AMERICA PROMISES TO COME BACK:
OUR NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

BY

JAMES J. TRITTEN

OCTOBER 23, 1991

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An analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25% budget cut negotiated with Congress, and a revised Soviet threat and new international security environment which assumes two-years warning of a European-centered global war with the USSR. During this period, the U.S. and NATO would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of the sources of new strategy and force structure, the Base Force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas intervention. Discussion of parallel NATO and Soviet initiatives. Discussion of major issues resulting from this new proposed strategy and force structure, including: is the new strategy real, defining new goals and objectives in both programming and war planning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirements for intelligence, requirements for decision-making, setting technological requirements, research and development, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitution, stockpiles, impact upon DoD organization-including the Navy and Marine Corps, a
Abstract

transition period, arms control, and new requirements for military operations research and analysis. Conclusions: there are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends; (1), the behavior of the USSR (2), the behavior of allies and the Congress (3), the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4), the ability of industry to meet new demands. Even if it can be shown that industry to meet new demands. Even if it can be shown that industry cannot meet new demands, the strategy may still be useful-- this area developed fully. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy but rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached defense since 1945.
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ABSTRACT

An analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25% budget cut negotiated with Congress, and a revised Soviet threat and new international security environment which assumes two-years warning of a European-centered global war with the USSR. During this period, the U.S. and NATO would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of the sources of new strategy and force structure, the Base Force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas intervention. Discussion of parallel NATO and Soviet initiatives. Discussion of major issues resulting from this new proposed strategy and force structure, including: is the new strategy real, defining new goals and objectives in both programming and war planning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirements for intelligence, requirements for decision-making, setting technological requirements, research and development, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitution, stockpiles, impact upon DoD organization--including the Navy and Marine Corps, a transition period, arms control, and new requirements for military operations research and analysis. Conclusions: there are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends; (1), the behavior of the USSR, (2), the behavior of allies and the Congress, (3), the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4), the ability of industry to meet new demands. Even if it can be shown that industry cannot meet new demands, the strategy may still be useful--this area developed fully. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy but rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached defense since 1945.
# Table of Contents

**Table of Contents**

Table of Contents................................. i  
List of Figures..................................... ii  
Acknowledgements................................... iii  
Introduction........................................ 1  
Notes................................................ 2  
Sources of the New Strategy........................ 3  
Notes................................................ 8  
The President's New National Security Strategy.... 17  
Reconstitution Against the Soviet Union........... 17  
Deterrence.......................................... 18  
Crisis Response.................................... 20  
Peacetime Engagement.............................. 22  
Changes in Military Art............................ 23  
Notes................................................ 24  
The Base Force...................................... 25  
The Strategic Force................................ 26  
The Atlantic Force................................ 27  
The Pacific Force................................... 29  
The Contingency Force.............................. 30  
Transportation...................................... 34  
Unilateral Capability?.............................. 35  
Notes................................................ 36  
NATO Initiatives.................................... 41  
Notes................................................ 45  
The New Soviet Union............................... 49  
Military Doctrine.................................. 49  
Strategic Missions.................................. 53  
Soviet Military Reform............................. 55  
Impact on Western Theater of Strategic Military Actions. 60  
New Roles for the Soviet Navy........................ 61  
Implications for the West........................... 62  
Notes................................................ 63  
Issues For Discussion............................. 69  
Is the New Strategy Real?........................... 69  
Defining Goals and Objectives in Programming and War Planning................................. 71  
Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.. 76  
New Requirements for Intelligence..................... 79  
Requirements for Decision-Making...................... 81  
Reconstitution........................................ 86  
Investment Strategy and Conversion.................... 91  
Research and Development............................. 93  
Technological Requirements........................... 94
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stockpiles</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on the Navy and Marine Corps</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Force</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Forces</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Aviation</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Forces</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Forces</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealift</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jointness</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Transition Period</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Operations Research and Analysis</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Success Factors</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Business as Usual?</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution List</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Figures

- U.S. Military Planning Schematic 1991........................................ 21
- New NATO Defense Organization.................................................. 42
- Soviet Sociopolitical Character/Classification of War.............. 50
- Soviet Military-Technical Character/Classification of War........ 51
- Possible New Soviet Military Strategic Missions.................... 53
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Introduction

On August 2, 1990, President George Bush unveiled a new national security strategy in a speech at the Aspen Institute entitled "In Defense of Defense." That title is misleading. Far from defending the U.S. military establishment from the winds of change, Bush proposed a dramatic restructuring of U.S. forces and defense policy in response to the decline of the Cold War. This report examines the crucial elements of Bush's new national security strategy and some unanswered questions that surround it.

The new national security strategy calls for recasting U.S. defenses around four major principles: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The first three of these principles sound familiar. However, beneath the superficial similarity to past U.S. principles, important differences exist. Deterrence, for example, used to be primarily based on U.S. forces in being. Under the new national security strategy, deterrence of the Soviet threat will largely be based upon a capability to build forces if, and when, they are ever needed.

The strategy calls for maintaining a much smaller active and reserve forces primarily focused on presence and worldwide major contingency operations—not a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. This shift from a focus on the "worst-case" threat to the "most-likely-case" will have major programming and strategy implications in both the near term and the long run.

If forces are required to fight a major war against the Soviet Union, the U.S. assumes that there would be sufficient time to reconstitute them. Specifically, the President has apparently accepted the consensus of his intelligence community that the Soviet Union would need "at least one to two years or longer to regenerate the capability for a European theater-wide offensive or a global conflict." The U.S. assumes, therefore, that it will have two-year's warning for a Europe-centered global war with the USSR.

The most important factors which drove this shift in defense planning are the collapse of the Cold War military threat from the Soviet Union, and (given that collapse) the decision to cut at U.S. defense spending by at least 25 percent from fiscal years 1991-1995. This reduction is not simply the low end of a periodic cycle of fluctuating defense expenditures—it is a recognition that the total resources devoted to defense need not be as high so long as the current political climate remains. Given the changes inside the Soviet Union following the August 1991 coup attempt, the need for a new post-Cold War national security strategy is even more apparent. As Clausewitz wrote, war has "...its own grammar, but not its own logic." The old political logic and lexicon of the Cold War has changed—it is now time to change the military grammar.
This report first sets the stage for the many issues that deserve careful analysis. The manner in which the strategy was announced tells the story of a major review and change in Administration policy done by a few individuals at the top rather than with the full participation of the vast federal bureaucracy. Next to be examined will be the essence of the strategy, as revealed in official documents, speeches, and testimony. Associated with the change in strategy is a significant restructuring of American military forces. This new force structure and associated roles and missions are examined next.

The next section of the report deals with parallel initiatives with the NATO Alliance and the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat is examined with implications for the West. The next section deals with issues that must be discussed: how real the new strategy is, changes in planning, the impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirements for intelligence and decision-making, industrial and technology aspects of the strategy—including reconstitution, the impact of the new strategy on stockpiles, arms control, and military operations research. The report contains a major assessment of the impact of the strategy on the Navy and Marine Corps. The final section of the report contains an assessment of the strategy's critical success factors and whether this is defense business as usual.

Notes


(2) "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium" (as delivered), Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, CO), The White House, August 2, 1990, 6 pp.


Sources of the New Strategy

Instead of a single or even a few documents which describes the new national security strategy and its associated force structure, a series of speeches, articles, and reports must be consulted to gain a full understanding of Bush's proposal. To understand these documents, they must be read in sequence to see how the concepts evolved over time. Since publication dates differing from dates on which some articles were written, they are placed in chronological sequence. This section provides the proper chronology and full documentation for all primary source documents.

Although the President first outlined the new strategy in his speech at Aspen on August 2, 1990, important details were gradually revealed by official spokesmen in the following months. Generally ignored by media due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on the same day, the New York Times covered the new strategy and force structure in depth on the same day, but based its story on leaks of a confidential briefing of the plan to the President in late June 1990, and subsequent briefings to the Defense Policy Resources Board (DPRB). Aviation Week & Space Technology covered the new national security strategy and force structure in depth—in their August 13, 1990 issue. The strategy was also covered in Europe. Interestingly, Aviation Week & Space Technology reported on significant forthcoming cuts in forces prior to the President's Aspen speech.

General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), described key elements of the new national security strategy and associated force structure in two speeches to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and the American Legion, late in August 1990. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney spoke at the 32nd Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on September 6, 1990 and explained that the new strategic concepts outlined in Aspen would form the basis of programming documents to be made public in early 1991. Cheney noted that a series of Congressional and other briefings were to have followed the Aspen speech, but that he and General Powell were able to meet only once, on August 2, 1990 with the chairman and ranking members of the four major Congressional armed services committees. Cheney's IISS remarks were followed by I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Resources), who provided additional details.

Moscow's Pravda reported Cheney's remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies meeting and that President Bush had ordered changes in American security strategy. Cheney followed up his IISS address with a similar speech at the Comstock Club/Air Force Association (AFA) in Sacramento on September 13, 1990 at the Bay Area Council in San Francisco on September 14, another briefing to AFA on September 17th, an address to the National Association of Business Economists on September
26th, and a talk to the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council on October 30th.\textsuperscript{13}

The former Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force, gave additional detailed information late in September 1990 at the National Press Club.\textsuperscript{14} The essence of this speech appeared subsequently in the Spring 1991 issue of \textit{Parameters}, the journal of the U.S. Army War College. From the tenor and content of Lieutenant General Butler's address and article, it appears that he had a major hand in developing the new national security strategy or force structure.\textsuperscript{15}

Secretary Cheney's visit and remarks in Moscow in October 1990 about the new national security strategy and future force structure, were widely covered by the Soviet press\textsuperscript{16} but generally not reported in the U.S. General Powell authored an article in the October 1990 issue of \textit{The Retired Officer}.\textsuperscript{17} This article, however, was based upon his presentation at the National Press Club immediately preceding the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait--hence it should be placed ahead of the Aspen speech. Similarly, General Powell's February 1991 article in the magazine of the Reserve Officers Association\textsuperscript{18} should be read from the perspective of currency through October 1990.

General Powell gave two December 1990 speeches: one to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI),\textsuperscript{19} the other at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA).\textsuperscript{20} The Chairman's RUSI remarks also appear in the Spring 1991 issue of \textit{The RUSI Journal} but these should be read assuming a December 1990 currency with superficial updating for the obvious.\textsuperscript{21}

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, U.S. Navy, echoed General Powell's concepts in another December 1990 speech to the President's National Security Telecommunications Committee.\textsuperscript{22} The Commander-in-Chief (Cinc), U.S. Space Command, General Donald J. Kuty, U.S. Air Force, told a San Diego Space Day audience in January 1991 that General Powell had asked each of the CinCs to examine their forces and present that minimal "base force" structure necessary to maintain our superpower status.\textsuperscript{23}

Only limited commentary about the new national security strategy or force structure appeared in the U.S. media,\textsuperscript{24} other than the reports in the \textit{New York Times} and \textit{Aviation Week & Space Technology}, until the February 1991, Department of Defense testimony to the Congress. The U.S. press had been otherwise engaged in major defense-associated reporting of events in the Middle East. In 1991, the testimony to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff preceded the delivery of the annual Department of Defense report to the Congress.
The first Congressional testimony was presented by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on February 7, 1991. Their second testimony was before the House Appropriations Committee on February 19th. Two days later, on February 21st, they testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Following this testimony, the 1991 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress was actually issued, although it is dated January. This report specifically addresses the new national security strategy and provides a force structure designed for budgetary and political give and take. For those who still did not understand that national strategy and force structure were changing, a copy of the President's Aspen speech was appended.

In mid-March 1991, "Scooter" Libby and Admiral Jeremiah appeared before the House Armed Services Committee and provided the first unclassified details on future force structure. Later in March, Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, also appeared before the House Armed Services Committee and testified with General Butler, now Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), on the strategy and how it would affect strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces.

Secretary Cheney prepared an address on the new national security strategy for delivery at the Georgetown University. By the end of March 1991, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued their 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) which included a Foreword by the Secretary. On April 3, 1991, General Powell once again spoke on the new national security strategy and force structure in an address to the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA). Powell also made some remarks on reorganization in mid-April, reported in Army Times. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the force structure associated with this new national security strategy, the Base Force, the centerpiece of his testimony before the Defense Base Closure Commission at the end of April. April also saw major recognition of the Administration's efforts by a Soviet academic writing in Kommunist.

In his May 29, 1991 commencement address at the U.S. Air Force Academy, President Bush mentioned his previous announcement of a shift in defense focus, but did not expand on his original vision. "Scooter" Libby returned to Congress in early June 1990, accompanied by the Deputy Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate on the Joint Staff (J-8), Brigadier General William Fedorochko, Jr., U.S. Army. Both testified further on details of the strategy and force structure. Later that month, Major General John David Robinson, U.S. Army, Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate on the Joint Staff (J-8), gave a similar presentation to the 59th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society.
General Powell made note of the Base Force and reconstitution forces in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1991. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also outlined the new strategy and Base Force to the Soviet military in a July presentation in Moscow and a September 1991 presentation at Harvard. The Department of Defense's *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, published in July, makes specific reference to the new national security strategy and links it to the Gulf war. July also saw a direct criticism of the strategy and associated force structure in the conservative Soviet press. In August 1991, Admiral Jeremiah spoke to another Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association gathering and once again outlined the Base Force and gave an interview to *Jane's Defence Weekly*, where he discussed changes in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).

The White House's March 1990 edition of the *National Security Strategy of the United States* should have been revised about the same time as the initial series of speeches were made about the new national security strategy. This document ought to have appeared at least at the time of the Administration's initial testimony on the strategy before Congress and release of the Secretary of Defense's annual report. The revised version of the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, incorporating the new national security strategy, finally appeared in August 1991. This publication, a major source document for the new strategy, codifies what had been said previously by others, and added a few new details.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are preparing a follow-on document, termed the *National Military Strategy for the 1990s*, that should be available before the end of the year. The JCS National Military Strategy will be based upon President Bush's: Aspen speech, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, and further explanations of what is meant by the "new world order." This new JCS document is being prepared in consultation with the commanders of the various unified and specified commands.

General Powell addressed Base Force and strategy issues in his remarks to the City Club of San Diego and in an interview in *The San Diego Union and Tribune* in mid-September 1991. The final primary source available at the time of preparation of this report was the September 25, 1991 testimony by General Powell on the Future of U.S. Military Bases before the House Appropriations Subcommittee. After an extensive prepared presentation, General Powell spent more than an additional hour fielding Congressional concerns regarding the Base Force.

On the evening of September 27, 1991, President Bush addressed the nation on national television. He addressed national security policy and nuclear forces. Bush outlined the new strategy and Base Force and the reasons for them. The President then announced major initiatives to reduce nuclear forces, our nuclear alert status, expand strategic arms control agreements
with the USSR, and to provide for limited defenses against bal-
listic missile attack. The next morning Secretary Cheney and
General Powell held a press conference in the Pentagon and provid-
ed additional details.59

Reviewing the list of primary source documents, a number of
implications emerge. First, there appears to be a very "top-
down" re-direction in defense strategy and force structure.60
From the public record, there were only a handful of individuals
who orchestrated the new concepts and there were few authorized
spokesmen.61 The usual indicators of a debate were absent—discussion by other senior military officials does not appear
until well after the new concepts were articulated in public.

The second point is that, despite their obvious concern with
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were simul-
taneously fashioning the new national security strategy and force
structure. The Secretary has stated repeatedly that there were
two major elements underway with defense in late 1990 and early
1991—the military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the new national
security strategy and force structure. Secretary Cheney and
General Powell were two of only a few people who were involved in
both.

A third matter is that the new national security strategy is
nameless. Inside the Washington beltway, the strategy is known
as the "new strategy," the "new Defense Strategy," the "Presi-
dent's strategy," and "the U.S. military's new regional contin-
gencies strategy." It has also been referred to, informally, as
the "Aspen Strategy," the "reconstitution strategy," "U.S. Na-
tional Defense Policy," and "the strategy for the new world
order," but it appears that the Administration will let academia,
or the press, select the title that will appear in the history
books. In this paper, the strategy is uniformly referred to as
the "new national security strategy."

Although it took some time, the new national security
strategy and force structure eventually appeared in the oral and
written testimony and other writings of additional officials in
the Pentagon. For example, Christopher Jehn, Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) appeared before
Congress on April 9, 1991 and used General Powell's concept of
four-force package with four supporting capabilities.62 Similarly,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood expanded upon the
Aspen speech in his address to the American Institute of Aeronau-
tics and Astronautics (AIAA) on May 1, 1991.63

Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill A. "Tony" McPeak,
made public reference to consolidating air forces into the new
Base Force structure.64 The U.S. Army Posture Statement reflects
a thorough understanding and support of the new national security
strategy.65 Similarly, H. Lawrence Garrett III, the Secretary of
the Navy, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), and General Al M. Gray former Commandant of the Marine
Corps jointly authored an article in the April 1991 U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* that makes specific mention of the Aspen speech and the new national security strategy. Admiral Kelso also made specific reference to the Aspen speech and strategy in his April 1991 *Sea Power* article.

Perhaps the reason the *National Security Strategy of the United States* did not appear until August 1991 and the fact that the strategy still lacks a formal name, is that the internal debate and discussion within the Administration has not ended. Rather than a "bottom-up" product of endless hours of staff work, involving all the major defense and industrial participants, the new national security strategy is analogous to recent shifts in military doctrine in the USSR--with perhaps even more debate in the USSR that has yet occurred in the U.S. By the end of September 1991, enough details of the President's new strategic concepts were available to make an in-depth assessment of the new national security strategy's impact.

**Notes**


(3) John D. Morrocco, "New Pentagon Strategy Shifts Focus From Europe to Regional Conflicts," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Vol. 133, No. 7, August 13, 1990, pp. 25-27. This article has depth similar to that found in Michael Gordon's article in the *New York Times*. The President's Aspen speech and the Base Force were also reported, but without a great deal of depth, in the Washington Roundout section of *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Vol. 133, No. 6, August 6, 1990, p. 15.


(6) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland, August 23, 1990," as deliv-
ered, 13 pp.

(7) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the 72nd Annual National Convention of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, August 30, 1990," as delivered, 21 pp.

(8) "Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, Thursday, September 6, 1990," News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 7 pp., and notes made by author, who was in the audience, of additional remarks.


(14) "Speech to the Center for Defense Journalism, The National Press Club, September 27, 1990, by Lieutenant General George L. Butler," 17 pp. Air Force General Butler was recently selected for his fourth star and as the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command.


(17) N. Belan interview in Tulan on October 18, 1990 as reported in "I Look Ahead With Optimism," Moscow Sovetskaya Rossiya in


(23) "Remarks as Delivered by Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN [U.S. Navy], Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the President's National Security Telecommunications Committee (NSTAC) at the Loy Henderson Conference Room, Department of State, 13 December 1990," 10 pp.


"Statement of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, 12 March 1991," 15 pp.

Admiral Jeremiah's testimony was covered by the journal of the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA), but the report failed to explain to its readers the significant changes that the new strategy and force structure meant for the nation. See John F. Morton, "JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Committee] Chief Weighs Competitiveness Against Requirements," National

(34) Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Release, "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, at Walsh Lecture, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Thursday, March 21, 1991 - 8:00 P.M. (EST)," No. 204-91, 10 pp. The Secretary departed from his prepared remarks at this lecture and instead talked about Operation DESERT STORM. His prepared remarks were submitted for the record and made available to the public.


(39) Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov, "What Kind of Military Reform?" Moscow Kommunist in Russian, No. 6, April 1991, pp. 88-99 (FBIS-SOV-91-137-A, July 17, 1991, pp. 5-13). This article, published inside the Soviet Union by an academic, directly criticizes the USSR Defense Ministry "Concept of Military Reform" for failing to take into account doctrinal, strategy, and force structure changes going on in the U.S. and other foreign nations.


(42) "Written Statement of Brigadier General William Fedorochko, Jr., [U.S. Army] Deputy Director for Force Structure and Re-


(45) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff, Moscow, 24 July 1991 (Moscow date)," as delivered, 13 pp.


(49) "Remarks as Delivered by Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN [U.S. Navy], Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 8 August 1991," 5 pp.

(50) "The JDW [Jane's Defence Weekly] Interview" [by Barbara Starr with Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 9, August 31, 1991, p. 380.


(52) Publication of the National Security Strategy of the United States was not unnoticed in the Soviet Union, although analysis was quite superficial, given the magnitude of the changes in this document. See Aleksandr Pogodin commentary, Radio Moscow World Service in English, 1210 GMT, August 14, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-158, August 15, 1991, p. 6).


(55) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the City Club of San Diego, San Diego, California, 16 September 1991," As Delivered, 20 pp.


(59) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Briefing, "Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], Pete Williams, LSD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] (Public Affairs), Saturday, September 27, 1991 - 10:00 a.m.," 20 pp.; with additional supporting background material - 2 pp.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as being the intellectual "godfather" of the strategy.

(61) Rudy Abramson and John Broder, "Four-Star Power," Los Angeles Times Magazine, April 7, 1991, p. 60 reports on General Colin Powell's apparent attempt to get the Base Force issue "out on the table quickly, even before Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was ready to discuss it publicly."


(63) "Defense Deputy Secretary Donald Atwood Address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics," May 1, 1991, at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia, Reuter Transcript Report, 8 pp.


(68) "...there are forces at work today which want to change and degrade that Base Force..." contained in "Remarks as Delivered by Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN [U.S. Navy], Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 8 August 1991," p. 3.
The President's New National Security Strategy

Among General Powell's most frequent themes in discussing the new national security strategy over the past year were enduring and emerging realities. According to Powell, the two major emerging realities that prompted the new national security strategy were the end of the Cold War and declining defense budgets. Powell identified a number of enduring and emerging realities addressed by the new strategy: persistent Soviet military power, vital interests across the Atlantic, in Europe and the Middle East, and in the Pacific, and the unknown threat—the crisis that no one expected. The new national security strategy and the associated Base Force are designed to meet these challenges by providing a less Soviet/European-centered and more flexible military capabilities which will meet America's security requirements as we enter the next Century.

Reconstitution Against the Soviet Union

Secretary Cheney said shortly before his departure from Moscow in October 1990, that "We are changing our strategy and our doctrine as a result of changes in the Soviet Union and changes in Europe. We no longer believe it is necessary to us to be prepared to fight a major land war in Europe..." The shift in focus from the Soviet threat and a European-centered global war is a major change in both program and war planning. The Armed Services must now attempt to justify procuring defense programs for reasons other than those routinely used since the end of World War II. Already, the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have begun reviewing existing war and contingency plans for their responsiveness to the new political realities.

A fundamental component of the President's new national security strategy is that, assuming a two-year warning of a Europe-centered global war with the USSR, the U.S. can generate wholly new forces—rebuild or "reconstitute" them if necessary. Specifically, current forces deemed unnecessary will be disbanded, not put into the reserves, since the risk is deemed acceptable. Reconstitution is the ability to restore a global war-fighting capability against the Soviet Union. It includes mobilizing manpower; forming, training, and fielding combat units; and reactivating the defense industrial base.

Reconstitution is not the same thing as mobilization or regeneration—it is more like what the United Kingdom had planned during the interwar years, when it assumed that up to ten years of strategic warning would be available. New defense manufacturing capability and new forces and military would be built essentially from the ground up. Preserving this capability means protecting our infrastructure and the defense industrial base, preserving our lead in critical technologies, and stockpiling critical materials. Preserving our alliance structure is another element of our ability to reconstitute a more significant forward-based military presence when, and if, it is ever again required.
The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the assumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to the homeland, that a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-like parity will exist from the Atlantic to the Urals, that the Soviet Union will remain inwardly focused, and that NATO and its members intelligence services are functioning. After events in the Soviet Union during the Winter of 1990-91, Secretary Cheney adopted a more cautious note on expected Soviet behavior. The failed Soviet coup of August 1991 certainly suggests further caution, until the USSR (or whatever becomes of it) achieves greater political stability.

Initial reports from Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, the new Soviet Defense Minister indicate that he supports the existing defensive defence doctrine and sufficiency. However, if national military forces leave newly independent border republics, and if these republics do not field large offensive national guards, and if strategic nuclear forces are reduced to minimal deterrent levels, then the 1990 Soviet threat envisaged by the framers of the new national security strategy will be excessive and obsolete for U.S. planning purposes.

In his February 21, 1991 Senate Armed Services Committee written statement, General Powell tied the removal of a "short-warning attack by massive Soviet conventional forces" to the ratification of the CFE Treaty. This was repeated during his July 1991 Senate testimony and in the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States. With the shift in government in the Soviet Union, CFE ratification will become more troublesome if the overall level of military forces in once-USSR territory increases due to the new republican national guards and the transfer of Committee on State Security (KGB) border troops to the Ministry of Defense. In the meantime, Soviet forces are slowly being withdrawn to the homeland, conventional arms control agreements have been signed drawing down forces drastically, and the USSR remains inward-focused.

Deterrence

The cornerstone of American defense strategy will remain deterrence of aggression and coercion against the U.S., its allies, and friends. Should deterrence fail, the strategy calls on the U.S. Armed Forces to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe. Deterrence is achieved by convincing a potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level, exceeds any possibility of gain.

To achieve this goal, the U.S. will continue its modernization of strategic nuclear forces and associated command, control, and communications capabilities. The U.S. is committed to improving its strategic nuclear defensive capabilities. One new area for strategic nuclear warfare will be to respond flexibly to lower levels of aggression. Strategic defenses can be effective in countering the growing threat of ballistic missiles from nations other than the USSR.
Deterrence is often thought to involve only nuclear weapons and has been focused on the Soviet Union, but under the new national security strategy, we should expect to see further investigation of deterrence of conventional warfare without the explicit threat to use nuclear weapons. The U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy will remain committed to fostering nuclear stability, an environment in which no nation perceives a compelling advantage in using nuclear weapons in a first-strike.

One of the paradoxes of our times is that we have generated a great number of views about deterrence theory but, despite all the discussion, we must recognize deterrence for what it is—a theory that cannot be objectively proven as the reason that we have not fought wars. Further more there is no agreed upon concrete formula that quantifies exactly what it is that we must do to deter and we constantly get ourselves confused with how much is enough in our own minds instead of considering what will affect the minds of the leadership of the nation we intend to deter. If there were no confusion, we would know exactly what combination of offensive nuclear missiles, bombers, submarines, and defenses to build and deploy under the President's new national security strategy. Some elements of the complex nature of nuclear deterrence need to be further developed.

For example, conventional military forces used often to enhance the performance or survival of nuclear forces. The bulk of the Soviet Navy is expected, during a war, to deploy in bastions where they will defend ballistic missile submarines from attacks by Western antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces. Similarly, non-nuclear ballistic and cruise missile defenses can be used to defend one's own nuclear forces from attack. As the numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles are reduced, due to arms control agreements, the importance of these conventional military forces will increase since the value of each nuclear warhead will be relatively greater.

