SUCCESS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAVID J. SCHROER, MAJOR, USA
B.S., Northern Illinois University, DeKalb Illinois, 1978

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991

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Success in Low Intensity Conflict: Conclusions & Implications

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This study examines eighteen historical case studies in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) to determine if common, critical elements of success exist in all four operational categories. The results of the historical analysis did not yield a set of common, consistent critical elements of success. The study did provide a conceptual framework for analysis of LIC using historical examples to illustrate principles. The study also identified and outlined several trends that are indicative of success in LIC. Conclusions of the study call for greater depth to current U.S. Army doctrine, beginning with a comprehensive, interagency strategic approach to the four operational categories of conflict. Finally, the study recognizes the commonality between the Special Operations (SO) Imperatives and many of the trends in the study. With some expansion, the SO Imperatives form a much better basis for LIC doctrine than current Airland Battle doctrine.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

SUCCESS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS
by Major David J. Schroer, USA, 586 pages.

This study examines eighteen historical case studies in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) to determine if common, critical elements of success exist in all four operational categories. The results of the historical analysis did not yield a set of common, consistent critical elements of success. The study did provide a conceptual framework for analysis of LIC using historical examples to illustrate principles. The study also identified and outlined several trends that are indicative of success in LIC. Conclusions of the study call for greater depth to current U.S. Army doctrine, beginning with a comprehensive, interagency strategic approach to the four operational categories of conflict. Finally, the study recognizes the commonality between the Special Operations (SO) Imperatives and many of the trends in the study. With some expansion, the SO Imperatives form a much better basis for LIC doctrine than current Airland Battle doctrine.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study serves two purposes. The primary purpose is to determine and then operationally define, using historical examples, success in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). The secondary purpose is to draw implications from the results of the research and apply them to LIC doctrine, training and operations.

This study focuses on achieving success at all three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical, in Low Intensity Conflict. What is success, what contributes to it and what impedes it? The study examines historical examples of success, or lack of it and uses the individual findings collectively to build a broad picture of conditions and trends. These conditions and trends, properly analyzed should provide critical elements or a focused picture for use in future conflicts. This picture has several potential uses in doctrine, training and operations that will be discussed later.
Each low intensity conflict or event creates certain circumstances that are responded to in a variety of ways. Fundamental methods stress the application of some elements of power more than others. Approaches to problems vary by the resources available, desired results and scores of other variables. The circumstances, fundamental approach, and variables combine to impact on success or failure. This study will examine a sampling of conflicts analyzing the approaches or methods, variables and success or failure achieved in respect to the circumstances.

THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The essential question is: "What elements of power or activities are critical to success in low intensity conflict?". Can this question be answered using historical examples derived from historical analysis and comparisons? If so, will it shed light on previous lessons and give some broad indications of future operations? This inquiry forms the basis of the research.

The resulting answers will also serve as operational definitions of concepts and methods for low intensity conflict. There are several subordinate questions which further define and categorize the results.

The answer may be different for the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. The answers may also be different for each different type of conflict. The diversity and how the activities, operations and uses of
power interrelate at the different levels may establish trends useful in low intensity conflict doctrine.

Another important aspect of the research is how the critical elements combine to produce a synergistic effect or a sum greater than the parts. Answering this question can provide a framework for commanders at each of the three levels of war to synchronize activities to produce the desired results.

The study seeks historic examples of low intensity concepts and methods. These examples can be either of success or failure, but must be accompanied by indications of why the effort was lost or won. These examples give concrete definitions to abstract concepts and build a broader picture of success.

The results may also serve as guidelines for some conclusions about the applicability of the current U.S. low intensity conflict doctrine. Verifying and or clarifying current doctrine at the operational and tactical level fulfills part of the secondary purpose of the study.

Finally, the results may give some strategic direction and insight into different methods of projecting power and how that is related to national resources and security interests. How do countries with different resources approach conflicts differently? Do the different approaches lead along diverse paths to the same success? What conclusions can be drawn between a nation’s strategy for
success in low intensity conflict and the resources available? How does this affect the outcome and what impact should it have on U.S. doctrine?

Fundamental to the question of "What are the critical elements of success in LIC?" is a definition of success. This essential question is difficult. For many defining success would substantially ease the problems of conducting LIC. Where does the conflict stop and success begin?

If LIC involves all four elements of national power: political, military, economic and informational, how does success in one area affect the others and which area constitutes definitive success? How are the relationships of the elements of national power different in LIC than in mid and High Intensity Conflict (HIC)? These are important concepts that demonstrate some of the major distinctions between LIC and Mid Intensity Conflict (MIC). For pursuing a discussion of success an examination of the nature of low intensity conflict is necessary.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Military actions in low intensity conflict support political, economic and informational actions. This is in dramatic contrast to mid and high intensity conflict where military operations are designed to meet military objectives of military programs with the other elements of national power in support. This is most evident at the strategic level of war but is also important at the operational and
tactical levels. Thus LIC is not merely a distinction in size, magnitude or commitment but a fundamental difference in character.³

Low intensity conflict is a misnomer in two other major respects. The term is simply a positional indication on a linear scale or spectrum and not a functional descriptive statement. It implies that there must always be some form of conflict present, when in fact it includes operations that do not include conflict. Secondly the notion of intensity is a matter of perspective and differs considerably from operation to operation and level of involvement.⁴

For example, the category of peacetime contingency operations includes disaster relief.⁵ These operations are conducted in response to emergency conditions and not in response to conflict or belligerent actions of a state or group.⁶ Disaster relief could easily take place within the end-state of routine peaceful competition, totally without violence. In many respects the operational definition of low intensity conflict includes the range of the spectrum covered by routine peaceful competition also. For this study low intensity conflict includes any actions short of war.

In the second sense, any conflict to those directly involved is one of very high intensity. The term was designed to distinguish the subtle, indirect and long term nature of LIC.⁷
To display graphically the concept of LIC the operational continuum is used. Earlier attempts to define the spectrum used the categories of Peace, Conflict and War. More refined concepts (Figure 1-1) display a more detailed picture using the terms Routine Peaceful Competition, and Peacetime Competition to divide the area of peace. Routine peaceful competition represents an end-state where no violence takes place. Low intensity conflict occupies the left portion of this spectrum on the horizontal scale of intensity, hence the term low intensity conflict.

Figure 1-1 details the interaction of the operational continuum and the spectrum of conflict on the horizontal scale. Lines between categories are not absolute and as with any continuum, there are gray areas including events with characteristics of both categories.

The character of mid and high intensity conflict has been well studied and defined. Military operations designed to achieve military objectives have readily apparent links between cause and effect, action and success or failure. LIC however is fundamentally different and requires investigation to expose the underlying relationships of the elements of power. Determining what actually contributed to success, what was counterproductive and what was superfluous answers the primary research question.
SUCCESS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

What are the critical elements of success in Low Intensity Conflict? This is a fundamental question for developing a viable Low Intensity Conflict doctrine, organizing a training program and conducting successful operations. Analyzing how these critical elements interact constructs an accurate vision or picture of success. This picture serves as a goal to guide the structure of the developing doctrine, implement training and give commanders and staffs a framework for conducting operations.

The first major task in developing doctrine is to define success and then create or work toward those conditions or set of circumstances. Doctrine is fundamental to both training and operations, defining success and charting a path that leads to it.

FM 100-20 outlines five imperatives which are prerequisites for success in LIC. They are in fact broad abstract concepts suitable for an overall impression but with little operational definition and no concrete examples. How do we translate these broad imperatives into applicable methods and techniques. This study will use historical examples.

Success will be further defined within each operational category in respect to the individual conflicts. During the discussion of each conflict evidence of success will be presented. Circumstances will be considered and
compared between conflicts and one of the resulting trends should be an operational definition of success for each area. Characteristics of each type of conflict will also emerge. These characteristics will be used to draw conclusions and mold some implications about the nature of these conflicts, the operational categories and the applicability of current doctrine.

CURRENT U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

U.S. Army Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine contains some fundamental voids. To better understand the applicability of this study some background on the current doctrine and nature of the problem must be examined. FM 100-5 states:

"An army's fundamental doctrine is the condensed expression of it's approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations, support structure, equipment and training must all derive from it."

In other words, doctrine outlines how an army fights and wins with the resources and organization available. It guides the army to success within practical restraints, and everything an army is and does is built upon doctrine. Doctrine must be developed in the same way a complex building is built. The framework for the building, or doctrine is constructed from a definite blueprint of what the finished building, or success will look like. The blueprint places the integrated elements into proper perspective and
matches critical resources to structural points. The blueprint may only use the material currently available and must not require things which are clearly not realistic. This is considerably different from starting with a pile of material and by putting pieces together building a structure.

This goal or set of goals defines the desired product toward which all operations should serve in a common effort. Intermediate objectives can be mapped out toward this product and subordinate tasks developed to synchronize available assets. Critical paths can be identified and a branch network is developed that integrates individuals, functions and resources.

FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, was approved as a joint U.S. Army/Air Force manual in December 1989. The manual serves as the Army capstone manual for LIC. All other Army LIC doctrine will be derived from and conform to the parameters outlined in FM 100-20. In broad terms it fills the role of operational doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict.

Before the 1989 version of FM 100-20 doctrine developers in the U.S. Army wrestled with LIC trying to make it conform to existing doctrine. FM 100-5 Operations, states that although it is primarily geared to mid and high intensity conflict that the same principles apply to low intensity conflict. The principles it refers to are both
DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES & CONNECTIVITY OF LIC VS. MIC
DERIVATIVE LOGIC FLOW

LIC

MIC/ HIC

FM 100-1
PRINCIPLES OF WAR

FM 100-20
LIC IMPERATIVES

FM 100-5
DYNAMICS OF COMBAT POWER
AIRLAND BATTLE TENETS
CLOSE, DEEP, REAR OPNS
AIRLAND BATTLE IMPERATIVES

FM 100-15
BATTLEFIELD STRUCTURE
BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

FIGURE 1-2
DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES

THE ARMY

LEVELS OF WAR
- STRATEGIC
- OPERATIONAL
- TACTICAL

PRINCIPLES OF WAR
- OBJECTIVE
- OFFENSIVE
- MASS
- ECONOMY OF FORCE
- MANEUVER
- UNITY OF COMMAND
- SECURITY
- SURPRISE
- SIMPLICITY

OPERATIONS

TENETS
- AGILITY
- INITIATIVE
- DEPTH
- SYNCHRONIZATION

AIRLAND BATTLE IMPERATIVES
- ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT
- ANTICIPATE EVENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
- CONCENTRATE COMBAT POWER AGAINST ENEMY VULNERABILITIES
- DESIGNATE, SUSTAIN AND SHIFT THE MAIN EFFORT
- PRESS THE FIGHT
- MOVE FAST, STRIKE HARD, FINISH RAPIDLY
- USE TERRAIN, WEATHER, DECEPTION AND OPSEC
- CONSERVE STRENGTH FOR DECISIVE ACTION
- COMBINE ARMS & SISTER SERVICES TO COMPLEMENT & REINFORCE
- UNDERSTAND THE EFFECT OF BATTLE ON SOLDIERS, UNITS & LEADERS

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

LIC IMPERATIVES
- POLITICAL DOMINANCE
- UNITY OF EFFORT
- ADAPTABILITY
- LEGITIMACY
- PERSEVERANCE

FOUR OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES
- INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY
- PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
- COMBATING TERRORISM
- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

FIGURE 1-3
the principles of war from *FM 100-1 The Army*, and the Airland Battle Imperatives outlined in *FM 100-5*.

*FM 100-20* however, details new and altogether different LIC Imperatives that govern operations. This raises two critical questions. Do the principles of war outlined in *FM 100-1* apply to LIC? Does any of the doctrine derived from the Airland Battle Imperatives in *FM 100-5* apply to LIC? (See Figures 1-2 & 1-3) *FM 100-20* draws no clear links either to the higher principles of war or any of the subordinates of Airland Battle.

*FM 100-15, Corps Operations* is derived directly from the doctrine of *FM 100-5*. Again the Battlefield Structure and Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) are linked directly to Airland Battle. "The operating systems . . . provide a structure for integrating and synchronizing critical combat activities on the battlefield." This linkage does not exist in the doctrine of *FM 100-20*.

There is a flaw in the logic between the Principles of War in *FM 100-5* and the LIC Imperatives in *FM 100-20*. The Imperatives are not clearly derived from the doctrine in *FM 100-5*. And there is not continuity to the lower tactical level from the Imperatives in *FM 100-20*. They are not parallel in construction or in meaning. Something is missing.

This leaves two alternatives. Redefine and accept the doctrine of *FM 100-5* and its derivatives to give low
intensity conflict the doctrinal base it requires. Or develop a doctrine consistent with the unique requirements of low intensity conflict. Which is the correct choice? That is an important question that this study attempts to solve.

Using the results of this study's examination of success some conclusions can be made about how unique LIC is and some implications can be drawn about the need for an expanded doctrine. In answering these questions the results should also provide some basic guidelines. This contribution to doctrine forms the secondary purpose of the study.

Establishing a solid doctrinal base has important consequences for conducting training and operations. Effective training will begin only if the doctrine accurately maps a course to success. Otherwise training will be ineffective at best and possibly counterproductive. The relationship of doctrine to operations is much the same. Operations are planned and conducted to achieve success. Without a proper doctrinal framework and focus on success, operations will be meaningless, costly and even counterproductive.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY

The question is how to determine the critical elements of success in Low Intensity Conflict. In the absence of actual observed conflict, two methods offer the most direct answers; one is historical analysis and the second is wargaming. Historical analysis involves examining
previous conflicts and analyzing them to determine what factors led to success or failure. Wargaming requires constructing probable conflicts from a data base threat and simulating events to a conclusion.

This study will focus on the historical analysis of previous conflicts or events to determine what led to success. This approach offers several advantages over wargaming. Several different conflicts can be analyzed in depth without having to create new models for each new wargame. Different regions and political situations examined again without having to rework a computer model. And possibly most importantly the results can be used as historical, real world examples of doctrinal concepts and methods.

This analysis forms the basis of defining Low Intensity Conflicts in terms of similar characteristics and requirements for success. Conflicts can be compared and contrasted and a methodological approach to military operations constructed. This may result in several different visions of success for each different type of conflict or certain similarities may appear.

Two major restrictions beyond the control of the researcher or limitations impact on the study. The first, use of unclassified data and the second, historical analysis of conflicts both inherently serve to limit the study.
The first limitation is the use of unclassified data from open sources. Much of the data involving U.S. operations is still classified, often relating to intelligence matters and sources. However, there is a large volume of unclassified data, which should support the major trend analysis this study requires.

The second limitation of historical analysis of events is by definition subjective, relying on the historian for accuracy and proper perspective. In spite of providing facts and examples to support conclusions, events can always be shaded to support desired results. The critical method, described in detail in Chapter 3, becomes the key to all the analysis done in the study. Conscious attention to this limitation will dictate methodical examination and logical conclusions based on the complete presentation of facts at hand.

This study also involves a major restraint imposed by the researcher or delimitation. A representative sample of conflicts must be used for the research. Time and space preclude examining every low intensity conflict for use in the content analysis and subsequent comparisons. A geographically and nationally diverse group of conflicts was selected to be representative of the population at large. A secondary consideration in the selection of conflicts was the availability of unclassified research material. This resulted in the selection of four conflicts (six in
Combatting Terrorism) from each of the four operational categories outlined in FM 100-20 which are depicted in Table 1.

<p>| TABLE 1 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT/EVENT</th>
<th>PARTICIPANTS (PRINCIPLE)</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez Crisis</td>
<td>UK/FR</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Oct-Nov 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian Congo</td>
<td>FR/US</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Nov 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mayaguez Incident</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>May 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation JUST CAUSE</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Cent America</td>
<td>Dec 89-Jan 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSURGENCY &amp; COUNTERINSURGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayan Emergency</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Jun 48-Jul 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1945-Jul 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Emergency</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Oct 52-Jan 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Revolt</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>1954-1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBATTING TERRORISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Munich Olympics</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Sep 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entebbe Hostage Rescue</td>
<td>IS/UG</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Jul 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lufthansa Hijack</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Open Sky</td>
<td>Oct 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Hostage Rescue</td>
<td>US/IR</td>
<td>SW Asia</td>
<td>Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWA FLT 847</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Open Sky</td>
<td>Jun 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achille Lauro Incident</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Open Seas</td>
<td>Oct 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan PK Ops</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>'948-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian Congo</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1960-1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Irian PK Ops</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>South Pacific</td>
<td>1962-1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>1964-1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY

- ROLES
  - SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
  - SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

- MISSIONS
  - INSURGENCY
    - ADVISORY TRAINING & ASSISTANCE
    - INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
    - LOGISTIC SUPPORT
  - COUNTERINSURGENCY
    - ADVISORY TRAINING & ASSISTANCE
    - INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
    - LOGISTIC SUPPORT
    - CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
    - HUMANITARIAN & CIVIC ASSISTANCE
    - UNITED STATES TACTICAL OPERATIONS

18. PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

- ROLES
  - DISASTER RELIEF
  - SHOWS OF FORCE
  - NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION PROCEDURES
  - RESCUE & RECOVERY
  - STRIKES & RAIDS
  - PROTECTION OF SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION
  - PEACEMAKING
  - SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES
  - SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

- MISSIONS

FIGURE 1-4
COMBATING TERRORISM
- ROLES
  - ANTITERRORISM
  - COUNTERTERRORISM
- MISSIONS
  - INTELLIGENCE
  - SECURITY
    - PHYSICAL SECURITY
    - PERSONAL SECURITY
    - TACTICAL FORCE PROTECTION
  - HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS
  - HOSTAGE RESCUE
  - ASSAULT OF TERRORIST POSITIONS

PEACEKEEPING
- ROLES
  - SUPPORT
  - OBSERVERS
  - PEACEKEEPING FORCES
- MISSIONS
  - SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES
  - SUPERVISION OF CEASE FIRES
  - SUPERVISION OF WITHDRAWALS & DISENGAGEMENTS
  - SUPERVISION OF PRISONER OF WAR EXCHANGES
  - SUPERVISION OF DEMILITARIZATION & DEMOBILIZATION
  - MAINTENANCE OF LAW & ORDER
DEFINITIONS

Battlefield Operating System (BOS). A framework of systems that provide a structure for integrating and synchronizing critical combat activities on the battlefield.

(Derived from FM 100-15)\textsuperscript{22}

Combatting Terrorism. Actions including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist's acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

(JCS Pub 3.07)\textsuperscript{23}

Conflict. An armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. While regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other elements of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force.

(CGSC P511 Text)\textsuperscript{24}

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

(JCS Pub 3.07)\textsuperscript{25}
Counternarcotics Operations. Actions taken to detect, disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, material, and distribution system) of illicit drug trafficking entities. Such action will always be in conjunction with one or more governmental agencies such as the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, or the Drug Enforcement Administration. Military support to counterdrug operations can include mobile training teams, offshore training, advisory personnel, logistic support (material, maintenance, resupply and transportation), civic action, informational, detection and surveillance operations, or intelligence support.

(JCS Pub 3.07)\textsuperscript{26}

Critical Element of Success. An action or group of actions (program) with a common base and purpose that contribute in a major way to the successful conclusion of a conflict. These critical elements are not limited to those actions that clearly insure success, but also those lesser elements that have a synergistic effect on the overall success.

General War. Armed conflict between the major powers of the communist and free worlds in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

(CGSC P511 Text)\textsuperscript{27}
High Intensity Conflict (HIC). War between two or more nations and their respective allies, if any, in which the belligerents employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (to include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons); command, control and communications; and service support.

(CGSC P511 Text)²⁸

Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Disaster Relief).
Operations which provide emergency relief to victims of natural or man-made disasters. They are based on requests for immediate help and rehabilitation from foreign governments or international agencies. They include refugee assistance, food programs, medical treatment and care, damage control, or other civilian welfare programs.

(JCS Pub 3.07)²⁹

Indirect Action. Military action in support of political, economic and informational initiatives which are so dominant that they shape the form of the military action; military action through support of another party, such as security assistance to friendly foreign armed forces.

(FM 100-20)³⁰

Instruments of National Power. The means (political, economic, informational, and military) available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives.

(JCS Pub 3.07)³¹
1. Economic Actions. Actions to persuade or compel a foreign government or group to conform its actions to one's aims, or to assist it to do so, by means of transfer of funds, methods, or materials, or the withholding or restricting of such transfer.

2. Informational Actions. Communication with a foreign government, its supporters, its opponents, and others to explain one's own policies and actions.

3. Political Actions. Diplomacy; communication with a foreign government or group to persuade or compel it to support one's own policies, by means of argument, promises and threats.

*Insurgency.* An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

*(JCS Pub 3.07)*

**Levels of War.** Strategic, Operational and Tactical.

1. Strategic Level of War. The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish national and alliance military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.
2. Operational Level of War. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operation. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time and space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical force, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

3. Tactical Level of War. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the enemy to achieve combat objectives.

(JCS Pub 1.02) \(^\text{14}\)

LIC Imperatives. Prerequisites for the successful prosecution of low intensity conflict; political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy and patience.  

(FM 100-20) \(^\text{15}\)
Limited War. Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations.

(CGSC P511 Text)³⁶

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Confrontation between competing groups (within a state) or states utilizing violence or the threat of violence as a major method in the struggle. The struggle involves the use of all four elements of national power, political, economic, informational and military. However, the political element remains the dominant factor. LIC occupies the portion of the spectrum of conflict below conventional war. It includes the entire range of non-hostile uses of military forces. LIC includes both routine peaceful competition and operations short of war.

(Modified FM 100-20)³⁷

Mid Intensity Conflict (MIC). War between two or more nations and their respective allies, if any, in which the belligerents employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (excluding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons); command, control and communications; and service support for limited objectives under definitive policy limitations as to the extent of the destructive power that can be employed or the extent of the geographic area that might be involved.

(CGSC P511 Text)³⁸
Military Strategy. The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. 

(JCS Pub 1) 39

National Strategy. The art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.

(CGSC P511 Text) 40

Nationbuilding. The full range of assistance to developing nations to promote growth and assist in developing self-protection measures to combat subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. "The majority of U.S. programs for developing nations are economic, political, and humanitarian in nature. Some foreign assistance, however, does take the form of selected military programs." "The strategy focuses on building viable political, military, economic and social institutions that respond to the needs of the society."

