THE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER:
Is One Required?

A Monograph
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The Land Component Commander: Is One Required? (U)

Research Problem. Joint doctrine does not address the conflict between how the U.S. Army and the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) prefer to organize ground forces in a theater of operations. The Army prefers a subordinate land component commander (LCC). This monograph seeks to answer the question: when does a theater of operations need a subordinate LCC?

Research Method. The monograph reviews the problem, describes the organizational options, surveys the historical trends, and conducts a detailed analysis using three criteria, three principles of war: objective, unity of command, and simplicity.

Conclusions. There are five considerations which may favor the use of a subordinate LCC: theater immaturity, leader inexperience, objective concentration, CINC weakness, and parochial interest. A strong subordinate LCC is a means to ensure unity of land force command, if the CINC is weak. Finally, if the CINC has a different nationality from the major land force, that nation may need a subordinate LCC to protect its interests.
Title of Monograph: The Land Component Commander, Is One Required?

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Abstract


Research Problem. Joint doctrine does not address the conflict between how the United States Army and the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) prefer to organize ground forces in a theater of operations. The Army prefers a subordinate land component commander (LCC), while many CINCs organize their ground forces on an area basis. The lack of doctrinal guidance may cause the failure of the coalition land campaign. This monograph seeks to answer the question: when does a theater of operations need a subordinate LCC?

Research Method. The monograph reviews the problem, describes the organizational options, surveys the historical trends, and conducts a detailed analysis using three criteria. Reviewing joint and Army doctrine explains the problem. Studying management theory describes the organizational methods available. Surveying the organizational history of American theaters of operations over the last fifty years establishes the trends regarding the subordinate LCC. The analysis determines when a subordinate LCC is appropriate based on successful wartime theaters of operations. The criteria are three principles of war: objective, unity of command, and simplicity.

Conclusions. History tells us that successful theaters change from functionally based organizations with a subordinate LCC to area based organizations without one. Even so, there are five considerations which may favor the use of a subordinate LCC: theater immaturity, leader inexperience, objective concentration, CINC weakness, and parochial interest. Immature theaters at the start of a war tend to not be prepared for the decentralized joint operations inherent in the area based organization. Similarly, inexperienced subordinate leaders may be unable to control joint and combined operations. A small theater objective normally causes the CINC to centralize joint operations. A strong subordinate LCC is a means to ensure unity of land force command, if the CINC is weak. Finally, if the CINC has a different nationality from the major land force, that nation may need a subordinate LCC to protect its interests.
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THE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER: IS ONE REQUIRED?

PART I: INTRODUCTION

Mutual understanding among all commanders in terms of common military thinking and acting is a prerequisite to success. (Hi-100/100)

Joint doctrine does not address the fundamental differences between how the Army and the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) prefer to organize ground forces in a theater of operations. The United States Army prefers a subordinate land component commander (LCC), who commands all ground forces in theater. Conversely, many CINCs (or theater commanders) organize their ground forces on an area basis. Joint doctrine avoids any decision, stating that theater commanders will organize their theaters as they see fit.

Joint doctrine fails to address what circumstances favor which kind of theater organization. As a result, staffs in new theaters of operation, such as the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, waste precious planning time deciding which structure is best. The Army may be forced to operate in an organization which it is not prepared to fight in. In crisis, like Grenada, such controversy can lead to serious command, control, and communications problems. This doctrinal confusion may cause the failure of the coalition land campaign in war.

The United States has fought as a member of various coalitions from 1940–1990. For example, when we liberated Europe in World War II General Eisenhower was the commander of the Allied European Theater of Operations. He commanded American, British, Canadian, French and other nations' troops. On the other side of the world General MacArthur commanded American, Australian, Dutch, and New Zealand forces in the Southwest Pacific Area. Even today, General Schwarzkopf commands allied forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Therefore I will focus my analysis on allied (combined) theaters of operations in which American troops participated.

This monograph seeks to answer the question: when does a theater of operations need a subordinate land component commander (LCC)? We will seek this answer in four steps. First, by reviewing the doctrinal problem and highlighting the conflict between Army and joint organizational doctrine. Second, by studying management theory to understand the organizational methods available. Third, by surveying American theaters of operation over the last fifty years for organizational trends. At this point we will know doctrinal preferences, theoretical options, and what historically was done. Finally, we will
analyze these theater organizations against three criteria: objective, unity of command, and simplicity. These three principles of war lead to conclusions about when a subordinate LCC is appropriate and provide implications for future actions.

Our criteria determine when a subordinate LCC is appropriate based on an analysis of successful wartime theaters of operations. First, the criterion of objective identifies these successful wartime theaters. Then, the criteria of unity of command and simplicity compare and contrast theaters both with and without a subordinate LCC. Given this framework for analysis let us look in more detail at each criterion, starting with objective.

The first criterion determines which theaters met their objectives and should be kept for further analysis. Surveying history showed the organizational trends, but this includes too many organizations for detailed analysis within the limits of this monograph. One should reasonably expect that successful institutions have better organizations than unsuccessful ones. As Correlli Barrett said, "... war is the great auditor of institutions." Theaters with organizations which fail to achieve their objective will be discarded. After this screening I will compare and contrast theaters using the second criterion, unity of command.

Certain types of objectives should facilitate a subordinate LCC, while others do not. The principle of unity of command states that each objective should have one commander for unity of effort. Some groups of land force objectives probably need a subordinate LCC, while others need one commander per objective. The types of objectives should help identify when a subordinate LCC is appropriate. Comparing objective types will address unity of command; determining simple organizational solutions to problem areas addresses the last criterion.

Certain types of organizations are complex to control, while others are not. Simplicity reduces complexity, which limits control problems. The criterion, simplicity, determines whether the land force organization causes so many control problems that the CINC has difficulty overcoming them. By comparing the control problems in theaters with and without a subordinate LCC, we should see the constraints imposed by various theater organizations. Having reviewed the methodology, let us start with the problem, conflicting doctrine.
PART II: THE PROBLEM- DOCTRINE

Department of Defense (DOD) and Army doctrine for organizing theater ground forces conflict. Doctrine, something which is taught or a system of beliefs, provides an insight into how institutions prefer to organize. Joint doctrine explains how DOD prefers to organize theater ground forces, while Army doctrine details how the primary land force prefers to organize theater ground forces.

Joint doctrine states that the theater commander must organize his forces and provides him several ways to do this. The CINC can organize the theater on a functional or an area basis.

Joint doctrine states that a functional organization centralizes the responsibility for certain normal continuing operations throughout the theater. An example of such an organization is the Strategic Air Command, which centrally controls strategic bombing throughout the world. In this case the theater is the world and the centralized function is strategic bombing.

Joint doctrine discusses four functions that the CINC can centralize in a theater of operations. The CINC can designate a functional component commander for air, land, maritime, and special operations. A subordinate LCC centralizes control of land operations.

Joint doctrine also provides a means to decentralize operations. It states that an area organization decentralizes the control of certain normal continuing joint operations within an area. The joint area commander can control all actions, air, land, and sea in his area. The National Guard in each state are an example of an area organization. The Adjutant General controls the Army and Air National Guard units in his state. This decentralizes control of joint forces, the Army and Air National Guard to the state. So, a functional organization centralizes land operations, while an area organization decentralizes joint operations. Which organization does DOD prefer?

Slightly overstating the case, joint doctrine wants a centralized functional organization with the advantages of a decentralized area organization. It states that, "The organizational structure should facilitate the efficient integration of components, while optimizing the capabilities of each service." This provides no guidance, so we will look at Army doctrine.

The Army prefers functional organizations with a subordinate LCC. Army doctrine makes numerous references to a LCC and has no discussion of area commands. Army group, field army, or corps commanders can be the theater LCC according to FM 100-5.
Operations, the Army's basic doctrinal manual.\(^{10}\) The Army accepts this.

Army officers believe in a subordinate LCC. During joint exercises at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Army students insist upon a LCC. A literature search reinforces this.\(^{11}\) The Army preference ignores joint doctrine.

Joint and Army doctrine on ground force organization conflict. Joint doctrine is ambivalent. It sees both a need for decentralization and centralization, so it allows for area and functional organization. The Army prefers a functional organization and ignores the area organization. The Army prefers centralized land operations with a subordinate LCC, while DOD allows for decentralized joint operations with a subordinate LCC. Given these conflicting doctrinal preferences, let us see how institutions can be organized.

PART III: THE OPTIONS-- THEORY

Generally, management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organization. Sun Tzu The Art of War

Theory provides a framework to look at a situation in an organized manner. Departmentation is the management theory which discusses how and why institutions organize. It explains how institutions can be organized and what circumstances favor which type of organization. There are two general ways to organize subordinate departments: by function or by area.\(^{12}\) Let us look at functional departmentation first.