The dispersal of nuclear-armed bombers, mobile missiles, and the fleet from known peacetime locations can be used by governments during a crisis to send a message of political resolve. Nations should be careful not to make their nuclear forces even more vulnerable. For example, the dispersal of nuclear forces to less capable bases may eventually result in lower alert rates due to the lack of supporting infrastructure. Dispersal bases are also often more easily accessible to an enemy's special operations forces or attack by sabotage. With fewer nuclear warheads expected in their arsenals in the future, the superpowers must consider such issues more seriously than when they had over 10,000 warheads to manage.

Attrition of dual-use forces such as cruise missile carriers and tankers is likely during future contingency operations. Such attrition will have an impact on nuclear deterrence. As the numbers of dual-use forces come down, it is more likely to make such highly capable forces "magnets" for attacks or, at least,
the continued object of high priority research and development (R&D).

Conventional and nuclear warfare are probably intertwined in ways that the average tactician or strategist may not normally fully appreciate. The tendency by some to separate armed conflict into general warfare and nuclear warfare is an artificial one that can lead to erroneous thinking and possible catastrophic errors during the execution of military operations. By failing to deal with these intricacies, politico-military planning has often been unavoidably and erroneously bifurcated into separate nuclear and nonnuclear compartments resulting in less than satisfactory planning for the execution of military operations in support of deterrence.

Given that each of the two superpowers concedes the possibility of an extended contingency operations, thorough prewar planning must be undertaken to not "blunder" into unwanted escalation (of any type). The complex interactions between conventional and nuclear forces must be understood so that threats to continued nuclear deterrence are understood.

Crisis Response

There is a risk that the end of the Cold War may bring an increased risk of regional conflicts and greater unpredictability in the international security environment. Today's crises are extremely dangerous due to the proliferation of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) and the demonstrated willingness of Third World nations to use them. General Powell reminded Congress in February 1991 about Operation DESERT STORM where: "We are clearly at the 'high end' of technology in a conflict with a so-called 'Third World' nation [Iraq]."

High technology weapons in the hands of Third World nations include: modern tanks, ballistic missiles and artillery, air defenses, tactical air forces, cruise missiles, and diesel attack submarines. These make conflict in the Third World increasingly destructive and lethal. U.S. crisis response forces will provide presence and the ability to reinforce with adequate forces to prevent a potentially major crisis from escalating or to resolve favorably less demanding conflicts.

The U.S. crisis response strategy will focus on limiting vertical and horizontal escalation as well as escalation over time; i.e. swift termination and containing the conflict to the theater of origin. Obviously, actions outside the affected theater will be considered if they are necessary to ensure success for a military operation. Prior to committing U.S. forces, the U.S. military will want to ensure that there is a clear and present risk to U.S. vital interests and that some military objective is actually attainable.
Moreover, the support and participation of U.S. allies in such conflicts will often be essential. Although the strategy acknowledges solidarity with existing allies, the U.S. is likely to have enduring interests with perhaps more ad hoc coalitions and friends than inflexible alliances. Such coalitions or allies are vital for the reintroduction of formidable American military power overseas.

For ease of budget discussion, the U.S. often has used an illustrative planning scenario. Any planning for contingency responses by the U.S. should include the ability to react to more than one "canned" predicament or a single scenario. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have now developed a family of likely (and perhaps even unlikely) events for which the U.S. may elect to commit military forces. Any regional crisis that has the potential to escalate into a global conflict should, and will, receive priority.

The conventional conflict scenarios now used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are contained in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment. They range from peacetime engagement to war escalating from a European crisis with full mobilization. Contingencies include: (1) counter-insurgency/counter-narcotics; (2) lesser regional contingencies, with two sub-cases (2,000 and 6000 nautical miles from the U.S.); (3) a major regional contingency in Korea; and (4) a major regional contingency in Southwest Asia. These contingencies are graphically depicted in Figure 1--U.S. Military Planning Schematic 1991.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that not all crises will evolve in the same manner. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment outlines four possible types of crises: (1) a slow-building crisis; (2) a fast-rising crisis; (3) imminent conflict; and (4) conflict. The length and intensity of combat, for planning purposes, is assumed to be 450 days for counter-insurgency/counter-narcotics, 90 days of low-mid intensity for lesser regional contingencies, 120 days of mid-high intensity for major regional contingencies, and more than 50 days of mid-high intensity for a war escalating from a European crisis.

Responses to these contingencies are contained in a series of measured response options. Responses could include a flexible minimal force deterrent response, a major deterrent response (Operation DESERT SHIELD), and more "worst-case" responses where combat begins soon after the insertion of troops or simultaneously. This program of contingency types and measured responses appears to be a building-block and force sequencing approach to crisis management. Rather than requiring the deliberate planning against a single and known threat, the post-Cold War era will be need more flexible adaptive planning.
FIGURE 1

U.S. MILITARY PLANNING SCHEMATIC 1991

U.S. Core Interests

U.S. National Objectives

U.S. National Security Objectives

U.S. National Security Strategy

Peacetime Crisis War

- Strategic Nuclear
  - Offensive
  - Defensive
- Conventional

- Counter Insurgency /Narcotics
- Lesser Regional
  - 2,000 km
  - 6,000 km
- Major Regional
  - Korea
  - Southwest Asia
- Europe

- Regional
  - Unilateral
  - Alliance
- Global Conventional
- Nonstrategic Nuclear
- Strategic Nuclear

Source: The author

The most complex military operation outlined for planning purposes in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment is a war escalating from a European crisis. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States speaks of a "potential threat to a single flank or region" and a "limited, conventional threat to Europe." This planning scenario is not the old European-centered global war with the USSR but rather something less, handled by existing active duty and reserve forces, and not requiring reconstitution.

Peacetime Engagement

According to Secretary Cheney's February 1991 Congressional testimony, the U.S. will also devise a dynamic "peacetime engagement" strategy to deter low intensity conflict and support international stability. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States says that the U.S. "...cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's security problems." Indeed, America's crisis response role under the new national security strategy should not be akin to that of a policeman but rather a fireman. The U.S. armed forces will
participate in that strategy largely in the form of overseas presence.

In his Aspen speech, the President alluded to maintaining a forward presence by exercises. General Powell stated at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, in December 1990, that forward presence includes military assistance programs. In his February 1991 testimony to Congress, General Powell expanded his definition of presence to include, but not be limited to: stationed forces, rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military relations. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment adds combined planning, nation-assistance, peacekeeping efforts, logistic arrangements, supporting lift, and exchanges to the list of forms of military presence. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States includes training missions and prepositioned equipment. Other pronouncements include forces afloat and intelligence sharing and cooperation. These expanded definitions should be viewed as attempts to ensure that all planned future activities will satisfy the requirement to maintain an overseas presence with a smaller force.

Changes in Military Art

Another element in the new national security strategy is an emphasis on technological breakthroughs that will change military art. Secretary Cheney first addressed this in his February 1991 remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee: Changes in military art occurred during the inter-war years with the development of blitzkrieg, carrier-based strike naval air, and amphibious warfare capabilities. The Soviet military has long discussed the "Revolution in Military Affairs" that occurred after World War II and the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range means of delivery. Senior Soviet military officers have been warning of another "revolution" in the near future. Indeed, this subject was mentioned in their November 1991 draft military doctrine. After the splendid performance of U.S. weapons during Operation DESERT STORM, it appears that their worst fears were justified. General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), apparently agrees. In a February 1991 address, he remarked after discussing Operation DESERT STORM that "...precision weapons have changed the whole face of battle." The coming revolution will present enormous challenges and opportunities in doctrinal and strategy development.

The new National Security Strategy of the United States declares that regional crises along with forward presence "...will be the primary determinant of the size and structure of our future forces." After assessing the military threats and the recommended defense program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment conclude that "...the Defense Program provides minimum capability to accomplish national security objectives." The Base Force is that minimum defense pro-
gramming force structure necessary to meet America's enduring needs. It is to this program that we will now turn.

Notes


(2) This was not unnoticed in the Soviet Union, see: Vladislav Kozyakov, Moscow World Service in English, 2300 GMT, February 11, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-029, February 12, 1991, p. 5).


(4) Albert Carnesale, Acting Dean of Public Policy and Administration at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, takes the analogy one step further. In a July 31, 1991 address at the Naval Postgraduate School, Carnesale characterized the logical outcome of the strategy as the U.S. shifting from policeman, to fireman, and eventually becoming a hermit. Remarks entitled "U.S. Security in the 1990s" delivered at the Sixth Annual Conference on Crisis Stability and the Offense/Defense Relationship: New Challenges for Strategic Programs.


Although details of the President's new national security strategy are still being debated, active duty and ready reserve forces are likely to decrease significantly. According to the initial report in the *New York Times*, the "bottom line" numbers discussed in June 1990 at the White House were: Army, 12 active and 6 ready reserve divisions (currently 18 active and 10 reserve) and 2 "cadre" or reconstitutable reserve divisions; Air Force, 25 active and reserve tactical air wings (currently 36); Navy, 11-12 aircraft carriers (currently 14); and Marine Corps, 150,000 personnel (currently 196,000).

Subsequent reports in the media and the recommended force levels delivered to the Congress by the Administration are slightly higher, and reflect budgetary negotiations that parallel the developing new national security strategy. Force levels discussed in the most recent (September 1991) reports include the following additions and changes: a Navy of 448 ships (down from 545), including 12 deployable aircraft carriers and 1 devoted to training, 13 carrier air wings, 150 surface combatants, with no battleships; a 3 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine Corps of 159,000 personnel with simultaneous amphibious lift for the assault echelons of 2 ½ Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs); 15 active and 11 Air Force wings, and 181 strategic bombers (down from 268) including 75 B-2s.

Army divisions will apparently break down as follows: active component--7 armored, 4 light, 1 infantry; reserve component--5 armored and 1 light with an additional 2 armored in the new cadre division category. As the U.S. government attempts to complete a new budget cycle, we will see numerous other force levels suggested and debated. The June, 1990 *New York Times* report should be viewed in the context of a minimally acceptable force that probably was agreed to by the participants before events in Iraq and Kuwait.

Termed the Base Force, the new force structure advocated by General Powell will be organized into four basic military components: Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive; Atlantic; Pacific; and a Contingency Force; and four supporting capabilities: Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research and Development. This force structure and supporting capabilities are not contained in the President's speech but were developed parallel to and in support of the President's new national security strategy. What constitutes those forces will be debated throughout the next year. These "Forces" are not meant to represent new commands, but rather force packages much the same that "Tactical Air Forces," according to the annual Department of Defense posture statement, includes aviation forces assigned to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Once acquired, these packages would then be available to the existing Commanders-in-Chief in the field.
The Strategic Force

The Strategic Force will initially include those offensive forces that result from START, as modified by the President's national television speech at the end of September 1991. Bush announced that he has ordered the immediate stand-down of alert bombers and those intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) already scheduled for deactivation under START. Previously, START II goals of 4500 and 3000 warheads for each side had been discussed openly—clearly those numbers are now on the high side of our future nuclear arsenal.

Soviet reaction to the President's bold suggestions is eagerly awaited. After the dramatic events of August 1991 in the Soviet Union, it is possible unilateral cuts in the Soviet arsenal may be welcome; a shift in government and internal power may also bring about an abrupt change in deterrence philosophy from war-fighting to assured destruction with minimal forces.

In their February 1991 Congressional testimony, Secretary Cheney and General Powell stated that they were prepared to reduce strategic bombers from 268 to 181, halt the construction of OHIO class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at 18, not retrofit all of those submarines with the more advanced TRIDENT II (D-5) missiles, and consider only the PEACEKEEPER (MX) rail garrison ICBM and small ICBM as research and development programs, without plans for their deployment. President Bush told the nation in September 1991 that the mobile PEACEKEEPER and small ICBM programs will be terminated, retaining the non-mobile small ICBM as the only U.S. strategic nuclear missile program. Admiral Jeremiah told Congress, in March 1991, that the Base Force would include 550 ICBMs.

Reducing the offensive threat dramatically to such lower numbers suggests revisiting the suitability of strategic defenses. General Powell included the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in his American Legion, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, and Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association speeches and his February 1991 article. Admiral Jeremiah outlined the need for SDI in December 1990: "...against an attack by a major power..." and "also against Third World weapons of mass destruction delivered by ballistic missiles."

General Kutyna discussed the need for SDI and the Third World ballistic missile threat in his January 1991 Space Day briefing. He specifically noted Libyan Colonel Quadhafi's April 1990 statement that he would have fired missiles at New York had he the capability, when previously attacked by U.S. forces. President Bush said in his State of the Union address, in January 1991, that SDI would be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes against the U.S., its forces overseas, and friends and allies.

In his February 1991 testimony to Congress and subsequent written report to Congress, Secretary Cheney outlined a reorien-
tation of SDI to a system of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)—indicating that it would be space, ground, and sea-based. When the Soviets first commented on a revised U.S. defense against limited nuclear strikes, they assumed that it would be ground-based. After President Bush's State of the Union address, they quickly picked up on a New York Times report that the new GPALS system would consist of 1,000 land-based and 1,000 space-based interceptors.

The initial objective of GPALS would be protection against accidental, unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic missile strikes. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States notes that with adequate funding, GPALS could protect troops in the field by the mid-1990s and the U.S. itself by the turn of the century. The system should be only half the size of the Phase I plan associated with SDI.\(^8\) In September 1991, the President once again raised the issue of strategic defenses—this time in the context of a limited deployment in cooperation with the USSR. It is likely that strategic defenses will at least continue as a research and development program.

An obvious area that demands clarification is the increased nuclear role for naval strategic nuclear and air forces replacing ground-based weapons withdrawn from Europe. General Powell stated in both speeches in December 1990 that the U.S. remains committed to a triad of offensive forces, but that we would probably increase reliance on sea-based systems. In addition, he stated in his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association speech that "...we must make sure that our residual Strategic Forces are second to none."

The Atlantic Force

The conventional military forces of the U.S. appear to be headed for both reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic Force will include residual forces in Europe, those forward-deployed to Europe, and the continental U.S.-based reinforcing force (including heavy ground forces). The Atlantic Force would contain a significant reserve component. This force would be responsible for Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia, recognizing that in the future the Middle East threat is on a par with that to Europe, thus demanding the same type of response. That this force is not called the European Force indicates both the shift in emphasis of the new national security strategy and the apparent desire to alter the concept for employment, and perhaps command, of the forces normally assigned to the Atlantic, European, and Middle Eastern theaters.

General Powell stated in his December 1990 Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies speech that the residual Atlantic Force retained in Europe would consist of a heavy Army component (defined as perhaps at Corps strength) with supporting air forces. In his testimony to Congress, in February 1991, General Powell stated that the European forward-based Atlantic Force would consist of mechanized and armored ground forces.
In his March 1991 testimony to Congress, Admiral Jeremiah gave the first unclassified breakdown of exactly what was destined for the Atlantic and other Forces. The U.S. will retain in Europe: 2 Army divisions and about 3 Air Force wings. The August 2, 1990 New York Times report discussed 100,000-125,000 military personnel remaining in Europe although, in his September 1991 Congressional testimony, Powell used a 150,000-level to describe the residual quantity.

In his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association remarks, General Powell further stated that forward presence for the Atlantic Force means access in the Middle East, Allied interoperability and flexible command, control, and communications systems, and military assistance programs. All spokesmen have told Congress that there will also be some residual presence in the Middle East. In his September 1991 testimony to Congress, General Powell defined our residual presence as 1 carrier battle group, 1 amphibious ready group, and prepositioned material.

Atlantic Force forward presence will be backed by a powerful and rapid reinforcement capability. In his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association address, General Powell stated that Atlantic Force reinforcement and sustaining forces capability would consist of a mix of active and reserve heavy Army divisions and tactical fighter aircraft. In March and August 1991, Admiral Jeremiah identified that capability as consisting of 4 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre reserve Army divisions, 2 active and 11 reserve Air Force wings, 5 Navy carrier battle groups, 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and the Marine Corps reserve component. Each MEB has a notional force size of 16,000 personnel with 30 days combat sustainment.

General Powell told Congress in September 1991 that the Army active duty reinforcement contribution will be 3 heavy divisions that include roundout (third) brigades from the reserves component. He also said that the Marine Corps contribution to the Atlantic Force had been redefined as a Marine Expeditionary Force—notional force size of 48,000 personnel with 60 days
sustainment. Powell also adjusted the Navy reinforcement capability to 4 carrier battle groups, obviously due to the assignment of 1 carrier battle group to Southwest Asia. General Gordon R. Sullivan, the new Army Chief of Staff, stated, in an interview published in the October 1991 Armed Forces Journal International, that the Army's "III Corps, will be generally designated for Central Europe, although it could go to Southwest Asia."11

The Atlantic Force will be the backbone of America's future conventional deterrence for an area of the world that has dominated defense thinking for fifty years. Although there is no specific reference to dual-committing forces from one theater to another, it should be noted that Japan-based U.S. forces participated in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It should be obvious that if we reduce our residual force in Europe to those outlined above, it would strain them to be dual-committed to the Contingency Force. However, General Powell told Congress, in September 1991, that the concept of "strategic agility" applied to force structure means that European-based U.S. forces will continue to be available for crises outside of the Continent.

The Pacific Force

In September 1990, Lieutenant General Butler stated "...that the U.S. could undertake a prudent, phased series of steps to reduce modestly our force presence in Korea, as well as Japan and elsewhere." General Powell told Congress in February 1991 that "...we can initiate a gradual transition toward a partnership in which ROK [Republic of Korea] forces assume the leading role on the Peninsula. However, should deterrence fail, in-place and reinforcing US forces would still be required to blunt, reverse and defeat the type of short-warning attack that North Korea is still clearly capable of mounting."

The Pacific Force will include a modest and chiefly maritime residual forward-based and forward-deployed force in Korea, Japan and elsewhere in the theater, and reinforcing forces located in the continental U.S. Admiral Jeremiah outlined that modest force in his March 1991 testimony. In Korea, we will initially retain 1 Army division and 1-2 Air Force wings; in Japan, 1-2 Air Force wings and 1 home-based Navy carrier battle group. A Marine Expeditionary Unit will operate in the Western Pacific for most of each year. General Sullivan stated in an October 1991 published interview that the Army's I Corps will be earmarked for the Pacific theater.12

General Powell stated in his December 1990 Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies speech that "the bulk of American Army and Air Force power in the Pacific would be as reinforcements...using Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental United States as springboards." Admiral Jeremiah defined that reinforcement in Hawaii and Alaska as a light Army division (probably the 25th Infantry Division), an Air Force wing, and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. He stated that in the continental U.S.,
there would be an additional MEB and 5 Navy carrier battle groups and that the modest reserve components in Alaska and Hawaii would be allocated to the Pacific Force. In his Congressional testimony in September 1991, General Powell stated that the Army contribution might eventually be 2 divisions, but that this subject depended upon how the Alaskan and Hawaiian reserve component was organized.

The fate of the Marines on Okinawa also remains unclear. Powell said that the overall Marine Corps contributions to the Pacific Force included a Marine Expeditionary Force—adding, however, that it would be forward-deployed. The Marine Corps does not even currently forward-deploy a MEF in the Pacific. Perhaps the Chairman meant that a MEF would be assigned to the Pacific Force and that a Marine Expeditionary Brigade would be forward-deployed.

In his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association address, General Powell stated that "In short, the Pacific Force would continue our very successful economy of force operation in this critical region." It is unlikely that the modest-sized Army and Air Force Pacific Force assets would have a dual-commitment to the European theater in a revitalized "swing strategy" but it is clear that any substantial land war in Asia would require "borrowing" forces from elsewhere.

Is there a need to retain expensive overseas bases in the Philippines, and elsewhere, under the new strategic concept? If the Cold War was our original justification for the presence of large forces in the Pacific, and if the Cold War is over, then it is ended in the Pacific as well. This was suggested also by former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in his statement to the Second International Conference on "The Asia-Pacific Region--Dialogue, Peace, Cooperation," in Vladivostok, in September 199013 If forces and bases are to be permanently retained overseas, it should be for other reasons, and those reasons should be clearly articulated and debated in Congress. The Congress and American public may well ask why the U.S. should remain unilaterally committed to defend nations which are not obligated to assist the U.S. in its own defense. If the U.S. significantly reduces its forces in Japan, there is a possibility that effective arguments will be provided to increase the size and/or capability of the Japanese Armed Forces. Any such possibility will be watched very carefully by China and many other Western Pacific nations.

The Contingency Force

Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the Chairman's recommended force structure is idea of a Contingency Force based in the continental U.S. For the present, existing Commanders-in-Chief will still retain their own forward-stationed and deployed forces for immediate contingency response. Continental U.S.-based contingency forces will be available, as a quick-response force, to assist CinCs as well as to provide significant conventional
capabilities for those areas of the world not covered by the Atlantic or Pacific Forces; i.e. South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and island nations. It is also possible that the Contingency Force may provide forces for South Asia.

Soviet criticism of a unilateral U.S. crisis response force was to be expected. In unofficial commentary by political analyst, the Soviets stated that: "No questions would be asked if the new fire brigade force were created within the framework of the United Nations and their military committee and manned by troops from different countries. Such a force could then act as a powerful factor in support of a new world order." 14

Continental U.S.-based contingency response forces are not a new idea. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services experimented with a series of similar schemes, eventually abandoned by the Kennedy Administration. A U.S. Strike Command existed from October 1961-December 1971 as a Unified Command. Similar arrangements involved varying commands have, from time to time, been responsible for the Middle East and South Asia.

Once the U.S. Army created a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) consisting of 2 divisions. Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) as well as Navy and Marine Corps units, not otherwise allocated to other Commanders-in-Chief, were assigned to the U.S. Strike Command. Similarly, the old Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was another precursor to the proposed Contingency Force. U.S. planning for contingencies should also benefit from the experiences of France's Force d'Action Rapide (FAR)--formed as an additional component to the French Army in 1983--with a mission similar to the proposed Contingency Force.

The Contingency Force will have a very small reserve component; primarily of airlift and supporting forces—not combat capability. According to General Powell's Congressional testimony in September 1991, the Army will commit 5 divisions15 and Air Force 7 wings to the Contingency Force. General Sullivan said in an October 1991 published interview that the Army's "XVIIIth Airborne Corps would be a worldwide contingency force." 16 According to the Army Posture Statement, contingency response divisions will be structured to sustain deployments for about thirty days without augmentation by reserve components.

The Air Force will overhaul its internal structure to be more responsive to regional threats. A new "Air Combat Command" will take the place of the existing Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command. A new "Air Mobility Command" will replace the Military Airlift Command. 17

A Marine Expeditionary Force, most of the rapid response sealift and intertheater airlift will also be available to the Contingency Force. The Navy will apparently provide dual-committed forces from the Atlantic and Pacific Forces. Special Operations Forces appear to have a role both with the Contingency
Force and the Commanders-in-Chief. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment additionally included the following in their definition of the Contingency Force: Army airborne, air assault, light, and highly mobile heavy divisions, Air Force long-range conventional bombers, and Navy attack submarines.

Lieutenant General Butler provided the following detailed description of how the Contingency Force would function. The first stage of a Contingency Force, to be used in what he termed a "graduated deterrence response," and, for program planning purposes, would consist of (in the order stated): (1) Army light and airborne divisions, (2) Marine Expeditionary Brigades, (3) Special Operations Forces, and (4) selected Air Force units. At his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association speech, General Powell used a different order: (1) light Army forces, (2) mixed Air Force and Navy units, (3) Marine Corps units, and (4) units from the Special Operations Command. The Air Force has made a strong case for the use of continental U.S.-based airpower to respond to future crises.

According to Lieutenant General Butler, this initial component of the Contingency Force would be buttressed as necessary by: (1) carrier forces, and (2) amphibious forces. Normally the Navy prefers to promote the frequent call on carrier forces for immediate crisis response, and listing these forces in the second component of the Contingency Force probably reflects the land orientation of the concept. It would be wholly illogical to assume that the U.S. will require fewer responses by carrier battle groups in the future--indeed, a solid case can be made that we will send the fleet more often in the future.

The listing of amphibious forces in the second tier seems appropriate, reflects recent employment of the Marine Corps, and is consistent with General Al M. Gray's, the former Commandant, publication Warfighting (FMFM 1) on maneuver warfighting doctrine and shift in identification of Fleet Marine Forces from "Amphibious" to "Expeditionary." Warfighting's lack of significant use of the word amphibious is indicative of a shift in service self-identity. On the other hand, General Gray later claimed that "this type of operation [amphibious] can achieve objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare." Amphibious capabilities must be retained by the U.S. but in the context of tactical or operational-level regional contingency operations rather than a major strategic-level assault on Europe--General Powell's statement regarding the forced entry amphibious capability for the Atlantic Force notwithstanding. If another D-Day type invasion were ever required of American forces, amphibious forces would be among the forces reconstituted and built, as during World War II.

The third tier of the Contingency Force appears to be heavier forces with the capability for long-term sustainability. Again, we have seen this application in Operation DESERT SHIELD.
On April 16, 1991, Major General Fred E. Elam, U.S. Army, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, testified before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials "...that evolving national strategies require that the Army have a capability to simultaneously deploy two armored divisions anywhere in the world from the US within approximately 30 days."21

Admiral Frank Kelso, U.S. Navy, told Congress, in February 1991, that a Base Force, 451-ship Navy, deploying about 30 percent of the available fleet, could provide an immediate response to a crisis anywhere in the world within 7 days. It would comprise 1 Amphibious Strike Task Force, consisting of 1 carrier battle group and 1 Amphibious Ready Group with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit. A second carrier battle group could be available within 15 days. A full Marine Expeditionary Brigade could arrive within 30 days.22 Hence, the most the sea services could deliver to a crisis area within a week under this plan is a token force capable only at the tactical-level of warfare. Within a month, the sea services could deliver a force with only about the firepower equivalent of an Army light division and few wings of aircraft--again only capable of tactical-level warfighting. Surely the Army and Air Force could deliver more capability within the same time frame as this--depending upon assumptions made about host-nation-support.

It would take the sea services a 40 percent deployment rate to respond to a regional conflict with a more robust combat capability: 3 carrier battle groups and a full Marine Expeditionary Force. This type of force could be capable of operational-level warfighting and perhaps opposed entry against a sophisticated enemy. With the costs of providing such a high deployment rate, it is unlikely that the Navy will recommend such a posture--given its desires to replace aging hardware. Deployment rates in excess of 40 percent are necessary for the sea services to simultaneously respond with 3 carrier battle groups and 1 MEF in one location and another carrier elsewhere.

Although the sea services logically could have been considered the core of the new Contingency Force,23 the Army and Air Force can argue that they can provide faster airpower and combat capability anywhere in the world. Indeed, there have been arcane informal suggestions by Air Force personnel that their new composite wings can be expressed in terms of carrier battle group equivalents! The new composite wing to be formed at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, will be designed for quick air intervention anywhere in the world - and if necessary to return to the continental U.S. The wing at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, will be paired with the Army's 82nd Airborne Division.24 Assuming that the U.S. will involve itself in overseas contingency operations only with the cooperation of host nations, and with the support of coalitions, then the Air Force/Army response may appear more cost-effective.
The clue to understanding the new crisis response portion of the new national security strategy is that it is not keyed to one service, or even to the active component having a unilateral capability. Future crisis response appears to be a joint responsibility with a mix of active and selected reserve units.