(Modified FM 100-20) 41

Operational Art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Operational art requires the commander to answer three questions:

1. What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?

3. How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?

\[(FM\_100-5)^{43}\]

Operational Categories. Groupings of methods of military operations in low intensity conflict, according to shared characteristics; they are; insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.

\[(FM\_100-20)^{43}\]

Operational Continuum. The general states of peacetime competition, conflict and war within which various types of military operations and activities are conducted.

\[(CGSC\text{ P511 Text})^{44}\]

Peacekeeping Operations. Efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace.

\[(JCS\text{ Pub} \_3.07)^{45}\]

Peacemaking. A type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force.

\[(JCS\text{ Pub} \_3.07)^{46}\]

Peacetime Contingency Operations. Normally, the short-term, rapid projection or employment of military forces in conditions short of war. Such employment can also require a
large, highly visible buildup of US military forces over extended periods of time.

(JCS Pub 3.07)"7

Peacetime Competition. A non-hostile state wherein political, economic, psychological, and military measures, short of U.S. combat operations or active support to warring parties, are employed to achieve national objectives.

(CGSC P511 Text)"8

Principles of War. The nine principles that are fundamental to U.S. Army doctrine.

1. Objective. Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

2. Offensive. Seize, retain and exploit the initiative.

3. Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.

4. Economy of Force. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts

5. Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

6. Unity of Command. For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.

7. Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

8. Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared.
9. Simplicity. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

\[\text{(FM 100-5)}^{49}\]

Routine Peaceful Competition. The condition of relations among states in which each seeks to protect and advance its interests by political, economic and informational means without employing violence.

\[\text{(FM 100-20)}^{50}\]

Success. Achievement of national security objectives in concert with desirable outcomes in each respective element of national power. National policy goals are satisfied or furthered while individual objectives are not sacrificed. "A favorable or satisfactory outcome or result."

\[\text{(Webster's Dictionary)}^{51}\]

Strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.

\[\text{(CGSC P511 Text)}^{52}\]

Terrorism. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

\[\text{(JCS Pub 3.07)}^{53}\]
War. Sustained armed conflict between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. War may be limited with some self-imposed restraints on resources or objectives. Or it may be general with the total resources of a nation or nations employed and the national survival of a belligerent at stake.

(CGSC P511 Text)
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER I


7. U.S. Army, *FM 100-20 (Final Draft)*, vi.


34. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1.02 quoted in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *Fundamentals of Joint and Combined Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), 259 thru 261.


39. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1; quoted in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *Joint and Combined Environments* (P511 Text), (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), xvi.


45. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3.07 (Initial Draft), xvi.

46. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3.07 (Initial Draft), xvi.

47. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3.07 (Initial Draft), xvi.


53. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3.07 (Initial Draft), xvii.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The review of literature serves primarily to connect the central themes of related literature to the concepts applied in the thesis. The individual footnotes relate specific facts and limited ideas to portions of the study. The review on the other hand gives an overall summary, collating general ideas so the reader can follow the development of the ideas in the thesis.

In this way the review provides a road map for anyone wishing to duplicate or elaborate on the findings and recommendations of the thesis. By highlighting aspects of the available literature the author identifies which portions or ideas in the literature were important to the study and in which way.

A secondary purpose of the review is to serve as a reference and guide to further research. The summary of related literature provides a starting point for further, possibly more specific or detailed research. By summarizing the key aspects of the different references, readers can
decide whether a certain work is applicable, advantageous or necessary to their own research.

There is a tremendous amount of literature concerning Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Only recently is there a direct connection in the writings between events and the theoretical environment now described as LIC. Previously, most works examined the events or concepts and were assembled into individual subcategories such as guerrilla warfare or insurgency, terrorism, small wars and peacekeeping. These subcategories became the genesis of the four operation categories outlined in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.

More recent theoretical and doctrinal works have combined the separate categories under the overall heading of LIC. Therefore many of the earlier military histories discuss the details of operations but comment only briefly on the nature of the conflict and its uniqueness.

It is easy to examine this development in hindsight and understand the difficulties involved in coming to grips with LIC in doctrinal terms. It is an example of individual events being dealt with in an isolated manner with an all encompassing theory developed later in retrospect. This is exactly opposite of the scientific method.

The literature can be roughly be divided into four categories. These are:
1. Theoretical works
2. Political histories
3. Conflict or military histories
4. Doctrinal manuals
The four categories can be further divided and characterized by the level at which the particular work concentrates. For instance, most political histories by their nature focus on the strategic level of war. On the other hand, military histories span the range between tactical and strategic. Works by senior military men often detail operational level accounts with some light shed on both the tactical and strategic arenas. Works by individual soldiers and lower ranking officers provide excellent tactical detail and more importantly a general picture of trends in morale, discipline, training and unit level operations.

The theoretical works examine the concepts surrounding conflict and its characteristics. These works usually construct models using isolated historical examples to define certain concepts or ideas. They deal with general premises and guidelines generally applicable only at the strategic level.

The doctrinal manuals are almost exclusively military and, in generally antiseptic terms, outline guidance for training and operations. These manuals are purposely divided into the categories of strategic, operational and tactical applicability. A major shortcoming of these manuals is lack of a conceptual framework and sufficiently detailed examples to illustrate the general statements of guidance.
The political histories outline the events and policy that created different circumstances in world history. The nature of LIC requires an examination of the political aspects of events along with the events themselves. These histories are focused almost entirely at the national, strategic level. Policy decisions often led directly to military decisions and the linkage is essential to understanding the nature of LIC. The direct impact of national strategic guidance on battlefield operations is a key concept.

The purely historical accounts detail events and operations involved in the different conflicts. The accounts vary from individual soldier accounts to military theater commander’s reminiscences. They are valuable because they give different views of the same event, focusing on different aspects and critical elements.

The vast majority of the literature concerning this study and its central focus are the historical accounts. This is natural since this study examines the events individually and establishes trends. A principle shortcoming is the lack of historical or operational examples in the theoretical works and the military doctrine. At best the theoretical works use very limited examples to support their concepts.

The limitations of historical accounts must also be kept in perspective. Security classification, limits of
memory and personal motivations all impact on historical accounts. Secrecy often limits the available information to write a detailed history. At the same time the human elements of vanity, significance of an event in one’s memory and personal perspective can color or shape certain accounts.

The focus of this study is examining the historical literature and placing diverse conflicts into a central framework. This serves as a check on the theory and doctrine while providing concrete examples of esoteric principles. Secondly it demonstrates the direct and interdependent linkage of political and military events.

Each category of literature and the major works relevant to this study will be outlined individually. Some categories contain conflicts with extensive literature that have been divided and listed individually. Other categories such as Peacekeeping Operations and Combatting Terrorism have relatively little literature on specific events and are therefore considered as a group.

**GENERAL THEORETICAL LITERATURE**

This study is primarily focused on the American perspective of Low Intensity Conflict and the accompanying American military doctrine. The majority of this section in the review of literature therefore concerns the evolution of American perspectives. Other literature is used to outline important concepts or events that in turn are related to U.S. development.
Robert Osgood’s *Limited War* is a fundamental work. It considers the nature of conflict as a whole and the distinctions between total and limited war. Using experiences in the Korean War, Osgood discusses the likely trends in conflict based on the current capabilities of weapons of mass destruction. He determined that political realities will require warfare to remain limited in terms of geography, weapons use, and forces committed. *Limited War* outlines the inadequacy of U.S. military capabilities to meet this threat in the late 1950s and prescribes some solutions.

Following closely after *Limited War* in 1959 was General Maxwell Taylor’s *The Uncertain Trumpet*. The retired Army Chief of Staff concurs with many of Osgood’s conclusions and calls for a drastic reevaluation of national security policy and military structure. General Taylor pointed out flaws in the doctrines of massive retaliation (focused on nuclear capability) and called for a balanced force structure (including conventional forces) to fulfill a doctrine of flexible response. This new doctrine focused on a range of capabilities allowing a powerful military response "in kind" to different forms of aggression.

Weigley’s *The American Way of War* recounts the U.S. reliance on a massive industrial base, overwhelming numbers and objectives in terms of total victory. Osgood and Taylor are key because they demonstrate the beginnings of a basic shift in American strategic thought away from the points
Weigley brings out. Although far short of recognizing the emergence of a full spectrum of conflict, they signal a theoretical move away from total war. Both approach recognizing the need for a full range of capabilities.

As limited conflicts continued, strategists and historians began to wrestle with the dimensions and character of these conflicts. Often referred to as small wars, the concept lacked an umbrella theory. Analysis ranged from one extreme; widely divergent historical examples taken together, to detailed accounts of only certain types of operations. Conclusions were drawn piecemeal without fitting all the parts into an overall framework. Two examples follow to illustrate this point.

In the first example, *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's*, Bloomfield and Leiss analyze five conflicts. The conflicts range in intensity from the Bay of Pigs to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Although some cogent lessons are drawn from detailed analysis they are rolled together with little regard for the large disparity between the case studies.

In the second example, *Internal Security and Military Power and Peaceful Conflict*, examine the concept of military civic action and its usefulness. Relying predominantly on Latin American examples the authors conclude that one of the most important tools in assisting developing democracies is civic action. These two excellent, though very specific,
studies were quickly forgotten in the rush to erase anything even closely resembling Vietnam era information from institutional knowledge.

Central to understanding the evolution of conflict theory in post World War II terms is the issue of the "Cold War" and the threat of world communist domination. John Foster Dulles' *Peace or War* gives an insight into the American character and outlook in foreign affairs following WW II. American policy is clearer when viewed in the context of an almost all-consuming preoccupation with communism.

*Communism and Revolution*, *Subversion of the Innocents* and *Conquest Without War* examine the nature of communist strategy. *Communism and Revolution* surveys the trends until 1963 across the post WW II globe, highlighting communist inspired revolutions. *Subversion of the Innocents* focuses on the communist inroads in Africa, Asia and the Middle East during the same period. *Conquest Without War* is a compilation and analysis of the speeches of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, outlining the theoretical inevitability of East-West confrontation.

At the same time, socialists began analyzing the motivations behind smaller conflicts, particularly revolutionary political movements. Although an earlier and more general work, Vagts' *A History of Militarism* sets a solid foundation for understanding the role of military power in society. His analysis, concluding with the need for a
basically apolitical military, sheds some light on the current problems in Latin America. Gross’ The Seizure of Political Power traces the modern history of violent exchange of political power and the social preconditions. Although the communist case studies predominate, many of the tactics and countermeasures have broad application.

Gurr’s Why Men Rebel is an excellent study of the human motivations behind political violence. Sweeping away many false preconceptions, Gurr finds that social conditions prompt revolt much more than any political ideology. This was a significant response to those who saw all the world’s problems in terms of Soviet sponsored, communist dominated violence. More importantly his conclusions argue that force only aggravates revolt. Coercive measures should be avoided in favor of long term strategies toward basic solutions.

Arendt’s On Violence and On Revolution explore the history of political violence from the sociologist’s point of view. Using the earlier European and Russian revolts Arendt concludes that violence is part of the human character with a proportional relationship to the strength of the current political power. In other words regimes exercising absolute power have few problems with political violence, whereas emerging democracies are much more unstable and prone to violence.

From the opposite or external perspective, Blackstock’s The Strategy of Subversion examines covert
activity, primarily from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. perspective. Recounting the principle events from the early "Cold War" until 1964, Blackstock concludes that covert actions constituted a major threat to peace and stability. These operations are often counterproductive because of their reliance on despotic regimes and bandage fixes. They have a place in the arsenal but fundamental issues such as human rights and corruption should be solved first.

At the strategic level hundreds of essays and books have been written on modern or post World War II military strategy. *Limited War* is complemented by such works as Halperin's *Contemporary Military Strategy*. At a higher, more political level, Young's *The Politics of Force* analyses decision making during international crises.

From an evolutionary perspective all these works contributed, directly or indirectly to establishing an overall concept of a spectrum of conflict. As depicted in Chapter I, the spectrum encompasses everything from thermonuclear war on one extreme to internal political violence and trade wars on the other. Several authors have expanded the understanding of these concepts.

Sarkesian's *The New Battlefield* and Loren Thompson's *Low Intensity Conflict* are excellent starting points for an explanation of the spectrum of conflict and its relationship to intensity, likelihood of occurrence and consequences. Sir Robert Thompson's *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*
activity, primarily from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. perspective. Recounting the principle events from the early "Cold War" until 1964, Blackstock concludes that covert actions constituted a major threat to peace and stability. These operations are often counterproductive because of their reliance on despotic regimes and bandage fixes. They have a place in the arsenal but fundamental issues such as human rights and corruption should be solved first.

At the strategic level hundreds of essays and books have been written on modern or post World War II military strategy. Limited War is complemented by such works as Halperin's Contemporary Military Strategy. At a higher, more political level, Young's The Politics of Force analyses decision making during international crises.

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1945-1969 examines communist inspired revolutions since World War II. He focuses on the strategy and tactics used by the insurgents to achieve success. J. Bowyer Bell's *On Revolt* examines seven conflicts from British experience following World War II. Brian Crozier's *A Theory of Conflict* studies five current revolutionary movements and details the nature of the government response to each. Each book is an excellent, more detailed work by authors with significant experience in Low Intensity Conflicts.

From a less objective and flattering viewpoint toward the U.S., Klare's *War Without End* and *Low Intensity Warfare* discuss the same events but with a completely different approach. Although flawed in some aspects, many substantial points are raised. They are valuable if for no other reason than they represent a particular school of thought that should be considered.

**GENERAL POLITICAL HISTORIES**

Lord Brockway's *The Colonial Revolution* chronicles the political and social events leading to the development of anti-colonialism. He covers every major colonial conflict area following World War II, though some in greater detail than others.

Much more specific are Walton's *Cold War and Counter-revolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* and Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest*. Both detail the political personalities and resulting decisions that produced
events such as the Bay of Pigs and more importantly, the Vietnam War.

Ball's *The Past Has Another Pattern* is a personal memoir by the Undersecretary of State during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. George Ball also directly supervised Operation DRAGON ROUGE as the State Department representative in the Belgian Congo. Although somewhat politically biased and partisan, the book gives an excellent insider's account of events.

**GENERAL CONFLICT HISTORIES**

Brogan's *The Fighting Never Stopped* and Knapp's *A History of War and Peace 1939-1965* are both good background histories of modern conflict. Brogan, published in 1989, brings events much closer to the present but also with less detail and background. Knapp ties events to regional history and gives the reader a better historical perspective.

Two excellent works from a military perspective are Sir Robert Thompson and John Keegan's edited work *War in Peace* and Carver's *War Since 1945*. The works complement each other as *War in Peace* provides more detail at the military tactical level while Carver focuses more on the operational level of events. Both provide summaries of the major military operations since the end of World War II.

Mydans' *The Violent Peace* published in 1968 is a journalistic account of the major military actions since the close of World War II. A collection of eyewitness accounts,
this book gives a more limited but much more human account of the different types of fighting. This book is very valuable for an overall understanding of events and for examples of the way the conflicts were characterized in the Western Press.

Tugwell's *The Unquiet Peace* and Allen's *The Savage Wars of Peace* are detailed accounts of the British experiences in post World War II conflict. *The Unquiet Peace* is an edited collection of accounts by principle officers involved in the conflicts. Henniker, Kitson and Coombe are a few of the familiar figures authoring chapters. Allen's book on the other hand, focuses on the experiences of individual soldiers in the same conflicts, providing another valuable perspective.

*The Banana Wars* by Musicant is a detailed examination of American involvement in Central America and the Carribean in the first half of the twentieth century. Focusing on the Marines, this book provides good background for early American experience in guerrilla warfare and stability operations. The singular question this work begs is: "Where did this experience go in the period following World War II?".

Treverton's *Covert Action* covers a seldom considered aspect of Low Intensity Conflict. Treverton examines the U.S. operations in Iran and Guatemala as the basis of his study. He traces their impact on later U.S. operations such
as the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam, questioning the role of these
types of intelligence operations in American policy.
Particularly valuable are his discussions of the military
involvement in both Iran and Guatemala.

Bolger's *American's at War 1975-1986* and Martin's *The
Best Laid Plans* recount the major recent American military
operations in world events. Both are detailed and well
researched although Bolger tends to include speculation and
some questionable sources in his accounts. These were
essential works for this study because of the level of detail
and focus on military operations.

*Armies in Low Intensity Conflict* edited by Charters
and Tugwell, is an excellent account of how the U.S., French,
British, Canadian and Israeli armies have conducted
operations since World War II. This book specifically
relates events and tactics to the environment of Low
Intensity Conflict and examines how the different national
organizations adapted.

Paschall's *LIC 2010* completes the aspect of evolving
document by attempting to look forward and predict the
predominant form of conflict in the next century. Paschall
concludes that the spectrum of conflict will shrink to the
LIC end of the scale while other forms of conflict will
become too costly and the consequences too risky. His
conclusions call for more emphasis by western democracies to
improve their capabilities in this form of conflict.
MILITARY DOCTRINAL MANUALS

The contributions and relative significance of the various doctrinal manuals are outlined in Chapter I and V.

INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY

Beckett's *The Roots of Counter-Insurgency* is a good survey of insurgencies in the early 1900's with emphasis on how the different countries involved responded. Each chapter chronicles a different nation's experience. Covered in detail are British, French, German, Soviet, U.S and Chinese experiences. This is an important work for gaining an understanding of the evolution of LIC doctrine. It highlights major contributors such as Lyautey and describes the circumstances that evolved the policies.

In an effort to support theoretical premises with historical background Cable's *Conflict of Myths* and Blaufarb's *The Counterinsurgency Era* examine the U.S. post World War II experiences with insurgencies. Both draw important conclusions, comparing the results of previous conflicts to the development of policy. These two books, along with Beckett's, are important for understanding the evolution of LIC doctrine. Cable and Blaufarb are particularly significant because of their focus on U.S. experiences and doctrine.

From a more strictly historical perspective, the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare* examines and compares 23
insurgencies during the twentieth century. These case studies focus on the political and social causes of the insurgencies as well as the overall outcome. Military operations are discussed but only in general terms. Each case study uses a standard format, similar to the Command & General Staff College (CGSC) Insurgency Analysis Worksheet, to describe the various aspects of the different conflicts.

Several excellent works have been done using historical case studies to analyze guerrilla strategies and appropriate government countermeasures. The best of these is Sir Robert Thompson's *Defeating Communist Insurgencies* and *No Exit From Vietnam*. Both books are unique because of Thompson's participation at senior levels in both Vietnam and Malaya. Outlining basic guerrilla strategy and government countermeasures, Thompson compares the successes of Malaya with the failures in Vietnam.

Another definitive work using British experience is Paget's *Counter-Insurgency Operations*. Using descriptions of the insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, Paget outlines the British counterinsurgent techniques, largely from the operational level. In the final chapter Paget summarizes the successes in the three campaigns and concludes with general rules for counterinsurgency.

For another national perspective are Trinquier's *Modern Warfare* and Paret's *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*. Using analysis from Franco's
experiences in Indochina and Algeria, these works give a good background on the French methods in counterinsurgency. Significant and diametrically opposed to British philosophy are the French reliance on "tough methods" in dealing with the civil population.

Other fine works covering the same subject and the military perspective include Galula's *Counter-Insurgency Warfare*, Osanka's *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, Campbell's *Guerrillas*, Bell's *The Myth of the Guerrilla* and McCuen's *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*. An interesting aspect of Bell's book is the conclusion that insurgencies are often not the popular movements they are assumed to be. In many cases both the government and the insurgent forces represent only a small fraction of the population, each vying for control of the majority of the population.

For much more detailed analysis of individual aspects of insurgency, SORO's *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* and *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* provide well documented research.

**France in Indochina**

Maclear's *The Ten Thousand Day War* and Karnow's *Vietnam* are both excellent overall histories of Vietnam. Although primarily written as histories of the American involvement both devote several chapters to the First Indochina War. Because of the general focus however, French
military actions are not detailed except at larger unit levels.

Hammer's *The Struggle for Indochina* and McAlister's *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* are definitive accounts of events at the national political level. Tracing causes back to pre-World War II Indochina both lay a firm foundation for the nationalist-communist political struggle. The impact of French colonial rule is explained as well as the failures of the Boa Dai government.

Tanham's *Communist Revolutionary Warfare*, Fall's *The Two Viet-Nams* and Duncanson's *Government and Revolution in Vietnam* are detailed accounts of the political and social events shaping the First Indochina War. Tanham's book is especially detailed with respect to Viet Minh organization, operations and tactics.

*Approaching Vietnam* by Gardner chronicles America's involvement with France in Indochina. Focusing on senior U.S. decision makers, such as Secretary of State Dulles, the book outlines the behind the scenes decisions following World War II and how they were made.

From a much different perspective Patti's *Why Vietnam* is a history of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) mission to organize resistance against the Japanese. Patti commanded the mission and was instrumental in providing training and supplies to Ho Chi Minh's forces during World War II. He concludes that America was in a unique position
to influence events at the end of the war and made flawed
decisions eventually leading to the French defeat and
American involvement.

Fall’s Street Without Joy is one of the best accounts
of French tactical operations during the war. Written in
most cases with first hand knowledge, the book explains, in
detail, French military operations. More importantly Fall
gives vivid understanding to the nature of unit level
commanders and soldiers. Thompson and Keegan’s War in Peace
also provided the majority of military operational level
information.

The singular event most remembered from the First
Indochina War is Dien Bien Phu. Roy’s The Battle of
Dienbienphu and Fall’s Hell in a Very Small Place are superb
accounts of the battle. Although the final battle is a
relatively minor event in this study, both books characterize
French military plans and the basic flaws that led to Dien
Bien Phu.

BRITAIN IN MALAYA

In addition to Sir Robert Thompson’s books are
Clutterbuck’s The Long Long War, Campbell’s Jungle Green, and
Henniker’s Red Shadow Over Malaya. Each author served as a
field grade British officer in Malaya during the Emergency.
Filled with detail and essentials of tactics each book is
well written and presents a slightly different aspect of
events based on the assignment of the author. Campbell’s and
Henniker's works were published during the Emergency and as such are not a complete account. Clutterbuck was published in 1966, and like Thompson, does some comparison between Malaya and Vietnam.

*The War of the Running Dogs* by Barber and *Menace in Malaya* by Miller are excellent overall accounts of the Malayan Emergency. Written by journalists and not restricted to purely military concerns, both give insights into the colonial lifestyle, local politics and the perspective of the plantation owners and miners.

Cross' *In Gurkha Company*, Baynes' *The Cameronians* and Sinclair Stevenson's *The Life of a Regiment* provide vivid accounts of tactical operations and the life of a soldier during the Emergency. Written as British Army regimental histories they collectively cover periods in Cyprus, Kenya, Borneo, Aden and Oman.

The British equivalent of the U.S. Army Ranger Handbook during the Emergency is *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*. This extremely detailed manual covers all aspects of tactical operations in Malaya. The manual was reprinted, with special permission, by the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance.