Functional departmentation organizes based on the major activities that an institution performs. It is the most common form of departmentation and exists at some level in almost all organizations.\(^{14}\) The U. S. Government is organized on functional lines to regulate many financial activities (see figure 1). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation manages banking, the Federal Reserve controls the money supply, the
Security and Exchange Commission oversees financial markets, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collects taxes. This departmentation centralizes control, maintains the power and prestige of the functions, but leads to parochialism and a slow response to changing conditions.\textsuperscript{15}

The IRS has power, prestige, and centralized control. Tax policy for the entire U.S. is made in Washington D.C., which centralizes control and tends to keep policy uniform. This centralized control protects IRS workers from local influence, which gives the IRS quite a lot of power. Centralized power has its down side, however.

The IRS is perceived by many to be parochial and reluctant to make any changes. For example, an IRS audit is certainly not something anyone looks forward to. Taxpayers must prove to the IRS that their audited tax returns are correct. They must prove their case to the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is looking out for the IRS, he isn't there to help the taxpayer. This narrowness of interests is the essence of parochialism. Parochialism and protection from local influence make adaption to local conditions difficult. Military doctrine ignores these problems when discussing functional departmentation.

Military doctrine addresses only the centralized facet of functional departmentation. It doesn't address prestige of the function, parochialism and inflexibility to local conditions. Military doctrine has also overlooked facets of area departmentation.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{area_departmentation.png}
\caption{Area departmentation}
\end{figure}

Area departmentation organizes geographically for physically dispersed activities. All activities in an area are under the control of one manager.\textsuperscript{17} State governments are an example of area departmentation in the U.S. (see figure 2). Each state is a separate area within the U.S. Area departmentation decentralizes control and improves local coordination, but needs more trained or experienced leaders.\textsuperscript{18} The states' law enforcement agencies provide an example of each of these traits.

Each state needs trained or experienced leaders to locally control and coordinate law enforcement.
The U.S. constitution gives each state control of its own law enforcement system. Local politicians and community leaders coordinate with local law enforcement agencies to ensure that these agencies perform in accordance with local standards. Clearly, if there are not enough competent local politicians and leaders, control fails and events such as police beatings may become prevalent. Decentralization and local coordination are addressed by military doctrine, but the need for more competent leaders is not. Let us analyze departmentation theory and see when it recommends a subordinate LOC.

### Theory & a Theater of Operations

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<td>Flexible</td>
<td>For Dispersion, Needs Experienced Leaders</td>
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Table 1

Functional departmentation centralizes control, maintains the power and prestige of the function, but is slow to adapt. Therefore, a subordinate LCC centralizes control of land operations, protects the power and prestige of the land component (Army), but is less flexible to change. Area departmentation decentralizes control, flexibly coordinates in dispersed areas, but needs more experienced leaders. A theater organized without a subordinate LOC, therefore, decentralizes joint operations, is dispersed over a wide area, but requires more trained leaders. There are three inferences from the other category (see Table 1), starting with dispersion and area departmentation.

First, since dispersion leads to area departmentation, concentration may lead to functional departmentation. In that case theaters which concentrate the bulk of their forces in a small area would be functionally organized. A concentrated land force objective would mass the land forces in a theater. Therefore, a subordinate LCC would be expected in a theater with a single concentrated land force objective. Conversely, an area organization should be expected in a vast theater with dispersed objectives. Just as dispersion and concentration are related, so are experience and inexperience.

Since area based organizations need more experienced leaders, functionally based organizations may need less experienced leaders. War provides combat experience, while peace does not. A mature wartime theater is more likely to have experienced combat leaders than a new peacetime theater. Additionally, a new theater is less likely to have leaders used to working in that organization than a long established theater. Experience is
related to area based organizations. A mature theater will have many leaders who are familiar with the peculiarities of that theater. Therefore, a mature wartime theater allows for an area based organization, while a new peacetime theater allows for a functionally based organization. This relationship is the second inference, protecting the land force leads to the third inference.

Joint doctrine states that the service with the preponderance of type forces and appropriate command and control provides the functional commander. For example, if the Army has three divisions and the Marines have two divisions in a functionally organized theater, the Army provides the subordinate LCC. This seems reasonable. The majority should rule, so long as minority rights are not ignored.

Based on this guidance from doctrine, we deduce a similar rule between nations in a combined organization. The nation with the majority of land forces normally provides the subordinate LCC. If a theater has twelve German divisions and four American divisions, we expect that the Germans provide the subordinate LCC. Since all theaters do not have a subordinate LCC, when is one needed?

A theater is functionally organized with a subordinate LCC to protect the power and prestige of the major national land force. Theory says that a functional organization maintains the power and prestige of the functions. The function that the subordinate LCC protects is the nationality of the land force. If the theater commander is not the same service or nationality as the major land force, the land force needs protection. The CINC may not understand the concerns of a nation. The major national land force needs a senior representative to ensure that his nation’s land forces are not slighted, compared to the others. The subordinate LCC protects the major national land force. Theory and its inferences therefore lead to some expectations.

### Expectations

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<th>Departmentation</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Problem Addressed</th>
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<td>Functional(LCC)</td>
<td>War Start/Theater New</td>
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<td>Protect Land Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>War End/Theater Mature</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
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Historical trends and detailed analysis should confirm three major points. First, historical trends should show a transition from functionally based organizations at the start of war to area based organizations at the end of war. Second, detailed analysis should show that theaters with a single concentrated land objective have a subordinate LCC, while big theaters with dispersed objectives have an area based organization. Third,
we should expect that a subordinate LCC is a way to address parochial service or national interests. History will test the first hypothesis.

**PART IV: HISTORICAL TRENDS**

From 1940-1990 the United States fought wars in five separate theaters of operations: Central Europe, the Mediterranean, South East Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific. A review of the theater organizations will show how prevalent a subordinate LCC was and if the trend over time was towards an area based organization without a subordinate LCC. The review starts with Central Europe.

![Diagram of theater organizations](image)

**Figure 3**

The Allies were functionally organized with a subordinate LCC at the start of the war (figure 3). During the stunning fall of France in 1940, the CINC of the Northeast Front commanded all land forces, as the LCC. He had air counterparts in the French Zone of Air Operations (North) and the United Kingdom Air Forces (France). There was no overall CINC, who commanded all allied air and ground forces. This unity of command problem was solved before the invasion of France in the Summer of 1944.

General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces, commanded all of the functionally organized units invading France (figure 3). General Montgomery, Commander 21st Army Group, was the LCC. Air Marshall Tedder, Commander Allied Air Forces, was the Air Component Commander (ACC). Finally, Admiral Ramsey, Commander Allied Naval Forces, was the Maritime Component Commander (MCC). This functionally based organization successfully invaded France, but changed after Normandy.
From September 1944 to the present, allied forces in central Europe maintained an area organization (figure 4). Three army groups, one in the north (21st), one in the center (12th), and one in the south (6th), along with a separate allied airborne army were the ground forces which conquered Germany in May 1945. Habitually associated with each army group was an air force as shown above. Eisenhower found a subordinate LCC and ACC to be an excess link in the chain of command. The essence of this organization survives today in NATO's central front.

Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) has an area organization for land forces (see figure 4). There are two army groups in Germany, one in the north (NORTHAG) and one in the south (CENTAG). AFCENT has a subordinate ACC, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE). Each army group still has a habitually associated air force: 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) with NORTHAG and 4th ATAF with CENTAG. So, the Central European Theater changed from a functional organization without a CINC to an area organization with a CINC. A similar change occurred in the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean Theater began as an area and functional organization without a
CINC (figure 5). When Allied ground forces landed in North Africa in the Fall of 1942, there was no commander for all forces in theater. Eisenhower’s Allied Force Headquarters controlled Northwest Africa but the rest of the Mediterranean was under British service commanders. The Allies failed to secure North Africa in the Winter of 1942. The lack of a theater CINC made unity of effort difficult and the area task forces were failures.28

The task forces were too complex and were abandoned after the severe American defeat at Kasserine Pass. Each task force was a joint and combined air–land team which changed organization daily. Battalions and divisions rotated from one nation’s headquarters to another with extreme rapidity. Aircraft flew directly under the command of corps in a small theater where centralized air control was more appropriate. This turbulence in a new and untried theater command structure aided the catastrophe at Kasserine. After that debacle the theater reverted to a more familiar structure.29

The area structure in figure six remained for the rest of the war. The Allies appointed a CINC, initially Eisenhower, to control all joint and combined operations in the Mediterranean. One group of armies (Allied Armies Italy) sequentially liberated North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, while a second group of armies under CINC Middle East secured the Middle East and liberated Greece. CINC Mediterranean was the Maritime Component Commander (MCC), while the Air Component Commander (ACC) controlled the Mediterranean Air Command.31 As in the Central European Theater, the essence of this structure survives today.

Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) also has an area structure (figure 6). One army, Allied Land Forces Southern Europe is in Italy, while a group of armies, Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe controls forces in the eastern Mediterranean (Greece and Turkey). AFSOUTH also has an ACC and MCC like the Mediterranean Theater from...
1943-1945. This trend continues in Southeast Asia.

South East Asia also went from a functional organization to an area organization. In 1942 the Allies lost Burma to the Japanese with three national LCCs (figure 7). The British India Command focused on protecting India and retreated west. Stilwell, Commanding General (CG) of the American China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater focused on the supply route to China and retreated north. The Chinese defended China and retreated to the Northeast. Without a CINC, Burma fell to an outnumbered Japanese army.

By 1944 the allies had a CINC. Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command, controlled the functionally organized forces in theater (figure 7). There was an ACC (Allied Air CINC), a LCC (CINC Allied Land Forces SE Asia), and a MCC (CINC East Indies Fleet). As in the Mediterranean, the theater became area based with a CINC. America forgot the CINC in Vietnam.

Vietnam, a stunning American defeat, had an area based land organization without a CINC (figure 8). American Field Force areas coincided with Vietnamese Corps areas. Commander Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) was the MCC in South Vietnam, while Commander, 7th Air Force, was the ACC in South Vietnam.

No CINC was in charge of all Allied forces in South East Asia. The Vietnamese
government controlled the Vietnamese ground forces, while Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) controlled American ground forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff controlled Strategic Air Command sorties, while Pacific Command with the Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Air Forces controlled the air and sea war outside South Vietnam. This structure was a contributing factor to the defeat. Vietnam was a disastrous exception in our trend towards an area organized theater with a CINC. The Far East developed both the CINC and the area organization.

Figure 9

The Allies in the Far East failed with their initial functional organization. In December, 1941 the Japanese overran a functionally organized Philippines (figure 9). MacArthur commanded Army forces in the Philippines and was pushed back into Bataan. Stark's Asiatic Fleet was totally ineffective. The other allies were also functionally organized without a CINC and they failed too. In the face of total defeat the Allies replaced separate national service coordination with the first joint and combined CINC.

Field Marshall Wavell totally failed as the CINC of the functionally organized ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, and Australian Command)(figure 9). He had no time to form an effective headquarters and had limited authority over his subordinates. When Singapore fell in February 1942, the command collapsed. The British retreated through Burma to India. The Dutch surrendered in Indonesia. Americans surrendered at Bataan. The Australians and newly arriving American forces defended Australia as their base. Once in Australia, the Allies finally empowered a CINC, MacArthur, as Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific Area (SWPA).
On 18 April 1942 he organized the theater on functional lines (figure 10). Marshall ordered a reluctant MacArthur to have a LCC. General Blamey, the Australian Army Chief of Staff was his LCC and Americans became the ACC and MCC. The Allies defeated the Japanese thrust to Australia and recaptured eastern New Guinea (Papua) by January 1943 with this functional organization. Victory did not save the structure.\textsuperscript{43}

From 1943 to 1945 the Allies in SWPA defeated the Japanese with three Army sized area commands (figure 10). 6th Army (initially ALAMO force) conducted amphibious assaults, bypassing the Japanese, while the 8th Army cleared and defended the lodgements. Allied Land Forces, the Australians and all land forces in Australia, secured the rear and pursued the retreating Japanese. Americans remained as the ACC and MCC.\textsuperscript{44} Again, as in ETO and MTO, a functional land force organization without a CINC became an area organization with a CINC. Far East Command continued this organization in Korea.

Far East Command kept this area structure from the Korean War to the present day (figure 11). Far Eastern Command had three to four area commands during the war. Two were island commands (Ryukus and Marianas/Bonin), one was a peninsula command (8th Army, which controlled Korea), and the last (Xth Corps from September to December 1950) was an amphibious assault force, like 6th Army in SWPA. Between
1953 and 1990 in Korea, the Far East Command underwent many organizational changes. Area commands under the CINC, such as the 1990 structure, remain the basic structure. Currently there are three Republic of Korea (ROK) armies and the Combined Field Army to control ground forces in Korea. There is still an ACC and a MCC. The only new type of structure is the Special Operations Command. The trend, a joint and combined CINC with an area organization for land forces, continues. Even the Pacific evolved to this.

The Pacific Theater began World War Two functionally organized on service lines and then became an area organization with a CINC (figure 12). At Pearl Harbor the United States lost much of the Pacific Fleet. There was a functional Army command, the Hawaiian Department, but there was no CINC to command all forces, Army and Navy, in Hawaii or the Pacific. Admiral Nimitz, appointed as the theater CINC shortly thereafter, was directed to have three area commands. North, Central, and South Pacific Areas fought World War II using their own area organizations. Nimitz, with this structure, successfully penetrated the Central Pacific, blockaded Japan, and seized the air bases for the bombardment of Japan. This area organization continues today.
Currently PACOM has four area commands which control land forces (figure 13). The actual number of subordinate commands fluctuated from 1947-1990 depending on PACOM's area of responsibility. Archipelagos such as Japan and isolated peninsulas such as Korea or Alaska form the basis of commands controlling ground forces. US Forces Japan currently controls all joint forces in the Japanese archipelago, while US Forces Korea controls all joint forces in the Korean peninsula. The Alaskan command controls all joint forces in the Alaskan peninsula and US Army Pacific controls all remaining forces in the Pacific. Practically, U.S. Army Pacific controls Army forces in Hawaii.50

The fifty year trends in American theaters of operations are remarkably similar. Most theaters begin without a CINC and are functionally organized with a subordinate LCC. These theater organizations fail. Successful theaters then organize under a CINC, who controls all joint and combined forces. Eventually, successful theaters transition from having a subordinate LCC to having several area commands. This confirms the first inference from theory. Theaters start with a functionally based organization and transition to an area based organization. This indicates that war trains leaders, and needs flexible, decentralized, and joint operations, while peace allows for inflexibility and centralized control of land operations. A closer look at the doctrine before and after World War Two reaffirms the transition towards decentralized joint operations and area based organizations.

Few successful theaters were organized on a functional basis; the area basis of organization was the most common. In fact, this was exactly what the Joint Manual Joint Action Armed Forces dated September 1951 (after World War Two) stated. Its successor manual, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), dated 23 November 1959 also stated this. This did not change until the next UNAAF, dated October 1974, deleted any mention of this.51 Interestingly, this was near the end of the disastrous Vietnam War. Doctrine emphasized area organizations concurrently with decentralized joint operations.

Decentralized joint operations became more important than centralized ground operations. Comparing the 1927 Joint Action of the Army and the Navy with the 1951 Joint Action Armed Forces shows this doctrinal change. In 1927 the emphasis was on

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HISTORICAL TREND
independent service operations. The 1927 manual merely addressed how the Army and Navy would cooperate in the few rare joint operations: overseas movement, amphibious assaults, and coastal defense. In 1951 the primary principle governing the functions of the Armed Forces was maximum integration. By 19 February 1962, Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations reached the same conclusion. "... the day of separate land, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. No single element of the nation's overall military power will suffice." Just as doctrine emphasized jointness, it de-emphasized the services.

Both Joint and Army doctrine showed a decrease in service influence. The 1927 Joint Actions of the Army and the Navy stressed the functions of the services, while the 1951 Joint Action Armed Forces emphasized the preeminence of joint operations. The Army took longer to come around on this point but it finally did. As late as the 27 September 1954 in FM 100-5, the Army emphasized its importance. "... all other components will be operating in support of the Army component. Overall command is vested in the Army commander." By 1962 the Army got on board, "Land, sea, and airpower are interdependent elements to be applied under unified direction." The trend from the power and prestige of the services to decentralized joint operations continued.

This historical review of theater organizations and military doctrine confirms the first inference. Theaters of operations transition from a functional organization with a subordinate LCC to an area organization without a subordinate LCC. Theaters tend to start with functionally based organizations. Peace does not provide the experienced combat leaders to fight a decentralized and flexible area organization. As the theater matures, develops experienced leaders, and is forced by the chaos of battle to become more flexible, the area based organization predominates.