**Transportation**

According to General Powell, transportation is one of the major supporting components to the new national security strategy. Mobility programs proposed by the Secretary of Defense in his annual report included the ability to return to Europe with 4 Army divisions, 30 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons, 1 Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and their associated support within 10 days. Additional forces would be provided within 2-3 months. The Department of Defense will continue to build toward prepositioned equipment in Europe for 6 Army divisions and their associated support elements.

For contingencies outside Europe, the goal is to provide 5 Army divisions, together with associated air and naval forces in about 6 weeks. Ground units would fly to a future crisis, much as forces assigned to Operation DESERT SHIELD did to Saudi Arabia. Personnel will then either be married with prepositioned equipment or with equipment that arrives via sealift.

Prepositioning for ground and air forces is part of the complete package that must include intertheater lift. The equipment that must be prepositioned for even a light Army division, essentially a duplicate set, will probably make prepositioning a less attractive alternative to the Army than fast sealift. When addressing fast sealift, the military must make a tradeoff between speed and tonnage.

The U.S. is obligated to retain sufficient lift to support immediate contingency operations by either the Atlantic or the Contingency Forces. Lift requirements for the Pacific Force are less clear. Initial lift requirement will probably include the capability to continue concurrent but staggered operations but it is unlikely that funding will be provided for simultaneous crises, given the years of failure to provide lift for a 1½ war strategy. The March 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment states that the U.S. can deploy forces in all program scenarios except: (1), when two regional contingencies occur sequentially or concurrently; and (2), in the early weeks of a short-warning war in Southwest Asia.

Lift capability disclosed during Operation DESERT SHIELD will be studied and may result in new requirements and possibly additional assets. The U.S. already has special lift assets and a robust prepositioning program, but may learn from recent experience that modest increments of additional lift or prepositioned equipment are required.
Lift will probably include a modest government-owned capability in a caretaker status and civilian air and sea transportation assets engaged in normal peacetime trade. The U.S. generally met its lift requirements for Operation DESERT SHIELD with a combination of existing assets, those taken from trade, and charters of foreign vessels. The new national security strategy will probably make similar assumptions.

Air and sealift for a major NATO war in Europe is in the category of forces that could be reconstituted during the two-years' warning that future program planning now assumes is available. Reconstitution of lift should include: that provided by allies, charters from foreign non-aligned sources, and the activation of assets in storage. It will be hard to justify the retention of older, World War II-era ships, as a part of a restructured National Defense Reserve Fleet.

Unilateral Capability?

Among the more interesting questions regarding the continental U.S.-based Contingency Force, and potential crisis intervention by the Atlantic or Pacific Forces, is whether the planning assumptions include the ability for the U.S. to operate unilaterally. Are the force reductions envisaged by the new strategy so deep as to make the participation of host nations and allies a prerequisite for U.S. military action? Although Secretary Cheney told the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, in February 1991, that the U.S. "will retain the ability to act alone," the March 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment assumes that host-nation-support and sufficient infrastructure is available for any major regional contingency. At the end of April 1991, General Powell told the Defense Base Closure Commission that: "Frequently, access ashore will be contested or unobtainable, requiring employment of sea-based forces."

"Acting alone" must be viewed in terms of the level of warfare being discussed--strategic (a major war such as World War II), operational (campaign sized similar to Operations DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM), or tactical (similar to the invasion of Grenada or Panama); and whether such operations are essentially nuclear, maritime, or air/land warfare. The U.S. will probably reserve the right, and maintain the capability, to take unilateral conventional forces military actions at the tactical-level, but probably not at the strategic- or operational-levels of air/land warfare. In other words, the strategy only calls for a modest unilateral tactical capability, about that provided by an Amphibious Strike Task Force or Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPPF) Marine Expeditionary Brigade. If the U.S. remains committed to maritime superiority, then it could still mount a unilateral theater campaign at sea.

However, it should be assumed that the U.S. could not unilaterally mount an opposed contingency operation or campaign such as DESERT SHIELD with the Base Force. Further, one could argue, that the U.S. probably does not have this operational-level
capability today. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were careful in their testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, in February 1991, to project that the Base Force could handle an Operation DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM but that it might have taken longer before the forces were prepared to go on the offensive. This answer assumes, however, that such operations are coalition-based, and not unilateral.

The U.S. long has assumed that a major war (at the strategic-level) would be pursued only as a part of alliances, such as NATO—hence there is no real change at this level of warfare. Indeed, continued good working relations with allies is a specific goal of the new national security strategy and a vital building block for the reconstitution of a substantial U.S. military presence in Europe. Similarly, the U.S. has always maintained a unilateral capability at the tactical-level of warfare and there is no reason to assume that it will not do so in the future.

The Administration amplified its views on this issue, in the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States, presumably after the military pointed out the significantly different force structure required for the varying assumptions. The White House document states that the U.S. must be prepared for "differing levels of support from host nations." This includes the necessity to:

"deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where prepositioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be available (at least before a crisis) and where there is a less developed industrial base and infrastructure to support our forces once they have arrived. Our strategy demands we be able to move men and material to the scene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force."

If the U.S. desires a unilateral capability to intervene in the world without host-nation-support, on the order of an Operation DESERT SHIELD, then the current force structure will remain high—perhaps too high to absorb the imminent budget reductions. If the budget drives the problem, we are less likely to field a force that can intervene without the assumption of host nation and coalition support. This issue will probably be a major focus of discussion during the next budget year.

Notes

(3) In this report, the supporting capabilities of transporta-
tion, reconstitution, and research & development are discussed at
length. Space, however, has not been developed. In his September
1991 testimony to Congress, General Powell included the following
under the supporting capability space: electronics warfare,
intelligence, surveillance, navigation, command control and
communications (C^3), antisatellite, antiballistic missile sys-
tems, operations, and satellites.

(4) See results of an interview with General George Lee Butler,
U.S. Air Force in, Larry Grossman, "SACs [Strategic Air Com-

(5) General Donald J. Kutyna, U.S. Air Force, address to the
"12th Western Conference and Exposition - Space Day - San Diego,
CA - 24 January 1991," OASD/PA [Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense/Public Affairs] #91-0294, 23 Jan 91, annotated slides
54-57.

(6) "Text of the State of the Union Address," Washington Post,

(7) TASS report by Vladimir Chernyshev in English at 1805 GMT,

(8) Vladimir Chernyshev report, Moscow TASS in English, 1922
and Vladislav Kozyakov commentary on Moscow World Service in
English, 2300 GMT, February 14, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-033, February

(9) For additional details, see "The President's New Focus For
SDI: Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)," distrib-
uted by the Department of Defense's Strategic Defense Initiative

(10) Examples used by Army General Colin L. Powell in his April
1991 testimony before the Congressional Defense Base Closure
Commission included the: 1st Infantry Division (ID) from Ft.
Riley, KS, 4th Mechanized ID from Ft. Carson, CO, 5th Mechanized
ID from Ft. Hood, TX, and the 194th "Armoured" Brigade from Ft.
Knox, KY. General Powell used the new home bases for all units
in his testimony.

(11) LuAnne K. Levens and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "An Exclusive
AFJI [Armed Forces Journal International] Interview with: General
Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, United States Army," Armed
54.

(12) LuAnne K. Levens and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "An Exclusive
AFJI [Armed Forces Journal International] Interview with: General
Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, United States Army," Armed


(15) Examples used by General Colin Powell in his April 1991 testimony before the Congressional Defense Base Closure Commission included the: 82nd Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, NC, 101st Airborne Division from Ft. Campbell, KY, 7th Light ID from Ft. Lewis, WA, and the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division from Ft. Stewart, GA. General Powell used the new home bases for all units in his testimony. In his September 1991 Congressional testimony, Powell stated that two heavy divisions were included. The press reported, in August 1991, that a reactivated 3rd Armored Division, the "Spearhead Division, will become a part of the new Contingency Force. See: Melissa Healy, "Army to dissolve 2 German divisions," The Herald [Monterey, CA], Friday, August 16, 1991, p. 7A.


(27) "Part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet is no Longer Needed," Statement of Brad Hathaway, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, Before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy, Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, GAO/T-NSIAD-91-44, July 11, 1991, 8 pp. and 2 slides.
U.S. forces in Europe, and elsewhere, cannot be changed without considering long-term commitments to allies and the planned employment of American resources in combined operations under NATO command. Most Europeans initially assumed that the U.S. Army and Air Force would either remain as a major element in-theater, or maintain large standing active or Ready Reserve forces which could return to Europe within a reasonable period. This may not be the case, and America's promise to return may be only quickly with a smaller existing active and reserve force mix, and after two or more years with reconstituted additional forces.

While the U.S. is considering major changes in strategy and forces, so is NATO. The July 1990 NATO London Declaration stated that "NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed." The July Declaration stated that the Alliance too was preparing a new "military strategy moving away from 'forward defense'...towards a reduced forward presence..." The declaration also stated that "NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces" and "will scale back the readiness of active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises."

General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), told the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), in December 1990, that he envisages a change in his primary combat mission from flexible response and forward defense to crisis response. NATO forces appear to be recast in three levels: (1), Reaction Forces available for crisis response without major mobilization; (2), Main Defense Forces consisting of in-place Central European Army corps; and (3), North American, primarily, and some European Augmentation Forces. These forces are still under study, are dependent upon the outcome of Alliance discussions on a revised strategy, and have not yet been finalized. Initial indications for NATO forces are as follows:

The Reaction Force will apparently have two categories: Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The IRF will be centered around a standing multinational and rapidly deployable forces modeled on the existing brigade-size Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. These forces will be at the highest state of readiness and be able to respond within 72 hours to a contingency with around some 5,000 personnel.

RRF forces will be built around a multinational corps. This corps would become available in 5-7 days for crisis response to reinforce the Immediate Reaction Forces with a more substantive combat capability. The Rapid Reaction Force would include 1 heavy armored British division, 1 light armored British division, 2 new multinational divisions, parachute forces, commandos, and marines. The U.S. might contribute as much as 1 division.
The Main Defense Force of some 4-6 Central European national and multinational corps would consist of an active duty covering force, termed the Ready Maneuver Force, and a large reserve contingent. The Ready Maneuver Force would constitute the first forces available for an expanded crisis. Generally, the Main Defense Force appears to be sized to meet the threat of a significant contingency in Europe. Should these forces not be able to support political decision making or a threat appear that resembles the old Soviet theater strategic offensive operation, then additional forces will be mobilized and regenerated or reconstituted.

Augmentation Forces of some 20, or so, divisions would generally be available only after strategic warning and would be dependent upon dual-committed strategic lift. The size of the planned Augmentation Force would obviously have to be flexible enough match the threat that would be posed in a Soviet reconstitution scenario. Some of the Augmentation Forces include part of the Ready Maneuver Force and would be available for crisis management. Figure 2--New NATO Defense Organization, based upon the limited sources available thus far, outlines this new concept for NATO military forces.

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**FIGURE 2**

**NEW NATO DEFENSE ORGANIZATION**

Reaction Force
- Immediate Reaction Force (IRF), brigade-size, available within 72 hours
- Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), 4-5 divisions, available within 5-7 days

Main Defense Force
- Ready Maneuver Force, 4-6 divisions
- Reserves

Augmentation Force, 20+ divisions

Source: The author

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NATO initiatives include more emphasis on mobility and multinationality. Multinational corps with 2 or 3 divisions from different countries parallel existing arrangements for multinational maritime forces. Multinational maritime arrangements may be expanded to other areas and to include other types of forces. General Galvin told the International Institute for Strategic Studies that he would present his third draft of a revised force structure to the Chiefs of Defense staffs in April 1991. He
speculated that NATO would field about half of its existing force levels in the Central Region with about the same forces in the North and South.

Although NATO is attempting to reach an alliance-wide agreement on force structure, many NATO nations are undertaking unilateral force reductions. Germany is reducing its forces to 370,000 personnel, about half of whom will be placed in the reserves. France is withdrawing all its 55,000 officers and men from Germany. The United Kingdom announced a plan to reduce the British Army on the Rhine by about 50 percent, demobilizing most of the troops but retaining regimental identifications. There are reports of additional unilateral cuts. These unilateral decisions by member nations will have dramatic impacts on the NATO war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief plans for military operations and campaigns in the event of war.

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe's realistic residual U.S. force for Europe apparently is 1 corps (2 divisions), 3½ Air Force wings, and the Sixth Fleet (which includes around 20,000 personnel ashore). Planning in Europe should include the possibility of an eventual total withdrawal of American combat units from the continent. Were this to happen, would other allied NATO ground forces remain unilaterally forward-deployed, and if so, where?

The NATO London Declaration and General Galvin's Defense Planning Committee remarks indicate a new NATO war-fighting strategy is being drafted to replace the current strategy of flexible response (MC-14/3). The strategy perhaps may be identified as MC-14/4 or have a new series designation to signify the fundamental changes that it reflects. The new overall NATO strategy will be based upon newly calculated national commitment force levels. It is not clear if NATO's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), primarily a land theater and under the command of an Army general, will take the lead in the development of a new NATO maritime concept of operations, in his areas of responsibility (which includes the Mediterranean), or leave that to his maritime counterpart—the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

Unilateral programming actions for future forces being undertaken by individual NATO nations, like the U.S., will obviously affect the warfighting strategy that NATO as a whole can implement as those programmed forces become operational. Current national programming actions may stem from revised national views on war, the threat, or the resources available for defense, or any combination of these. This has happened in the U.S.

NATO is attempting to obtain a quick consensus on its war-fighting strategy so that national programming actions will support its new strategy, rather than limit it. In October 1990, General Galvin reminded us that MC-14/3 took nearly six years to write and be approved and that the General Political Guidance for the employment of Nuclear Weapons took fifteen years. NATO's
Supreme Allied Commander Europe stated, in addition, that the NATO process "...has to be completed within a year, or at most a couple of years."

The Soviets, who have undergone a similar change in military doctrine and strategy, are anxious that NATO complete this process as soon as possible. Soviet Army General Vladimir N. Lobov, now Chief of their General Staff, stated after attending an elaboration of the strategy at the Spring 1991 North Atlantic Assembly session in Rotterdam that, "It is sometimes said in our country that we are disarming unilaterally and there is no reaction from NATO. This meeting showed once again that such opinions are erroneous."

General Galvin told the International Institute for Strategic Studies in February 1991 that he would present the new strategy before the Chiefs of Defense staffs of all the nations at their meeting in April 1991. Later reports indicate that a draft document "The Strategic Concept of the Alliance" has been completed and was to be submitted for discussion to the Military Planning Committee at the end of May 1991 and to the Council the following November.

The new NATO strategy will be based upon paragraph 20 of the London Declaration. According to General Galvin's remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, NATO strategy will be responsive to peacetime, crisis, and wartime demands. Peacetime elements will likely include: enumeration of national prerogatives, maintenance of alliance cohesion by integration and multinational forces, intelligence and verification of arms control agreements, forward presence, active and reserve forces training, force generation preparation, and interaction with non-NATO forces.

The crisis response strategy will likely consider: readiness for Reaction Forces, the quick reaction of the alliance to emerging crises, communication with adversaries, planned sharing of risks and burdens, escalation and deescalation, and preparations for controlled mobilization and demobilization. New political realities require an enhanced political component to crises that erupt in the NATO area. For example, the initial reaction to a crisis in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic might include the NATO German Corps deployment including avoiding contact with remaining Soviet troops. The political goals of a future crisis appears to be to control and deescalate.

NATO strategies will likely not be so strongly based upon the threat; they will reflect the need to defend NATO member states territory or NATO interests. If interests are to be defended, this involves NATO in out-of-area operations--something the Allies have traditionally been reluctant to formalize as an Alliance role. There is an open debate on whether NATO should assume this role, or whether such a role should exist under some other umbrella organization--or at all? Out-of-area operations
in Eastern Europe by Reaction Forces has been criticized by the
Soviet media.\footnote{15}

There appears to be a definite difference in the use of the
term "reconstitution" by NATO and as envisaged by President Bush
and Secretary Cheney. NATO officials have been talking in terms
of mobilization over a longer period rather than the creation of
wholly new forces. A similar problem exists even in the U.S.
The U.S. Army uses the term "reconstitution" to mean both a
return of operationally deployed units to pre-hostilities levels
of capability as well as to rebuild forces as envisaged by Secre-
tary Cheney.

Reconstitution, as understood in the U.S., makes no sense
unless NATO is prepared to receive the military forces from the
continental U.S. In other words, if the Europeans have no similar
programs in parallel to match a revived Soviet threat, then it is
unlikely that the Bush Administration could gain the support of
the Congress to fund reconstitution in the U.S. There are some
indications that reconstitution against the two-year plus Soviet
threat is a "dead" issue in Europe and, in fact, will not be
funded.\footnote{16}

All of the following actions are necessary: national pro-
gramming planning to deal with future national force levels;
national war planning to outline current plans to commit forces
to NATO and for actions by forces retained under national com-
mand; and NATO war planning to deal with current and future
forces they expect to commit to the Alliance. It is very likely
that initially, there will be significant differences between the
strategies articulated for each case.

Notes

\footnote{(1) This section draws upon my article "America Promises to Come

\footnote{(2) "NATO Transformed: The London Declaration," \textit{Selected Docu-
ments}, No. 38, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State,
containing the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic
Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participat-
ing in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on July 5-6,
1990.}

\footnote{(3) General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, NATO Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR), "SACEUR DPC [Defense Planning Commit-
tee] Remarks, Brussels, BE, 6 Dec 90" transcript, 4 pp.}

\footnote{(4) Excerpts of testimony of General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army,
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, May 9, 1991, con-
tained in \textit{SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe]}
Officers' Association Newsletter, No. 86, August 1991, pp. 16-23;


The New Soviet Union

Underlying any reexamination of America's role in the world and America's or NATO's basic national security strategy are the monumental changes in the international security environment in recent years. Strategies are designed to cope with implied or explicit threats; the profound changes in the threat, therefore, have direct bearings on the strategies that the U.S. and NATO need and will develop.

Has the Soviet threat to the U.S. and NATO gone away? Is the danger of a superpower war so remote today that we should shift our strategic planning focus to contingency operations and non-military threats? Do events in Yugoslavia cause alarm in the West and raise the specter of a fragmented Soviet empire with multiple nuclear actors or a central core that lashes out from its deathbed? Once the breakup of the Soviet empire is complete, will a new strong central government take its place and will this one be just as great a threat to the West as the past one? The danger of war with the USSR still exists, although the type of war that we have all considered the old main line possible future war scenario is not nearly as of much interest today as it was a few years ago.

Military Doctrine

A pre-coup defensive draft Soviet military doctrine and draft military reform plan, consistent with the new doctrine was openly published and widely discussed in the Soviet and Western literature. Under the draft doctrine, the USSR renounced war and the use or threat of military force to settle any political, economic and ideological differences. The USSR committed itself "...to not begin military operations (voyennyye geystviya) against any state..." except in response to an attack.

The draft military doctrine went so far as to state that the USSR did not regard any people as its enemy, had no territorial claims, and did not strive for military superiority. The draft stated that the USSR wanted to reduce armed forces to: "...a minimum agreed-upon level so that in providing for its defense, no side would have the means and capabilities for a surprise attack on the other side and for conducting large-scale offensive operations." The draft doctrine, however, also reserved the right of the USSR to make maximum use of any military capabilities for stopping aggression aimed against it or any state allied with it. The draft doctrine appeared to accept that defense of the USSR will consist of defensive military operations originating from within its own territory. It did not state that the USSR Armed Forces have any defensive mission external to the homeland.

Both the August 1991 coup and the Soviet view of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM will affect what happens to the draft military doctrine and reform—neither of which had been
fully implemented by the time of the coup. At the time of writing, it was not totally clear what that affect would be; however, initial indications from Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, the new Soviet Defense Minister are that defensive defense and the concept of sufficiency will remain intact.

Having published a new military doctrine, the Soviet Union was undergoing a thorough discussion of its military-technical aspects. This debate will obviously have to be restaged once they have identified the new political leadership of the Soviet Union, or whatever replaces it. This discussion will effect the reformulation of Soviet military art, strategy, operational art, and tactics.

Some aspects of the previous draft military doctrine, however, give a clear indication how the Soviets think about war. For example, the draft specifically identified the principal military danger as the high levels of military confrontation, the U.S. military-political policy of "from a position of strength," and the presence of foreign military bases and forces around the territory of the USSR. The draft also stated that the danger of the initiation of local wars has not been eliminated. The Soviets do not talk about war in the abstract—they are quite precise in the types of war that they fear, need to prepare for, and have dismissed as impermissible in the future.

For example, the major Soviet sociopolitical characteristic or class of war is a "war in defense of the homeland." Wars are in defense of national independence are always just wars. Such wars have not been renounced by the leadership of the Soviet or Russian governments. Preparation for wars in defense of the homeland are the objective raison d'être for all national armed forces. Even if the USSR breaks up into multiple and capitalist political actors, there will always be a requirement for the defense of the homeland.

War involving the USSR is still possible. Figure 3, Soviet Character/Classification of War, illustrates the various Soviet-termed sociopolitical characteristics of war and their possibility in the near future. A "must" rating of probability is given to wars in defense of the homeland since all nations must plan for this eventuality, no matter how remote the possibility. A "high" rating for the internal use of the Soviet military against its own people is given due to recent events in the USSR. Wars in support of allies is listed as "declaratory" since the draft military doctrine specifically states that the USSR reserves the right to participate in such endeavors.

The Soviets also characterize war by its military-technical characteristics. For example, war is either global or local. Traditionally, Soviet military doctrine has assumed that a future war with the U.S. would automatically assume a global character. There have always been differences in opinion (in the USSR and the U.S.) concerning whether a war with the U.S. could or should be limited to a single theater of origin.
Another Soviet military-technical characteristic of war is whether it is nuclear or conventional. Despite Soviet pronouncements that nuclear war can serve no political purpose—implying that it should not be fought—a just nuclear war fought in defense of the homeland is still possible and must be planned for by the Soviet Armed Forces. Other types of nuclear war that must

FIGURE 3

SOVIET SOCIOPOLITICAL CHARACTER/CLASSIFICATION OF WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of occurrence</th>
<th>Just</th>
<th>Unjust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USSR Defense of Socialist Homeland
- Defense of national independence X Must Must
- In support of allies X Declaratory Must
- Defense against internal reactionaries X High Low

Support for National Liberation Wars
- Freedom & Social Progress X Low Moderate
- Against aggression X Low Moderate

USSR Support for Revolutionary, Civil Wars
- Liberation from exploitation or national oppression X Low Moderate

USSR Imperialist Wars*
- Protection of state sovereignty of capitalist country from imperialist aggression X Must N/A
- Suppressing liberation struggle X Low N/A
- Capture foreign territories X Low N/A
- Enslaving/plundering other peoples X Low N/A
- Defense of reactionary regimes X Low N/A
- Against socialist states X Low N/A
- Between capitalist nations X Low N/A

* This section reflects the author's judgment on the probability of imperialist wars if the USSR becomes capitalist—a "not applicable" (N/A) category prior to recent changes.

Source: The author

51
be planned for are: accidental or inadvertent nuclear wars, local nuclear wars (with China, for example), and nuclear escalation out of a crisis. In addition, the Soviets must continue to be interested in nuclear war as a hedge against the possibility that their current arms control efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 will be unsuccessful. What the Soviet political leadership actually renounced was not all nuclear war but rather only nuclear-rocket war on a scale that would equate to a world war.

Figure 4, Soviet Military-Technical Character/Classification of War, presents the author's judgment of which types of war have

**FIGURE 4**

**SOVIET MILITARY-TECHNICAL CHARACTER/CLASSIFICATION OF WAR**

Source: The author
been renounced or affected by recent political events and which type have not. The categories that appear in boldface appear to have been either renounced or made more difficult to execute due to recent political changes. The implication for U.S. and NATO politico-military planning is that war between the U.S. or NATO and the USSR, or whatever replaces it, is still possible and therefore must be planned for.

Strategic Missions

The major strategic goals and strategic missions of the Soviet Armed Forces in an armed conflict have been openly discussed in the Soviet military literature for numerous years. There is some Soviet literature evidence, however, that these traditional strategic missions have been revised in accordance with the new defensive military doctrine. Any changes in U.S. or NATO military doctrine or strategy must take these new Soviet strategic missions into account.

Figure 5 graphically depicts these new missions and place the Soviet Armed Forces within them. Figure 5 shows the connection from military operations/actions at the strategic-level of armed conflict to the combat operations/actions at the operational- and tactical-levels. Original Russian words are contained in parentheses where appropriate to ensure that the reader can correctly place key phrases in this diagram.

It appears that the traditional strategic missions of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the criteria for successful completion of those missions, have undergone significant revision. Formerly, total defeat of the enemy's armed forces in an armed conflict was demanded as the military's contribution to the overall war effort. Under a defensive doctrine, the revised military requirement is to defeat the invading force and to prevent vertical and horizontal escalation, or the escalation of the conflict over time. This change in requirement is a major change in Western planning assumptions regarding the Soviet threat.

In a November 1989 interview, the late Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev offered some very specific views on how long this defensive period would last. He implied that the role of the defensive, during the first few weeks of the initial period of a future war, was to allow the political leadership the opportunity to terminate the crisis before it erupted into a major armed conflict and war. If the political leadership failed, Akhromeyev implied that the military would then be unleashed to perform their normal function of crushing and decisively routing the enemy.

The draft defensive doctrine also attempted to deal with this issue of how long the defensive period would last. It stated that "defense is the principal form of military operations with the beginning of aggression. Subsequent operations by the USSR Armed Forces are determined by the nature of the enemy's military operations and depend on means and methods of warfare he
FIGURE 5

POSSIBLE NEW SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC MISSIONS

WAR--Achieves Political Goals by Using

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Econ Means</th>
<th>Dipl Means</th>
<th>Ideolog Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict</td>
<td>Intell Means</td>
<td>Sci/Tech Means</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Military Operations/Actions - Strategic Scale
  (Voyennyye Deystviya)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Operations</th>
<th>Campaigns</th>
<th>Battles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Strategicheskaya Operatsiya)</td>
<td>(Bitva)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repelling Enemy Aerospace Attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces &amp; Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO/Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroy missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroy aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat naval platforms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-SSBN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW/Anti-surface</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Suppression of Enemy Mil-Econ Potential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Forces &amp; Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Missile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strikes (Udar) SRF/Navy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Single/Group/Massive</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Aviation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Space</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy (Anti-SLOC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character/Time &amp; Sequence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive/Defensive/Counter-offensive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Initial/Subsequent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Simultaneous/Successive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruct of Grouping of Enemy Armed Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces &amp; Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Arms/Fleet</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups of Fronts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offensive/Defensive/Counter-offensive</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time &amp; Sequence of Execution</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Initial/Subsequent</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous/Successive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Combat Operations/Actions -- Operational & Tactical Scale

ASW=antisubmarine warfare  SLOC=sealines of communications
SSBN=nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
PVO=Air Defense Troops  SRF=Strategic Rocket Forces

Source: The author
is using." The draft also revealed that the defensive mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the event of aggression is to repel it, defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and create "conditions for the most rapid cessation of war and the restoration of a just and lasting peace."

