-7.


(7) "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium" p. 5.


(9) Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, p. ix.


(11) Ibid.


(16) "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium," pp. 2-3.

(17) Wolffe, "Powell: 'I'm running out of demons'."

(18) "Statement of General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 7 February 1991," p. 5.


(20) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the American Defense Preparedness Association Board of Directors, Reception and Dinner, The Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., 3 April 1991" - As Delivered, p. 18.


On August 2, 1990, President George Bush unveiled a new national security strategy in a speech at the Aspen Institute entitled "In Defense of Defense." That title is misleading. Far from defending the U.S. military establishment from the winds of change, Bush proposed a dramatic restructuring of U.S. forces and defense policy in response to the decline of the Cold War. This chapter examines the crucial elements of Bush's new national security strategy and some unanswered questions that surround it.

The new national security strategy calls for recasting U.S. defenses around four major principles: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The first three of these sound familiar. However, beneath the superficial similarity to past U.S. principles, important differences exist. The strategy calls for maintaining a much smaller active and reserve force mix primarily focused on presence and world-wide major contingency operations—not a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. This shift from a focus on the "worst case" threat to the "most likely" case will have major programming and strategy implications in both the near term and the long run.

If forces were required to fight a major war against the Soviet Union, the U.S. assumes that there would be sufficient time to reconstitute them. Specifically, the President has apparently accepted the consensus of his intelligence community that the Soviet Union would need "at least one to two years or longer to regenerate the capability for a European theater-wide offensive or a global conflict." The U.S. assumes, therefore, that it will have two year's warning for a Europe-centered global war with the USSR.

The most important factors which drove this shift in defense planning are the collapse of the Cold War military threat from the Soviet Union, and (given that collapse) the decision to cut U.S. defense spending by at least 25 percent from fiscal years 1991 - 1995. This reduction is not simply the low end of a periodic cycle of fluctuating defense expenditures—it is a recognition that the total resources devoted to defense need not be as high so long as the current political climate remains. Given the changes inside the Soviet Union following the August 1991 coup attempt, the need for a new post-Cold War national security strategy is even more apparent. As Clausewitz wrote, war has "... its own grammar, but not its own logic." The old political logic and lexicon of the Cold War has changed - it is now time to change the military grammar.

This chapter sets the stage for examining the critical security issues raised by President Bush's strategy. After a
brief overview of how the strategy was formulated, the chapter examines the main elements of the strategy and its proposed changes in U.S. forces. The final section identifies some unresolved issues surrounding the new strategy.

SOURCES OF THE NEW STRATEGY

Instead of a single or even a few documents which describe the new national security strategy and its associated force structure, a series of speeches, articles, and reports that must be consulted to gain a full understanding of Bush's proposal. The Appendix to this report provides the proper chronology and full documentation for all primary and secondary source documents.

Although the President first outlined the new strategy in his speech at Aspen on August 2, 1990, important details were gradually revealed by official spokesmen in the following months. General (GEN) Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), described the key elements of the new national security strategy and associated force structure in a series of speeches beginning late in August 1990 and lasting throughout the next twelve months.

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Dick Cheney first spoke about the new strategy at the 32nd Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on September 6, 1990, and has likewise continued to provide details throughout the next year. Cheney noted at the IISS Conference that a series of Congressional and other briefings were to have followed the Aspen speech, but that he and GEN Powell were able to meet only once, on August 2, 1990 with the chairman and ranking members of the four major Congressional armed services committees.

The former Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Lieutenant General (LTG) George Lee Butler, USAF, gave additional detailed information late in September 1990 at the National Press Club. From the tenor and content of LTG Butler's address, it appears that he had a major hand in developing of the new national security strategy or force structure.

Two major sources for Department of Defense (DoD) information each year are the annual testimony and reports to Congress. In an rather unusual move, the February 1991 DoD testimony preceded delivery of the annual DoD report. The 1991 SECDEF Annual Report to the President and the Congress was actually issued at the end of February, although dated January. This report specifically addresses the new national security strategy and provides a force structure designed for budgetary and political give and take. For those who still did not understand that national strategy and force structure were changing, a copy of the President's Aspen speech was appended.
Informative testimony was presented, in February 1991, by the SECDEF and the CJCS before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), House Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). In mid-March 1991, "Scooter" Libby and Vice CJCS, Admiral (ADM) David E. Jeremiah, USN, appeared before the HASC and provided the first unclassified details on future force structure. By the end of March 1991, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued their 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) - a major source document on both the new strategy and force structure.

The White House's March 1990 edition of the National Security Strategy of the United States should have been revised about the same time as the initial series of speeches were made about the new national security strategy. This document ought to have appeared at least at the time of the Administration's initial testimony on the strategy before Congress and release of the SECDEF's annual report. The revised version of the National Security Strategy of the United States, incorporating the new national security strategy, finally appeared in August 1991. This publication, a major source document for the new strategy, codifies what had been said previously by others, and added a few new details.

The JCS are preparing a follow-on document, termed the National Military Strategy for the 1990s, that should be available before the end of the year. The JCS National Military Strategy will be based upon President Bush's: Aspen speech, National Security Strategy of the United States, and further explanations of what is meant by the "new world order." This new JCS document is being prepared in consultation with the commanders of the various unified and specified commands. GEN Powell gave a preview of this document when he testified, in September 1991, to Congress on the Future of U.S. Military Bases.

At the end of September, President Bush addressed the nation on national television. Bush outlined the new strategy and Base Force and the reasons for them. The President then announced major initiatives to reduce nuclear forces, our nuclear alert status, expand strategic arms control agreements with the USSR, and to provide for limited defenses against ballistic missile attack.

Reviewing the list of primary source documents, a number of implications emerge. First, there appears to be a very "top-down" re-direction in defense strategy and force structure. From the public record, there were only a handful of individuals who orchestrated the new concepts and there were few authorized spokesmen. The usual indicators of a debate were absent - discussion by other senior military officials does not appear until well after the new concepts were articulated in public. The manner in which the strategy was announced tells the story of a major review and change in Administration policy done by a few individuals at the top rather than with the full participation of the vast federal bureaucracy.
The second point is that, despite their obvious concern with Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the SECDEF and the CJCS were simultaneously fashioning the new national security strategy and force structure. The Secretary has stated repeatedly that there were two major elements underway with defense in late 1990 and early 1991— the military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the new national security strategy and force structure. Secretary Cheney and GEN Powell were two of only a few people who were involved in both.

A third matter is that the new national security strategy is nameless. Inside the Washington beltway, the strategy is known as the "new strategy," the new "Defense Strategy," the "President's strategy," and "the U.S. military's new regional contingencies strategy." It has also been referred to, informally, as the "Aspen Strategy," the "reconstitution strategy," "U.S. National Defense Policy," and the "strategy for the new world order," but it appears that the Administration will let academia, or the press, select the title that will appear in the history books. In this report, the strategy is uniformly referred to as the "new national security strategy."

The reason the National Security Strategy of the United States did not appear until August 1991 and that the strategy still lacks a formal name, may stem from the fact that the internal debate and discussion within the Administration has not ended. Rather than a "bottom-up" product of endless hours of staff work, involving all the major defense and industrial participants, the new national security strategy is analogous to recent shifts in military doctrine in the USSR—with perhaps even more debate in the USSR that has yet occurred in the U.S. By the end of September 1991, enough details of the President's new strategic concepts were available to make an in-depth assessment of the new national security strategy's impact.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Among GEN Powell's most frequent themes in discussing the new national security strategy over the past year were enduring and emerging realities. According to Powell, the two major emerging realities that prompted the new national security strategy were the end of the Cold War and declining defense budgets. Powell identified a number of enduring and emerging realities addressed by the new strategy: persistent Soviet military power, vital interests across the Atlantic, in Europe and the Middle East, and in the Pacific, and the unknown threat—the crisis that no one expected. The new national security strategy responds to these concerns by adopting the following principles of U.S. defense policy.
Reconstitution Against the Soviet Union

Secretary Cheney said shortly before his departure from Moscow in October 1990, that "We are changing our strategy and our doctrine as a result of changes in the Soviet Union and changes in Europe. We no longer believe it is necessary to us to be prepared to fight a major land war in Europe. ..." The shift in focus from the Soviet threat and a European-centered global war is a major change in both program and war planning. The Armed Services must now attempt to justify procuring defense programs for reasons other than those routinely used since the end of World War II. Already, the Services and the JCS have begun reviewing existing war and contingency plans for their responsiveness to the new political realities.

A fundamental component of the President's new national security strategy is that, assuming a two-year warning of a Europe-centered global war with the USSR, the U.S. can generate wholly new forces - rebuild or "reconstitute" them if necessary. Specifically, current forces deemed unnecessary will be disbanded, not put into the reserves, since the risk is deemed acceptable. Reconstitution is the ability to restore a global war-fighting capability against the Soviet Union. It includes mobilizing manpower; forming, training, and fielding combat units; and reactivating the defense industrial base.

Reconstitution is not the same thing as mobilization or regeneration - it is more like what the United Kingdom had planned during the interwar years, when it assumed that up to ten years of strategic warning would be available. New defense manufacturing capability and new forces and military would be built essentially from the ground up. Preserving this capability means protecting our infrastructure and the defense industrial base, preserving our lead in critical technologies, and stockpiling critical materials. Preserving our alliance structure is another element of our ability to reconstitute a more significant forward-based military presence when, and if, it is ever again required.

Crisis Response

There is a risk that the end of the Cold War may bring an increased risk of regional conflicts and greater unpredictability in the international security environment. Today's crises are extremely dangerous due to the proliferation of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction and the demonstrated willingness of Third World nations to use them. GEN Powell reminded Congress, in February 1991, about Operation DESERT STORM where: "We are clearly at the 'high end' of technology in a conflict with a so-called 'Third World' nation."
The U.S. crisis response strategy will focus on limiting vertical and horizontal escalation as well as escalation over time; i.e. swift termination and containing the conflict to the theater of origin. Obviously, actions outside the affected theater will be considered if they are necessary to ensure success for a military operation. Prior to committing U.S. forces, the U.S. military will want to ensure that there is a clear and present risk to U.S. vital interests and that some military objective is actually attainable. Moreover, the support and participation of allies in such conflicts is essential—especially for the reintroduction of formidable American military power overseas.

For ease of budget discussion, the U.S. often has used an illustrative planning scenario. Any planning for contingency responses by the U.S. should include the ability to react to more than one "canned" predicament or a single scenario. The JCS have now developed a family of likely (and perhaps even unlikely) events for which the U.S. may elect to commit military forces. Any regional crisis that has the potential to escalate into a global conflict should, and will, receive priority.

The conventional conflict scenarios now used by the JCS are contained in this year's JMNA. They range from peacetime engagement to war escalating from a European crisis with full mobilization. Contingencies include: (1) counter-insurgency/counter-narcotics; (2) lesser regional contingencies, with two sub-cases (2,000 and 6000 nautical miles from the U.S.); (3) a major regional contingency in Korea; and (4) a major regional contingency in Southwest Asia.

The JCS recognize that not all crises will evolve in the same manner. The JMNA outlines four possible types of crises: (1) a slow-building crisis; (2) a fast-rising crisis; (3) imminent conflict; and (4) conflict. The length and intensity of combat, for planning purposes, is assumed to be 450 days for counter-insurgency/counter-narcotics, 90 days of low-mid intensity for lesser regional contingencies, 120 days of mid-high intensity for major regional contingencies, and more than 50 days of mid-high intensity for a war escalating from a European crisis.

Responses to these contingencies are contained in a series of measured response options. Responses could include a flexible minimal force deterrent response, a major deterrent response (Operation DESERT SHIELD), and more worst-case responses where combat begins soon after the insertion of troops or simultaneously. This program of contingency types and measured responses appears to be a building-block and force sequencing approach to crisis management. Rather than requiring the deliberate planning against a single and known threat, the post-Cold War era will be need more flexible adaptive planning.

The most complex military operation outlined for planning purposes in the JMNA is a war escalating from a European crisis.
The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States speaks of a "potential threat to a single flank or region" and a "limited, conventional threat to Europe." This planning scenario is not the old European-centered global war with the USSR but rather something less, handled by existing active duty and reserve forces, and not requiring reconstitution.

Peacetime Engagement

According to Secretary Cheney's February 1991 Congressional testimony, the U.S. will also devise a dynamic "peacetime engagement" strategy to deter low intensity conflict and promote international stability. The U.S. armed forces will participate in that strategy largely in the form of overseas presence. In his Aspen speech, the President alluded to maintaining a forward presence by exercises. GEN Powell stated at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), in December 1990, that forward presence includes military assistance programs. In his February 1991 testimony to Congress, GEN Powell expanded his definition of presence to include, but not be limited to: stationed forces, rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military relations. The JMNA adds combined planning, nation-assistance, peacekeeping efforts, logistic arrangements, supporting lift, and exchanges to the list of forms of military presence. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States includes training missions and prepositioned equipment. Other pronouncements include forces afloat and intelligence sharing and cooperation. These expanded definitions should be viewed as attempts to ensure that all planned future activities will satisfy the requirement to maintain an overseas presence with a smaller force.

The new National Security Strategy of the United States declares that regional crises along with forward presence "will be the primary determinant of the size and structure of our future forces." After assessing the military threats and the recommended Defense Program, the JCS in the JMNA conclude that "the Defense Program provides minimum capability to accomplish national security objectives." The Base Force is that minimum defense programming force structure necessary to meet America's enduring needs. It is to this program that we will now turn.

THE BASE FORCE

Although details of the President's new national security strategy are still being debated, active duty and ready reserve forces are likely to decrease significantly. According to an initial report in the New York Times, the "bottom line" numbers discussed in June 1990 at the White House were: Army, 12 active
and 6 ready reserve divisions (currently 18 active and 10 reserve) and 2 "cadre" or reconstitutable reserve divisions; Air Force, 25 active and reserve tactical air wings (currently 36); Navy, 11-12 aircraft carriers (currently 14); and Marine Corps, 150,000 personnel (currently 196,000).

Subsequent reports in the media and the recommended force levels delivered to the Congress by the Administration are slightly higher, and reflect budgetary negotiations that parallel the developing new national security strategy. Force levels discussed in the most recent (September 1991) reports include the following additions and changes: a Navy of 448 ships (down from 545), including 12 deployable aircraft carriers and 1 devoted to training, 13 carrier air wings (CVWs), 150 surface combatants, with no battleships; a 3 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine Corps of 159,000 personnel with simultaneous amphibious lift for the assault echelons of 2½ Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs); 15 active and 11 Air Force tactical fighter wings (TFWs), and 181 strategic bombers (down from 268) including 75 B-2s.

Army divisions will apparently break down as follows: active component - 7 armored, 4 light, 1 infantry; reserve component - 5 armored and 1 light with an additional 2 armored in the new cadre division category. As the U.S. government attempts to complete a new budget cycle, we will see numerous other force levels suggested and debated. The June 1990 New York Times report should be viewed in the context of a minimally acceptable force that probably was agreed to by the participants before events in Iraq and Kuwait.

Termed the Base Force, the new force structure advocated by GEN Powell will be organized into four basic military components: Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive; Atlantic; Pacific; and a Contingency Force; and four supporting capabilities: Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research and Development (R&D). This force structure and supporting capabilities are not contained in the President's speech but were developed parallel to and in support of the President's new national security strategy. What constitutes those forces will be debated throughout the next year. These "Forces" are not meant to represent new commands, but rather force packages much the same that "Tactical Air Forces," according to the annual DoD posture statement, includes aviation forces assigned to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Once acquired, these packages would then be available to the existing Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) in the field.

The Strategic Force

The Strategic Force will initially include those offensive forces that result from START, as modified by the President's national television speech at the end of September 1991. Bush announced that he has ordered the immediate stand-down of alert bombers and those intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs)
already scheduled for deactivation under START. Previously, START II goals of 4500 and 3000 warheads for each side had been discussed openly—clearly those numbers are now on the high side of our future nuclear arsenal.

Soviet reaction to the President's bold suggestions is eagerly awaited. After the dramatic events of August 1991 in the Soviet Union, it is possible unilateral cuts in the Soviet arsenal may be welcome; a shift in government and internal power may also bring about an abrupt change in deterrence philosophy from war-fighting to assured destruction with minimal forces.

In their February 1991 Congressional testimony, Secretary Cheney and GEN Powell stated that they were prepared to reduce strategic bombers from 268 to 181, halt the construction of OHIO class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at eighteen, not retrofit all of those submarines with the more advanced TRIDENT II (D-5) missiles, and consider only the PEACEKEEPER (MX) rail garrison ICBM and small ICBM as R&D programs, without plans for their deployment. President Bush told the nation in September 1991 that the mobile PEACEKEEPER and small ICBM programs will be terminated, retaining the non-mobile small ICBM as the only U.S. strategic nuclear missile program. ADM Jeremiah told Congress, in March 1991, that the Base Force would include 550 ICBMs.

Reducing the offensive threat dramatically to such lower numbers suggests revisiting the suitability of strategic defenses. GEN Powell included the strategic defense initiative (SDI) in his August 1990 American Legion, December 1990 RUSI and Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) speeches, and his February 1991 The Officer article. ADM Jeremiah outlined the need for SDI in a December 1990 speech to the President's National Security Telecommunications Committee: "...against an attack by a major power..." and "also against Third World weapons of mass destruction delivered by ballistic missiles."

The CinC, U.S. Space Command, GEN Donald J. Kutyna, USAF, discussed the need for SDI and the Third World ballistic missile threat in his January 1991 Space Day briefing. He specifically noted Libyan Colonel Quadhafi's April 1990 statement that he would have fired missiles at New York had he the capability, when previously attacked by U.S. forces. President Bush said in his State of the Union address, in January 1991, that SDI would be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes against the U.S., its forces overseas, and friends and allies.

In his February 1991 testimony to Congress and subsequent written report to Congress, Secretary Cheney outlined a reorientation of SDI to a system of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)—indicating that it would be space, ground, and sea-based. The initial objective of GPALS would be protection against accidental, unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic missile strikes. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the
United States notes that with adequate funding, GPALS could protect troops in the field by the mid-1990s and the U.S. itself by the turn of the century. The system should be only half the size of the Phase I plan associated with SDI. In September 1991, the President once again raised the issue of strategic defenses--this time in the context of a limited deployment in cooperation with the USSR. It is likely that strategic defenses will at least continue as an R&D program.

An obvious area that demands clarification is the increased nuclear role for naval and air forces replacing ground-based weapons withdrawn from Europe. GEN Powell stated in both speeches in December 1990 that the U.S. remains committed to a triad of offensive forces, but that we would probably increase reliance on sea-based systems. In addition, he stated in the AFCEA speech that "...we must make sure that our residual Strategic Forces are second to none."

The Atlantic Force

The conventional military forces of the U.S. appear to be headed for both reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic Force will include residual forces in Europe, those forward-deployed to Europe, and the continental U.S. (CONUS)-based reinforcing force (including heavy ground forces). The Atlantic Force would contain a significant reserve component. This force would be responsible for Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia, recognizing that in the future the Middle East threat is on a par with that to Europe, thus demanding the same type of response. That this force is not called the European Force indicates both the shift in emphasis of the new national security strategy and the apparent desire to alter the concept for employment, and perhaps command, of the forces normally assigned to the Atlantic, European, and Middle Eastern theaters.

GEN Powell stated in his December 1990 RUSI speech that the residual Atlantic Force retained in Europe would consist of a heavy Army component (defined as perhaps at Corps strength) with supporting air forces. In his testimony to Congress, in February 1991, GEN Powell stated that the European forward-based Atlantic Force would consist of mechanized and armored ground forces.

In his March 1991 testimony to Congress, ADM Jeremiah gave the first unclassified breakdown of exactly what was destined for the Atlantic and other Forces. The U.S. will retain in Europe: two Army divisions and about three Air Force TFWs. In his September 1991 Congressional testimony, Powell used a 150,000-level to describe the residual level.

In his December 1990 AFCEA remarks, GEN Powell further stated that forward presence for the Atlantic Force means Marines in the Mediterranean and strong maritime forces. In his testimony to Congress, in February 1991, GEN Powell stated that the
European forward-based Atlantic Force amphibious forces should be capable of forced entry operations. According to ADM Jeremiah, in March 1991, the residual maritime forces in Europe will be one carrier battle group (CVBG) and an amphibious ready group (ARG). The JMNA refers to an Atlantic Force with one CVBG and one Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed continuously in the Mediterranean Sea or eastern Atlantic Ocean. The notional force size of a MEU is 2,500 personnel with fifteen days combat sustainment. This is hardly a residual European-based capability for significant forced entry.

In his AFCEA remarks, GEN Powell stated that forward presence for the Atlantic Force means access in the Middle East, Allied interoperability and flexible command, control, and communications systems, and military assistance programs. All spokesmen have told Congress that there will also be some residual presence in the Middle East. In his September 1991 testimony to Congress, GEN Powell defined our residual presence as one CVBG, an ARG, and prepositioned material.

Atlantic Force forward presence will be backed by a powerful and rapid reinforcement capability. In his AFCEA address, GEN Powell stated that Atlantic Force reinforcement and sustaining forces capability would consist of a mix of active and reserve heavy Army divisions and tactical fighter aircraft. In March and August 1991, ADM Jeremiah identified that capability as consisting of 4 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre reserve Army divisions,18 2 active and 11 reserve Air Force TFWs, 5 Navy CVBGs, 2 MEBs, and the Marine Corps reserve component. Each MEB has a notional force size of 16,000 personnel with thirty days combat sustainment.

GEN Powell told Congress in September 1991 that the Army active duty reinforcement contribution will be 3 heavy divisions that include roundout (third) brigades from the reserves component. He also said that the Marine Corps contribution to the Atlantic Force had been redefined as a MEF - notional Marine Corps force size of 48,000 personnel with sixty days sustainment. Powell also adjusted the Navy reinforcement capability to 4 CVBGs, obviously due to the assignment of 1 CVBG to Southwest Asia. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, the new Army Chief of Staff, stated, in an interview published in the October 1991 Armed Forces Journal International, that the Army's "III Corps, will be generally designated for Central Europe, although it could go to Southwest Asia."19

The Atlantic Force will be the backbone of America's future conventional deterrence for an area of the world that has dominated defense thinking for fifty years. Although there is no specific reference to dual-committing forces from one theater to another, it should be noted that Japan-based U.S. forces participated in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It should be obvious that if we reduce our residual force in Europe to those outlined above, it would strain them to be dual-committed to the Contingency Force. However, GEN Powell told Congress, in September 1991, that the concept of "strategic agility" applied
to force structure means that European-based U.S. forces will continue to be available for crises outside of the Continent.

The Pacific Force

In September 1990, LTG Butler stated "...that the U.S. could undertake a prudent, phased series of steps to reduce modestly our force presence in Korea, as well as Japan and elsewhere." GEN Powell told Congress, in February 1991, that "...we can initiate a gradual transition toward a partnership in which ROK [Republic of Korea] forces assume the leading role on the Peninsula. However, should deterrence fail, in-place and reinforcing US forces would still be required to blunt, reverse and defeat the type of short-warning attack that North Korea is still clearly capable of mounting."

The Pacific Force will include a modest and chiefly maritime residual forward-based and forward-deployed force in Korea, Japan and elsewhere in the theater, and reinforcing forces located in CONUS. ADM Jeremiah outlined that modest force in his March 1991 testimony. In Korea, we will initially retain 1 Army division and 1-2 Air Force TFWs; in Japan, 1-2 Air Force TFWs and 1 home-based Navy CVBG. A MEB will operate in the Western Pacific for most of each year. GEN Sullivan stated in an October 1991 published interview that the Army's I Corps will be earmarked for the Pacific theater.

GEN Powell stated in his December 1990 RUSI speech that "the bulk of American Army and Air Force power in the Pacific would be as reinforcements ... using Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental United States as springboards." ADM Jeremiah defined that reinforcement in Hawaii and Alaska as a light Army division (probably the 25th Infantry Division), an Air Force TFW, and a MEB. He stated that in CONUS, there would be an additional MEB and 5 Navy CVBGs and that the modest reserve components in Alaska and Hawaii would be allocated to the Pacific Force. In his Congressional testimony in September 1991, GEN Powell stated that the Army contribution might eventually be 2 divisions, but that this subject depended upon how the Alaskan and Hawaiian reserve component was organized.

The fate of the Marines on Okinawa also remains unclear. Powell said that the overall Marine Corps contributions to the Pacific Force included a MEF--adding, however, that it would be forward-deployed. The Marine Corps does not even currently forward-deploy a MEF in the Pacific. Perhaps the Chairman meant that a MEF would be assigned to the Pacific Force and that a MEB would be forward-deployed.

In his AFCEA address, GEN Powell stated that "In short, the Pacific Force would continue our very successful economy of force operation in this critical region." It is unlikely that the modest-sized Army and Air Force Pacific Force assets would have a
dual-commitment to the European theater in a revitalized "swing strategy" but it is clear that any substantial land war in Asia would require "borrowing" forces from elsewhere.

Is there a need to retain expensive overseas bases in the Philippines, and elsewhere, under the new strategic concept? If the Cold War was our original justification for the presence of large forces in the Pacific, and if the Cold War is over, then it is ended in the Pacific as well.21 If forces and bases are to be permanently retained overseas, it should be for other reasons, and those reasons should be clearly articulated and debated in Congress. The Congress and American public may well ask why the U.S. should remain unilaterally committed to defend nations which are not obligated to assist the U.S. in its own defense. If the U.S. significantly reduces its forces in Japan, there is a possibility that effective arguments will be provided to increase the size and/or capability of the Japanese Armed Forces. Any such possibility will be watched very carefully by China and many other Western Pacific nations.

The Contingency Force

Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the Chairman's recommended force structure is idea of a Contingency Force based in CONUS.22 For the present, each existing CinC will still retain his own forward-stationed and deployed forces for immediate contingency response. CONUS-based contingency forces will be available, as a quick-response force, to assist CinCs as well as to provide significant conventional capabilities for those areas of the world not covered by the Atlantic or Pacific Forces; i.e. Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and island nations.23

CONUS-based contingency response forces are not a new idea. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the JCS and the military services experimented with a series of similar schemes, eventually abandoned by the Kennedy Administration. A U.S. Strike Command existed from October 1961 - December 1971 as a Unified Command. Similar arrangements involved varying commands have, from time to time, been responsible for the Middle East and South Asia.

Once the U.S. Army created a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) consisting of two divisions. Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) as well as Navy and Marine Corps units, not otherwise allocated to other CinCs, were assigned to the U.S. Strike Command. Similarly, the old Rapid-Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was another precursor to the proposed Contingency Force. U.S. planning for contingencies should also benefit from the experiences of France's Force d'Action Rapide (FAR)--formed as an additional component to the French Army in 1983--with a mission similar to the proposed Contingency Force.

The Contingency Force will have a very small Reserve component; primarily of airlift and supporting forces - not combat capability. According to General Powell's Congressional testimo-
In September 1991, the Army and Air Force will commit 5 divisions and 7 TFWs to the Contingency Force. General Sullivan said in an October 1991 published interview that the Army's "XVIII Airborne Corps would be a worldwide contingency force." According to the Army Posture Statement, contingency response divisions will be structured to sustain deployments for about thirty days without augmentation by reserve components.

The Air Force will overhaul its internal structure to be more responsive to regional threats. A new "Air Combat Command" will take the place of the existing Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command. A new "Air Mobility Command" will replace the Military Airlift Command.

A MEF, most of the rapid response sealift and intertheater airlift will be available to the Contingency Force. The Navy will apparently provide dual-committed forces from the Atlantic and Pacific. Special Operations Forces appear to have a role both with the Contingency Force and the CinCs. The JMNA additionally included the following in their definition of the Contingency Force: Army airborne, air assault, light, and highly mobile heavy divisions, Air Force long-range conventional bombers, and Navy attack submarines.

LTG Butler provided the following detailed description of how the Contingency Force would function. The first stage of a Contingency Force to be used in what he termed a "graduated deterrence response," and, for program planning purposes, would consist of: Army light & airborne divisions, MEBs, Special Operations Forces, and selected Air Force units.

According to LTG Butler, this initial component of the Contingency Force would be buttressed as necessary by: carrier and amphibious forces. Normally the Navy prefers to promote the frequent call on carrier forces for immediate crisis response, and listing these forces in the second component of the Contingency Force probably reflects the land orientation of the concept. It would be wholly illogical to assume that the U.S. will require fewer responses by carrier battle groups in the future - indeed, a solid case can be made that we will send the fleet more often in the future.

The listing of amphibious forces in the second tier seems appropriate, reflects recent employment of the Marine Corps, and is consistent with the former Commandant's statement on maneuver warfighting doctrine and shift in identification of Fleet Marine Forces from "Amphibious" to "Expeditionary." Amphibious capabilities must be retained by the U.S. but in the context of tactical or operational-level regional contingency operations rather than a major strategic-level assault on Europe--GEN Powell's statement regarding the forced entry amphibious capability for the Atlantic Force notwithstanding. If another D-Day type invasion were ever required of American forces, amphibious forces would be among the forces reconstituted and built, as during World War II.
The third tier of the Contingency Force appears to be heavier forces, with the capability for long-term sustainability. Again, we have seen this application in Operation DESERT SHIELD. On April 16, 1991, Major General Fred E. Elam, USA, Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, testified before the HASC Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials that evolving national strategies require that the Army have a capability to simultaneously deploy two armored divisions anywhere in the world from the US within approximately 30 days.\(^2\)

ADM Frank Kelso, USN, told Congress, in February 1991, that a Base Force, 451-ship Navy, deploying about 30 percent of the available fleet, could provide an immediate response to a crisis anywhere in the world within seven days. It would comprise one Amphibious Strike Task Force, consisting of one CVBG and an ARG with an embarked MEU. A second CVBG could be available within fifteen days. A full MEB could arrive within thirty days. Hence, the most the sea services could deliver to a crisis area under this plan is a token force within a week, and a force about the size of one Army light division with an additional few squadrons of aircraft within a month.

It would take the sea services a 40 percent deployment rate to respond to a regional conflict with a more robust combat capability: three CVBGs and a full MEF. With the costs of providing such a high deployment rate, it is unlikely that the Navy will recommend such a posture - given its desires to replace aging hardware. Deployment rates in excess of 40 percent are necessary for the sea services to simultaneously respond with three CVBGs and a MEF in one location and another carrier elsewhere.

Although the sea services logically could have been considered the core of the new Contingency Force, the Army and Air Force can argue that they can provide faster airpower and combat capability anywhere in the world. Indeed, there have been arcane informal suggestions by Air Force personnel that their new composite wings can be expressed in terms of CVBG equivalents! Assuming that the U.S. will involve itself in overseas contingency operations only with the cooperation of host nations, and with the support of coalitions, then the Air Force/Army response may appear more cost-effective.

The clue to understanding the new crisis response portion of the new national security strategy is that it is not keyed to one service, or even to the active component having a unilateral capability. Future crisis response appears to be a joint responsibility with a mix of active and selected reserve units.
According to GEN Powell, transportation is one of the major supporting components to the new national security strategy. Mobility programs proposed by the SECDEF in his annual report included the ability to return to Europe with 4 Army divisions, 30 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons, 1 MEB, and their associated support within 10 days. Additional forces would be provided within 2-3 months. DoD will continue to build toward prepositioned equipment in Europe for 6 Army divisions and their associated support elements.

For contingencies outside Europe, the goal is to provide 5 Army divisions, together with associated air and naval forces in about 6 weeks. Ground units would fly to a future crisis, much as forces assigned to Operation DESERT SHIELD did to Saudi Arabia. Personnel will then either be married with prepositioned equipment or with equipment that arrives via sealift.

Prepositioning for ground and air forces is part of the complete package that must include intertheater lift. The equipment that must be prepositioned for even a light Army division, essentially a duplicate set, will probably make prepositioning a less attractive alternative to the Army than fast sealift. When addressing fast sealift, the military must make a tradeoff between speed and tonnage.

The U.S. is obligated to retain sufficient lift to support immediate contingency operations by either the Atlantic or the Contingency Forces. Lift requirements for the Pacific Force are less clear. Initial lift requirement will probably include the capability to continue concurrent but staggered operations but it is unlikely that funding will be provided for simultaneous crises, given the years of failure to provide lift for a 1 1/2 war strategy. The March 1991 JMNA states that the U.S. can deploy forces in all program scenarios except: (1), when two regional contingencies occur sequentially or concurrently; and (2), in the early weeks of a short-warning war in Southwest Asia.

Lift capability disclosed during Operation DESERT SHIELD will be studied and may result in new requirements and possibly additional assets. The U.S. already has special lift assets and a robust prepositioning program, but may learn from recent experience that modest increments of additional lift or prepositioned equipment are required.

Lift will probably include a modest government-owned capability in a caretaker status and civilian air and sea transportation assets engaged in normal peacetime trade. The U.S. generally met its lift requirements for Operation DESERT SHIELD with a combination of existing assets, those taken from trade, and charters of foreign vessels. The new national security strategy will probably make similar assumptions.
Air and sealift for a major NATO war in Europe is in the category of forces that could be reconstituted during the two years' warning that future program planning now assumes is available. Reconstitution of lift should include: that provided by allies, charters from foreign non-aligned sources, and the activation of assets in storage. It will be hard to justify the retention of older, World War II-era ships, as a part of a restructured National Defense Reserve Fleet.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Unilateral Capability?

Among the more interesting questions regarding the CONUS-based Contingency Force, and potential crisis intervention by the Atlantic or Pacific Forces, is whether the planning assumptions include the ability for the U.S. to operate unilaterally. Are the force reductions envisaged by the new strategy so deep as to make the participation of host nations and allies a prerequisite for U.S. military action? Although Secretary Cheney told the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, in February 1991, that the U.S. "will retain the ability to act alone," the March 1991 JMNA assumes that host nation support and sufficient infrastructure is available for any major regional contingency. At the end of April 1991, GEN Powell told the Defense Base Closure Commission that: "Frequently, access ashore will be contested or unobtainable, requiring employment of sea-based forces."

"Acting alone" must be viewed in terms of the level of warfare being discussed--strategic (a major war such as World War II), operational (campaign sized similar to Operations DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM), or tactical (similar to the invasion of Grenada or Panama); and whether such operations are essentially nuclear, maritime, or air/land warfare. The U.S. will probably reserve the right, and maintain the capability, to take unilateral conventional forces military actions at the tactical-level, but probably not at the strategic or operational levels of air/land warfare. In other words, the strategy only calls for a modest unilateral tactical capability, about that provided by an Amphibious Strike Task Force or Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) MEB. If the U.S. remains committed to maritime superiority, then it could still mount a unilateral theater campaign at sea.

However, it should be assumed that the U.S. could not unilaterally mount an opposed contingency operation or campaign such as DESERT SHIELD with the Base Force. Further, one could argue, that the U.S. probably does not have this operational level capability today. Both the SECDEF and the CJCS were careful, in their testimony to the SASC, in February 1991, to project that the Base Force could handle an Operation DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM but that it might have taken longer before the forces were
prepared to go on the offensive. This answer assumes, however, that such operations are coalition-based--and not unilateral.

The U.S. long has assumed that a major war (at the strategic level) would be pursued only as a part of alliances, such as NATO--hence there is no real change at this level of warfare. Indeed, continued good working relations with allies is a specific goal of the new national security strategy and a vital building block for the reconstitution of a substantial U.S. military presence in Europe. Similarly, the U.S. has always maintained a unilateral capability at the tactical level of warfare and there is no reason to assume that it will not do so in the future.

The Administration amplified its views on this issue, in the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States, presumably after the military pointed out the significantly different force structure required for the varying assumptions. The White House document states that the U.S. must be prepared for "differing levels of support from host nations." This includes the necessity to "...deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where prepositioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be available (at least before a crisis) and where there is a less developed industrial base and infrastructure to support our forces once they have arrived. Our strategy demands we be able to move men and material to the scene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force."

If the U.S. desires a unilateral capability to intervene in the world without host nation support, on the order of an Operation DESERT SHIELD, then the current force structure will remain high--perhaps too high to absorb the imminent budget reductions. If the budget drives the problem, we are less likely to field a force that can intervene without the assumption of host nation and coalition support. This issue will probably be a major focus of discussion during the next budget year.

DoD Organization

If changes of this magnitude occur, it is obvious that the DoD is about to undergo another soul-wrenching reappraisal of military service roles-and-missions. From a reading of this year's Service Secretary's and Chiefs of Staff posture statements, it is obvious that the Army was more attuned to the new strategy and Base Force than were the other services. The absence of serious discussion of the new national security strategy by the other services in their posture statements is, frankly, remarkable - given the fact that the Aspen speech occurred almost six months earlier.

No matter how painful, the review of roles and missions will occur, implicitly through budget decisions or explicitly if we dare. Should new services be created - such as space or special
operations forces - or do we instead field the recommended four new force packages, made up of multiple but existing services operating under joint military strategies for the benefit of the existing CinCs?

Although the U.S. Air Force has always had strong analytic support, they are only beginning to study the implications of the new national security strategy instead preferring to address strategy and force structure, to date, in terms of their pre-Aspen speech White Paper, "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global Power." Since the Air Campaign was so successful in Operation DESERT STORM, can we finally bury the recurring suggestion to revisit a separate Air Force?

Even more interesting is the question of should the bulk of the Marine Corps remain as a part of the Department of the Navy; or, since it is dedicating forces to CONUS-based land warfare-oriented Contingency Force and playing a significant role in the Army-heavy Atlantic Force, move most of its assets to the Department of the Army? Some argue that the Navy/Marine Corps team is already an existing contingency response force - implying why do we need another? The new strategy assumes that we need a unilateral but modest tactical amphibious warfare capability, which we already have with our Amphibious Strike Task Forces.