These trends partially answer our research question. They say that a subordinate LCC is more likely at the start of a campaign. They do not state when a subordinate LCC is likely at the end of a campaign. Our analysis of theory indicate that a single concentrated land objective favors a subordinate LCC, while several dispersed objectives in a vast theater of operations favor an area organization. Let us compare and contrast successful theaters with and without a subordinate LCC to see if this is true. First, we must identify the successful theaters. The first criterion, objective, does this.
PART V: DETAILED ANALYSIS

Theaters which met their Objective

This criterion finds successful wartime theater organizations, which will be kept for further analysis. One should reasonably expect that successful institutions have better organizations than unsuccessful ones. Theaters with organizations which failed to achieve their objective will therefore be discarded from further analysis. Additionally, theater organizations, which did not fight in a war will be discarded. War is the ultimate judge of any military organization. If the organization has not been tested in the forge of combat, its structure may not work.

The analysis of historical examples involves two questions. First, did the theater of operations fight in a war and second, did the theater achieve its objective? Highlighting which of these successful theaters had a subordinate LCC and which had an area organization will also aid our comparison with the last two criteria. Analysis again includes five theaters: Central Europe, the Mediterranean, South East Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>WAR/PEACE</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SUCCESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France 1940</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Theater of Operations (ETO) 1944</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Normandy</td>
<td>Success(LCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETO 1945, (September 1944-May 1945)</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Ruhr</td>
<td>Success(Area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCENT 1990</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two of the Central European theater organizations met the criterion of objective: ETO at Normandy and ETO from September 1944 to May 1945. The 1940 Allies in France failed to defeat the May German blitzkrieg. In 41 days the outnumbered Germans defeated over three million allied soldiers at a cost of 150,000 casualties. Four years later the Allies successfully invaded Normandy in June of 1944 with Eisenhower as the CINC and Montgomery as the LCC. Later, after Normandy and until the defeat of Germany in May of 1945, Eisenhower, as the CINC, commanded three army groups and an airborne army without a subordinate LCC. AFCENT kept this area structure. France 1940 was an Allied failure and AFCENT has never fought in a war. Two Central European organizations are available for further analysis, ETO 1944 and ETO 1945.
One Mediterranean Theater structure met the criterion of objective. The Allies failed to secure North Africa (Tunis) as planned by December, 1942.57 Without an overall CINC and with constantly changing joint and combined task forces there were numerous command and control problems in the Mediterranean Theater. The Allies reorganized and from 1943-1945 succeeded in liberating the Mediterranean. A CINC commanded two army groups in an area organized Mediterranean Theater. AFSOUTH, with its two groups of armies in Italy and Greece/Turkey, kept this area organization. AFSOUTH never fought in a war and the 1942 structure in the Mediterranean was a failure, so they will not be analyzed any further. We will continue to analyze the successful 1943-1945 area structure, along with a functionally based one from South East Asia.

### SOUTHEAST ASIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>WAR/PEACE</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SUCCESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia 1942</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Defend Burma</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia Command (SEAC) 1944</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Success (LCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam 1965-1975</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Secure Vietnam</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Allies' 1944 to 1945 South East Asia Command (SEAC) is the only organization which meets the criterion objective. Without a CINC in 1942 to control Allied operations, the outnumbered Japanese quickly overran Burma. By mid 1944 the Allies installed Mountbatten as the CINC and Leese as the subordinate LOC. The Allies liberated Burma in 1945 with this successful and functionally organized command. America failed in the Vietnam War. SEAC 1944, functionally organized with a subordinate LOC, is the only Allied organization in South East Asia, which succeeded in war. This organization will be further analyzed along with three from the Far East.

### THE FAR EAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>WAR/PEACE</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SUCCESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Far East 1941</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Defend Phillipines</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABDACOM Jan/Feb 1942</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Defend East Indies</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWPA 1942</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Defend Australia</td>
<td>Success (LCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWPA 1943-1945</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Secure Phillipines</td>
<td>Success (LCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Command (Korean War)</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Defend South Korea</td>
<td>Success (Area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea 1990</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three of six Allied organizations in the Far East were successful in war. American Far East forces in 1941 failed to defend the Phillipines. The Allies in ABDACOM then failed to defend the East Indies. The Allies in SWPA, ABDACOM's successor, successfully defended Australia in 1942. They were functionally organized with MacArthur as CINC and Blamey as his LCC. MacArthur then reorganized SWPA on area lines. Using three subordinate armies he liberated the Phillipines. Far East Command, redesignated from SWPA, defended Korea. It was organized on area lines with an army in Korea and two island commands. Today, Far East Command, redesignated as the Combined Forces Command, continues to defend Korea in a time of peace. Three Far East organizations were successful in war: SWPA 1942, SWPA 1943-1945, and Far East Command (FEC) during the Korean War. We will only keep one Pacific organization for further analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>PACIFIC</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SUCCESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific, December 7, 1941</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Ocean Area 1942-1945</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command 1990</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only the Pacific Ocean Area met our criterion of objective in the Pacific Theater of Operations. American forces in the Pacific suffered a decisive defeat at Pearl Harbor. Nimitz, the newly appointed Pacific Ocean Area CINC, successfully penetrated Japanese defenses, bombarding and blockading Japan. His theater was organized on area lines using joint task forces and island base commands. The Pacific Command retained this area organization during peace. The Pacific Ocean Area (POA) was the last organization successful in war. Counting POA, there were three functional and five area organizations, which met the criterion, objective:

**Functional Organization(with LCC)**
ETO 1944, SWPA 1942, SEAC 1944

**Area Organizations(without LCC)**
ETO 1945, MTO 1943, SWPA 1943
Korea 1950, POA

These successful theater organizations will help identify when a subordinate LCC is appropriate using the second and third criteria, unity of command and simplicity. According to theory, theaters with a subordinate LCC should have a single concentrated land force objective.
Unity of Command: Which organization for what objective

The principle of unity of command states that each objective should have one commander for unity of effort. Analysis flows from this relationship between the objective and the commander. We will determine the common characteristics of the land force objective in theaters of operations with a subordinate LCC. Then we will find the common characteristics of the land force objectives in theaters without a subordinate LCC. Area based organizations should have dispersed objectives, while the three theaters with a subordinate LCC should have a concentrated land force objective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theater</th>
<th>LCC</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETO 1944</td>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>Normandy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWPA 1942</td>
<td>Blamey</td>
<td>Papua (New Guinea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAC 1944</td>
<td>Leese</td>
<td>Central Burma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Montgomery's compact objective area fell in line with expectations from theory. Field Marshall Montgomery, the LCC as commander of the invading 21st Army Group, had a simple mission: secure a beachhead in Normandy. The beachhead, 100 miles wide and 20 miles deep, was bounded by the English Channel on the North, the river Seine on the East, and the Cotentin Peninsula on the West. The transition from a theater with a subordinate LCC to one without one also fell in line with theory.

Once the Allies exploited out of Normandy and the objectives dispersed, ETO no longer had a subordinate LCC. Montgomery's 21st Army Group secured the beachhead with Second British Army, First U.S. Army, and First Canadian Army. Once the beachhead was secure, the 12th Army Group assumed control of two U.S. armies (the First U.S. Army and Patton's newly activated Third U.S. Army). 12th Army Group then exploited south and west out of Normandy, while 21st Army Group fixed the Germans in Normandy. Eisenhower directly controlled these army groups as the theater CINC. So, when the land force objective was compact, there was a LCC and when the land objectives diverged, there no longer was a LCC and ETO organized on an area basis. This transition also occurred in the SWPA.

SWPA was initially organized on a functional basis to fight in a compact defensive area. General Blamey was MacArthur's subordinate LCC. MacArthur's mission, as CINC SWPA, was to defend Australia. Lacking the forces to defend the entire Australian continent, he ordered Blamey to defend forward in Papua, eastern New Guinea. Papua was a triangular peninsula, 160 kilometers by 400 kilometers. Like Normandy, it was a
A contiguous land mass largely bounded by water. Also like Normandy, the organization with a subordinate LCC only lasted so long as the battle was confined to Papua.

Once MacArthur began operations outside Papua and the objectives dispersed, SWPA reorganized on an area basis. A second ground unit, ALAMO force (later renamed 6th Army) under Krueger was formed. After that, Blamey fixed Japanese forces in Papua and controlled forces in the rear (Australia), while Krueger began amphibious assaults, which bypassed the Japanese. Krueger invaded islands separate from New Guinea or conducted deep amphibious turning movements in New Guinea. As in Normandy, once the confines of the single peninsula were broken, a second land headquarters was established. SEAC's land force objective was similar to Blamey's in 1942.

SEAC was also functionally organized to secure a compact objective area. Mountbatten's subordinate LCC was General Leese, CINC Allied Land Forces South East Asia. Mountbatten's mission, as CINC SEAC, was to liberate Burma. Mountains bounded Burma on the North, East, and West, while the ocean formed the southern boundary. Burma was vast like Australia and exterior lines of operations divided the Chinese in the Northeast, the Americans in the Northwest, and the British in the West. Not only were the Allies' aims quite different, their lines of operations were far apart. Leese's objective, central Burma, was where these three lines of operations met.