A previous debate within the framework of Soviet military science covering the initial period of a war may prove instructive on the topic of initial defensive operations today. During 1922-1941, questions arose regarding how long border skirmishes and diplomatic exchanges would last prior to total mobilization. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi K. Zhukov, in his memoirs, gives the interwar years planning interval as "several days" while Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiley D. Sokolovski writes in his Military Strategy that the initial period might have lasted 15-20 days.11

The political/ideological goal of traditional post World War II Soviet war termination strategy was to ensure that the aggressor could not again threaten the USSR, and that progress was made toward eventual peace ("mir") and a world socialist order. The political goals for war termination are now to prevent nuclear holocaust and simultaneously ensure the survival of the homeland (socialist or other).

Soviet Military Reform

Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, then-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR First Deputy Defense Minister, announced in November 1990, a series of significant Soviet military reforms that parallel actions being taken by the U.S., NATO, and the general European community of nations.12 Moiseyev's interview was followed by publication of the previously cited "USSR Ministry of Defense Draft Military Reform Concept." Although this draft reform plan will be revised in the post-coup environment, it indicates just how far the former Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, and Chief of the General Staff were willing to go prior to August 1991.

The first stage of the planned reform was to last until 1994 and consist of the complete redeployment and resettlement of Soviet troops now based on foreign soil. The second stage (1994-1995) was to consist of the formulation of strategic groupings of armed forces on Soviet territory with a new system for training and mobilization. The third stage was to last from 1996-2000. In this stage, further reductions, reorganizations, and reequipping of forces will take place.

By the year 2000, according to the draft plan, strategic nuclear forces were to be cut 50 percent (with additional cuts possible), ground forces by 10-12 percent, air defense forces by 18-20 percent, air forces by 6-8 percent, and administrative, research, and other combat forces by 30 percent. The number of generals to be cut was 1,300, officers 220,000, and warrant officers and ensigns 250,000. The overall armed forces was to
number 3-3.2 million personnel—down from 3.9 million. Military authors tended to tie such drastic reductions to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; rendering a military force incapable of conducting offensive strategic operations should not occur until the total worldwide destruction of all nuclear weapons.¹³

The number of nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union possesses will fall dramatically. The "sufficiency" of strategic nuclear forces was defined in the draft military doctrine as:

...the nuclear potential necessary for delivering a retaliatory strike, the consequences of which would wipe out any of the aggressor's advantages; such sufficiency is considered an intermediate state on the path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

There has been a significant amount of Soviet literature evidence, since 1987, suggesting that the measure of 400 equivalent megatons of survivable and deliverable nuclear combat potential, is not only appropriate for the United States but also for the USSR.¹⁴ Others have suggested that around 10 per cent of the existing force to survive START, or around 500-600 weapons is more appropriate.¹⁵ A real minimal deterrence posture of "tens" of warheads surfaced early in the debate and appears to have gained renewed interest.¹⁶ Some spokesman have suggested that the GaulList model of a force d'frappe is perhaps appropriate for the new Russia, initially as a stage enroute to total abolition.¹⁷ As far as the former Minister of Defense Marshal Yazov was concerned, a fully defensive military doctrine and strategy could only occur in a nuclear-free world!¹⁸

The U.S. Department of Defense stated in as early as September 1990 that "...a short-warning or pre-emptive strategic nuclear attack against the continental United States for the foreseeable future...is judged to be unlikely."¹⁹ The 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that: "Despite the threat still posed by the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons, the likelihood of their deliberate use by the Soviet state is declining and the scenario which we frequently projected as the precursor of their use—massive war in Europe—is less likely than at any other time since World War II."²⁰ Obviously, the President's unilateral actions in September 1991 to reduce our nuclear alert rates and operational nuclear forces means that he has judged the possibility of a "bolt-from-the-blue" attack by the USSR to be much lower than before.

However, existing offensive Soviet nuclear forces far exceed that necessary for delivering a retaliatory strike—even under the "worst-case" for the USSR. Defensive systems and an aggressive research and development program to improve those defensive systems are strong evidence that the Soviets have never accepted the mutual vulnerability required under mutual assured destruction (MAD). Critics of this excessive Soviet nuclear capability may have to learn to live with this state of affairs until such
time as the USSR is able to reduce its force structure. An offensive-capable Soviet nuclear force does not automatically indicate an offensive military doctrine or strategy. Critics should remember that once the U.S. had total strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR—within an overall defensive military doctrine and strategy.

Perhaps the most startling "new thinking" about Soviet military reform was the proposal by a senior Soviet, General-Major V. Ivanov, attached to the General Staff Academy that appears to have gained renewed support in the post-coup USSR. In this proposal, the Armed Forces of the USSR restructure themselves into three basic contingents, which show a remarkable resemblance to President Bush's new national security strategy and General Powell's Base Force structure. General-Major Ivanov's proposal also appears to be entirely consistent with the subsequently published draft Soviet military doctrine. The USSR appears to be discussing its own version of an active, reserve, and reconstitutable force and strategy.

The first contingent, in General-Major Ivanov's proposal, would comprise forces in a state of permanent high combat readiness. It would consist, in part, of new military services called the Nuclear Forces and Space Forces. The Nuclear Forces would comprehend the existing Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as appropriate units from the Air Force and the Navy. Space Forces would include existing Air Defense and Antisatellite Forces. These new services would remain under the direct control of the Supreme High Command.

The first contingent would also consist of highly mobile Ground Forces, whose strength and composition could change depending upon the international politico-military situation and the economic potential of the USSR. This force size would be sufficient to resolve a conflict in an individual region until relieved by forces of the second contingent. The draft military doctrine referred to such a concept and specified that: "the first strategic echelon consists of troops of the border military districts and fleet forces. Troops of internal military districts form the strategic reserve."

Prior to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR deployed slightly more than half (56 percent) of its Ground Forces divisions, some 170 divisions and 2 brigades (2,901,000 personnel), to the defense of state borders in the Western Theater of Strategic Military Actions (TVD). The Soviets deployed 56 divisions and 2 brigades in the first echelon of its border-defense armies. Each first echelon division was responsible for some 100-120 km of the border when it followed mountains or rivers and 25-30 km in the most important axes. There were 52 divisions in second echelons and 62 divisions in reserve deployed some 25-75 km from the state border. The General Staff's May "1941 State Border Defense Plan" also provided for additional reserves in interior military districts. These reserve forces
would be used to deliver counterthrusts and man defensive lines 100-150 km from the new state borders.

The requirement for the future first contingent of Ground Forces, under General-Major Ivanov's proposal, does not appear to include the capability for offensive military operations at a theater strategic-level—hence it will be necessary to compare the Soviet experiences in the Great Patriotic War with future force levels. General-Major Ivanov gave estimates for a first contingent force of only 1.2-1.3 million servicemen allocated between the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense and Space Defense Forces, and the Navy. Command and control would remain with the High Command of Forces in the TVDs.

The second contingent, according to General-Major Ivanov's proposal, would consist of an additional 630,000-man reserve force. Up to 1/3 of the first contingent would form the nucleus of the second contingent. Hardware and weapons for these reserves would be stored at depots and bases. This contingent would form the large strategic formations necessary for major military operations in a war. The second contingent could probably mount an offensive theater strategic military operation—but before it was organized, strategic warning would be provided.

The third contingent would embrace, in part, some 300,000-350,000 additional men undergoing between 5-6 months training for national service. The men would then serve for an additional 5-6 months with either first and second contingent forces, or a longer period in newly organized republican units, probably similar to the U.S National Guard. Call-up will take place twice a year. These forces would augment troops in the field should war erupt. A second part of the third contingent would consist of these new republican units. The total strength of the third contingent would be some 600,000-700,000 servicemen.

General-Major Ivanov's proposal for reorganizing the Soviet military is but an example of a continuing internal debate over the programming for new forces. Among the many articles that appeared during this debate was one that was authored by General of the Army Vladimir N. Lobov—now the Chief of the General Staff. In this article, Lobov was critical of the concepts of defensive defense envisaged by the draft reforms. Another article by a civilian academic also criticized the USSR Defense Ministry "Concept of Military Reform" for being too offensive and failing to take into account doctrinal, strategy, and force structure changes going on in the U.S. and other foreign nations.

Some other literature evidence provides significant details on what was visualized by some civilian academics as a defensive military doctrine—important because military leadership was involved in the August 1991 coup and may now have to change their position in the programming debate—(emphasis added):

In the area of conventional arms, defense must be not only and not so much positional as it is mobile. It includes
meeting engagements, counterstrikes, flanking strikes and a counteroffensive with the objective of driving an invading aggressor from one's own territory.

For conventional armed forces, the main indicators are not only the quantity levels and qualitative characteristics of weapons but also deployment, structure and strength and possibilities of strengthening. At the tactical level, the same divisions, their arms and combat equipment can carry out offensive as well as defensive operations, whereby both may be required for defensive strategy. But at the strategic level (that is, at the level of fronts and groups of forces at the scale of a theater of war) as well, it is quite possible to delimit offensive and defensive orientations. If the forces are spread out along a forward edge, this most likely indicates a defensive strategy. If the forces are concentrated in strike "fists" in individual sectors of the front, then one can conclude that there are offensive plans...

...From the point of view of defense, it is optimum to have troops at the forward edge deployed along a front (or in threatened sectors) in fortified defensive lines and an offensive reserve (second echelon) in the rear for a counterattack so as to close a possible penetration and repel the enemy. The stronger the defense at the forward edge and the more serious are the reciprocal measures of the two alliances to restructure their military potentials under defensive principles, the smaller is the necessary size of the counteroffensive force and the deeper it can be deployed in the rear without causing fear on the other side...

...the mission of the armed forces and conventional arms is to carry out not offensive strategic operations in the main theaters of war in Europe and Asia but defensive actions for the purpose of disrupting the offensive operations of the enemy; a prolonged conventional war is impossible and the mission of the armed forces is not to permit a victory of the enemy in intensive short combat actions and not to allow nuclear escalation with impunity.

In a startling post-coup article, General Lobov modified his previous criticisms of the defensive nature of the draft reforms and embraced a series of actions that strongly resembled those originally proposed by General-Major Ivanov. Lobov stated that the USSR would have to fundamentally review military doctrine once again, provide for a cost-effective defensive military that was not a burden for the country, and account for the new role for republics. Lobov went so far as to say that the Soviet Union does "...not regard anyone as an actual enemy..." and that their "...defensive measures will not cause anyone any anxiety." Finally, he declared that the Soviet Union would embrace a deterrence strategy that hinted at punishment rather than denial of war aims as the method.
The debate is not over, however, and many military leaders today retain their "old thinking" from the days that they were first socialized into the Army and it is this type of thinking that we would have to face if there was a war today. During the Civil War, the Red Army was forced to use former Tsarist officers because they were the only Russians who had been trained and educated in military strategy. Even if the USSR breaks up into multiple republics with independent armed forces, it is likely that a majority of the officers in those armed forces will have been educated in and retain an affection for the "old" Soviet military strategy and thinking.

**Impact on Western Theater of Strategic Military Actions**

It is also appropriate to analyze the impact of these changes on the Soviet Commander-in-Chief of the Western TVD. NATO is aware of the capabilities of Soviet hardware, military exercises and deployment, and military-technical aspects of military doctrine, indicating a real strategy and capability for offensive warfare by the Western TVD Commander. Employing this offensive capability was termed, by the Soviets, a theater strategic military operation. The Manchurian Operation they fought against Japan near the end of World War II strongly resembled the theater strategic operation of which we believed the Soviets capable of recently.27

In the Western TVD, initial offensive military operations by a front were assumed to achieve advance rates of 40-60 kilometers per day to a depth of 600-800 kilometers.28 A normal frontal operation lasted about 15-20 days, meaning that overall, two fronts should have handled all of Western Europe in about 25-30 days. NATO took this threat seriously and prepared its own forces and counterstrategy accordingly.

It is not clear whether the Soviets ever saw themselves as the fierce warriors the West did. They had a much clearer picture of deficiencies in the military-industrial sector, that have only now become apparent to the West. They recognized the incipient problems if they attempted a theater-wide military operation with a simultaneous surge effort by multiple fronts. It is doubtful that they even felt capable of managing such a theater strategic offensive using sequential operations.29

With the nagging self-doubt in their ability to manage a theater strategic military operation before the sweeping recent political changes in Europe, the problems are infinitely more complicated, with the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Even if Soviet forces remain in Poland for a few years, the Western TVD Commander cannot count on former-Warsaw Pact nations committing their armed forces to Soviet command. Indeed, the Western TVD Commander probably assumes that Eastern European military forces would oppose a Soviet forced reentry.
The Western TVD Commander cannot advise his political leadership that, under current or likely future conditions, it is possible to launch offensive military operations at the theater-strategic-level, against Europe with any degree of confidence in successfully completing his assigned mission. The Western TVD Commander is probably driving his staff to develop new plans for the defense of the USSR from within their own borders and perhaps their forced and opposed reentry into Eastern Europe.

These observations made about the Western TVD dovetail remarkably with the draft Soviet military doctrine and the draft military reform. We have often seen Soviet deeds belie Soviet words, when they previously spoke of a defensive doctrine but clearly maintained forces for an offensive strategy. The Soviet Union is moving towards re-positioning all its ground forces within its borders, absorbing the first blow from an adversary, then having the capability and military strategy to repel the invasion to the Soviet border but not cross and continue the counteroffensive in enemy territory.

If NATO, or its member nations, finds themselves in an armed struggle with the USSR (under any circumstances), do they know what their new political goals will be? For example, should the West have military plans, in the event of an armed struggle, to overthrow the existing border republic governments? Would the Soviets try to do this to its former allies, now neighbors, in the new national security environment? Can either side use its military forces to achieve that objective anymore?

New Roles for the Soviet Navy

It is to land-oriented military strategy that we must first look to in order to properly understand Soviet Navy roles and missions. Soviet Navy roles and missions have been recast in terms of the new defensive doctrine and strategy. What this means for the Soviet Navy is that first-strike damage limitation by nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines is disavowed and that the fleet will conduct defensive fleet operations (operatsii) in bastions which may even be closer to the shore than we once assumed.

It is fairly obvious to see the impact of the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces from Eastern Europe and the specific reductions in Ground and Air Forces on land warfare capabilities. It will also be fairly obvious to see the impact on nuclear strategy of the negotiated and coming other reductions in nuclear forces. It will not, however, be quite so easy to understand the new roles and missions for the Soviet Navy and we have already seen some of the Western sea services--and especially retired officer community--to argue that the threat at sea is still there, no matter what is going on ashore.

If the shift to defensive strategy truly involves the Soviet Navy, then we should see evidence in the form of hardware emphasizing antisubmarine warfare helicopters, short- or mid-range
land-based naval aviation, and small coastal patrol ships instead of long-range Bear F aircraft, aircraft carriers, and supporting open-ocean battle groups. The Soviet (or Russian) Navy should immediately end its forward deployments of naval forces that can be construed by the West as being "first-strike" nuclear forces targeted against the U.S., its overseas bases, or its allies.

Despite the lack of significant change in fleet hardware to date, we must consider that without a capability to consolidate victory ashore, the offensive Soviet Navy that we see today can be construed as a "defensive" force. Just how offensive is it anyway, without significant sea-based air power and at sea sustainability? Remember, the most offensive naval force ever amassed, the U.S. Navy, is understood without question to be part of an overall defensive military strategy. Despite our might at sea, NATO armies were simply capable of the type of defense that the Soviets are moving towards—repulse of the aggressor and restoration of prewar borders. The military-technical characteristics of war include its pace; hence there will be a requirement for the conducting of both short and long wars, although there may be funding shortfalls for the more expensive long war. Navies are a hedge against the long war.

Implications for the West

The message for the West is that if reorganization plans like this are implemented, and reductions in military capability include strategic nuclear and naval forces in the future, then Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's promise to eliminate the threat has come true. The changes in strategy envisaged by President George Bush and by NATO are appropriate under such an international security environment.

Even if the Soviets are found to be cheating on the margin with regard to Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and other future arms control and confidence building measures in Europe, we should ask ourselves if they are in the position to once again mount the old theater strategic offensive operation? When confronted with that question, CFE "cheating" may more correctly be seen as an inability to provide exact numbers and locations which will be corrected when requested. When testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 25, 1991, General Galvin, U.S. Army, stated that two-thirds of all the Soviet military equipment moved east of the Urals, which have been described as non-complying, has been left to rust if not already partially or totally destroyed.

Learning how the Russians think and calculate the correlation of forces and means and coefficient of control must be of the highest priority to our intelligence community. They will then face the arduous task of explaining the Soviet perceptions to political and military decision makers who will not be as aware of the differences and will be tempted themselves to automatically "mirror image." If the Soviets appear to be oriented toward output measures, dynamic assessments, and other complicat-
ed non-Western measures, then we must deal with these measures as the Soviets or Russians see them. We must now consider the questions stemming from "what if peace?"

Notes


(8) Boris Kanevsky and Pyoty Shabardin, "The Correlation of Politics, War and a Nuclear Catastrophe," Moscow International Affairs in English, No. 2, February 1988, p. 96 (the original Russian version of this article appeared in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn in October 1987).


Issues For Discussion

The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numerous, complex, and require discussion. Among the most important are: how likely is the President's new national security strategy to appeal and take hold; how do we define our new goals and objectives for both program and war planning; what are the lasting impacts of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; what are the new requirements for the intelligence community and for decision-making? What is reconstitution? What are the investment strategy and industrial aspects of the new national security strategy: research and development, technology requirements, and the impact on stockpiles? Answers to these questions will certainly have an immense impact upon Department of Defense organizations and the need for a special transition period. Finally, there are obvious implications for arms control and military operations research and analysis. This section responds to the obvious questions, and perhaps suggests what else might be included.

Is the New Strategy Real?¹

It may be instructive to review another Presidential unveiling of a major programming strategy to seek parallels. When President Ronald Reagan announced his concept for SDI in March 1983 he explained how the U.S. and its allies planned to defend themselves against an attack by Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. Both President Reagan's and Bush's speeches unveiling their new strategic concepts were just that; visions of a new strategy to be debated and possibly adopted—not necessarily an announcement of new governmental policy.

The strategy associated with SDI would be possible only if the Congress purchased the weapons systems associated with it. It would have been wrong to assume that current U.S. or NATO strategy was immediately changed to defend the U.S. against intercontinental ballistic missiles, since neither the U.S. nor its allies had defensive forces which could engage such missiles.

Just as in 1990, in 1983 there occurred a series of briefings and speeches by supporting officials following the President's vision of a new defense doctrine. Then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger delivered a major speech explaining the basic concept.³ A Blue-Ribbon panel of experts was commissioned to study the possible applications of technology to the strategy, and initial results of their deliberations began leaking to the public in late 1983. Not until the programming documents were delivered to Congress in February 1984 was the strategy for defense of homeland and allies under SDI fleshed out in official documents.⁵ Indeed, strategic defenses in the previous set of programming documents provided no hint that a new initiative was being contemplated.⁶
Unlike the 1990 case, in 1983 the civilian academic community appeared to mobilize almost instantaneously and publish both supporting and critical assessments of the new doctrine, mostly newspaper Op-Ed pieces. It was months later before the public saw more comprehensive treatments of the strategy and associated technologies. There was widespread interest in the technologies associated with SDI, primarily because of the opportunities for procurement business with the government and opportunities to work in the vanguard of science. What is less well recognized, however, was the great deal of "study money" used to flesh out the strategic concepts.

We should assume that President Bush's Aspen speech will also lead to substantial "study money" to flesh out the concepts he discussed. What remains to be seen is whether the studies will be completed before 1991 budget actions or faster than significant international events unfold. Recent events in the Middle East shelved or sidetracked much internal examination of the new national security strategy and the expected critical evaluation from those outside government.

Under the American form of government, the announcement of a policy by the Administration is not necessarily an announcement of government policy. Indeed, SDI, although feared and attacked by the Soviet Union, and probably the cause for major decisions in the Soviet budget, never developed beyond an initiative, and full-scale evolution or deployment may not yet be feasible. On the other hand, the Bush Administration has been successful in working with the key power bases in Washington to push policies through with a minimum of debate.

Another case of a new strategic vision is also instructive. Both candidates George Bush and Michael Dukakis appeared to embrace the "competitive strategies initiative" during the last presidential campaign. The Annual Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Years 1987 through 1989 included sections devoted to competitive strategies. Competitive strategies also appear in the 1987 edition of the White House's National Security Strategy of the United States and in the United States Military Posture FY [Fiscal Year] 1988, prepared by the Joint Staff. Competitive strategies, still an initiative, has never attained full policy status in the Executive branch of government and receives barely a mention in the 1991 annual posture statement by the Secretary of Defense. Despite having an extremely powerful weapon to use against the USSR today, the economic weapon, the West is not only not using this weapon but is actively trying to bail out the Soviet Union.

In short, before any new initiative becomes a funded government policy, vested domestic interests and America's allies will have opportunities to make their desires known. Whether they succeed in becoming a player in shaping America's new national security strategy and Base Force structure will depend upon their political prowess.
Parliamentary governments, common among our NATO allies, may have some advantage in completing a comprehensive review of strategy and redirection of defense programs. Hence, it may be easier for NATO nations to respond to this U.S. initiative and international events than it will for the U.S. to take action.

A good example of the verities of parliamentary forms of government, compared to the American government, in making major defense policy changes, is the review of the master strategy for Australian defense forces conducted from 1985-1987. In February 1985, the Australian Minister of Defense, Kim Beazley, employed noted strategist Paul Dibb to examine the current capabilities of the Australian Defense Force, describe the current strategic environment, set defense priorities and strategy, and define the appropriate future force structure.

Dibb issued his report in March 1986 and, after an adequate period for analysis and criticism, the government issued its own version in March 1987.8 Concepts first outlined by Dibb were adopted by the Australian government, after a serious but brief (by American standards) debate and adjustment. They were then carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the Australian Defense Forces.9 Such a relatively orderly process seldom occurs in the U.S., and we should not expect debate over the President's new national security strategy to remain either bloodless or limited to American domestic political actors.

Defining Goals and Objectives in Programming and War Planning10

Political-military strategic planning generally commences with: (1), a tabulation of the resources likely to be available, or (2), an assessment of the threat, or (3), an examination of the goals and objectives to be attained. The planning process can start with any of these factors but it generally starts with different ones, depending upon the type of planning underway--war planning for immediate combat operations or program planning for budgeted forces to be delivered in the future.

In wartime, planning often starts with a tabulation of the resources available--probably how the military started the process on December 8, 1941 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor put significant portions of the Pacific Fleet out of action. Existing plans for war with Japan had to be revised based upon the numbers and types of surviving forces. Initial goals were limited by the resources available.

In wartime, nations may also turn first to an examination and analysis of the threat, especially when faced with the need to create major strategic plans insufficiently researched before the war. The USSR likely did this after the Germans invaded on June 22, 1941. Prior to being invaded by Germany, insufficient attention had been paid to fighting the Germans on Soviet soil on the strategic defensive. The Soviet military was forced to develop plans in short order and execute them according to a revised threat scenario.
War planning may also start with an examination, analysis, and reconsideration of goals and objectives. The U.S. and the Soviet Union had initial goals and objectives they attempted to achieve in the initial stages of World War II. Generally these were limited by the newly revised resources available and the actual threat demonstrated by enemy capability. Later, however, the allies amassed sufficient forces to operate on the strategic offensive in all theaters and recognized that "unconditional surrender" was a possible goal. War plans could then be devised with primary consideration given to goals and objectives rather than resources and the threat. This also underscores that goals and objectives can, and often do, change during wars.

Much of the literature devoted to defense planning does not, however, concern actual war planning, but rather program planning, used to explain to legislators and the public why certain types of weapons systems and forces should be purchased and maintained. There is often some overlap between the initial program plans and subsequent program plans—but not always. For example, the USS MIDWAY was justified in 1940s programming plans to help defeat Japan. War plans in the 1980s included the USS MIDWAY defending Japan. Similarly, program plans after March 1983 included SDI but war plans written that year could not.

Program planning under the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), in the U.S., officially starts with an examination and identification of the threat. There have always been implicit unofficial discussions of the range of resources available and a general consensus on goals that preceded the threat examination. The consensus on goals is what is being discussed in the President's new national security strategy.

Current U.S. and Soviet program planning has been drastically affected by the change in perceptions of the threat facing them. After decades of reliance on military preparedness to guarantee peace, each side apparently understands that what it considered reasonable steps for self-defense were perceived by the other side as evidence of aggressive intentions. The American public, and therefore the Congress, has revised their world view, and let it be known that the levels of programming expenditure devoted to the Soviet threat are no longer required. It seems that the major driving factor behind the President's new programming strategy is the need to present a viable plan to maintain national defense in a climate of greatly reduced resources.

Program planning logically should start with goals and objectives but, in the past, this has rarely occurred. In general, a fundamental reexamination of goals and objectives has not been necessary given the generally stability of politico-military relations between the superpowers. Due to the major changes in the international political climate, we should also expect to see the U.S. debate whether its program (or even wartime) planning should include unilateral capabilities, or automatically assume
standing alliance or ad hoc coalitions and host-nation-support. There is a tremendous difference in programming based upon the assumptions made on this question.

Although the U.S. and NATO never had the opportunity to develop war plans a milieu that included forces envisaged under SDI, there is no need to delay immediate revisions of war plans for existing forces. There are significant changes in the international environment, especially the threat, and an urgent need to reduce defense expenditures—hence plans can be changed now. According to the National Security Strategy of the United States, we have apparently already begun to alter the planned employment of strategic nuclear forces.

We should be addressing the need to target facilities and forces in nations that clearly are no longer enemies? It is a fair assumption that we once targeted Soviet nuclear forces deployed in Eastern Europe. Presumably, we have technical ways to preclude nuclear warheads from exploding in the former German Democratic Republic now that this territory is part of a NATO member nation. We should apply common sense to the nuclear targeting of other national areas. Soviet nuclear forces are deployed in only four Soviet republics: Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan.1

What political benefit would be gained from targeting areas where restless nationalities are already struggling against the national (Union) government in the USSR? Will the Soviet military assume that these areas and Eastern Europe are "safe havens?" Will the USSR create targeting plans for areas in formerly allied nations? Can both sides change their targeting fast enough to respond to rapidly changing political events? Do we have to render inoperative certain warheads in missiles with multiple warheads to both meet our objectives of destroying military targets yet avoiding collateral damage?

The Soviet press covered an initial and limited report in the Washington Post that the Strategic Air Command and Pentagon have revised the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) to delete 1,000 targets in Eastern Europe. According to Soviet sources, the new plan, termed SIOP-7, "hastily" deleted these targets last year.13 Another, more in-depth, discussion of the major shift in U.S. targeting is contained in a later Washington Post report.14 This shift in targeting strategy was severely criticized in the Soviet media for not having gone far enough in reflecting the changed political circumstances in the world. According to President Bush's September 1991 address to the nation, we will immediately lower our alert posture and reduce our operational strategic nuclear forces—necessitating additional major changes to existing nuclear war plans.