If the Marine Corps casts its lot with the Army, it might be able to successfully shift the bulk of its fighting potential without loss of its special identification. Other armies have amphibious troops and the U.S Army already has five amphibious assault ships and is building 35 assault landing craft. A very small independent Naval or Marine Infantry might be retained under the Navy for at-sea duties such as: evacuation of non-combatants, piracy suppression, the at-sea recovery of maritime assets, drug interdiction, and guard duties.

On the other hand, staying with the Navy Department means that planned programs and personnel actions will not undergo the scrutiny associated with a shift to a new military department. On the whole, although one can make a case that the bulk of the Marine Corps could and even should shift to the Army, it is doubtful that neither the Administration nor the JCS will tackle this issue in the near term. Hence the Marine Corps should not oppose the new strategy and Base Force - they should assume that under it, no one will question their "right" to exist.

The CJCS told an American Defense Preparedness Association audience and Army Times in April 1991, that the new four military forces do not necessarily represent new CinCs. On the other hand, it has been reported that GEN Powell was indeed considering changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP). According to a more recent report, ambitious plans to reorganize the UCP was "scaled back as senior officials realized the difficulty of pushing through such a major reorganization in the face of possible opposition from the CINCs, the services, Congress and others."
In an August 1991 interview, ADM Jeremiah suggested that it might be too soon for substantive changes but hinted that future command reorganization is not precluded. The same line was followed by GEN Powell the next month, in his Congressional testimony. Powell emphatically denied that any changes would take place soon but that cuts in headquarters would have to occur in the future. Two days after Powell testified to Congress, the President announced on nationwide television that, with the concurrence of the SECDEF and the JCS, all operational strategic nuclear forces in the U.S. would be reorganized under a new Strategic Command.

Probably more than any other issue associated with the new national security strategy and Base Force, the review of the UCP, dividing the world into CinC areas of responsibility, has more flag and general officer's attention than any other item. The new national security strategy and Base Force suggest that we revisit the existing wartime command and control structure for theater and functional CinCs. Do we need warfighting CinCs for the entire world? With asymmetrical reductions in force structure should come a loss of organizational influence. Such changes will obviously affect all joint military and intelligence organizations.

Jointness

A parallel, but closely related, debate is ongoing over the degree of future jointness that the Navy is willing to accept. The current active-duty Navy leadership appears to have internalized the Goldwater-Nichols Act and agree that "jointness is here to stay." Problems with the quality of DoD strategic planning should have been solved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and two administrations committed to implement this legislation. The fundamental review of national military strategy will severely test this assumption. The low level of inter-service infighting made public over Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM indicates that there has been success in this area.

One strategy to deal with the jointness issue is to not just "embrace it, but capture it, take it over and run with it." This recommendation attempts to use jointness as a vehicle to perform traditional maritime missions with traditional forces. Another strategy is to accept jointness, accede to nationally-mandated roles and missions, and modify the Navy's traditional self-image as the victor in the Pacific theater in World War II. This approach would necessitate refuting the retired flag officer community's criticism of the new national security strategy and Base Force.

Commands, however, will obviously not be allocated on a basis where the Navy has the majority. The Pacific theater has been declared a maritime one and the assumption is that it will
retain a Navy CinC. If there is no serious maritime opposition to Navy forces at sea in the Pacific area of responsibility, is this assumption valid? Regarding the new Strategic Command, although a majority of strategic nuclear warheads may be sea-based in the future, at best, command will rotate between the Air Force and the Navy.\footnote{45}

The Army and Air Force have already indicated they would dedicate serious assets to contingency response, making them the current leading candidates for command of a CONUS-based Joint Contingency Force. This alone should cause the Marine Corps to seriously consider consolidating existing flag officer billets in order to gain one new four star general who would be a contender.\footnote{46} If the Navy dedicated standing forces to a future Contingency Force, it would logically lead to a full rotational command policy.

Perhaps the most serious debate will occur over the proposed Atlantic Force. By dedicating most U.S. Army heavy assets to this force, one could conclude that the Army sees the Atlantic Force as a land-oriented command with seapower as a significant but supporting element. The Navy will probably focus on the word "Atlantic" and argue that it should obviously retain its maritime character and command. The Navy might even be willing to surrender cognizance over the Caribbean and South American waters in order to retain the Atlantic command. Major fleet elements of the U.S. Navy operated under the command of Army generals during World War II and have routinely done so in the Mediterranean since then.

If the Atlantic Force is in fact primarily focused on regional response power projection in Europe and the Middle East/Southwest Asia, then perhaps the major peacetime commander should be oriented toward ground warfare with air and maritime commanders playing a subordinate role. After all, is there any serious threat to our maritime forces in this area of the world? If the Soviet (or some other) threat returns, it will be relatively easy to split the Atlantic Force into its land and sea-based components as a part of our reconstitution for a major global war originating in Europe.

On the other hand, in the new era of jointness, it can be argued that all the CinC positions could be filled by the best candidate from any service with no one single service having a lock on any specific job. Even if this would mean, in reality, rotation, the objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act may be more fully realized than if we retain current practices.

Under the President's new national security strategy, we are clearly marching to a drumbeat that will probably mean the end of unilateral naval intervention overseas. Naval and Marine Corps forces are viewed under the new national security strategy and Base Force as being a part of a larger package - they are not going to be able to advertise themselves only as the Navy/Marine
Corps Team. The new team is a leaner but more powerful U.S. Armed Forces.

The Industrial and Manpower Base

The most demanding, critical factor in the success of the President's new national security strategy is the ability of private industry to deliver during the "reconstitution" process. What is visualized is not industrial mobilization from a "warm" start: rather, industry will be asked to deliver military equipment and supplies from a "cold" start - assuming that many of our current defense industries shift to the non-defense sector.

The Bush Administration is attempting to both save our defense industrial base under very trying conditions, and simultaneously reduce defense spending - a dubious prospect, when it seems reluctant even to address the need for a national industrial policy. Reconstitution of U.S. industrial capabilities is an insufficient goal - international reconstitution will be necessary for overseas suppliers of finished goods and raw materials. Major changes are required in the way we do business, to retain both our technological position in the world and the personnel necessary to meet newly defined defense needs.

Reconstitution. Reconstitution has three essential subcomponents: mobilization, military force reconstitution, and industrial reconstitution. Mobilization will provide the ability to respond to crises with an active duty and reserve force mix. Much more attention should be paid to ensuring that the reserves can respond, then return to their disrupted civilian occupations without loss of families, homes, and jobs. Existing legislation should be reviewed now that we have completed Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Military force and industrial reconstitution, however, are areas in which the U.S. has not had active interests for many years. Reconstitution must provide, primarily in the European theater - but not only there, additional forces and military hardware for a major war, assuming that no major combat takes place for two years. Reconstitution time goals can be somewhat vague; since what is required is that we need only convince the Soviet Union, and European nations, that we can: "reconstitute a credible [deterrence/] defense faster than any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense." Reconstitution in Europe is possible only with a continued alliance structure such as NATO.

According to ADM Jeremiah's March 1991 Congressional testimony, the new Army cadre reserve divisions will reach combat-ready status in 12-18 months. The Army is now stating that the time involved may be as short as 15 months. In peacetime, a cadre division might consist of a skeleton organization of some 3,000 officers and noncommissioned officers (vice over 10,000 in
an active division). The individual ready reserve or conscription are low cost methods of managing the necessary manpower pool required for reconstitution.

Marine Corps reserve divisions have not been included in this new cadre status. Additional goals for reconstitution will be provided as staffs become familiar with the concept - but some initial areas to investigate might include: sealift and inter-theater airlift, strategic air and missile defenses, and short-range and naval nuclear weapons.

Some of the military capability that America and its allies must retain should be contained in existing active duty and ready reserve forces. On-hand equipment and supplies are needed for those ready forces, while some should be stockpiled and prepositioned. Maritime prepositioning offers great flexibility, recently demonstrated in the Middle East. However, not all the materials for all types of war need be readily available.

Implicit in the President's new national security strategy is the capability of tooling-up for wartime production within two years for a major war in Europe and less than that for lengthy contingency operations. GEN Powell stated, in December 1990, that this ability to reconstitute was one of the critical underlying support capabilities of the new national security strategy. This capability will consist primarily of the knowledge, skills, and tools to respond within the time limits specified. This concept is not new. We should review the 1930s history of planning assumptions and industry's ability to respond.

Dr. Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), was a proponent of preprogrammed crisis budgets and industrial responses to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime. Industrial mobilization, instead of military mobilization or the deployment of troops, might form the basis of an adequate governmental response to ambiguous warning indicators. Ikle proposed a series of industrial alert conditions, similar to those used in the military, which would trigger specific actions. These would be less threatening because they would not immediately increase military capability.

A "graduated deterrence response," the term used by LTG Butler in his September 1990 talk at the National Press Club, could well involve a "graduated industrial response." This is not the same type of response that the government ordered in 1987 under the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) concept— that program being used to support national mobilization for crises and war with existing forces and strategies. GMR remains a high priority program to support regional contingency response. There is no reason contracts cannot be let ahead of time for both a response to a major war and for contingencies.

Although we speak abstractly about devising plans and passing budgets ahead of the need to do so, economists must help government ascertain how much money would be required to recon-
stitute the defense industry. If that money is earmarked for other purposes, then financial planning should include tracking sufficient governmental short-term money which can be quickly diverted to defense—if the GMR and reconstitution part of the new national security strategy is to have teeth.

Industry and government should decide on a basic strategy consonant with our ability to support a defense industrial base and invest in new technologies; and both must be comfortable with their new, nonconfrontational, roles. Government should ensure that industry is capable of retooling and delivering military products within two years or less.

The government record of abandoning major production programs is a travesty, and it is likely that—unless consciously addressed—we will permit the destruction of most capability. Notable examples include the APOLLO and SATURN V programs, where facilities, equipment, hardware, stores, instrumentation, data files, test stands, etc. were destroyed and all technical teams were dispersed.

Many military contractors have been provided government-owned equipment, or have charged the development of facilities and equipment to military contracts. If the federal government wants these facilities retained, mothballed, or perhaps even improved, then it should provide incentives. Ownership of government equipment can be transferred to industry, or management of facilities can be turned over to government. If retained by industry, federal, state, and local tax laws must be revised to reduce or eliminate taxes on idle property and land.

Industry will work, meanwhile, on projects that have no direct defense application and simultaneously be asked to maintain the expertise necessary to produce military equipment within specified time limits. Keeping this expertise will require innovative measures—perhaps even joint government and private repositories of knowledge at taxpayers expense. This, in turn, requires new and innovative approaches to intellectual property rights. The DoD has allowed defense contractors to retain title rights for inventions while reserving the right of license-free use. If we mix federal and private sector research, we may have to allow federal employees to benefit from royalties for work that is produced while on government time.

Making the two year response time a reality may require abandoning military design specifications (MILSPEC) in many areas. We may have to acknowledge that, to meet deadlines, available commercial products may be substituted. For areas that clearly require specifications, the old system should be retained.

The reconstitution of industrial capability appears the single most demanding element of the new national security strategy. The March 1991 JMNA states that "it would likely be 6 to 24 months before industrial base mobilization or surge produc-
tion could begin to deliver critical items. . .by the end-FY 1997, it is estimated that it would take 2 to 4 years to restore production capability to 1990 levels for items whose lines have gone 'cold'." Fortunately, the Soviet Union is accorded the same capability. Clearly, the U.S. will have to monitor the ability to meet reconstitution targets, to test capabilities, to enhance the credibility of our response and to monitor the Soviet ability to do the same.

Reconstitution is fundamentally oriented toward the U.S. contribution to the defense of Europe in the face of a regenerated Soviet conventional threat. The U.S. need not reconstitute the 1990-era conventional force it had forward-deployed to Europe. New technologies, especially in air breathing systems, may offer the same or even increased combat potential with fewer ground troops. Nuclear weapons, especially those based at sea, and maritime forces, offer the U.S. an ability to fully meet its military commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty without the extensive deployment of any ground or air forces on European soil.

The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the assumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to the homeland, that a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-like parity will exist from the Atlantic to the Urals, that the Soviet Union will remain inwardly focused, and that NATO and its members intelligence services are functioning. After events in the Soviet Union during the Winter of 1990-91, Secretary Cheney adopted a more cautious note on expected Soviet behavior. The failed Soviet coup of August 1991 certainly suggests further caution, until the USSR (or whatever becomes of it) achieves greater political stability. However, if national military forces leave newly independent border republics, and if these republics do not field large offensive national guards, and if strategic nuclear forces are reduced to minimal deterrent levels, then the 1990 Soviet threat envisaged by the framers of the new national security strategy will be excessive and obsolete for U.S. planning purposes.

Investment Strategy and Conversion. The major implication of the two-year big war warning of a Europe-centered global war with the USSR is that American programming strategy will shift its focus to the more immediate threats presented in other areas of the world. Until now, the unstated relationship of the threat to programmed forces was, generally, that U.S. forces would meet the challenge of the most demanding threat, the USSR, and assume that they could also cope with lesser contingencies. That basic assumption was not entirely true and now will be essentially reversed: forces will be acquired to meet the challenges of the more likely, less demanding, threats assuming that they are also useful against the more unlikely but greater threat posed by a Soviet Union that decides to rearm.

This will be a new planning assumption for America, new for its allies, and somewhat impractical for the near term - or until
we see substantial changes in Soviet maritime and nuclear force structure to match what we know for certain are reductions in the ground and air forces. The intelligence community is tasked to advise Western governments when their strategic nuclear and maritime postures can be relaxed. Can it meet the challenge?

There will be a fundamental restructuring of the near-term programming already contracted, and there may be extraordinarily high penalties incurred as industries move from the defense area to others. There will be last-ditch attempts to salvage certain programs, arguments that previously programmed forces are needed in the new Base Force, and bids to simply keep people employed and legislative districts satisfied. This will be a great challenge to the new Congress—which should play its larger role instead of responding only to narrow constituent interests.

An obvious next step for the DoD is to provide incentives for the services to stop rejustifying old programs under the new national security strategy and instead, to actually perform a zero-based needs assessment. An obvious second step is to plan for the divestiture of unnecessary forces, equipment and industrial capability. There will be a great temptation to tie the reduction in capability to arms control—both for reasons of merit and to delay, or perhaps derail, reductions.

Implicit in the reconstitution portion of the new national security strategy is the retention of capability to produce equipment and supplies that have not been maintained. Not all firms must convert, nor should they be allowed to convert to the civilian non-defense sector. Government could regulate the decline but appears prepared to allow the market to determine survivors. Deputy Defense Secretary Donald Atwood told a group on May 1, 1991, that:

I believe the free economic system is the system which should determine who wins, who loses, who merges. I believe in the free marketplace. I don't think we, the Department of Defense surely, have the capability to try to plan any kind of industrial policy. Quite the contrary. The free marketplace has to determine. Our role is to sponsor research and development and our role is to make sure people know what we're going to buy. And let the marketplace determine those in between.

Some firms will manage to convert to the civilian sector. The assisted conversion of defense businesses to the civilian sector is a highly charged process. If a firm can produce tanks and another automobiles, why subsidize the uninitiated to do what there are competent firms already doing? Conversion assistance schemes abound, with proposals to use independent R&D funds for everything from non-military ventures to fully-funded programs.

For those firms which can convert, with or without assistance, there will be significant cultural adjustments. Government contractors often have the customer providing capital for spe-
cialized facilities and equipment. This is not normal procedure in the commercial market. In the defense industrial world, requirements often advance the state of the art whereas in the commercial market, state of the art is limited by costs and competition. The two environments have drastically different financial structures and supporting infrastructures capable of preparing proposals.

Defense contractors are often organized along narrow compartmentalized, functional lines with little awareness of the overall program. Many firms do business in both worlds but there is little interconnection of personnel. Government and civilian contractors both agree that there is a significant problem converting personnel from one culture into successes in the other. It is also likely that management cannot make the transition.

After Vietnam War production ended, a downsizing of the defense industry was followed by massive displacements of professional and technical specialists. Conversion efforts then consisted largely of acquiring non-defense firms and attempting to expand into new markets. Most conversions failed, but primarily at the plant level. The cultural shock was either too great or the technologies offered by the defense firms were not needed.

The wholesale demobilization of military personnel into the civilian job market has taken place several times in the U.S., with mixed results. Appropriate temporary programs are needed to ensure that we manage the transition smoothly to support new national industrial and business goals.

Some industrial and military facilities inevitably will be idled, even made obsolete, by the new national security strategy. We can anticipate massive environmental cleanups at particularly dirty facilities, such as industrial sites used for the manufacture of weapons grade plutonium. The staggering costs of these efforts will make them economically unattractive for private peaceful use. Clearly, the government will have to assume these costs.

Research & Development. A fundamental restructuring of the defense procurement processes is long overdue. Industry often sought, or took the leading role in exploring, technological opportunities and charged that research to overhead for major programs. With the major programs likely to be severely reduced, a new mechanism is required for basic research and initial development. To change the leading role in military R&D, governments may be compelled to reverse a major downward spiral in this category of spending. Indeed, GEN Powell stated, in his December 1990 speeches, that defense R&D is one of the four underlying support capabilities of the new national security strategy.

Another possibility is to set up major government design bureaus, and internalize R&D responsibility itself—perhaps specializing in areas devoid of normal civilian spin-offs. The
Navy did this in the 1930s, when its Naval Aircraft Factory did prototyping, and both the Aircraft Factory and shipyards provided "yardsticks" by which to measure contractor performance. An alternative strategy is to continue those operations in the private sector and provide nourishing government subsidies. Perhaps state and local governments can be persuaded to invest in R&D as well. The objective is to retain technology capability in numerous areas and the production capabilities in a few.

In any case, the output cannot be a family of senescent designs, curing on the shelf, but rather fully operational prototypes which normally never enter full scale development. In some cases, limited production runs may be necessary to ensure that production experience is maintained. In most cases, product improvement programs should be included in the prototype program. Prototyping generally results in three major options: (1) buying the system, (2) buying major components, or (3), rolling over the technology to the next generation. This third option is currently being looked at by the staff of the HASC Policy Committee. A prototypes development program should ensure that both the capability of assembly and a dynamic R&D program continue.

The Soviets also have worried about the same issues as they convert former military industries to civilian production. RADM Yu M. Khaliulin, Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, told Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev at a November 13, 1990 meeting with military people's deputies, that a naval ship should be built every year or two at newly "converted" shipyards, just to retain the capability to do so.

Such a shift in USSR defense procurement will offer new challenges to our intelligence community. How do we classify evidence of new hardware when we cannot predict whether it will be followed by a procurement program? Keeping multiple products on the shelf is also a good competitive strategy that will force an enemy to match all possible threats, instead of just a few. This, of course, works both ways and may prove justification for otherwise unwanted armaments. This shift to worrying about possible "breakout" is not altogether new, but will alter the emphasis of our collection efforts.

The new programming environment will reflect a new understanding of the partnership between government and industry. It will require major changes in the charters of many R&D and programming agencies to allow easier adaptation of commercial technologies into the defense sector, and the continued flow of defense technologies into the civilian world. It is also likely to require changing defense regulations to allow profits on R&D and prototypes.

CONCLUSIONS

There appear to be four main problem areas in which solutions portend success for the President's dream. The first is
that everything depends upon the responsible, good behavior of the Soviet Union. The second critical area demands that the intelligence community be able to surmount the new challenges. The third area that can undermine a successful transition to this new world will be the international behavior of allies and the U.S. Congress. The final and most demanding, critical factor in the success of President Bush's new national security strategy is the capability to reconstitute the defense industrial base.

By withdrawing forces from overseas and promising to reconstitute within two years and return, the U.S. will have fundamentally changed its international politico-military posture. If after internal investigation, we cannot fulfill this promise, then the U.S. government should keep this conclusion under wraps, endure the open-source critical debate and criticism it will face, and keep this declaratory strategy operational.

The President's new national security strategy is a programming concept that supports the continued reliance on deterrence of war as the cornerstone of American security. There are those who doubted that the U.S. would ever use centrally-based nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe--perhaps a President never would have decided to actually do that. Deterrence strategies are influenced greatly by perceptions; under the new national security strategy, it will be important to maintain the perception of our ability to reconstitute. Just as in the past, evidence of programs, deployments, exercises, and literature must be provided to support deterrence.

The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numerous, complex, and require discussion. This book-length report responds to the obvious questions, and perhaps suggests what else might be included. In his Aspen speech, the President opened the door to a total reexamination of America's role in the world and overall U.S. military capabilities. The historical parallel is the British reorientation in the first decade of the 20th Century from strategic focus on colonies to Europe. It is very likely that as a result of this new national security strategy, the U.S. will start down the path toward splendid isolationism.

NOTES


(2) "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium" (as delivered), Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, CO), The White House, August 2, 1990, 6 pp. The Appendix to this report contains the full citations for all additional strategy and force structure source materials.
(3) Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1991, p. 3.


(5) See results of an interview with General (GEN) George Lee Butler, USAF in, Larry Grossman, "SACs [Strategic Air Command's] Twin Triads," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 74, No. 8, August 1991, p. 56. GEN Butler was promoted and became the Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of SAC after leaving his position on the Joint Staff.


(9) Rudy Abramson and John Broder, "Four-Star Power," Los Angeles Times Magazine, April 7, 1991, p. 60, reports about GEN Colin Powell's apparent attempt to get the Base Force issue "out on the table quickly, even before Cheney was ready to discuss it publicly."

(10) A Navy study concluded that the recent review of strategy leading to President Bush's speech at Aspen was only possible due to: the fiscal crisis, the waning threat, and the new powers of the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) authorized by the Goldwater Nichols Act - all of which did not come together until GEN Powell became the CJCS. See: Commander (CDR) William F. Hickman, USN, "Is the Maritime Strategy Dead?" Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, unpublished winner in the 1991 CJCS Strategic Essay Competition, pp. 7-9.

(11) "...there are forces at work today which want to change and degrade that Base Force..." contained in "Remarks as Delivered by Admiral [ADM] David E. Jeremiah, USN, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff [VCJCS], to the Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 8 August 1991," p. 3.

report to Congress, the Defense Planning and Resources Board apparently played a role in reviewing the new strategy.


(15) GEN Donald J. Kutyna, USAF address to the "12th Western Conference and Exposition - Space Day - San Diego, CA - 24 January 1991," OASD/PA #91-0294, 23 Jan 91, annotated slides 54-57.


(17) For additional details, see "The President's New Focus For SDI: Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)," distributed by the DoD's Strategic Defense Initiative Office, June 6, 1991, 8 pp.


(22) Soviet criticism of a unilateral U.S. crisis response force was to be expected. See Yuriy Tyssovskiy commentary carried by Moscow TASS in English at 1527 GMT on December 7, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-237, December 10, 1990, p. 16).

(23) It is also possible that the Contingency Force may provide forces for South Asia.

(24) Examples used by General Colin L. Powell in his April 1991 testimony before the Defense Base Closure Commission included the: 82nd Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, NC, 101st Airborne Division from Ft. Campbell, KY, 7th Light ID from Ft. Lewis, WA, and the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division from Ft. Stewart, GA.
General Powell used the new home bases for all units in his testimony. In his September 1991 Congressional testimony, Powell stated that two heavy divisions were included. The press reported, in August 1991, that a reactivated 3rd Armored Division, the "Spearhead Division, will become a part of the new Contingency Force. See: Melissa Healy, "Army to dissolve 2 German divisions," The Herald [Monterey, CA], Friday, August 16, 1991, p. 7A.


(28) "Warfighting," FMFM 1, March 6, 1989, 88 pp. This document's lack of significant use of the word "amphibious" is indicative of a shift in service self-identity. On the other hand, GEN Al Gray claimed that "this type of operation can achieve objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare." See: A.M. Gray, "Leaning Forward," Sea Power, Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 67.


(32) The recent Air Force restructuring was generally justified in terms of "Global Reach - Global Power," although the associated White Paper did acknowledge that "the Air Force will move ahead to implement the new National Security Strategy of the
United States, with its emphasis on potential regional conflicts..." See: "Air Force Restructure," p. 2. Furthermore, Air Force Secretary Rice did acknowledge at an AFA Convention in September that the restructuring will "...posture us to dovetail with the results of Base Force planning being done by the Chairman and Secretary of Defense." See: "Rice Remarks at the Air Force Association Convention," p. 4.


(37) Munro, "Role of CINCs Increases as Budget Forces Shift," p. 26.


(45) Munro, "Role of CINCs Increases as Budget Forces Shift," p. 26, reports that this will probably occur.

(46) Levens & Schemmer, "AFJI Interview With General Mundy" pp. 50-52, reports the Marine Corps position on this matter being that of a need for a Joint Task Force and a rotating or nominative command structure.

(47) This section draws upon discussions, presentations, and draft position papers from the "What if Peace?" National Science and Technology Policy Conference sponsored by the California Engineering Foundation and Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 28-29, 1990, Costa Mesa, CA. Attendees at this conference explicitly addressed the issues related to industrial capability to respond to the new strategy.

(48) The Army has recognized the need for a national plan for the industrial base. See Army Focus, p. 66.

The National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, p. 30, does not use the word "deterrence."

Army Focus, p. 56.


"Defense Deputy Secretary Donald Atwood Address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics," May 1, 1991, at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City, Arlington, VA, Reuter Transcript Report, p. 7. This position appears to have also been echoed by the government of the Netherlands. See John G. Roos, "Dutch Government Tells Defense Sector: 'Sink or Swim'," Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 128, No. 11, June 1991, pp. 36-42, 98.


The movement has already begun. See, for example, Patrick J. Buchanan, "Now That Red Is Dead, Come Home, America," Washington-
U.S. Intelligence and the New National Security Strategy
by
Thomas B. Grassey

The U.S. intelligence community is at another crossroad. The end of the Cold War concluded four decades of fear that the Soviet Union would initiate a major war in Europe. Just as the post-war defense and intelligence establishments were created simultaneously by the National Security Act of 1947, a new vision of American armed forces—indeed, of the entire "world order"—was heralded at Aspen. What effects may this new national security strategy have on U.S. intelligence? What effects should it have?

The latter question is where policy-makers ought to begin. However, that question raises four more basic issues. First, what intelligence requirements remain the same despite this reduction in military threat? Second, what new demands on intelligence arise because of the reduction? Third, what changes in U.S. intelligence activities are required by world trends at the close of the century, irrespective of the reduced Soviet military threat? Finally, what effects will adjustments in U.S. military capabilities have on intelligence?

WHAT HAS NOT CHANGED

Pearl Harbor dominates American thinking on intelligence. Despite the extraordinary insights into an adversary's intentions which code-breaking allowed, the U.S. suffered a painful surprise attack. Strategists argue that, should the nation be similarly surprised in the nuclear age, recovery would be impossible and defeat inevitable. Better intelligence and an invulnerable retaliatory force have been proposed as complementary measures to discourage a massive surprise nuclear attack on the U.S.

That intelligence requirement has not diminished, nor will it so long as such an attack is possible. Despite the dramatic changes in European theater force levels and significant political and military re-arrangements, the Soviet Union's strategic forces—intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, cruise missiles, and submarine-launched nuclear missiles—remain formidable, are being improved, and constitute the major military threat to the U.S. for the foreseeable future. U.S. intelligence must devote ceaseless attention to the threat of a massive Soviet nuclear strike. Even deep reductions in strategic forces achieved through arms control negotiations will not ease this responsibility; for, as levels are reduced, the deterrent value of each weapon increases and the demand for warning of an attack grows greater.

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What also has not changed, despite the end of the Cold War, is the requirement of U.S. forces for intelligence to conduct operations having little or no counter-Soviet dimension. Whether in Lebanon or Grenada, Panama or Iraq, U.S. military forces have fought, and Americans have died, in need of better intelligence. Equally, threatened or actual introduction of U.S. forces during international crises will be used by American governments to support policies. In this fashion, or on future battlegrounds, superior U.S. intelligence capabilities are essential. Since so few of these situations involve the Soviet Union, the reduced threat of a major war against the Soviets is inconsequential to these other requirements on U.S. intelligence capabilities.

WHAT NEW DEMANDS ON INTELLIGENCE WILL ARISE?

For intelligence, ending the Cold War increases demands to comprehend many nations and subnational organizations on their own terms rather than as "superpower clients." Intelligence questions will cost more to answer because so little can be carried over from an understanding of superpower interests and policies in a region. If an old U.S. intelligence fallacy lay in over-estimating Soviet control, the new difficulty stems from the virtual absence of Soviet suasion. Syria must be understood as Syria, Egypt as Egypt. Replacing the tidy, albeit oversimplified, East-West division, intelligence analysts must consider an array of more than 160 nations and scores of independent groups (e.g., the Palestine Liberation Organization). "New World Order" suggests an unconscious verbal reaction to the chaos of a shattered Cold War world.

A second major new demand on U.S. intelligence is treaty verification. The U.S. and USSR have been cooperating since 1960 on treaties limiting weapons. But, until recently, the pace of cooperation has been glacial and the verification requirements clearly satisfiable. The ability of each side to monitor the other's compliance through its own intelligence collection capabilities determined how far each treaty's provisions extended. Intelligence organizations grumbled about how their budgets were consumed by verification duties, and critics of arms control complained about the ascendance of treaty-monitoring over warfighting capabilities in U.S. intelligence; yet the stipulations of treaties could be confirmed without severe strains.

That may no longer be true. A host of arms-control treaties, bilaterally between the U.S. and the Soviet Union or multilaterally among many nations, on topics as varied as strategic weapons, chemical warfare, and conventional force levels in Europe, appears ready to overwhelm the verification assets of intelligence organizations. Additionally, intrusive measures like visits to production facilities and military bases are manpower-intensive, leading to the creation of the On-Site Inspection Agency which draws personnel primarily from U.S. intelligence organizations to satisfy its extensive requirements.
Further, the numerous semi-permanent Soviet monitoring teams located in the U.S. could engage in collateral espionage. The glasnost-inspired openness in scholarly, cultural, and commercial exchanges adds to this difficulty. So, beyond the expanding tasks of verification, U.S. intelligence organizations face heavier counter-intelligence challenges. On balance, the demands on U.S. intelligence appear to be growing—directly from treaty-verification assignments, indirectly from counter-intelligence concerns.

A third new requirement on U.S. intelligence is long lead-time warning. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and other administration officials, have stated that the U.S. would have two years' strategic warning of a major Soviet conventional attack against NATO. Henceforth, instead of scrutinizing Warsaw Pact tank armies, air bases, and military communications nets, U.S. intelligence must monitor Soviet military and industrial mobilization capabilities, munitions and critical resources stockpiling, and similar long-term preparations for war. Presumably, an upsurge in these activities will warrant alerting U.S. (and other Western) leaders of a heightened Soviet military threat.

Certainly, U.S. intelligence has attempted for decades to understand and evaluate the Soviet Union's scientific and technological capabilities, along with its capacity to sustain the military, industrial, economic, political, and social strains that a major modern war would impose. The new aspect is that these appraisals will now be treated as war-warning indicators; President George Bush's proposed national security strategy relies on these "large category" intelligence assessments to signal the need to activate U.S. (and Western) defensive preparations.

Fourth, a nation's fate in the next century may be decided more by its economic competitiveness than by the strength of its armed forces. Discussion of the role U.S. intelligence agencies might play in the economic competition among industrialized nations has become a "hot potato." Whereas some leading allies coordinate a trade policy which links the corporate sector's research efforts with government-conducted espionage against foreign technological and commercial developments, the U.S. is not culturally attuned to a close relationship (formally recognized) between government and business. Apparently, national as well as military intelligence organizations are balking at suggestions they might anticipate greater involvement in this economic competition.

Fifth of new demands on intelligence is the urgent requirement to understand the internal affairs of the new Soviet Union or whatever replaces it. Until Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, the USSR was viewed as a monolith by most U.S. intelligence analysts. With perestroika sinking into razval, disintegration, no analyst can ignore the centrifugal strains in that nation. Consequently, predictions of Soviet actions and positions that
formerly were derived by studying the views of a handful of key Kremlin officials now must consider: non-Communist republic leaders, the attitudes of miners in the Kuznetsk Basin, nationalists in the Ukraine, and insurrectionists in Azerbaijan. U.S. intelligence organizations lack sufficient linguists even to keep adequate appraisals of internal events in the polyglot Soviet Union; higher-order analyses must be tenuous. At stake for U.S. intelligence are the future actions of a state with the world's greatest area, the third largest population, and (inter alia) the second largest nuclear weapons arsenal.

The U.S. intelligence community must also assess additional non-Soviet-related threats to U.S. interests: weapons proliferation, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, ecological hazards and disasters, the social unrest and struggle for resources caused by population growth, and intra-national conflict based on group identity.

U.S. intelligence agencies can anticipate heightened responsibilities monitoring world resources and assessing social instability in areas of importance to the United States. The much-discussed "North-South gap," the world's continuing population explosion (especially in lesser-developed states), the accelerating information-age's impact of electronic images ... these "megatrends" increasingly will concern national leaders. Their questions will be directed to many organizations and agencies, within and outside the government; and the unique sources which the intelligence community taps should provide answers to some of these questions.

While traditional reporting from the U.S. embassy and consulates usually provides a good overview of issues, events, and personalities, such open collection must be supplemented by clandestine contacts, secret agents, and in-place networks. From this combination of diplomatic observations and espionage, U.S. intelligence can appraise a nation's internal affairs. Iran is the classic lesson of what can happen if clandestine contacts with opposition groups are restricted, development of secret agents is prohibited, and establishment of "stay-behind" networks is ignored.

Considering the importance to the U.S. of so many nations, and the diverse social tensions at work, a robust overt and covert monitoring effort is mandatory. Concomitantly, it will be challenging, for historically the U.S. has been indisposed to such monitoring; Americans have been ethnocentric, averse to "spying," and poorly suited to long-term development of a reliable covert agent network.

HOW WILL A CHANGING U.S. MILITARY AFFECT U.S. INTELLIGENCE?

The planned 25 percent reduction in U.S. armed forces has a disquieting consequence: in most situations, there will be less
American military power available. The responsibility for appraising the threats that a smaller U.S. military must be configured to fight falls on the intelligence community. Nor should it be forgotten that smaller U.S. armed forces also suggest a diminished military intelligence capability, particularly in collection (e.g., budgetary pressures led the Air Force to withdraw the SR-71 from service) but also in analysis, production, and dissemination.

Reflecting on the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence establishment, there is a broader concern: while its forte is military assessment, particularly order of battle (OOB) collection and indications and warning (I&W), the historical record admonishes the wise not to rely exclusively on short-term intelligence reports. While American intelligence capabilities are technically impressive, those capabilities are not always timely or precise, they can be foiled, and they are often inadequate for military operations.

Recent events in Iraq illustrate the limitations of U.S. intelligence even in its best areas: accurate intelligence warnings were ignored; the enemy OOB estimate was inflated; and battlefield requirements for timely and precise information exceeded the collective capabilities of surveillance systems. Moreover, the DESERT STORM war approximated the ideal scenario for employing the intelligence tools developed to watch the Soviet Union. Their successes ought not to delude us into imagining that future military operations will duplicate those in Iraq-Kuwait.

To the contrary, future commitments of U.S. forces almost certainly will require information which the intelligence community is currently ill-prepared to provide. The organizations created to warn of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S., or of a Warsaw Pact assault on NATO forces in Western Europe, must shift their efforts toward other kinds of contingencies: assistance to counter-insurgency (or to pro-insurgency) forces, non-combatant evacuation missions, anti-terrorist intervention, drug interdiction operations, and peace-keeping presence. These military operations need different forms of intelligence than is obtained through KH-11 imagery, U-2 synthetic aperture radar, or RC-135 radio intercepts. Thus, many of the assets in which the three major intelligence organizations take pride are of limited value in probable scenarios involving U.S. military forces.

Some future military operations are likely to be directed against specific "high-value targets." Whether for political purposes (the rescue of American hostages, the capture of a drug kingpin) or military necessity (destruction of a chemical munitions plant, tracking of a nuclear-armed mobile ballistic missile), U.S. intelligence will be expected to provide precise information on individual objects or persons. Whereas the "law of large numbers" allows accurate statistical estimations of the probability of kinds of events or activities, predicting an individual event is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible.
(Thus, a McDonald's restaurant can reliably estimate how many hamburgers, cheeseburgers, and so on it will sell on any given day; yet not even the customers know beforehand what they will order.) National leaders must understand that ambitious operational objectives aimed at eliminating specific targets may not be supportable by any feasible intelligence capability.

American intelligence often has been dismayingly obtuse about imminent—sometimes patent—requirements. Flying in a show-of-force to support President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines during the latest recent attempted military coup, U.S. Air Force pilots had no adequate charts of downtown Manila. Seven months to the day after President Ronald Reagan made a nationally-televised address and pointed to an SR-71 photograph of the Point Salines airfield, American forces landed in Grenada ... with utterly inadequate maps and charts. During 1983, Marine units were introduced and withdrawn, reintroduced, and then assigned in Lebanon with too few French, Italian, Hebrew, or Arabic linguists. One can only surmise, from these past deficiencies, how poor intelligence contributions in future "contingency operations" will be unless strenuous remedial efforts are undertaken. "In low-intensity conflict as in real estate," a senior U.S. diplomat has been quoted, "there are only three things that matter. In real estate these are location, location, and location; in low-intensity conflict they are intelligence, intelligence, and intelligence."10

The U.S. will withdraw from many of its remaining forward bases because of the end of the Cold War, the new national security strategy's reduction of U.S. forces, Congressional attitudes toward overseas bases, and host nations' reluctance to allow a permanent foreign military presence. The elimination of overseas bases will affect intelligence in various ways, ranging from the closure of purposely-built collection facilities to the loss of anonymity amidst so many other American operations. (If a U.S. Navy EP-3 on an electronic intelligence collection mission lands at a foreign airfield, it will be more prominent when it is the only U.S. plane at that field than when it was one among dozens.) Because overseas bases offer "cover" for intelligence personnel, equipment, and activities, the elimination of many of those bases will complicate U.S. intelligence operations.