**BRITAIN IN KENYA**

*State of Emergency* by Majdalany is an excellent overall history of the Emergency in Kenya. It is focused
primarily at the national level, although there are some detailed accounts of military operations.

Another overall history, although less flattering to the British is Edgerton's *Mau Mau*. Providing questions on several issues this book complements State of Emergency well and when taken together they give a balanced portrayal of events.

Thompson and Keegan's *War in Peace*, Allen's *The Savage Wars of Peace*, Paget's *Counter-Insurgency Operations* and Carver's *War Since 1945* provided the bulk of detailed information on military operations for this study.

**France in Algeria**

Brace's *Ordeal in Algeria*, Talbot's *The War Without a Name* and Horne's *A Savage War of Peace* are all detailed overall histories of the conflict in Algeria. Each is written from a slightly different perspective and as such, each covers the major events but gives them a different slant.

In dealing more with the military aspects of the conflict rather than the social and political, Heggoy's *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Algeria* is the best work for the purposes of this study. Written primarily from the National Liberation Front (FLN) point of view, Heggoy gives a detailed breakdown of the organization and tactics of the FLN. Particularly interesting are the accounts of the role of external support for the FLN.
Fannon's three books and *The Gangrene* are written at a much lower, more personal level. Detailing the abuses of power and France's "tough methods" they paint a gloomy picture of operations and account for the continued deterioration of French rule.

Leulliette's *The War in Algeria*, Servan-Schreiber's *Lieutenant in Algeria* and Murray's *Legionnaire* give dramatic, vivid accounts of the conflict from the individual French soldier's perspective. In many cases they confirm the brutal nature of the war and its dehumanizing effects on the soldiers. They complement Fannon's books to give a balanced report of the character of the fighting and an individual perspective.

Like Dien Bien Phu in Indochina, Algeria also had its own final, convulsive event. Henissart's *Wolves in the City*, Bocca's *The Secret Army* and Menard's *The Army and The Fifth Republic* chronicle the "revolt" and the creation of the Organisation Armee Secrete (OAS). Menard analyzes how the Army came to rise in revolt twice in three years. Henissart and Bocca detail the terrorism and counterterrorism of Frenchmen against each other and the Algerians in between.

**PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

Very little in the public forum has been written in about contingency operations. For most civilian writers the question is quickly elevated to a political debate on the legality of intervention with scant attention to the military
applications. Therefore the focus of this portion of the review will be on the individual case studies and the works directly related to them.

**SUEZ CRISIS**

*Crisis* by Robertson is a good overall account of the 1956 Suez intervention. It is very detailed, well researched and covers all the major events. However it is focused at the international political level and hence, covers military operations only in general terms.

Lloyd's *Suez 1956* and Thomas' *Suez* are political histories covering the crisis. Both are written from the British perspective and avoid the issue of collaboration with the Israelis. They are particularly valuable for the analysis and comments on the political/military command structure and its coalition aspects.

Finer's *Dulles Over Suez* is the American equivalent of Lloyd and Thomas. Along with Dayan's *Diary of the Sinai Campaign* they complete the collective view of the major western powers.

*Airborne to Suez* by Cavenagh and Leulliette's *War in Algeria* (many French units were pulled out of Algeria to participate) provide good first hand, individual soldier accounts of the intervention.

As in other cases, works such as Thompson and Keegan's *War in Peace* were used to gather operational level details on military operations.
CONGO

Odom's Hostage Rescues in the Congo is an excellent, detailed history of the DRAGON operations in the Congo. Written from a military viewpoint, all major aspects of the operations are covered. Details of the political and social situation are also presented to provide a complete picture.

111 Days in Stanleyville by Reed is a good account of the DRAGON ROUGE as told from the hostage perspective. Reed gives more insight into the rebel organization and leadership making it a good complement to Odom's work.

MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT

Americans at War by Bolger formed the basis of the discussion on the Mayaguez incident.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Because of the recent nature of Operation JUST CAUSE, few accounts have appeared in print at this writing. The Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletins and the author's personal experiences are used for the majority of the information in this case study.

Brigg's Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent account for the individual soldier perspective. Although limited by his unit's participation, the book covers many of the salient points of the conflict.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

There are many excellent books in terms of general theoretical works on terrorism. Laqueur's Terrorism and
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Walter's *Terror and Resistance* are two of the very best. Walter examines terrorism from both governmental uses of terror and also a terrorist perspective. Laqueur points out that terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but his history uses only a few examples and is very short. From a more political and less comprehensive view, Stohl's edited volume, *The Politics of Terrorism* is also very good.

*Language of Violence* by O'Ballance is an excellent historical examination of terrorism. This book contains detailed historical accounts of early terrorism, giving the reader a better historical understanding.

Rosie's *Directory of International Terrorism* is a catalog of the major terrorist events, personalities, organizations and counter-terror groups during the twentieth century. Listed under alphabetized topic headings the book serves as an excellent quick reference and guide to further research.

*The Financing of Terror* by Adams is an excellent in-depth analysis of how major terror organization find funding. In contrast to Sterling's *The Terror Network*, Adams outlines avenues of funds and disputes the singular Soviet sponsorship of major terror groups. Adams portrays independent terror groups with independent funding finding common ground and occasionally acting in concert. He concludes that coordinated action is not the norm and only entered upon when it clearly is mutually beneficial.
The aspect of government response to terror is also the subject of hundreds of books. Bell’s *A Time of Terror* gives a good background on terrorism and response using several detailed case studies. Two excellent, more current works are Kupperman and Trent’s *Terrorism: Threat, Reality and Response* and Livingstone’s *The War Against Terrorism*. Both discuss the recent growth of terrorism and the specific governmental strategies and tactics taken to counter the terrorists.

Rapoport’s *Inside Terrorist Organizations* and Livingstone and Halevy’s *Inside the PLO* give detailed accounts of the organization and decision making of some of the major terror organizations. *Inside the PLO* discusses the role of front organizations and the need for covert operations to retain legitimacy.

Ryan’s *The Iranian Rescue Mission* is a definitive study of Operation EAGLE CLAW. Using the Holloway Report as a basis for inquiry the book examines the failure of the mission and the reasons why.

From a hostage’s point of view Testrake’s *Triumph Over Terror* gives a detailed account of what it was like to be a hostage during a prolonged hijacking/hostage situation. Written primarily as religious testimony, the book gives an excellent first hand image of the stress, quick thinking, and terrorist reactions during a hijacking.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

*International Peace Observation* by Wainhouse is a comprehensive overall history of peacekeeping. It is not limited to United Nations operations and gives detailed accounts of each major operation. Because of its survey nature it does not discuss military operations in detail but is an excellent starting point for further research.

*The Blue Helmets* by the United Nations is an institutional history of UN peacekeeping operations. Written primarily from the strategic military level it gives another dimension of detail when used in conjunction with Wainhouse's book.

From a political standpoint, O'Brien's *To Katanga and Back* is a detailed account of the early days of the UN operation in the Belgian Congo. Focused on the Katanga secessionist movement and the commensurate UN operations O'Brien brings out some major points on the problems of peacekeeping.

Harbottle's *The Blue Berets* and *The Impartial Soldier* and von Horn's *Soldiering for Peace* are excellent soldier's accounts of peacekeeping. Written by UN force commanders, these three books give detailed insight into the frustration, political overtones and tactical problems of peacekeeping operations. These books provide operational and tactical details of several UN operations.
The Root by Hammel and Peacekeepers at War by Petit are excellent individual soldier accounts of the Beirut peacekeeping operation. Both books build to the barracks bombing but still provide soldier reaction to coping with rules of engagement, snipers and maintaining impartiality.

**AUTHOR’S NOTE: As an aid to further research the Bibliography includes works on other conflicts not specifically reviewed in this study. These works were used for further background material in some instances and for general information in others.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The primary purpose of this study is to analyze several low intensity conflicts historically to determine the conditions that lead to success. According to Dr. Fischer in Historical Fallacies, "a historical explanation is an attempt to relate some historical phenomenon in a functional way to other historic phenomenon".¹ This study seeks to relate several diverse conflicts and determine common conditions that lead to success.

Once those conditions have been described a comparison between conflicts can be made and trends identified. If trends can be established a cause and effect analysis can be conducted. Finally conclusions will be drawn from the results of the analysis and implications presented for Army doctrine, training and operations.

This study does not examine a particular period, in spite of the close proximity of conflict dates. Rather, this study examines the activities of a limited portion of the operational continuum. Recent conflicts are used to make
generalizations to future conflicts more applicable. Thus, low intensity conflict is studied as a problem in historical terms to find trends, analyze the interactions and generalize to future conflicts. This study does not seek to blindly apply past solutions to unique events in future conflicts.²

According to Barzun and Graff in The Modern Researcher a historian contributes two things; results of original research and conclusions or explanations that link the facts.³ This study seeks to provide both. The original research focuses on the comparison of several conflicts and the resulting trend analysis. The conclusions will establish a cause and effect relationship and generalize the specific conditions of success to future conflicts.

FRAMING THE QUESTION

The primary research question was framed within the six rules outlined by Dr. Fischer.⁴ Each of these six affirmative checks or axioms have been applied.

1. Operationalism 4. Analytically
2. Open-endedness 5. Precision
3. Flexibility 6. Testability

Although each is not satisfied within the question itself, the introduction and definitions, taken together, outline the requirements.

Operationalism is "the demand that the concepts or terms used in the description of experience be framed in terms which can be unequivocally performed".⁵ Standard definitions have been used throughout the study. The
definitions in the introduction cover most terms and concepts and those that have been modified from current doctrine are noted. The definitions are consistently applied, unless otherwise noted.

The requirement of open-endedness serves as a guide to limit the information applicable to the study without predetermining the outcome. The question of success requires an individual evaluation of each conflict. This produces a unique set of solutions that can later be compared to other conflicts. Information is limited in terms of its applicability to success and not because of content.

Flexibility, or the ability to refine questions further is addressed in the broad terms of the original question. Refinement and further categorization will be expanded as the study progresses. The pattern for research uses categories from existing doctrine and is flexible enough for discussion of the conclusions based on the outcome.

The research question is not analytical and does not allow for logical subdivision and research. Limitations addressed in the introduction and the patterns addressed later in the methodology serve this check. They allow for breaking the topic down and examining it in parts that will contribute to a larger solution.

The requirement to be precise is not completely solved by the research question standing alone. Explicit
definition of success, critical elements and the operational categories sufficiently satisfy this portion of the question. Finally, the findings of this study will determine how well the question was tested or empirically verified. Quality of the evidence and sound reasoning of the conclusions will give empirical verification or some fault will be found within, which must be corrected. The reader must be the ultimate judge.

DETERMINING THE PATTERN OF RESEARCH

The category of low intensity conflict is broad and contains a variety of potential scenarios for conflict. Barzun and Graff discuss the need for a system or pattern to examine history methodically. This pattern must fit the evidence and provide a graspable design for the reader.

"There are many factual patterns - an infinite number of them - which can be superimposed on past events. An historian’s task is to find patterns which are more relevant to his problems, and more accurate and more comprehensive than others."

This study will use a modified topical outline for organization. Within major subject areas a combination of modified topic outline and chronological order will be used to examine events within each individual conflict. This allows a logical pattern of examination and considers the subordination and perspective provided by chronological ordering of events.

The modified topical outline will use the four operational categories of low intensity conflict from
**FM 100-20** to form the major framework. The four categories form the basis of the historical examination and subsequent analysis.¹⁸

1. Insurgency & Counterinsurgency
2. Peacetime Contingency Operations
3. Combating Terrorism
4. Peacekeeping Operations

Comparison of trends within categories will be the initial goal of the study. If trends emerge within categories then a subsequent comparison between categories will be conducted. The common characteristics of each operational category will also be examined. Conclusions will be made about the applicability of the original four categories based on content and common characteristics.

A major concern is whether the sample of conflicts is sufficient to permit generalization in the conclusions.¹⁷ Unlike samples in other research, conflicts do not lend themselves to statistical proof. In selecting the conflicts for examination factors of geographic location, origin of participants, host and intervening country relationships and availability of data were major considerations.

The study seeks trends in conditions, despite each of these conflicts being unique. The key is the analysis of trends despite variables, or even possibly because of variables.¹⁸ The conclusions drawn must describe the interaction of the conditions, and provide evidence for both the comparison and cause and effect linkage. The weight of evidence and sound reasoning must consistently address the
unique variables applied to conditions and any resulting trends.¹⁹

**CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH**

Dr. Fischer cautions, that "historical evidence must be a direct answer to the question asked and not some other question".²⁰ This is the rule of immediacy. Six axioms grow directly from this basic rule of "not just getting the facts right, but getting the right facts right".²¹

The first axiom requires the best evidence be presented in support of conclusions.²² This implies that proper weight is assigned to different types of evidence and that differences are resolved. This study is based primarily on direct observation. The other two types of evidence, the event itself and authentic remains of the event are not useful to the research.²³

Second, evidence must be affirmative and demonstrate that a condition did exist.²⁴ Evidence attesting to the fact that other conditions did not exist is not affirmative and possibly no evidence at all. Positive proof is the only absolute answer and negative evidence only supports uncertainty.²⁵

The third axiom lays the burden of proof on the author and not the reader.²⁶ The quality of evidence and the sound conclusions will satisfy this requirement.

The fourth axiom applies to all aspects of the study.²⁷ It states that "all inferences from empirical
evidence are probabilistic". The study must demonstrate that something was not only possible but also the most probable. This is not absolute proof, but supports the sound reasoning of the historical argument.

The fifth axiom requires that historical facts be presented properly and not taken out of context. As stated earlier in the discussion of sample size, historical facts must be individually related to the variables. This requires extensive analysis in the comparison of different conflicts and the trends.

Finally, the sixth axiom cautions that facts must not be given more precision, weight or significance than the evidence allows. Proper perspective must be maintained and evidence weighted and subordinated carefully, especially when differences arise.

With the rules of factual verification in mind this research will involve several steps:

a) Review of general LIC literature. Initially a review of the general literature concerning LIC will provide background and some possible candidates for critical elements from the broad perspective. Differing perspectives and classifications of LIC will be examined for possible inclusion in discussion and conclusions.

b) Examination of historical evidence for each conflict.
   1. Conditions for success outlined for each conflict. Major activities at each level of war, strategic, operational
and tactical which contributed to overall success will be detailed. The interaction of activities and outside variables will be included.

2. Comparison analysis conducted within the four operational categories to establish trends. This will determine similarity of conditions within categories and whether geographic regions or nationality of participants creates major differences.

3. Overall cause and effect relationships established.

c) Conclusions on the applicability of results to current doctrine, training and operations. This will be done within each category and also for the low intensity portion of the conflict spectrum in general.

DETERMINING THE FACTS

Barzun and Graff note that there are two primary avenues for verifying the truth of a historical event. First is an abundance of documentary evidence. The second is a critical examination of the evidence available that will show the high probability of truth."

The critical examination referred to forms the critical method:

"... No piece of evidence can be used for historiography in the state in which it is found. It is invariably and necessarily subjected to the action of the researcher's mind, and when that action is methodical and just, what is being applied is known as the critical method.""
This critical method causes the author to answer three critical questions for each fact. They are:

a) "Is this object or piece of writing genuine?"
b) "Is its message trustworthy?"
c) "How do I know?"

The critical method is the primary instrument for determining the historical facts in this study. The answer to the second question (b) is critical to this study and requires the corroboration of other evidence. To support this, several diverse sources for each conflict are used. The relationship and applicability of those facts will be supported in the conclusions.

The research question requires a description of the conditions at each level of war leading to success be produced for each conflict in the sample. It is important to note that overall success requires the correct application of strategic, operational and tactical elements of power and activities. Activities must be consistent in their application or individual successes will remain fragmented achievements which do not contribute to the overall aim. The relationship of each of these elements and how they interrelate between the host and intervening countries are the subject of a portion of the discussion.

Examination and analysis of each low intensity conflict will be based on direct observations. These observations are a primary source for an individual in the conflict giving primary evidence about his actions, methods
and thoughts. These same observations are a secondary source for information on the actions, methods and thoughts of the others around him. Sources for material will center primarily on books and articles written on each conflict. Personal interviews, news documentaries and special studies will also be included where applicable and available. Analysis of how individual conditions and activities interacted and the contribution of each toward success involves assimilating and comparing the evidence.  

For each conflict several diverse primary sources were selected as the basis of the examination. The result should be a picture of events from several aspects of the same event. The actions and reactions designed to produce success for each major participant are examined with the aim of enlarging the perspective and giving additional weight to evidence using multiple sources.

One aspect of the additional weighting of evidence examines the actions and counteractions of participants toward specific goals. By examining multiple aspects of the conflict success is partially defined in terms of the prevention of success of the opposition. In other words one side sought to establish X condition as an element of success and the other side prevented X condition. The strategy and tactics associated with its prevention are an element that contributed to the success of the opposition. The fact that more than one participant worked either for or against a
specific condition may indicate that it contributed in a major way to success.

Another aspect of evidence focuses exclusively on the desired results of one side and whether that side was successful or not. The events leading to that success can be evaluated both in terms stated by primary and secondary sources. Relative probability of the success of a course of action can also be evaluated and in retrospective whether the action was likely to produce the desired results.

By examining and analyzing several aspects of each conflict a complete picture of the conditions associated with success should develop. Conflicting evidence and views must be addressed and resolved before comparisons and conclusions may be drawn. Similar characteristics will be highlighted and exceptions will be investigated to determine a cause and effect relationship. In this way a set of common characteristics for a group of conflicts will emerge, along with the cause and effect relationships at various levels of conflict.

The conditions contributing to success can be graphically displayed in matrix form for each conflict. Each matrix must outline the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict and subordinate the conditions as they apply to each level. For example, a particular strategic design might require two or more operational plans and several contributing tactical efforts. These would be displayed as follows:
### CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
<th>TACTICAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy 1</td>
<td>Operational Plan 1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operational Plan 2</td>
<td>Tactic 2</td>
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Each different conflict will yield a reliable set of characteristics. Common elements of success should appear. Comparison and contrast of the individual conflicts in matrix form should produce a group of critical elements common to success. In this way the common critical elements of success for LIC can be developed and graphically displayed in matrix form.

Cause and effect examinations can be conducted once the critical elements have been identified and categorized. Interdependence and interrelations can also be established.

### DEVELOPING CONCLUSIONS

Thus the study addresses complex issues in a proper perspective, separating the important from the unimportant. It does not attempt to find a single cause or essence of success in low intensity conflict.\(^{37}\) This approach includes the possibility/probability of several causal elements and their interaction.

Nor does it seek to exact specific examples from history and apply them literally as policies to present problems without regard for intervening changes.\(^{38}\) One of the worst mistakes a historian can make is to blindly apply
lessons from history without regard for the changes in circumstances and conditions that have taken place.

Generalizing the results of this study to future conflicts requires a cause and effect relationship between critical elements of success. Dr. Fischer defines a causal explanation as "One that identifies underlying conditions which were of such a nature that they rendered the effect probable". He notes that there can be correlation without cause but no cause without correlation. To establish a causal proposition between X and Y three things must be present:

a) "There must be a correlation between X and Y."

b) "There must be a proper temporal relationship in their occurrence."

c) "There must be at least a presumptive agency which connects them."

Using both the comparison developed earlier and the cause and effect discussion, several common conditions applying to success in low intensity conflict should develop. From these, the critical elements for success can then be derived.

The critical elements must be operationally defined based on the historical analysis. Situational concerns can be outlined; exceptions and notes highlighted. Depending on results, this would serve as a strategic, operational or tactical commander's guideline for planning and execution in a future LIC.
This guideline has many doctrinal and training applications. One direct application is a comparison between the results of the historical analysis and the current BOS. This could be used to answer the disconnect outlined earlier between current conventional and LIC doctrine at the operational/tactical level. Specific examples, expansion, redefinition, or even replacement of the BOS may result.

The product should be a methodological approach to a LIC from a commander's perspective covering the strategic, operational and tactical aspects. Historical evidence derived from both successful and unsuccessful conflicts will be available as concrete examples and operational definitions of general principles. In this way, commanders at all levels would have a useful tool to adopt a fundamental mindset or approach required for success in his operation.


CHAPTER 4. PART I

INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY

The case studies in this section represent radically different fundamental approaches to counterinsurgency. Geographic areas and nationalities are varied and the insurgent infrastructure shows different stages of development. Economic conditions and social development differ in each case.

Although all the insurgent organizations examined here follow Mao's doctrine of cellular structure, only the revolutionary movements in Indochina and Malaya subscribed to communist ideology. The cases also represent a range of rural and urban based insurgencies.

Available space and time limit the overall study of this operational category. Only counterinsurgency operations are discussed in this portion of the study. No claim is made here that support for insurgencies exactly parallels counterinsurgency tactics. Available unclassified information and maintaining a consistency in the framework of analysis dictate that study be left for future examination.
On 2 September 1945 Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of the newly created Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The republic united the pre-war French colonies of Tonkin, Annam and Chochin-China. Ho had seized the moment and taken power in the vacuum created by the sudden Japanese surrender at the close of World War II.

Ho Chi Minh was an alias taken when Ho was released from a Chinese jail, where he had been imprisoned during the war for being a communist. Born in 1892 as Nguyen That Thanh, son of an administrator in the French colonial government, he became disillusioned at an early age. Following the dismissal of his father from the administration on ethical charges he served a term in prison for preaching nationalism. After his release, Ho traveled as a merchant seamen and eventually settled in Paris, becoming involved in revolutionary politics. He was known in Paris, and later, as Nguyen Ai Quoc.

In 1920 Ho was a co-founder of the French Communist party and attended the 1923 Congress of the Peasant International in Moscow. He stayed on to study and came to the attention of Lenin and Stalin. In 1925, sponsored by the Soviets, he went to China and formed the Association of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth. This was the beginning of the organization of the Viet Minh.
Small cells of the Revolutionary Youth were infiltrated into Vietnam and organized local groups to oppose the French. During the early 1930's opposition of French colonial rule increased and several small groups attempted revolts. These uprisings were brutally put down and Ho capitalized on the ensuing disorganization.

By the time war broke out in 1939 Ho had assembled many of the smaller factions under the nationalist banner of the Viet Minh. Communist ideology was suppressed to gain widespread popular support and to allay fears of Chaing Kai-shek that communist elements were growing on his southern flank. In May 1941 at a congress held in southern China the Viet Minh was established as the central nationalist organization.

Ho was imprisoned by the Chinese while operating in southern China on the suspicion of his communist tendencies. In an attempt to weaken Ho's base of support, Chaing Kai-shek sponsored the creation of a second nationalist organization once he had imprisoned Ho. This was called the Dong Minh Hoi. At the same time another activist, Vo Nguyen Giap was organizing the cells established earlier in northern Vietnam and accumulating valuable intelligence.