When assessing the possible targets for nuclear weapons in an actual war, the key considerations should be: the political objectives of the war; the required military campaigns and actions that are necessary to achieve strategic goals expected to
attain these objectives; the time schedule by which one hopes to meet these goals; and the price that one is willing to pay in order to achieve them.

The ability to dominate the decision to escalate vertically, horizontally, in time, or to another medium of warfare, is a significant political advantage that the U.S. gave up in the 1960's. It is also an advantage that we chose not to once again seek, attainable perhaps following the end of the Cold War and in the aftermath of the August 1991 coup in the USSR. In fighting a future war, the U.S. will probably be unable to dominate the escalation decision and thereby control escalation or war termination. The U.S. should not allow actions to be taken during the conventional phase of a future war that would place the Soviet Union into a position where it can do so.

In the conventional realm, there is an obvious, immediate need to revise existing war plans--since NATO now controls both sides of the Fulda Gap. Indeed, General Galvin told the Defense Planning Committee that "it is clear that the old General Defense Plan is useless, and I have already rescinded it." NATO has now been asked for assistance to defend a member nation, Turkey, from a non-Warsaw Pact threat--Iraq. Did plans for that contingency exist? There are obvious components to conventional war planning that should be revisited and need not await programming decisions.

Conventional war planners also should be changing the focus of their efforts, from the "big" war with the USSR, to the regional contingencies outlined in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment. War planners have traditionally devoted most of their efforts to planning for the most demanding and least likely scenarios--they should now devote the bulk of their efforts to the most likely and less demanding. This redirection will not come easily and may require different types of expertise. New contingency plans are needed soon so that program planners can have Commander-in-Chief inputs to force requirements, i.e. the forces desired for contingencies may not be the same as we procured for the "big" war.

Conventional war planning in the U.S., unlike nuclear war planning, has generally been done by professional military forces, without significant direct civilian involvement. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the warfighting Commanders-in-Chief should reconsider this situation and seek active interaction with the civilian community to make meaningful contributions and immediate changes to conventional war planning.

Specifically, strategists, political scientists, area studies specialists, economists, etc., probably can all provide the military immediate assistance and advice to adjust current planning scenarios and war and contingency plans. The military traditionally has performed this task in-house, but with the phenomenal changes in the international security environment and the
preoccupation of the bureaucracy with Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, assistance from the "outside" may be required.

Most "experts" in strategic planning have been educated and worked with a fundamental assumption being an implied threat that no longer exists. Put another way, if our fundamental threats are economic and non-Soviet, the government needs to supplement, or replace, its Soviet and European-oriented strategic planners with those whose expertise lies elsewhere. Complicating this problem is the current lack of education and experience in the skills of politico-military strategic planning by most economists and non-Soviet or European area specialists.

Left to their own devices, the bureaucracy may be tempted to ensure that current war plans support planned future programs and the existing organizational structure. Many civilian "outsiders" who could help are the numerous government employee faculty members at the war colleges, service academies, research laboratories, and similar institutions. These individuals are not from "outside" the government and many have requisite security clearances and a great deal of expertise.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff already recognizes that a revolution has occurred in the international security environment which requires the immediate transfusion of expertise from the civilian community to the military. We cannot afford the indulgence of waiting for new officers who recently studied these affairs, to cycle through the graduate education and war college processes; nor is the contracting and consulting community the government's best source for new ideas. This involvement by civilians in military affairs already occurs with nuclear program and war planning, and general forces program planning. Although proposals for such involvement from individuals within the Pentagon have been made before, they have always been defeated.

NATO nations and the USSR should intermix their civilian academic communities with military planners. It is my experience that some other armed forces and perhaps even the intelligence communities are more comfortable with this model than is the American or Soviet military. This is not the time to draw distinctions between who should be involved in the debate over fundamental goals and objectives. In World War II, the U.S. and allied armed services drafted, or otherwise secured, the services of academics who had years of area experience that the military lacked. The social, political, and economic upheavals in the world have not been seen by the existing bureaucracy. Now is the time to repeat the involvement of outsiders.

An alternative model would be for the military to allow or invite the political leaders of their nations to dictate the revised goals and objectives. While there are some political leaders and many advisors available to discuss and decide nuclear strategy issues intelligently, most civilian leaders lack the requisite background in conventional warfare to know what is
possible and what is not. The military perspective is that the military must participate in the debate. The military should also involve civilian specialists in areas from which they traditionally have been excluded.

In addition to these questions, we should address the type of individual involved in this major overhaul of the defense planning assumptions? The military should provide individuals who can both represent service interests and capabilities and appreciate the task at hand. This exercise cannot be just another interagency meeting, with compromise likely and one service holding the entire process hostage to their threats or objections.

This review will have serious repercussions in existing force structures and established plans for future forces. It is going to hurt, and will require officer participants willing to place their allegiance to country ahead of combat arms or service parochialism. These individuals exist in the peacetime services, generally already networking outside of official channels. Perhaps we could review our entire system for training and educating weapons systems acquisition managers, and more fully integrate basic political science type issues that were assumed constant in the past.

Problems with the quality of Department of Defense strategic planning and personnel have been discussed frequently. They should have been solved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and two administrations committed to implement this legislation. The fundamental review of national military strategy will severely test this assumption. The low level of inter-service infighting made public over Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM indicates that there has been success in this area.

Past problems occurred at all levels: with political appointees, within the services, or both. Some political appointees have caused problems because of their relative inexperience, high turnover rates, and lengthy vacancies. The position of Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) during the Reagan Administration remained unfilled for an extended period following the resignation of Dr. Fred Ikle. Past friction between the experienced military and the relatively inexperienced political appointee could be exacerbated when those political appointees preside over the "olesale dismantling of a military machine that senior officers spent their entire careers building and defending.

Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

A decade ago, when the U.S. initially prepared contingency plans for its Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, many observers feared that the deployment of significant military forces to the Middle East would move forces simultaneously committed to the defense of Europe. War planners feared an outbreak of hostilities in the Western TVD at the same time U.S. forces were arriving in Southwest Asia. That nightmare would tax America's capa-
bility to redeploy forces, or deploy forces remaining in North America, to Europe in time to influence the war. Despite some 541,000 U.S. personnel deployed in early 1991 to Southwest Asia, and the new force levels associated with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, there was a dearth of commentary from Europeans worried about this issue. If we could afford to place more combat troops in the Middle East than we had in Europe at the height of the Cold War, should we not assume that European NATO nations have accepted the diminution of those forces in Europe to deter a war today?

Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated that the U.S. could muster sufficient assets from the continental U.S. to meet a major contingency where there were no forces in being. Indeed, General Powell drew this parallel as early as December 1990 in both his speeches at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies and the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association. Brigadier General Daniel W. Christman, U.S. Army, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the U.S. Army Staff, has also drawn a parallel between Operation DESERT SHIELD and our new contingency-based strategy. Interestingly, he credits former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, U.S. Navy, with initiating the current redirection of U.S. national security strategy.

The initial deployment of forces in Operation DESERT SHIELD also seemed to demonstrate that such a force does not require basing overseas in Europe, although additional forces were redeployed from Europe and other locations to the Middle East. The developed ports, airfields and petroleum available in Saudi Arabia and the geographic vulnerability of Iraq may not be convenient at future contingency locations, let alone such an exemplary villain or six unmolested months to build up forces--cautioning us to exercise caution in using these Operations as models for the future. It will take careful analysis of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to make a definitive statement on the issue—but we should review the President's new national security strategy and the associated force structure now that these Operations have run their course.

Some initial studies of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM purport to also analyze what they term as "the U.S. military's new regional contingencies strategy," without demonstrating that they have fully internalized the implications of the President's new national security strategy. Instead, they often refer to previous studies and make prescriptive recommendations rather than really analyzing the consequences of what has been charted by the Bush Administration. The first official Department of Defense reports on these Operations concentrate on the military conduct of the conflict rather than their impact on the new national security strategy.

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM after-action reports will try to ascertain which systems appeared to make a difference in the political and military outcome? Successful use of the PATRIOT
anti-missile system has already suggested to many the value of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems for the continental U.S. The corollary to this old lesson is that events of seemingly little military import, i.e. the launching of an Iraqi SCUD missile, can have an enormous political significance that demands military action.

Systems that did not make a major contribution to Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM should be reevaluated for upgrading, cancellation, or replacement. Under the new national security strategy to reconstitute capabilities useful in a Europe-centered global war with the USSR, there will be no need to retain systems that do not have a dual-use in the Contingency Force.

There appear to be a number of obvious areas for research concerning lessons learned. Among the more obvious are whether a land campaign was truly required, or could our objectives have been accomplished with airpower alone? Since the destruction of Iraq's nuclear weaponry figured so high in the American public's support for Operation DESERT STORM, should we continue to consider nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the same warfare category, or, single out nuclear weapons as the most important? Are reserve air forces staffs needed if they will never be deployed?

What lessons do the Soviets claim they have learned from our experience? Both sides will obviously study the lessons learned, especially of the Air Campaign, and see if adjustments to military art are required. If the lessons are that significant, we can expect to not only see the U.S. consider revisions to the new national security strategy, but also the Soviet Union start their internal military doctrine debate anew. At least one major lesson should have been learned by the USSR; that the politico-military behavior of the U.S. cannot be predicted (responding to the threat to Saudi Arabia with troops and public support for that response to include an offensive military campaign). Even in retrospect, most politically-aware American "experts" still would not have predicted the Bush Administration's actions and public support for those actions during the events in the Persian Gulf.

There is a significantly reduced life expectancy for the equipment used in the desert for the recent Operations. Should the reserves be reduced as a result of the new national security strategy and Base Force, what do we do with the excess equipment? Another significant impact of Operation DESERT STORM will be a significant alteration in the resources assumed to be available for defense programming. When the new national security strategy and Base Force were initially discussed by staffs in Washington, planners simply could not have known the level of military activities that would be undertaken shortly in the Middle East, the need to replenish stocks of war materials and equipment, and the costs involved with cleaning sand from our equipment, mobilizing reserves and providing for post-conflict veteran's entitlements
--to name a few. In essence, if the driving force for the new national security strategy was a realization that defense dollars will decrease, then DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM may add to the problem.

New Requirements for Intelligence

The changes suggested by the Bush Administration, if accepted by the U.S. Congress, will place an enormous burden on the intelligence community. Although one might argue that logically, concomitant with such fundamental changes intelligence appropriations should increase, it is probable that they will decrease like defense spending.

President Bush's Aspen remarks are programming remarks and do not reflect changes in the current defense plans for the U.S. or U.S. forces which would fight today under NATO. The intelligence community should provide all of their traditional services until the new international security environment takes hold. This action should satisfy critics who will complain that we are overlooking the Soviet threat or that the events that we see in the USSR are simply a ruse or represent an attempt to secure a breathing space prior to a massive rearmament. In short, there is a current intelligence requirement that remains well focused on the existing Soviet threat.

In addition to providing intelligence products concerning the USSR to support current war planning, the intelligence community must also provide new products to support programming for the future Atlantic Force. For example, we need quick, rough answers to approximations of how much the USSR will devote in the future, or is devoting, to defense, given other needs. Naturally, the intelligence community has been attempting to provide this information all along but, with new information available, we can perhaps refine our assessments. Similarly, we need to identify the new international goals and objectives that serve as the requirements for future Soviet forces. Perhaps the time has come to game jointly, with the USSR, the deescalation of crises. Before dismissing this suggestion out of hand, the reader is reminded that General Powell did not rule out the possibility of joint exercises with the Soviet Armed Forces when he and Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, were interviewed by American Broadcasting Company newsman Ted Koppel on "Nightline," July 25, 1991. If we do international wargaming with the USSR, we will need to "game the game" beforehand to not give away more than we expect to learn.

Most of the U.S. and NATO national intelligence communities are oriented toward understanding and countering the Soviet threat. Although it took many years, the West eventually grew sophisticated at understanding the Soviet perspective on doctrine, strategy, arms control, and the like. Our intelligence agencies and associated policy offices are substantially less competent at analyzing, predicting behavior, and conducting net assessments for the rest of the world. Obviously that situation
is already remedying itself vis-a-vis Iraq, but there remain many areas of the world for which this conclusion is true. The Contingency Force will need strong supporting intelligence capabilities.

We need more in-depth intelligence capabilities for wide-ranging areas of the world. Deficiencies should be corrected, and quickly. Can the intelligence community prepared to provide players in seminar and war games who can represent the behavior of nations other than our traditional enemies? The failure by the U.S. to capture North Vietnamese behavior with "red" team players in late 1960s - early 1970s politico-military war games has been addressed before. We recently felt comfortable enough with our knowledge of the USSR to create artificial intelligence-like models to represent Soviet behavior in expert systems that substituted machine actions for human behavior. Are we ready to do this for non-Soviet actors?

Flexibility is essential in shifting intelligence assets from one set of collection targets to rapidly emerging priority targets to support the contingency response element of the President's new national security strategy. Continued unimpeded access to space underlies support for the use of American military forces and has been identified by General Powell as one of the key supporting capabilities.

Intelligence activities include more than collection and analysis. There is the arcane area of counterintelligence; actions taken to thwart the activities of foreign intelligence services. As the Soviet military withdraws from Eastern Europe, their overt military intelligence collection efforts will suffer, forcing a shift to covert programs. For many reasons, the U.S. prefers to categorize its own covert action; i.e. intelligence support to foreign intelligence services, political actions, propaganda, and paramilitary actions, as an intelligence function rather than within the routine province of statecraft. Are the Western intelligence services ready for expanded counterintelligence and covert action in areas that have traditionally not been in the limelight?

As the U.S. withdraws its military forces from overseas and reduces its presence, there also will be a concomitant reduction in available military intelligence. The loss of these sources must be matched by new collection efforts. The Director of Naval Intelligence told the Congress, in March 1991, that: "It is time to rediscover classic intelligence collection using legal travelers, emigres, elicitation, the attache system, industry, academia, area expertise, and 'open sources'."

As the intelligence community re-enters areas, it will have to make some adjustments in how it does business. Formerly, when intelligence analysts differed, the debate could be settled by a re-assessment of the data. With political and economic intelligence, it is often the methodology rather than the data that settles disputes.
We have to build capabilities to match our stated need for new types of information. Economic and other forms of strategic intelligence, for example, may become relatively more important than extremely costly technical intelligence systems designed to provide tactical warning. This fact has not gone unnoticed by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, from published U.S. reports, the Department of Defense is avoiding any entry into economic intelligence. The net impact of the President's new national security strategy is that the intelligence community may have to undergo a fundamental reexamination of its missions and priorities.

The U.S. possesses an excellent intelligence community which will need fine tuning and some redirection but is capable of providing the government with all the necessary assessments. To involve the intelligence community with additional tasking in economic analysis will challenge the community, and it should be done only with the full cooperation of existing organizations outside of government. The challenges of providing two-years and other forms of warning should not be allowed to degenerate into a debate over the track record of the intelligence community. The nation will need a discrete list of data required to provide such warning, and the political process will determine whether the resources can, or will, be made available.

Requirements for Decision-Making

NATO used to talk in terms of a few days warning (the time to detect an invasion) and another few days for decision. Mobilization and return of initial American troops and air forces from the continental U.S. to Europe would take around 10 days. Hence the canonical 14-day scenario arose, with enormous effort devoted to the assessment of theater-strategic operations and campaigns to be fought by forces that could be brought to bear. We became adept at calculating theater-wide force ratios for the first 30 or 45 days of a war in Europe.

The question arises: how long would it take the Soviets to regain a position to cause the U.S. worry about a European crisis that could escalate to warfare and perhaps be over within a month and a half? Similarly, how long does the Soviet military feel that it would need to respond to an unanticipated rebuilding of Western military potential in Europe?

The March 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment asserts that in the event of a superpower crisis, the prime programming assumption is that armed conflict will not occur for at least 24 months. This is not equivalent to assuming that we will have two-year's strategic warning and response time; warning might be provided and ignored, or warning signs might not be recognized. For programming purposes, however, U.S. planners should assume that the old theater strategic operation, or a surge operational-strategic-level attack across the old inter-German border with the Pyrenees as goal, could not be mounted without the U.S.
intelligence community obtaining and understanding indicators two years in advance.

For program planning, we also assume that during this two year period, the U.S. can reconstitute forces for defense of Europe while the Soviets are doing the same for their offensive capability. During that time, we assume that we can re-build forces and materials instead of maintaining them on active duty, in the Ready Reserves, or prepositioned in Europe. U.S. forces reconstituted for a major war in Europe need only be adequate to deter or defend against a Soviet attack--not launch a theater strategic offensive operation.

In short, the need for the old, massive, short-term (14-day) mobilization has diminished. The threat planning assumption that once drove NATO toward a two-week mobilization requirement has been replaced with a threat assumption, for programming purposes, that now gives the alliance two years to respond.

We need to expand our discussion of this two-year period. For example, should we assume that we will have two years to reconstitute forces from the instant that strategic warning is provided and accepted by the intelligence community? If so, which intelligence community--the U.S., NATO, all NATO nations, or some new international command? Could it be two years following the government's acceptance that "something is wrong" that should be redressed? Which government or governments, and must NATO, collectively, agree to react? Is it two years, assuming that we detect something significant and recognize it at the time?

Two-year's warning does not mean that the USSR cannot launch an intercontinental nuclear strike against the continental U.S., or an attack at the tactical, or perhaps even the operational-level in Europe, in less time. There is probably some period of time associated with still realistic, but lesser, threats from the Soviet Union that is less than two years and more than two weeks. A major regional contingency involving the USSR in Europe should be, and is, in our program planning contingencies.

Indeed, the U.S. should include in its family of programming scenarios a major regional contingency involving the USSR in Europe, but limited to that theater. This will be new for navies. Program planning for a major single region contingency involving another global seapower will involve new thinking--in war situations, navies could hardly be expected to keep the fight limited to a single theater. That program planning assumption will now also need to be made by the sea services.

Even accepting the ability of the intelligence community to provide a two-year's strategic warning, there is controversy over what governments will do when faced with the initially, perhaps inconclusive, evidence provided. In October 1990, General Galvin told a group of former NATO headquarters officers that two-year's warning time should be viewed in the context of the warning
provided to, and the response made by, the U.S. from September 1939 to December 1941. Post-Stalin Soviet military authors are never reluctant to remind readers that, despite overwhelming intelligence evidence of an impending invasion by Nazi Germany, and despite the recommendations for mobilization from his military staffs, the USSR was not prepared for the invasion that began in June 1941.

If Western history is a guidebook of non-reactions to rear- mament by totalitarian nations and violations of arms control agreements, we should assume that democracies will: (1), delay decisions to rearm for many reasons--such as different interpretations of ambiguous intelligence data, the desire to deescalate a crisis, etc., (2), deny that a change in a former opponent's behavior has taken place or, if it has, is strategically insignificant or not precisely a violation of an agreement, and (3), even suppress the intelligence and findings of facts that do not support government policy.

A major lesson from previous arms control agreements is that they not only limit necessary preparations for deterrence, but also deter democracies from exposing totalitarian nations openly violating such agreements. During the inter-war period, Germany, Italy and Japan built many warships exceeding limits set forth in arms control and other treaties--clear violations, actively hidden by at least one major democracy. For example, Britain had an Italian cruiser in its Gibraltar drydock, weighed it, found it in excess of the 10,000 ton treaty limit, and hid its findings. In yet another case, the Admiralty continued to record the incorrect but treaty-compliant tonnage for the German battleship BISMARK, even after it was sunk and the Royal Navy's Intelligence Division had examined the surviving ship's logs and crew.

Linking the behavior of a nation to a formal agreement, such as arms control, takes the reporting and interpretation of data away from the intelligence community and makes it the province of lawyers and politicians. For years, these bureaucrats debated whether a Soviet radar was in compliance with the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, despite no apparent changes in the data provided by the intelligence community. We sensed that there were differing interpretations of ambiguous data, that the violation was not strategically significant or not a precise violation, or that, even if true, the fact should not have been reported since it undermined the arms control process. In the end, the Soviets admitted that the radar was a violation. Had this radar not been linked to an arms control treaty, it is most likely that the assessment of its intended purpose would have been the routine province of professionals.

We must make a serious study of the decision-making patterns of nations faced with decisions similar to that which NATO governments will face when presented with ambiguous evidence which, some might argue, constitutes "proof" that the USSR, or the Russian Republic in a new USSR confederation, is violating the "understandings" or treaties that codify the new international
security environment. NATO reactions will be inhibited by the arms control and confidence building measures we adopt over the next few years.

War planners, unlike program planners, are not required to use "best-case" assumptions and are, therefore, authorized to formulate their plans on less optimistic suppositions. Hence, redirection of programming planners to the "best-case" (two-years warning) does not necessarily influence war planning for current forces. Nor does it necessarily deny government decision-makers access to alternative intelligence assessments based upon current capabilities rather than program assumption intentions.

The military should include in their family of actual war plans, plans based upon the track record of their governments acting courageously in response to provocation. For example, the military is not barred from drafting internal war plans which assume that authorization for the mobility of existing forces and the mobilization of reserves will not be granted until hostilities begin.

Decision-making studies to support program and current war planning should span the gamut of possible scenarios. At one end of the spectrum is the "worst-case" of NATO reconstituting its forces within the two years predicted, but withholding the authority to mobilize forces out of garrison and responding to tactical warning until an attack by the USSR takes place, is verified, reported to the national and allied command authorities, and an authorization to respond is communicated to the field. In this scenario, we assume that the Soviet military machine came back strong and went back into Eastern Europe. The related "best-case" would be if all forces could report to their NATO-assigned positions, ready for a stillborn Soviet threat generated during two years of economic and political chaos. Perhaps in this situation, NATO might have an option for offensive tactical and even operational-level warfare against the USSR.

At the other end of the spectrum is the other "worst-case" of a USSR that takes a full two years to rearm in such a manner that it obtains a significant advantage in its estimation of the correlation of forces and means. The scenario would assume that NATO nations failed to make bold decisions when faced with ambiguous evidence by the intelligence community. The associated "best-case" would be a NATO that made the bold decisions and matched the Soviet regeneration with their own. Both sides would then be fully reconstituted and on a wartime command and control footing and deployment.

Simply put, numerous scenarios need investigation. Despite the lack of credibility accorded the old "bolt-from-the-blue" ground or strategic nuclear attack by the USSR, we should analyze these scenarios to develop intelligence indicators to monitor as insurance against such a possibility. Soviet press reports on the new Czech and Slovak Federal Republic military doctrine have
emphasized its shift in attention to the threat from the East. According to a Polish press report, the Polish military has already been "rehearsing operations on exercises" that included an offensive from an "eastern enemy."

It is even conceivable that Eastern European nations might ask Soviet, or Russian, troops back into their nations. As far-fetched as this sounds, it is interesting to note that this exact scenario was examined at a forum "Civic Control Over Security" that took place in Rostov-on-Don. That scenario can build upon our existing studies. Differences with today's scenarios might include reconstitution at national locations but failure to deploy forces from home garrisons and allow their transfer to NATO. Other possibilities include using portions of the programmed Pacific and Contingency Forces, in addition to the Atlantic Force, to respond to a European crisis.

War planners will also wrestle over how much time, and what type of decisions, are required during the initial combat actions in a crisis, before forces are either called up from the reserves or reconstituted in full. During this period, presumably both superpowers would act defensively. How long should we assume this period will last? Should we have one set of assumptions for programming and another for war planning? It is very likely that programmers will assume a longer defensive period than do operational war planners.

NATO exercises and simulated military decision-making usually has assumed that the alliance political structure would make decisions, which would then be executed by near-simultaneous actions taken by all member nations. In a restructured NATO alliance more political than military, in a new international security environment, alliance and national military commanders might have to devise future plans based upon a likely decision-making process which has member nations taking unilateral actions prior to those of the Alliance.

National decisions taking preeminence, in turn, would require Alliance planning for sequential rather than simultaneous military operations. Similarly, planning for allied, or combined forces, military operations may take second place to national planning. Future military planning by NATO may stress combined or joint operations but with forces under national command. These topics are all being discussed by the appropriate military commands.

Crisis decision-making should also be reviewed carefully, with the lessons of the post-World War II era firmly in mind. Not all crises will require decisions at the same pace; some crises are slow to build, others are more fast-paced. Some crises occur with armed conflict imminent while others occur after the outbreak of hostilities. Measured responses need to include the full gamut--from a minor show of force to a major insertion of all types of troops. Scenarios should include a
favorable outcome to a "worst-case" response. A building-block approach appears an appropriate analogy.

These and other scenarios should be augmented by the most sophisticated techniques available, to learn lessons of wars and campaigns yet to be fought. An artificial history could be written of alternative futures. Then the military can better advise the political leadership on the most suitable courses of action for impending decisions.

Reconstitution

Reconstitution has three essential sub-components: mobilization, military force reconstitution, and industrial reconstitution. Mobilization will provide the ability to respond to crises with an active duty and reserve force mix. Much more attention should be paid to ensuring that the reserves can respond, then return to their disrupted civilian occupations without loss of families, homes, and jobs. Existing legislation should be reviewed now that we have completed Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Military force and industrial reconstitution, however, are areas in which the U.S. has not had active interests for many years. Reconstitution must provide, primarily in the European theater—but not only there, additional forces and military hardware for a major war, assuming that no major combat takes place for two years. Reconstitution time goals can be somewhat vague; since what is required is that we need only convince the Soviet Union, and European nations, that we can: "reconstitute a credible [deterrence/] defense faster than any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense." Reconstitution in Europe is possible only with a continued alliance structure such as NATO.

According to Admiral Jeremiah's March 1991 Congressional testimony, the new Army cadre reserve divisions will reach combat-ready status in 12-18 months. The Army is now stating that the time involved may be as short as 15 months. In peacetime, a cadre division might consist of a skeleton organization of some 3,000 officers and noncommissioned officers (vice over 10,000 in an active division). The individual ready reserve or conscription are low cost methods of managing the necessary manpower pool required for reconstitution.

Marine Corps reserve divisions have not been included in this new cadre status. Additional goals for reconstitution will be provided as staffs become familiar with the concept—but some initial areas to investigate might include: operational-level amphibious capability, sealift and intertheater airlift, strategic air and missile defenses, short-range and naval nuclear weapons, intercontinental strategic nuclear bombers, advanced ballistic missiles, and civil defense.
Most difficult will be maintaining a cadre of leaders. How will they obtain the necessary military leadership training at appropriate levels of command, when there are fewer forces to command? Schools are an obvious solution for the officer corps and senior non-commissioned officers, but will the services fund schools when faced with giving airmen flight time or sailors actual time at sea? Service schools may have to be consolidated for efficiency but there may be even more novel solutions.

If the officer corps is to be significantly reduced below current levels, eventually a level is reached at which it is no longer efficient to maintain military-run graduate schools, war colleges, and individual service flight training. A similar problem exists with special and limited duty, non-commissioned, and warrant officers, technical schools, and some government laboratories. Suggestions to consolidate Department of Defense facilities are already under consideration but other government agencies might consolidate with defense.