WHAT WILL DETERMINE THE ACTUAL CHANGES?

From the reduced threat of a major war with the Soviet Union, future U.S. intelligence requirements can be deduced by considering what tasks have not changed and what new demands have arisen (either as an immediate consequence of events in the USSR, as a corollary of the reduction in U.S. military capability, or as a result of world trends irrespective of the superpower rivalry). The actual U.S. intelligence community adjustments to the new situation will be influenced by other factors: organizational relationships, targets of concern, responses to stress, and problems of adjustment.

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Relationships

The U.S. intelligence establishment is, like the culture which spawned it, fundamentally competitive. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) vie with one another and with the intelligence branches of the military services, the State Department, and the departments of Energy, Treasury, and Justice. Moreover, the "official" intelligence community must compete with individual staffs, foreign intelligence services, and open-source organizations (e.g., Cable News Network).

Competition sometimes occurs in collecting intelligence information, but usually thrives in analyzing and appraising the data, or in disseminating conclusions. Intelligence analysts are proud people, confined to a life of anonymity; their only avenue for recognition lies in discerning what other analysts have not detected, or in beating everyone else in reporting what any good analyst can see. Both organizationally and individually, then, the U.S. intelligence community is marked by competition. Periodically one hears calls for even greater emphasis on competition and accountability; the "Team B" episode of the 1970s was just one upshot of this popular criticism.\cite{11}

The new national security strategy portends reduction in the size of the defense and intelligence establishments, elimination of redundant functions, and a sharp focus on efficient use of limited assets. No longer will analysts at DIA, CIA, and the Army Intelligence Agency compete in analyzing the newest Soviet tank; there will not be enough people (even if all three organizations survive) for this kind of overlapping effort.\cite{12} The drawback to this desired efficiency is, plainly, its lack of competitiveness. While logic might suggest a perfectly coordinated (hence maximally efficient) intelligence structure, strong forces will oppose this management demand, for several reasons.

First, for tasks more challenging than "bean-counting" or simple mensuration, intelligence assessments which enjoy unanimous concurrence usually are wrong. Almost all the hard questions have numerous attractive but incompatible answers, so seasoned intelligence officials believe that the truth is more likely to be discovered through John Stuart Mill's "collision of adverse opinions."

Second, historical studies of intelligence organizations suggest that there is no perfect structure, and the wisest approach is to employ opposed arrangements (even though this appears inefficient). For instance, if analysts of the Soviet cruise missile program are placed in the "Soviet Area" shop, they are likely to have too little contact with the engineers in the "Cruise Missile" shop, and miss the clues which suggest the Soviet program is vigorously pursuing a direction only hinted at in the newest French technology innovations. On the other hand, if those analysts are located in the "Cruise Missile" shop, they
are likely to have too little contact with the experts on the Soviet military budget, and miss the clues which disclose greatly heightened Kremlin interest in accelerating the cruise missile program. While it may seem inefficient to allow two sets of analysts to work on the same question (one group based in one organizational design, the other in a different one), that may be necessary and prudent.

Third, competition serves to counteract tendencies toward "groupthink" and servility toward policy preferences ("cooking the intelligence"). One large, concentrated, "efficient" intelligence organization, or a "highly coordinated constellation," is more prone to canonical uniformity; it also is tempted to provide estimates agreeable to policy-makers, and to attempt to influence policy. Separate, competing organizations studying the same phenomenon are more likely to keep one another intellectually honest. Post-event analyses of the 1983 Korean airliner (KAL-007) shootdown found the Air Force intelligence staff had correctly assessed what had happened, while the larger agencies (CIA, DIA, NSA) were wrong--and wrong in a way pleasing to the administration. The KAL-007 analysis debacle should serve as a warning to those who want an "efficient" U.S. intelligence organization.

Fourth, regardless of what an elected or appointed leadership considers optimally efficient, subordinate organizations will retain their own traditions and focused expertise. The DIA was established in 1961 to "bring the military intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense into full consonance with the concept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958." It had no such effect. On the contrary, the Services successfully resisted Robert S. McNamara's plan to have the DIA subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. To offset the new entity, they enlarged and strengthened their own intelligence organizations, guaranteeing prime consideration of service-specific needs. Through control of officers assigned to DIA, they ensured that service loyalties were not forgotten.

So the new national security strategy will likely try to accommodate significant reductions in the size of the national intelligence community (including elimination of many intelligence units and commands) with measures to increase coordination among (the remaining) organizations. Congress appears inclined to want "unification" even more than "coordination," and a Director of National Intelligence, with authority over all U.S. intelligence (including CIA, DIA, NSA and other organizations), is again being mentioned. This reduction and restructuring will be problematic.

Concerns

In man-years, dollar-expenditures, numbers of organizations, prestige, or any other likely measure of gauging what the U.S.
intelligence establishment considers its most important responsibility, there is little doubt that military threats to American interests dominate the attention of the intelligence community. Consequently, the equipment, tasking, personnel, and expertise are committed primarily to studying those dangers.

The threats envisioned by the new national security strategy, in contrast, suggest a shift to other concerns which require different skills and capabilities. By deliberately eliminating the readiness to engage the Soviet Union in a European-centered global war, the new strategy presumes its intelligence establishment can provide two years' prior warning that such a war seems likely; based on that warning, the U.S. could then reconstitute (create ex nihilo) adequate forces to deter or, if necessary, to fight and win that war.

Much thought has been devoted to "the I&W problem" because of the traumatic effect Pearl Harbor has had in shaping American consciousness. But virtually all that methodology is attuned to short-term changes in existing military forces. However, indicators to trip alarms more than several months in advance of hostilities are very hard to find, or have a dubious confidence-level. For instance, an agent serving on the Politburo staff might report that the Soviet Union was planning to attack NATO in twelve months. While the source would be extremely valuable, his protection would (or should) compel extraordinary measures to hide his identity. Yet dramatic warnings backed by deliberately vague sources ("a highly-placed agent") are hard to accept.

Moreover, to act upon such a warning would lead to two foreseeable consequences: the enemy--seeing NATO's heightened readiness--would defer the attack, since it was postulated on surprise (which, ex hypothesi, no longer exists); and he would investigate how his plans had been disclosed, perhaps terminating the agent. Deep-penetration sources about enemy intentions are extraordinarily valuable--and vulnerable--when they are used as I&W indicators.

Perversely, judging historically, they seldom are believed. For example, Richard Sorge evidently had three sources in Germany's Tokyo embassy who provided information which enabled him to radio warnings to Moscow about Operation BARBAROSSA; Stalin discounted them. And Colonel Hans Oster, deputy chief of German counter-intelligence, steadily apprised his friend, the Dutch military attache, of Hitler's plans to invade Holland; the Hague did not believe so high an official could be a reliable source. These illustrate one intelligence insider's observation, "Nobody has ever believed a piece of HUMINT [intelligence from a foreign human source], no matter its pedigree, unless he found it compatible with his personal predisposition."

Conversely, a deliberately planned major war requires preparations extending many months before its onset, and most of those preparations are detectable. The creation of trained armies, production of combat aircraft, construction of naval vessels, and
the psychological-political preparation of a society for war cannot be hidden. U.S. intelligence can provide the American government with a reasonable appreciation of an adversary's capability to initiate a planned major war.

A number of relevant issues are important. One is that capabilities do not necessarily signify intentions. Only rarely during the Cold War did the U.S. or the Soviet Union actually fear that the other intended an imminent attack, although some measure of capability to do so always was available. Contrarily, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was understood by U.S. intelligence as an Iraqi capability weeks, if not months, before the attack; most of the community did not recognize it as an intention until a few hours beforehand. 18

Another potential problem is that major wars sometimes are not planned; they "just happen." Historians hold that Adolf Hitler did not expect the Nazi invasion of Poland to trigger World War II; he evidently believed that the British and French would recognize their strategic inability to aid the Poles, and that the democracies were politically unprepared for war in any event.19 Similarly, the U.S. erred about Chinese intervention in the Korean War.20

A third possible fallacy in the new strategy's expectation of "two years' warning" is that one side's ability to attain war-readiness may be faster or easier than the other's ability to respond. Totalitarian regimes generally can act more quickly than democracies; and even a smaller economy might be ruthlessly focused on war preparation while a larger economy could have difficulty transitioning from consumer-society production. Until its invasion of Russia, the Third Reich displayed a superior recovery from the worldwide depression in preparing its economy for war than did the British and French with their notably larger and less affected economies (even though German industry was lazily committed to war production as late as 1943).21

The analogical danger would be for the new Soviet Union, or whatever replaces it, to decide on, and vigorously prepare for, major war against the West; even if reliable intelligence immediately alerted the U.S. and its allies of this threat, conceivably the required political, industrial, and military countermeasures could not be completed in time to prevent or, worse, win that war.

Finally, the best warning is of little value unless it is heeded. What are labeled "intelligence failures" often were "decision failures": all the information and danger signals were provided in a timely way to leaders duly alerted to the threat, but they disregarded the reported danger. In every age, in all forms of government, this problem has existed; as human beings, decision-makers err. A constitutional democracy especially must be mindful of the indecision and delays its elected officials experience in considering whether, or how, to react to reported threats. The firmest intelligence community alarm of a Soviet
(or Russian) long-term buildup toward war may not be sufficient to prompt Congress and the Administration to pay the political price required to fully counter the danger.

Such concerns suggest that intelligence estimates of capabilities are distinct from, and may not satisfactorily serve as, I&W alerts. The new national security strategy proposes to treat capabilities assessments as adequate warning indicators to initiate the reconstitution of American military forces; this may not work. Increased enemy military capabilities may be disregarded because they are not perceived to be accompanied by hostile intentions. Or war could begin as a minor dispute and grow into a major conflict not by design, so there would be no warning that the enemy was planning such a war. Or an enemy regime might achieve a war-winning capability before the U.S. could recognize and respond to such preparations. Or, finally, the nation's leaders may ignore intelligence warnings until it is too late to avert the disaster of war.

Concurrently, other difficulties are likely to arise. The U.S. intelligence community has responsibilities which extend beyond warning of, and preparation for, military operations. Future intelligence requirements also will stem from American grand strategy—the full and varied political, economic, and cultural interactions with other nations by which U.S. interests are advanced. While the American intelligence establishment will be challenged to support the new national security strategy, it also must significantly upgrade capabilities required by a U.S. grand strategy appropriate for the Twenty-first Century.

Language skills, foreign area expertise, knowledge of religious and political views, agricultural and economic appraisals, industrial and technology assessment, cross-cultural understanding...these have never been strengths of American intelligence. Yet such capabilities can be developed. Doing so will require organizational wisdom, substantial investments of time and money, and (most importantly) continual recognition that these traditional forms of intelligence capabilities are every bit as vital as those which newer systems provide. These improvements will be hard to accomplish, however, if there is a serious reduction in the intelligence community.

Stress Points

Although subtle, the principal adjustment the U.S. intelligence community must make is in its thinking. Old questions, phrases, and even words now often have completely different meanings. "How much warning time will we have of a Russian attack in Europe?" used to be posed in a cultural setting which no longer exists.

One danger of continuing to use an obsolete vocabulary in a transformed situation is that crucial new issues may be lost in
deceptively familiar expressions. "How much warning time will we have of a Russian attack in Europe?" now should raise the following questions: If the Soviet Union were forcibly to intervene in Poland or Rumania, and pitched battles ensued, accompanied by pleas from the Poles or Rumanians for Western military assistance, would that be "a Russian attack in Europe"? What if this were to occur in the newly independent Baltic Republics? Soviet armies must advance--probably fight--hundreds of miles westward before encountering NATO ground forces. This has enormous ramifications for Soviet and NATO military strategies, and for intelligence requirements.

A second stress point is that while many familiar requirements persist as obligations on U.S. intelligence, reductions in the intelligence budget are looming. The Soviet Union's capability to inflict incalculable destruction in a massive nuclear attack on the U.S. demands the continuation, and modernization, of intelligence systems and programs whose cost is enormous. Although some upgrades can be postponed, the imperative to maintain vigilance against Armageddon is inescapable. No significant savings can be realized in intelligence programs here.

The proliferation of deadly weaponry (ballistic missiles, chemical and nuclear warheads, etc.) and the disappearance of "the Red threat" means that the world arms trade is more commercial, less curtailed by ideological inhibitions. U.S. forces will face enemies armed with sophisticated weapons from many suppliers. Intelligence must prepare those forces against a much wider variety of tactics, weapons, and capabilities--the threat problem has exploded.

The final stress point on the U.S. intelligence community is the overwhelming volume of material that pours in daily. With the revolution in computers and communications, analysts face a mind-numbing torrent of data. Even helped by elaborate filtering, archiving, retrieval, and interpretation programs, human analysts (after learning how to use their sophisticated expert-systems) must survey mountains of information during a normal workday. The reports, studies, estimates, analyses, intercepts, articles, books, and broadcasts available on any important topic--no matter how narrowly defined--stagger the researcher. The ability of the intelligence community to serve future decision-makers depends on the maturation of artificial intelligence systems.

The Problems of Adjustment

Former CIA director Admiral Stansfield Turner titled one part of Secrecy and Democracy, "Managing the Octopus." No one should underestimate the inertia in the activities in the scores of organizations, with many thousands of individuals, who comprise "the U.S. intelligence community." Moreover, given their competitive nature and the secretive character of their work,
these organizations and people are structured to resist external direction. They are, finally, genuinely concerned with the national welfare, about which they have considerable information and tested convictions. Therefore, organizational "rice bowls" will be protected and personal agendas defended from outside pressures.

At the organization level, for example, the NSA clearly will advocate improvements to its signals intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, its cryptographic techniques, and its information security skills. Since it is a Defense Department organization, with a three-star military officer director and a budget drawn out of DoD funding, NSA must be apprehensive about reductions in the defense budget. The CIA's budget is much smaller than NSA's, but hidden among many government programs in the federal budget; as across-the-board cuts are imposed, the CIA will either be squeezed or irritate the comptrollers of their "host" programs.

Organizations can change more easily than individuals, for the latter have built careers around specific skills. Just as President Gorbachev is finding that programs to eliminate the apparatchiki's influence cannot easily be accomplished through the apparat itself, anyone who plans to re-direct the effort of U.S. intelligence organizations should consider the power of people in those organizations to impede such changes. James Schlesinger and Stansfield Turner are remembered with bitterness for their modest reductions in CIA staffing.23 Shifting American intelligence from the Soviet threat toward other nations, and from military targets to heightened interest in economic competitors, will undercut the careers of many persons who may find it difficult or impossible to acquire new skills.

The likelihood of future "covert action" operations by U.S. intelligence organizations is unclear. Some observers feel that the decline in Soviet-American rivalry will obviate the need to "engage" every presumed enemy with propaganda, harassments, and "dirty tricks." Others predict that future leaders, lacking "Soviet imperialism" as a justification for injecting American military power, will rely on less obvious means of suasion, so covert action by intelligence operatives may be more, rather than less, necessary. If so, the special requirements for effective covert actions (distinct from simple espionage) will augment the importance of the CIA, particularly its Directorate of Operations.

Setting up and running the clandestine assets of each covert action will be very complicated, involving a Presidential "finding," Congressional notification and oversight, the fielding of qualified operators, establishment of necessary secret and "front" organizations, and serious reflection on the consequences of discovery (consider the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the mining of Nicaraguan ports by CIA agents, or the "Irangate" episode). Some observers question whether any U.S. covert action can be kept secret; others doubt the utility of such operations; and the U.S.
intelligence community is of a mixed mind about the extent to which "covert action" properly should be an intelligence responsibility. The direction administrations take on covert action will renew this argument and affect the prominence of the CIA in the intelligence community.

The esprit de corps of an intelligence service, and individual morale within its organizations, matter greatly in effective intelligence operations. Transitioning to meet the requirements of the 1990s and beyond will demand exceptional leadership to maintain the strength that survived the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate 1975 Church Committee hearings on intelligence, the nadir in American Cold War intelligence self-esteem. Prospects for success are not aided by Senator Daniel Moynihan's call for abolition of the CIA, or others' suggestions that the intelligence budget should be sharply scaled back. Honorable severance arrangements, recruitment of new talent, realignment of organizational responsibilities, and resolution of fundamental questions about intelligence are aspects of the leadership challenge ahead. Of course, the primary task of the American intelligence community's leadership will be to demonstrate what has sometimes seemed uncertain: that a free society can conduct secret activities without destroying itself.

CONCLUSIONS

From General George Washington's Revolutionary War espionage nets through Herbert Yardley's Black Chamber to William Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (OSS), American intelligence organizations seldom have survived long beyond the wars that gave them birth. This American pattern, visible again in the Church and Pike committees of the 1970s and the Iran-Contra probe of the 1980s, reflects a deep aversion to clandestine power. Today's intelligence community came into existence because of the Cold War, and may too pass into history.

For the intelligence community to survive, it must be transformed to meet threats which are judged clearly more dangerous than those latent in a powerful secret government organization. This ancient problem was recognized by Plato: "We must have the guardians gentle to their fellow citizens and fierce to their enemies. If we cannot do that, they will prevent the enemy from destroying the city by destroying it first themselves." Articulating the requirements for the intelligence community's survival, and convincing the American people that its operations can be regulated, will be the foremost challenge of the intelligence community's leaders.

One of the key points those leaders must make is that while intelligence is related to military requirements, it is a distinct national activity. Hence, although the end of the Cold War has eliminated one form of military threat as a concern, the total demands on the U.S. intelligence community have not eased.
To the contrary, in many respects they have increased, and will continue to do so.

Intelligence for the 1990s must make the new national security strategy viable by supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrence retaliatory force, providing timely information for conventional military operations, verifying treaty compliance, detecting long lead-time changes in Soviet warfighting capabilities, and understanding the historic changes taking place in the USSR. It must also keep track of weapons proliferation, espionage, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, ecological hazards and disasters, the struggle for resources and social unrest due to population growth and intra-national conflicts, as well as economic competition among industrialized states. Many of these are unfamiliar to U.S. intelligence, which will have to meet these requirements by adding skills, personnel, and new modes of analytic monitoring.

Many signs point to reductions in U.S. intelligence funding, when the opposite should occur. The new national security strategy requires intelligence bolstered in resources and leadership vision. A notably smaller U.S. military demands heightened concern for intelligence superiority; and the Twenty-first Century will find the U.S. challenged in ways the Cold War intelligence community could not have imagined.

The end of the Cold War is not "the end of history"; Americans should forsake--albeit carefully--their tradition of viewing each war's end as the inauguration of the millennium. Beyond a structure to provide military intelligence during an era of widespread lethal weaponry, the intelligence community must shape itself to reflect the character and help satisfy the aspirations of the American people. Leadership based on knowledge of the past, understanding of the present, and vision for the future is most needed by the U.S. intelligence community now that the Cold War has ended and a New World Order is being created.

NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.


(3) Syria, for instance, and Egypt prior to 1973, were considered by Western governments to be Soviet "client-states," just as Israel is regarded in the Arab world as a U.S. surrogate. Throughout the Cold War, North Korea and North Vietnam were able repeatedly to surprise both the U.S. and the USSR; Iranians to
this day blame the U.S. much more than Saddam Hussein for the Iran-Iraq war; and American critics of the right and left in the 1980s saw Soviet control of the European anti-nuclear movement and U.S. control of Central American governments, respectively.


(12) William Matthews, "Intelligence reorganization focuses on cuts, mergers," Navy Times, May 13, 1991, pp. 12-13, discusses certain changes already underway. It should be noted that "France is studying a plan to set up a single military intelligence service, replacing the five separate French agencies, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe has reported." Jane's Defence Weekly, May 18, 1991, p. 815.


Patrick E. Tyler, "The Task: Slip Spies Into the New World Order," *New York Times*, May 19, 1991, p. 5, reporting that the DIA and service intelligence agencies are estimated at slightly more than half the annual intelligence budget. A significant portion of the remainder undoubtedly also is devoted to military interests.


President George Bush's speech at Aspen included a last-minute insert. His address on August 2, 1990 had been about eight months in the making, carefully structured and written. In that time, the President's personal involvement had been evident, along with that of his trio of principal advisors in national defense and security: Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General Colin L. Powell, USA. During the architecture and construction of the address, his Presidential advisors and National Security Council (NSC) staff members had sometimes found it useful to think in terms of headlines: What New York Times and Washington Post headlines would be written over the story of this speech by the President?

Clearly, they should announce the weighty subject of the address, the outright chartering of a new national security strategy, a significant event in the history of the republic during the late Twentieth Century. But then events out of the control even of the President intervened. The next day's headlines were not about the new national security strategy; in fact, they weren't about strategy at all. They were about the winds of war in the Persian Gulf. Iraqi forces continued their sweep across Kuwait even while the President was speaking in Aspen, Colorado.

The insert in the President's speech referring to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a last-minute refinement: "The brutal aggression launched last night against Kuwait illustrates my central thesis." These words are the coincidental intersection between the two important events--the war and the strategy--dated August 2, 1990 that will drive the U.S. military into the next American Century. The President was defining what would become an understated yet direct public policy description of Operation DESERT SHIELD and its later active mode, Operation DESERT STORM. The new national security strategy he was articulating would quickly have its first, unplanned operational test by the harsh reality of international crisis. This early test was going to happen as the strategy was first evolving--a circumstance unique in American history, and certainly an unusual factor in the most unique war the U.S. has ever fought.

The new national security strategy is actually not "strategy" at all, in the strictest sense. One sense of strategy is that it is a design for the implementation of polity. Sometimes it is a rigid design. The Aspen address and the fleshing in of its precepts are most correctly strategic policy, broadly-gauged conceptual strategy that does not implement polity. It is polity. Because strategists are theologians of a sort, the most appropriate metaphor for the new national security strategy may
be a religious one: The strategy is rather like the Christian doctrine of the Trinity (strategic policy), instead of a prescriptive catechism (strategy). The catechism will follow in political and military incarnations. It will be appropriately accompanied by challenging heresies, reformations, competing orthodoxies and heterodoxies, and evangelism.

This strategic policy, this design architecture, will likely stand even through succeeding administrations of either political party. Just as 45 years of Cold War strategy was embodied in the Truman Doctrine's simplicity, this new national security strategy is both the touchstone and the defining event for all the strategy which follows. Its gestation period has been initialized and launched by the events of the Persian Gulf War in all of that war's uniqueness, unpredictability, and brilliant successes.

The central question addressed in this chapter is a simple one. It will not be answered completely until the historical verdicts are read well into the next century. How did the Persian Gulf War affect the new national security strategy? I will first outline five important areas of the new national security strategy which appear to have been affected by the Persian Gulf war: a shift to a regional focus, the unpredictability of future events, escalation, military challenges, and American leadership. I will then look at the four official pillars of the strategy and review them, including our crisis expectations, through the prism of the Gulf war. Finally, I will conclude with the overall influence of the war on strategy.

HOW THE WAR CHANGED THE STRATEGY

There are five key areas which represent how the strategy has changed because of the war occurring in its defining moment. First, we see an emphasis on regional conflict almost to the exclusion of any continuing Soviet threat. A continued adversarial relationship, also vastly changed, remains, although its central characteristic is uncertainty. With the sudden onset of the Persian Gulf War, the unprecedented cooperation of the Soviet Union with U.S. efforts in the United Nations, and the apparent de-unionization of the USSR, the Soviet threat has begun to seem very remote, almost archaic. The general perception inculcated by the war is that the strategy will have to deal with regional threats—and that even our global problems will emanate from the wellspring of regional problems rather than from the Soviet or Russian axis. The proximate danger here, of course, is that perceiving the Soviets after the Cold War like Germany or Japan after World War II both negates formidable Soviet or Russian military strength and presumes, amid the greatest political uncertainty, future Soviet disposition just like in the Persian Gulf War.

Second, we have an expectation of future crises arising unpredictably. Because of the nature and the success of the new
national security strategy in its first outing, there is already 
an expectation that the next crisis (or the next war, depending 
on degree) will be as unpredictable and as unforeseen as the 
last. Generals and Admirals are not the only professionals to 
view military involvement in the terms of reference for the last 
war. Political leaders also form their expectations concerning 
the nature of crises using the template of national experience in 
previous military ventures.

The vociferous congressional debate about the enablement for 
the use of U.S. military force after January 15, 1991 carried the 
heavy political baggage of the Vietnam War. The next debate on 
the use of force will no doubt carry the weight of the Persian 
Gulf War. As Vietnam framed our cautions in the Gulf, so will 
The Gulf frame our premonitions for future crisis involvement in 
a strategy that greatly emphasizes regional responses. We will 
expect that the next crisis will erupt in much the same way that 
this one did—as a tactical surprise.

Expecting unpredictability will be a consequence of the 
Persian Gulf War. It may be gainful to design a national force 
structure for an unpredictable world, but it is of much graver 
consequence when U.S. strategic planning embraces uncertainty. 
High levels of uncertainty are generally bad for strategic plan-
ing, especially when resources are tight and international 
political futures are uncertain. One of classic strategy's best 
means of deterring an adversary is to introduce high degrees of 
uncertainty into his planning. If the adversary cannot reckon 
the degree of gain for a contemplated political or military 
action because of inherent uncertainties, he would be foolish to 
undertake that action. Expecting uncertainty for one's own 
planning becomes, therefore, "self-deterring." By contrast, the 
best military planning judges that certain crises are pretty 
likely, and takes steps to handle them if they happen. This is a 
core assumption of the U.S. joint military planning process.5

Third, we have embraced a possible predisposition to escal- 
tion and the use of military force. If one of the enduring 
legacies of Vietnam in the years 1975-1990 was a general reluc-
tance to resort to military force (or its threat), one of the 
first legacies of the Persian Gulf War may be exactly the oppo-
site. We were brilliantly successful under tough circumstances. 
We prevailed against a capable and formidable enemy using Soviet 
weapons, tactics, and training. In domestic political terms, 
objections to the use of force in the debate before the war 
gained no political capital at all for the opponents. In con-
trast to the post-Vietnam period, the new national security 
strategy is decidedly one of direct international engagement.

The strategy quite subtly (perhaps unintentionally) enables 
and embraces an easier motivation and justification for the 
future use of force. A U.S. freed from Soviet confrontation—or 
elements of that confrontation complicating regional crises—has 
far less to fear, far less to risk. With an increased emphasis 
on coalition pressure politically and coalition operations mili-
tarily, the collective use of force centered on American strength could be more attractive now than ever.

Fourth, the alteration of general purpose military forces under the new national security strategy, in aggregate, means a change in some U.S. military roles and missions. Naval forces (particularly aircraft carriers and Marine amphibious forces for forcible entry), have long been the principal national expeditionary means for dealing with crises. In most Cold War crises, naval forces were often the only military power brought to bear on developing international situations. Naval forces were and are seen as particularly good for intervention. They draw on no other nation's sovereignty, land area, or airspace besides the adversary's.

But in the Persian Gulf War, naval forces were supporting forces. They played nowhere near the predominant role that they did in the Pacific theater in World War II, or even during Vietnam. Naval forces were enabling forces, where the Maritime Interdiction Force and early Marine Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Brigades insertion made possible both the air war and the lightning-quick ground assault of February 1991. The primacy of land forces and land-based air forces during the Persian Gulf War could significantly alter the future application of the new national security strategy. With the experience of a war, unique as it was, that decisively validated these types of forces, we will likely call on them again.

The Base Force gives increased expeditionary and power-projection roles to land forces and to land-based air forces. This is a very new development for the U.S., given our inherent political-cultural bias against the introduction and continuation of garrison forces overseas, a development present from the first public introduction of the strategy. At Aspen, the President used phrases that are shorthand-descriptive of Army airmobile forces ("...we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most recently in Panama...") and land-based air forces ("We need forces that give us global reach").

A reliance upon land forces and land-based air forces as principal expeditionary and power-projection elements of U.S. strategy means that we will likely view regional geopolitical challenges as military challenges. Historically, the introduction of land forces and land-based air forces has been perceived in international politics as a much weightier matter than the mustering of a naval force off shore at the location of a crisis. Moving land forces into place raises issues of sovereignty, raises the question of which nation ultimately controls military action, and invariably raises the stakes of political confrontation.

Sometimes crises can begin to look like military opportunities--especially the intractable, insoluble ones that may come to dominate the post-Cold War world. When land forces and land-based air forces take over a primary national expeditionary role,
those opportunities can become politically self-complicating (if not militarily self-escalating) due to the immediate range of military response available. But with naval forces in the expeditionary mainstay role, the same general range of military power is available, with nowhere near the same expenditure of political capital or complication/escalation potential. After a crisis is resolved, ships will still come and go in international waters, but the extraction of land forces is one of the most difficult feats in international politics—as our 1991 experience in Iraqi Kurdistan bore out.

With land forces and land-based air forces at the center of U.S. expeditionary capabilities, the range of our response means taking a very big step, as we did in Operation DESERT SHIELD, rather than the gradations of force engendered by naval power, as we used in the Cold War. Additionally, with a reliance of any sort on land-based air forces stationed in the continental U.S. (CONUS), we could remove the ability to respond militarily with force or credible threats of force at levels less than conventional strategic bombing—such as the introduction of amphibious forces or the mere proximity of aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs).

Finally, we have made a determination to provide U.S. leadership in future crises, and to define U.S. interests in specific detail. President Harry S. Truman empowered the Cold War. Bush empowered the Persian Gulf War. America's global leadership role was the centerpiece of each empowerment. The U.S. provided a new level and character of global leadership in the Persian Gulf War, especially within the context of the United Nations Security Council, and defined that this nation's vital interests were indeed at stake in the Gulf. We were also quite specific about what our goals actually were (in intentional contrast to Vietnam-era strategic policy). If the "superpower shingle" hangs over only one door in the world today, while "the U.S. tends to avoid taking unilateral military action and prefers to work with allies," then our willingness to provide international leadership must be the defining factor in future uses of the new national security strategy.

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR'S EFFECT ON KEY ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY

In order to examine the substantive changes in the new national security strategy because of the war (and any warning flags raised by the application of the war to the evolving strategy) each of the four "pillars" of the strategy can be looked at in turn through the lens of Operation DESERT STORM.

Strategic Deterrence

In the new national security strategy, strategic deterrence means above all strategic nuclear deterrence—a distinction that
continues from the Cold War. The strategy is quite clear about the continuation of our strategic nuclear arsenal, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), and non-SIOP options. But has it been affected by the war? The answer is a qualified yes. The main factor which changed is the war's influence on how we perceive strategic defense, particularly ballistic missile defense. The character of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars," debate was greatly altered by Iraq's use of the SS-1C SCUD B missile in the Persian Gulf War.

The focus of SDI is no longer "Star Wars," it is now GPALS, or "Global Protection Against Limited Strikes," a program less than half the size of the previous SDI phase I architecture. The timing and presentation of the GPALS refocus is important. At the immediate moment it was brought forth, in mid-February 1991, the most consequential development in the war was Iraq's use of the SCUD attack to terrorize the populations of Saudi Arabia and Israel. Iraq's well-recognized attempt by these attacks was to draw Israel into the war in order to fragment the Arab-U.S. link in the coalition. But the SCUDs only aggravated and galvanized the populations of the target nations, much as England rallied in the fall of 1944 during the V-2 rocket attacks late in World War II. SCUDs did not achieve a Douhet-style capitulation. Their principal effect was not operational or political, it was psychological. It also shifted the strategic defense debate into a theater emphasis. That emphasis certainly affects the evolution of U.S. strategy.

The Soviet interest in arms control measures should also be heightened in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War because of another weapon: the TOMAHAWK Land-Attack Missile (TLAM). The high-explosive unitary conventional warhead (TLAM-C) and bomblet (TLAM-D) versions of TOMAHAWK were, of course, used to great advantage in the Persian Gulf War. The validation of the TLAM weapon during Operation DESERT STORM will help to drive future Soviet strategy, behavior toward the U.S. in crises, and even the Soviet perspective on arms control agreements. Since the war, TOMAHAWK has become part of the final START agreement--not within the treaty proper, but as a politically binding codicil.

Forward Presence

On December 3, 1989, at the end of the "Revolution of 1989" experienced in eastern Europe, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met at Malta. There, the Soviet president spread a map on the ship's table. It was a line-drawn Mercator-projection map of the world centered on the Soviet Union. It illustrated the Soviet perception of American forward defense, labeled "US Military Bases and Installations Outside CONUS." (See Figure 1)
As a totem of the Cold War, the map is an especially compelling depiction of U.S. forces from the Soviet perspective. Our land forces and bases are poised around the Soviet rimland, bristling and arrayed in depth across the European theater, the southern flank, and throughout the Pacific. President Bush referred to this map in his Aspen address, saying that it showed, in Gorbachev's view, "American encirclement of the Soviet Union."

It is hard to imagine a more distinctive geographic representation of our "policy of containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world." The strategic policy of containment was an effort to manage Soviet perceptions (the key to deterrence) in order to respond to the Soviet threat as we understood it during the Cold War. Creating and then managing a deterrent perception in our strategic adversary was the centerpiece of Cold War strategy.

Creating and managing a deterrent perception was also of absolute critical consequence in the early phases of Operation DESERT SHIELD, where the rapid movement of land, air, and naval forces were easily understood to be necessary in order to "contain" Iraqi forces from moving further south, beyond Kuwait and into the Najd and Ahsa regions of eastern Saudi Arabia. The difference between Gorbachev's map and a notional (very empty) corresponding map of the Arabian peninsula on, say, July 31, 1990 is illustrative of the most significant change in American strategy after the Cold War: the move from the Cold War's "forward defense" (principally of Europe and the Pacific) to the new national security strategy's "forward presence" (globally, but less).

Out of our experience Kuwait and Iraq, there is one overriding validating principle of forward presence which can be gleaned from our experience: When forward presence is reduced, logistics and mobility become the key currencies of strategy. The forward presence of a scaled-back, restructured U.S. military in the fulfillment of the new national security strategy is very much like our forward presence in the Persian Gulf region before Operation DESERT SHIELD began.

When Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, there was effectively no American or coalition "forward defense" in the Persian Gulf or on the Arabian peninsula. But there was a moderate naval force and there was a most significant military surge-capable infrastructure; in short, there was "forward presence." In this way, the region was representative of the future of American forward military presence. Our rapid deployment to the area, and more importantly, our bringing quickly to bear a collection of joint and combined power projection forces, were critical to the defense of Saudi Arabia. What is noteworthy here is not the character of our crisis response, but our extremely low yet temperate, credible, visible "forward presence.

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It enabled an appropriate military action when one became necessary, despite next to no strategic warning.

Unlike the forward defense of Europe and the Pacific Rim during the Cold War, this region enjoyed only a minimist American military disposition punctuated by augmented force levels in crises. It also enjoyed the construction of the most exhaustively complete indigenous infrastructure, especially for land-based air forces and port offload, anywhere in the world. Some kind of infrastructure (not necessarily to this degree) is central in the new national security strategy's forward presence, if we expect to remain, as President Bush stated in Aspen, "a strong and engaged America," with "forces able to respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur." This factor--logistics pre-planned within a reasonable infrastructure--is essential to achieve if the strategy is to succeed at all levels of warfare.

However, the reality in the 1990s is that we are withdrawing from our extensive structure of overseas basing grounded in the threat-determined requirements of the Cold War. Therefore, in areas of the world where there is less available surge infrastructure, and where we have a compelling geostrategic interest, we must necessarily accept and carefully manage more risk. We have to do so on multiple levels of policy, diplomacy, peacetime military operations supporting forward presence, and in burgeoning crises.

To accomplish these ends during peacetime, the second factor affecting forward presence enters: mobility, which, like some forward infrastructure is also present in the President's Aspen address: "No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies by thousands of miles of water." Mobility--by sea and air--is probably more critical to strategic success and credibility than overseas infrastructure.

For obvious fiscal reasons (and because of some very real isolationist sentiment rumbling around on our political right and left edges), we will be parsimonious with our overseas spending well into the new century. So what Aspen implies through the lens of the Persian Gulf War is that mobility writ large--for naval forces, tactical air forces, and light ground forces--is the sine qua non of peacetime forward presence. Without mobility, reduced, restructured levels of military forces cannot be credible in regional deterrence or as a stepping-stone for crisis response.

There is, however, a cautionary side to the Persian Gulf War's logistics and mobility influence on forward presence. The greatest early successes of Operation DESERT SHIELD--the landing of the Marine Corps's First and Second MPF Brigades and the early insertion of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division--were made possible not only by American investment, but also because of Saudi Arabian development of airfields and piers that exist in nowhere
near as comprehensive a form anywhere in the world. If the U.S. cannot (and should not) invest to this extent in overseas infrastructure, and if most developing nations are not capable of matching wealthy Saudi Arabia's feat, then what are the alternatives that can fuel stability and security?

If mobility is going to be a credentializing determinant for American global presence, there are some alternatives. First, emphasize naval presence, accepting tradeoffs both in deployments removed from "traditional" fleet hubs and in resource allocations with relatively heavier weight to the naval services (especially to CVBG strike forces and to Marine Corps amphibious brigades), moving away by design from the Cold War's "normal" one third/one-third/one-third dollar split among the services.