Giap had been a history professor with strong nationalist beliefs at the outbreak of World War II. Like many other Vietnamese, Giap had heard of Ho through his
writings from Paris and China. Deeply impressed with Ho’s ideology, Giap pledged all his support to Ho’s movement.

In 1943 America eagerly sought intelligence on Japanese dispositions and operations. The U.S. sought to organize resistance in Indochina and pressed Chaing Kai-shek for the release of Ho. This was the price required to garner the support of Giap and his well functioning network.\(^2\) Chaing’s original plan backfired, when Ho took a new name as he was released from prison and shortly afterward became the head of the Dong Minh Hoi.\(^3\)

During 1944 Ho and Giap continued to improve their underground forces and relay intelligence to the allies. However, Free French intelligence missions were also in Vietnam working with the French colonial administration and pressed the Americans not to support the nationalist Ho.\(^4\)

In early 1945 the French garrison in Vietnam staged an uprising which was quickly suppressed by the Japanese. The remaining French were imprisoned and the Japanese took direct control of the government of Vietnam. An American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) mission headed by Major Patti sent in to gather intelligence and organize resistance had little choice but to link up with Ho. The only functioning organization left in Vietnam was the Viet Minh.\(^5\)

Ho Chi Minh consolidated his power, and in the vacuum left by the French, took control of day to day administration of Tonkin under the Japanese.\(^6\) Major Patti ignored French
demands to withdraw support from Ho and planned major actions in northern Vietnam with Vietnamese guerrillas. American training and material support continued although in small quantities, as relations grew. Both Ho and Major Patti believed the Pacific war would continue for several years.\textsuperscript{17}

Roosevelt's postwar American policy favored independence for the prewar colonies and Major Patti's mission followed those guidelines.\textsuperscript{18} Unfortunately the British would not yield on the subject of colonies, not wanting to lose her own and so supported France. Given postwar rebuilding, unification of Europe against Stalin and Roosevelt's death, President Truman was forced to acquiesce.\textsuperscript{19} Nowhere was the chain reaction of this confusion more strongly felt than in Vietnam.

In August 1945 following the two atom bombs and the lightning Japanese surrender, Ho controlled all of Tonkin and northern Annam. Boa Dai, the figurehead under Japanese occupation abdicated and became part of the Ho regime.\textsuperscript{20} On 2 September independence was declared.

According to the Potsdam Conference Chaing Kai-shek's forces would take the Japanese surrender in northern Vietnam while the British accepted it in the South. Chinese troops moved in but allowed Ho to continue his administration, even providing captured Japanese equipment to his government. In the south confusion reigned.\textsuperscript{21}
British occupation troops were forced to rearm Japanese soldiers to ensure the peace. Violence continued as French garrison soldiers were released from prison and rearmed. Law and order was a secondary concern as competing factions wrestled for power.

In October 1945 French General Leclerc arrived with an infantry division to relieve the British and re-established order. In November Admiral d'Argenlieu arrived in Saigon as French High Commissioner of all Indochina, charged with reasserting French authority.

Ho Chi Minh's outside support dwindled forcing him to negotiate with the French. Ho agreed in February 1946 to the return of 25,000 French troops in exchange for the total withdrawal of the Chinese. France agreed in principle to a republic in Vietnam with its own government, but French actions inclined differently. Talks completed on 6 March, with an agreement promising eventual independence, but providing for continued French occupation. Admiral d'Argenlieu promised Ho more negotiations would follow in June.

Talks were conducted in Paris in July 1946 but General De Gaulle interceded to retain the colony and no progress was made. Ho returned to Vietnam. In November, in a dispute with Ho's forces over the control of the customs house, French forces shelled Haiphong killing 6,000.
Ho Chi Minh and Giap withdrew their forces from the major cities as French forces increased. The Viet Minh returned to their wartime base areas in Tan Trao. Guerrilla cadres were reestablished and Giap's 30,000 regular troops began fighting French forces in the rural areas.²⁸

In March 1947 President Truman announced the "Truman Doctrine" which France interpreted as support for retention of its colonial possessions.²⁹ NATO was being organized and French participation was seen as a major requirement.³⁰ In spite of being deeply divided politically, France began to reinforce military forces in Vietnam and focused on eliminating Ho Chi Minh's armed resistance.

Using conventional tactics, the French controlled only the larger cities. The local Viet Minh controlled the countryside.³¹ French units raided villages and forced residents out if the village was suspected of supporting the Viet Minh. This increased hatred of the French and created a huge refugee problem. The refugees provided excellent recruits for Giap's anticolonial forces.³²

Ho and Giap continued to organize forces and expand the rural areas under their control. Ho was clearly recognized as the central political figure and he selected Giap to head the military forces. By 1949 French forces had reestablished control over most of the Red River Delta and all major cities. The south (Cochin-China) was plagued by constant infighting of religious sects (Coa Dai, Hoa Hoa) and the Viet Minh underground.³³
In January 1950 the newly liberated communist Red China recognized Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh as the legitimate government of Vietnam. The Soviet Union quickly followed. The French responded and installed the wartime Emperor Boa Dai in Saigon as ruler of Vietnam within the French Union. The United States recognized the Saigon government.

Any question of America's position with respect to colonial vs. communist governments was discharged in June 1950 when the Korean War started. The United States immediately sent $10 Million worth of equipment to the French in Vietnam. Secretary of State Dulles believed it was imperative to support the French and contain communist China. He felt by supporting the French and encouraging them to built a Vietnamese Army the U.S. could avoid involvement.

Giap, strengthened by Chinese equipment, attacked and seized a line of French outposts in the north along the Cao Bang-Lang Son ridge. French paratroops counterattacked but were eventually forced to evacuate. On October 3 the retreating garrison together with a reinforcing force from That Khe were ambushed resulting in 6000 French losses.

Encouraged by these victories Giap began a general offensive against the Red River Delta in late October. General de Lattre arrived in December in time to recorganize the delta defenses. Fortified positions were constructed and mobile groups of armored units and paratroops acted as rapid
reinforcements. Giap was fighting openly conventional battles, against well equipped French troops, often against prepared defenses. The French counterattacked and achieved success after success. Throughout the spring of 1951 Giap was beaten back out of the Red River Delta.  

Giap had moved to the third phase of guerrilla warfare, the all out war of movement too quickly. He withdrew his forces, reorganized and resupplied waiting for a new opportunity to arise. Chinese support continued to flow in and the Viet Minh grew.

De Lattre, encouraged by his victories, turned to the offensive, attacking Viet Minh supply bases in November 1951. Hoa Binh was captured using a combination parachute assault and mobile armored units. Viet Minh supplies were destroyed and a French garrison installed. However, the French still only controlled the areas and towns they actually occupied. Lines of communication were constantly ambushed and the Viet Minh had uncontested control and movement throughout the rural areas.

Seizing the chance, Giap deployed six divisions to cut off the extended garrison at Hoa Binh. De Lattre was forced by ill health to return to France and was replaced by General Salan. The situation deteriorated at Hoa Binh and finally on 22 February 1952 General Salan ordered its evacuation. In October Giap took the Nglia Lo Ridge further constraining the French area of operations.
In October, in an effort to regain the initiative General Salan launched Operation Lorraine using his mobile reserves to seize Viet Minh supply dumps at Pho Tho and Phu Doan. The French forces achieved quick victory with their overwhelming firepower. Viet Minh resistance was characterized as minimal. However in what appeared to be a growing pattern the Viet Minh cut supply lines to the occupying garrisons and pressed them with continuous minor engagements. On 14 November the garrisons were evacuated."41

French forces were slowly but effectively being worn down. Political decisions prevented French draftees from serving outside France, so the forces available were limited to Foreign Legion, colonial forces and volunteers."42 U.S support helped but could not hold the tide indefinitely. French air support still reigned supreme but could not protect overextended supply lines everywhere. The fledgling Vietnamese Army grew slowly but suffered from an acute lack of quality officers and non-commissioned officers."43

In April 1953 Giap invaded Laos with a reinforced division threatening the French garrison at Sam Neua. General Salan was surprised, expecting the next blow to be against the Red River Delta. He was forced again to evacuate the garrison which fought a desperate rearguard action suffering heavy losses. Several French positions were surrounded stretching air resources to the limit. But the monsoons came, making ground resupply and movement very
difficult. Giap was forced to withdraw, not wanting to overextend his own logistics. This gave the French positions a reprieve.

In May 1953 General Salan was replaced by General Navarre in an attempt to reinvigorate the command. General Navarre planned a holding action during 1953/early 1954 in order to build the Vietnamese Army and consolidate his strength. The political situation in France worsened as problems in Algeria increased and U.S. support appeared to be slackening. The government grudgingly supported his plan and sent ten additional battalions.

During the summer of 1953 Navarre conducted two successful operations using the Vietnamese Army against Viet Minh supply points. Even so, he was unable to stop infiltration of Giap’s forces into the Red River Delta or eliminate those already present.

In another attempt to lure Giap into a decisive conventional battle Navarre attacked the Viet Minh 320th Division at Phu Ly as the monsoons ended. The attack was repulsed and no Viet Minh reinforcements were drawn in. Fearing he would lose the initiative Navarre sought another area between Giap’s forces and supply routes in Laos where he could draw the Viet Minh in.

General Navarre thought that keeping the initiative was critical. This would buy time needed to increase his reserves and build the Vietnamese Army into a capable force.
In order to do this, an attack was planned on a valley, astride a main supply route, just across the border in Laos: Dien Bien Phu.

On 20 November 1953 three parachute battalions dropped on Dien Bien Phu as the assault force. Surprising two Viet Minh companies a six hour battle raged. The French took casualties but eventually wiped out the Viet Minh. The forces built up quickly with 10,000 in place and 5,000 more in reserve after only a one week. The distance to the airstrip was at the limit of French Air Force based in Hanoi. Other garrisons were stripped or abandoned in order to concentrate on Dien Bien Phu.

Military planners and intelligence sources felt the Viet Minh were incapable of deploying artillery or air defenses around the valley. The two airfields with the circle of protective positions appeared impregnable. Artillery, fighter bombers and even light tanks were flown in to support offensive operations based from the valley.

But Giap was mobilizing also. A conference to discuss the end of the Korean and IndoChina Wars had already been scheduled. Support for the war in France was falling off rapidly as the bill in both economic and manpower terms was growing. Ho and Giap realized the strategic importance of the opportunity. All the assets of the Viet Minh in the north were called out. China was pressed for support including heavy artillery and air defense weapons.
Using a human logistics chain and Chinese trucks Giap gradually built up his forces. Heavy artillery was moved into the surrounding mountains and dug in. Chinese air defenses were brought in and covered the air routes into and out of the valley. Five Viet Minh divisions, twice the French intelligence estimate were moved into position.\(^2\)

On 12 March the Viet Minh attacked, preceded by a heavy artillery barrage. The French were stunned. 500 men died on one hill alone. Outpost Beatrice fell the first day following an onslaught by an entire Viet Minh division. Gabrielle and Anne-Marie fell by the 15th and the situation was getting desperate. On 16 March a paratroop battalion was dropped as reinforcements.\(^3\)

The Viet Minh suffered heavy losses in the human wave attacks advised by the Chinese observers. Following the initial successes Giap reflected and stopped the frontal assaults. Heavy artillery pounding continued and the Viet Minh began digging assault trenches toward the French perimeter.\(^4\)

The French conducted several successful counterattacks but suffered heavy losses, which they could ill afford. By 27 March the airstrip was closed and all resupply was by air drop, often falling into the Viet Minh hands. Wounded could not get out and there were no more reinforcements.\(^5\)
France requested American assistance, but newly installed President Eisenhower was reluctant to move alone. He pledged support if Britain would assist. But Winston Churchill thought it would only prolong the agony. Additionally the U.S. Congress opposed it. In the end a U.S. plan for bombing support was tabled. In Geneva the fateful conference, previously scheduled to discuss East Asian peace issues, convened.  

The final assault lasted for two days beginning on the evening of 5 May 1945. During two days of constant artillery fire and human assaults the remaining French positions were overrun one by one. A plan to conduct a breakout was dropped because the commanders felt the men were too exhausted. On 7 May Dien Bien Phu surrendered and the French were forced to negotiate an agreement in Geneva from a position of weakness.  

On 21 July 1954 the Geneva Agreements were signed. Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel, with Ho Chi Minh recognized as the legitimate leader in the north, and Ngo Dinh Diem would become the head of government in the south. The French were given 100 days to withdraw and an international control commission was established to supervise.  

* * * * *  

At the strategic level France was not prepared or committed to fight a prolonged guerrilla war following
closely on the devastation of World War II. The country was economically and politically devastated and the population was tired of war.

Ho Chi Minh was absolutely correct in his assessment that a long struggle would bleed France dry and quickly lose all political support. From the outset Ho proposed a guerrilla strategy against French forces. He spent time and effort establishing an effective political organization to build his base of power. French forces consistently underestimated the strength and dimensions of his organization.

Overestimation of Viet Minh capabilities and impatience by Chinese advisors pushed Giap to fight conventional battles early on. Quickly reverting to the original strategy, Ho and Giap waited until the opportunity at Dien Bien Phu arose.

Political stability was nonexistent in France during this time and therefore it was almost impossible to compose a coherent strategy for the conflict in Vietnam. The French government was factionalized, and in this it was truly representative of the population. Fifteen different governments assumed and lost power during the First Indochina War. Consensus on any issue would have been extremely difficult. Two of the most dramatic examples concern Ho Chi Minh and Admiral d'Argenlieu.
Ho Chi Minh traveled to France to negotiate in good faith with the French government in July 1946. Some progress was made and the government appeared willing to make concessions. Then General De Gaulle, who had been ousted from power, signaled his displeasure with the possible loss of Indochina. This was enough to force an immediate conclusion of the talks by a weak and disorganized French government.60

Admiral d'Argenlieu was directed by General De Gaulle in November 1945 to reassert French authority throughout Indochina. He subsequently lost the backing of the government in January 1946 when De Gaulle resigned. However, his strong personality combined with the private words of De Gaulle kept support of the war in Indochina alive in the political sector.61 This lack of continuity significantly contributed to the lack of a focused strategy on Indochina.

President Mendes-France finally galvanized a clear political majority in 1954 with his moves to remove France from Indochina. This was clearly demonstrated in the public support he received for his pledge to end the war or resign.62 Thus only after nine years of conflict, was a politician able to formulate a solid policy on Indochina. That policy was to leave as quickly as possible.

Materially France was not any better prepared to fight than it was politically. Aid from the United States provided surplus World War II military equipment but France
could not afford a massive infrastructure rebuilding program for Indochina. France was almost totally consumed rebuilding and rearming France.63

Manpower was also a priority item with finite capabilities. French law forbade draftees from serving outside France. The unfavorable political climate surrounding the war prohibited changing this law and limited available forces to the Foreign Legion, and other colonial or French volunteer troops.64

Considering all these factors, many in France, especially in the military, felt that this colonial uprising could be defeated with limited means. Experience by Lyautey in Indochina, Algeria and Morocco during the late 19th and early 20th century reinforced this misconception. The French gravely underestimated the depth of organization of the Viet Minh and the widespread nationalist backing for the war by the Tonkin Vietnamese.65 This failure to understand the basic nature and scope of the conflict was a major strategic error.

The strategic errors were compounded at the operational level. A lack of a comprehensive strategic policy on Indochina, forced military officials to use the tools they knew best. Admiral d'Argenlieu possessed supreme authority as the French High Commissioner. His determined efforts to reestablish French authority by force only further distanced the population of Indochina. As a precursor to the
American involvement in Vietnam, he felt the solution lay in applying larger and more powerful military forces against the Viet Minh.66

A Vietnamese army was only grudgingly endorsed, more because of American pressure than French desire. The army was officered by the French and training was very poor until 1952. As French manpower problems became more acute, training was improved and successful operations conducted like those in summer 1953 under General Navarre.67 Shortages of quality leadership for the Vietnamese forces continually hampered expansion.

Little was done to extend the effectiveness of the French administration or address the political desires of the population. No programs for social change were instituted or considered. Government control did not extend beyond the boundaries of the major cities, allowing the Viet Minh freedom of movement in the countryside.68

Almost nothing was done to gain support of the population. On the contrary, French methods were often brutal, direct and harsh. The military became the lead element in government and no attempt was made to expand the police force. Weapons were committed against targets with little regard for collateral damage. The shelling of Haiaphong and routine French tactical air support against villages are two major examples of counterproductive firepower.69
French commanders continually sought to exploit their advantages in mobility, firepower and air supremacy. Operationally this quest took several forms in the French plans. Often it led directly to an overextension of French tactical or logistical assets. Rather than consolidating areas and gradually working out, the French attempted to cover all areas simultaneously.

Continually seeking a major conventional battle, seizing and holding terrain, and the focus on killing Viet Minh in a conflict of attrition led to tactical errors. Little was done to attack the organization and support infrastructure behind Ho’s forces.

Several French tactics proved very successful but because they were employed in a failing strategy at the operational level, gains were minor and temporary. Use of indigenous forces, aerial resupply, mobile columns, and parachute reinforcements all emerged as successes.

Major Trinquier and his work with indigenous forces in the counterguerrilla role paid several dividends. The attack and seizure of the town and airfield of Than-Uyen for seven months behind enemy lines is only one example. To be successful in a major way these operations needed to be integrated into an overall operational plan. They were not.

Individual efforts continued to focus on destroying the guerrilla forces rather than attacking the organization.
and support network. Military efforts were quickly evaded as insurgents reverted to limited operations and allowed the overextended logistics to become the weak link in the chain. Because the French aerial resupply capability was overtaxed, the counterguerrilla operations made overall logistics efforts more difficult. These operations highlight the obsession of the French commanders with seizing and holding terrain. Rather than striking quickly and withdrawing, these irregular forces became tied to defensive positions deep in unfriendly territory. Operations were not well coordinated and lacked an overall goal other than denying the enemy a certain village.\textsuperscript{72}

Initially the focus may have been better placed denying the enemy general freedom of movement. Securing isolated villages, no matter how loyal to the French cause, contributed little to the operational success of defeating the Viet Minh. Had operations been better coordinated or conceived earlier, regional successes rather than just local tactical gains may have resulted.

The French use of large scale tactical airborne and aerial resupply operations were extremely successful. Combined with mobile columns of lightly armored vehicles deep objectives were quickly taken. The coordinated assault of Hoa Binh is an example of only one of several airborne & ground linkup operations successfully seizing a Viet Minh
supply center.\footnote{3} These heavy/light operationally mixed forces operated well, even against guerrilla tactics.

Tactical close air support was used extensively to give fire support to these deployed forces. But just as the aerial resupply efforts were quickly overextended, so also did the close air support. Even when available, the firepower could not overcome all the weaknesses of conventional forces battling guerrillas.

Again, because the overall operational objectives were unclear or unreasonable, substantial tactical success turned into a logistical drain and eventually a hollow victory. After only 97 days General Salan was forced to evacuate Hoa Binh. Had these operations been designed as deep strikes to deny the enemy supplies and security without the following occupation of the area, better results may have been achieved.\footnote{4}

The deep French attacks and subsequent garrison activities did not improve French control of the rural areas. Instead they controlled only the village and what was within weapons range on either side of the road in and out. The mobile resupply columns were often ambushed enroute or fell victim to mines. These operations did little to further any objectives and instead became a burden in logistics and manpower as losses mounted.\footnote{5}

Intelligence at all levels was clearly not successful. Without adequate agent networks the French were
unable to keep track of the Viet Minh regular forces. Giap capitalized on this when he surrounded the garrison at Hoa Binh with six divisions.\

With poor or nonexistent administrative links in the rural areas, the French knew almost nothing of the Viet Minh infrastructure or support base. Operations focused on the regular formations and senior commanders felt the objective of defeating these forces would lead to ultimate success. This explains one aspect of why the French underestimated the depth of the Viet Minh organization and the strength of the nationalist feeling.

The ultimate failure at Dien Bien Phu highlights the intelligence shortfalls in several areas. Conventional intelligence underestimated the number of committed Viet Minh divisions. Nothing was known of the massive, Chinese supplied, heavy weapons infiltration to Dien Bien Phu. The massive mobilization of manpower to construct jungle trails and move supplies went unnoticed. All these indicators would have alerted the French that they had underestimated their ability to deal a death blow to the Viet Minh.

The French attempted to fight in all areas simultaneously. If they had adopted an approach similar to Lyautey's "touch of oil" theory and taken a longer term view success on a larger scale may have been realized. This would have required them to consolidate their holdings, expanding gradually while maintaining the initiative with
strikes. This would have required a better understanding of the protracted nature of the conflict, the depth of the enemy organization and a long term governmental commitment.
THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948-1960

During the industrial build-up of the early twentieth century the rubber plantations and tin mines in Malaya expanded considerably. To meet the need for manpower many native Chinese migrated to Malaya to work. With some of them came the budding communist ideas that were becoming very powerful in China during the 1920's and 1930's.¹

The communists established some limited organizations in the Chinese workforce and in the local school system but were not a viable political force.² Life in Malaya was improving and most native Malayans had little to complain about.

When Japan invaded China in 1939 the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) became a central organization which the Chinese used to voice their opposition to the intervention and show their support for Chinese nationalism. In 1942 the Japanese invaded Malaya and Singapore. The only remaining group with any organizational infrastructure for the British to build a resistance base upon was the MCP.³

As Japanese domination spread, more and more mines and plantations ceased operations. The Chinese immigrants were also forced from the cities because of a lack of service type employment. They moved into the rural areas and built small shacks on government land along the roads. They cleared small plots and survived by subsistence agriculture.⁴
The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was organized and officered by British officers, operating deep in the jungles, around the MCP. 3 Volunteers were plentiful from the Chinese refugees squatting on the rural government lands. Weapons were captured or air dropped by British aircraft to arm the resistance groups. Few significant military operations were conducted, although the MCP took advantage of the opportunity to eliminate many political opponents.