The Department of Energy maintains laboratories, the Federal Aviation Agency has aviation facilities, inter alia. Expanding the student body may even take the form of training and educating military students from former socialist nations—attempting to provide them with the technical details and structural framework for a military operating within a democracy. The Department of Defense has already started moving in this direction with the expansion of International Military Education and Training (IMET) resource allocation courses at the Defense Education Resources Management Center (DRMEC) in Monterey, California. This school saw its first contingent of Eastern Europeans (Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak officers and civilians) in July-August 1991. The intelligence community could take advantage of opportunities like these to learn more about the capabilities of the Soviet and other foreign military services. Increasing the number of foreign students attending military schools may also improve our own language training capabilities.

One solution, other than consolidation, or expanding the student base, is an affiliation of defense schools and laboratories with select civilian institutions. The innovation would provide mixed civilian-military educational and research institutions that can be "reconstituted" to pure military or government facilities within two years. We may not need large numbers of officers and technical specialists trained during peace, but the model for the reconstitution of industry might well be applied to military training and education. Although not directly related to the new national security strategy, the Congress required the General Accounting Office (GAO) to look at the "practicality and desirability of using civilian educational institutions to provide technical training to military personnel." The RAND Corporation is about to issue a report on this subject.

Another solution is to broaden and raise the level of research conducted at these institutions so that a substantive faculty remains onboard, and can shift to teaching duties when
required. Keeping special and limited duty, non-commissioned, and warrant officers active in research at industry, or mixed government-industry design bureaus, can maintain the nucleus of a capability that may be required on short notice. Similar arrangements can be made with government graduate schools to increase their research and still return quickly to teaching. These suggested solutions beg for a Presidential Blue-Ribbon panel to study the options and make non-partisan recommendations.

Some of the military capability that America and its allies must retain should be contained in existing active duty and ready reserve forces. On-hand equipment and supplies are needed for those ready forces, while some should be stockpiled and prepositioned. Maritime prepositioning offers great flexibility, recently demonstrated in the Middle East. However, not all the materials for all types of war need be readily available.

Implicit in the President's new national security strategy is the capability of tooling-up for wartime production within two years for a major war in Europe and less than that for lengthy contingency operations. General Powell stated in December 1990 that this ability to reconstitute was one of the critical underlying support capabilities of the new national security strategy. This capability will consist primarily of the knowledge, skills, and tools to respond within the time limits specified. This concept is not new. We should review the 1930s history of planning assumptions and industry's ability to respond.

Congress is just beginning to explore its role in this process. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) completed a background study in February 1991 that accepted the emerging changes in the national security environment and attempted to provide a first look at: "what form the future defense technology and industrial base might take; what form it ought to take; what government policies can do to draw these two together; and how the sweeping changes expected in the base can be managed to minimize adverse economic effects and ensure sufficient technology and industrial capability to meet the Nation's needs." This preliminary report from OTA made only passing reference to the Base Force and President Bush's proposed "Reconstituted Force." It is obvious that the authors either did not have a complete understanding of the implications of the new national security strategy or that they chose to not consider the probability that this strategy would survive Congressional oversight. A second report, issued in July, demonstrates that the Office of Technology Assessment authors were again aware of the Aspen speech and the new national security strategy, but again, they did not use them as a basis for discussion. A final report is to be delivered in the Spring of 1992.

Dr. Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), was a proponent of preprogrammed crisis budgets and industrial responses to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime. Industrial mobilization, instead of military mobilization or the deployment of troops, might form the basis of an adequate govern-
mental response to ambiguous warning indicators. Ikle proposed a series of industrial alert conditions, similar to those used in the military, which would trigger specific actions. These would be less threatening because they would not immediately increase military capability.

A Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) system was investigated by the Department of Defense in the 1980s but largely as a component of our deterrent strategy vis-a-vis the USSR. A "graduated deterrence response," the term used by Lieutenant General Butler, could well involve a "graduated industrial response." This is not the same type of response that the government ordered in 1987 under the GMR concept—that program now being used to support national mobilization for crises and war with existing forces and strategies. GMR remains a high priority program to support regional contingency response. There is no reason contracts cannot be let ahead of time for both a response to a major war and for contingencies.

Although we speak abstractly about devising plans and passing budgets ahead of the need to do so, economists must help government ascertain how much money would be required to reconstitute the defense industry. If that money is earmarked for other purposes, then financial planning should include tracking sufficient governmental short-term money which can be quickly diverted to defense—if Graduated Mobilization Response and reconstitution part of the new national security strategy is to have teeth.

Industry and government should decide on a basic strategy consonant with our ability to support a defense industrial base and invest in new technologies; and both must be comfortable with their new, nonconfrontational, roles. Government should ensure that industry is capable of retooling and delivering military products within two years or less.

The government record of abandoning major production programs is a travesty, and it is likely that—unless consciously addressed—we will permit the destruction of most capability. Notable examples include the APOLLO and SATURN V programs, where facilities, equipment, hardware, stores, instrumentation, data files, test stands, etc. were destroyed and all technical teams were dispersed.

Many military contractors have been provided government-owned equipment, or have charged the development of facilities and equipment to military contracts. If the federal government wants these facilities retained, mothballed, or perhaps even improved, then it should provide incentives. Ownership of government equipment can be transferred to industry, or management of facilities can be turned over to government. If retained by industry, federal, state, and local tax laws must be revised to reduce or eliminate taxes on idle property and land.
Industry will work, meanwhile, on projects that have no direct defense application and simultaneously be asked to maintain the expertise necessary to produce military equipment within specified time limits. Keeping this expertise will require innovative measures—perhaps even joint government and private repositories of knowledge at taxpayers expense. This, in turn, requires new and innovative approaches to intellectual property rights. The Department of Defense has allowed defense contractors to retain title rights for inventions while reserving the right of license-free use. If we mix federal and private sector research, we may have to allow federal employees to benefit from royalties for work that is produced while on government time.

Making the two-year response time a reality may require abandoning military design specifications (MILSPEC) in many areas. We may have to acknowledge that, to meet deadlines, available commercial products may be substituted. For areas that clearly require specifications, the old system should be retained.

The reconstitution of industrial capability appears the single most demanding element of the new national security strategy. The March 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment states that "it would likely be 6 to 24 months before industrial base mobilization or surge production could begin to deliver critical items...by the end-FY [fiscal year] 1997, it is estimated that it would take 2 to 4 years to restore production capability to 1990 levels for items whose lines have gone 'cold'." Fortunately, the Soviet Union is accorded the same capability. Clearly, the U.S. will have to monitor the ability to meet reconstitution targets, to test capabilities, to enhance the credibility of our response and to monitor the Soviet ability to do the same.

Reconstitution is fundamentally oriented toward the U.S. contribution to the defense of Europe in the face of a regenerat-ed Soviet conventional threat. The U.S. need not reconstitute the 1990-era conventional force it had forward-deployed to Europe. New technologies, especially in air-breathing systems, may offer the same or even increased combat potential with fewer ground troops.

Nuclear weapons, especially those based at sea, and maritime forces, offer the U.S. an ability to fully meet its military commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty without the extensive deployment of any ground or air forces on European soil. Simply put, if the U.S. Army was to totally withdraw a combat capability from the European continent, the U.S. could still provide routine extended deterrence with its strategic nuclear forces at sea. A rapid response to any European crisis can be met with our forward-deployed carrier and Marines as well as new Air Force composite wings and rapidly deployable Army units.
Investment Strategy and Conversion

The major implication of the two-year warning of a Europe-centered global war with the USSR is that American programming strategy will shift its focus to the more immediate threats presented in other areas of the world. Until now, the unstated relationship of the threat to programmed forces was, generally, that U.S. forces would meet the challenge of the most demanding threat, the USSR, and assume that they could also cope with lesser contingencies. That basic assumption was not entirely true and now will be essentially reversed: forces will be acquired to meet the challenges of the more likely, less demanding, threats assuming that they are also useful against the more unlikely but greater threat posed by a Soviet Union that decides to rearm.

This will be a new planning assumption for America, new for its allies, and somewhat impractical for the near term—or until we see substantial changes in Soviet maritime and nuclear force structure to match what we know for certain are reductions in the ground and air forces. The intelligence community is tasked to advise Western governments when their strategic nuclear and maritime postures can be relaxed. Can it meet the challenge?

There will be a fundamental restructuring of the near-term programming already contracted, and there may be extraordinarily high penalties incurred as industries move from the defense area to others. Programs like the B-2, A-12, the YF-22A, and other advanced technology aircraft, the SSN-21 SEAWOLF nuclear-powered attack submarine, the follow-on to the TRIDENT II missile, and other programs such as TACIT RAINBOW, tied to the AIRLAND Battle, appear related to an international security environment that no longer exists.

There will be last-ditch attempts to salvage certain programs, arguments that previously programmed forces are needed in the Base Force, and bids to simply keep people employed and legislative districts satisfied. This will be a great challenge to the Congress—which should play its larger role instead of responding only to narrow constituent interests.

An obvious next step for the Department of Defense is to provide incentives for the services to stop rejustifying old programs under the new national security strategy and, instead, to actually perform a zero-based needs assessment. An obvious second step is to plan for the divestiture of unnecessary forces, equipment and industrial capability. There will be a great temptation to tie the reduction in capability to arms control—both for reasons of merit and to delay, or perhaps derail, reductions.

Implicit in the reconstitution portion of the new national security strategy is the retention of capability to produce equipment and supplies that have not been maintained. Not all firms must convert, nor should they be allowed to convert to the
civilian non-defense sector. Government could regulate the decline but appears prepared to allow the market to determine survivors. This position appears to have also been echoed by the government of the Netherlands. Deputy Defense Secretary Donald Atwood told a group on May 1, 1991, that:

I believe the free economic system is the system which should determine who wins, who loses, who merges. I believe in the free marketplace. I don't think we, the Department of Defense surely, have the capability to try to plan any kind of industrial policy. Quite the contrary. The free marketplace has to determine. Our role is to sponsor research and development and our role is to make sure people know what we're going to buy. And let the marketplace determine those in between.

Some firms will manage to convert to the civilian sector. The assisted conversion of defense businesses to the civilian sector is a highly charged process. If a firm can produce tanks and another automobiles, why subsidize the uninitiated to do what there are competent firms already doing? Conversion assistance schemes abound, with proposals to use independent research and development funds for everything from non-military ventures to fully-funded programs.

For those firms which can convert, with or without assistance, there will be significant cultural adjustments. Government contractors often have the customer providing capital for specialized facilities and equipment. This is not normal procedure in the commercial market. In the defense industrial world, requirements often advance the state of the art whereas in the commercial market, state of the art is limited by costs and competition. The two environments have drastically different financial structures and supporting infrastructures capable of preparing proposals.

Defense contractors are often organized along narrow compartmentalized, functional lines with little awareness of the overall program. Many firms do business in both worlds but there is little interconnection of personnel. Government and civilian contractors both agree that there is a significant problem converting personnel from one culture into successes in the other. It is also likely that management cannot make the transition.

After Vietnam War production ended, a downsizing of the defense industry was followed by massive displacements of professional and technical specialists. Conversion efforts then consisted largely of acquiring non-defense firms and attempting to expand into new markets. Most conversions failed, but primarily at the plant level. The cultural shock was either too great or the technologies offered by the defense firms were not needed.

The wholesale demobilization of military personnel into the civilian job market has taken place several times in the U.S.
with mixed results. Appropriate temporary programs are needed to ensure that we manage the transition smoothly to support new national industrial and business goals.

Some industrial and military facilities inevitably will be idled, even made obsolete, by the new national security strategy. We can anticipate massive environmental cleanups at particularly dirty facilities, such as industrial sites used for the manufacture of weapons-grade plutonium. The staggering costs of these efforts will make them economically unattractive for private peaceful use. Initial costs of $30 billion for a Five-Year Plan represent only a fraction of the hundreds of billions of dollars that could ultimately be required. Clearly, the government will have to assume these costs.

The conversion of defense plants, and other government capabilities, should be studied by a Blue-Ribbon Panel assisted by industrial and professional associations. This effort goes beyond similar panels that have suggested acquisition reform since, in this case, the government must ensure that defense-critical industries are identified and make certain the capability to produce is retained.

Research and Development

A fundamental restructuring of the defense procurement processes is long overdue. Industry often sought, or took the leading role in exploring, technological opportunities and charged that research to overhead for major programs. With the major programs likely to be severely reduced, a new mechanism is required for basic research and initial development. To change the leading role in military research and development, governments may be compelled to reverse a major downward spiral in this category of spending. Indeed, General Powell stated in his December 1990 speeches that defense research and development is one of the four underlying support capabilities of the new national security strategy.

Another possibility is to set up major government design bureaus, and internalize research and development responsibility itself—perhaps specializing in areas devoid of normal civilian spin-offs. The Navy did this in the 1930s, when its Naval Aircraft Factory did prototyping, and both the Aircraft Factory and shipyards provided "yardsticks" by which to measure contractor performance. An alternative strategy is to continue those operations in the private sector and provide nourishing government subsidies. Perhaps state and local governments can be persuaded to invest in research and development as well. The objective is to retain technology capabilities in numerous areas and the production capability in a few.

In any case, the output cannot be a family of senescent designs, curing on the shelf, but rather fully operational prototypes which normally never enter full scale development. In some cases, limited production runs may be necessary to ensure that
production experience is maintained. In most cases, product improvement programs should be included in the prototype program. Prototyping generally results in three major options: (1) buying the system, (2) buying major components, or (3), rolling over the technology to the next generation. This third option is currently being looked at by the staff of the House Armed Services Committee Policy Subcommittee. A prototypes development program should ensure that both the capability of assembly and a dynamic research and development program continue.

The Soviets also have worried about the same issues as they convert former military industries to civilian production. Rear Admiral Yu M. Khaliulin, Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, told Soviet President Gorbachev at a November 13, 1990 meeting with military people's deputies, that a naval ship should be built every year or two at newly "converted" shipyards, just to retain the capability to do so.

Such a shift in USSR defense procurement will offer new challenges to our intelligence community. How do we classify evidence of new hardware when we cannot predict whether it will be followed by a procurement program? Keeping multiple products on the shelf is also a good competitive strategy that will force an enemy to match all possible threats, instead of just a few. This, of course, works both ways and may prove justification for otherwise unwanted armaments. This shift to worrying about possible "breakout" is not altogether new, but will alter the emphasis of our collection efforts.

The new programming environment will reflect a new understanding of the partnership between government and industry. It will require major changes in the charters of many research and development and programming agencies to allow easier adaptation of commercial technologies into the defense sector and the continued flow of defense technologies into the civilian world. It is also likely to require changing defense regulations to allow profits on research and development and prototypes.

Technological Requirements

In the new politico-military environment, the American public predictably is unlikely to support a major overseas military presence, or combat in foreign lands. The new national security strategy calls for an ability to respond to crises, however. This requirement necessitates technologies to support easily deployed and sustained weapons systems. If future crisis scenarios assume host-nation-support and coalitions, we must also plan to resolve these crises quickly, then withdraw. Hence, requirements will demand high technology weapons systems using robotics and artificial intelligence so that, if engaged in combat, American casualties are minimized and the crisis resolved rapidly. As Admiral Jeremiah reminded us in December 1990, without the Soviet threat to spur continued investment in hardware, obsolescence in deployed systems will slow down--perhaps permitting us technological leaps instead of concentrating on marginal
improvements. America's smaller armed forces should be provided with the most technologically advanced equipment.

Perhaps it is time to revisit President Reagan's dream of a defense-dominant world. Deployment of the ABM Treaty-compliant antiballistic missile system should be a first step, instead of the Administration arguing for both strategic defenses and the available technology required for GPALS. Once there is a national consensus on the value of defenses, and a Treaty-compliant system is actually fielded, the U.S. can move toward more costly programs—but incrementally. Recent actions taken by the Senate Armed Services Committee to require deployment of an Antiballistic Missile Treaty-compliant ballistic missile defense of the continental U.S. have not gone unnoticed in the USSR.

Technologies formerly considered less useful under the old political and international security environment may prove more interesting in the brave new world. For example, with adequate overseas bases, offshore basing technologies received only modest interest. With the possibility that many American forces may return to North America, the U.S. should investigate carefully the realistic capabilities of offshore basing concepts.

With the demise of the old NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario and the prospect of numerous arms control agreements, the requirement for certain technologies may diminish. For example, if the Soviet Union accepts mutual assured destruction, demonstrated by abandoning strategic air and missile defenses, we may not need to invest in countermeasures to penetrate those defenses and attack strategic offensive forces. Similarly, if warhead numbers are driven low enough, we might abandon the search for increased missile accuracy.

With NATO armies on both sides of the old inter-German border, some systems designed for AIRLAND Battle should have lower priorities. Conversely, some technologies identified with NATO follow-on forces attack (FOFA) may still be useful in out-of-area contingency operations. An integrated joint task force, comprised of all the services, might benefit from technologies designed to conduct simultaneous operations over the full breadth and depth of the battlefield. The intelligence community should provide an assessment of world areas where such technologies might prove useful. An unbiased review of the technologies and systems associated with the AIRLAND Battle and FOFA will decide which are appropriate under the new national security strategy.

The U.S. government is concerned with maintaining its edge in defense technologies. It has identified key technologies that should be protected, and routinely tracks our relative standing in these areas vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We have recently expanded the comparisons of our technological standing to include allied nations, developing countries, and Eastern Europe.
Expanded technological comparisons call for new analyses from the intelligence community, and demand new national efforts to ensure that the appropriate technology is protected. Technologies available for what remains of military competition could improve so dramatically in the next few years that the fundamental nature of warfare may also change. Competition in military hardware could shift from the nuclear arena to the non-nuclear and, as non-nuclear weapons become ever more capable, they may substitute for nuclear weapons at the tactical-, operational-, and even strategic-levels. Nations will attempt to retain their technological leads in key areas, including sectors which formerly did not require protection. If protection of emerging technologies is too restrictive, it can stifle initiative and progress. A balance should be maintained between the need to protect technologies and that to ensure growth.

Economic technological competition with other nations will continue despite the new international security environment. While there have been efforts to limit the spread of technologies to the Eastern-bloc, we will likely see wholesale changes in the management of militarily significant commercial products by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). This has not yet happened. Existing national legislation requires reconsideration and amendment, while new legislation is clearly needed to deal with the myriad of questions arising when former socialist states apply for access to technologies forbidden them for outdated ideological and military reasons. Governments must fundamentally revise policies to transfer key technologies to certain nations for economic advantage, not military balance of forces.

The nation would benefit from a Presidential Blue-Ribbon Panel synthesizing key technologies to explain and validate their importance in the new politico-military environment. The panel might attempt to resolve the difficult question of balance between protection and growth and perhaps many we thought critical can be downgraded. Still, if we are to reconstitute a significant combat capability against a world-class adversary, we should identify those technologies that we must still protect.

Stockpiles

Technologies are not the only economic assets whose protection has been justified for military reasons. Our National Defense Stockpile is guaranteed to provide the U.S. with guaranteed access to critical strategic minerals for three years. We feared both disruption during a long war with the USSR, and curtailed access during the so-called "resources war," that never occurred. Interestingly, although we can claim that certain critical finished components should have been stockpiled, no such program ever existed. Such a stockpile would be very difficult to manage due to the transitory nature of "critical" components.

Our National Defense Stockpile of strategic minerals had its genesis well prior to the Cold War, but can it be justified
economically? Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, maintain similar reserves for economic reasons but, some years ago, a major study of the goals and objectives of our stockpile concluded that a less costly option to ensure access to materials included international development agencies and diplomatic efforts to ensure stability of major minerals producers, without significant budgetary costs.  

Perhaps maintaining strategic reserves had more to do with domestic politics than true defense needs. In any case, the entire program should be reexamined and one of the options should be a carefully controlled sale of major portions of the stockpile to reduce the federal deficit.

The Strategic Petroleum Reserves have been justified for economic rather than military reasons. On the other hand, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and numerous military programs have also been justified to ensure America's access to oil. Given competition for tax dollars, it seems a prudent planning assumption that the Congress may not fund both a refill of the petroleum reserve and General Powell's Atlantic Force to ensure we have access to oil. The 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States urges the U.S. to "...develop creative mechanisms to fill its Strategic Petroleum Reserve to the statutorily required one billion barrels, consistent with sound budgetary practices and avoiding an unnecessary burden on the oil market."  

It is equally appropriate to review the goals and objectives of our capabilities to provide sufficient quantities of oil--but to fund only one. If, instead of the current unmet goal of 90 days, we had an oil reserve capable of supplying all economic and military needs for one or two years, would we also have time to mobilize additional military reserves for, or reconstitute, a more capable Atlantic Force? If our oil reserves were this high, would we have intervened in Kuwait?

Impact on the Navy and Marine Corps

From this look at the President's new national security strategy and the Chairman's recommended Base Force, it appears that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will change the least. The fundamental maritime approach of our new national security strategy should logically result in asymmetric loss of military influence in favor of the sea services. This does not mean, however, that the Navy and Marine Corps can sit out the debate on roles and missions since they will not be effected by either--they will. The Air Force appears to have accepted the coming debate over roles and missions.

The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the former Commandant of the Marine Corps have obviously internalized the new national security strategy and the Base Force ideas and indicated their willingness to become partners in the new directions that the Department of Defense are taking.
The Secretary has even suggested that: "Given continued changes in the Soviet Union, we eventually expect to see a diminished open ocean anti-submarine warfare threat...With changes in the world order and our own strategy, it is appropriate to re-examine the top-priority emphasis we have previously placed on countering the Soviet submarine threat."  

At the strategic-level of warfare, forward defense and the Maritime Strategy have been replaced by crisis response and presence. This is not an insignificant change since the old Maritime Strategy called for maritime superiority. Although the Maritime Strategy and former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman were associated with maritime superiority, the term should have never been interpreted as being across the board superiority in all geographic and functional areas. Indeed, careful analysis of the public statements of Lehman reveals that eventually, maritime superiority in wartime meant a working ability to command the seas, in selected areas of the world, during a designated period of time, and in conjunction with allies.

At the operational-level of warfare, or the campaign-level associated with Operation DESERT STORM, antisubmarine warfare as the Navy's primary mission has been replaced by power projection. Operational-level power projection set into the context of strategic-level crisis response is not the Navy-Marine Corps Team storming the beaches of the Soviet Union. This section will now discuss what the future force structure looks like for the sea services as their roles and missions will be under jointness.

At his speech to the Comstock Club in September 1990, Defense Secretary Cheney twice spoke of the need for naval superiority. In his testimony to Congress, in February 1991, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (an Army General) discussed the need for maritime superiority. General Robinson's address to the Military Operations Research Society in June 1991 used a slide that appeared to set maritime (and aerospace) superiority as an underlying tenant of our ability to respond to crises--not in the context of the old Soviet threat.

Secretary of the Navy Garrett's testimony to Congress in February 1991 alluded to the possibility that maritime superiority may not be affordable in the future: "Fiscal realities have also made affordability an important factor to be considered in sustaining maritime superiority." These sentiments were echoed by the Chief of Naval Operations as well: "There should be no doubt that, if the continued decline in Navy funding, force structure, modernization, and personnel persists, we will reach a point where this nation will no longer be capable of maintaining the maritime superiority so vital to the support of our global interests."  

Retaining maritime superiority does not mean that the U.S. will adopt an overall national maritime strategic outlook, positing heavy reliance on maritime forces to the exclusion of others, since the sea services can contribute to attaining political
goals, but they cannot achieve them all. On the other hand, defense cuts under this new national security strategy should be asymmetrical and favor the sea services. Within the sea services, resources should also be allocated asymmetrically to favor those capabilities that are required under the new national security strategy.

Secretary Garrett and the Chief of Naval Operations Kelso told the Congress, in February 1991, that a 451-ship Navy could provide 2-3 aircraft carriers, 2-3 amphibious ready groups, 25-30 surface combatants, and 14 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) on permanent forward deployment. The CNO's 30 percent deployment rate means that he used around 50 available submarines to maintain 14 subs routinely on deployment—a far cry from the recent goal of 100 SSNs or even the fallback position of 75-90. In an interview published in the October 1991 Sea Power, Chief of Naval Operations Kelso told readers that he not only supported a Base Force of 450 ships, but that he had come up with the same number previously.

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been using the most supportive Navy missions in their public pronouncements—maritime superiority, power projection, and sea control. If Secretary Cheney and General Powell truly agree with these concepts, then the sea services should capitalize on that and focus on second-order issues involving specific programs or the Unified Command Plan. Unfortunately, it seems apparent that elements associated with the Navy have fired a series of broadsides at both the strategy and the Base Force—due to programming and UCP issues. On the other hand, there is every indication that the Marine Corps is taking a more statesmanlike approach and carefully trying to ascertain its place in the "new world order."

The May 1991 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings/Naval Review contains a series of articles that make it clear that the authors understood most, but not all, of the new concepts and did not embrace them. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, U.S. Navy (Ret.) wrote a brief commentary entitled "Head's Up, Navy" in which he essentially told the Navy to circle the wagons and defend itself against the attack it faced from the Air Force, the Army, and specifically the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The commentary is placed prominently as the first substantive article. Another Navy study concluded that the recent review of strategy leading to President Bush's speech at Aspen was only possible due to: the fiscal crisis, the waning threat, and the new powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized by the Goldwater-Nichols Act—all of which did not come together until General Powell became the Chairman.

Another May Proceedings article enumerates Navy weapons systems that are in serious jeopardy because of the new strategy and Base Force. Apparently this is true: June 1991 testimony by the Congressional Budget Office to the Senate Armed Services Committee suggests that the Navy may end up with as few as 310
ships, depending on the funding decisions made over the new AX attack aircraft, upgrades to the F/A-18, and the SSN-21. A June 1991 book written by a retired naval officer and strategic planner now at the Center for Naval Analyses, seconds this fear with a warning that the Navy and Marine Corps are headed toward: 300 ships in the year 2000; including 8-9 carrier battle groups, 50 nuclear-powered attack submarines, 50-60 surface combatants, 10 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades. By the end of September, 1991, press reports contained additional reports that 450 ships is merely a number that will be hit while on the way down.

The members of the Navy League of the United States, who attended their May 29, 1991 national convention in Anaheim, California, adopted a resolution calling for "caution in the formulation of the nation's long-term global political and military strategy" and that "the U.S. global strategy in a peaceful new world order should be the subject of a national policy commanding grass roots support."

The July 1991 Proceedings contains another critical article of the strategy's resulting budget. Another prominently-placed article by a retired flag officer critical of the Base Force concept appeared in the August 1991 Proceedings. Rear Admiral William J. Holland's commentary "Strategic Command - Who Needs It and Why?" denies that a roles and missions feud is on-going but encourages the Navy to "lock up its daughters and put its wallet in an inside pocket." Again, this commentary is located conspicuously as the first significant article of that issue. Although elements of the retired flag officer community have taken exception to the new national security strategy and Base Force, the leadership of the active duty Navy has publicly embraced both.

Even the new Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (ACNO) (Undersea Warfare), Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon—nominal leader of the Navy combat arm perhaps most likely to lose the most under the new national security strategy—did not break ranks. Vice Admiral Bacon's only non-consistent comment was to say that his own personal thinking included the potential threats to the U.S. from the existing Soviet submarine force. Vice Admiral Bacon also embraced the strategy in his address to the Naval Submarine League 9th Annual Symposium on July 13, 1991. Non-dissenting Congressional testimony this Spring was given by the Atlantic and Pacific Commanders-in-Chief, Admirals Leon A. Edney and Charles R. Larson, U.S. Navy. On the other hand, at least one active duty submarine flag officer, Admiral Bruce DeMars, has registered his disagreement with this attempt to shift roles and missions.