Second, invest some of our scaled-back defense resources in the homeless children of strategic programatics, fast sealift for heavy, armored ground forces (like the extremely successful 24th Infantry Division), more roll-on/roll-off ships, and further development of prepositioning: upgrading Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons for the Navy and Maritime Prepositioning Ship sets for the Marine Corps, and greatly improving Afloat Prepositioning Ship sets for the Army and Air Force.

Finally, structure our Army, Navy, and Air Force airpower programs principally around rapidly deployable, stealthy, sustainable tactical strike forces capable of a wide range of deployments, responses, subtleties of force, and missions--while supporting but giving much less relative weight to bomber aircraft which, while at greater expense and less strategic value, can undoubtedly provide rapid reach to any location on the globe.

Crisis Response

Under the new national security strategy, crisis response and presence are the focus of strategy and the engines of defense programming. What the Persian Gulf War means overall for this pillar of the new national security strategy is the enfranchisement of certain expectations for crisis response in the new world order. There are eight post-Persian Gulf War expectations for future crisis response, and they will directly impact upon the new national security strategy when it is next employed.

The first expectation is a quick resolution. The entire Persian Gulf War--from the invasion of Kuwait to its liberation--lasted only 214 days. Operation DESERT SHIELD, the deterrent build-up and mustering of offensive forces, took 167 days; Operation DESERT STORM's air war was 43 days long; and the ground war lasted only 100 hours. What the Persian Gulf War has done, following the blazingly quick end of the Cold War, is to give the American body politic a taste for the quick resolution of crises. This expectation means a compression of political decisionmaking, and possibly a smaller scope of available military options. It
can especially contribute to negating long-term options like naval and air embargoes, and economic sanctions. In the most cynical expression of this expectation, our next war had better end in forty-three days, or it begins then to become a domestic and international political problem.

Second, a build-up period for a crisis response is expected under the new national security strategy. In Southwest Asia, we had the ability to mount Operation DESERT SHIELD, the largest and most comprehensive force deployment in almost a half-century. This build-up meant not only that we could defend Saudi Arabia and deter further aggression; it also enabled us to emplace, then use an airpower- and land force-prominent offense to liberate Kuwait. The lesson that future Saddams will likely take from this experience is not to give the U.S. time for massive force movement. At least here, the Operation DESERT SHIELD model is not really a model at all. Expecting this kind of time to plan and move is only an invitation to refight the Persian Gulf War. Time for a six-month build-up is the most prominent non-lesson of the conflict; we should not expect it.

Third, the new strategy expects coalition support for future crisis response. Perhaps the most unprecedented American achievement in facing up to the crisis of August 1990 was our ability to muster a coalition that held together throughout the next six months, including the six weeks of offensive operations. In crises of another nature—where our interests do not coincide so forcefully with those of our allies, perhaps, or where terrorism begets an amorphous threat—our ability to mount this kind of coalition may well be diminished, if it exists at all in the first place. The degree to which it will diminish depends, of course, on what the crisis is.

Regions of the world other than the Middle East will present their own problems and challenges for bringing together coalitions as well. Secretary Cheney recognized this expectation when he noted that "the requirements of deterrence and defense dictate that we not reduce forces to a level that would leave ourselves overly vulnerable."11 In other words, American unilateralism in strategy is demonstrably bad, but some unilateral capability in force structure can only be prudent.

Fourth, the new strategy expects host nation support. The Persian Gulf War has given us this disposition, and it is also a legacy of the Cold War, where host western Europe was threatened by the Warsaw Pact. But Saudi Arabia, even under threat of imminent Iraqi attack, required convincing through the presentation of military intelligence and lots of high-level diplomacy before that nation would acquiesce to American land force deployment on the Arabian peninsula.12 It is reasonable to assume that future crises would have neither as clear-cut a threat, as outrageous a provocation, nor as clearly despotic an enemy.

Fifth, domestic political cohesion is expected for any future crisis response. In the Persian Gulf War, we really have
Saddam Hussein to thank for our domestic political purpose and resolve. In another major regional crisis, domestic political cohesion may not, and probably will not, be as easily attained. Furthermore, our early success in the Operation DESERT STORM air war factored greatly in public support for this war, as did its brevity, intensity, and low coalition casualties. Not all future crises will have as sharp definition for the Congress and for the American public. When these elements line up as they did before the Persian Gulf War, solidified by the Saddam-gua-Hitler understanding well nurtured in press and government, the political effect can be unbelievably potent. It should not, however, be relied upon.

Force sufficiency is a sixth expectation for future crisis response under the new strategy. Some commentator in years to come will no doubt remark on the "inevitability" of the Persian Gulf War, given that it came at a moment in history when the U.S. had just completed its largest peacetime military force building ever. That commentator will be wrong, but he or she will have raised a good point. The success of the Persian Gulf War as a crisis response was made possible by the military power we had available at the moment it was needed.

In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, one of the most frequently-asked questions from the Congress is "Can this be done in 1995?" The answer is always conditional--on threat, warning time, place, scenario, geopolitics, intensity of conflict, likelihood of occurrence, and a lot of undeterminable trends in the future strategic environment. What is clear from Aspen is that we will respond to crises in the future with a leaner, restructured force. Its sufficiency is a good expectation, one to which the American public has a right. But its overwhelming triumph as in the Persian Gulf War could be dangerous to expect, especially during military planning and in constructing foreign policy responses in crises.

The seventh expectation, under the new strategy for future crisis response is a technological advantage. We expect, and in all likelihood will attain, a distinct technological advantage over any strategic adversary. But this expectation must be hedged, as the defense establishment is already doing in planning for crises to come.

Reliance on technological advantage is an expectation that we should embrace, but one which the Persian Gulf War must not cause us to take for granted. This expectation is a corollary to force sufficiency. With the war's heavy reliance on high technology to enable a ground incursion, there will be a tendency for the body politic to take our technological margin for granted. This expectation is also part of our ethnocentric psyche: American technology is best, we ardently believe, and shall prevail. The cautionary note needed to be sounded with this expectation is not that it exists, but that we could believe it to be perpetual and therefore take it for granted.
In the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, it was clear that Secretary Cheney was not about to allow that position. His requested budget authority for research was, after accounting for inflation, ten percent above the previous year's, with technology base funding also increasing even as "force reductions were begun" and "defense continues to take a smaller and smaller portion" of our national fiscal resources. In order to prevail in coming major regional crises, our technological advantage is crucial. It is useful for Operation DESERT STORM to have focused us on it.

The final major crisis expectation bequeathed by the Persian Gulf War on the new national security strategy is a geopolitical one. We now expect that the Soviets' behavior during the war will presage Soviet action in future crises. This is perhaps the most optimistic expectation we could have. This expectation belongs to the national leadership. The general public, however, is not as sanguine about continued good Soviet behavior. The question raised by this expectation is whether or not it is reasonable to believe that future crises will be like the Persian Gulf War— with Soviet acquiescence, if not alliance— or whether they will have a Soviet adversarial component. And given the dramatic events of August 1991 in the Soviet Union, the real question may be which Soviet—or Russian—leaders will participate in future crises. With uncertainty as the hallmark of Soviet politics, and "Soviet Union" now a seeming oxymoron, American prudence and fortitude were never more necessary.

Reconstitution

Among the four pillars of the new national security strategy, force reconstitution is the one least overtly affected by the Persian Gulf War. The operations in Kuwait and Iraq were obviously not the types of operations for which reconstitution is intended. But in at least two areas—lift and the reserves—the experience of the Persian Gulf War will gauge some of our approaches to issues of reconstitution.

There were significant challenges for sealift in the Persian Gulf War, and it is the focus these challenges bring that will affect both the debate on the new national security strategy and its implementation. The same is true, but to a lesser extent, of airlift—which played the key mobility role in moving land forces quickly into Saudi Arabia early in August 1990. What the war did, more than any mere policy pronouncements could have, was alert us to this most critical element of logistics strategy. It is at the heart of the concept of reconstitution (and also crucial to peacetime forward presence and crisis response).

With the first call-up of reservists for combat duty since the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War bequeathed a particular legacy on the new national security strategy. It was the first real demonstration of the policy of maximizing military capabili-
ty through the optimum mix of active and reserve forces, often called the Total Force Policy. Reserve policy is the most visible immediate feedback of how the war influenced the strategy outright. This element of reconstitution--greatly supported by the Congress--will be the war's indelible mark for the foreseeable future.

THE INFLUENCE OF WAR ON STRATEGY

In one sense, the public perception of the Persian Gulf War and its relation to the new national security strategy is that we announced a strategy, then tried it out during the war. In reality, the strategy was only entering its gestation period when the war was thrust upon it. In 1990 and 1991, the U.S. experienced an interesting inversion of the normal relationship between strategy and war. In this case--unique in this country's history--the war has altered our long-term strategy.

Our military forces are now in the process of building down to their 1995 floor. By that year we will attain the lowest defense outlays as a share of gross national product in over 50 years. Our strategy has been announced in general geopolitical terms, but in strategy, as in economics or in legislation, the devil is in the details. For the new national security strategy, those details exist in defense budgeting and programmatic, and the Persian Gulf War will demonstrably influence them. As President Bush stated in Aspen, we are restructuring "with an orderly reduction, not a fire sale." We are meeting "emerging challenges." And we are still coping with the end of the Cold War; we have continuing uncertainty about and mistrust for the Soviets, even as they experience some of the most rapid and dramatic national change in world history.

The Soviets have certainly taken notice of the Persian Gulf War--and of the new national security strategy. Army General M. A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff before his removal in the aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup, noted with approval the success of the United States' joint operations in southwest Asia, saying that "the war in the Persian Gulf confirmed yet again the importance of the infrastructure in achieving the effectiveness of the operations of both the air and the ground troop groupings." He was almost admiring.

In the end analysis, the influence of this war on this strategy has yet to be understood fully. The reason is simple: We do not yet fully understand the war. Early lessons are incoming all the time, but they seem for the most part to be selective, and supportive of whatever disparate viewpoint the commentator holds and wishes to "prove" as a consequence of something that happened in the war. For that reason alone, the new national security strategy is a good and sufficient American strategic policy. The strategy is grounded in the reality of geopolitics independent of Iraq's aggression of 1990 or any parochial lessons
to be gleaned from our response. The Persian Gulf War has not really changed any of the basics of the strategy. It has subtly altered the gestation of strategic policy, and it will be the cornerstone of future force structure. Like the insert to the President's speech, its intrusion can lead the way for everything which follows. Our challenge is to manage that intrusion for the most gainful effects America can have on the new world order.

NOTES

(1) The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the author alone and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. Navy.

(2) The Aspen address presenting the new national security strategy was developed at the National Security Council staff by two Directors for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Colonel Michael V. Hayden, USAF, and Rear Admiral (then Captain [CAPT] Donald L. Pilling, USN. The National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Secretary of Defense were intimately involved. The public policy presentation was framed and the Aspen Institute venue was chosen by David F. Demarest, Jr., Assistant to the President for Communications, and Sig Rogich, Assistant to the President for Public Events and Initiatives. The speechwriter who crafted the actual text with President Bush was Special Assistant to the President Dan McGroarty. Development of the strategy originated in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under the direction of Paul D. Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; it is Wolfowitz, in fact, who can most correctly be called the intellectual "Godfather" of the strategy.

(3) The Truman Doctrine--"to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"--was also "strategic policy," not "strategy."

(4) In the JCS 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) (Washington, DC: March 1991), p. 1-1, changes in the Soviet Union are likened "to a monumental shift in the tectonic plates, unleashing a host of forces that are irrevocably changing the strategic landscape," with "enormous implications for US national security policy" in the "astounding advent of a second Russian Revolution in this century."

(5) See, for example, "Conventional Contingency Response," Chapter 9 in the JMNA, where contingencies by geographic area and specific threat are considered.

(6) "Global Reach--Global Power" is widely understood in the defense establishment to be a service-specific U.S. Air Force strategy envisioning airpower as the principal means of dealing with the 21st Century's security environment. This was the subtitle of an Air Force White Paper, "The Air Force and U.S.

(7) The phrase is General Colin Powell's.


(10) There are, of course, many more validating principles that will emerge (for all facets of strategy) from detailed analysis of the war ongoing at the time of this writing (Summer 1991). The principal United States Government effort was published as Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25) (Washington: DoD, July 1991). I was the Navy Department's staff officer for the production of this report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The final report is due to the Congress on January 15, 1992 in both classified and unclassified versions.


(14) Dick Cheney, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1991), p. ix. It is appropriate to disclose here my role as the Navy Department's staff officer for the production of this report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The principal staff officer who developed Part I for Secretary Cheney was CAPT Martin Spolarich, USN, in the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Resources).

(15) In a comprehensive Gallup Poll taken during the Persian Gulf War (while the Soviets were cooperating with us at the U.N. at every turn), 64 percent of adult Americans agreed that "the Cold War is not really over and you cannot really trust the Russians." Seventy-three percent of the national leadership disagreed with that statement. The poll, commissioned by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and published on February 11, 1991, was conducted between October 23 and November 15, 1990 by the Gallup
Organization. It "relied on additional Gallup polls taken in January both before and after" offensive operations began in the Persian Gulf War.

The Congressional Response
by
Paul N. Stockton²

The most immediate hurdle confronting the new national security strategy lies on Capitol Hill. That strategy calls for a revolution in defense spending, not only by incorporating sharp cuts in the military budget, but also by reordering future defense priorities. However, the President can only propose such changes. Congress legislates the defense budget, often in conflict with the President's recommendations. And it is Congress that will decide whether, and how, to transform the new national security strategy from rhetoric into budgetary reality.

Congress has not taken an up or down vote on the strategy was a whole and is unlikely to ever do so. Instead, the funding changes needed to implement that strategy will dealt with piecemeal through the annual budget process. To what extent will those particular budget decisions be guided by broader congressional concerns over the need to recast U.S. defense policy? Under what circumstances will Congress attempt to shape that overall policy? How might such congressional activism affect the fate of the new national security strategy?

This chapter argues that in early 1990, months before the President George Bush announced his new strategy, the perceived failure of the Administration to respond to the end of the Cold War encouraged Congress to step into the breach and press for a thorough revision of U.S. defense policy. Bush recaptured the initiative with the new national security strategy, which (although the product of the Administration's own policy review) co-opted many of the policy changes Congress was already advocating. That co-option may avert future congressional challenges to the strategy. However, if President Bush fails to respond to further shifts in the security environment, Congress remains poised to recast U.S. defense policy on its own, particularly if it can seize on new rationales to slash military spending.

Even if Congress does accept the broad principles of the new national security strategy, conflicts over the implementation of those principles will persist. Congress is already battling the President over how to transform the need for a new strategy into actual changes in weapons and personnel spending. Some congressional activism is driven by the desire to protect constituent interests. However, the new strategy is vague in its implications for some key weapons programs, encouraging members of Congress to disagree with Administration funding requests on grounds of policy rather than pork. Because the fate of the strategy will ultimately be determined by decisions on particular programs, this opportunity for congressional activism will continue to give the legislative branch a decisive role in the future.
Part one of the chapter examines the immediate response of Congress to the new national security strategy, the congressional context in which that strategy emerged, and the implications for the new national security strategy. Part two analyzes the specific ways in which Congress is likely to revise the strategy. Part three describes the roles that Congress must play in sustaining that strategy, and evaluates those roles in light of emerging patterns of congressional policymaking.

CONGRESS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW STRATEGY

When President Bush submitted his budget request for Fiscal Year (FY)-1991 in January, 1990, that request barely hinted at the policy revolution he would propose eight months later. Bush said that his FY-91 request was intended to be "a defense budget that begins the transition to a restructured military...." However, when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney testified in support of that request on Capitol Hill, he noted that the budget was largely a continuation of past policies. Cheney told Congress that despite the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Soviet military power remained formidable. Furthermore, in the face of uncertainty surrounding the decline of the Cold War, Cheney testified that this was "the worst possible time to contemplate changes in defense strategy."

Cheney's stance provoked sharp criticism on Capitol Hill. Almost immediately, members began calling for a thorough revision of U.S. defense policy--and specifying what they thought the new U.S. military strategy should be. Prominent among these members was Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Nunn gave a series of speeches on the Senate floor in early 1990 in which he assessed future U.S. security requirements and proposed "major changes in our military strategy." Other Armed Services Committee members soon began offering their own visions of future U.S. strategy. Even Republican members such as John McCain (R-AZ) and William Cohen (R-ME) called for drastic revisions of Administration policy, and issued defense budget proposals to carry out their reassessment of U.S. strategy.

This congressional drive for a new defense strategy quickly moved beyond rhetoric. After attacking the testimony of Cheney and other defense officials in a series of defense policy hearings, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and SASC began in the Spring of 1990 to draft their own versions of the defense budget. Under the leadership of Senator Nunn and Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), chairman of the HASC, the committee "marks" that began to emerge reflected a very different sense of defense priorities (and much lower spending levels) than those proposed by the President.

Members of Congress were not alone pressing for change. Despite Cheney's public dismissal of the need to rethink U.S.
defense strategy, a number of officials in the Administration and Defense Department were already carrying out such a reappraisal in early 1990. The internal Administration disagreement over the need for policy change became public in March, 1990 when Central Intelligence Agency Director William Webster declared that the decline of the Soviet threat was irreversible. The appearance of Executive Branch dissension, however, only encouraged members of Congress to press for change, particularly as Cheney continued to defend the FY-91 budget request.

One immediate impetus for this congressional activism was the belief that, despite Webster's assessment, the Administration continued to underestimate the decline of the Soviet threat. Nunn told his colleagues on March 22, 1990 that the Administration's understanding of the threat was "rooted in the past," and that "the development of a new military strategy that responds to the changes in the threat has not yet occurred." Congressman Aspin considered the Administration's threat assessment so unrealistic that he commissioned one of his own, conducted by a special panel of the HASC. That report found the threat in rapid decline, and concluded that the "Bush Administration has been overly cautious, even grudging, in its appreciation of how the Soviet threat is changing."  

Congressional interest in the declining threat was closely tied to another Hill concern: that of reducing defense expenditures. The President's FY-91 budget request submitted in January, 1990 called for $295 billion in defense spending. Although that figure represented a two percent real decrease from the FY-90 Department of Defense (DoD) budget, Cheney emphasized that no further cuts could be made without endangering U.S. security. That stand was immediately attacked by Nunn, Aspin and Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser (D-TN), who joined in arguing that the decline of the Soviet threat permitted much deeper cuts in U.S. defense spending--as much as ten percent, according to Sasser. Moreover, it was not just Democratic opponents of the President who pushed for a lower defense budget. Republicans like Senators McCain, Cohen, and John Warner (R-VA) also added their support for sharper reductions.

However, cuts of that magnitude would have profound policy implications. With the congressional desire for such reductions, and for responding to the decline of the Soviet threat, Aspin and Nunn were rankled by the Administration's refusal to propose a policy revolution in the FY-91 request. Of course, the Defense Department's planning, programming and budgeting system is a complex and time-consuming process. Even if Administration officials had wanted to totally recast the FY-91 request in response to the Eastern European upheavals of late 1990, they would have encountered serious difficulties in doing so. But Cheney's testimony that it was the "worst possible time" to consider dramatic policy changes provoked congressional outrage. Senator Nunn attacked that attitude as incomprehensible, and charged that the Administration's defense policy was riddled with "big blanks." Aspin reached a similar conclusion, arguing that
"there are new realities in the world, but no new thinking at home to match them." From the perspective of Capitol Hill, the Bush Administration had created a policy vacuum by failing to respond to the end of the Cold War.

That failure created both the opportunity and the impetus for Congress to step into the breech. According to Representative Norman Dicks (D-WA), "Congress abhors a vacuum;" the failure of the executive branch to set overall policy encourages Congress to do so in its stead. But why is that so? After all, according to analysts who argue that Congress is disinterested in policy, congressmen lack the incentive to address such issues because doing so is usually irrelevant to getting re-elected. The need to get re-elected cannot account for the push by Nunn and Aspin in 1990 to revolutionize U.S. defense policy. Both have "safe" seats; therefore, regardless of whether their constituents care about defense policy, neither were at sufficient risk of defeat to be motivated by electoral concerns alone.

However, members have other incentives that encourage them to address policy issues— incentives that could lead to future congressional scrutiny of the new national security strategy. James Lindsay argues that members of Congress address policy issues because they believe doing so is simply part of their job. Members of Congress cited that motivation in justifying their policy initiatives in early 1990. Republicans and Democrats alike argued that because of the absence of long-range policy guidance from the President, it was becoming difficult for them to fulfill their legislative responsibility to draft the defense budget. Someone had to step into the policy breach and provide the necessary guidance. Senator Nunn told his colleagues that his committee would exercise leadership in the absence of administration decisions.

Political incentives can also encourage attention to policy matters. Although the need to get re-elected may not drive much congressional interest in policy, members have other political goals. Congressmen and Senators may believe that addressing policy issues makes them appear more "statesmanlike," and thereby improves their chances of winning higher office or of gaining (or preserving) power within Congress. Both incentives may have contributed to congressional activism in early 1990. Speculation arose that Senator Nunn was positioning himself to run for president, and was highlighting defense policy issues to raise his national profile. Aspin has faced the more immediate concern of maintaining his power within Congress. During the 1980s, House liberals twice attempted to oust him from the Committee chairman-ship. With the end of the Cold War, and the clamor of House Democrats for a peace dividend, Aspin's push for a defense policy revolution helped cement his leadership position.

The desire for a peace dividend highlights another key motivation for Congress. Despite the assumption that defense policy issues are usually irrelevant to getting re-elected, such issues can sometimes attract enough public support to encourage
congressional action, as in the nuclear freeze movement. Public support for major shifts in the defense budget can gain particular attention on Capitol Hill. In the early 1980s, when public support was strong for increased defense spending, members of Congress were quick to follow President Ronald Reagan's lead in boosting such spending. However, after the fall of the Berlin wall, public opinion polls by early 1990 showed unprecedented support for slashing the defense budget. President Bush's FY-91 request ran counter to this opinion surge, and created a juicy political opportunity for congressional Republicans and Democrats to propose much deeper military cuts.

Implications for the New National Security Strategy

Some of the incentives that drove congressional activism in early 1990 will persist, and encourage Congress to critique the new national security strategy. For example, to the degree that members view policy oversight as an inherent part of their job, Administration efforts to push the new national security strategy on Capitol Hill are bound to attract congressional attention. That attention has already begun. At the opening hearings of the HASC and SASC on the FY-92 budget, when Secretary Cheney and other officials described the new strategy, members questioned whether that strategy went far enough (or perhaps too far) in restructuring U.S. defense policy.

However, questions at hearings and subcommittee investigations do not necessarily lead to congressional action. While Congress demonstrated in early 1990 that it could push for a policy revolution, two of the key factors that encouraged this activism are likely to decline. The first is defense budget-cutting. Before his Aspen speech, President Bush helped make it politically attractive for Congress to focus on defense policy, because his defense budget proposal was so contrary to public opinion trends. That political opportunity for Congress has shrunk. Under the new national security strategy and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (which grew out of the "budget summit" of that year), the defense budget is slated to plummet by as much as 20 percent in real terms between FY-91 and FY-95.

Members of Congress could, however, attempt to break the agreement and impose deeper cuts. Under what circumstances might they have the opportunity and incentives to do so? One possibility is that members of Congress could attack the Administration for not spending enough on defense. Republicans such as Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska have already raised concerns about the steepness of the cuts. More significantly, Democrats such as Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) have joined that criticism, proposing that the Administration consider postponing its five-year plan to cut active duty force levels. It is conceivable that if the Bush Administration continues to press for deep military reductions, Democrats will recognize a political opportunity to attack the President for being weak on defense, just as Senators...
John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson did during the Eisenhower Administration.

However, Kennedy and Johnson could point to the Soviet Union as an obvious security threat (though one that was overstated in the case of Democratic allegations of a missile gap). The absence of an immediate threat today has not only made the new national security strategy possible, but also more difficult to criticize. Not even the Gulf War could lead Congress to reconsider the budget cuts agreed to by the Administration. Despite efforts by Army Secretary Michael Stone and other Pentagon officials to use the DESERT STORM victory to argue for a slowdown in force reductions, leading conservatives on the Hill were reluctant to push such efforts. "Let there be no mistake," said William Dickinson (R-AL), the ranking member of the HASC. "DESERT STORM is behind us, and the defense drawdown train has left the station."22

More probable is that Congress will attack President Bush for not cutting defense enough, and impose reductions far beyond those envisioned under the new national security strategy. The underlying impetus for further reductions lies in the congressional desire for a peace dividend (to free up resources for domestic needs or to cut the deficit). However, even liberal members of Congress such as Leon Panetta (D-CA) have expressed a reluctance to unravel the budget agreement negotiated with such difficulty in late 1990.

Congress is most likely to impose drastic new defense cuts if two events were to recreate the conditions that spurred congressional activism in early 1990. The first would be a sharp decline in the perceived threat to the U.S., as happened after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. The second would be the apparent failure of President Bush to respond to that declining threat, which would give Congress the opportunity to step into the policy breach with its own agenda for defense cutbacks.

The aftermath of the Soviet coup attempt of August, 1991 could create these conditions. As in early 1990, a conflict emerged between members of Congress and the Administration as to how much the Soviet threat had declined. Some in Congress argued that with the failure of the coup, the Soviet threat had dropped far below its previous level, and that further reductions in the U.S. defense budget were warranted. Secretary Cheney argued that it was far too soon to make such a judgment and that the President's budget request out to be upheld.23

Nevertheless, this disagreement may not provide as strong a basis for congressional activism as in 1990. Although a milestone in the evolution of the Soviet Union, the coup also raised uncertainties over the ultimate fate of that nation and its military forces. In contrast, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall had far clearer implications for the Soviet threat, and provided a much more dramatic impetus for Congress to push for change in U.S. defense policy.
Moreover, in presenting the new national security strategy, Administration officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have stressed that the new national security strategy satisfies the past objections of Congress. No longer can congressional leaders accuse the Administration of ignoring the changes in the Soviet Union. Administration officials and the JCS have adopted a sharply reduced assessment of the Soviet threat, and recognized the "total, absolute demise of the Cold War." They have also highlighted their claim that this strategy represents a "total rethinking" of U.S. defense policy.

Moreover, at least for the short term, the Administration has diffused potential criticism of the new strategy by appearing to incorporate many of the policy changes recommended by Congress. Senator Nunn stated in September 1990 that: "The Defense Department...had just come up with their new strategy the day that Saddam Hussein hit Iraq. And I would say that their strategy was very similar to some of the things I was talking about earlier this spring." This co-optation of Congress will not protect the new national security strategy from all criticism. Although Nunn and other congressional leaders initially believed that the new national security strategy incorporated their recommendations, key elements of the strategy--including the concept of reconstitution--were created by the Administration. Pride of congressional authorship will not shield those new national security strategy components from scrutiny on the Hill.

Even if Congress accepted the general precepts of the new strategy, gaps and controversies in specific defense policy issues are likely to persist. The future of naval aviation is a prime example. Under the strategy, carrier-borne aircraft will play a key role in providing the U.S. with mobile, flexible striking power. However, because of cost overruns, mismanagement and other problems, the service's top four aircraft programs were axed in 1990 and 1991. As Representative Dicks has warned, the failure of the executive branch to exercise better leadership in naval aviation will spur Congress to dictate policy on its own.

Nevertheless, the sort of large-scale policy vacuum that encouraged congressional activism in early 1990 has been filled. The future of naval aviation is an important issue, but offers far less dramatic appeal than the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. While members of Congress may still hope to pursue higher office or gain other political goals by addressing policy issues, their opportunities will rarely be as inviting as when President Bush appeared to ignore the end of the Cold War. Other incentives must emerge if anything beyond a sense of duty is to impel Congress to scrutinize the new national security strategy.
According to many analysts of Congress, the desire to serve narrow constituent interests provides just such an incentive. According to Barry Blechman members of Congress tend to overlook large scale policy issues because other concerns—especially that of providing "pork" for their constituents—offers more immediate political benefits. Congress has been "sacrificing overall consistency and coherence of national policy for narrow interests and short-term objectives. This is a natural consequence of the political calculus that inevitably dominates congressional decisionmaking:" i.e., the need to "protect the interests of constituents." 

Not all studies agree that constituent interests are so decisive in shaping congressional behavior, especially in the case of strategic weapons (where the policy views of members offer a more reliable predictor of their voting behavior). It is clear, however, that Congress will have ample opportunity to undermine and distort the new national security strategy through pork-driven activism.

The President's budget request for FY-92 calls for cutbacks in two especially visible areas. In personnel, the budget would reduce active duty forces by 19 percent and National Guard and reserve forces by 23 percent by the end of FY-95. In weapons development and procurement, the President has proposed canceling 11 major programs, including the V-22 OSPREY tilt-rotor aircraft.

Both categories of reductions are bound to stir up the pork instincts of Congress. Personnel cuts, particularly when aimed at locally-based reserves such as National Guard units, have a direct economic impact on congressional districts. The cancellation of weapons programs have the same effect. Indeed, because of the harm that such cancellations can inflict on constituents (and the electoral prospects of members), many analysts argue that Congress is fundamentally incapable of halting weapon programs. The result could be that Congress will refuse to make the force reductions necessary to implement the new strategy. From this perspective, the danger is not that Congress will pay too little attention to the new national security strategy, but all too much.

Congressional Parochialism and the FY-92 Budget

Congressional action on the FY-92 budget provided some indications as to the future effect of pork on the new national security strategy. Shortly after the House of Representatives rejected the Administration's proposed defense budget, and enacted its own version of the FY-92 defense authorization bill,
President Bush denounced that bill as riddled by parochial interests and called for a budget that "defends people, not pork." 31

Bush and Secretary Cheney cited the House decisions on reserve forces as being especially porcine. The Administration proposed cutting the reserves by 107,000 in FY-92. According to Secretary Cheney, those cuts were needed not only to reduce overall spending, but because reserve forces will not play as prominent a role under the new national security strategy. That strategy emphasized the need for U.S. forces to respond quickly to regional conflicts. Cheney argued that reserves and National Guard units are unsuitable for such operations, and that the Gulf War underscored the need to diminish the combat roles assigned to reserves in the future. 32

The House rejected this proposal. In the FY-92 defense authorization bill approved by the House on May 22, members agreed to restore two-thirds of the reserve and National Guard troops Cheney has sought to cut. 33 The defense appropriations bill passed by the House on June 7 went a step further, eliminating the Administration's proposed cutbacks and adding $645 million for 1,065 new members of the reserve and Guard. 34 Moreover, while the Administration is continuing to fight for cuts, the motives of congressional opponents suggest that this fight will remain difficult.

Representative G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery (D-MS) took the lead in protecting the reserves and Guard in the House authorization bill. Justifying his position, Montgomery argued that "the best way to spread around defense spending is to have National Guard and reserve units in our different communities, where those reservists can receive additional income, educational benefits and serve his or her country." Advocates of reserve cuts (and military base closings) also recognize the power of those political considerations. According to Senator Inouye, "cutbacks translate into loss of jobs and loss of economic base, and politically, that is of considerable concern to most, if not all, members because it affects constituents. And the people screaming the loudest are the ones who are quick to cut the defense budget, but not in my back yard." 35

Nevertheless, opponents of reserve and National Guard reductions cited more than pork considerations in their defense. They also argued that it was good defense policy to maintain current force levels. Montgomery and other Congressmen disagreed with Cheney's claim that reserves had performed poorly in the Gulf war, and cited earlier statements by him on the effective contribution such forces had made. Congressional opponents also argued that with cuts in the defense budget under the new U.S. defense strategy, it was more important than ever to maintain reserve and National Guard forces, because such forces offered a relatively cheap way for the U.S. to maintain a pool of trained military personnel. 36
This overlap between pork and policy considerations is particularly strong in the case of the V-22 OSPREY tilt-rotor transport aircraft. Every year since 1989, Secretary Cheney has attempted to eliminate the V-22's funding, arguing that the $33 billion program simply cannot be afforded within the shrinking defense budget. However, Congress has consistently rejected that recommendation and voted to continue funding the V-22. The FY-92 defense appropriations bill passed by the House would provide $625 million for this aircraft.37

This money would just happen to be spent in the districts of leading congressional advocates of the OSPREY. For example, Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), a key supporter of the program, represents a district that is home to Boeing Helicopter, a V-22 prime contractor.38 Another leader is Representative Peter Green, (D-TX), whose Fort Worth district currently benefits from 500 V-22 jobs at Bell Helicopter Textron (another prime contractor), and could gain up to 5,000 jobs if the aircraft goes into full production.39

However, V-22 spending is heavily concentrated in Texas and Pennsylvania. The program offers few jobs or related benefits for congressional districts in other states.40 Some members of Congress including Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) back the program because they believe it would lead to civil aviation spinoffs important to their states. Nevertheless, far more members of Congress support the V-22 than have explicit, pork-related incentives to do so. If members voted only for those weapons that provided them with immediate constituent benefits, the V-22 would have been defeated long ago. What accounts for the aircraft's survival on Capitol Hill?

One possibility is that pork-based logrolling keeps the V-22 funded. In exchange for supporting the V-22, members from states other than Pennsylvania and Texas may get support for their own programs. Another possibility is that when Les Aspin crafts the "Chairman's mark," which represents his alternative to the Administration's defense budget proposal, the need to win support from large state delegations (including Texas and Pennsylvania) drives him to incorporate and promote their pork requests. Again, however, in contrast to the reserve force issue, where a large number of members have an immediate constituent interest in reserve spending, the V-22 has garnered broad House support where few direct pork incentives exist.

Policy considerations have played a key role in winning that support. The leaders of the V-22 fight have been able to convince members that with the end of the Cold War, and the growing need for highly mobile forces, this transport aircraft is far more important than has been recognized by the Administration. That policy argument has also received quiet support from the Marine Corps. As a result, according to Representative Curt Weldon (a Pennsylvania Republican whose district is home to Bell Helicopter), "We've won the battle not because of pork, but because it has solid, deep support in Congress, and in the Penta-
gon from the standpoint of service leaders." Indeed, by making need for mobility all the more apparent, the new national security strategy may have reduced the importance of pork in shaping such congressional activism.

Policy considerations also appear crucial in the case of sealift cargo ships for transporting tanks and other combat equipment. The Administration declined to include money in its proposed FY-92 budget for sealift and had refused to spend funds Congress appropriated for that purpose for the previous two years. Cheney's rationale was that fast transport ships were not worth the money, in part because the U.S. would be able to preposition military hardware in potential areas of conflict.

The House rejected that reasoning and voted to appropriate $1.3 billion for the sealift fleet. Of course, some congressional districts would gain jobs from building that fleet. As with the V-22, however, the vast majority of congressmen lack such direct constituent interests, making policy considerations more visible. Sealift advocates were able to justify their program by citing the need for greater mobility in the post Cold-War era, and criticizing the assumption that the U.S. would be able to know in advance where prepositioned arms would be needed. Again, the new national security strategy gave sealift backers a stronger policy basis on which to argue their case. As with the V-22, sealift advocates claimed at least tacit support from U.S. military officers, as when Les Aspin quoted DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Central Command Commander-in-Chief General (GEN) Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, as stating that "I've been advocating more sealift for a very, very long time."

However, there is another basis for rejecting the hypothesis that pork alone will drive (and distort) the congressional response to the new national security strategy. Although President Bush accused the House of parochialism in refusing to cut programs such as the V-22, he also berated Congress for refusing to spend as much as the Administration requested on programs such as the B-2 bomber and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). If pork was as dominant a force as Bush suggests, the B-2 and SDI would be guaranteed strong support on the Hill. Both programs would provide billions of dollars worth of jobs for constituents. Yet, as the President complained, the House voted to slash spending on both programs. What accounts for this behavior?

Policy considerations overcame pork. With the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet threat, members such as Aspin concluded that less money should be spent on strategic programs such as the B-2 and SDI, originally designed to counter the Soviet arsenal. While Administration officials scrambled to justify both programs in terms of future non-Soviet threats, the effort failed. The Administration's budget was designed to boost development of "Cold War" items, according to Aspin; he argued that the House needed to cut such programs, and fund alternatives "that could give us the right defense for the future...."
The new national security strategy is vulnerable to pork-driven congressional action. To implement that strategy, Cold War-oriented programs must be cut to free resources for more urgent initiatives. These cuts will inevitably threaten local economic interests. When many congressional districts share such an interest, such as maintaining reserve and National Guard spending, the desire to protect the local economy can lead Congress to oppose the reductions recommended by the Administration.

However, for programs that provide economic benefits in relatively few districts, pork motives alone may be inadequate to build a winning congressional coalition to block spending cuts. Pork incentives can even fail to halt reductions in enormous, job-bonanza programs such as the B-2. Policy considerations, and not pork alone, play a crucial role in shaping congressional action on such programs.

The fact that Congress is driven, however, by more than pork does not necessarily augur well for the Administration's plans to implement the new national security strategy. If Congress accepted those plans as sound policy, the new strategy would enjoy smooth sailing. But that is not the case. Although Congress is in broad agreement with President Bush that the Cold War is over, and that the U.S. needs smaller, highly mobile forces for the future, ample room exists for disagreement over which programs will best meet those needs.

The V-22, sealift and B-2 programs exemplify this opportunity for policy disagreement—and for congressional intervention in carrying out the new national security strategy. One of the keys to the new strategy is to ensure that the contingency force will be extremely mobile. The V-22 and sealift programs are designed to provide that mobility. Another key to the new strategy is to free up resources by cutting non-essential programs, particularly those tailored to the (former) Soviet threat. The B-2 was tailored precisely that way.