Central Burma united the Chinese, Americans, and British. A secure central Burma protected the supply road to China in the North and was the gateway to secure Mandalay and the rest of Burma. The Americans and the Chinese wanted the Ledo road in North Burma opened, the Americans to supply Chennault's strategic bombing of Japan from China and the Chinese to provision their Army. The British wanted to retake their entire colony in Burma. Central Burma, the 100 mile line from Mandalay to Lashio, was the compact objective which united Leese's disparate forces. The war ended before the British attack south to Singapore and the American advance north into China split the land force objective and tested the need for a subordinate LCC. Even so, we see a common thread.

These three successful theaters with a subordinate LCC had a single compact objective, which focused the efforts of the land forces. The beachhead at Normandy was such a compact and unifying objective. When Patton broke out of Normandy and exploited west to Brittany, while 21st Army Group attacked east to Germany, no such objective unified the land forces and a second land force headquarters was formed. Papua was another compact and unifying objective. Once the campaign expanded to include islands and parts of New Guinea separated by water from Papua, no contiguous land mass united the
land forces. Again, a second land force headquarters, ALAMO Force, was formed. In the case of SEAC central Burma remained the compact and unifying land objective.

Functionally organized theaters with a compact land force objective confirms theory. Each of the three theaters, FTO 1944, SWPA 1942, and SEAC were functionally organized theaters with a single compact land force objective.

Let us now see if the five area based theaters had dispersed objectives. If so, we can conclude that management theory is correct, geographical concentration is a primary reason for having a subordinate LCC. We will start with the European Theater of Operations from September 1944 to May 1945 (ETO 1945).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theater</th>
<th>Line of Operations/Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETO 1945&lt;sup&gt;59&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Army Group</td>
<td>Normandy, North Belgium, North Ruhr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Army Group</td>
<td>Normandy, Saar, South Ruhr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Army Group</td>
<td>Marseilles, Saar, Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Allied Airborne Army</td>
<td>United Kingdom, Air Corridor, Landing Zone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The European Theater of Operations (ETO) was organized on an area basis to decentralize control of its dispersed joint forces. ETO had three army groups habitually associated with three air forces on separate lines of operations. In addition ETO had the First Allied Airborne Army with its own transport aircraft to conduct airborne assaults. With four air ground teams operating on four separate axes, area departmentation made sense. Let us review each axis starting with the North.

The 21st Army Group and the associated 2d Tactical Air Force attacked on the northern line of operations. Their supplies or lines of communications ran from English Channel ports, while their axis of advance or lines of operations ran north of the Ardennes up to their objective, the northern Ruhr. The Ruhr was the economic heart of Germany and it lay behind the Ardennes. The Ardennes was the historical barrier which separated the two major invasion routes into Germany. South of the Ardennes was the next axis.

The 12th Army Group and its habitually associated 9th (U.S.) Air Force attacked on the southern line of operations. Their lines of communication also ran from English Channel ports. Their axis ran south of the Ardennes and through the Saar enroute to their objective, the southern Ruhr. The Saar is the second historical invasion route into Germany. This line of operations approaches the Ruhr from the south. As 12th Army Group turned north to the Ruhr, it would have an exposed flank. The third air-land
grouping fought on this flank.

The 6th Army Group and the associated 1st Tactical Air Force guarded the southern flank on a separate line of operations. Their supplies came from Marseilles in the Mediterranean. Their start point differed from 12th Army Group, which began in Normandy. Additionally, as 6th Army Group attacked into Germany they would be advancing east as a flank guard, while 12th Army Group attacked northeast towards the Ruhr. Even though both Army Groups were south of the Ardennes, they were on separate lines of operations. Their start and end points were different. In addition to this flank guard, Eisenhower had a deep air-land attack force.

The First Allied Airborne Army supported the army groups on a fourth line of operations. Their assembly area was in England and their means of movement and supply was by air. Their landing zones, Northern Belgium for Operation MARKET GARDEN and the far side of the Ruhr for Operation GRENADE, were beyond the ground forces. They had separate lines of operations, since their routes, along with start and end points, were different from the army groups. So, while Eisenhower’s aim was the Ruhr, he had four air-land teams, separated by terrain and supply lines, advancing on geographically dispersed objectives.

Dispersed joint operations fell in line with our theory for having an area based organization. An area based organization decentralized joint operations in a dispersed geographical area. Eisenhower had four joint (air-land teams), oriented on separate objectives and divided by lines of operations. So, ETO decentralized joint operations on four separate axes with an area based organization. We saw a similar structure in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO).

**MTO 1943-1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Force</th>
<th>Line of Operations/Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allied Armies Italy</td>
<td>Tunisia, Sicily, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ Middle East</td>
<td>Middle East, Sicily</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Mediterranean was also organized on an area basis. This decentralized the control of dispersed ground forces. MTO had two land forces, separate groups of armies, on two lines of operations. These axes were not divided by a major ground obstacle, but by the sea itself. This forced each group of armies to fight a separate decentralized battle. Allied Armies Italy attacked on the Italian axis.

It advanced through Tunisia and Sicily to Italy in order to knock the Italians out of the
war and to fix German forces in the central Mediterranean. As 18th Army Group, it cleared Tunisia. It was then renamed 15th Army Group and liberated Sicily. It was again renamed during the initial operations in Italy as Allied Armies Italy (AAI). Finally, when Clark replaced Alexander, it was finally renamed 15th Army Group and secured Italy. Meanwhile, a second group of armies was in the eastern Mediterranean.

General Headquarters Middle East (GHQME), secured the Middle East and liberated Greece. Much of the time GHQME was an British Army service component command, which rotated forces between the Italian line of operations and the Middle East. It supervised training and its 9th and 10th (UK) Armies performed internal security from Egypt to Iran. GHQME ran a second line of operations up the "soft underbelly" of Europe. It failed during 1943 in a disastrous Aegean campaign. Success followed the destruction of Germany's Army Group South Ukraine in Romania. The Germans had to abandon Greece or have those forces destroyed in detail. This left an opportunity for the British to pursue their aim of postwar influence in the Balkans.

MTO fought in two widely separate lines of operations, while pursuing radically different objectives. The Allies fought on the Italian line of operations after a United Nations objective. The British secured the Middle East and liberated Greece, primarily in search of British objectives. Not only where the objectives and lines of operations physically separated by water, they were politically diverse. This dispersion of aims was bound to be controlled under two different land headquarters. A similar difference in national priorities also separated ground forces in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Forces</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Line of Operations/Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Army</td>
<td>Bypass, Seize Beachhead</td>
<td>Australia, New Guinea, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Army</td>
<td>Block Retreat, Defend Beachhead</td>
<td>Australia, New Guinea, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Land Forces</td>
<td>Frontal Pursuit, Rear Ops</td>
<td>Australia, New Guinea, Borneo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SWPA during this time was organized on an area basis to decentralize the control of dispersed joint and combined operations. Three armies fought joint air, land, and sea battles in areas separated by the ocean and national objectives. 6th Army conducted the amphibious assaults, 8th Army defended the beachhead, and Allied Land Forces (primarily Australians) pursued the Japanese along with securing the rear. Not only were the armies isolated from each other, the American objective was the Philippines, while the Australian objective was Borneo. Geographical and political separation of objectives justified an area organization in accordance with the theory section.
Army led the attack.

It fought an isolated joint battle deep in the Japanese rear. 6th Army's amphibious assault was a joint operation requiring naval forces for transport, air forces for cover, and land forces to hold the ground. It was the lead in a column of three armies and bypassed Japanese positions. Initial operations in New Britain and New Guinea showed that the bypassed Japanese invariably force marched through the jungle to attack these beachheads.\(^6\) If 6th Army continued to defend the beachhead along with planning and executing future amphibious assaults, it would be split up, fighting on several beachheads at once. If 6th Army was to focus on planning and fighting one isolated amphibious assault at a time, someone else had to assume the defense of the beachhead.

The 8th Army followed 6th Army and also fought an isolated joint battle. 8th Army assumed control of the beachhead after 6th Army had secured it. This freed up 6th Army to focus on one task and an extremely complex one at that, amphibious assault. This left 8th Army blocking the Japanese retreat in the isolated beachhead. It needed the air force for air support and the Navy for supplies. While 6th and 8th Armies bypassed the Japanese and secured blocking positions deep in the Japanese rear, the Australians conducted the frontal pursuit.