The MPAJA voluntarily accepted disbandment and turned in some of their weapons when the war ended in 1945. 6 However, many weapons were cached in waterproof containers in the jungle for possible use later. Following the war the MCP had weapons, some measure of military training and a very effective organization with a strong involvement in trade unions, Chinese schools and youth movements. 7

This is an excellent example of the communist tactic of parallel hierarchies. The central communist party organizes and controls many different organizations, such as youth groups, agricultural clubs, and workers groups, promoting the widest possible appeal to the people. These organizations take direction from the central party and are used to further party aims by propaganda and expand internal organization. 8

Prior to 1948 the MCP made little headway as a political organization. Many of the Chinese laborers were
reemployed but remained living in the rural shacks. They were a fertile breeding ground of discontent but suffered from lack of political goals and organization. Several strikes, both local and general, were organized but produced few tangible results. Racial violence increased between the ethnic Chinese and native Malays, further separating the two populations.2

In early 1948, following successes in the Chinese and Greek Civil Wars, the MCP began a concerted effort to recruit and organize the thousands of Chinese refugees. Recognizing their lack of political success, the MCP focused on an armed struggle to drive out the British colonial government and install a communist successor.10

The insurgency was carefully organized following Mao's doctrine of a central party with an expanding network of headquarters down to local level. The Central Committee determined the political objectives which governed military strategy.11 The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) became the regular military organization of the MCP. The support structure, which was part of the local populace, was called the Min Yuen.12

The party and the Min Yuen used small, strictly divided cells with message links as the basic unit in the organization. The people comprising these cells were spread throughout the population, working and living seemingly normal lives. The regular military was organized into
platoons that operated from small hideouts located in the dense jungle. Messengers carried orders from the respective headquarters and made supply pick-ups from the Min Yuen.  

On 16 June 1948 a series of terrorist attacks against miners and plantation owners in northwest Malaya were launched.  

A State of Emergency was declared in Perak and the following month the entire country was included.

Widespread violence occurred as plantation and mine workers were gathered together after dark in their villages and terrorized. Taxes and food were collected and recriminations were promised if the visits were reported. Europeans were ambushed while traveling on the roads or even making the rounds on their plantations. Mine equipment was sabotaged and rubber trees were slashed.

The British High Commissioner Sir Edward Gent did not consider the outbreak of violence as directly connected with the MCP or as a threat to the colony. He felt that it was an extension of the labor strikes and could be quickly controlled by the judicious application of force. He did not share the opinion of many that this was the first outward signs of an insurgent movement aimed at overthrowing the colonial government.

While flying back to London to present his view, Sir Edward Gent was killed in an airplane crash. He was replaced by Sir Henry Gurney, who was leaving the post of Chief Secretary in Palestine. The Commissioner of Police
was also replaced, by Colonel Gray, also coming from Palestine. Unfortunately they would not arrive for several months. In spite of this delay, it was fortunate to have personnel appointed with experience in dealing with insurgency and terrorism.

In the meantime the MCP was declared illegal. They were forced to flee into jungle camps which were secretly built near the refugee areas for support. Although the violence required the premature flight to the jungle, it was clear that the insurgents had the initiative. Government agencies, with only 10,000 police and nine British or Gurkha battalions augmented with two Malaya regiments, were unprepared to respond.

Once established, Sir Henry Gurney requested a military officer be appointed from London as Director of Operations. Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs was named but would fill the post as a civilian. Another fortunate choice, his initial groundwork laid the firm foundation for success in Malaya.

The Briggs' Plan had four main points:

1. "To dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security, which would in time result in a steady and increasing flow of information coming from all sources."

2. "To break up the communist organizations within the populated areas."

3. "To isolate the bandits from their food and supply organizations in the populated areas."
4. "To destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack the Security Forces on their own ground." 

It is important to note that only one of four, and the last in order of priority, talks of directly fighting the insurgents. All the other elements of the plan applied indirect force against the insurgents. Note also the primary reliance on security and information. This was not a military operation designed to hunt and kill insurgents.

This plan characterized the entire British approach to the conflict. The most important element was to improve the effectiveness and collective security provided by the government. This strategically indirect plan targeted the civil population instead of attempting to work directly against the insurgents. The operational and tactical direction for operations was a derivative of this strategic policy.

As a precursor to accomplishing the aims outlined in the plan, Sir Harold Briggs combined the civil and military administrations. This was done at each level to produce a nationally integrated civil administration, military command, police establishment and intelligence apparatus.

At the national level this integrated establishment was in the form of an Emergency Operations Council (EOC) headed by the Prime Minister. Subordinate to this council, General Briggs created the Director of Operations Committee (DOC) headed by himself with the Service Chiefs, Commissioner of Police and Minister of Defense.
The purpose of the EOC was long term planning and integration at the national level. In this forum, all the major functions involved in combatting the insurgency were brought together. This included finance, public works, administration, intelligence and security.26

The DOC supervised and integrated the security and intelligence portion of operations at the national level. This council had much more of a direct supervisory and day to day operational responsibility.27

At the local level, the War Executive Committee (WEC) paralleled the EOC in establishing policy. Day to day operations were coordinated by the Operations Committee.28

The system of integrated planning and coordinated operations was executed by joint military-police Operations Rooms. Military liaison officers, policemen and Special Branch officers worked together planning and supervising operations. They passed coordinated directives to their respective units to execute and served as a central receiving point for their reports.29

These Operations Rooms communicated consolidated reports through the local Operations Committees to the national DOC. In return they received intelligence reports from a centralized intelligence organization headed by a national Chief of Intelligence working for the DOC.30

In spite of adapting the administration, Sir Harold Briggs did not have authority over the civil agencies. This
remained a problem throughout his term. It was overcome largely by Briggs' personality and the genuine desire by almost all concerned to work toward a solution.

The Army was placed in a support role to the police. This initially frustrated many of the military commanders, but having key personnel with extensive experience and credible records in the civil administration overcame most of the objections. With few personnel and vast areas to secure everyone was initially part of the security operations. Units were broken into small groups and tasked to guard key installations and routes.

Several programs were developed to accomplish the objectives outlined in the "Briggs' Plan". Resettlement, food denial, national identification cards, creation of a Home Guard and deep patrols all contributed to wearing down terrorist strength.

Briggs realized that the Chinese refugees played a central role in the insurgency. Malays were reluctant to extend rights of citizenship or property ownership to them. In a controversial move, Briggs secured valuable land from the ruling Sultans and devised a scheme of resettling the Chinese squatters. Predominant in the plan was Chinese ownership of the new land with an eventual offer of citizenship.

Each "New Village" was surveyed and organized on the ground in advance. Families were allocated one-sixth of an
acre for a house and garden. Wells were drilled and schools built. Tight security measures such as perimeter fences and guard positions were also constructed. Additional land outside the enclosed village was allocated for agriculture depending on the type of village being constructed.34

When all of the basic preparations were complete, an Army unit would be tasked to resettle a specific group of squatters. Generally a limited sweep operation would be conducted to secure the overall areas and drive the insurgents away during the assembly and transportation of the squatters. Infantry units would be augmented with sufficient transport to accommodate all of the families, their possessions and livestock. Nothing would be left behind.35

Prior to sunrise on the appointed day, a unit would surround the squatter area while the adjacent sweep was conducted. Quickly, but with demonstrated concern, the people in the area would be assembled and told of the mandatory move. A portion of the unit provided local security while the remainder was divided and assigned to load individual families into the arriving transport.36

Normally by midmorning the column would be enroute to the "New Village". Upon arrival families were issued temporary shelter and building materials for their homes. Military engineers were often detailed to assist in the construction of the new homes. Funds were paid to the inhabitants for five months while food crops were planted and
homes constructed. Agricultural implements and other supplies were distributed on long term credit.  

Industrious individuals quickly took advantage of the loans and shops or even small businesses sprang up. Military units initially provided security but as homes were completed and personal affairs settled, a local Home Guard was recruited and trained. The Home Guard was gradually incorporated into the security system and the military units released to move on to other new villages. A small cadre was usually left to supervise and continue the training of the Home Guard unit.

As an adjunct to the resettlement program, mine and plantation owners were required to construct and secure living areas for their workers at their own expense. This provided the same measure of security and separation for the workers that the New Villages afforded the refugees. It also forced mine and plantation owners to provide a minimum standard of living for their workers, hitting hard at the insurgent propaganda claims.

The resettlement program accomplished several goals simultaneously. Chinese refugees were incorporated into Malayan society giving them a stake in the country and its success. Land ownership was tangible evidence of a brighter future and something to work for. Strict security measures separated the insurgents from the support base in the population and in turn demonstrated the governments ability
to protect its citizens from terror and intimidation. Finally the Home Guard involved the general population in the government cause.

After the transport column had departed to the new village, the unit conducting the sweep operation normally destroyed the squatter's shacks and crops. Nothing was left for the insurgents to benefit from, and the jungle quickly reclaimed the area.

Of 500,000 Chinese squatters, 400,000 had been moved into 500 New Villages by the close of 1951. Village administrations were established and democratic elections held.

Comprehensive food denial sanctions were also put into effect. Rice was issued to plantation workers already cooked so it could only be kept for 2 or 3 days. Canned foods sold in shops were punctured upon sale requiring speedy consumption. Unauthorized possession and transport of food items became a serious crime. taken together these sanctions made food resupply from the general populace to the insurgents very difficult. Intelligence determined later that the insurgents were forced to retreat deeper into the jungle and tend small plots for their survival. These plots then became targets of air and ground searches in the jungle and were destroyed or observed for ambush whenever they were discovered.
Another massive program involved a nationwide census and identification card issue. Each person was issued an identification card that was regularly checked at various roadblocks, checkpoints and for food purchases.\textsuperscript{44}

Further separating the insurgents from the general population this program came under swift attack. Buses were often stopped and ID cards collected and destroyed. Government administrators operating the program were targeted in ambushes and threatened with execution notices.\textsuperscript{45}

Government reaction was equally swift and military units were detailed to protect the administrators. Destroyed ID cards were quickly replaced and government action gained respect from the population for its effectiveness and determination.\textsuperscript{46}

Home Guard and Police augmentation forces were widely recruited. Although arms were not available initially these forces freed regular police and troops for more pressing tasks and involved the people in their own security. As arms became available, in another controversial decision, Briggs urged that the Home Guard be universally armed and trained.\textsuperscript{47} Fears of arms falling into guerrilla hands diminished later as more Guard units accounted for guerrilla contacts and acquitted themselves well.

As regular military units were freed from security tasks and additional units, such as British Special Air Service (SAS) troops, arrived from other areas offensive
actions were planned. Companies were moved to central locations to act as rapid reaction forces for several adjacent villages.48

Units were selected to conduct jungle training and then begin operations in small units to conduct long term, deep patrols. SAS units established jungle forts to use as base camps deep in the interior. Special techniques of parachute drops into jungle canopy were developed along with aerial resupply. This allowed units to operate for long periods, deep in the jungle, undetected by the insurgents.49

Although targeted against insurgent bands, the patrols were more successful in disrupting the freedom of movement and insurgent resupply/communications than in killing guerrillas. These patrols forced the insurgents to break up into smaller groups and drove them even further from the population areas.50

In February 1952 General Sir Gerald Templer replaced Sir Harold Briggs but as High Commissioner rather than Director of Operations. It was a dramatic move to appoint a military officer, even though he would serve as a civilian, as High Commissioner with comprehensive powers over all aspects of the Emergency.51

Sir Gerald Templer quickly reinforced the "Briggs' Plan" and added his own philosophy. Two of his four main points are now famous.
"Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated."

"The answer lies in not pouring more troops into the jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people."

The other two points dictated that "the whole population must play its part fighting communists" and that "the insurgents must be defeated before Malaya could expect self-government".

Malaya was fortunate that the Korean War inflated world market prices for its chief exports: tin and rubber. The colony was able to fund large programs such as the resettlement initiative and expand the police and Home Guard units. In addition, civil services were improved and expanded, making the insurgent propaganda campaign more difficult to sustain.

With sweeping powers, Sir Gerald Templer further streamlined the national command and control structure. New arms were purchased as well as newer, larger helicopters. A Federal Malay Army was created and the Home Guard was completely armed.

As methods of isolating the population became more and more effective, offensive operations became more widespread. Critical to organizing and planning these offensive actions was accurate, detailed intelligence. Special Branch was the central agency in the nationally
centralized intelligence organization. Using proven police investigative methods, combined with military counterintelligence operations, detailed information was acquired and disseminated.

Captured insurgents were given respectful treatment and completely interrogated. Specially selected captured or surrendered insurgents were put through a program of training aimed at enlisting their support against their former comrades. Using carefully constructed but always truthful propaganda hundreds were recruited to go back into the jungles to assist deep patrols or convince their comrades to surrender.

Emergency legal measures adopted during Sir Harold Briggs’ tenure allowed suspects to be held without trial for extended periods. Military courts were allowed to try certain types of crimes and impose especially strict sentences. Especially effective was the ability to deport suspected insurgents to China without trial.

Special Branch took advantage of these sanctions and often was able to capture jungle bands without the regional communist organization knowing. Selected members were then retrained and with police or military support reinserted into the jungle. In tracking small bands the counterguerrilla operations were very successful. In several cases large groups were convinced by their former comrades to surrender without any shots fired.
Closely tied to the intelligence operations were the propaganda efforts aimed at the insurgents. Hundreds of leaflets and specially modified planes carrying loudspeakers brought the message to the small insurgent bands. Pictures of well fed, surrender guerrillas and tape recorded messages from former comrades testifying to the good treatment and truth of the messages were difficult to ignore.

Large rewards were offered to surrendering guerrillas as well as bonuses for information and assistance in further captures. These cash payments, sometimes combined with transportation out of the country were also extremely effective.

When these efforts were combined, especially with the increased security to the population of the New Villages and plantation camps, intelligence information increased beyond expectation. Operations were able to capitalize on timely, detailed information which was provided to the authorities in strictest confidence. The Min Yuen civilian support structure was infiltrated with different cells captured and messengers tracked to effectively dismantle large sections of the network.

Under the direction of Sir Gerald Templer and with the profits from tin and rubber, the military forces grew to 40,000 and the police force expanded to 40,000 also. The Home Guard eventually reached 250,000 and were armed, in some
cases, with armored cars. In contrast the guerrilla strength was estimated at between 6,000 and 8,000.65

As government strength and effectiveness continued to grow, insurgent bands were forced to disperse and move deeper into the jungle. Captures, surrenders and killings depleted insurgent ranks and the population separation and security measures denied the movement new recruits. Guerrilla life became harder and more uncomfortable. Their ability to communicate and mount operations was further limited.

In an effort to demonstrate the dimensions of governments successes Sir Gerald Templer declared a large area in the State of Malacca a "White Area" on 3 September 1953. Emergency restrictions were lifted and life allowed to return in large part to normal. Residents were reminded that as long as communists remained out of the area they would live free of restrictions.66

The "White Areas" were a tremendous psychological incentive as well as a propaganda tool. Standards of living improved quicker in the "White Areas" as economic and social benefits were extended to these areas on a priority basis. Word spread quickly and increased the ever expanding intelligence flow.

Sir Gerald Templer resigned in June, 1954. Control of the Security Forces reverted to the Director of Operations. The Deputy High Commissioner took over from Sir Gerald Templer and General Sir Geoffrey Bourne continued as
Director of Operations. Although a reversal of earlier policy in centralizing authority, the situation appeared improved enough to return to more normal administration.67

In 1955, the general improvement in overall circumstances led to the first elections and rumors of independence. An Alliance Party comprised of the senior members of the Malay and Chinese communities commanded a huge victory.68

The party leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman, offered a comprehensive amnesty to the insurgents who agreed to a meeting. Indicative of their weak condition the insurgents negotiated. However, they remained adamant on legality for the MCP. Rahman refused and talks broke down with the insurgents returning to the jungle.69

The insurgents were now fighting for survival as they were hunted from all corners of the country. Security Forces clearly had the upper hand and the guerrillas lost even the support of the Chinese community in Malaya.

In early 1957 independence for Malaya was announced. Any nationalist claims remaining in the insurgent propaganda were killed. Independence became effective on 31 August 1957 and although the insurgents were broken it took three more years to eliminate the threat they posed.70

Operations after independence focused on hunting down the small insurgent bands hiding deep in the jungle. Intelligence techniques were finely honed and captured
guerrillas routinely acted as scouts and trackers for the Security Forces.

In early 1960 it was estimated that the remaining insurgents numbered only about 500 and were limited to hiding along the border with Thailand. "On 31 July 1960 the Federal Government of Malaysia declared the State of Emergency was at an end." 72

* * * * *

At the strategic level the British realized that the insurgency was as much a political battle as a military one. General Briggs' recognition of the population as the target and not the communists was central to this theme. He realized that effective government was as essential as military strength. Civil government must remain in control of the situation, with the military in a supporting role. As Sir Robert Thompson stated:

"Government that not only functioned, but was seen to function, so that the births, marriages, and deaths still get registered. For this, as much as anything else was the key to the changing fortunes." 73

The British strategy focused on eventual independence, but only when the threat to democratic government had been eliminated. The Emergency was really a conflict for the succession of government in Malaya and not between communism and colonialism.

This approach was strengthened significantly when the Korean War inflated prices and demand for rubber and tin.
The revenues and general state of the economy allowed for sweeping social programs and defense expansion to be funded.

It is interesting to note that Sir Edward Gent initially refused to acknowledge the problem. Had he continued as High Commissioner, the situation may have gotten well out of hand before adequate steps were taken to correct it.

The administration in Malaya was fortunate that it had several experienced people in key positions. Men like Sir Robert Thompson, and the new arrivals from Palestine, made a big difference. They were able to quickly apply proven methods and gradually adapt them to the circumstances.

General Briggs’ plan focused on several critical areas. First it placed emphasis on the population and security. By securing the population, General Briggs knew he could begin to separate the insurgents from the population and begin to receive intelligence. He understood the requirement for timely accurate human intelligence in combatting an insurgency.

Secondly he attacked the organization of the insurgents as the key to their strength. By breaking up the organization, he knew that he could eliminate the real power of the insurgents.

Thirdly he sought to isolate the insurgents from the population. External support for the insurgents was almost non-existent. This meant all their support was coming from
inside the country. By removing the sources of food, supplies and information the insurgents would be operationally crippled.

Finally, having succeeded in the previous three efforts, he sought to bring the insurgents to fight on terms favorable to the government. Although all these areas would receive some emphasis simultaneously, there was clearly a priority, starting with the first main point.

As an example of a successful counterinsurgency strategy, it is important to examine the operational and tactical efforts that grew from the strategy General Briggs outlined and his successors followed. Instead of discussing each level of war individually, the four main points listed above will be traced through all three levels of war. Many programs advanced several points of the strategy. These will be discussed in only one section, but the collateral benefits will be noted.

Before any of the points indicated in the overall strategy can be discussed, two other major points must be covered. The first is the philosophy which governed how the strategy would be implemented. The second is the tool to implement them.

The British philosophical approach to insurgency revolves around the "Rule of Law". This means that all actions taken to fight the Emergency had to be subject to the national laws. No unusual or unnecessarily harsh measures
were sanctioned or permitted. Even though special legal provisions were enacted, they applied to everyone and were uniformly employed. Excesses by any agency or branch were not permitted and punishable under the law.

In this way the British approach takes the long view. It avoids alienation of the civil population through the driving of a wedge between the people and the government. All actions are implemented to gain effectiveness and respect for the government and not hatred.

General Briggs' first move was to streamline the administration. By doing this, he created the tool to carry out his strategy. He made it more responsive to the demands placed on it by the insurgency. In effect, it brought all the power of government to bear on the insurgency.

It became not a military problem, but a problem for the entire government. The head of the colonial administration remained a civilian for the entire Emergency. Administrators controlling the health and human services were required to coordinate with the security forces to carry out their programs. Thus not only were all the elements of national power focused on the problem, they were in a coordinated effort.

The integration was extended to all levels of administration down to the local village. Information was coordinated and different departments gained a measure of consistency, as the level above and below were coordinated.
also. This, as much as the strategy, was significant in the overall success.

The national intelligence organization was no exception to this policy of integrated administration. There was a single integrated intelligence structure with each service providing liaisons. This eliminated partisan debates and demanded that intelligence was shared. It collated requirements and eliminated duplication, when critical resources were scarce.

The first point of the strategy focused on the population, security and increasing the flow of intelligence. Several operation programs grew out of this strategy, but the most important was the resettlement plan of the "New Villages".

The resettlement program contained as many sweeping social changes, as it did physical. Chinese refugees were made citizens and given valuable land. This made them part of the country, not an outside element with grievances against the government. The "New Villages" provided security and also isolated the insurgents from their support infrastructure.

In the operational sense, the program was coordinated to provide a measure of common security in an entire area. "New Villages" were constructed in a planned manner to expand governmental control across an area and not just be individual, sporadic locations.
Security forces involved in the program were well trained and disciplined. They treated the refugees with respect and in return gained a measure of respect for themselves and the government. The program was well organized and well executed, taking care to not create new problems in place of the old ones.

Once the security forces established the "New Village" and proved the population was free from intimidation by the insurgents, information generally flowed quickly. This relationship between information and security formed a vicious cycle. The security forces needed information to interdict the insurgents and protect the population. But the population was not willing to provide the information until its security was guaranteed. Once this cycle was successfully broken, security forces were often inundated with information.

The extensive legal measures complimented the security of the "New Villages" by making food smuggling and curfew violations serious crimes. This gave the population reason not to support the insurgents and provided a legal basis for the population control measures.

The second main point targeted the insurgent organizations. As already outlined the "New Villages" did a great deal to break up communist organizations. Intensive intelligence efforts aimed at breaking into the organization and then following the trail.
Large rewards were offered for information and identification of insurgents. Once identified they were apprehended and well treated. They were encouraged to give more information and were offered rewards in return. Many offered to return to their former position and report to the security forces on a regular basis. Little by little an intelligence network was constructed, that eventually penetrated the entire organization.

The third main point sought to isolate the insurgents from their support structure. Several programs assisted in this regard. Combined with the resettlement, food denial programs and security patrols cut insurgent support dramatically.

The food denial programs gave the population another reason not to support the insurgents. Even when intimidated they had a reasonable excuse to avoid giving support. The food denial operations had the additional benefit of forcing the insurgents to support themselves. This made them dependent on certain areas and limited their mobility. The crops they planted could be ambushed by security forces and left them less time to attack the local population.

Extensive population control measures aided this effort as well. A national census was undertaken and each person issued with an identification card. Check points were established, and searches conducted for identification cards and contraband.
The final main point sought to attack the insurgents on favorable terms. All of the other programs eventually contributed to this, but several others were very successful in this area alone.

An extensive Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) campaign was conducted against the insurgents. It was coordinated at the national level and had surrendered insurgents as advisors. Leaflets and broadcasts complemented tactical operations and intelligence efforts. These campaigns often provoked surrenders, which provided candidates for counterguerrilla and intelligence operations.

The PSYOP effort and the counterguerrilla operations also had the effect of breaking up the insurgent organization from within. Guerrillas became suspicious of each other and were forced to adopt tighter internal security measures. This further limited their freedom and ability to operate.

The creation of a Home Guard involved the local population in their own security and rapidly increased the available manpower where it was most needed. In the closing years of the Emergency the Home Guard accounted for more contacts than the regular forces. It also freed regular forces for more extensive duties against the insurgents.