The Administration was not necessarily wrong in taking the opposite position. Rather, within the broad precepts of the new national security strategy, disputes are bound to arise between Congress and the President as to how the strategy should be transformed from rhetoric into budgetary reality. The good news is that Congress is driven by policy as well as pork. The bad news (from the Administration perspective) is that policy concerns will lead Congress to recast the implementation of new national security strategy, in ways the Administration may abhor.

RECONSTITUTION, THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE, AND CONGRESS

The question of how to carry out the new national security strategy involves more than near-term budget issues. Assuming
that some version of the new strategy remains the goal of future administrations, and that Congress accepts the broad outlines of that strategy (while often reshaping its actual implementation), Congress will face one particularly difficult problem over the longer term: how to preserve the U.S. ability to reconstitute its military forces.

However, retaining the necessary industrial and technological base (to say nothing of highly trained personnel) will become ever more difficult as the U.S. defense budget shrinks. With fewer purchases of military hardware, the companies that provide it will encounter increasing difficulties in surviving. If enough defense companies fail, or move into non-defense work that leaves them unprepared to build the necessary weapons, the U.S. may be incapable of reconstituting large-scale forces when they are most needed.

The relatively small cuts already made to the defense budget are already having an impact on the industrial base. Only two U.S. companies build nuclear-powered submarines: General Dynamic Corporation's Electric Boat division in Groton, Connecticut and Tenneco Inc.'s Newport News shipyard in Virginia. Electric Boat is on record that unless it is awarded the next contract to build the SSN-21 SEAWOLF submarine, it will not have enough business to stay open beyond the middle of the decade, leaving the U.S. with only one source of submarines. Newport News, however, has made a similar argument concerning its own ability to stay in the submarine business. The problem is that because of budgetary pressures, and the concomitant need to maintain efficient production schedules, it may simply be impossible to award enough construction contracts to keep both producers in business.45 Similar problems are emerging for producers of tanks, military aircraft and other vital weapons, as well as the more prosaic components that make them work.46

GEN Powell cites this declining defense industrial base as "the element of greatest concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff." According to Powell, "The number of producers and suppliers...of many of our critical military items is dwindling drastically, and is shrinking to unacceptably low levels." It is Congress, however, that ultimately determines how much money will be available to preserve the industrial base (and how that money should be spent). Consequently, Powell has also asked for "the help of Congress to turn this trend around."47

Help is on the way--though not necessarily of the sort Powell and the Administration would prefer. Three factors encourage congressional intervention on the industrial base issue. First, at the level of overall strategic guidance, a policy vacuum is emerging of the sort described in Section I of this paper. Although the industrial base problem strikes at the core of the new national security strategy, the Administration has yet to propose how to preserve the industrial base in the face of continued budget cuts. Although the White House Office of Science and Technology has identified 22 technologies as essen-
tial to preserving U.S. military strength, Administration offi-
cials have not described how the government should change its
methods of supporting their development. While William J.
Perry and other members of the Defense Science Board have sug-
gested a number of proposals to strengthen the industrial base
and improve the weapons acquisition process, those recommenda-
tions have not yet been accepted. Congress has a wonderful
opportunity to step into the policy breach.

Second, industrial base policy might sometimes come to be
spelled p-o-r-k. Closing the Electric Boat division would mean
the loss of 22,000 jobs at the company and thousands more at its
suppliers and subcontractors. Inevitably, leaders in the fight to assure that
the next SEAWOLF production contract goes to Electric Boat are
the legislators from Connecticut, just as the leaders of the
fight on behalf of Newport News represent Virginia. Inevitably,
those opposing legislators are using the defense budget as the
vehicle for defending their respective proposals.

However, this pork is again mixed with policy. When Repre-
sentative Norman Sissisky (D-VA) proposed that the next SEAWOLF
contract be awarded to Newport News, that initiative would have
been of direct benefit to his constituents. Nevertheless, Sis-
sisky may also have been correct in arguing that from a national
security perspective, his effort was essential "to maintain an
adequate submarine construction industrial base." When Sam
Gejdenson (D-CT) attacked that proposal, he was a bit disingenu-
ous in asking his colleagues not to "turn the submarine program
into pork;" his own proposal would have improved Electric Boat's
chances of winning the contract. Nevertheless, there may have
been merit to his argument that the declining defense budget
makes it all the more important to produce SEAWOLF submarines on
the most efficient scale possible (even at the risk of having
only one producer).

Policy considerations loom still larger for the majority of
Congressmen who lack a direct constituent interest in either
shipyard, but who must ultimately help decide the outcome of this
issue. The same is true of the other disputes that will arise
over protecting the defense industrial base. Whether Congress
will be able to resolve such disputes in a way that makes recon-
stitution practical remains to be seen. What is clear is that in
creating the new national security strategy, the President has
created not just the opportunity but the requirement for contin-
ued congressional policymaking, from near-term implementation of
that strategy to laying the foundations of U.S. military power
for the future.

CONCLUSIONS

The relationship between Congress and the new national
security strategy has taken a paradoxical twist. It was Con-
gress, not the President, who pushed for a revolution in defense policy after the fall of the Berlin wall. Indeed, Congress moved so decisively that President Bush was left with the choice of abandoning his "stand pat" position or being rendered irrelevant to the budgetary process. However, some members of the Administration were already moving on their own accord to reassess U.S. military strategy. Furthermore, when the President unveiled his new national security strategy, he co-opted much of the congressional drive for policy revisions. By so doing, he has reduced the incentives for congressional activism that proved so potent in early 1990.

This suggests that revisions are needed to the argument that Congress is disinterested in policy. Members of Congress have made policy oversight part of their job, in part because powerful political incentives exist for dealing with such issues. However, the strength of those incentives depends on the issues at stake and how the executive branch deals with them. Members had a golden opportunity in early 1990 to ride the surge of opinion in favor of defense budget cuts, and to demonstrate their leadership qualities in the absence of presidential guidance. Those opportunities, however, have shrunk. By embracing radical defense budget cuts, and offering the new national security strategy, President Bush has demonstrated a fundamental constraint on congressional policymaking: that is, the ability of a politically astute president to co-opt and minimize incentives for congressional action.

If no policy vacuum attracts Congress, will members challenge and attempt to revise the new national security strategy? Budgetary concerns will continue to attract congressional attention. Already, some members are attacking the strategy for cutting forces too deeply, while others are calling for further reductions in response to the failed coup. As long as the President maintains his position near the center of this spectrum of opinion, in contrast to his more extreme stand of early 1990, Congress will make only minor changes to the overall spending levels proposed under the new national security strategy.

What will happen within those spending levels is a different matter. According to Blechman and others analysts, members of Congress tend to overlook large-scale policy issues because other concerns--particularly that of providing "pork" for constituents--offer more immediate political benefits. Some congressional activism is driven by the desire to protect constituent interests. However, the new strategy is vague in its implications for some key weapons programs, encouraging members of Congress to disagree with Administration funding requests on grounds of policy rather than pork. Because the fate of the strategy will ultimately be determined by decisions on particular programs, this opportunity for congressional activism will continue to give the legislative branch a decisive role in the future.
NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.


(4) Ibid., p. 13.


(10) Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress.


(18) Lindsay, "Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense," pp. 22-23.


(24) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Washington Chapter of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)--The Shoreham Hotel, 14 December 1990," as delivered, p. 13.


(26) "ASW No Longer Navy's Top Priority--Garrett."


(35) Sia, "Plan to cut Guard, Reserves gives Pentagon Political Trouble."

(36) Ibid. and Towell, "House Defense Funding Bill Keeps Cuts in SDI and B-2."

(37) Towell, "House Defense Funding Bill Keeps Cuts in SDI and B-2."


(40) Scarborough, "Cheney Can't Ground Osprey."

(41) Scarborough, "Cheney Can't Ground Osprey."

(42) Towell, "House Defense Funding Bill Keeps Cuts in SDI and B-2."


(47) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the American Defense Preparedness Association Board of Directors, Reception and Dinner, The Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., 3 April 1991" - as delivered, 20 pp.


(49) William Perry, Defense Investment: A Strategy for the 1990s

(50) Stevenson, "Fears on Cut in U.S. Arms."


(52) Ibid.
The Means to Deliver:
Implications of the New National Security Strategy
for Maritime Forces
by
Sam J. Tangredi

Conventional wisdom suggests that pending cuts in the American defense budget will have a lesser impact on the Department of the Navy (DoN), which includes both the Navy and the Marine Corps, than any other military department. Indeed, a significant reduction in overseas-based land and air forces would appear to increase the relative importance of naval forces, giving greater meaning to the long-standing Navy claim to represent America's first line of defense. The actual impact of the new national security strategy, however, may be quite different. The purpose of this chapter is not to argue for an increased reliance on maritime forces, but to examine the likely impact the President's new national security strategy would have on the composition and, ultimately, the employment of the Navy and Marine Corps.

This analysis will take two directions. First, an assessment will be made of how the new strategy would change strategic vision of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The term strategic vision encapsulates the DoN's current objectives, strategic planning assumptions and concepts of its future role in American foreign policy and defense strategy.2

Second, this chapter will examine how the new strategy would affect the future programs of the DoN as reflected in public sources, particularly, the Secretary of the Navy's 1991 Annual Report to the U.S. Congress (referred to in Pentagon vernacular as the SECNAV Posture Statement).3 On that basis, an assessment will be made of the impact of program changes on the operational level of naval planning.

IS THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY A STRATEGY?

The initial and unavoidable question is whether the force reductions mandated by the new national security strategy do in fact represent a new strategic vision or are simply a reaction to perceived fiscal realities. The opening chapters suggest that a bold new vision underlies these changes: that of a multipolar world characterized by greater trust and cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Obviously, this vision is driven by the promise of a continuation of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policies, Soviet economic and internal political distress, the formal collapse of the Warsaw Pact, observed Soviet military dispositions and exercises, and the general perception that the Cold War ended in a Western victory.

But from a naval planner's perspective, do these elements significantly change the factors that determine the course of a
potential naval conflict? Granted, the likelihood of global warfare with the Soviet Union has greatly declined. Does this mean a new strategy is in order? Or should we dust off the Maritime Strategy, mothball a few carrier battle groups (CVBGs) to match a reduced budget, and remove the name Soviet Union wherever it appears, replacing it with that of the latest regional threat? And what would happen if a renewed Soviet or Russian military threat emerged?

Official statements concerning the new national security strategy emphasize the need to conform to fiscal realities created by the U.S. government budget deficit. As Secretary Garrett admitted in his Posture statement, "Fiscal realities have also made affordability an important factor to be considered in sustaining maritime superiority." Inherent in the American defense planning process, the separation between formulation of strategy and force structure planning often appears unclear. This emphasis on fiscal restraints could easily lead cynics to argue that the new national security strategy is a budget in search of a strategy, rather than a strategy shaping a budget. In this view, the requirement to provide Congress and the public with a peace dividend is what drives our new strategy full steam ahead.

STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

Part of the dilemma is whether the naval strategy and posture should respond to Soviet doctrine or to Soviet capabilities. Secretary Garrett was cautious in discussing Soviet intentions: "their [Soviet] capabilities... have not exactly matched their strategic intentions." Likewise, a stronger note of caution was issued concerning our capabilities to reconstitute: "We are continually re-assessing the Soviet Union, and must reserve the right to rebuild in response to its actions in the future."

This note of caution might strike critics as proof that naval officials have greater reservations about the new national security strategy than do other Service counterparts. This impression is enhanced by negative public commentary by several retired naval officers. Whether or not this perception is true, at least three factors impose greater caution in the maritime perspective.

First, the ambiguity of Soviet intentions concerning naval forces is greater. President Gorbachev had the opportunity to cancel the enormously expensive Soviet aircraft carrier program when he announced the down-sizing of Red Army forces, but he did not. While the threat posed by one, two, or even three fixed-wing aircraft carriers to an American force of twelve deployable carrier groups (as proposed in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman General (GEN) Colin L. Powell's Base Force, the analytical genesis of the new strategy) may appear strategically insignificant, the dedication of scarce and important resources to develop a capability that Moscow long eschewed and frequently denigrated
Construction of carriers by other nations has generally been interpreted as a symbolic commitment to continuing development of ocean-going power projection. The Soviet Union already possesses considerable open-ocean capability, which it could choose to deploy in the future. Certainly, sea-based naval aviation complements this potential.

Second, the current defensive deployment of Soviet naval forces does not necessarily represent a permanent change in the Soviet attitude towards out of area operations. In the past, setbacks in diplomacy and shifts in internal Soviet decision-making have frequently affected the Soviet approach to naval deployments. Whereas Soviet troop withdrawals from former Warsaw Pact members (in conjunction with the formal dissolution of the Pact) is an unprecedented, breathtaking change in Soviet military doctrine, a renewed defensive orientation for naval forces, in light of an on-again, off-again Soviet attitude towards extensive ship deployments, seems much less spectacular.

Third, much of the force that the U.S. Navy built to defeat the Soviet fleet appears to have--with several notable exceptions discussed later--the same capabilities appropriate for the major regional contingencies to which Secretary Cheney alluded. A prime example of this is the use of CVBGs, marine amphibious forces and maritime prepositioning supplies--all designed to counter a Soviet thrust into Southwest Asia--to prevent further Iraqi incursion into the Gulf Arab states in our first post-Cold War crisis. While the CVBG concept, designed to defeat the Soviet navy in open-ocean battle, may appear obsolete, the carriers, AEGIS cruisers and TOMAHAWK-carrying destroyers certainly are not. The success of American and Allied naval forces, largely designed for the Maritime Strategy, in executing their tasks in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM provides a certain support for the facetious planning phrase that "if you can skin the cat, you can skin the kitten."

These factors, the ambiguity of Soviet naval intentions, and the apparent success of Cold War naval forces in fulfilling a significant Third-World crisis mission, constitute the naval planning dilemma. Based on Secretary Garrett's testimony, it is obvious that the DoN leadership intends to fully support the objectives of the new national security strategy. However, from a uniquely naval perspective, it is open to question whether the new strategy represents a strategic vision superseding the premises of the 1980s Maritime Strategy, whether it is a budget plan that forces a modification of that Strategy, or whether it is a combination of strategy and budget plan providing mutual justification for shifting from the Maritime Strategy to a less demanding posture.

THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AS STRATEGIC VISION

Reaction by the naval leadership to the new national security strategy, particularly by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
Admiral (ADM) Frank Kelso, has been to accept it as a strategic vision that partially supersedes the assumptions on which the much-discussed Maritime Strategy was built. To a considerable extent, the formal Maritime Strategy had already been modified by mid-1990 to reflect a waning concentration on countering what was previously considered the prime Soviet naval threat: the Soviet submarine force.

The modified product, renamed the Naval Policy, attempted to take into account the revolutionary changes in the Warsaw Pact by emphasizing the generic principles of seapower and their application to crises outside the Cold War context. As explained in Policy briefing materials, the 1990s represented a period of dramatic transition requiring a shift in the Navy-Marine Corps focus: "With the likelihood of global war with the Soviets significantly reduced, United States strategic emphasis shifts from global containment and war-fighting to a global stability strategy with a regional focus."

The most significant change entailed a shift in mission priorities. "Changing circumstances make possible an increased emphasis on power projection tied to local sea control." Although power projection was an obvious element of the Maritime Strategy, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) was considered the initial mission in a global war. Discussing this change, ADM Kelso stated that "Power projection is the Navy's number one priority." In his post-Aspen speech posture statement, Secretary Garrett carried this shift into the realm of programming: "Accordingly, anti-submarine warfare investment can once again proceed at a more measured pace, with particular emphasis on research and development."

This shift in priority among naval missions is the most tangible evidence that the elements of the new national security strategy have been incorporated into the Navy's newest strategic vision. Physical impediments and continuing improvements in the Soviet submarine force were once assumed to require a large investment in ASW systems. If, however, a war with the Soviet Union is considered unlikely, there is a lesser incentive for investment because there are no other potential enemies with large or sophisticated submarine forces.

If ASW requirements are minimized due to a reduction in the perceived Soviet threat, does this mean that a significant reorganization is taking place within the U.S. Navy? A partial answer is that an adjustment is obviously required by the funding level of the FY 91-95 defense program. However, as noted, many of the naval forces designed for the Cold War environment have proven their worth in Third World conflicts and in crises short of war. While the lessons learned from the war against Iraq will be discussed in another chapter, it is evident that most fleet assets played vital roles. Hence, it is likely that naval decision-makers will opt for a balanced fleet, similar in composition but downsized from current levels. With emphasis on power pro-
jection, other supporting mission areas may increase in stature in both plans and resource allocation.

FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES

Although the Administration is committed to a 451-ship Base Force Navy, there have been questions raised whether that is merely a number reached on the way down or a true bottom line. According to recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) research, the planned resources for the Navy will ultimately lead to a 310 fleet Navy. That fleet would have no more than nine aircraft carriers (equipped with fewer of the most capable aircraft) and 45 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The CBO has concluded that the future of Navy force structure is extremely sensitive to decisions that will be reached on the SSN-21 SEAWOLF and replacements and upgrades for naval aviation. A June 1991 book written by a retired naval officer and strategic planner now at the Center for Naval Analyses, seconds this fear with a warning that the Navy and Marine Corps are headed toward: 300 ships in the year 2000; including eight-nine CVBGs, 50 SSNs, 50-60 surface combatants, ten nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).

From the strategic perspective, the initial campaign envisioned in the Maritime Strategy demanded an emphasis on ASW--primarily the ASW capabilities of American SSNs and fixed or towed sensor systems. The first war-fighting goal of the strategy was to "conduct forward operations with attack submarines, as well as to establish barriers at key world chokepoints using maritime patrol aircraft, mines, attack submarines, or sonobouys, to prevent leakage of enemy forces to the open ocean where the Western Alliance's resupply lines can be threatened."

The prerequisite of a successful ASW campaign before moving to a power projection phase (i.e., the oft debated move of carrier battle forces into the Norwegian and Japan Seas) obviously was a concentration of resources. Under this demanding strategy, new construction programs such as the SSN-21 SEAWOLF were required to maintain U.S. technological superiority against an ever quieter and faster Soviet SSN force. However, since the planning focus has shifted to Third World contingencies and forward presence instead of forward operations, the strategic justification for a more capable and expensive American SSN force collapses.

Reflecting this, SEAWOLF procurement is now planned at 1 vice 2 units per year--barely enough to keep one nuclear shipbuilding yard operating. With an estimated unit cost of $1.2-1.5 billion, the program will probably continue to be an attractive target for cost cutting. A possible alternative is the procurement of improved versions of the current LOS ANGELES class SSN. Additionally, ADM Kelso informed Congress in his 1991 Posture Statement, that he ordered a study to "define new, lower cost options for a successor to the SEAWOLF." It is this act that
appears to provide the programmatic confirmation that the Navy leadership accepts the new national security strategy as a new strategic vision for naval planning.\textsuperscript{11}

The Marine Corps may face a different set of future circumstances. The current emphasis on maneuver warfare, evident in such doctrine as Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, \textit{Warfighting},\textsuperscript{12} appears to position the Corps to assume major responsibility for both the Pacific and Contingency components of the proposed new military organization. The Pacific region, in which the Administration plans to employ chiefly maritime forces in a reduced level of forward operations, is most suitable for a sea-borne Marine presence for crisis response since most nations of interest to the U.S.--whether as potential allies or potential enemies--are coastal states.

Secretary Garrett outlined his program for amphibious capabilities: maintain enough amphibious ships to lift the assault echelons of $2\frac{1}{2}$ MEBs. The revised plan would require about the same number of amphibious assault ships as in the current inventory, and the method is to continue to procure new but fewer amphibious ships. The objective is to maintain two-to-three Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marines on station as a forward presence. The Marine Corps is expected to maintain a total of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, although they will be smaller.

\textit{Warfighting} and other recent writings on Marine doctrine, appear to have deemphasized classic amphibious operations. The military campaign of the Marine Corps in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations consisted of effective ground maneuver combined with sea and land based air support, but did not include a major combat amphibious assault. Critics will probably be swift to point out that Marine actions differed from those of the Army only in the degree of armor involved--thereby challenging the Marine Corps claim to exclusivity of mission. The probability of a debate exists, reminiscent of the "Where does the Marine Corps go from here" challenges of the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{13}

Since carrier-based tactical aircraft remains the prime element of naval power projection, CVBGs and assigned airwings should be least affected by the strategic assumptions of the new national security strategy. The reality is, of course, that the desired reductions in the DoN budget can come only with some reduction in the carrier force, the most expensive element of the Navy. It is obvious that reliance on carrier-based aircraft as a deterrent and war-fighting instrument will increase as access to overseas land bases decreases.\textsuperscript{14}

The threat to the carrier force is bureaucratic: interservice rivalry with the U.S. Air Force. The probability of a bloody carriers versus Air Force tactical squadrons battle, reminiscent of the 1947-49 Air Force-Navy tangle over carriers and unification, is increased by Secretary Cheney's decision to terminate the problem-plagued A-12 Navy strike aircraft program, as well as
the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter and the Air Force Advanced Tactical Aircraft.

The Air Force, wrestling with its own budget problems, appears to have fired the opening salvo in the potential interservice conflict by evaluating B-2 bomber squadrons in terms of carrier airwing equivalents. The issue of carriers-vs.-bombers is likely to turn on the feasibility of deploying and sustaining forces in light of future base-rights agreements.

Within Navy tactical aviation itself, the demise of all future aircraft programs poses a quandary: how to begin, again, preparing for the future. Should its aircraft be designed to be superior in all respects to Soviet aviation? Or should the Navy opt for a lower cost carrier-based equivalent of the Air Force A-10 tank killer, an aircraft designed to recast carriers--floating unmolested off third world shores--into highly mobile AIRLAND Battle bases? Under competing pressures, the most likely solution--destined to please no one--is to retain the remaining carrier airwings much the same, in essence, the Maritime Strategy minus the Soviet Union approach.

The role of ships with a considerable capability for strike warfare, primarily in the forms of land-attack cruise missiles and heavy caliber gunnery, is of obvious importance in Third World crisis intervention. As demonstrated, TOMAHAWK missiles are excellent leading edge tools in an air campaign. Rather than a substitute for strike aviation, TOMAHAWK has proven a successful adjunct to manned aircraft, attacking fixed air defense and command and control targets that would otherwise enable the enemy to conduct a coordinated air defense.

Battleships were the other major surface platforms utilized with great effect in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, however, the Navy has apparently already made the decision to return the remaining battleships to mothballs. With crew levels of approximately 1500 per battleship, the number of sailors assigned to the two remaining battleships are roughly equal to the crews of ten TOMAHAWK-carrying destroyers.

Surface and air ASW forces appear to be other casualties of the deemphasis of the Soviet submarine threat. The impact on the most modern units in the surface fleet is minimal because these vessels are largely designed to be multi-purpose with particular stress on fleet anti-air warfare defense. Aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles are undoubtedly the main naval threat in Third World crises. Thus, it is unlikely that the surface Navy would eliminate or substitute lower-cost units for procurement of AEGIS-system ARLEIGH BURKE destroyers, which also possess open-ocean ASW capability.

Older ships primarily designed for ASW will be greatly affected by the shift away from open ocean ASW. In his 1991 Posture statement, Secretary Garrett unveiled a plan referred to as the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept, in which reserve crews will
be trained to provide total wartime manning for inactivated KNOX frigates. The initial impact of this plan will transfer a significant portion of the open ocean ASW combat and convoy capability to the reserves.

Sealift is a critical element in the new national security strategy, and is literally the means by which the U.S. can deliver the forces necessary to win a mechanized land battle overseas. As American forces are withdrawn from foreign soil, the possibility of their return in force should a future crisis develop is obviously dependent on a fast, secure means of delivery. This is the metaphorical aspect of the idea that "the Navy constitutes the 'means to deliver' on the American promise to return its forces to the European theater in event of a renewed Soviet (or other) threat."

Sealift played a critical role in the logistics build-up that ensured success in the war to liberate Kuwait. While its performance was generally good, delays and breakdowns were frequent enough to prompt critics to argue that American sealift capability is antiquated. Three options proposed to remedy this shortfall and provide greater reliability are: (1) construction of more fast sealift ships, (2) increase in the number of maritime prepositioning ships stationed near possible crisis areas, and (3) a subsidized revitalization of the U.S. merchant marine fleet, with new ships designed for fast conversion to military purposes.

Pressure may build to fund additional sealift at the expense of Navy fleet construction, the logic being that sealift ships were more critical to DESERT SHIELD/STORM success than many of the surface combatants in the Persian Gulf area. But if sealift is to increase the concomitant requirement for naval escort forces also increases. The irony is that the fewer American forces stationed in Europe, the greater the potential payoff for Soviet investment in attack submarines assigned to interdiction. Investment in sealift alone does little to remedy this potential hazard.

The new emphasis on Third World crises reveals another mission area that requires reassessment. Under the division of labor that evolved between NATO maritime forces, the responsibility for minesweeping was assigned to those members with small, coastal defense navies. Experience during the Persian Gulf Tanker War between Iran and Iraq, and most recently in operations off Kuwait, has vividly demonstrated the likelihood of encountering mine defenses in hostile waters. The shift from the Maritime Strategy appears to demand an independent U.S. counter-mine capability rapidly deployable to crisis regions where our NATO allies may not be involved.

With the cutback in ships and aircraft available for deployments, it is quite likely that the need for deterrence or intervention will lengthen deployments, disrupt the deployment cycles, and limit the number of units available for surge operations.
One method of resolving this problem is to change the pattern of deployments. ADM Kelso confirmed his support for this approach in testimony to Congress: "Reduced United States-traditional Soviet tensions will allow greater freedom in deployment patterns and the shifting of forces among theaters in response to world events."

Another solution is to change the concept of deployment. Instead of active, near continuous exercises by forward deployed fleets, deployed ships might spend long periods at anchor, in port, or under less demanding training conditions. An alternative would be to homeport more ships overseas, closer to potential crisis areas, to maximize the deterrent effect of such vessels even when not conducting underway operations. Of course, this poses problems associated with negotiating for suitable foreign bases.

An additional area for future debate is the implied role of sea-based platforms in the proposed reorientation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to a less-ambitious Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system. The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system referred to as GPALS has yet to be fully defined, yet it has been cited as an integral component of the new national security strategy. A sea-based version of the PATRIOT could be carried and launched by almost any naval platform. A more sophisticated SDI-type interceptor could be launched from covert locations out of SSBN launch tubes or SSN torpedo/cruise missile tubes. Another option would be to resurrect previous suggestions to utilize surface ships, primarily guided-missile destroyers, and carrier aircraft to help defend the continental U.S. from ballistic missile attack.

A more difficult question may be the disposition of naval tactical nuclear weapons currently deployed on surface ships, SSNs, and with land-based naval aviation. How will we manage the plan for reconstitution of these nuclear weapons and what conditions must be met before we once again deploy them with the fleet? Although they might have been used to deter potential Third-World nuclear powers from acquiring or threatening American forces with weapons of mass destruction, we will now need alternative plans for deterrence or direct defense. There are significant verification issues that need to be addressed as we implement President Bush's new plans to cut tactical nuclear weapons at sea.

SEAPower and the New National Security Strategy

It is evident that the tenets of the new national security strategy may have an effect on certain particular naval capabilities. But we return to the central question of its impact on traditional naval strategy. Does the new strategy reflect a significant change in the U.S. perception of the nature and importance of seapower?
Combining the official statements with the logic of geopolitics, the answer is a definite no. But even that answer is ambiguous and subject to interpretation. If the Maritime Strategy was considered the epitome of the seapower orientation in American national strategy, then it can be argued that new national security strategy reduces our reliance on the Mahanian concept that maritime supremacy can occur primarily through decisive fleet versus fleet engagements. The new strategy discounts the possibility of a significant engagement with the Soviet fleet. Reducing the number of CVBGs does not necessarily reflect an intellectual rejection of a maritime-oriented strategy. Rather, it reflects what it is—a desire to reduce the overall defense budget in the light of a perceived receding global threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Some argue that the new national security strategy actually represents a greater reliance on seapower. As noted, control of the sea is vital for alliance protection and crisis intervention, particularly if overseas ground forces are substantially reduced. In the Gulf War, the convenience of having a large, armored ground force in Europe that could be sealifted into Saudi Arabia greatly facilitated our success. Had Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait several years later, the model of our response might have been more like that of the British campaign to free the Falklands. In turn, a renewal of the Soviet threat—even in diluted form—can only be countered by maritime superiority in the Atlantic theater. Otherwise, the mass of supplies and heavy equipment for air-transportable troops can not be delivered. The promise to come back would be a mere promise.

At another level, it can be further argued that the American capability for transoceanic power projection and resupply has become, under the new national security strategy, the real American strategic deterrent to future global war. The gradual delegitimization of nuclear deterrence enacted through public fears of nuclear war, arms control treaties, and international efforts at non-proliferation, may make strategic nuclear deterrence less credible. If a collapsing Soviet Union is no longer a threat to American security, is it reasonable to threaten nuclear destruction—with no current strategic defenses to protect Americans—to prevent the Soviets from lashing out at our Allies?

Or, are we instead transitioning to a mode in which the reduction and withdrawal of Soviet ground forces (as a quid pro quo for reduction of U.S. forces in Europe) means that the prime deterrent to renewed Soviet militarism is the American capability to come back? That would represent the realization of the strategic nature of seapower. As Colin Gray maintains: "US (and allied) maritime advantage is not just desirable, but literally essential for the deterrence of war, in that the credible promise of the US exercise of sea control is a necessary precondition for the conduct of protracted armed conflict in and about Eurasia-Africa." At the same time the strategic reach required for crisis intervention is also based on sea control. Because of
geography, "the United States cannot be a landpower beyond North America unless she is a seapower, and seapower has strategic meaning insofar as it has influence on events on land.""18

However, while seapower will remain crucial under the new strategy, that strategy also calls for spending cutbacks that could undermine efforts to reconstitute large-scale U.S. naval forces in the future. The investment in time to reconstruct large vessels exceeds the two year strategic warning assumption upon which the new national security strategy is based. The diminution in American shipbuilding capabilities, caused by cancellation of current ship construction, only compounds this problem. The lead time for naval construction is another of the "enduring realities that require a strong America," as GEN Powell described them. And this is where the political imperatives for fiscal restraint have a decisive (an politically dangerous) impact on capabilities for reconstitution.

THE NAVY OF THE FUTURE

It is obvious that the new national security strategy will have a major impact on the size and capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps. In terms of mission areas, the following forces are emphasized by the assumptions and tenets of the new strategy: carrier aviation and surface strike forces in power projection roles, amphibious ships and Fleet Marine Forces, particularly in the Pacific, sealift, counter-mine warfare, and the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept.

The following mission areas are deemphasized: submarine warfare, open-ocean anti-submarine warfare, and fleet against fleet engagements. The new national security strategy represents a supersession of the Maritime Strategy only in the particulars, not in its underlying philosophy of Atlantic and Pacific seapower. However, if forces need to be reconstituted in the wake of a renewed Soviet threat, there is every reason to believe even some of the particulars would become operative.

Ship construction, preservation of the industrial base, and the research, development, test & evaluation necessary to retain technological superiority at sea will become critical issues. They have been addressed but not resolved in public statements by defense decision-makers concerning the new national security strategy.

Maritime power remains a preferred instrument, when required, of crisis intervention. Even more, it is the absolute prerequisite for such intervention, the 'means to deliver' both figuratively and literally. Experience with the war against Iraq indicates a critical need for sealift. Naval forces are obviously required to protect sealift and supply the power projection necessary to land and resupply the forces that will utilize sealifted equipment. As access to overseas land bases decreases,
the compelling necessity for sea control increases for any intervention in crisis areas.

The bulk of the American strategic deterrent will be shifting to sea. While the concept of a strategic Triad will undoubtedly be retained, offensive forces will be centered on the SSBN. This may cause a readjustment in the command and organizational structure of these forces. A final assessment of their relationship to strategic defensive forces awaits the development of a deployable strategic defense. The future role of nuclear SLCM is unclear, as is the use of sea-based platforms in GPALS.

The possibility that the deterrent effect of the strategic nuclear arsenal will wane heightens the likelihood that America will rely on its traditional deterrent: the threat of coming over there. Geography dictates the ultimate reliance on maritime forces to make this threat to deploy reconstituted forces credible.

NOTES

(1) The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the U.S. government. An earlier version of this chapter was released in May 1991 as Working Paper in International Studies (I-91-8) of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University.


ADM Frank B. Kelso, USN, "A Report by Admiral F.B. Kelso, II, Chief of Naval Operations on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the U.S. Navy," February 14, 1991, p. 7. This ongoing study has been named "CENTURION." It is not certain if that will also be the name of the new class of submarine.


Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
1976).


(15) Discussion of this building interservice rivalry can be found in Norman Friedman, "U.S. Air Force Plans for Peace," USNI Proceedings, Vol. 116, No. 9, September 1990, pp. 135, 138, and Jeffrey Record, "The U.S. Air Force in the Post-Cold War Era," Strategic Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 Spring 1991, p. 67. The original Air Force White Paper to which these articles refer, Department of the Air Force, "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach--Global Power," June 1990, is a masterpiece of subtlety: "The [land-based] bomber's long range means that the United States can project power and enhance presence in a very short time--and often at lower cost relative to other options--regardless of conflict location. In the Persian Gulf area or deep in other theaters, long range bombers can threaten or hit targets in the crucial first hours of early days of a conflict. They may be the only assets capable of doing so." (p. 8) The "other option" is sea-based aviation and cruise missiles.

(16) Introduction and discussion of this concept can be found in David S. Yost, "The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?" Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 16, No. 4, Summer 1990, pp. 487-508.


Strategic Nuclear Policy in a Time of Fundamental Change
by
Bruce W. MacDonald

At a time of fundamental change in the U.S. conventional force posture, U.S. strategic nuclear policy seems—at least on the surface—to be mired in the past. President George Bush himself has helped foster this sense of dichotomy. Although the President has emphasized the need to recast U.S. conventional forces in response to the end of the Cold War and the changes in the Soviet Union, he has argued that similarly dramatic shifts are not yet justified in the strategic realm. Nevertheless, the new national security strategy and the broader changes associated with it open the door to drastic nuclear policy revisions. Such revisions are necessary, inevitable, and (sometimes beneath the surface of Administration rhetoric) already underway.

This chapter begins by examining how the overall objectives of U.S. nuclear policy are changing, particularly in the aftermath of the failed Soviet coup of August, 1991. The second section assesses the impact of the new national security strategy on the organization and control of U.S. strategic forces. Section three analyzes prospective changes in U.S. strategic targeting, strategic force levels and modernization plans, and arms control initiatives. The final section examines some larger problems in the evolution of U.S. nuclear policy: in particular, the rush toward unilateral U.S. strategic arms reductions, and the impact such reductions will have on the future U.S. strategic posture.

OVERALL OBJECTIVES

The superficial stasis in strategic nuclear policy derives from the continuity of the broad strategic goals of deterrence and strategic stability. The Bush Administration has stated that, unlike U.S. conventional force policy, U.S. strategic goals will be little changed as a result of the turbulent changes in the Soviet Union since 1989. Despite the radical change that has taken place in the Soviet Union, according to President Bush's speech at Aspen, the central reality that continues to drive U.S. strategic policy is "our number one concern [that] the Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons", which requires the U.S. "to maintain an effective deterrent that ensures that renewed confrontation is not a feasible option for any Soviet leadership." In Senate testimony, General (GEN) Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), has called Soviet strategic nuclear power one of the new era's "important enduring realities . . . notwithstanding its [USSR's] evolving ideology and the intentions of its leadership."
Yet this rhetoric of continuity obscures the fundamental change that is sweeping the landscape of U.S. strategic nuclear policy. These changes affect the organization and control of U.S. nuclear forces, the doctrine governing them, targeting policy, force structure and modernization, and strategic arms control. Much of the change has originated within the Executive Branch, though Congress has had both direct and indirect influence on the process. With the exception of the attention given to the increased emphasis on strategic defense, this transformation has generated remarkably little attention.

The revolution now underway in U.S. strategic nuclear policy was described on May 7, 1991 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), GEN George Lee Butler, USAF, in his Senate Appropriations Committee testimony. While recognizing "that U.S. fundamental security objectives largely remain constant," Butler said the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War "represent a volcanic upset of longstanding strategic calculations and call for a sweeping reassessment of traditional views and approaches," requiring a "new military strategy" that has been developed to deal with the "changing strategic landscape." This does not promise full consistency among the many facets of strategic nuclear policy but suggests that the major contradictions produced by the Cold War's end have at least been addressed.

Old Objectives

One factor guiding this review was the persistence of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal. Butler pointed out that "[E]ven at projected START I levels, these forces will constitute an undiminished threat in terms of their capacity to destroy the United States." Soviet modernization of its strategic forces continues to be cited by Department of Defense (DoD) officials and others as unabated, though there are continuing reports of slowdowns in Soviet strategic force modernization. Adding to the angst over Soviet nuclear capabilities is the unknown degree of control the Soviets maintain over their nuclear forces in light of the upheaval in the Soviet republics.