An interesting question is should the bulk of the Marine Corps remain as a part of the Department of the Navy; or, since it is dedicating forces to the continental U.S.-based land warfare-oriented Contingency Force and playing a significant role in the Army-heavy Atlantic Force, move most of its assets to the Department of the Army? Some argue that the Navy/Marine Corps team is already an existing contingency response force—implying
why do we need another? The new strategy assumes that we need a unilateral but modest tactical amphibious warfare capability, which we already have with our Amphibious Strike Task Forces. Marine Corps Commandant General Carl E. Mundy, Jr. apparently gave a speech on September 25, 1991 speech of to the 48th annual luncheon of the National Security Industrial Association in which he told his audience that there was no longer any debate between the Army and Marine Corps over the role that each would play in the Contingency Force.

If the Marine Corps casts its lot with the Army, it might be able to successfully shift the bulk of its fighting potential without loss of its special identification. Other armies have amphibious troops and the U.S Army already has 5 amphibious assault ships and is building 35 assault landing craft. A very small independent Naval or Marine Infantry might be retained under the Navy for at-sea duties such as: evacuation of non-combatants, piracy suppression, the at-sea recovery of maritime assets, drug interdiction, and guard duties.

On the other hand, staying with the Navy Department means that planned programs and personnel actions will not undergo the scrutiny associated with a shift to a new military department. On the whole, although one can make a case that the bulk of the Marine Corps could and even should shift to the Army, it is doubtful that either the Administration or the Joint Chiefs of Staff will tackle this issue in the near term. Hence the Marine Corps should not oppose the new strategy and Base Force--they should assume that under it, no one will question their "right" to exist.

Navy programming planning appears to have gone along, during much of 1990, without any recognition that the world was changed. There are signs, however, that at least some parts of the Navy recognized the changes and worried about the implications for programming. The rationalization for Navy and Marine Corps programs should be first: what are the national missions that require: attack submarines, aircraft-at-sea, at-sea Marines, etc. This will lead to the number of submarines, aircraft-capable units, ships that can carry troops, etc., that the nation needs. Second, we should ask what type should be built: attack submarines (nuclear or diesel), ships to carry airpower (conventional or vertical takeoff), or ships to carry Marines (amphibious or other)--recognizing the tradeoffs that are inherent between numbers and capability. Only then should be decide what type of hulls or specific models are needed. Saving the industrial base is not a reason that the nation will build a significant number of very expensive formerly programmed fleet units. The future budget climate for the military will simply not allow the Navy or Marine Corps to retain programs it took for granted in the past, or that it would rather have.
For the submarine community, the shift in top priority from antisubmarine warfare means that the goal of 75-90 or 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines, previously justified assuming a European-centered global war with the USSR, must find a new rationalization. The U.S. Navy faces an extremely difficult task over retaining the full SSN-21 SEAWOLF program in a new international security environment focused on regional crises. Since it currently is the only submarine shipbuilding program (OHIO class ballistic missile submarines are considered national systems and exist quite apart from attack submarines), attempts to cut the SSN-21 will be interpreted as an attempt to cut the submarine force. Indeed, the April and July 1991 issues of the Journal of the Naval Submarine League, The Submarine Review, contained a series of articles which sought to defend the SEAWOLF submarine building program despite the new strategy.

The Chief of Naval Operations told Congress that he has ordered a study (the CENTURION) to explore a new, lower cost option for a successor to the SEAWOLF nuclear-powered attack submarine. Although the study for this new submarine has been identified as the CENTURION, it is not clear if this will also be the name of the new class. Since it would likely take 10-15 years to launch the first "SSN-X," we may see a maximum of some dozen or so SSN-21s built before a newer, smaller, and less-capable class would be available.

The May 1991 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings reported that the SEAWOLF program may stop with 5-6 boats. Others, who have questioned the SEAWOLF program, predict that it could lead to a total of 30 SSNs in the fleet. In his June 1991 address to the Naval Submarine League, Admiral Bruce DeMars, U.S. Navy, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, stated that the current construction and retirement programs would lead to a 70 nuclear-powered attack submarines force by the end of the century, 40 SSNs by the year 2025, and inevitably 30 thereafter.

Certainly there will be those who question whether we need even 14 deployed submarines at sea in our new crisis response and presence-heavy strategy if we are going to have only the capability to quickly respond with 1 carrier task force and 1 Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Even if the submarine community today can justify 7 deployed submarines on each coast, the question is whether such deployments are too ambitious in the future given the paucity of surface and aviation units that will be routinely available for crisis response? In other words, is there a higher political payoff for the nation by forward-deploying 14 submarines but only 2-3 carrier battle groups or fewer submarines and 4-5 carriers? Which type deployments better serve to meet nationally-mandated missions?

If the submarine community can make the case that it needs 14 deployed units, then the second-order question is whether all of these need to be nuclear-powered or some can be diesel-elec-
tric? Third-order questions should be what specific hull design is used. Saving the industrial base is not a reason that the nation will build a significant number of very expensive SSN-21s.

New justification for the submarine force might include substituting for carriers called away for crisis response and direct integrated response in crisis areas performing: surveillance, power projection, delivery of special forces, combat search and rescue, evacuation of nationals or hostages, blockade interdiction of surface traffic, etc. For an interesting series of articles addressing other roles and missions for the submarine force, see recent issues of The Submarine Review. Similar articles appear in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

Rationalization for nuclear-powered attack submarines also involves GPALS since submarines are high leverage platforms that can carry intercontinental ballistic missile or submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) interceptors which can catch missiles in the boost phase of flight. Perhaps we should consider ready reserve submarines. Submarine officers have also argued that submarines have a role in naval diplomacy. Using these and other more traditional missions, the submarine force can justify a total number of hulls that it needs before it proceeds to the specific types to be built.

Surface Forces

In addition to the obvious programs on which the Navy has traditionally placed less emphasis (sealift, mine warfare, diesel attack submarines, etc.), there are some other candidates for review. In this "new world order," is there a place for major fleet vs. fleet engagements, or will it be primarily fleet vs. shore? If long range weapons make it less likely that major fleet forces will ever engage, there are probably some significant changes in order for our surface and other forces. If we renegotiate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, naval surface ships, such as the TICONDEROGA class, may perform GPALS interceptor duty.

If a principal reason for deployments is to maintain overseas presence, under the new expanded definition of presence, perhaps we do not need such highly capable nuclear-powered attack submarines or surface warships. It has been standard practice for the French Navy to maintain low-capability forces on permanent forward deployment in many areas of the world (e.g. the Indian Ocean) while the U.S. and Royal Navies generally cycle through high-capability forces on a scheduled basis. The U.S. Navy used to perform these type of low-capability force deployments before World War II. When faced with extremely tough budget decisions, the U.S. Navy may consider whether the French naval deployment system has any merit and adopt the less-capable forces as substitute for the fully-capable carrier battle group. Response to a crisis involving forward-deployed less-capable fleet assets may be with long-range continental U.S.-based Air Force units rather than naval aviation.
Now that the President has stated that the U.S. will remove all tactical nuclear weapons from our naval forces and land-based naval air forces, the U.S. government will revise its long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. naval surface ships and attack submarines. NCND was a good policy for a national security environment that simply no longer is operable.

Naval Aviation

Naval aviation programs are also in serious trouble—being referred to in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings as being in "Chapter 11". The goal of 15 deployable carrier battle groups, the A-12, and upgrades for existing aircraft, previously justified by assuming a European-centered global war with the USSR, have already gone by the wayside. With transportation goals of only 1½ contingencies and a unilateral intervention capability requirement at only the tactical-level of warfare, we have already seen studies stating that the need for big-deck aircraft carriers is perhaps as low as 9 and the nation can afford some smaller less-capable aircraft carriers.

We should expect to see less support for traditional naval aviation programs and planned upgrades for existing forces as well. Naval aviation programs need to be justified in terms of future contingency operations in the Third World—not using the scenarios that have been of interest in the past few decades. Under the new program planning assumptions, justifying the need for air defense assets in terms of the threat of regiments of BACKFIREs is liable to create the impression that the Navy is unaware of the changes that have occurred in the world recently. The Navy still needs to defend itself against air threats but may not be allowed to procure active and ready reserve forces to defend itself against the "old" Soviet threat—those forces will be "reconstituted," if necessary.

New justification for a modified carrier force might include, however, some roles against the revised, but still credible, Soviet threat; antisatellite warfare and defense against ballistic missiles. The Air Force has proven that aircraft can carry missiles that can reach into space—why should some of these not be sea-based? Might not carrier aircraft carry GPALS interceptors which can catch ballistic missiles in the boost phase of flight?

Maybe this is the time to again consider re-integrating the aircraft carrier into the SIOP and adding cruise missiles back into its arsenal? Perhaps we should borrow an idea from the USSR and integrate aircraft carriers into continental air defense? There are strong bureaucratic and strategy reasons that we did not do these in the recent past—but perhaps these conditions no longer apply. Deterrence and defense of the homeland will always remain missions for the U.S. Armed Forces. The ability of
Naval aviation to supplement missiles and land-based air and extend the air defense envelope should not be ignored.

Another idea that we should also consider is ready reserve aircraft carriers that can be reconstituted with reserve air wings within 1-2 years. Reserve forces may not be as appealing as active ones, but as the budget ax falls, consideration should be given to naval aviation capabilities that can respond to the threats posed by a regenerated USSR or other similar high end threat. Our new training carrier, USS FORRESTAL, should be dual-committed to the Atlantic and/or Contingency Forces, much as the USS LEXINGTON was once considered a back-up antisubmarine warfare carrier. Budget cuts may even force the Navy to accept additional common or joint elements to flight training for its aviators.

Power projection in the new international security environment may not require advanced strike aircraft operating from large deck carriers but rather Army and Marine Corps helicopters operating from Navy surface warfare ships and civilian cargo ships taken up from trade in conjunction with land-based Air Force fixed wing assets. Recent press reports discuss cooperation between the Army and Air Force in the areas of power projection and complaints from the Navy about being "forced" out of this role. Let us not forget the tremendous success enjoyed by the nation when Army aircraft flew off a Navy aircraft carrier and struck Tokyo in the early days of the World War II Pacific campaign. Since antisubmarine warfare is no longer going to be the Navy's primary mission, there is no reason that Navy antisubmarine warfare helicopters cannot also have an anti-tank mission. This suggests that interservice, in the new era, is much more important than allied interoperability—a major Navy priority and strength in the past.

Amphibious Forces

The Marines have already seen the Navy's battleships mothballed and may see the reduction or total redesign or mothballing of major amphibious assault ships. The amphibious assault ships that we retain could also be dual-committed as sea control or antisubmarine warfare ships. What forward-deployed Marines we do retain in Europe could operate in multinational task groups as a part of the new NATO Reaction Force.

Power projection for primarily contingency response in the new international security environment may not necessitate large numbers of advanced amphibious assault ships. The bulk of our Marine units would arrive in a crisis area by air and be supported by prepositioning. Press reports predict that, due to a reduction in resources and personnel and the impending block obsolescence of the amphibious fleet, we will only have the capability for the amphibious lift for 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades by the next century. There have been some reports that General Carl E. Mundy, Jr. the new Commandant of the Marine Corps, is dissatisfied with current programmed levels for amphibious ships.
It unlikely that the modest-sized Army and Air Force assets dedicated to the Pacific Force should have a dual-commitment to the European theater in a revitalized "swing strategy" but what about Pacific Marines? These forces are supposed to be loaned to the Contingency Force, if needed, unless the Marines decide to dedicate assets to this new force. In this case, a substantial land war in Asia would necessitate "borrowing" forces from elsewhere, including Atlantic or Contingency Force Marines. In short, the dual-commitment of sea services to the new force commanders will have to be carefully negotiated.

Special Operations Forces

The sea services will have to decide upon their desired role in regard to special operations forces, presumably to be all assigned to a new joint Contingency Force, and in riverine warfare. The Marine Corps has avoided assignment of its forces to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) but it also claimed that its Marine Expeditionary Unit-sized forces were normally special operations capable—earning the designation as MEU(SOC). This force is ideally suited for coastal raids but "brown water" is an area of the world's oceans of general disinterest to the Navy. This is obviously an area that needs to be ironed out.

Does the Navy want to take more interest in "brown water" operations, or will USSOCOM continue to purchase hardware for Navy special operations forces? Perhaps the Marine Corps can also rely on USSOCOM to purchase amphibious ships and craft for them? Does the U.S. Coast Guard desire a piece of the "brown water" action? If so, what arrangements can be made with the Department of Transportation to involve the Coast Guard as a part of the Contingency Force?

Reserve Forces

As a cost-cutting measure which allows retention of the industrial base, perhaps some Navy hulls might remain uncompleted and, instead, put into deep storage where they could be "re-constituted" for a war with the USSR. It has been announced that some naval surface escort forces necessary for more robust power projection will be put into a new Innovative Naval Reserve Concept (INRC). The Navy plans to use 8 FF-1052 KNOX class frigates as training ships with an additional 32 in a Reduced Operational Status (ROS) which would be available within 180 days. These forces are not reconstitution forces but rather reserve forces available in a lengthy contingency. We might also consider reconstitution of additional amphibious capability by placing amphibious assault ship hulls in deep storage.

It is likely that a robust shipyard capability, to repair battle-damaged fleet assets, may be part of the defense industrial base to be reconstituted and not fully maintained in peacetime. Reserve forces might be assigned to plan for and manage these capabilities.
Sealift

We are headed toward an overall force structure and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) that will permit the U.S military to respond to only 1 or perhaps 1½ contingencies (not wars) with active-duty forces. Could a more innovative approach be taken with lift requirements? Government has already provided subsidies and other incentives to ship and aircraft owners and operators to maintain a military lift capability while operating their fleets in commercial trade. Perhaps future arrangements will include the government purchasing commercially inefficient but militarily useful shipping and allowing rotating commercial operations of this fleet by a contractor? Contractors could be subsidized to operate ships while performing routine maintenance and modifications to modernize the fleet. Although all sealift is not specifically administered by the Department of the Navy, the Navy, does and should, play an important role in this critical issue for the new national security strategy.

Jointness

If changes to force structure of this magnitude will occur, it is obvious that the Department of Defense is about to undergo another soul-wrenching reappraisal of military service roles-and-missions. From a reading of this year's Service Secretary's and Chiefs of Staff posture statements, it is obvious that the Army was more attuned to the new strategy and Base Force than were the other services. The absence of serious discussion of the new national security strategy by the other services in their posture statements is, frankly, remarkable--given the fact that the Aspen speech occurred almost six months earlier.

No matter how painful, the review of roles and missions will occur, implicitly through budget decisions or explicitly if we dare. Should new services be created--such as space or special operations forces--or do we instead field the recommended four new force packages, made up of multiple but existing services operating under joint military strategies for the benefit of the existing Commanders-in-Chief?

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told an American Defense Preparedness Association audience and Army Times, that the four new military forces do not necessarily represent new Commanders-in-Chief. On the other hand, it had been reported that General Powell was indeed considering changes to the Unified Command Plan. According to a more recent report, ambitious plans to reorganize the UCP were "scaled back as senior officials realized the difficulty of pushing through such a major reorganization in the face of possible opposition from the CINCs, the services, Congress and others."

In an August 1991 interview, Admiral Jeremiah suggested that it might be too soon for substantive changes but hinted that future command reorganization were not precluded. The same
line was followed by General Powell the next month, in his Congressional testimony. Powell emphatically denied that any changes would take place soon but that cuts in headquarters would have to occur in the future. Two days after Powell testified to Congress, the President announced on nationwide television that, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all operational strategic nuclear forces in the U.S. would be reorganized under a new Strategic Command.

Probably more than any other issue associated with the new national security strategy and Base Force, the review of the Unified Command Plan, dividing the world into CinC areas of responsibility, has more flag and general officer's attention than any other item. The new national security strategy and Base Force suggest that we revisit the existing wartime command and control structure for theater and functional Commanders-in-Chief. Do we need warfighting CinCs for the entire world? With asymmetrical reductions in force structure should come a loss of organizational influence. Such changes will obviously affect all joint military and intelligence organizations.

Commands, however, will obviously not be allocated on a basis where the Navy has the majority. The Pacific theater has been declared a maritime one and the assumption is that it will retain a Navy CinC. If there is no serious maritime opposition to Navy forces at sea in the Pacific area of responsibility, is this assumption valid? Regarding the new Strategic Command, although a majority of strategic nuclear warheads may be seabased in the future, at best, command will rotate between the Air Force and the Navy. Recent press reports indicate that this actually will happen.

The Army and Air Force have already indicated they would dedicate serious assets to contingency response, making them the current leading candidates for command of a continental U.S.-based Contingency Force. This alone should cause the Marine Corps to seriously consider consolidating existing flag officer billets in order to gain one new four-star general who would be a contender. The press reports the Marine Corps' recent position on the proposed Contingency Force being that of a need for a Joint Task Force and a rotating or nominative command structure. If the Navy dedicated standing forces to a future Contingency Force, it would logically lead to a full rotational command policy.

Perhaps the most serious debate will occur over the proposed Atlantic Force. By dedicating most U.S. Army heavy assets to this force, one could conclude that the Army sees the Atlantic Force as a land-oriented command with seapower as a significant but supporting element. The Navy will probably focus on the word "Atlantic" and argue that it should obviously retain its maritime character and command. The Navy might even be willing to surrender cognizance over the Caribbean and South American waters in order to retain the Atlantic Force. Major fleet elements of the U.S. Navy operated under the command of Army generals during
World War II and have routinely done so in the Mediterranean since then.

If the Atlantic Force is in fact primarily focused on regional response power projection in Europe and the Middle East/Southwest Asia, then perhaps the major peacetime commander should be oriented toward ground warfare with air and maritime commanders playing a subordinate role. After all, is there any serious threat to our maritime forces in this area of the world? If the Soviet (or some other) threat returns, it will be relatively easy to split the Atlantic Force into its land and sea-based components as a part of our reconstitution for a major global war originating in Europe.

On the other hand, in the new era of jointness, it can be argued that all Commander-in-Chief positions could be filled by the best candidate from any service with no one single service having a lock on any specific job. Even if this would mean, in reality, rotation, the objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act may be more fully realized than if we retain current practices.

The current active-duty Navy and Marine Corps leadership appears to have internalized the Goldwater-Nichols Act and agree that "jointness is here to stay." One strategy to deal with the jointness issue is to not just "embrace it, but capture it, take it over and run with it." This recommendation attempts to use jointness as a vehicle to perform traditional maritime missions with traditional forces. Another strategy is to accept jointness, accede to nationally-mandated roles and missions, and modify the Navy's traditional self-image as the victor in the Pacific theater in World War II. This approach would necessitate refuting the retired flag officer community's criticism of the new national security strategy and Base Force.

The uniformed services response to the new national security strategy reflects what can be found in a 1987 RAND Corporation assessment of their self-identification and cultural biases, from which I have extracted segments below. The U.S. Army is described as having "its roots in the citizenry...service to the nation, and...utter devotion to the nation...taken greater pride in the basic skills of soldiering than in their equipment...the most secure of the three services...aimed at getting a single answer (often a number) rather than illuminating the alternatives in the face of recognized uncertainties...not shown any particular strong affinity for strategy...unique among the services in its acceptance of national strategies in peacetime which it is both utterly committed to execute and unlikely to be able to successfully prosecute in wartime." "What is the Army? It is first and foremost, the nation's obedient and loyal military servant." The U.S. Army appears to be very comfortable with the new national security strategy and the Base Force.

According to the RAND study, the U.S. Air Force is "said to worship at the altar of technology...by far the most attached of the services to toys...always the most sensitive to defending or
guarding its legitimacy as an independent institution...supremely confident about its relevance...the most comfortable of the three services with analysis...the most comfortable with strategy and things strategic...but not irrevocably committed to their execution in war." "Who is the Air Force? It is the keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war."

Although the U.S. Air Force has always had strong analytic support, they are only beginning to study the implications of the new national security strategy--instead preferring to address strategy and force structure, to date, in terms of their pre-Aspen speech White Paper, "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global Power." As with the Navy, non-active duty elements associated with the Air Force appear to have decided that the President's new national security strategy is not necessarily in the best interests of their service.

The Navy is characterized by the RAND study as being "far less toy oriented...more likely to associate themselves with the Navy as an institution...the hypochondriac of the services, constantly taking its own temperature or pulse, finding it inadequate, caught up in an anxiety largely of its own making...supremely confident of its legitimacy as an independent institution, but with the advent of long-range aviation, and again with nuclear weapons, its relevancy has come into question...has little tolerance of analysis for planning or evaluating the Navy...may advocate strategies in peacetime to their advantage, but they are not irrevocably committed to their execution in war." "Who is the Navy? It is the supra-national institution that has inherited the British Navy's throne to naval supremacy."

All of this discussion over roles and missions might reopen old debates between maritime and continental strategies. On the other hand, one might conclude that the maritime school has become clearly preeminent. Recall criticism of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s for failing to more emphasize the primary role of land forces in attaining political goals that required military forces. The Navy should recall that it forms but one component of triadic forces that ensure U.S. national security strategy.

Under the President's new national security strategy, we are clearly marching to a drumbeat that will probably mean the end of unilateral naval intervention overseas. Naval and Marine Corps forces are viewed under the new national security strategy and Base Force as being a part of a larger package--they are not going to be able to advertise themselves only as the Navy/Marine Corps Team. The new team is a leaner but more powerful U.S. Armed Forces. If the sea services are going to argue for the existing command structure and autonomous military capabilities, then they have the burden of proving that off-shore airpower, "can-opener" capability, and maritime Commanders-in-Chief are still required in this "new world order."
The Transition Period

Before we attain the "new world order," we must manage a smooth transition period that gets us from here to there. There are numerous problems of consensus on what this new world will look like; but assuming such a consensus is possible, a plan needs to be devised for the journey. The new national security strategy and the Base Force are the Administration's first attempts to articulate the goals. They are not yet a plan for the transition.

With the Administrations's goals, American social scientists must quickly provide rough answers to approximations of how much can be devoted to defense, considering other pressing national needs. The initial answer has been provided by the Administration and the Congress--a 25 percent reduction is in order. This is not necessarily final, however. We may find that there are compelling reasons to defer such deep cuts so quickly or, that such success follows our initial reductions, that we should reduce even more.

The intelligence community and civilian academics outside government should rapidly provide assessments of all threats to U.S. interests in areas of the world traditionally relegated to official indifference. Initially, planning for non-Soviet contingencies will be assessed in terms of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, but recent actions in Southwest Asia may prove to be the exception rather than models of the future.

When President Reagan outlined his visions of a world without nuclear ballistic missiles, or a defense-dominated security environment, it was necessary to look not only at those individual scenarios but also to think through the painful transition from the current state of affairs to the new one. One scenario that should have been considered was a USSR that attempted to militarily "prevent" deployment of strategic defenses because of Soviet fear of the new security environment. After looking at this scenario, analysis should have yielded conditions necessary to make the USSR secure during this transition.

We will need to evaluate carefully Soviet reaction to our rosy view of the "new world order." Although the Soviet Union appears to be an economic basket case, incapable of influencing external events, it does retain a significant military capability that cannot be ignored. In short, we should work closely with Soviet and Russian leaders to ensure that they are comfortable with the transition to a non-confrontational world that may be even less stable than the past.

Arms Control

Governments should have an integrated defense and arms control agenda. We should not attempt to delay military cuts in order to achieve an arms control agreement. Opponents of the new national security strategy may embrace arms control as a mecha-
nism to derail the transition. Parallel unilateral actions by both superpowers is an acceptable model for action. Arms control should only be engaged in if it can be demonstrated that the agreement will contribute to the defense of the U.S., the decreased likelihood of war, the reduced consequences of war if one were to nevertheless break out, or a concurrent reduction in costs.

Actions are already being taken to attain the real objectives of arms control—without the actual signing of treaties. Unilateral actions by the President at the end of September 1991 were a welcome first step. In addition to following the President's lead, the post-coup USSR and/or Russia must help the West understand its military doctrine and strategy, and the internal debates over these issues. Military officers of both countries should continue to write on doctrine and strategy in each other's professional journals. Similar writings by civilian academics should also be encouraged.

The new national security strategy will present some interesting challenges to traditional arms control wisdom. For example, although both sides may wish to significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals, they may also desire to reconstitute additional capability. Indeed, a "quick fix" for an unseen or unchallenged Soviet regeneration or reconstitution is that of naval and air force nuclear weapons deployed to Europe. We may find military commanders even recommending retention of empty intercontinental ballistic missile silos in order to reconstitute land-based nuclear capability within two years. These empty holes would offer verification difficulties and if this recommendation is made and accepted, it would require revisiting START and the SALT I Interim Agreement.

We are currently engaged, or will likely soon engage, in arms control negotiations or unilateral steps in lieu of arms control, in almost every warfare area—including naval forces. Yet virtually none of these agreements reduces the threat to the U.S. in theaters outside of Europe—the very area that we say is our primary focus for defense programming!

The disposition of naval tactical nuclear weapons currently deployed on surface ships, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and with land-based naval aviation will present some difficult problems. How will we manage the plan for reconstitution of these nuclear weapons and what conditions must be met before we once again deploy them with the fleet? Although they might have been used to deter potential Third World nuclear powers from acquiring or threatening American forces with weapons of mass destruction, we will now need alternative plans for arms control, deterrence, or direct defense. There are significant verification issues that need to be addressed as we implement President Bush's new plans to cut tactical nuclear weapons at sea. The President's plan to reduce these weapons reverses the U.S. government's long-established position opposing naval arms control.
Even now there are some modest naval arms control measures that can be pursued without waiting for more important issues to be resolved. The existing seventeen year old bilateral incidents-at-sea agreement, and recent high level meetings between the military staffs of the superpowers appear as constructive moves to minimize potential crises arising from military contingency and normal peacetime operations and maximize communications on a professional level. These agreements could be signed on a bilateral basis by all major sea powers, with eventual negotiation of a multilateral agreement open to all maritime nations. Expanding the incidents-at-sea agreement to include non-interference with attack submarines or aircraft operations might also be examined and evaluated.

Open exchange of non-sensitive data, such as the names, classes, and homeports of major ships, can also be non-threatening to the U.S. Navy since this data is generally known. It might be nice to have an official list of all Soviet fleet units with their current status (active, reserve, decommissioned, mothballed, etc.), actual name, ship rank, and home fleet. Currently, this information is obtained by each side from intelligence sources. If we can exchange similar data for nuclear, ground, and air forces, why not build confidence by understanding each other's naval force structure?

Although nuclear weapons free zones may not have been necessarily in the West's best interests previously, they represent a reasonable concept today given President Bush's move to remove these weapons from our fleet. Another concept worth adopting now is no first nuclear use at sea. The disposal of naval nuclear reactors is another topic that might be scrutinized since it is in the best interests of all governments and navies to ensure that this is done safely and with minimal environmental impact. Although not a specific step to control naval arms, it is a useful step and confidence building measure.