Another operational effort constructed a series of jungle forts to act as bases for tactical deep patrols. These deep patrols denied the insurgents safe areas, no
matter how remote. They forced the guerrillas farther from the population and kept them moving and fearful of discovery.

The patrols also forced the insurgents into smaller and smaller bands, complicating their command, control and resupply problems. This made assembling a force to conduct an operation against the security forces very dangerous and easier to detect.

It took well, trained, motivated soldiers to endure the rigors of the jungle for weeks on end during the deep patrols. Contacts were few, and the terrain required constant physical exertion.
THE KENYA EMERGENCY, 1952-1960

Although officially declared an Emergency on 29 October 1952, the trouble in Kenya began much earlier, building gradually over time. Many diverse factors contributed to the insurgency. Ironically events culminated in spite of social and economic developments, rather than because of a lack of them, as one might expect.

European settlers and native tribes complemented each other in land allocation and use. The natives preferred the lower warmer stretches of plain and the Europeans tended toward the higher plateaus and cooler climate. Land ownership was guaranteed to the various native tribes and set aside in reservations or reserves. Space was not a problem and settlers and natives coexisted comfortably.

The single exception followed a misallocation of tribal land after WW I. Because of drought and a drop in the native population several large areas belonging to the reservation were uninhabited. One of these areas was mistakenly parceled out to settlers. In spite of a complete restoration, this incident served as a propaganda tool to fuel insurgent claims that Europeans were stealing native lands.

Native living conditions were poor at best, but European settlers also struggled against a harsh environment with small family farms. Land was available but required labor and the settlers were continuously frustrated by their
inability to hire natives. The culture and general lack of education made it difficult for the native tribes to conceive of working for pay."

The various tribes in Kenya received an informal education of sorts during service in World War I. A more formal one was produced by Christian Missionaries. European settlement was encouraged following both wars. World War II brought unexpected prosperity to the struggling colony. But the conclusion of WW II and the returning native troops caused a surge in unemployed youth in the larger metropolitan areas. Confusion over their role in the future and questions of the settler's rights led to feelings of resentment between both groups and disorientation on the natives part. The foundation of social unrest was spreading.

Although post war Kenya was prosperous, the Kikuyu tribe, closest geographically to the Europeans, was in the midst of what Fred Majdalany characterizes as "detribalization". The Kikuyu were an industrious, intelligent people who responded much more quickly to missionary intervention than the other Kenyan tribes. Following WW II, this well organized and disciplined tribe was caught between Christian teachings and tribal customs, the Victorian work ethic and subsistence existence.

They had been given an education and not allowed to put it to use. The missionaries had also taught them
Christian beliefs which they could not reconcile with European behavior, especially following WW II. Finally the missionaries forbade the tribal dances, sexual traditions and ceremonies. These were basic entertainment and fundamental social rituals.  

Against this background, native Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya from England in 1946. A member of the Kikuyu, he had been active in emerging African politics since the 1920's. He had been in England trying to enlist support for his cause when WW II broke out. Before the war, on previous trips to England, he had received a British college education and joined the Communist Party. He also made two short trips to Russia. An avowed nationalist, his leftist teachings were manifested in his organizational and propaganda methods much more than his political ideology.

Kenyatta quickly capitalized on the vulnerability of the Kikuyu in creating his movement for nationalism in Kenya. His announced aims were the expulsion of all Europeans and Asians and an African rule (Kikuyu domination) in Kenya. Through careful agitation and propaganda he enlarged the land problems of the Kikuyus, drew attention to racial barriers and created problems where none had existed. Kenyatta used Christian hymns rewritten with nationalist and Kenyatta inserts to spread his message. The Kikuyu, in transition between ancient tribal religion and Christianity, were easily swayed.
Young toughs from the streets of the urban areas were hired by Kenyatta to agitate peaceful rallies and intimidate opposition supporters. From these toughs, the Mau Mau, the secret military/terrorist branch of Kenyatta's movement evolved. (Controversy still exists as to whether Kenyatta actually sanctioned the Mau Mau. It is sufficient, for this discussion, to know that it supported his movement.) They moved back to the Kikuyu Reserve and into urban areas of Nairobi organizing and coercing new members for the violent nationalist movement.

Secret, dark of night ritual oathings terrified Kikuyu and, under duress, committed them to the service of the insurgent movement. Sacred tribal ceremonies were combined with animal slayings and strong native symbology to prey on the superstitions of the Kikuyu. Whether the Kikuyu believed in Kenyatta and the political ideology or not, they respected the power of the oath. This became a new dimension in creating support for the insurgents.

Labor unions were inspired to strike and the agricultural reformed programs of the colonial government were abandoned in the Reserve. Kikuyu loyal to the tribal chiefs opposing Kenyatta received greater and greater pressure to join the Mau Mau.

Kenyatta expanded his political power base by taking over the Kenya Africa Union (KAU) party and using it as a front for his outlawed militant Kikuyu Central Association.
By May 1946 he also controlled the Teacher's Training College at Githunguri, ensuring it carried forth his political message. These measures were aimed at the Kikuyu, with the intent to incorporate other tribes as the movement expanded.

Political rallies became more virulent in demanding nationalism and more violent. Even Kenyatta had difficulty controlling the large crowds once they were raised to fever pitch with hymns and slogans.

Indications of serious unrest appeared outside the rallies. Attacks on reluctant Kikuyu for refusing the oathing were becoming common and raids on settler's farms started. Europeans demanded greater action by the colonial administration.

The government was slow to acknowledge the problem and respond. In 1950 an attempt was made to establish a joint security committee. It failed due to lack of interest by the East Africa Command in Nairobi. In late 1952 the retiring Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell continued to deny that the trouble was serious or unusual.

Fortunately Sir Evelyn Baring arrived on 29 September 1952, replacing Sir Philip as Governor. He conducted a nine day tour of the colony, concluding that matters required immediate and serious action. On 9 October, Chief Warukiu, one of three senior chiefs of the Kikuyu, was murdered. The loss of a loyal and respected senior official prompted Baring
to cable London recommending a state of emergency and the arrest of Kenyatta and his supporters. ³¹

On 20 October 1952 a State of Emergency was declared, timed to coincide with the arrival of the Lancashire Fusiliers from Egypt. ³² Kenyatta and 183 Mau Mau were arrested with three battalions of the King’s African Rifles helping the police. ³³ In spite of the successful arrests Senior Chief Nderi and a British settler were murdered in less than two weeks. ³⁴

Plans were made to enlarge the police force and create the Kikuyu Home Guard. ³⁵ Tribal Police operated in the Reserve backed by African Rifles and the Colony Police administered the settler areas reinforced by the British battalion. ³⁶

Murders continued, with attacks on innocent Kikuyu and settlers. The Governor cabled London requesting the appointment of a senior military officer as Director of Operations as had been done in Malaya. Baring hoped he could formulate a long range comprehensive plan and integrate the different agencies, police and military forces. ³⁷

In February 1953 Major General Hinde arrived but only in the capacity as Chief Staff Officer to the Governor. This position lacked comprehensive authority. ³⁸ This was finally corrected in April and Hinde established a two tiered system of integrated committees to control operations. ³⁹ The Colony Emergency Committee contained the Governor, Hinde, the Police
Commissioner and senior members of the administration at the highest level. Subordinate to them, provincial and district committees were manned in the same way. In June General Sir George Erskine was assigned as Commander in Chief-East Africa with full powers over the Army, RAF and police. This formalized Hinde’s organizations and made them a direct operational chain of command rather than coordinating bodies. Major General Hinde remained as Director of Operations with Sir George acting as a coequal with the Governor.

Establishing dual control of the colony contrasted sharply with experience in Malaya where Sir Gerald Templer was singularly in control. In perspective, Kenya was considered unique because the insurgency was limited to only 1/5th of the native population and 1/16th of the total countryside. London decided to retain Governor Baring to administer the rest of the colony and Sir George to concentrate on the Emergency.

While the government organized and established a defensive reaction, the Mau Mau organization had continued to terrorize the Reserve and adjoining settler areas. Police forces with Army support were spread thin and worked initially to contain the insurgency within the Kikuyu Reserve. This is bordered by the forests of Mount Kenya and the Aberdare Mountains. The Mau Mau located their base camps in the forests and operated locally from them.
Unfortunately most European settlements bordered this area on the adjoining plains and plateaus of Central Kenya. The massacre at Lari on 26 March 1953 was a tragic but decisive event. More than a thousand Mau Mau concentrated around the village of Lari to attack and kill loyal Kikuyu who were known by name. In spite of an intelligence tip warning of the attack, Army forces and Home Guard had been diverted that afternoon to other duties. After dark the Mau Mau surrounded the village, tied cables around the Kikuyu huts to lock the doors and set fire to the thatch roofs. Other Mau Mau were posted to kill anyone escaping with machetes. 200 huts were destroyed, 84 Kikuyu, mostly women and children were killed and 31 others seriously injured.

Terrifying though it was, the attack backfired on the insurgent Mau Mau. Press coverage in Britain convinced Parliament that conditions in Kenya were serious and confirmed support for Government actions. Many Kikuyu were absolutely horrified at the massacre. They pledged total support for the Government, despite previous beliefs, and some even violated oaths to give information. Finally the debate about arming the Kikuyu Home Guard was laid to rest and they were immediately armed with modern weapons.

The Kikuyu unquestionably suffered the most throughout the Emergency. Events following the massacre were no exception. Settlers lost confidence in the Kikuyu
laborers and most returned to the Reserve. The huge influx of people aggravated conditions in the Reserve and many continued their migration to the traditional Kikuyu hiding places in times of trouble: the forest. This provided the Mau Mau with new recruits in their forest base camps and new grounds for propaganda.47

In April 1953 Jomo Kenyatta was convicted of organizing and directing the Mau Mau, receiving a maximum 7 year sentence. Many others from the original roundup were also convicted but legalities creating delays on appeals and sentencing voided much of the verdicts' propaganda value.48

Having gained a measure of outright Kikuyu support and forcing the Mau Mau on the defensive, Sir George planned to disrupt the secure areas in the forest. Following initial failures in the typical cordon and search operations new measures were adopted. Rough roads were cut into the forests and Army base camps established as patrolling centers. Small unit actions were adopted and units given specific areas to patrol in the forest. These patrols were coordinated between adjacent areas to keep the Mau Mau moving.49

Further streamlining the administration, a small War Council was established at the Governor's level with full powers and new Police Commissioners were assigned from Malaya.50 The Police Special Branch became the central focal point for all intelligence with liaison officers present to coordinate and share data.51
As events progressed into 1954 the Army was reinforced by two more battalions, the Police forces continued to expand and the training of the Kikuyu Home Guard improved dramatically.\textsuperscript{52} Operations in the forests were showing slow but consistent results. In April, Sir George planned to strike at the Mau Mau support structure. Intelligence traced the support wing of the Mau Mau back to Nairobi.\textsuperscript{53}

On 24 April another landmark event, Operation ANVIL, commenced in Nairobi. The massive cordon and search operation involved five Army battalions and hundreds of police. Supported by intensive intelligence efforts, the cordon focused on the African section of the city. Hooded informants were used to screen the Kikuyus, Embu and Meru of the city resulting in almost 20,000 detainees. This effectively crushed the Mau Mau support organization.\textsuperscript{54}

Simultaneously in the Reserve, population control measures such as identification cards and curfews were forcing the Mau Mau entirely into the forests. This contained the insurgents away from the population and subsequent increases in the patrols on the forest fringes made foraging or raiding for supplies extremely dangerous.

Scattered Kikuyu villages were resettled and developed. A new site was selected close to an area which would favor agricultural development. The Kikuyu were approached and convinced to move to the new better location.
Soldiers and Home Guard forces assisted with transportation and physical labor. Building materials were provided to construct more permanent, sturdier homes and livestock corrals. Wells were drilled and schools were constructed in the resettled villages and security forces provided to protect the tribesmen.

Government agricultural improvement programs of terracing and crop development began to show results. Combined with the better sites selected for new villages, life continued to improve. Government propaganda reinforced Kikuyu realization that they suffered more than anyone when the Mau Mau had forced them to abandon earlier agricultural programs.55

Conditions continued to improve and by early 1955 Sir George was able to focus major resources against the Mau Mau in the forests. Army elements had been operating in the forest for some time but now the bulk of attention could be focused on the Mau Mau stronghold.

RAF aircraft bombed insurgent bases with mixed results. Although few Mau Mau casualties were attributed to the bombing, it kept the insurgents off guard, fearful and moving. Bomb damage denied forest areas to Mau Mau and Government forces alike with tree blowdown, and it also caused widespread harm to the wildlife.56

Important also were the sky-shouter aircraft fitted with loudspeakers for broadcasting psychological operations.
against the Mau Mau. The guerrillas were fearful of being caught picking up or reading a leaflet but the broadcasts were easily heard in the jungle from the aircraft flying at treetop level. Hundreds of surrenders and desertions were credited to the continued broadcasts by interrogated insurgents.

The Kenya Police Reserve Air Wing played a more direct role in support of ground operations through communications relay, resupply, scouting and position verification. Flying small aircraft from rough, forward strips these local pilots knew the terrain and could spot even minor changes in canopy or ground cover. Constantly braving dangerous winds the Reserve Air Wing allowed patrols to operate for long periods in the forest undetected by Mau Mau.

Two major developments contributed significantly to the forest operations in 1955. Special "Forest Operating Companies" and Mau Mau "Pseudo-Gangs" built on available talent and previously successful ideas.

Forest Operating Companies were organized out of normal Army battalions by selecting the best soldiers for advanced training and special assignment. Each company contained 3 tracker/combat teams. The teams were composed of approximately 9 soldiers. A British officer or NCO led the team along with a radio operator, an interpreter, three African trackers, a tracker dog and a patrol dog with
handlers. These teams found and pursued the Mau Mau in a much more efficient form of cordon and search operations. 59

Police Special Operating Branch convinced surrendered or captured Mau Mau to reenter the forest in the service of the government to hunt and capture other Mau Mau groups. The Pseudo-gangs were very successful in capturing and recruiting more Mau Mau for even more Pseudo-gangs. The seeds of suspicion that the groups sowed created psychological handicaps for the insurgents at a time when most other events were going poorly. 60

General Sir George Erskine left in April 1955 and was replaced by General Lathbury. In spite of improving conditions General Lathbury continued the restrictive measures.

By 1956 the Mau Mau gangs had been forced into small groups constantly on the move with little or no support outside the forest. In all, 24 of 51 principle terrorist gang leaders had been killed and total Mau Mau strength reduced to 2,000. This is credited, in large part to the Pseudo-gangs. 61 Military operations continued, with greater emphasis on tracking and eliminating the remaining guerrillas in the forest.

In 1960 the Emergency was officially declared at an end. 62
"It had taken 10,000 British and African soldiers, 21,000 police and 25,000 Home Guard four years to defeat a rebellion limited to one tribe, which had no support of any kind from outside and a very limited supply of firearms."

<table>
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<tr>
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* * * *

In Kenya, the relationship between development and social and political unrest appears opposite of the expected norm. As development and education increased, so did social and political unrest. Although this trend appears unusual there are several reasons why it closely typifies the norm.

As education and social development increase, the population become more aware of the standards of living and differences in culture. Often, as standards rise there is an unrealistic expectation that they will continue to rise indefinitely. This is commonly referred to as the theory of rising expectations.

When these expectations are not met, social unrest occurs. Political unrest usually follows closely as different elements seek to gain power by creating a platform or filling a power vacuum. Thus, in Kenya, despite the high living standards and improving conditions social and political unrest emerged.
The government was slow to acknowledge the threat of insurgency until violence reached a climactic point. Several attempts were made to increase capabilities and address rising social unrest, but little real progress was made. When events clearly demonstrated that problems were widespread and serious, resources were very limited.

Fortunately the insurgents were not as well organized as other popular revolts had been. A solid central committee existed and a reasonably good political apparatus. But the insurgents lacked the complete top-to-bottom infrastructure that characterized many communist inspired insurgencies. Below the central party level, organization was loose and centered on several large semi-independent groups. This made the organization much easier to isolate and break up.

At the strategic level, the British applied the general philosophy of "Rule of Law" (See Malaya Case Study). When the State of Emergency was declared, several extensive, emergency legal measures were adopted. Under the auspices of these measures the initial group of arrests were made.

Despite an initial lack of intelligence, the insurgency was assessed as being the responsibility of the Kikuyu tribe. The government, in understanding that the insurgency was limited socially and geographically, maintained normal governmental services and functions. Effective and efficient government was seen as the ultimate solution to the Emergency.
However, special measures and organizational modifications were made in response to the threat. The armed forces were placed in a supporting role to the police, forming the security forces. Intelligence was centralized under the supervision of the police Special Branch. The government was tailored to create an integrated administration at the national level. This was carried out down to regional and local level in the areas affected by the insurgency.

In a departure from previous practices, the Director of Operations was eventually given equal powers with the governor in dealing with the Emergency. This parallel chain of command functioned well, and allowed special emphasis to be placed where it was needed most in combating the insurgents. This also gave the Director of Operations direct control over all agencies involved in the Emergency. It formalized the integrated administration and made it a direct chain of command.

British national will and the method of operations in Kenya clashed at times. Strict legal measures and violence made the home government question the utility of maintaining colonies and constantly fighting insurgencies. The movement toward independence had already begun, and as in Malaya the conflict was more a matter of governmental succession than a fight between communism and colonialism.
The massacre at Lari and the subsequent press coverage did a great deal to galvanize support for government operations in Kenya. The brutality of insurgent methods was now widely known. Governmental actions in Britain unanimously backed the required measures in Kenya. Because the colony did not have the economic surge that assisted Malaya, the support of the British home government and its pocketbook were critical.

At the operational level, the initial group of coordinated arrests did significant damage to the upper levels of the insurgent organization. This was instrumental in attacking the insurgent organizations at several levels simultaneously. Because the insurgents lacked a comprehensive organization they never completely recovered from this setback. In spite of this early success, it took eight years to completely eliminate the insurgency.

These arrests were the direct result of effective intelligence. Although limited at first, the Special Branch expanded quickly, providing timely accurate intelligence to assist at all levels in decision making and planning operations.

The creation of a Home Guard allowed the hundreds of loyal Kikuyu to participate in their own defense and promote defiance of the Mau Mau. Eventually as the Home Guard became more proficient, thoroughly trained and universally armed, they accounted for more contacts and dead insurgents than the regular force did.
Because much of the Mau Mau appeal was based on emotion and not reason, a comprehensive Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) campaign was extremely effective. Separate programs were targeted at the population and the insurgents with excellent results. The population began to realize that it was needlessly suffering for an unjust cause. The insurgents also began to understand the futility of the effort and that conditions in the forest were far worse than living with the government.

The massacre at Lari held tremendous psychological value, and can be viewed in many respects as a turning point. Insurgents lost respect with the native population, even to the point of Mau Mau breaking their oaths. World opinion sharply condemned what had been seen as a legitimate nationalist movement under Kenyatta. Most importantly it drove the population into the government's arms, by forcing them to greatfully accept the security and population control measures.

The decision to expand the police force, Home Guard and armed forces simultaneously demonstrated the integrated approach to the Emergency. Each agency had a role to fulfill, and each part was unique. These different roles maximized the advantages of the respective organizations, while assigning missions to minimize their shortcomings.

Emphasis was placed on isolating the insurgent rather than initially trying to track them down and kill them.
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Emphasis was placed on isolating the insurgent rather than initially trying to track them down and kill them.
Integrated efforts focused on programs such as resettlement and concurrent agricultural development with population control measures and increased local security.

The resettlement and agricultural development programs aimed at improving the Kikuyu standards of living and utilizing the land in the native reserve more efficiently. Both programs were well executed and coordinated to achieve a result greater than the individual sum of the parts (synergistic effect).

The population control measures and local security were direct efforts to isolate the insurgents and limit his freedom of movement. The food denial, identification cards and curfew made movement, resupply and communications very difficult.

The Kikuyu benefited from all of these programs and PYSOPs efforts capitalized on the positive side of these efforts. In return the government received increasing intelligence and support from the Kikuyu.

The massive urban cordon and search operation in Nairobi effectively targeted the insurgent support organization. Legal methods were used and the mere exposure of supporters was often sufficient to dissolve the ability of the organization to function.

At the tactical level, procedures integrating intelligence and tactical operations were finely honed. Counterguerrilla operations and deep patrols worked in
concert. They deprived the insurgents of safe areas, means of support, and freedom of movement. They used timely intelligence, PSYOPs and counterguerrillas to track target and often negotiate the surrender of insurgent groups.

Specially trained and well disciplined troops were necessary for these demanding operations. Skilled trackers, and expert soldiers were required to enable the patrols to operate in the forests for extended periods without detection. Small unit operations were needed to operate undetected with minimal supplies deep in the forests. Forts were established deep in the forest to act as staging sites for the extended patrols while special aviation forces assisted in resupply and navigation. This non-combat use of air support was critical to the extended operations in difficult terrain conducted by the counterguerrillas and special units.

Contrary to some commonly held beliefs, an insurgency limited in social/ethnic diversity does not mean it is a simple matter to deal with. As in Malaya the Mau Mau insurgents demonstrated they were largely immune to firepower. This required the government forces to adopt special techniques and training.

Reliance on enlarging the police force, civil administration, close civil-military coordination, pacification programs and intelligence centralization were all components in the Malaya strategy and were later put to
use in Cyprus. Yet several aspects of the Mau Mau insurgency are unique.

The realization that the colony must continue to function while the insurgency was isolated was demonstrated with the retention of the Governor with a co-equal military Commander in Chief. Spread of the insurgency to the other native tribes was in part prevented by this isolation and ability to carry on normal functions.

Two critical events, the massacre at Lari and Operation Anvil in Nairobi mark turning points in the Emergency. The Government was able to recognize and capitalize on the Mau Mau error at Lari and win back a major portion of the population. Intelligence pinpointed the infrastructure of the Mau Mau and targeting it effectively. This action limited the Mau Mau to operating in and on the immediate fringes of the forest. Even then they had little or no supply support for medicine, ammunition or special supplies.

The Pseudo-gangs proved the viability of the judicious use of reclaimed terrorists combined with operations in the terrorist’s own environment. It produced dramatic results. In the same way Forest Operating Companies used special skills in limited numbers together with conventional troops to detect and defeat the Mau Mau.
THE ALGERIAN REVOLT, 1954-1962

In 1830 France invaded the area known today as Algeria in response to acts of the Barbary pirates. A bitter struggle followed as determined resistance led by Abd el Kader tried to dislodge the French. In 1847 Abd el Kader surrendered and France integrated the territory into France, dividing it into three departments. From the French point of view it was no longer a colony. Unlike Indochina, it was part of France. This had constitutional implications when the question of nationalism arose.