Accordingly, the one constant in strategic policy is the need to maintain an unambiguous capability to deter a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States or our allies. However, greater uncertainty exists about the fate of a second goal of the past U.S. strategic nuclear policy: extended deterrence, that is, deterring Soviet conventional attacks on our allies. This goal has not been officially repudiated, and in fact still remains part of U.S. doctrine. However, it runs the risk in this post-Cold War world of being rendered obsolete. We have no security guarantees with eastern Europe, and western Europe's need for an American nuclear umbrella is shrinking.
The decline of the Soviet threat has further complicated U.S. nuclear planning by discrediting past scenarios of how a nuclear war might occur. The possibility that the Soviet Union would launch a "bolt from the blue," though taken into account in U.S. planning, has long been viewed as extremely unlikely. The more plausible scenario was that nuclear war would emerge out of a conventional conflict in Europe. With the Warsaw Pact dissol

Newer scenarios envision an economically enfeebled Soviet Union, gripped by political and social chaos, in which hard-liners of the old school retake control of power and plunge the world into Cold War II, perhaps even using the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal as a means to extort financial assistance from a terrified West. These latter scenarios fleetingly seemed less unrealistic during the August 1991 coup attempt, though in the aftermath of that watershed event, seem less plausible than ever. In short, the probability of strategic nuclear conflict has declined to its lowest level in decades, and credible scenarios for its outbreak are in short supply.

New Objectives

The end of the Cold War is changing some of the focus and direction of U.S. strategic nuclear objectives. Though too soon to be sure, the need for these changes is probably magnified by the August 1991 coup attempt and the resulting dethronement of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As some prime cold war missions vanish, like deterring a Warsaw Pact conventional attack, other missions are beginning to receive more attention. These missions have, in most cases, always been present, though overshadowed by the enormity of the missions that now are fading.

The uncovered attempts by Iraq to achieve nuclear status, and the continuing concern over nuclear proliferation, make Third World deterrence more than just an academic abstraction. The continuing instability within the USSR makes the deterrence of subnational nuclear adventurism another plausible mission, at least during this transitional period in Soviet history.

Operation DESERT STORM has highlighted an often overlooked aspect of U.S. strategic nuclear policy--its ongoing relevance to strategic non-nuclear policy. U.S. strategic bomber and tanker forces have long had a secondary conventional force role that has always been in the shadow of their larger deterrent role. With the demise of the Cold War, this conventional mission has grown
relatively more prominent, as seen by the recent Air Force decision to create Composite Air Wings of B-52G bombers and tactical aircraft. During its Congressional presentations on the B-2, the Air Force has often placed greater emphasis on its conventional strategic applications than on its nuclear strategic uses, for which it was originally designed.

GEN Butler has recognized the growing importance of the conventional strategic role when he described SAC to the Congress as having "a foot in two worlds," describing its mission "in terms of not one, but two TRIADS." The first is the traditional nuclear triad of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], sea-based missiles, and manned bombers, while the second is a conventional strategic triad consisting of the manned bomber, the tanker, and strategic reconnaissance forces. While SAC's forces have always played a limited role in some conventional operations, Butler envisions an expanded conventional role for SAC's forces.

ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL

For years, the command of U.S. strategic offensive forces has been split between the Air Force and Navy. Coordination of targeting has been accomplished through the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), while force posture and modernization issues have been coordinated at the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) level. This decades-old division of responsibility appears to be on the threshold of change.

The implication of the Base Force for strategic forces is to merge the nuclear forces of the Air Force and Navy into one command, a Strategic Command, that would have primary responsibility for strategic doctrine, targeting, force posture, and force modernization. This would allow the Navy to chair the resulting new command and JSTPS presumably on a rotating basis with the Air Force, which it has never done before, despite the fact that it currently controls about half of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads. This long-overdue change in command structure should lead to more coherence in U.S. force structure, modernization and arms control policy, as was achieved in targeting policy years ago with the creation of JSTPS.

TARGETING POLICY

While less visible because of its highly classified nature, nuclear targeting policy has also been swept by change as a result of recent events. Previous overall U.S. targeting guidance, as embodied in President Jimmy Carter's Presidential Directive-59 (PD-59) and President Ronald Reagan's National Security Decision Directive-13 (NSDD-13), placed heavy emphasis on target-
ing Soviet military and political control assets, as well as those economic base targets crucial for Soviet recovery from war.

The major shifts in the political tectonic plates of the Soviet Union that have been the hallmark of the 1990's, and the resulting earthquakes in the Soviet political and military power structure, have outdated previous U.S. targeting guidance and targeting plans. As a result of these shifts: (1), the U.S. no longer needs to have the ability to attack approximately 1,000 targets in Eastern Europe; (2), the upheaval that is taking place in the Baltic republics and other areas of the Soviet Union affects both target numbers and the war-fighting strategy the target list is designed to support; (3), the previous emphasis on targeting CPSU and other leadership targets is changing in view of the decline in the influence of the Party; (4), the Soviets have cut and are cutting their conventional forces both to comply with the CFE Treaty and for fiscal reasons, resulting in fewer targets; and (5), the Soviets have cut and are cutting their strategic forces primarily to comply with START, also resulting in fewer targets.

According to the Washington Post, recognition of factors such as these led the executive branch in 1989 to begin a major review of U.S. strategic nuclear targeting policy, leading to new targeting guidance and a substantially revised Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). As a result of this review, SECDEF Dick Cheney and GEN Powell have significantly modified overall strategic nuclear targeting policy to provide tighter linkage between targeting policy guidance and actual target planning. This guidance is reportedly being implemented by JSTPS. Surprisingly, overall targeting guidance, according to the Washington Post continues to be set by NSDD-13, the three-page directive signed by President Reagan in 1981, though it reportedly is being interpreted more broadly than before.

According to the Washington Post, the Defense Department's careful review of targets and targeting policy has resulted in an updated SIOP that eliminates about 3,000 targets, about a 30 percent reduction from the previous version of the SIOP. The most massive attack option contained in the new SIOP, according to this report, would still involve about 5,000 nuclear warheads, however. Administration officials have made explicit unclassified references to the removal of targets in Eastern Europe from the new SIOP. The upcoming reductions in Soviet forces under START will further reduce the number of targets, and hence weapons needed.

Decisions made by U.S. policymakers on force modernization and arms control issues will also have implications for targeting policy as well. For example, a reduced buy of B-2 bombers (see discussion below), coupled with continued retirement of B-52s could force reductions in targets or the level of destruction sought for them. GEN Butler has implied that a START II goal of 3,000 warheads, an often-discussed objective, will require the U.S. to consider shifting from war-fighting to assured destruc-
tion, which would have major targeting implications. Likewise, targeting policy changes will influence force structure and modernization decisions.

Despite the substantial targeting changes of the 1989-1991 period, further changes in targeting policy appear necessary, especially in light of the aftermath of the August 1991 coup attempt. In addition to unfinished business from the earlier review, the fall of the CPSU by itself is cause for a targeting review at least as searching as the previous one. High on the targeting policy agenda should be a number of issues.

First, a fundamental re-examination of how Soviet republics are targeted. As republics achieve more autonomy, this will have important implications for the treatment of targets within their borders. The question of whether fully independent republics should be targeted at all must be addressed, though targeting considerations will clearly depend on the existence of any military relationship with the central Soviet government.

Second, overall deterrence requirements for a more democratic Soviet Union. Logic suggests that fewer warheads are required to deter a democratically elected government than a dictatorship. A full Soviet transition to democracy would have major implications for U.S. targeting policy.

Third, new Presidential guidance on targeting needed to reflect the changes that have occurred since the late 1980's. The Reagan-era NSDD-13, with its emphasis on warfighting and deterring a totalitarian, monolithic USSR, is from another era and needs to be updated.

Fourth, a re-examination of the requirements for deterrence. In the past, for example, key targets have often been assigned several warheads to ensure high confidence in destroying those targets. In technical terms, this could mean reducing the required damage expectancy sought for such targets. Fifth, a realistic approach toward mobile Soviet targets.

Finally, targeting requirements against possible Third World states that might acquire nuclear weapons. This would seem a logical adjunct to the greater concern over Third World ballistic missiles now evident in the Bush Administration's strategic policy and challenges traditional deterrence concepts. As former SAC Commander GEN John T. Chain, USAF noted, "the more varied threats one faces [in addition to the Soviet threat] the more difficult deterrence becomes." 8

STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE AND MODERNIZATION

When President Bush implied in his Aspen speech that strategic policy did not need to be revised as thoroughly as the U.S. conventional force posture, he placed a special emphasis on the
need to continue U.S. strategic force modernization. Again, however, the reality of Administration policy has moved beyond this earlier assessment. In early 1991, the Bush Administration proposed the most far-reaching retrenchment of U.S. strategic force posture and modernization of the nuclear era. This quiet upheaval in strategic force posture and modernization, which one conservative observer has likened to "unilateral disarmament,\(^{10}\) has important implications for strategic stability, arms control, force posture, and the defense industrial base over the next twenty years. The budgetary implications of these changes are appreciable, though in comparison to total defense spending they are relatively modest. It is instructive to examine how each leg of the strategic triad has been affected.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

In a dramatic turnabout, the Bush Administration has significantly modified the ICBM leg of the triad in both modernization and deployments. As GEN Butler told Congress, "nowhere is the downstream effect of change ... more apparent than in our ICBM force: some forces are eliminated completely ... a number one priority yesterday becomes a hedge for tomorrow." In a major change to the philosophical approach of the Reagan Administration, it has been observed that not even the nuclear freeze legislation of the early 1980's would limit the ICBM program as much as President Bush's 1992 defense budget, e.g., the retirement of the MINUTEMAN II force.

The Bush Administration has now announced that it will not seek to produce and deploy a Rail Garrison version of the PEACEKEEPER (MX) ICBM, a decision that was foreshadowed in the previous year by reports that the Air Force was losing interest in it. GEN Chain was the major supporter of Rail Garrison MX in the Air Force. His June, 1990 retirement helped set the stage for the demise of Rail Garrison in 1991. Research and development will continue until completed, but this $7.1 billion research and development (R&D) program will likely never lead to deployment. The 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles currently housed in silos will presumably remain there.

With the demise of the Rail Garrison MX program, the long-standing question of the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs to Soviet attack, particularly to Soviet SS-18 ICBMs, remains. This ICBM vulnerability issue dates back to the Ford Administration and was once a staple of the defense debate. The end of Rail Garrison signifies the apparent willingness of the Defense Department to continue the de facto policy of simply living with ICBM vulnerability rhetoric, is no longer politically useful and has apparently been dropped.

The decisions not to produce and deploy Rail Garrison MX and to halt PEACEKEEPER missile production are significant in terms of overall U.S. strategic nuclear policy. These decisions indicate that in the midst of the leanest defense funding environment
in several decades, the Bush Administration has decided to jettison ideology in favor of practicality. Given that a START II agreement could ban both PEACEKEEPER and the SS-18, these MX decisions will save billions of dollars on missiles that may be banned before the end of the decade and a mobile missile system of declining utility in the post-Cold War era. These decisions also suggest that the PEACEKEEPER is no longer important to the President in terms of negotiating leverage in future arms talks.

One option for dealing with ICBM vulnerability, the Small ICBM (SICBM), or "Midgetman" is being preserved and pursued. Funding for research and development on this program has been accelerated, with the Fiscal Year (FY) 1992 budget seeking a robust $549 million for it, a significant departure from past years, when funding for SICBM R&D was slighted in favor of Rail Garrison MX. Nonetheless, the Bush Administration is quick to point out that there is no commitment to produce or deploy the SICBM, and plans now generally envisions deploying the "Midgetman" in existing silos. The hardened mobile launcher, a costly basing option that would provide much higher survivability for the SICBM, is seen only as an option and not as an integral part of the program.

Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles

In an abrupt reversal of its position when it submitted last year's defense budget, the Bush Administration decided in its FY-92 budget to end production of the OHIO class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). This will mean an eventual SSBN force of no more than 18 boats, well below the 21-24 that the Administration had said the year before that it wanted. The decision to end production saves $4-9 billion in ship construction costs and also avoids a potential conflict between ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) warheads that would otherwise occur under START's 4,900 warhead subceiling. Terminating OHIO production should also lead to a reduction of 144 from the overall buy for TRIDENT II (D-5) missiles of about 900. This decision should thus lead to eventual procurement savings of at least $9 billion.

Another cutback in the modernization of the sea-based leg of the triad is the cancellation of plans to replace the TRIDENT I (C-4) missiles with newer TRIDENT II's in the first eight OHIO class SSBNs when those boats are overhauled as part of their normal maintenance cycle. While official policy is that this backfit program has been "deferred past 1997," that is, beyond the horizon of the FY 92-97 Six Year Defense Plan, it seems likely that the first eight OHIO SSBNs will never be backfitted. This suspicion is strengthened by the testimony of Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, before a Senate panel, who said "we will not backfit the D-5 missile into early Ohio Class SSBNs." This gives a new lease on life to the older
TRIDENT I, which otherwise would have left the inventory before the end of the decade.

The third cutback in our sea-based strategic forces comes with the accelerated retirement of the POSEIDON (C-3)-capable SSBN fleet. During FY-92 seven POSEIDON-capable SSBNs will be retired, with the remaining fleet to be retired by 1997. While age and START reduction considerations would have led to the eventual retirement of the POSEIDON fleet, retiring seven in 1992 represents an appreciable acceleration of the process. By 1993, the U.S. will have only 23 SSBNs in its strategic fleet, in contrast to 35 as recently as 1988. This will constitute a reduction of nearly 2,000 warheads in one year.

Before the end of the decade, all remaining POSEIDON-capable SSBNs will be retired, leaving a force of only 18 TRIDENT I & II-capable submarines. This fleet will provide nearly 75 percent of the ballistic missile warheads allowed under START. Such a force would, in theory, make the Soviet strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) problem relatively easier, though the Navy is confident that this portends no problem.

For the future, any further warhead cuts in subsequent START negotiations will likely require either a new, smaller SSBN or some way of reducing the warhead loading of 192 on existing OHIO-class SSBNs--going to fewer than 18 hulls would be unlikely because of ASW concerns. The smaller submarine, suggested by the Scowcroft Commission in 1983, seems not to have sparked any interest in the Navy.

Bombers

Change has also swept the bomber leg of the strategic forces triad. The 1992 budget reflects the reduction in the planned B-2 buy made by the Major Aircraft Review the previous April from 132 down to 75 planes. In addition, the Bush Administration announced plans to retire all but about 40 B-52G aircraft from the Air Force's inventory by 1995, with those remaining aircraft to be assigned to purely conventional missions.

Thus a total of about 125 B-52G aircraft will be retired over just a few years. This assumes that Congress will approve all 75 B-2's that the Administration is seeking, an outcome that at this writing appears unlikely. If Congress terminates B-2 production below 75, this B-52G retirement decision could be revisited. The remaining 95 B-52H aircraft are slated to become pure stand-off cruise missile carriers. All this does not include the retirement of the 60 FB-111's from the SAC inventory and the transfer of some of them to the Tactical Air Command, which had been planned for several years.

At this writing, the fate of the B-2 is unclear. From a policy perspective, it is important to note that the debate is
less strident than past debates on weapons such as the PEACEKEEPER, as the B-2 does not pose a strategic stability threat in the way that some argue that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and MX do. For opponents, it is seen mostly as an unwise use of money. In the same way, B-2 supporters do not, for the most part, argue that the B-2 is crucial to U.S. survival, and they certainly agree that the cost is high. Accordingly, passions are nowhere near the levels of the MX debate in the early 1980's. The Air Force also has said that it will limit the maximum request for the B-2 it will make in any year to about $5 billion, which has the effect of stretching out the B-2 buy. From a political standpoint, the performance of the F-117 in the Gulf War has improved the B-2's survival prospects in Congress.

The final resolution of the B-2 debate may well be achieved the same way it was with the PEACEKEEPER missile in the mid-1980s: a compromise number will be proposed that both B-2 proponents and opponents dislike but can learn to live with, however uneasily. It is unclear if 1991 is the year for such a compromise, but it is probably not more than a year or two away at most. As with MX, this unknown number between 15 and 75 would then effectively conclude the national debate on the B-2.

A NEW CHAPTER IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSES DEBATE

Since 1972 and the signing of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, strategic defenses have been a minor aspect of U.S. strategic nuclear policy. Even with President Reagan's announcement of SDI on March 23, 1983, offensive strategic forces have been the preponderant focus of U.S. policy. The Gulf War and the role of the PATRIOT missile in defending against Iraq's SCUD missile attacks appear to have made a significant change in thinking in some decisionmaking circles on the role of ballistic missile defense. The end of the Cold War has modified the thrust and focus of this interest in a direction far different than the one envisioned in President Reagan's speech.

Previous plans for SDI had focused on a "Phase I" system capable of intercepting a significant percentage of Soviet warheads in an all-out attack. The major element of uncertainty this would introduce into Soviet attack planning was said to strengthen deterrence. Since early 1991, SDI's new focus has been "Global Protection Against Limited Strikes" (GPALS), a defense against modest accidental or unauthorized Soviet launches or deliberate launches by Third World states. GPALS echoes, in somewhat modified form, Senator Nunn's call in January, 198814 for examining the feasibility of an Accidental Launch Protections System (ALPS). The GPALS system would eventually be less than half the size of a Phase I system involving about 1,000 BRILLIANT PEBBLES and about 750 ground based interceptors. The limited threat it would be capable of addressing would be up to 200 reentry vehicles.15
In a major break with the past, the Senate has called for a different version of SDI. As expressed in the bill it passed in August 1991, this version would deploy ground-based interceptors only at "one or an adequate additional number of [ABM] sites." The objective would be to provide a thin nationwide defense against accidental, unauthorized, or Third World missiles, not too different from the rationale for the Sentinel ABM system proposed by SECDEF Robert S. McNamara in 1967.

The direction, if not magnitude, of the Senate version of SDI seems likely to persist in U.S. strategic policy. How far the U.S. will travel down this road of strategic defense will depend on three major considerations. First, threat magnitude and timing. The only Third World Countries with potential ICBM capability by the turn of the century, based on their space-launch capabilities, are Israel, India, and Brazil, hardly the focus of U.S. nuclear nightmares. Concern over unauthorized Soviet launches, which briefly peaked during the August 1991 coup attempt, are labeled very low by the Bush Administration itself. Accidental launches seems worrisome, but credible mechanisms are difficult to define, given the controls that exist on both sides.

Second, alternate means of attack. The Third World focus of the Senate plan and GPALS both generally, is on ballistic missile attack. A variety of non-ballistic missile attack mechanisms would be unaffected by such missile defenses, including air attack using presently available civilian aircraft, crude low technology intercontinental cruise missiles, covert ship-based delivery, and a welter of smuggling scenarios. Strengthening the weak U.S. air defense network, not to mention defenses against covert delivery, would be very costly.

Third, Soviet reaction. The Soviets have traditionally been hostile to U.S. suggestions for major modifications to the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have often explicitly linked START and the ABM Treaty, threatening to abandon START if the Treaty is abrogated. In signing START, the Soviets formally noted "[t]his treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the [ABM] Treaty."16

PERSPECTIVES ON THE REVISIONS TO STRATEGIC POLICY

The rise of democracy in the Soviet Union, its spiraling economic problems, and the unprecedented warming of U.S.-Soviet relations have revolutionized the strategic nuclear policy environment. The continuity of official rhetoric on the need to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent has masked significant and ongoing changes in the components of U.S. strategic nuclear policy. From the review just made, several important characteristics emerge from the changes this policy is undergoing.

One important characteristic is that changes are, in fact, taking place. While some accuse the White House and Defense
Department of not realizing the Cold War is over, in fact there are more strategic policy and program changes taking place than probably at any time since the early days of the Cold War.

Another theme that resonates throughout is caution. While the change that has been unleashed in the Soviet Union is probably irreversible, there is an understandable reluctance to assume the best about future Soviet behavior when the prospect of the worst, however remote, remains so dangerous. If U.S.-Soviet relations ever evolve to a point where they are not unlike U.S.-British or U.S.-French relations, this caution will probably be relaxed. Short of this, U.S. strategic policy will probably demand the retention of a significant nuclear capability as insurance, if nothing else, against the recrudescence of and adversarial Soviet government.

In addition, it is clear that as U.S-Soviet relations improve, arms control is no longer the centerpiece of U.S.-Soviet relations, and thus is assuming a more subordinate role in strategic policy. Of all the major components of U.S. strategic nuclear policy, the one that has probably been influenced least by the end of the Cold War and the new national security strategy is arms control. U.S. policy toward the START talks was little different in 1991 than it was in 1988, or even before.

START's entry into force will nonetheless have a significant effect on the strategic nuclear environment. In the area of strategic stability, one of START's most important features is its 50 percent reduction in the hard target capable SS-18 ICBMs, cutting the warhead level from 3,080 to 1,540. Coincidentally, this is the same level of reduction as the JCS reportedly laid down as a requirement for Phase I of SDI.

A major and rather startling result of the change in U.S. strategic policy is the unilateral nature of this change, nowhere better seen than in the areas of force posture and modernization. One of the strategic golden rules of the first ten years of the Reagan-Bush era seemed to be to avoid giving up anything without getting something for it in Geneva. Many Congressional or grass roots ideas for strategic force or arms control initiatives were opposed, usually successfully, by brandishing that argument. That rule has been quietly, but fully, abandoned with the large number of unilateral cuts in U.S. force posture and modernization plans. Whatever the merits of each action, they are individually surprising, and collectively nothing short of a repudiation of previous declaratory policy.

Strategic modernization will be at a low ebb by historical standards by the end of the 1990s. SSBN/SLBM modernization will be completed. B-2 production probably will be completed and SICBM may be in production in modest numbers. A nagging question remains unanswered, however. If U.S.-Soviet relations do continue to improve, what does the future hold for U.S. strategic forces and policy? We already are seeing the first results in strategic
modernization, and in the reductions made in alert levels of U.S. forces.

Future casualties would probably be strategic modernization, as we would probably retain and patch up our existing forces. Further major reductions would likely take place, either unilaterally on both sides or through negotiations. The end result could be modest, almost minimum-deterrence levels of a few hundred strategic nuclear forces. A research base would need to be preserved that would allow a buildup in the event that deteriorating world circumstances dictated. The production capability for strategic weapons will probably be preserved indirectly, through commercial and conventional force production capability.

A noteworthy feature of the change under way is the consensus that is emerging on the outlines of U.S. strategic nuclear policy. Most of the shifts can fairly be called centrist in their political complexion—indeed, their centrist nature is an important explanation for the lack of controversy they have engendered, SDI being an important exception. Nonetheless these moves constitute a virtual revolution in U.S. strategic nuclear policy. This revolution is still under way, and the outcome will depend chiefly upon the path of U.S.-Soviet relations in the years ahead, whose course cannot be foreseen. We are witnessing a significant shift in strategic priorities toward pragmatism in modernization, force structure, and targeting policy, and a subtle shift in emphasis on arms control. These moves point the way to an emerging consensus on strategic nuclear policy that the country will need as we navigate the unfamiliar post-Cold War terrain of the nuclear era.

NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of Senator Dale Bumpers, the Senate, or the U.S. government.

(3) See for example, Powell, statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

(4) Butler, statement to Senate Appropriations Committee.


(9) Portions of this section are abstracted from the article "The Emerging Consensus on Strategic Modernization," written by the author, that appeared in the July-August, 1991 issue of Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 11-15.


(11) Twenty-four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines would represent a total of 4,608 warheads. If all of these were START-accountable, there would have been room for only 292 ICBM warheads under the 4,900 ballistic missile warhead ceiling. For a further discussion of this problem, see Senator Dale Bumpers, "The TRIDENT Boondoggle," the New York Times, October 31, 1989, p. A27, and "Continuity and Change in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy," The Fletcher Forum, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1987, p. 187.


(14) Speech by Senator Sam Nunn before the Arms Control Association, January 30, 1988.

(15) Statement on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, June 20, 1991, p. 8. A "BRILLIANT PEBBLE" is a small interceptor with sophisticated sensors in low earth orbit that would detect a missile launch and home in on the missile if it
were within range.

American national security strategy in Asia is being transformed by larger global trends. American officials, who prudently rely on the axiom that one must focus on an adversary's armed capabilities rather than its intentions, now generally conclude that the dramatic change in the Soviet Union makes it far less dangerous. The failure of a coup in Moscow by hard-liners in August 1991, which greatly enhanced domestic reformist tendencies, reinforced reduced American threat perceptions.

This has enormous consequences for U.S.-Asian relations. Responding to these dramatic geopolitical shifts, the U.S. is undertaking profound military reassessments. Despite its European emphasis, the new national security strategy also calls for preliminary modest changes in the United States' force posture in the Pacific region's Base Force. It builds upon the Bush administration's first incremental reductions in U.S. ground and air forces in the Western Pacific.

Although many in Europe are apprehensive that the new U.S. national security strategy, which changes the level of American forward deployed forces in Europe more than it does in Asia, is a further step in a U.S. shift toward a Pacific Century-oriented worldview, there is no evidence to substantiate their fears. Rather than indicating any new focus on Asia, the relative emphasis on the Pacific which is produced by the greater cuts in Europe reflects two short-term phenomena. First, there is an unwarranted sense among American military and diplomatic officials in the Asia-Pacific region that the Cold War's end does not apply to this region as thoroughly. Despite pockets of Cold War holdouts in Asia, this is a false overall perception which will be adjusted as reality sets in. Secondly, and most important for Europeans to understand, virtually all U.S. decisionmakers are Atlanticists whose entire working lives have been devoted to NATO- and European Community (EC)-oriented affairs, focusing on the Cold War threats from the Soviet Union. They have paid scant attention to the Asia-Pacific region, treating it as a corollary of U.S. global policy that can be readily adapted to policy changes made regarding the European-Soviet region.

In the new U.S. national security strategy Washington has followed these long-standing priorities again. Actions are being taken globally that affect the Asia-Pacific area, but not because of that region. There is no evidence that visions of a "Pacific Century" motivated any changes in overall U.S. strategy. Only as the imbalances in the consequent strategy become more evident, and as more Americans also come to terms with the end of Asia's Cold War, will the U.S. make adjustments in the Pacific that are comparable to what already is being done in Europe. This will, of course, have major consequences for bilateral U.S. security relations with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines which will
no longer have a Soviet focus for Americans. Unless a surrogate threat perception can be discovered, or developed, it seems unlikely that any of those bilateral relationships can remain intact.

Once the Soviet threat is removed, or vastly reduced, what alternative threat remains? No imminent threat looms across the region in the 1990s, except a common regional perception that North American and European free trade zones may exclude Asian products and pose a politico-economic "threat" to Asians. Beyond that, as the U.S. deals with Asian allies Americans are likely to discover that there is no external threat to the Philippines, Koreans see the Japanese as their largest potential foreign threat, and the Japanese see potential threats from a unified Korean state and from Russians (as distinct from "Soviets"), neither of which are dependent upon the existence of the Cold War.

Many Asian states also are apprehensive about China's long-term ambitions and wonder about the wisdom of American support for a stronger China. Similarly, many Asians are concerned about Japan's long term ability to convert its economic influence into political and military power and, as a corollary, about the United States' ability to control that process. Furthermore, Asians are increasingly concerned about India's strategic ambitions and about signs of intra-Asian arms races. For Americans, however, the most important point about these security issues is that they are not part of the Cold War. Nonetheless, rather than dwell on these post-Cold War circumstances, most Asians prefer to keep the focus on the remnants of a Russian threat which is easier to sell to Americans. In this context, any attempt to perpetuate U.S. bilateral security treaties in the Pacific after the region's version of the Cold War eventually is put to rest, will require Americans to face a far more difficult challenge than they do in Europe as they try to redefine for domestic U.S. consumption why remaining security commitments should be kept intact.

ASIAN REACTIONS

Asia has reacted cautiously and prudently to the modest changes for U.S. forces in the Pacific announced by the Bush administration in 1990-91. There is no sign that any Asian country fully appreciates how those changes are linked to the larger strategic shift being contemplated. There is virtually no indication that Asian defense specialists are aware that the new U.S. national security strategy has any direct relevance for their part of the world. It is universally seen as a U.S.-USSR and NATO-oriented issue. Regular reassurances to Asia by senior U.S. State and Defense Department officials, that the U.S. will remain a constant and reliable factor in their security system, apparently have been accepted at face value. If there are serious doubts, and there probably are--given past U.S. inconsistencies
that alarmed Asians—they are not being expressed. Asians seem to prefer to let "sleeping [American] dogs lie." Rather than ask profound questions whose adverse answers they suspect are entirely predictable, and which they do not want to hear, Asians are not raising the issue.

Compounding this sense of caution and guarded confidence that the U.S. will not make truly major revisions to its post-Cold War strategy as it applies to them, Asians tend to see the U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf War as a clear signal that Americans will not change their behavior. They are relieved by the willingness of the U.S., its leaders and masses, to perpetuate President Kennedy's readiness to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." This eagerness to be the leader, even at a high cost, reassures Asians greatly. It also surprises them greatly because they also see the U.S. as a superpower with economic feet of clay.

In short, Asians—even as they praise the U.S. and act as cheerleaders, and sometimes bankers, for the American cause—wonder how long such disproportionate arrangements can last. They fear the U.S. will fall victim to the daunting problems outlined by another Kennedy—Paul Kennedy of Yale.4 So, even as Asians welcome what the U.S. says and hope that nothing fundamental will change in U.S. national security strategy for the Pacific, they also sense that there will be changes beyond the ability of Americans to control. Nonetheless, they do not yet connect this dynamic process to the evolving new U.S. strategy's relevance for Asia.

Instead, Asians are preoccupied by serious and growing frictions in U.S.-Asian economic relations. These are prominent in U.S. relations with Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and—to a lesser extent—various states in Southeast Asia. They loom far larger to Asia than contemporary concerns over military affairs. The best evidence of this is the cool Asian—especially Japanese—responses to U.S. pressures for coalition assistance during the Persian Gulf crisis. No prominent leader of a major state in Asia viewed that crisis from a perspective even approximating Washington's position. Cooperation was grudging at best.

Japan eventually rallied around the cause, but only under political duress. South Korea helped out, too, but minimally, belatedly, and with little enthusiasm. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) did virtually nothing to help the DESERT STORM cause, and its arms sales contributed to the problem. Southeast Asians were asked to do nothing, and they were more than happy to oblige. Asian leaders—notably in Japan—resented the notion that American leaders would arrogate to themselves the right to make decisions and take actions in the name of the greater good of a broadly defined western world (including the advanced economies of Asia).
Still more grating was that, having taken these steps, Washington had the gall to twist their arms in pursuit of burden-sharing funds, especially Japanese yen. None of this sat well with Asian leaders, who generally empathized with the reluctant Japanese. That some responded as forthcomingly as they did and, in the Japanese case, a double digit $ billion range, had little relevance to any sense that they were genuine partners with the U.S. in a global coalition against distant aggression. Overwhelmingly, Asians cooperated rhetorically and financially, albeit reluctantly, to keep Americans off their backs and to help deflect further U.S. criticism of Asian trade practices. In effect, Asians were engaging in political and economic deterrence versus the U.S., postponing a while longer the day of reckoning.

This behavior points out clearly the ways in which Asians are preoccupied by their tense economic relations with the U.S. Their major goals are to placate Americans, to keep tensions manageable, and to keep frictions from so frustrating Americans that the U.S. could react adversely by retaliating through a trade war or reducing its security commitments in Asia. These would, in turn, compel Asians to deal autonomously and at much higher cost with their own defenses. This behavior exemplifies the ways in which most Asians hew to a broader and self-centered interpretation of their national security than Americans do regarding the U.S. It also highlights why most Asians were relieved that the burdensharing spasm during the Persian Gulf crisis was focused almost exclusively on U.S.-Japan ties, thereby letting most Asians (especially Chinese and Koreans, who were no more enthusiastic than the Japanese) off the hook.

On balance, U.S. promises of strategic continuity in Asia, apparent American willingness to police the Asia-Pacific region despite disavowals of any desire to play the role, American hubris over unipolar victory in the Cold War, and a perverse underlying sense that the United States' "feet of clay" gives Asia's most advanced states a quiet long term advantage that has not yet dawned on many Americans, collectively please Asians. They feel comfortable that events are going their way, that the U.S. will preserve the essential status quo for the next several years, and that enough remnants of the Cold War persist in Asia, despite U.S. and Soviet efforts to defuse them, to keep the U.S. from applying any new strategy to Asia. Asians tend to feel that their region will not, and should not, be influenced as much as Europe by a new post-Cold War world order. This, in turn, raises serious questions about how Americans might deal with Asians in this context.

END OF ASIA'S COLD WAR

The reason more drastic changes in this theater have not been made, by applying the new national security strategy as vigorously in Asia as in Europe, is that the Cold War has not completely ended in Asia. Some observers, notably former Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, feel that Asia's Cold War is fully over. American officials are, of course, well aware that the global Cold War is over, but their actions regarding Asia suggest lingering ambiguity.

Statements from the center of the U.S. Government indicate that key officials want to apply post-Cold War thinking to Asia. Similarly, examples in 1990, such as the Department of Defense "East Asian Strategic Initiative" and the "President's Report [to the Congress] of the U.S. Military Presence in East Asia," indicate that they are putting such thought into action. Nevertheless, all these examples of forward thinking retain an emphasis on residual Cold War era confrontation that are not cited as instances of strategic contingencies which the U.S. must be prepared to address.

Furthermore, despite such marginal progress in a lingering Cold War milieu, many American officials on the scene in Asia are much less flexible and responsive to change. In part, this gap may simply be bureaucratic inertia. It seems more purposeful, however, in that institutional conservatism--especially within the U.S. Armed Forces--leads many in the field to drag their heels in adjusting to new circumstances.

To be blunt, there is a widespread view in the field and at sea that senior Pentagon and civilian agency officials are being precipitous in their adaptation to global geopolitical change. As a consequence, there is a tangible sentiment, expressed in private, that the people in the field are best served by waiting out the latest cycle of policy innovators. In short, they have adopted an attitude that "this, too, shall pass." All signs indicate that they are wrong, but the net result is sluggish acceptance of the impact upon Asia of the end of the global Cold War.

Has Asia's Cold War ended? To answer that fundamental question, upon which much of a still evolving U.S. national security strategy will be based, requires that Americans, Asians, and Russians agree about what the "Asian Cold War" really is and the nature of remaining threats. Though this may seem self-evident, it is not. There are two fundamental choices. One can assume remnants of Asia's Cold War are so persistent that the new national security strategy need not be applied as vigorously as it will be in Europe (which is the U.S. assumption because U.S. forces and commands in the Asia-Pacific region are changing far less than in the Euro-Atlantic region) or one can demonstrate why it should be applied to this region as well because its version of the Cold War either has ended or will soon end. To make the latter case requires that the "end" of Asia's Cold War also be proven.

To sustain this proposition, it must be recognized that Asia's Cold War has always differed from Europe's. In Europe, where the U.S. and its Cold War allies shared common threat perceptions, there was one front line, one prime adversary, one ring.
of satellites in orbit around the Soviet center, and a joint security institution--NATO--through which the Cold War was waged. Asia possessed none of these. Its version of the Cold War was qualitatively different. Its Cold War threat perceptions have been extraordinarily diverse. No two states associated with the U.S. saw the Soviet adversary in the same light. Most Asian participants in the Cold War lacked a real front line or the strategic mentality such a barrier fosters. Korea's demilitarized zone (DMZ)-arrayed deterrence stalemate is the clearest exception. Vietnam was a partial exception, though the front line in its war with the U.S. was amorphous. Hence, none of Asia's Cold Warriors perceived the other's equivalent of a front line in a manner suggesting a shared strategic vision.

The relatively weak indigenous ideological quotient of Asia's Cold War, when coupled with a dual Soviet and Chinese focus of communist power, despite occasional shrill ideological rhetoric between Asia's divided nations, diluted the sense of "us versus them." Asia never developed cohesive rival ideological blocs comparable to those in Europe. The Sino-Soviet split further obscured the alienation regarding "them." Which them? Which us? The same phenomena muddied the notion of proxy or surrogate states within an adversary's bloc. Whom did Hanoi and Pyongyang heed? Conversely, whom did Seoul, Taipei, or Saigon heed? When were either side's client states acting autonomously?

Because the villains in Asia's Cold War were, unlike in Europe, never as precise or cohesive an entity to the defenders of freedom, the U.S. and its allies could never construct the equivalent of NATO in the Western Pacific, though some advocated such an institution. The difficulty was compounded by the systemic asymmetry of Asia's Cold War camps. Again, unlike Europe, where each side possessed rough parity in ground and naval forces, in the Asia-Pacific region the U.S. and most of its friends stressed mobile maritime-based power, embodied by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, whereas the Soviet Union, PRC, and states linked to them were overwhelmingly continental powers. In short, there were enormous strategic differences between Europe's Cold War and the version that Asia experienced.

Were it not for the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific region, transferring U.S.-Soviet tensions to the Soviet Union's eastern flank, it is doubtful that the area would have become a substantial participant in the Cold War. This contrasts with Europe, where Americans and their European allies shared a sense of common risk and destiny. In Asia the U.S. was the central vehicle for transmitting Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union to the region through various bilateral treaties and less formal relations.

Simultaneously, American anti-communist ideology was the glue bonding those bilateral ties into a loose network, with the U.S. the nexus connecting disparate elements rather than as the leader of a common cause. Furthermore, U.S.-Soviet frictions superimposed a layer of global hostility upon existing Asian
relations, intensifying some, obscuring others, and camouflaging still others. While some anti-communist elements in postwar Asia enthusiastically rallied around the U.S. cause, many phenomena in Asia's Cold War did not emerge from that "war" but had a life of their own.

Vivid examples of these are found in Japan-Soviet relations. Disputes over the so-called Northern Territories, several fishery zones, and a variety of economic issues may share a Cold War veneer that remains essentially intact, despite President Gorbachev's April 1991 visit to Japan, but they would have existed had the Cold War never developed. Japanese concerns about Soviet potentials for aggression probably would also have emerged without a Cold War. More likely, they would have been confrontational for Japan because it would not have enjoyed a defense buffer provided by the U.S. It was U.S.-Soviet hostility that wrapped the Cold War around these events, which actually stem from long-standing Russo-Japanese cross-national relations.