Allied Land Forces also fought its own isolated joint battles. First, Blamey controlled all allied land forces on the continent of Australia. This put an Australian in charge of Australia's defense. In addition to this joint rear operation, Blamey also conducted the frontal pursuit up the coast of New Guinea. He followed the Japanese and linked up with the next 8th Army beachhead. The Australians continued this isolated pursuit until the Spring of 1945. First Australian Army then invaded Borneo to recapture a British colony. At this point the Australian axis diverged from the American one. So, Blamey and Allied Land Forces fought three isolated joint operations: the defense of Australia, the pursuit in New Guinea, and the amphibious assault of Borneo.

Similarly, the Allies in SWPA had three armies fighting isolated joint operations.

The decentralized nature of joint operations in the SWPA justified the area based land force organization. One land force, 6th Army, made joint amphibious assaults deep in the rear. A second land force, 8th Army, defended these beachheads and blocked any Japanese withdrawal. Finally, a third land force brought up the rear and pursued the Japanese from New Guinea to Borneo. With three land forces fighting separate joint operations, a decentralized area based organization was logical. Just as in the MTO and SWPA, the ocean decentralized the Pacific Ocean Area (POA).
The vastness of the Pacific Ocean dispersed Allied forces into three joint and combined area commands. Each of these three subordinate subunified commands had completely different objectives, lines of operations, and lines of supply. The dispersion was so great that we must look below the subunified commands before we can find any land forces. These land forces were part of invading task forces or island base commands. The axes' separation showed the dispersion.

Each subunified command started and ended at greatly separated points. The North Pacific Area (NPA) under Admiral Theobald attacked from the West coast of the U.S. to retake Attu and Kiska Islands in the Aleutians. The Central Pacific Area (CPA) attacked from Hawaii, through the Marianas Islands (Saipan), and finally reached the Ryukus Islands (Okinawa) on the fringes of Japan. The distance between the NPA and CPA axis was 3000 miles. Nimitz tasked Halsey's South Pacific Area (SPA) to defend the sea lines of communication from the U.S. to Australia by seizing the Solomon Islands (Guadalcanal). At its closest, SPA's attack was 1000 miles from Tarawa on the CPA axis. Not only were these three axes widely separated, which favors area departmentation, the islands within each of these three theaters were separated.

Dispersion of land forces on islands within the subunified commands decentralized joint operations further. The CPA had land forces under the control of invading task forces and island base commands. Each invading force was a joint air, land, and sea force under the control of a Navy Admiral. The same was true of each island base command. Again a Navy admiral controlled all forces on a given island. These joint invading task forces and island base commands also controlled the dispersed land forces in the NPA and SPA.

Again, as geography disperses an organization, it tends to decentralize joint operations and result in an area organization. The vastness of a maritime theater and the isolation of individual islands are geographical facts which create dispersion. The size of the maritime theater lends itself to subordinate commands oriented on the various lines of operation/communication leading to their objectives. Since warfare in any isolated area is joint, this makes the subordinate command a subunified or joint command. Since each area will tend to have several isolated islands chains, the subunified commander will tend to control subordinate land forces through subordinate joint task force or island base.
The Pacific Ocean separated FEC's four land forces during the Korean War. The 8th Army defended South Korea, Xth Corps conducted amphibious assaults, and the two island commands each defended their island groups. Each land force had Japan as its supply base and depended on the Navy for reinforcements along with the Air Force for air support. The most interesting separation between land forces is that between 8th Army and Xth Corps, since both were in Korea, a small peninsula.

Lines of supply and operations separated these two forces. Both 8th Army and Xth Corps received their supplies by sea from Japan. 8th Army's port was Pusan, while Xth Corps' ports were Inchon and Hungnam. This meant that both organizations were dependent on FEC for supplies. Xth Corps was logistically separated from 8th Army.

This same isolation existed tactically. X Corps at Inchon was separated from the Pusan perimeter and 8th Army by 200 miles of mountains. Upon link up with Eighth Army, Xth Corps re-embarked and landed on the northeast coast of North Korea at Wonsong and Hungnam. Even when they linked up with Eighth Army's attack north to the Yalu River, the central mountain ridge in Korea separated Xth Corps from 8th Army. Terrain separated these two forces logistically and tactically. Once Xth Corps evacuated Hungnam in the face of the Chinese offensive and debarked at Pusan, it returned to 8th Army control. Their objective, the defense of South Korea, and their supply lines now coincided.

This reinforces the area organization theory. If geography disperses an organization, it tends to decentralize operations and results in an area organization. Dispersed objectives, separate lines of operations, and different lines of communication are manifestations of this.

Each theater had isolated objectives separated by geography. Every objective tended to have a separate line of operations or communications from its base to its objective. In order to maintain unity of effort, each objective and line of operations had a separate commander for unity of command. These commanders fought joint operations, which
caused the CINC to decentralize joint operations. This is just as theory predicted, area
departmentation decentralizes control. Theory also explained the three theaters
functionally organized with a subordinate LCC.

In these cases the theater had a single compact objective clearly defined by
geosynergy. ETO at Normandy, SWPA in Papua, and SEAC in central Burma all had a
single, compact, and unifying objective. To ensure unity of effort for land forces in this
small area, a single ground commander, the subordinate LCC, provided unity of
command. Just as theory implied, geographical dispersion was a key factor in
determining whether or not to have a subordinate LCC.

So, we have confirmed our first two implications from theory. Let us look at our
final criteria, simplicity, and see if a subordinate LCC addresses national interests.

**Simplicity:** Addressing political problems

Theater organizations should have the simplest structure, which meets the objective
and avoids major political problems. First, we will determine the common political
problems that theaters with a subordinate LCC address. Then we will determine the
common political problems that theaters without a subordinate LCC address. Last, we
will compare these. Functionally based organizations (ETO 1944, SEAC 1944, and SWPA
1943) should address issues of service and national power and prestige.

**Functionally Based Theaters**

The European Theater of Operations at Normandy (ETO 1944) resolved its land force
political crisis by having a British LCC under the CINC. The British had the majority of
land forces and wanted a British LCC. Just as doctrine required, the LCC was British.
This addressed a problem of national prestige and power.

The British, as the senior partner, preferred a British LCC for two political
reasons, service preference and national interest. First, the British system of command
in a theater was to have three coequal service chiefs collectively command the theater.66
This was much like the pre Goldwater Nichols Act with the collective body of the joint
chiefs of staff. With no service in charge each service chief could veto any plan
threatening a service interest. This British preference for a service organization did not
completely address why the British accepted an Eisenhower as the CINC, yet wanted
Montgomery as the LCC.

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The American CINC and the British LCC were means to address each nation's power and prestige. As time wore on, the American contribution to the alliance became overwhelming. By making an American the CINC, this addressed America's share of power in the Alliance. Similarly, during the invasion of Normandy the bulk of Allied forces came from the British Empire. Only after the beachhead was secure did American land and airpower predominate. Additionally, Montgomery was the premier British ground commander of his time. He had defeated Rommel and supervised the detailed planning for OVERLORD. If the Americans had not accepted Montgomery as the British LCC, this would have been a blow to British prestige. It would have said that Britain's temporary preponderance of power in the alliance was irrelevant. Making an Englishman the LCC, recognized the British contribution to the invasion. Even so, some Americans were not even willing to do that.67

Eisenhower did not appoint Montgomery as the LCC until just before the invasion. Montgomery had been the Commander of 21st Army Group for months. This made him the de facto LCC since he commanded the invading First U.S., First Canadian, and Second British Armies. Even so, the Americans delayed addressing the issue of the LCC. Not until 1 June, 1944, five days before the invasion, did Eisenhower designate Montgomery as the LCC. Eisenhower preferred to have Alexander as his LCC, because Montgomery was too abrasive for many Americans.68

These fears of Montgomery's personality did not come to pass. Montgomery, mindful of the differences in command styles between the Americans and the British, continued to micromanage the British, yet used much less control with the Americans. When Bradley, the American First Army commander, reflected on his experience under Montgomery, he thought highly of Montgomery's command style.69 So we see that the LCC issue was politically loaded. It became a means to acknowledge the ally with the majority of land forces in a theater. The same was true in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) in 1942.

The SWPA in 1942 also resolved its land force political crisis by having a LCC under the CINC. The Australians had the bulk of the land forces, were used to the British system with a LCC, and wanted an Australian LCC. The Americans provided the preponderance of force, would soon have the majority of land forces, and didn't want an Australian LCC. Again, the nation with the majority of land forces provided the LCC.

General Marshall, the American Army Chief of Staff, ordered MacArthur to implement the structure for two reasons. First, the previous ABDACOM structure had a LCC and all the Allies had agreed to that structure. Second, the Australians had the
majority of land forces in SWPA. The LCC solved those problems, but did resolve all the issues of prestige and power. Parochial interests continued to fester.