Settlers were encouraged to migrate to the new departments. Land was appropriated from native tribesmen for small sums and turned over to the settlers. Known as "pied noirs" the settlers had increased to 100,000 by 1870.

Colonial affairs were determined by a military Governor-General with a representative body of "pied noirs" speaking for the European settlers. Natives had few rights and were universally discriminated against. Tribesmen who emigrated to France in search of manual labor jobs enjoyed all the benefits of citizenship until they returned to Algeria.

In Paris many poor foreign workers were introduced to the communist party. As in the case of Ho Chi Minh and his anti-French Vietnamese nationalism, Paris also became a center for anti-French Algerian nationalism. This was exported back to Algeria in newspapers, letters and by returning laborers.
World War II had the same devastating results in Algeria that it had on Indochina. French authority was dramatically weakened as inner splits occurred between loyal Frenchmen and those who collaborated with the Germans. Budgets for social services decline as France struggled to rebuild. Colonialism in general became a questionable practice.\(^5\)

Because of the Allied liberation and constant French presence, the nationalist movement took several more years to reach a critical mass. However, warning signs appeared as early as 8 May 1945 when the nationalists staged large demonstrations on "Liberation Day". In a pattern to become common later, Army and police units sought out demonstrators using brutal methods while "pied noirs" conducted fierce vigilante reprisals. In the swift crackdown and reprisals which followed an estimated 4,000 Muslims were killed, effectively depleting the nationalist ranks.\(^6\)

Encouraged by the Viet Minh success in Indochina and supported by Nasser in Egypt, anti-colonialism spread rapidly in Algeria during the early 1950's. Several diverse groups, with equally diverse aims, emerged. Some favored complete union with France and guaranteed rights of citizenship. Others advocated different relationships ranging from complete independence to political independence within a French Union. Disagreement on methods split ideological
groups even further. Some adopted only peaceful political means and others demanded violent overthrow.⁷

Militant leaders from several factional organizations united to form the Comite Revolutionnaire Pour L’Unite et L’Action (CRUA) in July 1954.⁸ Years of political struggle had produced few results (notably fraudulent elections in 1948) while violent action in Morocco and Tunisia heartened the leaders of the new CRUA. As a security move, prior to the outbreak of planned violence, the group changed the organization’s name to the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in October 1954.⁹

Following Mao’s theory of organization, Algeria was split into six areas for political and administrative control. These "Wilayas" were further subdivided down to local level for effective organization and control. Armed guerrillas were recruited and trained. The military force of the FLN was called the Armee de Liberation Nationale.¹⁰ An external committee based in Egypt (with Nasser’s knowledge and encouragement) coordinated support and championed the cause outside Algeria.¹¹

Communism’s intolerance for religion as well as party denunciations of the 8 May demonstrations precluded widespread appeal of the ideology or the communist party.¹² Organization, guerrilla tactics, terrorism, propaganda and political control were elements of Mao’s doctrine which were seriously emulated. France’s misunderstanding of the
ideological foundations of the insurgency led to extremism and intransigence by the Army and "pied noirs". Links to communism demanded that the Army show no quarter, and the "pied noirs" would have no future in Algeria if the insurgents succeeded.

During the night of 31 October and 1 November 1954 the FLN launched scores of separate attacks on Army positions, government buildings, and Europeans. The government in France had not recovered from the debacle in Indochina, and despite liberal desires to consider Algerian independence, political realities required the support of the "pied noirs". Underestimating the size of the insurgency and the degree to which it had penetrated Algeria, conventional Army units were ordered into the mountains to subdue the rebellion.

Poorly organized and trained for counterinsurgency operations, French Army units searched villages and conducted sweep operations. They achieved only minimal results but the harsh treatment of the native population alienated the poor farmers and created willing recruits for the ALN.

In November 1954 the 25th Airborne Division, recently returned from Indochina, moved into the Aures Mountains. Operations improved dramatically and by February 1955 many key rebels had been killed or captured. But bitter feelings by the population and new recruits refused to allow the movement to die. Guerrilla bands receded deep into the
mountains for the remainder of the winter to regroup and train.¹⁸

During the summer of 1955 attacks on Europeans farms and industry became commonplace. Although the Army had been increased to 100,000, it was stretched trying to protect the farming areas and population centers.¹⁹ In August, in response to Army reprisals, 123 "pied noirs" and loyal Muslims were massacred outside of Philippeville in two separate attacks.²⁰

A Parachute Regiment from the 25th was moved into the area and conducted several harsh search operations. Far more damaging were the "pied noir" vigilante attacks which killed an estimated 12,000 Muslims.²¹ Native Algerians now flocked to the FLN cause, while world opinion condemned French action and divisive internal political rifts in France appeared.²²

The French Army instituted a system of territorial control called the quadrillage. This system divided the country into small parcels which were garrisoned by Army units. Focused on maintaining a presence across the country, especially in rural areas, Army units patrolled their local area. Requiring most of the 200,000 men in the Army the program left only small reserves for offensive operations.²³

To augment the French Army loyal Arabs were recruited into native units. Most were used for local guard and patrol duties. Some were selected for special training and formed into special counterguerrilla units called "harkis".²⁴
Population control was further enhanced by resettling villages in areas closer to the garrisons. This allowed better supervision of the natives and greater separation from the insurgents. Unfortunately there were few funds for developing these resettled villages and conditions were often poor.  

Complementing the Army garrisons, Section Administrative Specialisee (SAS) teams, led by Arab speaking Army officers, conducted civic action missions. Schools and medical clinics were constructed and diligent efforts were made to improve the life of the poor native population. Results were usually limited, but in rural areas, where Army presence had never been previously effective, these efforts did much to repair the strain on French-Arab relations.

In early 1956 Governor-General Jacques Soustelle resigned. His attempts to establish a middle ground and foster greater Arab citizenship rights failed as violence continued to consume the population. Extremist "pied noirs" resisted any Arab rights and therefore, any progressive position. They sought brutal repression of the native population and a return to the pre-war status quo. Soustelle had been undermined equally as much by the rapid succession of French governments, unable to develop a consistent policy on Algeria.

The original appointment of a successor to Soustelle met with violent "pied noir" demonstrations when the French
Premier, Guy Mollet visited Algeria. Bowing to their pressure, Mollet appointed Robert Lacoste as the new Governor-General.\textsuperscript{28}

FLN leadership underwent several changes in 1956. The external committee was generally ousted from power when the key planning congress in the Soummam Valley was deliberately held despite their absence. This allowed younger, more radical personalities to emerge and gain power. As a result of this shift in power and in response to the French efforts in the rural areas, greater resources and emphasis were directed toward the urban terrorism campaign beginning in the city of Algiers.\textsuperscript{29}

In June 1956, in response to executions of convicted terrorists, forty-nine "pied noirs" were assassinated in the streets of Algeria by insurgents.\textsuperscript{30} On 10 August 70 Muslims were killed in a reprisal bombing by "pied noir" vigilantes.\textsuperscript{31} The vicious cycle of terrorist attack and vigilante reprisals disrupted all normal law and order in the city. Circumstances worsened at the end of the summer when several elite French units were withdrawn from Algeria to participate in the Suez intervention.\textsuperscript{32}

Saadi Yacef, the underground leader in Algiers, had painstakingly constructed an elaborate cellular structured terrorist organization. It contained about 1,400 active supporters, based in the Arab quarter (Casbah) of Algiers. With widespread terrorist acts Yacef hoped to provoke harsh
French reprisals and even further alienate the native population. In addition he knew the "pied noirs" would respond with counterterror, pushing all parties concerned to extreme positions. He hoped this would destroy the moderates and their support for a rapprochement with France.\textsuperscript{33}

General Salan replaced General Lorillot in December as the Commander in Chief of French Forces in Algeria. As an example of the factionalism and violent tendencies of the parties involved, Salan was the subject of two plots within weeks of his arrival. One was a military plot to replace Governor-General Lacoste by Salan which was immediately subdued. The other was a bazooka on Salan by "pied noirs". The effort to replace him with his deputy, General Cogny killed one of his aides instead.\textsuperscript{34}

Against this background of political infighting and rivalry, the terrorism in Algiers continued. Following their return from Suez, the four Regiments of the 10th Parachute Division were deployed into Algiers. Lacoste gave the Division Commander, General Massu a free hand to quell the violence.\textsuperscript{35}

The city was divided into sectors and the Casbah was completely sealed off. A strict curfew was imposed and shoot on site orders issued for violations. A general strike in the Casbah on 28 January was canceled as paratroops opened shops and made the owners chose between looting and normal business.\textsuperscript{16}
Bombings increased at a frightening pace. In response, houses in the Casbah were searched with only the slightest indication of FLN support. Occupants were arrested and questioned. Colonels Godard and Trinquier encouraged brutal methods of questioning, often involving torture. This system is generally referred to as the "tough methods." Subjects were apprehended just before the curfew so other cells could not be warned. Following hours of brutal questioning, subjects gave information on other cells which allowed further raids before daylight. During the day information was assembled and another series of evening apprehensions planned.

Each area of Algiers was divided into a civilian chain of responsibility. Using large, loyal Arabs, each family, floor, building, street, block and section had a person assigned for which he was to be responsible. He accounted for the comings and goings of everyone under his supervision and was required to make random checks for unauthorized visitors.

Following large successes in March the paratroops were withdrawn. Curfews were lifted and some normalcy returned. But Yacef's terror network had not been completely dismantled. On 3 June a new wave of bombings began. "Pied noir" reprisals followed immediately and the paratroops were recalled.
Once again the city was divided and the Casbah sealed off. Following another round of detentions, "tough" interrogations and raids the organization was completely penetrated. In September Yacef was captured and within two weeks the remainder of the terrorists were either killed or captured.\textsuperscript{41}

The finale was the announcement that Ben M’hidi, a noted leader of Yacef’s organization, had committed suicide in his cell in February. It raised a number of questions. Gradually, accounts such as \textit{The Gangrene} detailing French uses of brutal torture, often resulting in death, surfaced. Lists of missing Arabs, said to have "disappeared" during the Algiers campaign, numbered as high as 3,000.\textsuperscript{42}

French public opinion, which was clearly divided before, became angrily aroused against such brutal methods by French troops. World opinion, constantly being reminded of the Arab cause by the external committee, once again condemned French action in Algeria.\textsuperscript{43}

In late 1956, with the terrorists in Algiers virtually eliminated and French efforts in rural areas showing results, France faced a new challenge. In March, 1956 Tunisia and Morocco were granted independence.\textsuperscript{44} Insurgents pushed from rural areas could now cross the borders into safety for supplies and rest. Initially the governments in Morocco and Tunisia denied sanctuary to the guerrillas. Increasing evidence of French torture and the
abduction of insurgent leaders while on a commercial flight diverted to Algiers, changed their policy.45

In 1957 France closed Algeria’s borders with Morocco and Tunisia. Electrified fences surrounded by 45 meters of minefield on both sides provided a deadly barrier to insurgents fleeing across the border or to supplies being smuggled. Mobile reaction forces of paratroops and armored columns were deployed to counter any forced crossings.46

In January 1958 an armed crossing of the Morice Line on the Tunisia border ambushed a French patrol killing 15 and capturing 4. Within two weeks, despite French warnings, a French patrol plane was shot down and another fired upon from the Tunisian village of Sakiet. France quickly retaliated, bombing the village, killing an estimated 80 civilians and wounding many more.47

Although succeeding militarily, French authorities in Algeria were becoming more and more politically isolated. Five major changes had occurred in French government at home since 1954, contributing to a lack of support for and policy in Algeria. Yacef’s terrorism had the desired effect of widening the gulf between belligerents and the "tough methods", along with incidents such as the Sakiet bombing, brought sympathy to the Arab cause.48

The Army regarded the insurgency as communist inspired and therefore, by and large backed the extremist "pied noirs". Leftist governments, seeking negotiations with
the insurgents, angered the Army. Senior officers felt they were being betrayed by their own government as they had been in Indochina. Several large factions in the Army and in the "pied noirs" favored a "pied noir" government independent of Paris. 

On 9 May 1958 the FLN announced it had executed three French Army prisoners who had been convicted of war crimes. This triggered a telegram from General Salan to French Chief of Staff, General Ely. It demanded that Algeria not be abandoned by the government. The weeks that followed were tense and included a plan by the French paratroops in Algeria to seize key sites in Paris and conduct a coup. "Pied noir" demonstrations increased and veiled threats of military action from Algeria continued. Civil government in France was completely split and immobilized.

On 1 June 1958, de Gaulle acceded to the demands of several factions in France and returned to power in Paris with a mandate to rule by decree for six months. On 4 June he traveled to Algeria to quell the demonstrations and show his support.

Unknown to the Army and the "pied noirs", de Gaulle did not favor a French Algeria. He sought a military solution to the FLN in order to negotiate from a position of strength. Unlike Dien Bien Phu, de Gaulle wanted a friendly non-communist regime, of France's choosing, installed following a clear French military victory.
In early 1959, General Challe replaced General Salan. Targeting the remaining insurgent organizations, Challe adopted a more offensive strategy. Forming a large reserve force and reducing the troops dedicated to the guerrilla operations, Challe began hunting the guerrillas."

The insurgents had been effectively isolated by the border fortifications. Urban areas were pacified with the strict population control measures proven successful in Algiers. The specially trained "harkis" native units were now employed in counterguerrilla operations on a large scale."4

The "harkis" infiltrated an area to track the guerrilla units and build intelligence information. When locations had been pinpointed and individuals identified, large reserve forces would quickly surround and isolate key areas. With detailed intelligence and a decided advantage in firepower and mobility the insurgents would be systematically hunted down and eliminated. Helicopter air assault tactics and propeller driven close air support aircraft were extensively used to support ground operations."5

Following four large scale operations based on these tactics the ALN was destroyed in all but one remaining "Wilaya" by the end of 1959. In each operation the area was completely isolated. Forces and resources were then concentrated against one "Wilaya" until operations were completed. French estimates put the FLN strength at 15,000,
down from an earlier 60,000." Operation TRIDENT was scheduled in early 1960 to assault the remaining stronghold.

President de Gaulle had been selectively replacing officers involved in the earlier demonstrations. Salan's replacement was only one in a series. Additionally, he elaborated on a program of development and expanded rights for the Algerians, alarming the "pied noirs". On 16 September 1959 de Gaulle announced a program of self-determination for Algeria. This angered the "pied noirs" and the Army."

On 24 January 1960, 30,000 "pied noirs", under the banner of the French National Front (PNF), took to the streets and attempted to seize political power in Algeria. President de Gaulle ordered General Challe to use military force to stop the demonstrations and appealed for loyal French support of the government position. Following a week behind barricades, the demonstrations were finally dispersed. Extremists in the Army and the "pied noirs" felt increasingly isolated after "Barricades Week"."

The French population was dissatisfied with another lengthy colonial war and concerned over the methods France was using to subdue the rebellion. World opinion and domestic feeling gave de Gaulle definitive backing."

Military operations continued at a slower pace, having been interrupted by "Barricades Week". Military leaders now questioned their necessity if Algeria was to be
abandoned. General Challe was posted to a NATO staff position and replaced by a de Gaulle loyalist. On 25 June 1960 representatives of the French government met with the FLN to discuss negotiations. Talks quickly stalled but extremists once again rallied.

"Pied noirs" secretly organized with French military extremists and plotted a takeover of Algeria. Ex-Governor-General Houstelle, General Salan and others encouraged the plan. On 11 April 1961 President de Gaulle made a speech discussing the "decolonization of Algeria."

On 21 April General Challe and General Zeller secretly flew to Algeria. They established a headquarters at Zeralda where the Legionnaire 1st Regiment Etranger Parachutiste (REP) was barracked. On 22 April the 1st REP moved on Algiers and word of the coup was sent to Paris. Challe was joined by Generals Salan and Jouhard, but many of the senior commanders in Algeria wavered. The French conscript soldiers failed to support the coup and domestic French support evaporated.

On 25 April 1961 General Challe and Zeller flew to France and surrendered. The 1st REP blew up their barracks and were disbanded two days later. Generals Jouhard and Salan joined with "pied noir" extremists and Army deserters. Going underground, they formed the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS). The OAS engaged in widespread terrorist activity killing thousands of Muslims and provoking ALN reprisals."
President de Gaulle lost his opportunity to negotiate from a position of strength. The Army was devastated by the stress and racked by the trials of those involved. At home, the French population had enough: Algeria was not worth the price and should be abandoned immediately."

Europeans feared the backlash as events continued toward Algerian independence. Despite FLN promises all but 30,000 "pied noirs" and as many as 1.3 million Algerians fled the country."" Many of the Algerian elite and most of the European landowners left, taking their talents and money.

The FLN refused to waiver on its original demands and France was in a poor position to make demands. On 19 March 1962, an agreement was reached at Evian-les-Bains, France. A cease-fire went into effect on 19 March and power was handed over to a provisional government. On 1 July a majority vote by referendum affirmed the decision of independence from France. Independence was granted to Algeria on 4 July 1962.""

At the strategic level, it was difficult for France to commit to another colonial conflict following Indochina. The Algerians detected the instability of French government, particularly after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. France had never been completely committed politically to the conflict in Indochina. The conflict in Algeria continued to widen the distances between competing factions in French politics.
The constant turmoil in government made a consistent strategy toward Algeria impossible. The military strategy reflects this strategic vacuum. No significant programs for social or political development were instituted in Algeria. The political power of the "pied noirs" made political moderation, economic improvement and social programs unacceptable. This forced the direction of the strategy toward the military element of power.

All the solutions focused on the use of force. An integrated administration was never constructed, and military leaders controlled all aspects of operations dealing with the insurgency. France continued to develop the military and security forces as their primary instrument in responding to an insurgency at the strategic level.

Even in Algeria the government could not form a united front to combat the insurgency. Factionalism and rivalries split the colonial administration as badly as the home government. This led to even greater difficulty in establishing a consistent position in Algeria.

This is most clearly demonstrated by the actions of the military in 1958 and 1961. Had a definitive strategic plan been devised, the situation would have never deteriorated to that point. Objectives would have been clear from the beginning and impact of the "pied noirs" minimized.

Efforts to build non-military solutions were hampered by France's economic situation and the poor economy of
Algeria. Resources were limited and efforts were directed at maintaining control with minimal expenditures.

Appeals to the Algerian population for support were complicated by the one-sided application of justice by the security forces. Military officials clearly supported the "pied noirs" and allowed vigilante action and reprisals to undermine any attempts toward moderation or rapprochement.

External support in the form of political recognition, supplies and, most importantly refuge played an increasingly important role in the conflict. French national will was divided at home and constantly assaulted by the external committee's propaganda efforts. By keeping the conflict in world view and provoking condemnation of the French, the external committee eroded national will.

Controversy still exists about the actual effectiveness of the external supply effort. Several individual incidents were used by the French as examples but most agree that it had a only a limited impact. The psychological effect of receiving better weapons from outside sources bolstered morale and justified continued resistance.

The insurgent support of Tunisia and Morocco played a major role in later operations. However, the French were able to effectively isolate the insurgents even from this external support. This was a significant factor in bringing the situation to a stalemate. Had political events turned out differently, it may have resulted in ultimate success.
In focusing on a military solution the French operational efforts centered on isolation and destruction of the insurgents. Initially large cordon and search operations by conventional units were unsuccessful, maybe even counterproductive. The arrival of elite units, more accustomed to operating in small groups proved much more successful.

The quadrillage method required an all-consuming commitment of troops. However, when it was coordinated with the SAS teams it showed some results in isolating the insurgents from an area. The execution of any social programs was relegated to the tactical level of the SAS teams. This left and uncoordinated and poorly resourced effort, with no operational direction.

The limited resettlement efforts are excellent examples of good programs which were uncoordinated and poorly resourced. No improvement of the living standards of the population and only resentment toward the government resulted. In the short term the resettlement isolated the insurgents from the population, but in the long term it produced no better appreciation of the government.

Other systematic efforts to isolate the insurgents included comprehensive urban population measures. These measures placed responsibility for urban insurgent incidents back on the population. Although effective in the short
term, they alienated the population even further and did nothing to reinforce the effectiveness of the government.

Intelligence was developed, not in conjunction with increasing support of the population, but in spite of a lack of it. This required what became known as the "tough methods". In the short term it produced effective, timely intelligence which was quickly exploited by tactical operations. The network of dissemination and planning was clearly a significant factor in the overall success of the operations.

In the larger sense the "tough methods" eventually surfaced and became the subject of intense media attention and propaganda by the external committee. The use of these methods distanced the native population and created widespread popular support for the insurgency. France was condemned in world opinion and by the population at home.

In the long term it is questionable whether this practice produced any results which outweighed the negative aspects. Had France remained in Algeria or installed a friendly government the backlash to these practices would have become a major obstacle to progress.

At the tactical level, the urban operations in Algiers were very successful. The cordon and search methods, combined with the strike breaking eliminated much of the general popular support in the city. Outside of the "tough methods", the curfew and apprehension system was very
effective. Had other methods been used to gather intelligence, the Battle of Algiers may not have had the negative connotation now normally associated with it.

The integration of the civil-military operations at the tactical level was good in concept. Had the quadrillage and SAS units been better coordinated and allocated more resources, greater results may have been produced.

The combination of rapid reaction forces with the border fortification system worked extremely well. Light, helicopter or airborne units responded quickly, while armored columns reinforced areas when necessary. These heavy/light operations provided rapid identification of forces and held them until sufficient combat power could be moved into position to destroy them.

The coordination of forces on a single area is another tactic which proved very valuable. Use of native forces as intelligence gathering counterguerrillas, followed by massive reaction forces effectively concentrated and destroyed insurgent groups.

The Battle of Algiers also demonstrates the mistake of premature withdrawal. Incidents had been greatly reduced but the insurgent organization remained intact. The insurgents waited for the government forces to move on and reinstituted the campaign of terror. That mistake was not repeated.
The overreaction by French forces at Sakiet, and even possibly Algiers, provoked condemnation around the world. Algiers required some type of immediate action, but Sakiet was clearly not a major threat. These types of action produced marginal tactical gains in exchange for massive strategic alienation.
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER 4, PART I

THE FIRST INDOCHINA WAR: VIETNAM, 1945-1954


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THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948-1960


2. Carver, War Since 1945, 12; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 81.


5. Carver, War Since 1945, 12 thru 13; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 81; Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 44.

6. Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 81; Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 44.

7. Carver, War Since 1945, 12 thru 15; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 81 thru 82; Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 44 thru 46.

8. Carver, War Since 1945, 12 thru 15; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 81 thru 82; Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 44 thru 46.


43. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 141 thru 155.