Agreements on the notification of ballistic missile tests, and on the prevention of dangerous military activities, were recently signed by the superpowers. Perhaps we can agree as well on advance notification of major naval exercises. Notification might be limited to those which the other side finds most threatening, such as flushing of all Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines from port to deployed bastions, or conducting a fleet-size antisubmarine warfare exercise by NATO in waters close to the USSR. Although advance notification clearly undermines the principle of freedom of the seas, if navies are asked to accept some restrictions, it is better to promise to notify prior to an exercise rather than to have the exercise canceled for lack of governmental support.

A final area into which we should once again look at is permissive action links (PALs). PALs must receive an active signal to fire of a nuclear device. PALs are found on strategic bombers and in the system to launch land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although generally impractical for our
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (and an emotional issue for the crews involved), how have we accepted this principle with sea-based cruise missiles and naval aircraft delivered systems? Would the West not feel more secure, should the Soviet government again prove incapable of governance, if Soviet SSBNs could not fire without such a device? To ensure that this is the case in the now unstable USSR, it may be worth the price of inserting PALs on Western SSBNs.

Military Operations Research and Analysis

The operations analysis and political science communities must cooperate as they never have before. The lack of cooperation between the policy sciences and operations research has recently been addressed by the operations research community but has not yet been recognized as a significant deficiency in some parts of political science.

Military operations analysis previously concentrated on investigating issues posed in a politico-military environment that was not subject to debate. Those assumptions are no longer valid. The old European-based war scenarios with two weeks warning and mobilization are simply not of very much interest anymore. The military operations analysis community has to reorient itself to measurements of regeneration and reconstitution where the timelines are measured in months and years, not days or weeks. Strategic warning, decision-making, non-NATO battlefields (ashore and at sea), manpower and personnel planning, resource allocation, test and evaluation, combat models, and gaming and simulation are all areas that will need fundamental readjustment in the new international security environment.

The Military Operations Research Society (MORS) addressed all of these subjects at their 59th MORS Symposium at West Point in June 1991. When General Robinson addressed the Society, he contrasted the requirements in the past to those of the future. Robinson suggested that analysts pay more attention to politico-military games with low-moderate resolution simulations and "on-the-fly" tools.

One technique for viewing alternative futures is that of path gaming. These are politico-military games that identify interesting alternative paths to a desired future, and examine them simultaneously with different groups of players. Gaming, naturally, is no substitute for solid analysis. Gaming, however, can provide new insight, and supplements more traditional methods of dealing with alternative futures. This technique was recently used by the Naval War College to explore the politico-military environment under President Bush's new national security strategy.

Governments will become more adept at using means, other than military forces, to influence the behavior of other nations—hence these tools will also need to be studied as a part of our "graduated deterrence response." A recent Soviet forum
"Civic Control Over Security," sponsored by the magazine *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* and the School for the Strategy of Socio-Intellectual Enterprise in Rostov-on-Don, highlighted the vulnerability of the USSR to economic sanctions as the USSR becomes tied into the world economy and less self-sufficient. In short, the military operations research community will need to integrate itself into analysis involving other tools of statecraft rather than considering itself a discipline that can exist unto itself.

For example, new research may evaluate how successful economic sanctions have been in the past and as a supplement to Operation DESERT SHIELD. Apparently, sanctions were not as successful as some desired, since the U.S. and allied coalition nations launched Operation DESERT STORM. What is the appropriate mix of economic sanctions as a precursor to military operations and a follow-on, once the military campaign is completed? Economic tools are even more difficult to use than in the past, as multi-national corporations become less responsive to national governments. The intelligence community will have to provide new types of information to decision-makers to allow them to assess the capabilities of economic and other sanctions.

We also need much more sophisticated analysis of the military balances well beyond the traditional units of measure involving only the two superpowers and their allies. We need to become extremely more sophisticated in our construction of threat and net assessments. Simple minded tabulations of force levels based on familiar arms control measures of effectiveness are not only misleading but not a true measure of military balances. We must move well beyond input measures that count "things" and perform complicated dynamic assessments that include the interaction between offense and defense and nuclear and conventional forces over an extended period of time. "Spasm" exchange calculations must give way to analyses of campaigns in which time as a crucial variable is not overlooked. The correlation of forces and means is not a static calculation but is a dynamic assessment that varies over time before, during, and after the war. Have we yet begun to model the new Soviet concepts of net assessments by comparing combat systems rather than the old correlation of forces?

A more correct way to assess a threat is to outline the objectives that each nation hopes to achieve by its expected military campaigns, the time required to do so, and the price that must be paid to meet those objectives on schedule. In short, we must focus on output measures that by their very nature will not fit neatly onto briefing charts or the front pages of newspapers. New measures of effectiveness will be difficult to explain to the public and the political leadership of the nation but will serve to more fully represent reality. This will put a heavy burden on the simulation and gaming communities.

In short, military operations research and analysis will become more complicated and require the cooperation of specialists in other disciplines. This will mean that the government
should devise a strategy to direct and manage all the studies that will be done as we learn what is required of our transition to the "new world order."

Notes


(4) This was the group that produced the "Future Security Strategy Study" headed by Fred S. Hoffman, director of Pan Heuristics, and Defense Technologies Study Team, also known as the Fletcher Panel for its chairman, James C. Fletcher, former head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.


(11) For examples of possible Soviet misperceptions of the U.S. military buildup of the 1980s, see commentary by ex-Committee on State Security [KGB] Officer Oleg Gordievsky as recently pub-


117


(23) See the Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, July 1991, p. 2-7: "...Coalition political leaders and commanders may have held some hope that the air phases of the theater campaign plan might cause Saddam to agree to Coalition demands without the need to launch a ground offensive..."


(40) Department of the Army, Army Focus, June 1991, p. 56.


(50) "Defense Deputy Secretary Donald Atwood Address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics," May 1, 1991, at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City, Arlington, VA, Reuter Transcript Report, p. 7.


(58) Contrary to customary use of the term "mutual assured destruction" (MAD), MAD should only be used to describe a world where both sides have left themselves vulnerable to the other's attacks. Most authors and scholars emphasize the offensive aspects of MAD. True, each side has a powerful force of ballistic missiles and bombers, however, one side--the USSR--never abandoned its major defenses against bombers, actually fielded a limited ballistic missile defense, maintained a passive defense system, and an aggressive research and development program for antisubmarine warfare. Such a world is not in keeping with the philosophy of mutual assured destruction.


(69) It will be interesting to see if this changes given recent...
issues of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (see below).


Essay Competition, pp. 7-9.


(79) "Statement of Robert F. Hale, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office, before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, June 14, 1991."


(91) These are called Logistics Support Vessels (LSV) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU). The former are ocean-going vessels, 273 feet in length, a crew of 29 soldiers, and a cargo capacity of 15
M1A1 tanks or 27 M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. See: The Honorable Michael P.W. Stone, Secretary of the Army and General Carl E. Vuono, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff, Trained and Ready: The United States Army Posture Statement FY 92/93, February 15, 1991, p. 74. We should also remember that most of the U.S. European theater amphibious operations during World War II were conducted by the Army and not the Marine Corps.


(94) James L. George, "A Strategy in the Navy's Best Interest," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 117, No. 5, pp. 114-123. Although this article is the Prize Essay in the 1991 Arleigh Burke Essay Contest, its placement in the Naval Review 1991 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings indicates that the publishers wished to focus more attention to other subjects than it did the recommendations contained in the essay.

(95) Portions of this section were first developed in my precis of this report: "America's New National Security Strategy," The Submarine Review, April 1991, pp. 15-24.

(96) For example, see criticism found in James J. Kilpatrick, "It's time to sink Seawolf sub," The Herald [Monterey, CA], Friday, September 13, 1991, p. 13A.


(100) See especially: "Address to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium - 14 June 1990" by Vice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper, U.S.


(106) "Statement of Robert F. Hale, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office, before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, June 14, 1991," p. 3.


(110) "The Top Line of Tomorrow's Navy" Interview with Vice Admiral William D. Smith, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-


(114) "The JDW [Jane's Defence Weekly] Interview" [by Barbara Starr with Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 9, August 31, 1991, p. 380.


(117) Eliot A. Cohen, "The Future of Force and American State-


(124) Department of the Air Force, "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global Power," A White Paper, June 1990, 15 pp. Even the recent Air Force restructuring was generally justified in terms of this although the associated White Paper did acknowledge that "the Air Force will move ahead to implement the new National Security Strategy of the United States, with its emphasis on potential regional conflicts..."


(127) This section draws upon and updates concepts initially developed in my article, "Naval Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come," Current Research on Peace and Violence, 2/1990, pp. 65-86.


There appear to be four main problem areas in which solutions portend success for the President's dream. The first is that everything depends upon the responsible, good behavior of the Soviet Union. It may not be desirable to have your fundamental national security strategy so dependent upon the behavior of the once "evil empire" but, for any of this to work, the Soviets must return to their homeland, remain inwardly focused, and continue the serious reductions in military capability they have only started.

Specifically, what is meant by the continued "good" behavior of the Soviet Union will be debated. Clearly, additional drawdowns in naval and strategic nuclear systems must follow soon. Their inability to mount an offensive theater strategic offensive operation in Western Europe should be the key determinant. Internal behavior of the Soviet Union toward its own population, and marginal "cheating" or non-compliance with arms control measures, should not be grounds to derail the new national security strategy.

The second critical area demands that the intelligence community be able to surmount the new challenges. If funding for intelligence follows defense downward, then the reconstitution portion of the new national security strategy is bankrupt. The intelligence community should move into spheres they have traditionally avoided or under-emphasized, such as the Third World and economics. They will also have significantly increased burdens demanded by the monitoring and verification of compliance of arms control agreements. This is possible only if decision-makers recognize this crucial underpinning of the new national security strategy.

The third area that can undermine a successful transition to this new world will be the international behavior of allies and the U.S. Congress. Clearly, without Congress onboard, none of this is going to happen. Secretary Cheney's efforts to articulate the new national security strategy are designed to ensure that the Department of Defense is ahead of Congress and that the new policies are adopted.

Defense cuts have normally been performed in a "salami"-like fashion--across the board. The new national security strategy strongly suggests asymmetrical cuts. Reductions in all government programs have been made in the past without reference to existing or suggested government policies. Without an articulated national security strategy by the Bush Administration, the Congress would probably: (1) cut across the board, or (2) decide on their own version of a new national security strategy, and make asymmetrical cuts in accordance with that strategy. Clearly the Bush Administration has no choice but to present to Congress an articulate strategy for the defense of the U.S., then partici-
pate in the normal budgetary and political debate that will result.

If our European and Asian allies attempt to keep our forward presence there, and their contributions to their own defense lower than they should be, they will likely attempt to exploit our separation of governmental powers. The debate over retaining a forward overseas presence for U.S. forces has generally assumed presumptions made by each side; unquestionably we need to maintain a permanent presence, or we can now return all the troops home. In the debate over retaining an overseas presence, all sides should explain the rationale, the benefits, and costs of their points of view.

The final and most demanding, critical factor in the success of the President's new national security strategy is the ability of private industry to deliver during the "reconstitution" process. What is visualized is not industrial mobilization from a "warm" start: rather, industry will be asked to deliver military equipment and supplies from a "cold" start--assuming that many of our current defense industries shift to the non-defense sector.

The Bush Administration is attempting to both save our defense industrial base under very trying conditions, and simultaneously reduce defense spending--a dubious prospect, when it seems reluctant even to address the need for a national industrial policy? At least one military service has publicly advocated the need for a national plan for the industrial base.2 Reconstitution of U.S. industrial capabilities will be insufficient--international reconstitution will be necessary for overseas suppliers of finished goods and raw materials.3 According to one report, during Operation DESERT STORM, "...the U.S. government had to seek emergency assistance for 30 foreign governments to ensure that suppliers of critical components met combat-essential schedules."4

Major changes are required in the way we do business, to retain both our technological position in the world and the personnel necessary to meet newly defined defense needs. By withdrawing forces from overseas and promising to reconstitute within two years and return, the U.S. will have fundamentally changed its international politico-military posture. If after internal investigation, we cannot fulfill this promise, then the U.S. government should keep this conclusion under wraps, endure the open-source critical debate and criticism it will face, and keep this declaratory strategy operational.

The President's new national security strategy is a programming concept that supports the continued reliance on deterrence of war as the cornerstone of American security. There are those who doubted that the U.S. would ever use centrally-based nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe--perhaps a President never would have decided to actually do that. Deterrence strategies are influenced greatly by perceptions; under the new national security strategy, it will be important to maintain the percep-
tion of our ability to reconstitute. Just as in the past, evidence of programs, deployments, exercises, and literature must be provided to support deterrence.

Notes


(2) Department of the Army, Army Focus, June 1991, p. 66.


Major changes to the international environment have led planners to significantly shift the manner of addressing problems and issues. The first order questions, such as "what is America's role in the world, or the business and purpose of the Department of Defense," now demand answers prior to consideration of second order programming or efficiency issues, that have dominated the traditional defense debate.

America's new role in the world will widen strategic planner's horizons to considering issues more befitting planners of a major international superpower; such as the long-term competition between nations, the economic, political, legal, scientific-technical, and cultural aspects of competition, and uses of the military for other than a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. The U.S. cannot afford to indulge itself with "gold-plated" strategies capable of successfully dealing with all possible contingencies by itself.

The world may move to a more integrated political structure, or, at least parts of the world will move in this direction. The United Nations (UN) Charter still contains the framework for national armed forces acting on behalf of the Security Council. Perhaps this is the time to consider regional and global cooperation as alternative models to the nation-state. The nations of the world rejected this direction when they failed to adopt the UN-sponsored Law of the Sea Treaty and its "Common Heritage of Mankind" approach to certain types of "common" ocean resources. True, that approach was flawed, given the political realities of its day, but perhaps this is the time to amend international organizations, and see if they can do better than before.

Changes in the international environment likely will be more significant in the next twenty years than in the last twenty. Planning for the long-term requires a 10-20 year planning horizon. We cannot afford to lock up our strategic options with political and military assumptions or force structures that were developed in a political world which no longer exists.

The fundamental shift in the way programming planners look at the world will lead to less emphasis on the USSR and Europe, a redirection toward other areas of the world, and managing day-to-day competition with other powers. All this will occur while the U.S. has significantly less capable tools in its kit. Rather than acting as a "Chairman of the Board" with our allies, America's appropriate future role may be that of "first among equals" if it does not withdraw to the North American continent in splendid isolationism. If we elect to stay engaged in the world, is it likely that we will engage in "winning" the peace as we once prepared to "win" war? If so, it implies the creation of a truly integrated and nonconfrontational governmental and commercial planning process.
Problems in American defense planning have, for some time, provoked calls for more and better planning. Evidence of planning problems is abundant in four major areas of Department of Defense planning: strategic goals and objectives that lacked clarity; a functional organizational design which impedes mission integration; overemphasis on budgets and programming needs to the detriment of overall policies and strategies; and ignoring other agencies, competitors and the external environment. We have the opportunity to, and should, improve the quality of our national strategic or long-range planning while we answer the call made by the President at Aspen.

A major planning problem was a lack of a coordinated effort to integrate the government's primary goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. Analysis and review of America's fundamental role in the world should force the Department of Defense to solve this basic problem, at least temporarily. Sound strategic management, of which strategic planning is but one component, integrates an organization's principal goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. It marshals, allocates, and shapes an organization's resources into a unique and viable posture based on its relative internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment, and contingent moves by intelligent opponents. Strategic management is concerned with the management of the whole enterprise, not just its functional components or sub-parts.

The U.S. government has not developed truly successful and coherent defense, industrial, scientific, engineering, oceans, etc. policies since the end of World War II. Yet, we do have a successful agricultural policy and supporting programs. The federal government has also successfully managed complicated programs for space exploration, rural electrification, and transportation. Now is the time to again exercise leadership and provide guidance and support for success.

It is a challenge for the organizational leader to combine and direct the efforts and activities of other members of an organization toward the successful completion of a stated mission or purpose. It is this type of effort that we will see the Bush Administration attempt to perform while it undertakes a fundamental restructuring of America's role in the world, and missions for its military forces. It will be this effort, not the old roles and missions, that NATO political leadership will have to understand to deal effectively with the U.S. as it undergoes internal self-examination.

In contrast to most other types of planning, strategic management also analyzes an organization's external environment and internal climate, searches for new trends, discontinuities, surprises, and competitive advantages. Since its scope is broader than other types of planning, it typically embodies more qualitative shifts in direction than might be anticipated from the long-range planning process. Also guided by an idealized vision of the future, strategic management is much more action-oriented.
The organization attempts to keep its options open, considering a variety of alternatives to respond promptly to unforeseen contingencies as it seeks its ideal.

On the other hand, long-range planning, which has typified NATO planning in past decades, on the other hand, focuses more on specifying goals and objectives, translating them into current budgets and work programs. The objective of long-range planners (and short-range planners for that matter) is to work backward from goals to programs and budgets to document the sequence of decisions and actions required to achieve the desired future, embodied in the goals. Hence, long-range planning assumes that current trends will continue into the future and plans tend to be linear extrapolations of the present. Clearly, this is no longer feasible since our objectives appear to be changing.

To be effective, strategic management assumes certain necessary conditions. Among these are: agreement, or at least consensus, on goals and objectives; a process by which the organization can scan its environment, monitor trends, and assess its competitors; a management information system based on an integrated communication and control system; and a review and monitoring process to determine whether the current strategies are viable or should be revamped.

The top-down vision of the future, outlined by the President in Aspen, will usher in new governmental politico-military goals and objectives. The major players will be both domestic and international, and it is likely that a consensus will be reached. It is uncertain which group or groups will dominate the debate but the American public's willingness to sustain heavy defense burdens concurrently with large domestic programs (including the Savings and Loan bailout) should not be assumed gratuitously in the absence of a clear and present danger.

Effective strategic management is not possible without responsive and timely feedback. The debate over the President's new national security strategy should include an analysis of the U.S. political goals sought by the forward deployment of U.S. forces, and the political environment that compelled the formulation of America's alliance structure. If those goals have been attained, if the international environment has drastically changed, then it should be obvious that the fundamental strategy and resulting force structure are subject to wholesale renegotiation. That this is being done in a thoughtful and comprehensive manner, with the full participation of domestic interests and allies, should be comforting.

New legislation will be required as a result of the changes in the international system--so this exercise is not confined to the Executive Branch of government. The two government branches can cooperate or they can assume an adversarial relationship. Congress will cut forces and programs--with or without a carefully considered plan. The Executive Branch must present every possible option for cuts to the legislature--even those that
wrench the very souls of the leaders of a particular combat arm or military service. The Administration appears prepared to meet this challenge. Without a consensus between the legislative and executive branches on threats and an appropriate response, a closer relationship will never be possible between strategic planning and defense acquisition.

The assumption of two-year's strategic warning will be debated endlessly and perhaps never fully resolved. What the Administration has accomplished with this assumption is to make it explicit that to absorb a 25 percent cut, we must make an assumption of this magnitude. If nothing else, it will force the Congress and the American public to recognize exactly what we are buying into with the new national security strategy and Base Force. One hopes that the dramatic changes are recognized in the USSR as well.

Should the services refuse to present realistic plans to the Department of Defense, or play end-around games with Congress, the cuts will be made anyway. The services could find themselves playing catch-up, and redrafting strategies with whatever forces the resulting legislation permits. The looming debate should be about goals and objectives, realizing that these do not have to be what they were in the past. If we are realistic about these goals and objectives, there is every likelihood that we can reach a consensus on force requirements. If we engage in acrimonious debate over force structure, we may stumble into a strategy that will not serve our national interests in the 21st Century.

In his Aspen speech, the President opened the door to a total reexamination of America's role in the world and overall U.S. military capabilities. The historical parallel is the British reorientation in the first decade of the 20th Century from strategic focus on colonies to Europe. It is very likely that as a result of this new national security strategy, the U.S. will start down the path toward splendid isolationism.

Notes


(2) "Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment," A paper by the Future Security Environment Working Group, submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Andrew W. Marshall and Charles Wolf, Working Group Chairmen, April 1988, p. 18. It can also be argued that this state also defines our future
leadership in technology.


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Index

Africa, 31
Air Combat Command, 31
Air Mobility Command, 31
Aircraft carrier
   see Naval aviation
AIRLAND Battle, 91, 95
Airlift
   see Lift
Akhromeyev, Sergei F., 53
Alaska, 29, 30
Allied Command Europe (ACE), 41
American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA), 11, 12
Amphibious, 23, 25, 28, 32, 33, 35, 86, 99, 101, 105, 106, 125
Antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, 37, 78, 86, 95, 103, 104
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 83, 95, 103
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 19, 54, 61, 98, 102, 105, 113, 121
Arms control, 2, 6, 18, 19, 44, 52, 62, 69, 79, 83, 84, 91, 95, 111, 112, 113, 115, 131
Asia, 17, 30, 59, 106, 132
Aspen speech, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 23, 69, 70, 79, 88, 99, 107, 110, 136, 137, 138
Assured destruction, 18, 26, 56, 59
Attack submarines, 20, 32, 91, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 112, 113, 123
Atwood, 7, 92
Augmentation Force, 41, 42
Australia, 71
Bacon, Roger F., 100, 123
Ballistic missiles, 7, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 54, 69, 73, 78, 86, 91, 95, 103, 111, 112, 121
Ballistic missile submarines, 19, 26, 54, 61, 100, 102, 113, 114
Beazley, Kim, 71
Belorussia, 73
Best-case, 84
Biological weapons, 20, 78
Bolt-from-the-blue, 19, 56, 61, 62, 84
Bombers, 19, 25, 26, 32, 54, 86, 91, 113, 121, 122
Budget, 1, 3, 5, 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 34, 35, 36, 43, 45, 58, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 85, 88, 149
Mobilization, 17, 21, 41, 44, 45, 55, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 97, 114, 132
Moiiseyev, Mikhail A., 55, 79
Mundy, Carl E., 101, 105
Mutual assured destruction, 56, 95, 121

National Defense Reserve Fleet, 35
National Defense Stockpile, 96
National Military Strategy for the 1990s, 6
National Security Strategy of the United States, 6, 8, 13, 18, 22, 23, 27, 36, 56, 70, 73, 97, 128
NATO, 2, 18, 23, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 53, 55, 60, 61, 62, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90, 95, 98, 100, 105, 113, 136, 137
Naval aviation, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 62, 72, 90, 91, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 112, 113
Navy, 2, 7, 8, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 61, 62, 72, 82, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114
Navy League of the United States, 100
Neither confirm nor deny policy, 104
Netherlands, 92
New world order, 6, 7, 31, 99, 100, 103, 110, 111, 116
North Atlantic Assembly, 44
Nuclear, 5, 6, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 35, 43, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 73, 74, 75, 78, 82, 84, 86, 90, 91, 96, 104, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 131, 132

Office of Technology Assessment, 88
Okinawa, 30
Out-of-area, 44, 95

Panama, 35
Permissive action links, 113, 114
Philippines, 30
Planning Programming and Budgeting System, 72
Poland, 60, 85, 87
Powell, Colin L., 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 57, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 88, 93, 97, 98, 99, 107, 108
Prepositioning, 23, 28, 34, 35, 36, 82, 88, 105
Presence, 1, 17, 20, 23, 28, 29, 30, 36, 41, 44, 50, 80, 94, 98, 102, 103, 132
Programming
see Budget
Quadhafi, 26

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 31, 76, 97
Rapid Reaction Force, 41, 42
Reaction Force, 41, 42, 44, 45, 105
Ready Maneuver Force, 42
Reagan, Ronald, 69, 76, 95, 111
Reconstitution, 1, 2, 6, 7, 17, 22, 25, 32, 35, 36, 41, 42, 45,
Research and development, 20, 25, 26, 27, 56, 69, 92, 93, 94, 121
Reserves, 1, 17, 22, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 34, 41, 42, 43, 44, 57, 58, 59, 78, 82, 84, 85, 86, 88, 97, 103, 104, 105, 106, 113
Revolution in Military Affairs, 23
Robinson, John David, 5, 98, 114
Russia, 73
R&D
see Research and Development
SAC
see Strategic Air Command
SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]
see Galvin
SALT
see Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee]
see Congress
Saudi Arabia, 34, 78
SDI
see Strategic Defense Initiative
Sealift
see Lift
SECDEF [Secretary of Defense]
see Cheney
Secretary of Defense
see Cheney
Senate Armed Services Committee
see Congress
Shaposhnikov, Ye. I., 18, 50
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 30
Single Integrated Operations Plan, 73, 104
SIOP
see Single Integrated Operations Plan
Sixth Fleet, 43
SLBM [Submarine-launched ballistic missile]
see Ballistic missile
Sokolovskiy, Vasiley D., 55
South America, 31
South Asia, 31
Southwest Asia, 6, 21, 22, 27, 29, 34, 76, 77, 78, 109, 111
Soviet Navy, 19, 54, 57, 58, 61, 62, 91, 94, 98, 100, 104, 113, 114
Soviet Union, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 42, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 131, 135, 138
Space, 4, 25, 27, 37, 54, 57, 58, 80, 89, 104, 107, 136
Special Operations Command, 106
Special operations forces, 19, 31, 32, 106, 107
SSBN [Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine]
see Ballistic missile submarines
SSN [Nuclear-powered attack submarine]
see Attack submarines
START
see Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
Strategic Air Command, 5, 9, 31, 73, 91, 122
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, 112
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, 26, 56, 112
Strategic Army Corps, 31
Strategic Command, 100, 108
Strategic Defense Initiative, 26, 27, 69, 70, 72, 73
Strategic Force, 25, 26, 27, 100, 108
Strategic Petroleum Reserve, 97
Strike Command, 31
Submarine-launched ballistic missile
see Ballistic missiles
Sullivan, Gordon R., 29, 31
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, 43
Supreme Allied Commander Europe
see Galvin
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 43
Surface warfare, 25, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 112
Sweden, 97
Switzerland, 97

TAC
see Tactical Air Command
Tactical Air Command, 31
Technology, 2, 20, 23, 69, 70, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 109, 132, 139
Third World, 20, 26, 104, 112, 131
Turkey, 74

UCP
see Unified Command Plan
Ukraine, 73
Unified Command Plan, 6, 99, 107, 108, 109, 110
United Kingdom, 17, 41, 43, 83, 103, 110, 138
United Nations, 31, 135
USSR
see Soviet Union
U.S. Naval Institute, 99, 100, 125

Vietnam War, 80, 92

War planning, 43, 44, 45, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 82, 84, 85, 107
Warning, 1, 17, 18, 29, 34, 35, 42, 56, 58, 81, 82, 84, 85, 89, 91, 114, 138
Weinberger, 69
Wolfowitz, Paul D., 5, 14
World War II, 17, 23, 32, 35, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 72, 75, 103, 105, 109, 125, 136
Worst-case, 1, 21, 56, 84, 86
Wylie, J.C., 99

Yazov, Dmitriy, 55, 56
Yugoslavia, 49
Zhukov, Georgi K., 55
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162