The structure ran counter to American command preferences. The intent of the LCC in the ABADCOM structure was for the CINC to deal with strategic or political matters. He was to keep a theater-wide perspective, staying out of the details of any operation. MacArthur was powerful and like many American commanders, was prone to direct supervision. MacArthur began dealing directly with the commanders in New Guinea. Then the commanders began dealing directly with MacArthur. This reduced Blamey, the LCC, to de facto being just the commander of Allied forces in Australia. Even this was not enough for some Americans.

Many Americans were unwilling to work for Australians. This is similar to the distaste many Americans had working for Montgomery. The original designee for the command of I Corps refused to command, because he would be working for an Australian. This was a clear clash of national power and prestige and the command designee went home. Even so, New Guinea Force continued to command a combined American and Australian force and Blamey continued to command all Allied land forces in Australia. The nation with the preponderance of land forces provided the LCC. South East Asia Command (SEAC) also followed this doctrinal rule in 1944.

The SEAC in 1944 also resolved its land force political crisis by having a subordinate LCC. The Allies had different aims and clashing personalities. The CINC was the traditional British hands off theater commander, who preferred to handle strategic issues and avoided resolving operational problems. The British had the majority of force and preferred to have a LCC, Leese, but their Allies resisted. Again, the nation with the preponderance of land forces provided the LCC. The LCC overcame the Allies' differences.

The differences between the Allies' objectives has already been addressed in the unity of command discussion. The Chinese Nationalists wanted the Allies to provide American supplies by opening the Burma road. They avoided fighting the Japanese and husbanded their resources, so they could defeat the Red Chinese after the war. The Americans wanted to open the Burma road to supply Chennault's bombing of Japan and a Chinese offensive against the Japanese. Even though both wanted the Burma road open, their aims clashed. America's offensive aims diametrically opposed China's defensive aims. Finally, the British wanted to recapture their colonies in Asia, while the Americans and Chinese opposed colonialism. Not only did Allied aims clash, so did personalities.

Until the November 1944 reorganization of SEAC, none of the leaders could get along.
Stilwell, the American commander and deputy CINC, refused to work with Giffard, the British 11th Army Group commander. Stilwell got along with the CINC, but Mountbatten refused to get involved in the operational details. So, Stilwell had his land forces cooperate with the 14th Army commander, Slim. The Chinese refused to attack and only took orders from Chiang Kai Shek. Clearly, this divergence of objectives and personalities without a single commander for unity of effort was unworkable.

The collapse of the Chinese Army in China and the overrunning of Chennault's bomber bases led to unity of command under a LCC. The Chinese now needed the Burma road to survive and put the Chinese forces in northeast Burma under American control. The Americans had little use for bombers without bases and desperately needed the Chinese Army to keep fighting. Mountbatten was liked by everyone and was British royalty. His position was secure and nobody was going to get him involved in operational details. Stilwell and the 11th Army Group commander were therefore fired. Since the British had the majority of the land forces in theater, Leese became LCC. He commanded all allied land forces in Burma. Finally, there was unity of command and unity of effort.

So, the LCC in these functionally based theaters addressed the major political issues of power and prestige. First, the nation with the majority of land forces provided the LCC just as doctrine said. This LCC was Montgomery in ETO 1944, Blamey in SWPA 1942, and Leese in SEAC 1944. They addressed those nations' contributions in land forces and protected the power and prestige of the nation with the majority of land forces. Second, if the nationality of the CINC was different from the majority of the land forces, then a LCC was required. This was the case with Eisenhower and the British in ETO 1944 and with MacArthur and the Australians in SWPA 1942. Third, the LCC provided centralized control when a weak CINC, Mountbatten, could not be replaced for political reasons. Politics impacted organizational decisions, confirming theory. Since the subordinate LCC addressed political problems of national power and prestige, we should expect that the area based theaters had more political problems.

Area Based Theaters

Surprisingly, the area based theater organizations did not have more political problems, just different ones. First, the nation or service with the majority of land forces still provided the CINC or all subordinate land force commanders. This structurally addressed their power and prestige. Second, eliminating the subordinate LCC
created political problems until the power relationship was accepted. Finally, a U.S. Army or Navy headquarters commanding a joint or combined theater also created political problems. We will start with the first challenge.

The nation and service with the majority of land forces provided the CINC or all ground force commanders. America provided the majority of land forces to ETO after the breakout from Normandy. Eisenhower, the American CINC, directly controlled his four subordinate land forces. In this case the majority ruled.

Britain provided the majority of land forces to the MTO and either provided the CINC or both of the Army Group commanders. Initially, Eisenhower was the CINC and Alexander and Wilson, both Britons, commanded the Army Groups. Wilson and later Alexander replaced Eisenhower as the CINC. Again, the majority ruled as CINC or subordinate land force commanders.

America provided the majority of land forces to SWPA after 1942. MacArthur, the American CINC, directly controlled his three subordinate army commanders. The majority ruled again.

The same happened in the Korean War and the Pacific. America provided the majority of land forces in Korea. The American CINC directly controlled the subordinate land forces. The Navy, with its Marines, provided the majority of land forces in the POA for most of the war. Nimitz, through his sub area commanders, controlled all land forces. Again, the majority ruled.

The nation or service with the majority of land forces protected its power and prestige either by having the CINC or manning all major ground force commands. This is the same solution to majority interests we found in the functionally based theater. Only there, the CINC's nationality was different from the majority land force. In that case the subordinate LCC addressed the problem. Eliminating the subordinate LCC to reflect a new balance of land forces created political problems in ETO and POA.

Eliminating Montgomery as ETO's subordinate LCC reduced British power and prestige. The British lacked the preponderance of land forces after Normandy and Eisenhower, as the CINC, became the LCC. British land forces still had direct access to the CINC through Montgomery, but the British were no longer in charge. Before, with Eisenhower as the CINC and Montgomery as the LCC, the British could tell each other that Eisenhower was only a figurehead. They could claim that Britain was really in charge through Montgomery. Now, with Eisenhower as the CINC and no subordinate LCC, the British were clearly the junior partner. The depth of these emotions came out in several
The British made various attempts to keep Montgomery as LCC. Montgomery, the British Chiefs of Staff, and Churchill all lobbied Eisenhower for a subordinate LCC. They never demanded Montgomery but they suggested that the LCC should go to the most experienced ground commander. Eisenhower and the Americans ignored the requests. The issue only died when Montgomery went too far and threatened the alliance. Montgomery in an interview after the Battle of the Bulge claimed that he and the British Army had won the battle. Churchill was forced to publicly apologize by pointing out that Americans had done 95% of the fighting. Montgomery was almost relieved of command and the LCC issue finally died. The same level of passion existed in the Pacific at the end of the war.

Removing all Army forces from the POA before the invasion of Japan and placing them under MacArthur's command, reduced Navy power and prestige. The Army chafed throughout the Pacific war that no one protected Army interests in the Pacific. For most of the war the Army lacked the preponderance of land forces to press the issue. There were too many Marines. For the invasion of Japan the Army provided the overwhelming amount of land forces. The invasion involved several armies, so only MacArthur had the political stature to command the invading forces. No one could make MacArthur subordinate to Nimitz, so all Army forces were removed from Navy control. The JCS were forced to coordinate Nimitz and MacArthur's invasion of Japan. The loss of Army forces was a blow to Navy power and prestige but there seemed to be no other solution when the Army forces became overwhelming.

Changing the nationality of the LCC created problems. Ultimately, the service or nation with the bulk of land forces provided the LCC. While the majority ruled, the nature of many theater headquarters heightened minority frustrations. U.S. Army or Navy headquarters commanding a joint and combined theater caused political problems. Three of the theater headquarters were specified commands, while two were combined commands. MacArthur manned SWPA and FEC as a U.S. Army headquarters, while Nimitz manned POA as a Navy headquarters. The Australians in particular and the Navy to a lesser degree were irritated by the absence of their nation and service from MacArthur's headquarters. Without any representation on the theater staff they had difficulty making their views heard or of protecting their interests. The Navy and the Air Force were equally frustrated by FEC. Army officers ran FEC, to the exclusion of the Air Force and Navy. The same happened in POA. There were few Army
officers on Nimitz’s staff and they had no influence with him. He had only accepted Army officers on the orders from the JCS. There was none of this enmity in ETO or MTO.

Eisenhower had deliberately structured these as joint and combined headquarters. There were officers from each nation and service on the theater headquarters. If the principal staff officer was British, his deputy was American. This thorough intermixing of staffs by nation and service made the staff large and slow but also ensured that national and service viewpoints were addressed. This served one of the roles that functional departmentation provides, protecting the power and prestige of the function.

Comparison

The theater land force structure must protect service and national power and prestige, while maintaining unity of command. First, the structure must provide real unity of command. Second the organization must acknowledge the contribution of the major land force. Third, the structure must protect the minor land force. Unity of command is the easiest to address.