Comparable examples of national apprehensions becoming entangled in the Cold War are reflected in Sino-Japanese, Japan-North Korean, Southeast Asian-Chinese, and Indo-Pakistani animosities. Regional concerns about intimidation by the once ascendant Soviet empire did not differ greatly from earlier Czarist aggression. Those concerns would have developed had the Cold War never occurred. Other shaky examples of perceived Cold Warrior behavior in Asia include the patent ambiguity of North Korea and Vietnam as proxies for either of their giant communist backers. Sometimes they appeared to act as client states, but often they went their own way. One could legitimately ask whether their proxydom was more in the eye of American beholders than controlled by America's adversaries in the Cold War.

In Asia the indigenous stronghold of the Cold War was the Korean peninsula. Its division, destruction in war, and cultivation as rival armed camps are Asia's clearest (though not precise) parallels to the European Cold War. Unlike much of Asia, Korea was divided by an unambiguous military front line and the divided nation was riven by an imported ideological rivalry which established deep roots. Korea was part of the Cold War's birth, matured with that era, and now may be on the verge of ending its conflict along with the reduction in tension in the global Cold War.

Though many point to contemporary Korea as an example of the Cold War's intractability in Asia, and a prime reason why the new U.S. national security strategy should not be applied as thoroughly throughout Asia, the changing situation in Korea illustrates how Asia's most extreme example of the Cold War also is thawing. Dramatic recent improvements in South Korean relations with the Soviet Union and China rank alongside the importance of changes in Eastern Europe. Progress in Japan-North Korea relations also help to reduce tensions. Even U.S.-North Korean relations are mellowing, although impeded by American concerns about International Atomic Energy Agency oversight of possible North
Korean nuclear capabilities. If Korea's extreme version of the Cold War can be resolved over the next few years, a real possibility now that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union at long last stand ready to help, and because Pyongyang's external support has been damaged by the upheaval in the Soviet Union, then all else in the Asian Cold War also should be manageable.

As the major players seek to reduce Cold War tensions in Asia, it is vital for them to recognize what is, and what is not, meant by "The Cold War." Those cross-national tensions which stem from longstanding intra-Asian relations must be distinguished from their Cold War trappings. Washington and Moscow must dissociate the vestiges of their Cold War policies from those earlier contexts which, throughout the Cold War years, possessed a vitality ensuring that they would have developed in any event. Neither Washington nor Moscow should permit themselves to be trapped by remnants of Cold War institutions, drift with the momentum of anachronistic Cold War policies, be entangled by the inertia of stale Cold War thinking, or be misled by the ghosts of Cold War animosities. Most of Asia's remaining pockets of the Cold War between the U.S. and whatever finally replaces the Soviet Union can be rapidly resolved as "Cold War" phenomena if Washington and Moscow devote sufficient attention to them. Once this is done, the new U.S. national security strategy may be applied as thoroughly to Asia as it is to Europe.

Much can be removed from the lingering Cold War environment in Asia by simply agreeing that many of Asia's assumed Cold War problems never warranted that description. Many can be redefined out of existence, as the U.S. and PRC did with the Taiwan issue. It was effectively removed from the list of Cold War hot spots where it once seemed so prominent and relegated to an intra-China concern. The other problems will not disappear, of course, any more than Taiwan's place within China did as a regional issue. Yet they too can legitimately be removed from a Cold War milieu and returned to their rightful location, into a traditional cross-national geopolitical context.

It is no longer necessary to treat outstanding Russo-Japanese, Sino-Japanese, Japan-Korea, Indo-Pakistani, or various Chinese-Southeast Asian disputes as lingering parts of the Cold War. Neither are any intra-national problems necessarily linked to the Cold War. Let these issues stand alone and be dealt with by the regional parties concerned. Similarly, Washington and Moscow no longer need perceive hostile third states as proxies. Moreover, even their lingering hostility should be far more manageable by Washington, Moscow, and regional actors if totally removed from the Cold War environment. Should Washington and Moscow choose, they could be much less sensitive to remaining ill will from far-flung countries, since that animosity would be redefined out of the Cold War context.

Consequently, much of Asia's remaining Cold War can be disposed of quickly by redefining the areal terms of reference. If the Cold War's antagonists agree that neither is any longer a
danger to each other in Asia, the hoary axiom about capabilities versus intentions will not sustain remnants of the Cold War in Asia either. Too many Americans are reluctant to make that assumption. Nonetheless it is warranted because the severely weakened Soviet economy and troubled political system and those of its republics, which allows the U.S. to revise sharply downward any expectation of an attack in Europe, cannot sustain a more effective military threat in far away Asia.

The rapidly changing Soviet system, behind its Asian armed capabilities, is the same deteriorating and decrepit one behind its European capabilities. Moreover, in the Far East it must operate at the end of vulnerable, tenuous logistical supply lines, thereby diminishing its capabilities further. It is difficult to understand the continuing American anxiety about Soviet military strength in the Pacific region, especially in the form of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, or why the Soviet Union should be considered any more dangerous in Asia than in Europe. Even if, in a worst case situation, one assumes the Soviet or Russian military leaders in Asia were out of Moscow's control, they would still be hobbled by their disastrous economy and cut off from its European heart. Any such "worst case" scenario must be considered a remote prospect in the wake of the failed coup of August 1991 and the dramatic changes which followed it.

Coupling this objective reality with the improved expressed intentions of current leaders in Moscow, the prospects for completely ending Asia's Cold War must be assessed positively. It is time the U.S. and Soviet Union, or its successor, redefine the Asian Cold War out of existence. This will allow American defense officials to apply the new U.S. national security strategy to both Europe and Asia with equal thoroughness and enthusiasm.

TROUBLING ISSUES

Were the Cold War's antagonists to take these positive steps, however, two areas still would loom as particularly troublesome. One is Korea, where a genuine Stalinist relic of the Cold War persists. The progress toward Korean tension reduction made so far should be pursued, if possible. Just as in the superpower Cold War, the capabilities versus intentions calculations in Korea are now changing enough to further reduce tensions.

Since the singular parallels in Korea with Europe's Cold War are genuine there is reason to hope that Europe's precedents, especially German unification and nuclear arms control, and the good will of Washington and Moscow, can be influential in Korea. Every effort should be made toward that end. If it works, all concerned can rejoice and welcome a stable, peaceful, and perhaps unified Korea to the post-Cold War era. There is, however, a real possibility that the stubborn Korean Cold War may prove uniquely resistant to change because of the uncompromising nature of the leadership in both Seoul and Pyongyang. Each seems unwilling to
make genuine concessions to the other that have characterized recent Washington-Moscow relations.

If tensions persist, Washington and Moscow confront a difficult choice. Should they allow one isolated remnant of the Cold War to entangle them indefinitely? Or should they jointly decide to reduce their shared risk by leaving the Korean Cold War to be resolved by the two Koreas? This would be unlikely today because of persistent American assumptions that events in Korea will affect adjoining states with serious consequences for the remaining Cold War atmospherics in Asia.

If, however, Asian regional security concerns are effectively removed from that anachronistic context by Washington and Moscow disassociating themselves, then Korea's ability to disrupt its neighbors' peace and stability—though no less real for regional states—is no longer a quasi-Cold War vital issue. The Korean Cold War can legitimately be left in a vacuum for them to resolve, as a civil war stalemated by its own entrenched bipolar deterrence. Their success or failure would no longer bear on U.S. or Soviet/Russian vital interests vis-à-vis each other. Korean tensions, as a regional issue, could then revert to priority concerns for the peninsula's Asian neighbors, China and Japan.

That Korea is, and probably always will be, a crucial country for China and Japan (an because of that for the Soviet Union and Russian Republic, too), does not necessarily mean the U.S. must continue to assign as high a priority to Korean affairs as it received during the Cold War. This emphatically does not mean that Americans should be cavalier about Korea's fate. The U.S. has major interests there and a moral obligation built up over many years, but neither of those factors warrant perpetuating Cold War-era security commitments if they damage larger U.S. national interests. This may seem a cold hearted resolution for Korea, but it is eminently realistic for Washington and Moscow as they seek to spread the influence of the post-Cold War era. Knowing that Washington and Moscow enjoy this viable option should add to Seoul's and Pyongyang's incentives to make genuine compromises to end the Korean Cold War rapidly before the Korean peninsula has lost its strategic relevance to the superpowers.

Either way, Korea's stubborn perpetuation of the Cold War could, and should, be dealt with. Much less manageable is the second problem. There will remain an overarching disparity between Asia and the symmetry of U.S.-Soviet tension reduction in the Atlantic-European realm, where comparable cuts can be negotiated on both sides of their armed balance. The differences in continental versus maritime power are not so glaring there and can be easily accommodated. Naval power can remain in rough parity, while ground-based forces are cut significantly. In the Asia-Pacific region, however, trade-offs are extraordinarily difficult between Soviet and Russian continental power and U.S. maritime power.9
This is evident globally in the U.S. reluctance to negotiate significant naval arms control and in its new national security strategy which will allow large ground-based armed forces to be demobilized or put in reserves to await unknown contingencies. In part, this reflects the inherent personnel and industrial difficulties in reconstituting naval forces which have been demobilized or mothballed, even with the two year advance warning time the new national security strategy assumes for reconstituting American capabilities against a revived threat from the Soviet Union. Equally important to the U.S., however, is the justifiable perception that it remains more dependent upon maritime power in a sharply reduced threat environment than any future major adversary, including a revitalized Soviet threat.

So, even as the Cold War is terminated worldwide, the major powers must simultaneously agree upon mutual acceptance of differing military (ground and air forces) versus naval emphases in how to preserve their post-Cold War national security. In other words, the existence of large Soviet or Russian ground-based armed forces in Asia should be considered by American's to be "natural" and a quid pro quo for Moscow's acceptance of large U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. Each's disproportionate scale compared to the other's resources in that defense sector should be accepted as a routine expression of the legitimate national security establishment of a continental power versus a maritime power. This step, which should be implemented by a Pacific version of the U.S.-USSR Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Europe, is essential to end Asia's Cold War completely and allow smooth implementation of the new U.S. national security strategy.

Examples of Asian circumstances that might be influenced by the new U.S. national security strategy and, in turn, might influence that strategy, are numerous. When asked about the likelihood of war in the wake of the reduced Soviet threat, General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Washington Post "Haven't the foggiest. I don't know. That's the whole point. We don't know like we used to know." American thoughts about hypothetical contingencies for which U.S. forces should be prepared are outlined in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment. The major contingency it envisions in Asia concerns Korea. This contingency and those of lesser probability, are to be handled by existing U.S. forces in the region, prepositioned equipment available to mobile forces, and with the cooperation of allies in the region. All these elements are products of the Cold War years, made relatively less certain and reliable by the post-Cold War era.

If the U.S. and Soviet Union, or its successor, actually redefined the Asian Cold War out of existence, some rationales for U.S. and allied forces being located where they are in the Pacific region, and their existing tasks, would be dissipated. Furthermore, efforts at arms control and tension reduction within Asia (i.e., between the two Koreas and China-Taiwan) also could change the ground rules. Equally important, the expectations of
Asian friends and allies about how they might be expected to cooperate with the U.S. (never a dependable variable even at the height of the Cold War) is made more uncertain by the rapidly changing international environment. As a consequence, future American decisions about force structure, deployments, basing requirements, and command arrangements should be predicated on evolutionary reality in the Asia-Pacific region—not on anachronistic or static perceptions. American officials clearly think they are moving in that direction now, but—to the extent that they are—they are being hampered by remnants of the Cold War and foot dragging by Americans ""the scene in Asia.

Certain issues will be relatively narrow in their focus on the American defense bureaucracy such as the size and scope of a revamped U.S. Pacific Command, or—even more narrowly—how the unique U.S. Army command linkages from Korea to Washington will be adapted to the future shape of the Pacific Command. Broader issues such as the utility and availability of bases in the Philippines, Korea, and Japan, the nature of binational commands such as the Combined Forces Command in Korea, the willingness of Asian nationalists to yield to American strategic desires, and the growth of indigenous military power centers in Asia (i.e., China, Japan, and India) that might partially displace U.S. military power, collectively will shape whatever post-Cold War Asia that evolves from assertive U.S. and Soviet efforts to end completely Asia's Cold War. Perhaps most important, these factors will raise serious questions about the long-term viability of existing U.S. security treaties in the region. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, in particular, will be subjected to pressure to adapt to the new circumstances.

POST-COLD WAR PROSPECTS

The U.S. and the Soviet Union must also mesh this still uncertain process with the reality that the end of Asia's Cold War will remove the veneer of superpower constraints on long-standing underlying regional tensions, as happened in Europe. Removal of the geopolitical cork from the Asian strategic bottle may be more acute than comparable European developments because Asia's internal differences throughout the postwar period have remained more diverse than Europe's. Furthermore, if Europeans are anxious about adjusting to the U.S. strategic approach to their part of the world, and are nervously trying to discourage Americans from reducing their armed presence in Europe below the two divisions to be retained within NATO, one can imagine the consternation Asian leaders will experience over the next few years if the new national security strategy's impact is felt as acutely in the Pacific as in Europe.

The post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region will be both more complex strategically and less well positioned than Europe to foster a political surrogate for former military institutions. The lack of a NATO-like structure in the Asia-Pacific area pro-

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hibits the relatively simple conversion process envisaged by Europeans. This difference between the regions is compounded by the momentum toward enhanced EC unity after 1992, which may eventually absorb Eastern Europe and Russia. This would mitigate the underlying European tensions exposed by the removal of NATO-Warsaw Pact constraints. The Asianization of Asia's regional security likely to emerge in its post-Cold War era holds little promise of unity of purpose or shared aspirations.

On balance, however, the resurfacing of endemic regional tensions in Asia may be inevitable and ultimately healthy. Its prospect is no reason to perpetuate an artificial Cold War environment to prevent unleashing repressed dynamics. The argument which some Americans make, that the U.S. must remain as a stabilizing force to prevent excessively powerful Asian states from disrupting the equilibrium, is a relic of the Cold War. There is no need for the U.S. to be a policeman for the region, self-appointed or elected by default. Asian-Pacific dynamics should be unleashed to be dealt with by regional actors.

As this occurs, moreover, all concerned--but especially the U.S. and whatever remains of the Soviet Union--should reconsider whether Cold War era alliances, overtaken by events, still make sense for post-Cold War states. They could be retained intact if Washington or Moscow want to maintain a commitment to a given Asian country to defend it against its aggressive neighbors, for reasons that have nothing to do with the Cold War motives which led to the original commitments. Those motives were made obsolescent by the end of the superpower Cold War and by the resurfacing of regional tensions among states capable of dealing with each other without external assistance.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union will be free to retain existing bilateral security relationships in the region, if they can devise political rationales palatable to their respective publics. Similarly, each may wish to play a stabilizing role in the region's security. American officials often speak of doing so in the form of a so-called "balance wheel" for Asian security. In the American case, pursuing this option is likely to be rough where Asian economic power and political nationalism are on the rise.

In the post-Cold War era there are substantial reasons why such increasingly anachronistic bilateral and regional arrangements should be reconsidered by American and Soviet/Russian decisionmakers. Applying the new U.S. national security strategy to the Asian-Pacific region as thoroughly as it is to Europe would facilitate such reappraisals, based on post-Cold War U.S. interests in the area. This does not imply that either the U.S. or the Soviet Union/Russian Republic are likely soon to forego their status as Pacific powers. American leaders note frequently that the U.S. intends to maintain a presence in Pacific affairs regardless of the Soviet Union's role. The same view is as legitimately expressed by Soviet and Russian leaders.
Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or the Russian Republic, are Pacific states with valid national interests in the region and are likely to remain major factors long after the Asian Cold War has utterly melted. If the total dissolution of the Soviet Union actually occurs, the Russian Republic would remain as a key actor in Pacific security affairs. However, both countries are likely to be sharply constrained post-Cold War powers in a dramatically altered strategic context. Their adjustment to the new context promises significant changes in the ways they pursue their interests, with greater emphasis on economic issues than on the military issues which dominated the Cold War years. As this unfolds throughout the 1990s, Asia, too, must adjust to, and help shape, the new world order.

In this context the new U.S. strategic approach can, and should, be as vigorously applied to Asia as to Europe. Asia like Europe epitomizes the new security environment that the revamped American national security strategy is designed to address: a dramatically diminished Soviet/Russian threat; far less prominent regional military threats which economically powerful local allies are competent to handle despite minimal or no U.S. assistance; and--most important--growing regional economic "threats" which are a direct challenge to post-Cold War U.S. national interests. Consequently, applying the new U.S. national security strategy to Asia as thoroughly as it is being applied to Europe should not be avoided by Americans for archaic, Cold War vintage reasons. Though Asian security partners of the U.S. are no more likely than its European partners to welcome the dramatic shift in American strategic priorities, that should not deter Americans from applying the new national security strategy to both major regions in a spirit of parity. It is time to apply the new national security strategy universally, and move on to a more innovative U.S. policy for Asia that is capable of redressing the many economic issues which confront Americans in the region.

NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense (DoD), or the U.S. Navy. This chapter draws upon my article: "A New American Strategy in Asia?" Asian Survey, December 1991.

(2) For an assessment of why Asians see these issues differently, see: Richard Fisher, "Why Asia is Not Ready for Arms Control," Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center Backgrounder No. 113, May 25, 1991.


(8) A prominent example of U.S. caution regarding the Korean Cold War, and the need to maintain American forces on the peninsula, is the interview given by General Robert RisCassi USA, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (CFC/CINCUNC). FEER, May 2, 1991, pp. 18-19.


(12) This was initially raised by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon, The Christian Science Monitor, November 6, 1991, p. 6.
U.S. Forces in Europe: The Search for a Mission
by
Jan S. Breemer

For over 40 years protecting Western Europe against Soviet aggression has been the central preoccupation of American defense planners. Conversely, America's NATO allies have long come to regard their transatlantic bargain, and especially the basing on their soil of several hundred thousand U.S. troops, as an essential prerequisite for Continental security. Rarely questioned have been the propositions that (a) NATO, that is to say, a U.S.-led NATO should be the cornerstone of West European security and defense planning, and that (b) American leadership would continue to be underwritten by large-scale troop deployments on and about the European Continent.

Within the span of two years, both propositions have lost their sanctity. It has already become evident that, overseas at least, the impact of the U.S. new national security strategy is being felt most acutely in Europe, especially with respect to the future political and institutional character of the transatlantic bargain and the attendant role of U.S. military forces on the Continent.

This chapter examines the implications for U.S. forces in Europe of the Administration's avowed goal to re-define the country's military-strategic planning priorities away from the old scenario of a Europe-centered global war with the Soviet Union, and to instead towards regional crisis response and presence. Two particular implications are discussed: first, the certainty of a much reduced U.S. military presence within the next five years, and secondly, the need for a radical review of the political and military purposes that a residual American military presence can be expected to play in the new and evidently post-Soviet Europe.

A QUESTION OF NUMBERS

President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, remarked in 1986 that, "there is no special magic to any particular number of U.S. troops in Europe." From a purely military point of view, he was no doubt correct. But then the particular size of the U.S. military presence in Europe has never been dominated by military calculations alone. For the Europeans, NATO meant American protection, and the presence of U.S. divisions was the premium that guaranteed Europe's transatlantic insurance policy.

Today, all bets are off. Collectively and individually the NATO members are agreed that a significant North American military presence remains necessary, but few Allied officials, on either side of the Atlantic, are willing to predict what the size
of its U.S. component will look like at the end of this century. Equally uncertain, politically and militarily, is the future of the roles and missions that should be expected of residual U.S. forces on the Continent.

Two key NATO commanders were reported to have advocated roughly the same residual force levels. General (GEN) Crosbie E. Saint, the U.S. Army commander in Europe, reportedly told U.S. officials that he needed a minimum of 80,000 Army troops. Counting 20,000 Air Force personnel, this would add up to a deployment of some 100,000. Meanwhile, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, German GEN Wolfgang Altenburg, let it be known that he envisaged a future U.S. force level in the central region as low as 50,000.

The Alliance's Supreme Commander in Europe (SACEUR), GEN John R. Galvin, USA, adamantly rejected Altenburg's forecast. He thought that the U.S. would keep some 150,000 troops in Europe, including a full U.S. corps as well as the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, 20,000 navy personnel ashore and several Air Force wings.

There remains considerable speculation that the ultimate number will be considerably smaller in fact. For example, the German Welt am Sonntag claimed, in April 1991, that it had received information that the U.S. Army wants to reduce its German-based forces to 70,000 by 1995. The U.S. Air Force, the magazine reported, would probably come down to 5,000. At the time of this writing, the Administration remained officially committed to a 1995 force level of no fewer than about 150,000 troops, mostly organized in two Army divisions, three Air Force tactical wings, and the Sixth Fleet.

A QUESTION OF PURPOSE

The uncertainty on both sides of the Atlantic about the numerical future of U.S. forces in Europe is symptomatic of a deep seated dilemma, the question of roles and missions, especially military roles and missions. The American (and NATO-wide) quandary has been neatly summed up in a quote attributed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), GEN Colin L. Powell, USA: "Today we do not even have the luxury of a plannable threat any more." As long as the Soviet Union projected a plannable threat, Allied deliberations on national force contributions had at least the benefit of an agreed strategic concept.

The strategic concept that guided NATO force requirements since December 1967 is the MC 14/3 document, better known as Flexible Response. MC 14/3 became a lame duck strategy on July 6, 1990 and the announcement by NATO's heads of state that the Alliance would "prepare a new Allied strategy moving away from 'forward defence,' where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying 'flexible response' to reflect a reduced
reliance on nuclear weapons. 8 Tasked with formulating a successor strategy to Flexible Response (presumably to be designated MC14/4) was a newly-created Strategic Review Group, drawn from NATO's International Staff. At the same time the Military Committee was given the responsibility for elaborating new force plans for implementation of the new strategy.

The logical force planning process directs that the Military Committee's recommendations with respect to the kinds and numbers of forces that NATO will need in the future await the guidance of the new Allied Strategic Concept. Actually, the opposite sequence of events has occurred. The Alliance has been unable to agree on such key issues as nuclear policy, how to address out-of-area risks, and burden-sharing between NATO and a European defense identity. Confronted at the same time with an accelerating trend toward national force planning (meaning force reductions), the Alliance was compelled to agree on a new force structure while merely noting "with satisfaction that substantial progress has been made in the development of the new Alliance Strategic Concept." 9

With impeccable Gallic logic, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas could complain that the Allied ministerial decision to create a multinational Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) lacked clear political or strategic reasoning: "Logic would require that one first define the political objectives, then that one work out the strategy, before deciding on force structures," he said. Instead, he went on, "NATO has chosen the opposite path." 10

NATO's decision to let force restructuring lead the adoption of an agreed strategic concept signifies, of course, that uncertain future military roles and missions is not peculiar to U.S. forces alone but is a NATO-wide dilemma. Yet, it is true that the question of a raison d'être has particular urgency for the future of U.S. forces on the Continent. The reason for this is simple: being Europe's principal military outsider, the U.S. cannot rest its claim for keeping forces on the Continent on the minimalist argument that they betoken territorial integrity and national independence.

This is not to say that Europeans and Americans alike have found difficulty with advancing a plethora of political and military rationales for safeguarding a significant U.S. troop presence. Indeed, a skeptic might point out that the very diversity of the menu of political and military purposes that has been proposed is a tell-tale sign of confusion and lack of conviction. Be that as it may, the long list of objectives that have been proffered in the past two years or so in defense of keeping the Americans in looks something like this. Collectively, they are the potion that their proponents insist will recover the magical quality that ensured the longevity of America's six-division presence during the years of the Cold War.

Stability, confidence, and influence have become the most frequently mentioned political reasons for keeping U.S. forces as
a permanent fixture of Europe's military landscape. This theme holds that the real contribution of America's physical presence has been to glue together the European community. To this day, many Europeans continue to perceive the visible presence of an extra-continental outsider as a guarantee that the process of economic and political community building will continue fairly and equitably and not revert to the unpredictable politics of balance of power considerations.

The proposition that a continued U.S. military engagement is necessary as a European confidence-building measure has come to embrace a rather fascinating mix of sub-themes. One holds that American forces ought to remain in place - to paraphrase Secretary of State James A. Baker - that they have become "a bedrock of stability in an era of uncertainty, even confusion." The thought here is that nations, like individuals, need a few familiar landmarks to locate themselves in a rapidly changing and unpredictable environment. For half a century a familiar feature of the European landscape, America's military presence has assumed an institutional importance that cannot be measured by military calculations alone.

Another sub-theme is the notion that the real purpose of U.S. troop entanglement has been to allay European anxieties over the specter of a resurgent German military power. The "German Problem" was central to the debate that attended NATO's formative years, but, by the mid-1950s, was overtaken by the "Soviet Problem." For many Europeans, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the accelerated pace toward German reunification spelled the retreat of the old and familiar Soviet threat in exchange for the even older German bogey.

Since confidence in Germany's continued Western orientation is believed contingent on NATO membership, and as long as NATO's longevity is seen to hinge on the presence of U.S. forces, it follows that the latter are seen as an important guarantee that a "large, wealthy Germany concerned only with its own security" will not become a "'loose cannon' in the center of Europe, reviving the instabilities and insecurity that led to the world wars." Some, including German commentators have proposed that Germany's own self-confidence depends on the retention of U.S. forces. This sub-theme proceeds along two tracks. One paints U.S. military presence as a security blanket. It urges that the Germans themselves recognize that, without the moderating influence of a U.S. presence the success of reunification may go to their heads and prompt irresponsible policies. German membership in NATO, Socialist parliamentarian Egon Bahr told members of the U.S. Congress in October 1990, guaranteed that the Germans would remain level-headed (vernuenftig).

The second, related, track takes its cue from the old suspicion that American disengagement will make Germany vulnerable to Soviet nuclear blackmail, perhaps forcing Germany's own nuclear
armament. It is then claimed that only the U.S. can guarantee Germany against nuclear blackmail and give firm but fair direction to Germany's adaptation to its new circumstances.\textsuperscript{14}

Closely connected with the belief that U.S. forces in Europe serve a confidence-building purpose is the argument that they provide stability. A "U.S. military presence," reported Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Paul D. Wolfowitz in a speech in the Spring of 1990, "will reassure America's European allies during a transition period of potential instability."\textsuperscript{15} The newly independent Eastern European states would benefit too, he added: "U.S. presence can also provide the stability the Eastern European nations need as they attempt to become part of an undivided democratic Europe."

Part of the price for Europe's emergence from bipolarity will be incipient political and military instability, particularly in and among the former Soviet satellite states. The civil war in Yugoslavia has heightened fears that some countries may resort to military solutions to resolve their new problems. According to Wolfowitz in his Spring 1990 speech, the U.S. "must stay in Europe to prevent the kind of catastrophe that would cost us far more to put right."

Czech and Slovak Federal Republic President Václav Havel has been a most outspoken proponent of an expanded NATO umbrella, but he has limited his military reasoning to "signals from the Soviet Union that give us concern and the threat that instability there could bring for Europe."\textsuperscript{16} At no time has he or any other Eastern European leader suggested that the Alliance, including U.S. forces, assume a responsibility for resolving Yugoslavia-like domestic strife.

At the close of the June 1991 North Atlantic Council meeting in Copenhagen, the NATO ministers' communique announced that the security of the Alliance is "inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe," and the progress of Eastern European democracy free from "any form of coercion or intimidation" was "of direct and material concern."\textsuperscript{17} The statement was widely reported in the press as a de facto NATO commitment to Eastern European defense.\textsuperscript{18} Far from opening the door, NATO had merely cracked a window to allow the Eastern Europeans the satisfaction of intensified military contacts.

Barring Eastern European accession to full membership (which is permitted under Article Ten of the North Atlantic Treaty), or alternatively, a reinterpretation of Articles Five and Six so as to allow for out-of-area intervention, NATO or U.S. forces operating under NATO auspices lack a mandate to dampen or quell any sort of Eastern European instability. In theory, U.S. forces in Europe could be used to intervene in an Eastern European crisis without the NATO cover, unilaterally or in ad hoc combination with willing Allies.
There are two major reasons why this is unlikely: first, U.S. decisionmakers will be extremely reluctant to insert forces into an area that is commonly considered a bottomless powder keg. Next, between the new U.S. strategic focus on regional contingencies and the Continent's move toward a European defense identity, both Americans and Europeans will almost certainly conclude that at hand is a European problem whose solution should be Europe's responsibility. Washington's low key response to Yugoslavia's civil war compared with the burst of European crisis management activities is probably a portent of how the Alliance partners will share the burden of reducing potential Eastern European instabilities.

The third theme advanced in defense of the political significance of keeping U.S. military power on the Continent is that it will preserve American influence. A widely accepted, though unusually unspoken proposition, avers that the presence of American power on the Continent has served more than the altruistic purpose of protecting Europe's liberty. Deliberately or not, U.S. policymakers have used Europe's dependence on this power as a lever to influence European policies on behalf of U.S. interests.

Such efforts have grown more problematic with the end of the Cold War. That is particularly true since the goals of U.S. policy are changing in a way that renders military sources of power and influence less relevant. The Economic Community's (EC's) refusal to compromise on its tough negotiating line during the Uruguay round of talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade indicates that the U.S. cannot count on converting its military presence into economic influence.

Before Eastern Europe's "revolutions" of 1989, security for Europe meant mostly military security; more than any other consideration, American forces shaped Europe's security calculus. Today, West Europeans draw a clear distinction between (non-military) security and (military) defense. Europe's security dilemma will be dominated mainly by nonmilitary issues, notably economic and ethnic instability in the East, and population and fundamentalist pressures from the South. Conversely, Western Europe's (and NATO's) traditional preoccupation with the defense aspect of security is widely expected to retreat to the background. Hence, of course, NATO's promise to become progressively a "political" alliance.

Whether or not this perspective is factually correct matters less today than that most European politicians seem to believe that, on the Continent at least, military security solutions will become increasingly irrelevant. If this assessment is correct, then the implication is that, as an instrument of political influence, U.S. military forces in Europe will be progressively relegated to the sidelines of the Continent's "Great Game." Left then is the prospect of military influence.

Published remarks by GEN Galvin strongly suggest that the immediate influence-seeking pay-off the U.S. anticipates from
keeping large forces on the Continent is a strong voice in European defense decision-making. In Congressional testimony he cautioned again that a military presence was the price the U.S. had to pay to "have a seat at the table on the questions of future security in Europe and the shaping of that security." He also warned that the alternative could be for the U.S. another "bloody war."  

The most immediate military influence that a U.S. corps-size military presence is designed to safeguard concerns the weight of Washington's voice in NATO's decision-making. Historically, the allocation of major military commands within the Alliance has followed the rule that "he who pays, plays." Hence, the number of three- and four-star billets a member could claim has been roughly commensurate with its contribution in troops and other military capabilities. Traditionally, the U.S. has held the lion's share of NATO's most important commands, including two of only three major commands - SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. GEN Galvin evidently believes that a corps and three air wings are the minimum stake the U.S. must enter if it is to stay at the head table of the NATO command. This raises at least two questions.

Keeping a corps instead of, say, no more than one division in Europe will ensure a bigger American profile in NATO's future command structure. But all this says is that having more forces on the Continent gives the U.S. a greater voice in how those forces may be used - it is silent about the instrumental military influence the U.S. seeks to preserve. If our insistence on a corps-size presence is prompted by concern that fewer forces would deny the U.S. a commanding voice over their use, then removing American forces altogether serves the same purpose.

Clearly, the military influence rationale for a large residual U.S. troops presence goes deeper. GEN Galvin's warning, cited earlier, indicates that, without a substantial presence, the U.S. fears that it might become dragged, once again, into a European war. This had already happened twice before in this century, he told legislators. Significantly, he noted, in both instances "we had stayed out of Europe."

The connection drawn by the SACEUR between Europe's propensity for war and the presence of U.S. forces (and, as a corollary, American leadership in NATO) has been a recurring theme in recent American policy pronouncements. It is at the heart of U.S. disquietness over the prospect of a European defense identity at its own exclusion. Although U.S. policymakers are loath to admit it, there is the unsettling sense that, left to their own devices, the Europeans cannot quite be trusted to keep the peace; that without U.S. military leadership they might make military choices contrary to American interests and precipitate another costly American rescue operation. The suggestion by some Europeanists that a European army under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU) or EC might intervene in a (non-Soviet)
Eastern European crisis, Yugoslavia, for example, has not allayed American anxieties.\textsuperscript{23}

Few and far between are Europeans prepared to lead a WEU or EC peacekeeping force into Eastern Europe without broad NATO and, more important, U.S. approval. But the reason has little to do with the commanding influence of a corps-size U.S. military presence: with many or few American troops in place, the Europeans are simply not ready to embrace a go-it-alone role.

Open to question is the apparent American assumption that U.S. influence in Alliance decision-making is a function of keeping the right number of troops. With the retreat of the Soviet menace this assumption is debatable on at least two counts. The 300,000-plus forces the U.S. kept on the Continent for the past 40 years have never been the sole, or even dominant determinant of U.S. leadership. Those forces mattered for what they stood for: first, as the leading edge of large-scale reinforcements and next as a symbol of the ultimate guarantee of America's nuclear commitment. What will become of these larger elements of U.S. policy? Will NATO be recast accordingly?

NATO FORCE STRUCTURE

On May 28, 1991 the Alliance defense ministers approved NATO's first force structure overhaul since its inception 42 years before. The scheme takes account of these three principal factors: (1) the planned across-the-board reduction of some 20 percent over the next three years of NATO forces in the old Central Region; (2) the prospect of much smaller active armed forces and hence greater reliance, in the event of a major crisis, on the activation of reserve formations; and (3) the need for multilateral military contributions.

The Future Force Structure plan is to include these three major components:\textsuperscript{24} first, multinational reaction force, consisting of an Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and an RRF. The first will be a 5,000-strong brigade with supporting air elements and will be available on 72 hours notice. Its purpose is quick-reaction crisis management, and its organization is essentially an elaboration of the existing Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force.

The RRF is the centerpiece of NATO's new multinational force structure. It will consist of elements drawn from all three services, land, sea, and air, but the core will be a British-led 70,000-strong Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC). The latter is to be built around two British divisions, a multinational division made up of German, Dutch, and Belgian units, and (and this is much less certain) a second multinational division composed of elements drawn from the southern flank armies. The RRC would require up to ten days to, if necessary, augment the IRF. The model for the RRC will be the existing Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).
A main defense force (MDF) of seven (largely mobilizable) corps. Six of the two-division corps will be multinational and be stationed in the old Central Region. Two will be German-commanded, one Belgian, one U.S., one Dutch, and one will have a combined Danish-German staff. The seventh MDF corps will be all-German and barracked in the former German Democratic Republic. The MDF will retain the old Allied Forces Central (AFCENT) mission of deterrence and defense against traditional, longer-warnig threats. Up to three months may be needed to bring the MDF corps to full and combat-ready strength.

Augmentation forces (AF) of undetermined size are to round out the Future Force Structure. They would reinforce the MDF should the latter prove unable to defend against threats to the Central Region. AF elements will presumably include national reserve and (mainly U.S.) active forces and, should hostilities escalate, reconstituted U.S. divisions. The MDF and AF are ostensibly designed to blunt an attack from any direction. Their practical focus, however, appears to be against long-warning Soviet aggression.

Two points stand out with respect to the U.S. role. Most important, it appears that the Army's V corps that will comprise the bulk of the remaining American presence in Europe will be assigned to the MDF. One of its divisions will evidently team up with a German division to remain under U.S. Corps command, whereas the second will report to a German-led multinational corps. The next, related, point is that no major in-place U.S. maneuver unit will evidently be attached to the RRC. The word "in-place" is emphasized since it has been reported that the U.S. may commit a U.S.-based division.

This leads to two observations: first, the RRC will be mainly a European army. This has fueled speculation that the RRC may eventually assume a second identity as the WEU's European Reaction Force. Next, it seems rather anomalous that the U.S. has chosen to exclude the most obvious candidate (i.e., V Corps) from participation in the RRC. From even an institutional perspective, clearly the RRC will be the centerpiece of NATO action. More important, the RRC symbolizes the Alliance's main military task of risk management and crisis prevention - not defense against Soviet aggression. With this in mind, the menu of American military purposes can be discussed next.

U.S. MILITARY ROLES AND MISSIONS

The military value of keeping more or less U.S. forces in Europe has been advocated on these three grounds: first, it is argued that no less than a corps-size presence along with some three tactical fighter wings and naval forces will suffice for U.S. forces to retain a credible on-the-spot defensive capability; second, a U.S. military presence is to serve as a reception capability should the need arise for overseas reinforcements.
during the reconstitution for a European-centered global war with the USSR; and third, Europe affords the U.S. a convenient springboard for out-of-area contingencies.

SACEUR acknowledges that the chances of Soviet aggression are extremely small, but he has refused to rule out the possibility of a crisis, not necessarily of Soviet making, "into which the Soviets feel drawn." Regardless of Moscow's intentions, the General informed journalists in June 1991, the Soviet Union still had the capability to amass 45 divisions with 13,000 tanks and launch an attack from a standing start in about 45 days.

Before the August 1991 Soviet coup attempt, U.S. planners assumed that they would have two years advance warning of a reborn Soviet European-centered global war. It goes almost without saying that since then, the concept of a two-year warning period for a global war has lost its plausibility. U.S. strategists will probably join their European colleagues and relegate reconstitution to the scrapheap of strategic bumperstickers whose time has passed.

Even before the Russian revolution of 1991 the European one-half of NATO had evidently reached the conclusion that, for Europe at least, the retention of a military-industrial reconstitution capacity was not feasible. The term appeared sporadically in a few NATO communiques following President Bush's speech at the Aspen Institute, but was absent from speeches by key NATO leaders since the beginning of 1991. Referred to instead are "force augmentation" and "force build-up," meaning the mobilization and activation of existing military reserves, weapons in storage, and industrial facilities— not the creation-from-scratch of new military-industrial capacities as pure reconstitution implies.

Discussions with European NATO planners point to several reasons why the American way of reconstitution has evidently failed to get their agreement. Because of the novelty of the word, planners evoked different perceptions of its meaning, especially political meaning. For some, reconstitution signified the restoration of the old, Cold War, state of affairs, including the politically sensitive issue of preparing to break-out from the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE)-agreed ceiling on European forces. Others evidently thought that the term could be too readily confused with nuclear reconstitution, and feared that it could become associated with the (provocative) regeneration of NATO's nuclear forces.

The concern that an avowed strategy of reconstitution may turn out to be crisis-escalatory appears to have dominated NATO's political reasoning for its rejection. Specifically, given the likely ambiguity of warnings and indicators of a re-emerging Soviet menace, it is feared that NATO may act too hastily and trigger the kind of escalating series of tit-for-tat force build-up decisions that dragged both sides to World War I.
There is a practical reason as well why the Allied defense establishments have failed to embrace the reconstitution concept with enthusiasm. Faced with steeply declining defense budgets and the popular expectation of a peace dividend, they fear that reconstitution will be an excuse for even further cut-backs; that the option of creating forces in lieu of maintaining a standing force could be expanded to hedge against non-Soviet, so-called lesser contingencies as well. According to this theme, the national Treasures will not fund a standby reconstitution capacity that most politicians believe will never be used. Instead, the military can expect to be told that if they believe reconstitution important, they must decide how to apportion a fixed defense budget between standing and reconstitutable capacities. It takes no imagination to figure out which way the decision will go.

Despite official declarations, reconstitution has not generated political passions, even in the U.S. It is likely that, between its rejection as a NATO strategy and the revolutionary events in the Soviet Union in the Summer of 1991, the concept will wane to a slogan and disappear from the American and Allied lexicon. The principal reason is, of course, the dominant expectation that the Soviet threat will not return. This is the only realistic basis for assessing the military relevance of a U.S. presence in Europe. The present outlook is that neither defense nor reconstitution will be tenable.

The same observation holds concerning the future of U.S. forces as custodians of NATO's forward-based nuclear weapons. Historically, the military and political values of the American presence were intimately connected with their ownership of most of the Alliance's short-and medium-range nuclear weapons. Those forward based systems ensured the extended deterrence of American strategic nuclear forces, and extended America's influence in NATO's military councils irrespective of the number of GIs on the Continent. It has been a long-standing adage that, "no nukes, no troops."

Officially, NATO remains adamant about the need for the U.S. nuclear guarantee. The reason has less to do today with the fear of an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack, than the fact that the U.S. is the only NATO member which can offset the Soviet strategic nuclear capability. However, indications that this guarantee will be decoupled from America's forward based nuclear deployment and, before long, the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe will be limited to sea-based systems and some Air Force squadrons based in the United Kingdom. The implication is clear: if the U.S. and the Europeans wish to keep American troops on Continental soil, valid reasons other than nuclear custodianship must be found.

This leaves projection of force for out-of-area contingencies as the most persuasive military rationale for preserving a U.S. presence in Europe. Lacking credible anti-Soviet scenarios, it makes practical sense for the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to institutionalize the precedent set by DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and
reorient its day-to-day operational planning to out-of-area contingencies. This mission is consistent with current U.S. strategic planning, and it would also match the de facto out-of-area thrust of mainstream European defense thinking. The latter is reflected in (a) increasing recognition among the principal Western European powers that risks beyond NATO territory, not the risk of a re-emerging Soviet threat, will henceforth be the main preoccupation of standing forces; (b) the broad expectation that the centerpiece of NATO's new force structure, the RRC, will assume a dual NATO and European identity and will, in its second capacity, be the WEU's (and eventually the EC's) out-of-area intervention force; and (c) the momentum toward creating an independent European security and defense identity whose principal military planning focus will, again, be out-of-area.

U.S. strategists are agreed that planning for and structuring U.S. forces to a general war with the Soviet Union no longer makes sense; that, instead, the criterion for force readiness must be the ability to respond quickly to regional crises and conflicts. To remain relevant to the demands of the new world order, U.S. forces in Europe must be given a relevant and militarily defensible role. Providing for Europe's main or augmented defense against a resurrected Soviet threat is no longer an adequate purpose; out-of-area contingency operations in collaboration with the Europeans and as part of a new transatlantic bargain is.

CONCLUSION

In a monograph published by the International Institute for East-West Security Studies in early 1991, author Jan Willem Honig posed the question: "NATO: An Institution Under Threat?" There is little question that, especially since the Moscow coup attempt, the old, that is to say anti-Soviet NATO, has become an institution whose time has past. The cornerstone of the Alliance's old military strategy, the presence of U.S. military forces, risks the same fate.

Before the Soviet upheaval, it could still be argued plausibly, that American forces ought to remain in Europe to guard against a reversal of perestroika and reassure the Europeans that, should matters come to a head, the U.S. would have a reception capability for large-scale, including reconstituted reinforcements. The scenarios advancing this rationale have clearly lost whatever merit they had before August 1991. Gone too is the strategic justification for NATO's (anti-Soviet) main defense and augmented forces, including, America's contributions to them.

The only credible military rationale for maintaining a U.S. expeditionary force on the Continent is out-of-area operations. NATO's de facto direction must parallel this if the Alliance is to survive as a military institution. Using Europe as a springboard for regional contingency operations will not necessarily be
cheaper than forward-deploying the same forces from the continental U.S. More important than cost, however, is that European forward-basing allows U.S. forces to continue to train and exercise with the Europeans and preserve the material and doctrinal compatibility that proved crucial for the success of coalition forces in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, keeping U.S. forces in Europe will preserve their long-time stabilizing and confidence-building role.

The telling significance of a USEUCOM out-of-area mission will be political. Most important perhaps, the recognition that the U.S. presence no longer serves European security first will mean that U.S. leadership in the Alliance will devolve to partnership. The other partner will become a distinct and cohesive European defense identity under the auspices of the WEU, but later, under the umbrella of the EC.

NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.


(5) Ibid.


(9) "Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group Communiqué, Brussels, May 29, 1991," NATO Review, June 1991, p. 33. At the time of this writing, NATO's new Allied Strategic Concept was slated for publication at the ministerial summit set for Rome on November 7-8, 1991.


(11) Cited in Thomas C. Friedman, "Now NATO is in Search Of a New


(22) Thompson, "U.S. Plans to Complete Troop Cuts in Europe by 1991, General Says."

(23) Western European Union Secretary General W.F. van Eekelen has repeatedly advocated the intervention of a European "peacekeeping force" in Yugoslavia's civil war. See, for example, his interview with Jan Hoedeman, "Schadelijke Prestigestrijd," Elsevier, April 29, 1991. The possibility of WEU military intervention has also been hinted by the Dutch, Luxembourg, and Italian foreign ministers. See, for example, "Van den Broek on Possible SFRY Intervention," Hilversum Radio, August 2, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-150, August 5, 1991, p. 6).


(27) For the U.S. Congressional debate over this menu of missions, see the Congressional Record, May 21, 1991, pp. HH3311-26.


(30) One of the rare mentions of "reconstitution" by a top NATO official occurred during a November 1990 interview of Secretary General Manfred Woerner with reporter Baudouin Bollaert in the November 13, 1990 issue of Le Figaro (FBIS-WEU-90-226, November 23, 1990, p. 7).

Conclusion

by

James J. Wirtz

Although the new national security strategy is still in a state of flux, it is apparent that the Bush administration is altering American defense priorities and policies in fundamental ways. The modification of U.S. defense policy is of course a logical response to the sweeping changes in Europe that have ended the Cold War, a development universally welcomed. But revolutionary change in U.S. defense policy, regardless of the actual content of the transformation, is bound to provoke a good deal of shock and disorientation. Over the last forty years, Americans, their allies, and even their adversaries have grown familiar, if not always comfortable, with the military policies adopted by the U.S. during the Cold War.

Now that the slate has been virtually wiped clean, it is difficult to anticipate the impact of the new national security strategy. Will defense industries, converted to commercial production, be capable of mobilizing from a "cold" start and again begin producing military hardware? What will influence Congressional decisions now that Cold War assumptions no longer guide defense allocations? How will allies respond to the Bush administration's new strategy?

The contributors to this volume have offered the first tentative answers to these types of questions. By highlighting the hidden implications or potential ramifications of the new strategy, they identify challenges that could preoccupy U.S. policymakers and officers as they adjust to the end of the Cold War. This conclusion focuses on these challenges.

At the heart of the new national security strategy, as James Tritten notes, lies a fundamental reorientation. In the past, American policymakers and officers have based plans and force structures on an event that was both unlikely and gravely threatening, a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation along the Central Front. In contrast, the new strategy is directed against smaller conflicts on the periphery, conflicts that have occurred with regularity since the end of World War II. But the draw down of forces and the reorganization of the U.S. command structure represent only the first step in this reorientation. Questions remain about how the American military will adjust to the new situation.

In Sam Tangredi's view, the outline of a nascent interservice battle between the Navy and the Air Force, especially over the future of tactical airpower, is already discernible. The Navy appears willing to adjust to the new international situation by reducing capabilities specifically designed for Cold War contingencies: reductions in anti-submarine warfare forces and the new SEAWOLF nuclear-powered attack submarine program appear likely. Yet, the Navy and the other services will struggle to
prevent the transfer of their missions and the organizations that they have traditionally controlled to other branches of the armed forces. Not surprisingly, it is the Navy and not the Air Force, which currently supplies the officers who serve as Commander-In-Chief (CinC) Strategic Air Command, that seems interested in raising the question of which service will fill the new position of CinC Strategic Forces. Similarly, the vision of a world in which the Navy patrols the oceans and delivers the Marines to Asia and the Army to the Middle East leaves little room for the Air Force. Because the new strategy holds out the possibility of a fundamental modification of the services' roles, missions, and commands, Tangredi's prediction of a looming interservice battle, reminiscent of the "revolt of the Admirals," appears justified.

If the services are gearing up for a major bureaucratic battle, it is clear from Tangredi's analysis that at least the Navy has not come to terms with the strategic and operational implications of the new strategy. Admittedly, the Navy might be the service least affected by the end of the Cold War. Naval forces constructed to meet the Soviet threat have served effectively in other contingencies; it is impossible to reconstitute a fleet in two years. But unless the Navy develops a clear and compelling strategic justification for its preferred force structure, it is unlikely that it will persevere in a climate of budgetary austerity.

Will the services alter fundamentally their approach to warfare in response to the new strategy? Before the outbreak of the Gulf war, it would have been safe to assume that they would continue to rely on weapons and concepts suited to European contingencies. Indeed, observers often noted that during the Cold War the U.S. military relied on a force structure and operational style based on the formative experience of the Second World War. Unwilling or unable to adjust to the exigencies of local circumstances--Vietnam is a case in point--the military implemented procedures intended for European contingencies.

But Operation DESERT STORM, as Michael Pocalyko notes, could serve as a new organizational benchmark as the services begin planning in earnest for the post-Cold War era. Even though the assessment of the war against Iraq is still underway, Pocalyko identifies several ways the recent experience in the Gulf could influence strategic and procurement choices. For example, the conflict highlighted the importance of forward presence, coalition warfare, and the maintenance of a surge capability, factors emphasized in the new strategy. Yet, the potentially unique aspects of the recent Middle East conflict--the availability of an advanced military infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, coalition solidarity, and a tolerant Soviet Union--could reduce the relevance of these lessons to future conflicts. Similarly some lessons will simply fuel existing strategic and procurement controversies. Did technological superiority or "force sufficiency" (the availability of large forces) produce the quick victory in the Gulf?
Additionally, the potential political lessons drawn both domestically and internationally from DESERT STORM will shape the new strategy. American and allied publics might expect the U.S. to take a leading military role in future crises. They could also demand quick military resolutions of nascent conflicts. As a result, future administrations might be quick to resort to military force. At the same time, future adversaries might not allow an international coalition led by the U.S. to build its military response at a leisurely rate. Because potential adversaries may also learn from Iraqi mistakes, military and political strategists must be selective in applying the lessons of DESERT STORM to future contingencies.

Even without the requirements produced by the new national security strategy, the end of the Cold War has presented the intelligence community with a challenging set of tasks. If the bipolar structure of the Cold War becomes unstable, notes Thomas Grassey, former Superpower clients on the periphery may have more opportunities to pursue their own agendas. And as Soviet influence over former clients wanes, intelligence analysts will have to bridge cultural, historical, and ideological gaps to understand the internal developments that often govern the external behavior of Third World nations. For that matter, analysts will have to become increasingly attuned to the diversity that now characterizes politics in the USSR if they are to anticipate Soviet domestic and international initiatives. Under these circumstances, analysts will find Cold War concepts of diminishing value in estimating threats to U.S. national security. Potential demands for verifying multilateral arms control agreements, tracking individual terrorists, monitoring specific weapons manufacturing facilities and economic intelligence and counterintelligence activities would only add to the intellectual and organizational challenges facing analysts as they adjust to the transformation in world politics.

According to Grassey, these changes raise questions about the intelligence community's ability to make the organizational, personnel, and intellectual shifts needed to accommodate the issues that will dominate the political agenda in the years ahead. Will the "old Soviet hands" be willing or capable of acquiring new skills? Will organizations abandon their raison d'être and adopt new tasks and procedures? Further complicating these impending institutional changes is nascent Congressional interest in streamlining intelligence operations. Whether they are undertaken for reasons of austerity or to find an organizational remedy to the perennial problem of intelligence failure, it is likely that Congressional initiatives will only exacerbate bureaucratic turmoil as intelligence managers struggle to react to post-Cold War issues.

Compounding these challenges, however, are the demands created by the new national security strategy, demands that might require intelligence organizations to operate continuously at the theoretical limits of efficiency and effectiveness. If analysts
are to warn of a deteriorating international situation two years in advance of potential hostilities in Europe, they will have to base their estimates on highly ambiguous information. Given the reduced size of standing U.S. forces, only the smallest margin of error can be tolerated in intelligence estimates of opponents' military capabilities; in "peacetime" the U.S. military probably will be unable to employ numerical superiority to overwhelm Third World opponents. In effect, as U.S. military capabilities diminish, the intelligence community will be required to take up the slack.

It is apparent that historians, political scientists, and intelligence practitioners, who have recognized that failures of intelligence are more or less inevitable, were not consulted in the formulation of the new security strategy. Indeed, Richard Betts, a leading spokesman for this consensus, persuasively argued in the early 1980s against the type of intelligence policies included in the Bush administration's strategy. Given the inevitability of intelligence failure, according to Betts, increased military preparedness is the best way the U.S. can protect itself against the consequences of surprise attack.

Admittedly, given the new climate of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the risk of catastrophic intelligence failure might be diminished. But, to reduce further this risk, it is imperative that two additional actions be undertaken. First, administration officials, members of Congress, officers and the public must be made aware of the intelligence risks inherent in the new strategy. From both a military and intelligence perspective, the margin for error in American policy has been greatly reduced. Second, the intelligence community must be provided with the resources and time needed to adjust to the dual shocks produced by the end of the Cold War and the new national security strategy. Budget reductions could be appropriate in the years ahead, but only after the intelligence community adjusts to the new demands it faces.

Paul Stockton's analysis of the Congressional response to the new national security strategy, however, indicates that Congress will shape the Bush administration's plans for future intelligence and defense policy. By setting the terms of the policy debate, the administration preempted the burst of Congressional activism that accompanied the dramatic changes in Europe in late 1989. Members of Congress no longer criticize the Bush administration for failing to adjust to the new strategic realities brought about by the end of the Cold War. Instead, many legislators have already embraced their own interpretation of the new strategy, an interpretation that often varies from the administration's view of future defense priorities. Already, the new strategy has been used by some members of Congress to support programs that were deemed unnecessary by the administration.

It is surprising how quickly Congress has adopted the philosophy behind the new national security strategy. Programs interpreted as vestiges of the Cold War, the B-2 stands as a case
in point, are shunned, despite the obvious benefits they can provide to constituents' pocketbooks. But the administration also has been taken to task for failing to devote resources to programs that Congress has deemed important to the new strategy. As a result, officials in the defense and intelligence communities should take note that the Cold War concepts used to justify programs for the last forty years will receive a hostile reception on Capitol Hill. Special efforts will now be needed to continue ongoing programs, the procurement of strategic nuclear weapons, for example, that have not been rendered obsolete by recent international developments.

Still, there is little evidence that Congress has come to terms with the darker side of the new national security strategy. Indeed, Stockton's analysis suggests that Congressional debate about the broad implications of recent global events ended with the Aspen speech; the new strategy apparently now just serves as the terms of reference in distributing pork to constituents. Has Congress recognized the military and intelligence risks entailed in the new strategy? Have legislators come to terms with the fact that someday they might be asked to authorize a massive increase in defense expenditures on short notice? These questions remain unanswered. It is clear, however, that if the U.S. is to be in a position to increase its defense capabilities quickly, Congress must incorporate an awareness of both the positive and negative implications of the new strategy into its budgetary deliberations.

One issue that should enjoy a place of prominence on the Congressional agenda is the future of the defense industrial base. Even though it has been unwilling to develop a national industrial policy, Congress, with the help of the administration, will have to adopt programs to insure that the U.S. could win a reconstitution race. As Tritten suggests, the perception among allies and potential adversaries that the U.S. would win this type of race could strengthen deterrence in the years ahead. Yet, it is difficult to imagine how this capability would be exercised, thereby enhancing the credibility of the threat to reconstitute. Would former defense contractors on the brink of bankruptcy be rescued by a well-timed reconversion to defense production? Would corporate executives object to the disruption, and possible destruction, of their businesses in a reconstitution exercise? Ultimately, these concerns pale in comparison to the real challenge inherent in reconstitution. Without a vigorous economy, internationally competitive at the cutting edge of technology, the threat to reconstitute will ring hollow. Reconstitution exercises, conducted to mask economic decay, could actually prove counterproductive for purposes of deterrence.

Another question raised by the issue of reconstitution concerns the future of the weapons acquisition process. Given the planned reduction in standing forces, U.S. units will turn increasingly to technology as a force multiplier. Yet, the procurement of even small numbers of high technology weapons could measurably reduce the peace dividend, cooling Congressional
enthusiasm for defense expenditures. It also appears unlikely that the requisite political support exists to produce a never ending series of prototypes, an endeavor that could prove enormously expensive. For that matter, the services might not be satisfied with a single prototype and might demand at least limited production runs to gain operational experience with new weapons systems. For a nation that has become accustomed to "come as you are" wars, the notion of reconstitution represents a revolutionary departure in U.S. defense policy.

If the new strategy holds out the prospect of fundamental change in the domestic and bureaucratic aspects of U.S. defense policy, what impact will it have on longstanding relationships with America's allies? As Edward Olsen perceptively notes, the new national security strategy was primarily developed in response to the revolutionary changes in Europe and potential European contingencies. Yet, as a global strategy, it will impact U.S. interests in Asia.

To realize fully the new strategy in the Pacific, Olsen argues that Soviet and American attitudes toward Asia must undergo a change similar to the one that transformed the intellectual and political context of European security. Superpower statesmen must recognize that regional disputes have long been needlessly labeled as manifestations of the Cold War. When viewed in a post-Cold War context, these regional disputes, and Asian politics in general, are best managed by Asians. Even the last Asian manifestation of the Cold War, a divided Korea, would become a domestic political issue for Seoul and Pyongyang and would no longer serve as a potential flash point for a global war.

Interpreted in this manner, the new national security strategy is simply a tactical shift in an ongoing U.S. effort to interest Asian allies in bearing a greater share of the allied defense burden in the Pacific. Instead of obtaining increased contributions from allies, the new strategy would redefine the threat faced in Asia, allowing for a unilateral reduction in American forces. But as Olsen hints, it might be irresponsible for the U.S. to scale back rapidly its commitments in Asia without helping former allies and antagonists develop mechanisms to manage the end of the Cold War in the Pacific. Unlike Europe, which can turn to the European Community to deal with problems once handled by the Warsaw Pact or NATO, Asians lack a regional organization that could replace Superpower tutelage.

Even though one of the purposes behind the new national security strategy is to save money, in Asia the policy could take on controversial political overtones. U.S. resources, no longer devoted to the defense of Asian allies, could be invested in America's industrial infrastructure, improving the competitive position of U.S. firms in the international marketplace and helping to offset the impact of the new strategy on the defense industrial base. Simultaneously, the new strategy might force Asians to devote more resources to their own defense, possibly reducing the international competitiveness of their industries.
Recrimination and political turmoil will follow if Asians interpret the new strategy as a veiled form of economic warfare. But, as Olsen notes, Asians and Americans have only started to think about the implications of the new national security strategy for the Pacific rim. It remains to be seen how interested parties respond to the application of the strategy in Asia.

Surprisingly, the same conclusion can be drawn concerning the application of the new strategy in Europe. According to Jan Breemer, a desire to reduce the U.S. presence in Europe has overtaken the creation of a strategic justification not only for the size of the U.S. withdrawal, but for the continuing presence of American forces on the Continent. Politically, the case for retaining at least one U.S. Corps in Germany rests on somewhat different objectives for Europeans and Americans. For Europeans, the stability provided by a modest U.S. presence keeps in check the specter of a resurgent and irresponsible Germany. Yet, Americans seem reluctant to intervene to quell domestic turmoil, the type of event that apparently poses the greatest threat to European stability. For Americans, U.S. forces on the Continent promise continued influence in the affairs of Europe. But Breemer convincingly argues that U.S. policymakers have not yet explained how military power will influence European decisions in the realm of economics, the probable focus of relations among NATO members in the years ahead. As Breemer hints, U.S. policymakers will be disappointed if they expect military power to be fungible across a wide range of issue areas.

Of course, Americans have always valued the political stability and influence generated by the U.S. military presence on the Continent. In the past, however, these political goals often were of secondary importance when compared to the practical military objective of improving NATO's ability to resist a Warsaw Pact attack across the Central Front. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it was the perception that American forces were needed to deter Soviet aggression, not the actual size of U.S. military deployments, that engendered U.S. influence and even European stability. NATO members generally attempted to keep disputes within Western Europe and quarrels with the U.S. as limited as possible to prevent Americans from becoming disillusioned with their European partners. Now that the traditional military justification for the U.S. presence in Europe has evaporated, it is unlikely that Europeans will feel compelled to bow to American wishes on alliance matters.

In fact, the seeds of a significant dispute within NATO could be found in Breemer's identification of the remaining justification for U.S. deployments in Europe: to serve as NATO's standing force for out-of-area contingencies. Despite the fact that the U.S. and several of its NATO allies cooperated during the recent crisis in the Gulf, it is too much to expect that the next out-of-area crisis will produce the same degree of consensus within the alliance. In reality, American capability for unilateral action might be constrained by its continued relationship with NATO.
It is clear that the contributors to this volume agree that the U.S. stands at a major crossroads in its approach to defense policy. The outlines of the new national security strategy are evident. The Bush administration has created an opportunity to reassess America's post-war approach to national security. Yet, exactly how the new strategy will unfold and the institutions, events, and issues that will have the greatest impact on its development remain to be seen.

At the moment, a desire to reduce defense expenditures appears to be the major force shaping the evolution of the new national security strategy. Austerity lies behind the fundamental, if little recognized, change in U.S. strategic forces outlined by Bruce MacDonald. Yet, if adjustments in American strategic procurement policy represent the first hard evidence of the new strategy, these developments have taken place without a clearly articulated strategic justification or even a considered debate over their merits. Moreover, there is a distinct possibility that this paucity of debate will be reflected in the evolution of the conventional and political elements of the new strategy, or that interservice rivalry will drive procurement tradeoffs in the years ahead.

In a sense complacency, bred by the relatively benign end of the Cold War and the sweeping coalition victory in the Gulf, represents the greatest threat to the Bush administration's vision of American defense policy. Without a clear articulation of U.S. political objectives and a thorough debate over the best way to achieve them, retrenchment will come to characterize the new strategy. But retrenchment alone cannot guarantee the continuation of nearly fifty years of international stability. In effect, the Bush administration's strategic vision poses a fundamental challenge: if Americans take the "Long Peace" for granted, then the new national security strategy will not be a source of stability in the years ahead.

NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.


(3) Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); and Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Similarly, the services remain reluctant to surrender organizational autonomy or control of traditional roles and missions to take advantage of technological innovations, see C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense (New


(6) In a world in which manufacturing and technological competence is assumed to be a requisite of great power status, efforts to demonstrate economic capability might be interpreted as evidence of decrepitude. For an explanation of this logic see Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3, April 1991, pp. 313-335.

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Appendix

Sources of the New Strategy
by
James J. Tritten

This Appendix contains a narrative of the sequence of appearance of the various source documents for the new national security strategy and the Base Force, and commentary on those sources, along with full documentation for each in the form of a note. Throughout the text of the book, individual notes were not used to document general references to these sources—instead the reader may cross reference the item referred to in the text to documentation in this Appendix. Currency for sources is generally through the end of September 1991.

The sequence starts with the President's speech at Aspen on August 2, 1990. Generally ignored by media due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on the same day, the concepts outlined in the President's Aspen speech were brief and visionary—destined to be fully developed by official spokesmen in the following months. The New York Times covered the new strategy and force structure in depth on the same day, but based its story on leaks of a confidential briefing of the plan to the President in late June 1990, and subsequent briefings to the Defense Policy Resources Board.

Aviation Week & Space Technology covered the new national security strategy and force structure in depth—in their August 13, 1990 issue.

General (GEN) Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), provided details on the new national security strategy and associated force structure in two speeches to the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion, late in August 1990. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Dick Cheney spoke at the 32nd Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on September 6, 1990 and explained that the new strategic concepts outlined in Aspen would form the basis of programming documents to be made public in early 1991. Cheney's IISS remarks were followed at that conference by I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Principal Deputy Under SECDEF (Strategy and Resources), who provided additional details.

Moscow's Pravda reported Cheney's remarks at the IISS meeting and that President Bush had ordered changes in American security strategy. Cheney followed up his IISS address with a similar speech at the Comstock Club/Air Force Association (AFA) in Sacramento on September 13, 1990 at the Bay Area Council in San Francisco on September 14, another briefing to AFA on September 17th, an address to the National Association of Business Economists on September 26th, and a talk to the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council on October 30th.

Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, USAF, former Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), gave fur-
ther details at the National Press Club late in September 1990. The essence of this speech appeared subsequently in the Spring 1991 issue of Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War College.

Secretary Cheney's visit and remarks in Moscow in October 1990 about the new national security strategy and future force structure, were widely covered by the Soviet press but generally not reported in the U.S. GEN Powell authored an article in the October 1990 issue of The Retired Officer. This article, however, was based upon his presentation at the National Press Club immediately preceding the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait--hence it should be placed ahead of the Aspen speech. Similarly, GEN Powell's February 1991 article in the magazine of the Reserve Officers Association should be read from the perspective of currency through October 1990.

GEN Powell gave two December 1990 speeches: one to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), the other at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA). The Chairman's RUSI remarks also appear in the Spring 1991 issue of The RUSI Journal but these should be read assuming a December 1990 currency with superficial updating for the obvious.

Vice CJCS, Admiral (ADM) David E. Jeremiah, USN, echoed GEN Powell's concepts in another December 1990 speech to the President's National Security Telecommunications Committee. The Commander-in-Chief (CinC), U.S. Space Command, GEN Donald J. Kutyna, USAF, told a San Diego Space Day audience, in January 1991, that GEN Powell had asked each of the CinCs to examine their forces and present that minimal "base force" structure necessary to maintain our superpower status.

Only limited commentary about the new national security strategy or force structure appeared in the U.S. media, other than the reports in the New York Times and Aviation Week & Space Technology, until the February 1991 Department of Defense (DoD) testimony to the Congress. The U.S. press had been otherwise engaged in major defense-associated reporting of events in the Middle East. In 1991, the testimony to the Congress by the SECDEF and the CJCS preceded the delivery of the annual DoD report to the Congress.

The first testimony was presented by the SECDEF and the CJCS before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on February 7, 1991. Their second testimony was before the House Appropriations Committee on February 19th. Two days later, on February 21st, they testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Following this testimony, the 1991 SECDEF Annual Report to the President and the Congress was actually distributed, although it is dated the previous month (January).

In mid-March 1991, "Scooter" Libby and ADM Jeremiah appeared before the HASC and provided the first unclassified de-
tails on future force structure. Later in March, Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Under SECDEF for Policy, also appeared before the HASC and testified with GEN Butler, now CinC of the Strategic Air Command, on the strategy and how it would affect strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces.

Secretary Cheney prepared an address on the new national security strategy for delivery at the Georgetown University. By the end of March 1991, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued their 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) which included a Foreword by the Secretary. The March 1991 JMNA is a major source of details, especially regarding contingency scenarios. On April 3, 1991, GEN Powell once again spoke on the new national security strategy and force structure in an address to the American Defense Preparedness Association. Powell also made some remarks on reorganization in mid-April, reported in Army Times. The CJCS made the force structure associated with this new national security strategy, the Base Force, the centerpiece of his testimony before the Defense Base Closure Commission at the end of April. April also saw major recognition of the Administration's efforts by a Soviet academic writing in Kommu-nist.

In his May 29, 1991 commencement address at the U.S. Air Force Academy, President Bush mentioned his previous announcement of a shift in defense focus, but he did not expand on his original vision. "Scooter" Libby returned to Congress in early June 1991, accompanied by the Deputy Director for Force Structure, Resource, & Assessment Directorate on the Joint Staff (J-8), Brigadier General William Fedorochko, Jr., USA. Both testified further on details of the strategy and force structure. Later that month, Major General John David Robinson, USA, the J-8 Director, gave a similar presentation to the 59th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society.

GEN Powell made note of the Base Force and reconstitution forces in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July. The CJCS also outlined the new strategy and Base Force to the Soviet military in a July presentation in Moscow and a September 1991 presentation at Harvard. The DoD's Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, published in July, makes specific reference to the new national security strategy and links it to the Gulf war. July also saw a direct criticism of the strategy and associated force structure in the conservative Soviet press. In August 1991, ADM Jeremiah spoke to another AFCEA gathering and once again outlined the Base Force and gave an interview to Jane's Defence Weekly, where he discussed changes in the Unified Command Plan.

The White House's revised version of the National Security Strategy of the United States, incorporating the new national security strategy, appeared in August 1991. Publication was noticed in Moscow. The JCS are readying an ensuing text, entitled the National Military Strategy for the 1990s, that should by the end of 1991.
GEN Powell addressed Base Force and strategy issues in his remarks to the City Club of San Diego and in an interview in The San Diego Union and Tribune in mid-September 1991. The final primary source available at the time of preparation of this report was the September 25, 1991 testimony by GEN Powell on the Future of U.S. Military Bases before the House Appropriations Subcommittee. After an extensive prepared presentation, GEN Powell spent more than an additional hour fielding Congressional concerns regarding the Base Force. On September 27, 1991, President Bush addressed the nation on national television on the subjects of national security policy and nuclear forces. Bush outlined to the American public the new strategy and Base Force and the reasons for them. The next morning Secretary Cheney and GEN Powell held a news conference in the Pentagon and provided additional details.

Although it took some time, the new national security strategy and force structure eventually appeared in the oral and written testimony and other writings of additional officials in the Pentagon. For example, Christopher Jehn, Assistant SECDEF (Force Management and Personnel) appeared before Congress on April 9, 1991 and used GEN Powell's concept of four-force package with four supporting capabilities. Similarly, Deputy SECDEF Donald Atwood expanded upon the Aspen speech in his address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics on May 1, 1991.

Air Force Chief of Staff, GEN Merrill A. "Tony" McPeak, made public reference to consolidating air forces into the new Base Force structure. The U.S. Army Posture Statement reflects a thorough understanding and support of the new national security strategy. Similarly, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and former Commandant of the Marine Corps jointly authored an article in the April 1991 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings that makes specific mention of the Aspen speech and the new national security strategy. The CNO also made specific reference to the Aspen speech and strategy in his April 1991 Sea Power article.

NOTES


(2) "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium" (as delivered), Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, CO), The White House, August 2, 1990, 6 pp.

According to this year's DoD annual report to Congress, the Defense Planning and Resources Board apparently played a role in reviewing the new strategy.


(5) "Remarks by General [GEN] Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], at the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland, August 23, 1990," as delivered, 13 pp.

(6) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the 72nd Annual National Convention of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, August 30, 1990," as delivered, 21 pp.

(7) "Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense [SECDEF] Dick Cheney, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, Thursday, September 6, 1990," News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) [OASD/PA], 7 pp., and notes made by author, who was in the audience, of additional remarks.


(11) OASD News Release, "Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, San Francisco Bay Area Council, San Francisco, California, September 177

(21) "Remarks as Delivered by Admiral [ADM] David E. Jeremiah, USN, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the President's National Security Telecommunications Committee (NSTAC) at the Loy Henderson Conference Room, Department of State, 13 December 1990," 10 pp.

(22) GEN Donald J. Kutyna, USAF address to the "12th Western Conference and Exposition - Space Day - San Diego, CA - 24 January 1991," OASD/PA #91-0294, 23 Jan 91, p. 2. The Base Force appears on slides 1-2.


(28) "Statement of I. Lewis Libby, Principal Deputy Undersecret-

(29) "Statement of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, 12 March 1991," 15 pp.

(30) ADM Jeremiah's testimony was covered by the journal of the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA), but the report failed to explain to its readers the significant changes that the new strategy and force structure meant for the nation. See John F. Morton, "JROC Chief Weighs Competitiveness Against Requirements," National Defense, Vol. LXXV, No. 468, May/June 1991, pp. 18-20.


(32) OASD/PA News Release, "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, at Walsh Lecture, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Thursday, March 21, 1991 - 8:00 P.M. (EST)," No. 204-91, 10 pp. The Secretary departed from his prepared remarks at this lecture and instead talked about Operation DESERT STORM. His prepared remarks were submitted for the record and made available to the public.


(37) Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov, "What Kind of Military Reform?" Moscow Kommunist in Russian, No. 6, April 1991, pp. 88-99 (FBIS-SOV-91-137-A, July 17, 1991, pp. 5-13). This article directly criticizes the USSR Defense Ministry "Concept of Military Reform" for failing to take into account doctrinal, strategy, and force structure changes going on in the U.S. and other foreign nations.

(38) "Text of Remarks by the President at United States Air Force


(43) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff, Moscow, 24 July 1991 (Moscow date)," as delivered, 13 pp.

(44) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 9 September 1991," As Delivered, 13 pp.


(47) "Remarks as Delivered by Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 8 August 1991," 5 pp.


(50) Initial analysis of the new document, however, was quite


(52) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the City Club of San Diego, San Diego, California, 16 September 1991," As Delivered, 20 pp.


(55) "Address by the President to the Nation," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 8:02 P.M. EDT, September 27, 1991, 5 pp.; and accompanying Fact Sheet "Presidential Initiative on Nuclear Arms," 2 pp.

(56) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Briefing, "Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Pete Williams, ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] (Public Affairs), Saturday, September 27, 1991 - 10:00 a.m.," 20 pp.; with additional supporting background material - 2 pp.


(61) The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III, Secretary of the

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SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION
Saddam Hussein to thank for our domestic political purpose and resolve. In another major regional crisis, domestic political cohesion may not, and probably will not, be as easily attained. Furthermore, our early success in the Operation DESERT STORM air war factored greatly in public support for this war, as did its brevity, intensity, and low coalition casualties. Not all future crises will have as sharp definition for the Congress and for the American public. When these elements line up as they did before the Persian Gulf War, solidified by the Saddam-qua-Hitler understanding well nurtured in press and government, the political effect can be unbelievably potent. It should not, however, be relied upon.

Force sufficiency is a sixth expectation for future crisis response under the new strategy. Some commentator in years to come will no doubt remark on the "inevitability" of the Persian Gulf War, given that it came at a moment in history when the U.S. had just completed its largest peacetime military force building ever. That commentator will be wrong, but he or she will have raised a good point. The success of the Persian Gulf War as a crisis response was made possible by the military power we had available at the moment it was needed.

In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, one of the most frequently-asked questions from the Congress is "Can this be done in 1995?" The answer is always conditional—on threat, warning time, place, scenario, geopolitics, intensity of conflict, likelihood of occurrence, and a lot of undeterminable trends in the future strategic environment. What is clear from Aspen is that we will respond to crises in the future with a leaner, restructured force. Its sufficiency is a good expectation, one to which the American public has a right. But its overwhelming triumph as in the Persian Gulf War could be dangerous to expect, especially during military planning and in constructing foreign policy responses in crises.

The seventh expectation, under the new strategy for future crisis response is a technological advantage. We expect, and in all likelihood will attain, a distinct technological advantage over any strategic adversary. But this expectation must be hedged, as the defense establishment is already doing in planning for crises to come.

Reliance on technological advantage is an expectation that we should embrace, but one which the Persian Gulf War must not cause us to take for granted. This expectation is a corollary to force sufficiency. With the war's heavy reliance on high technology to enable a ground incursion, there will be a tendency for the body politic to take our technological margin for granted. This expectation is also part of our ethnocentric psyche: American technology is best, we ardently believe, and shall prevail. The cautionary note needed to be sounded with this expectation is not that it exists, but that we could believe it to be perpetual and therefore take it for granted.