There were two ways to provide unity of command for theater land forces. The best was to have a CINC empowered and capable of commanding the forces in theater. The second and less preferable way, was to have a subordinate LCC empowered and capable of commanding the land forces. The CINC of SEAC was unwilling to assume full command and could not be removed for political reasons. So, the subordinate LCC maintained unity of command over the theater’s disparate ground forces. Once we had unity of command, we addressed the contribution of the major land force.

We saw two ways to address this contribution. First, if the CINC was the same service or nationality as the major ground force, we had an area organization and the CINC was the LCC. This was the case in ETO at the end of World War Two. Second, if the CINC was not the same service or nationality as the major ground force, we had a functional organization with the major ground force providing the LCC. This was the case in SWPA 1942 and ETO 1944. As an alternative, we had an area organization and the major ground force provided all the subordinate ground commanders. This was the case in the MTO.

Having addressed the major ground force, we protected the minor ground forces.

The minor ground force needed access to the CINC to protect its power and prestige. The fully integrated joint or combined headquarters achieved this but took time to develop. An area organization also did this, if the minor ground force was a direct subordinate of

34
the CINC. This leads us to the relation between politics and the subordinate LCC.

Two primary political factors call for a subordinate LCC. First, if the CINC is weak and politically untouchable, the subordinate LCC is a way to create unity of command. Second, if the service or nationality of the CINC is not the same as that of the majority ground force, then the subordinate LCC is a way to address the power and prestige of that force. Analysis confirms theory again.

PART VI: CONCLUSION

We sought an answer to the question: when does a theater of operations need a subordinate LCC? Military doctrine provided conflicting views on theater organization. Joint doctrine stated that a theater could be organized on an area or a functional basis. The area basis decentralized joint operations, while the functional basis centralized land operations. The Army preferred centralized land operations with a subordinate LCC. Theory confirmed the centralized nature of functionally based organizations and highlighted several other points.

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<th>Departmentation</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Adaptability</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Other Considerations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional (LCC)</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Inflexible</td>
<td>Inexperienced</td>
<td>Protect Land Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
<td>Experienced</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
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Functional departmentation centralizes control, maintains the power and prestige of the function, but is slow to adapt. Therefore, a subordinate LCC centralizes control of land operations, protects the power and prestige of the land force, but is less flexible to change. Area departmentation decentralizes control and improves local coordination in dispersed areas, but needs more experienced leaders. A theater organized without a subordinate LCC, therefore, decentralizes joint operations, is flexible and dispersed over a wide area, but requires more trained leaders. Since, the area departmentation needs more trained or experienced leaders, the functional organization can be generalized as not needing as many experienced leaders. There are several other expectations.
First, theaters transition from functionally based organizations at the start of war to area based organizations at the end of war. Mature theaters adjust to the chaos of war and have experienced combat leaders, while new theaters adjust to the calm of peace and have inexperienced combat leaders. Second, theaters with a subordinate LCC have a single concentrated land objective, while vast theaters with dispersed objectives have an area based organization. Third, a subordinate LCC addresses parochial service or national interests, while a strong CINC overcomes these. History confirmed the first.

American theaters of operations changed from functionally based organizations with a subordinate LCC to area based organizations without a subordinate LCC. Theaters began with functionally based organizations and without a CINC. These organizations failed. Theaters then organized under a CINC, who controlled all joint and combined forces. Eventually successful theaters transitioned to an area based organization. Historical trends confirmed that a subordinate LCC was more likely at the start of a campaign. Analysis, using unity of command, confirmed the second expectation.

A single concentrated land objective favors a subordinate LCC, while several dispersed objectives in a vast theater of operations favors an area organization. The principle of unity of command states that for each objective there is one commander for unity of effort. Area based theaters, such as the Pacific, have isolated objectives separated by geography. These lead CINCs to decentralize joint operations. Conversely, functionally based theaters, such as ETO at Normandy, have a single compact objective, clearly defined by geography. The CINC ensures unity of effort in this small area by appointing a single ground force commander. Geographical dispersion decentralizes operations, while concentration centralizes them. Analysis also bears out our third inference about politics and structure.

The theater structure protects service and national prestige, while maintaining unity of command. Either the CINC or the subordinate LCC provided unity of command for land forces. If the CINC politically can or will not provide unity of command, the subordinate LCC does. The theater organization acknowledges the contribution of the major land force. If the CINC is not the same nationality or service as the major land force,
appointing a subordinate LCC from that service or nationality addresses this. Two political situations call for a subordinate LCC, a weak CINC or a CINC with a different nationality or service than the majority land force. Analysis of doctrine, theory, and history leads to the major lessons.

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<th>Lessons</th>
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History tells us that successful theaters change from functional organizations with a subordinate LCC to area based organizations without one. Campaigns become decentralized, dispersed, joint and combined operations, which need more trained leaders. Peace does not necessarily prepare leaders for this. Leaders lack combat experience, organizations are accustomed to stability, and national/service parochialism abound. This favors functionally based organizations. War brings experience for decentralized joint and combined operations. Even so, there are five considerations which favor the subordinate LCC in a mature theater.

The unexpected start of a war, inexperienced leaders, concentrated objectives, a weak CINC, and a CINC with a different nationality or service from the land force may call for a subordinate LCC. At the start of an unexpected war, leaders are probably inexperienced. If subordinate leaders are inexperienced, they will be unable to control joint and combined operations. The CINC then centralizes control. If the objective is small, the CINC coordinates joint and combined operations. Again, the CINC centralizes control. If the CINC is weak and politically untouchable, a strong subordinate LCC may provide unity of command for land operations. Finally, if the CINC has a different nationality or service from the major land force, that major land force needs their own LCC to protect their interests.

**PART VII: IMPLICATIONS**

Joint doctrine (JCS Pub 2.0 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAE)) should consider incorporating this monograph's major findings. First, highlighting that the area organization is the most prevalent form of organization of ground forces in a mature theater. Second, stressing the factors that favor area or functional departmentation to include: decentralization/centralization, geographical dispersion/concentration,
maturity of theater, experience of leaders, and protection of national and service power/prestige.

Joint doctrine provides these findings as a guide to action. This should not be dogma but a statement of fact to assist Army doctrine and Joint staffs. This should help Joint staffs, while they develop their theater command and control system. This can also guide Army doctrine to address alternative ways of organizing the theater. Ultimately, the issue of the subordinate LCC is dependent on the situation. While the subordinate LCC may be the appropriate way to start organizing a small theater, it is not the best way to organize all theaters.
ENDMOTES


4. FM 100-5, p. 177.


7. JCS Pub 2.0, pp. 3-1 to 3-14; JCS Pub 3.0, pp. xi, 11-1, 11-2, IV-5.

8. Ibid, pp. 3-4 to 3-6.

9. JCS Pub 3.0, p. 11-1.

10. FM 100-5, pp. 173-177.

11. Cushman, Mideast, this is the entire thrust of his paper; Cushman, Adequacy, pp. 3-59 to 3-66.; Thomas A. Cordwell, Command Structure for Theater Warfare: The Quest for Unity of Command, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, September 1984), pp. 31-33, 103-113.


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.
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20. JCS Pub 2.0, p. 3-2; JCS Pub 3.0, pp. IV-2, IV-5.


22. Horne, p. A.

23. Pogue, pp. 38, 159.


28. Howe, p. 16.


34. Romanus, pp. 102-148.


37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.


40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.


46. Ibid.


48. Ibid.


50. Ibid.


53. FM 100-5, 1962, p. 27; JAAN, 1951, p. 24;

54. JAAN, 1951, pp. v, 2; JAAN, 1927, pp. 1-16;


56. FM 100-5, 1962, p. 11.

57. Howe, pp. 29, 344.


60. Blumenson, Salerno, pp. 8, 24-33; Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, pp. 9, 58-118, 181, 258, 348, 357, 386; Ehrman, Grand Strategy VI, pp. 45, 49, 57, 83; Fisher, Casino, p. 5; Garand, Sicily, pp. 7-15, 22, 55, 57, 67, 89, 305, 381, 436; Owyer, pp. 653, 654, 709.

61. Ibid.


63. Ibid.


65. Schnabel, pp. 46-49.


67. Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, pp. 204, 282; Pogue, p. 49; Weigley, p. 36.
68. Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, p. 204; Pogue, pp. 43, 45, 180, 181, 251.

69. Weigley, p. 84.

70. Matloff, p. 171; Milner, pp. 18, 19.


72. Milner, p. 50; Horner, op. cit.

73. Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, 135, 140, 142, 146, 418, 581; Kirby IV, pp. 118-119; Romanus, Command, p. 28.


76. Pogue, p. 378.


79. Schnabel, pp. 46-49.

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