THE KENYA EMERGENCY, 1952-1960


7. Majdalany, State of Emergency, 37, 44.

8. Majdalany, State of Emergency, 44.


64. Carver, *War Since 1945*, 43.

**THE ALGERIAN REVOLT, 1954-1962**


CHAPTER 4, PART II

PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The four case studies in this section cover a wide range of operations using different forces and sponsored by different countries. The cases are spread throughout different regions and cover a span of thirty-five years.

These diverse operations serve as the sample for analysis in determining the critical elements of success in each case. Background on each case is provided to give the proper historical perspective and discourage over reliance on isolated events.

OPERATION MUSKETEER: THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1956

In 1952 the "Officers’ Revolution" removed King Farouk from power and installed a military government in Egypt. As he consolidated his power base, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser emerged in late 1954 as the monolithic military dictator. His endorsement of Arab unity found widespread appeal and further taxed Egyptian relations with Europe and the United States.'
Israel

- International boundary
- District (megad) boundary
- National capital
- District (megad) center
- Railroad
- Divided highway
- Other road

The 1960 Israeli proclamation that Jerusalem be the national capital is not recognized by the United States Government.

The Mediterranean Sea

The GAZA STRIP

The 1967 occupied


Egypt

SINAI

JORDAN

SAUDI ARABIA

NEGEV

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Britain and Egypt had increasingly strained relations since the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1954. In spite of the treaty promising British withdrawal from the area, troops remained.  

France traced support for the ongoing insurgency in Algeria to bases in Egypt. President Nasser openly recognized and encouraged the struggle against the French by the Arab insurgents.  

The United States was dismayed by the unwillingness of Egypt to join a regional defense organization and with the increasing Egyptian terrorist activity against Israel. Egypt could not pay for arms requested from the United States and when turned away, resorted to the Soviets. In July 1956 Britain and the United States withdrew funding for a massive Aswan Dam project.  

In response to the withdrawal of economic support Nasser again turned to the Soviets and on 26 July 1956 nationalized the Suez Canal. Israel was denied use of the Canal as well as the Straits of Tiran. Terrorist attacks increased from the Gaza Strip and Israeli aircraft were denied air passage through the airspace of the Straits of Tiran.  

As massive shipments of high technology weapons from Czechoslovakia began arriving in Egypt, tensions in Israel climbed. Included in the shipments were 230 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, 500 artillery pieces and 200
aircraft. What had been an equal arms balance between Egypt and Israel, now favored Egypt by four to one.9

France granted urgent Israeli requests for arms and began shipments. In return for the generous and timely support, Israel informed France that it intended a military strike. The major objectives were to eliminate the sanctuary of the Gaza Strip and Egyptian dominance of the Sharm el Sheikh chokepoint on the Straits of Tiran.10 The extent of cooperation and joint planning remains a matter of controversy. It is sufficient to know that France, and subsequently Britain, knew in advance of Israel's intention to attack.

Britain and France slowly mobilized for an attack on Egypt. Britain favored a seaborne invasion while France favored a quicker airborne invasion supplemented by seaborne reinforcements.11 France had few long range transport aircraft and so, depending on the British (with not many either), a compromise resulted. Airborne forces would be used following a naval bombardment to spearhead a seaborne assault on Port Said.12

Forces were slowly marshaled on the islands of Cyprus and Malta. Britain, more than France, was caught in the dilemma of being prepared for nuclear war on one extreme and insurgencies on the other, with little capability between.13 French paratroops were disengaged from duties involving the Algerian insurgency and British troops were recalled from al
over the world. A British-French combined command was established on 5 August. It was headed by Britain's General Sir Charles Keightley with France's Vice-Admiral Barjot as his deputy.14

As plans were developed the British favored an initial bombing attack to destroy the Egyptian Air Force. This would be followed by eight to ten days of air attacks and aero-psychological warfare designed to undermine the Egyptian will to fight. During the air campaign the invasion fleet would complete the six day sail from Malta. Then airborne assaults and naval landings would secure key areas. The central focus of the British plan required that the operation appear as a response to the Israeli attack.15

French military planners opposed this plan anticipating that world opinion would prevent a prolonged campaign. During September and early October suspicions were aroused by British mobilization and world opinion opposed European intervention. Instead France proposed a plan centered on quick strikes to seize key installations and topple the Nasser government before world opinion could interfere.16

Because Britain provided the bulk of the assets and controlled the senior positions at all levels on the combined staff the French were overruled.17 British staff officers felt that it was entirely reasonable to expect Israel's attack to take several weeks to reach the Suez Canal. In
this estimation, timing of the assault and swift follow on action were not as critical.\textsuperscript{19}

The forces available by mid-October consisted of 90,000 troops, 130 ships (seven aircraft carriers), and 500 aircraft. The land based aircraft and airborne forces were assembled on Cyprus. The seaborne forces were assembled in Malta because of the necessary port facilities.\textsuperscript{19} This compounded command and control problems.

Israel refused to wait any longer, and on 29 October launched its attack. The offensive overwhelmed the Sinai defenses. Simultaneous attacks pushed through the Gaza Strip along the north coast, toward Mitla Pass in the center of the Sinai, and toward Sharm el Sheikh in the south.\textsuperscript{20}

On 30 October a joint Anglo-French ultimatum was announced. It required a halt to hostilities and a withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces from a buffer zone extending 120 miles on either side of the canal. Israel publicly accepted the offer while continuing to fight. Egypt dismissed the ultimatum completely.\textsuperscript{21}

On 31 October aircraft from the joint Anglo-French force began attacking Egyptian airbases and aircraft.\textsuperscript{22} Air action continued but the political climate deteriorated rapidly. Plans were hastily reconsidered, but because of sailing time the main landings could not occur before 6 November. On 2 November France pressed for immediate action.
New plans called for the airborne assaults and for the faster steaming ships to move as quickly as possible to Port Said. On 5 November two airborne assault forces attacked Port Said. The British 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment seized the Gamil Airfield, outside Port Said. Fifteen minutes later elements of the French 2nd Regiment, French Colonial Parachute Division seized the bridges at Raswa, also outside Port Said. Resistance was initially stiff but both forces assembled quickly and secured the initial objectives. Later that afternoon the French made a second drop and secured Port Fouad, just south of Port Said on the Canal.

The town of Port Said was the follow-on objective of the airborne assault. Egyptian gun emplacements and stiff resistance held off the assault forces even with superior close air support by the Anglo-French forces. The Egyptian commander asked for surrender terms, but when unconditional surrender was demanded he refused. The Egyptian Army then immediately began to arm the population of Port Said with 150 tons of small arms and ammunition.

At dawn, on 6 November, the faster ships of the fleet arrived off Port Said. An hour long naval gunfire preparation preceded the landings. The British 40th and 42nd Commando, reinforced by tanks of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment, conducted amphibious assaults on the north shore of Port Said. The 45th Commando air assaulted into the center of the
city by helicopter. By noon, a link-up was made with the French paratroops holding the Raswa bridges.27

Late in the afternoon of 6 November, the British 16th Parachute Brigade was landed from ships in Port Said’s harbor. The seaborne landing was required because of the shortage of transport aircraft for paradrop.28 Together with 45 Commando they engaged in clearing the city of the substantial pockets of primarily armed civilian resistance.29

On the opposite side of the Suez Canal, the French assaulted Port Fouad with a Legionnaire airborne unit and three marine commandos reinforced with tanks. Resistance in the city was quickly suppressed by a tough French attitude toward the population.30

Following the link-up at the Raswa bridges the British 6th Royal Tank Regiment, accompanied by French paratroops, continued south along the canal. Against light resistance they advanced to El Tina before nightfall. With no secure lines to their rear they established a hasty defensive position.31

At 1900 hours 6 November the British government bowed to world pressure (principally U.S.) and announced it would accept a cease-fire if the Israelis and Egyptians would also. This was a unilateral action and caught France by surprise.32

In a desperate effort to consolidate the day’s gains, commanders hurriedly assembled forces into a mobile column for a link-up with the Tank Regiment. In the remaining hour...
before the midnight cease-fire, the convoy advanced an additional seven miles to El Cap. They were unable to reach the Tank Regiment, but had extended the penetration to a point 25 miles south of Port Said.33

On 4 November, a UN General Assembly resolution, sponsored by the U.S., called for a halt to hostilities and a United Nations force to supervise disengagement. The vote favored the resolution 57 to 0. Even before the ground operation commenced, Britain faced a united world body condemning its action.34 On 5 November following the airborne assault, Britain accepted the provision for the UN force but did not agree to the cease-fire until the next day. Anglo-French military operations ceased on midnight 6 November, awaiting the arrival of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I.35

* * * * *

Although successful in the military sense, the intervention by the Anglo-French forces was disastrous in political terms.36 Britain sought to regain a measure of prestige as a world power and France wanted to challenge the Nasser government. Neither goal was achieved.37 World opinion mounted quickly against Israel and the British-French coalition after the Anglo-French ultimatum.

Public opinion at home in France and Britain quickly split and dissension with government actions was loud and clear.38 Britain suffered a lightening swift monetary crisis
as a result of capital leaving the country following the outbreak of war. Only an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), underwritten by the U.S., saved the British pound. The price required by the U.S. was a halt to all hostilities.

The Soviet Union took advantage of the temporary rift in the NATO allies and threatened war with Britain and France. The U.S. reacted angrily and world war was averted, primarily by tremendous U.S. pressure on Israel, Britain and France.

In strategic terms the contingency suffered from two major faults. First, the huge British mobilization provided adequate international warning. Second, the basic plan minimized the importance of swift action, brought to a swift conclusion.

The mobilization and build up in the Mediterranean sacrificed strategic surprise. Egypt had limited resources to respond to the Anglo-French intervention but, more important, was world opinion. Before the major portion of the operation was launched, Britain was being forced to cease hostilities.

The speculation and indications of military operations had several detrimental spinoffs. One of the most significant was in the economic arena. The progressive build up gave financial planners time to consider the impact of events. When the crisis broke, many investors already had
planned to escape the British involvement. This provoked the British financial crisis, forcing them to accede to American pressure.

The British military planners consistently talked in terms of weeks and the French in terms of hours. Had the French approach been adopted with a swift coup d'après, results may have been different. The U.S., as well as many other governments, did not favor Nasser. Although a quick intervention would have also been condemned publicly, privately results might have spoken louder. If the Anglo-French action would have achieved a swift victory, with little loss of life and collateral damage many countries would have been pleased. They would have been compelled by world opinion to condemn the action, but the comments would have been short lived.

The justification for the intervention, a separation of Israeli and Egyptian belligerents, was not credible in world view. Whether jointly planned or not, the Anglo-French assault could not be easily justified based on the known facts. It was common knowledge that there was a British build-up going on in the Mediterranean. France and Britain did not hide their enmity toward the Nasser government. Both governments were dependent on the free flow of oil from the Middle East, principally through the Suez. In light of these issues it was difficult, in hindsight, to see the Anglo-French intervention as a humanitarian mission. The
deception may have been much more credible given swift action and quick resolution.

The operation did not even succeed in maintaining access to the Suez Canal. This was a major objective of the operation. Following the Anglo-French ultimatum and initial air attacks, Egypt filled more than 50 large ships with concrete and sank them in the main channel and harbor entrances.45

On the positive side, the coalition of Britain and France was a wise political move. Individually they would have not been able to stand international pressure. But together the two countries, both U.S. allies, slowed diplomatic actions and diluted the intensity. In the end the veto in the United Nations Security Council forced the matter to the General Assembly. Thus the actions which could be invoked had far less power than those generated by the Security Council.

The British acceptance of a cease-fire as a unilateral action had disastrous results on the coalition. French military staff officers were left without sufficient transport. In the larger perspective, France appeared as the aggressor when a coordinated diplomatic action could have easily avoided the situation. Relations became immediately strained and made further efforts difficult.

At the operational level, British domination of all sections of the combined command did little to encourage
interoperability. Original plans called for the respective forces to conduct operations primarily on one side of the canal or the other. This would ease command and control problems. However, when plans were hurriedly changed the initial dispositions could not be maintained.\(^6\) It is a credit to the Regimental, Brigade and Division commanders that events proceeded as well as they did. It is also a result of the short duration of the operations.

On the other hand, a combined staff gave depth and experience to the organization. It insured that national differences in the operating forces were accounted for in planning. Individual national commands would have complicated planning beyond hope and doomed events to failure.

Shortage of heavy lift transport aircraft plagued the entire operation from the beginning.\(^7\) If the British had been able to drop the 16th Parachute Brigade the first day and subsequently land 45 Commando from a fast helicopter carrier along with limited numbers of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment, events would have proceeded much quicker.

It is even possible this option would have been employed as early as 1 or 2 November. This would have spared the Anglo-French coalition the embarrassment of world opinion and strengthened the justification as a response to separate the belligerents.
The decision to require unconditional surrender of the Egyptian forces in Port Said is questionable. Had terms been worked out, the landing the following morning would have been unopposed and forces could have proceeded directly into the assault to the south. The hour long naval gunfire preparation and the resulting collateral damage could have been avoided. Most importantly, the assault forces might have been able to secure the entire Canal prior to the cease-fire.

The emphasis on quickly establishing air superiority was well placed. Airborne operations and amphibious landings are highly vulnerable to enemy air action. In this effort the carrier operations as well as long range attack aircraft played significant roles. The planned was flawed in the eight to ten days allotted to the operation.

A major collateral success for the Israeli effort was the destruction of the Egyptian Air Force. Israel was severely limited in fighter capabilities and operating ranges. The damage to the Egyptian airfields and aircraft done by the Anglo-French Air Forces allowed Israel to commit aircraft to close air support.

The requirement to split the intervention forces between Cyprus and Malta greatly complicated command and control. Lack of sufficient port facilities in Cyprus also dictated the six day sailing time for the amphibious fleet. The logistical requirements and size of the force imposed
many of the strategic/operational limits which eventually defeated the effort.

In tactical terms there were many successes. The airborne insertions were extremely successful as were the follow-on landings and subsequent penetrations. Unfortunately, with a hostile strategic environment and a badly flawed operational plan, the tactical successes meant almost nothing.

The British and French drops were on time and exactly on target. The airfield and remaining bridges were seized in about an hour each. Each force suffered only minor casualties and proceeded immediately toward the follow-on objectives.\textsuperscript{50}

Close air support of the airborne and seaborne assault forces work very well. Despite using aircraft and pilots of both nationalities, the joint procedures functioned extremely well. This could have alleviated the requirements for the numbers of armored support and accordingly decreased the size of the seaborne assault forces.\textsuperscript{51}

Use of helicopters to air assault large forces from the fleet into the center of Port Said was very successful. Units were delivered to critical points and able to establish superior positions by commanding the heights of buildings without having to fight for each one.

The link-up of the French paratroops and British armor formations went very well. This heavy/light force mix
optimized the advantages of each and minimized the shortcomings. This is especially important in fast moving, limited duration operations where exploitation is important.

The paratroops were quickly incorporated into the assault and the fast moving tempo of the attack was not lost. Egyptian troops fell back as the French paratroops cleared obstacles and small villages enroute. The tanks provided fire support and mobility keeping the Egyptian defenders disorganized.

A notable exception in the overall successes of the parachute insertions was the British method of dropping individual weapons consolidated in containers. During the assault on Gamil Airfield the paratroops were engaged as they landed and had little time to find and unpack their weapons.

Fortunately the Egyptians, expecting an assault landing by aircraft, had placed scores of sand filled oil drums on the runway. These drums provided cover as paratroops moved to the parachute containers and unpacked individual weapons to return fire.
OPERATION DRAGON ROUGE: CONGO INTERVENTION, 1964

In early 1964 Moise Tshombe acceded to Cyrille Adoula's request, left exile and became part of the government of national reconciliation. Tshombe had led the Katanga province's secession from the Congo in 1960 and maintained a large political following there. He fled into exile in 1964 when the United Nations peacekeeping forces defeated his secessionist movement and integrated Katanga back into the Congo.

Cyrille Adoula was building a coalition government in an attempt to stabilize the Congo after four years of internal strife. Tshombe represented a major faction in the Congo and Adoula needed his cooperation.

Unfortunately, Moise Tshombe outmaneuvered Adoula and quickly took over as Prime Minister. Together with General Mobutu, the Commander of the Armee Nationale Congolese (ANC) Tshombe sought to impose governmental control on a country of 14 million spread between 200 different tribes. As an active anti-communist, Tshombe received U.S and Belgian military support in material, training and advisors.

As Prime Minister Tshombe consolidated his power base, two Chinese communist backed secessionist insurgencies continued to grow in Kwilu and Katanga. These revolts were tribal based and although poorly organized, they represented a major threat to the government.
**Notes on map name changes:**

Zaire - Congo (Belgian)

Kisangani - Stanleyville  
Kalenei - Albertville  
Mungbere - Paulis

Kinshasa - Leopoldville  
Mbandaka - Couquilhatville  
Lubumbashi - Elisabethville

Shaba Province - Katanga Province (With minor alterations)  
Haut-Zaïre Province - Haut-Congo Province
In 1960 the Force Publique was the national security force. Only a few days after independence the Force mutinied against its Belgian officers demanding better pay and promotions. Prime Minister Lumumba sought to appease the Force and dismissed the Belgian officers, replacing them with Congolese. The name was also changed to the ANC.

From that point forward the Army was never an effective fighting force and proved unable to subdue the growing revolts. Poorly led, and often completely out of control, the Army was brutal in its treatment of the population. This fostered animosity and fed the cause of the insurgents.

Even with U.S. and Belgian support the Army was losing ground to the insurgents. Both the U.S. and Belgium supplied advisors and logistic managers. They coordinated the material support and assisted in troop deployments. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created a small Air Force using armed propeller trainers piloted by ex-patriot Cubans. The close air support that this small force provided made major contributions, but the ground forces remained ineffective.

By early July both revolts controlled substantial territory. While the Katanga revolt is the focus of this discussion, the Kwilu revolt, led by Pierre Mulele, continued to succeed and diverted government resources. This forced the ANC to fight two separate but powerful insurgencies at the same time.
In Katanga the insurgents, known as Simbas (Swahili for "Lion"), were led politically by Gaston Soumailot and Christophe Gbenye and militarily by Nicolas Olenga. Soumailot and Gbenye were communists and co-founders of the National Liberation Committee (CNL). Olenga was a Batetela tribesman who had worked as a railway clerk. He was a charismatic leader and had learned some fundamentals of revolt while working for Antoine Gizenga, whose insurgency had supported Patrice Lumumba from Stanleyville in 1961.

Communist ideology meant little to Olenga and the Simbas. Soumailot merely provided the connection for money and weapons. The rebels were tribesmen who were not favored by the government and had been subject to the reprisals of the ANC. Young tribesmen eagerly took up arms against authority and sought to steal some of what the government had denied them.

At the beginning of July a small band of only a few hundred, headed by Olenga, moved north out of Albertville, North Katanga. The rebels quickly captured small towns in Maniema Province as the ANC garrisons fled. At Kasongo, as the townspeople watched, the rebels massacred nearly 200 Congolese governmental and tribal leaders.

On 22 July Kindu, the provincial capital of Maniema, was occupied by the rebels. Olenga captured trucks and recruited thousands of eager volunteers. United by sorcerers and black magic the Simbas believed they were immortal.
Moving almost 250 miles, the rebels overran Wanie Rukula on 2 August. In less than a month a disorganized group of tribesmen had defeated the Army in the majority of three provinces and was now only 24 miles from Stanleyville.

In Stanleyville the temporary U.S. Counsel, Michael Hoyt arranged evacuation for the remaining U.S. dependents and destroyed the consulate's sensitive files. The ANC garrison of 1,500 was well armed but the commander, Colonel Mulamba was in Bukavu, over 300 miles to the southeast, fighting other rebel elements on the border.

On 4 August the Simbas attacked and succeeded in securing the outskirts of Stanleyville. The ANC provided some defense, but was disorganized and overly impressed by the Simbas "magic". All voluntary evacuations had been completed but many non-Congolese chose to remain and protect their interests. About 1200 Europeans (including 29 Americans) and 400 Indians stayed behind.

On 5 August the Simbas attacked in earnest. Colonel Mulamba's plane was unable to land when the pilot was shot and he was forced on to Leopoldville. Without leadership and awed by the powerful "magic" of the Simbas, the ANC put up a meager defense effort and withdrew, leaving the city to the Simbas.

Five American officials remained at the American consulate. They survived the initial assault by hiding in a vault. Emerging afterward they reestablished communication with Leopoldville.
The American Ambassador, G. McMurtie Godley drew up a hasty rescue plan which was finally abandoned on 7 August. Consul Hoyt believed the rescue was too risky for several reasons. Simbas had once again surrounded the consulate and occupied the city by the thousands. In addition, Hoyt felt the decidedly anti-American Simbas would massacre the remaining Europeans in a rage of anger, if the Americans were successfully rescued.  

Diplomatic discussions were opened immediately with Belgium. The American Ambassador, W. Averell Harriman began direct talks with the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak on the subject of assisting the Congo in subduing the rebels. The subject was difficult because the Belgian intervention of 1960, which was highly criticized, was still fresh in world memory. The United Nations forces which intervened to separate the Belgians from the Congolese had departed only months before.

Stanleyville's capture triggered a series of events which provoked eventual western intervention. Concern over Europeans and the success of a communist supported insurgency in Africa became a major issue as the Simbas brutally occupied Stanleyville. Olenga stated later that "We should never have taken Stanleyville."  

Belgium and the U.S. agreed to support a white mercenary force which would assist the ANC in crushing both revolts in the Congo. This would strengthen Tshombe's hand,
and would be difficult to term direct U.S./Belgian intervention. It was felt that this would protect the Europeans in Stanleyville from reprisals and help maintain a more favorable international image.²⁴

Belgian Colonel Vandewalle was named as Tshombe's military advisor. In reality he was the leader, that the mercenary task force would be built around. Vandewalle had considerable experience in the Congo and was Tshombe's military advisor during the Katangese secession of 1960-63.²⁵

In addition, Ambassador Harriman requested a joint task force be deployed to the Congo. U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) had regional responsibility for the Congo which had been removed from U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) in 1963.²⁶

The USSTRICOM commander, General Paul Adams had already prepared a preliminary Operations Plan (OPLAN) that he now modified. OPLAN 515/1 "Ready Move II" called for the deployment of Joint Task Force LEO (JTF LEO), consisting of a small staff, an infantry platoon, two helicopters and two C-130 transports.²⁷

When presented with the USSTRICOM plan, Tshombe and Mobutu requested four additional infantry battalions and Special Forces. The U.S. turned down his request, as a force of that size would be difficult to conceal from world attention.²⁸ Tshombe also appealed to South Africa for
assistance. This request crippled a U.S. plan for an United African force to fight the rebels.29

JTF LEO deployed from MacDill Air Force Base, Florida and Germany on 11 August 1964. The aircraft were to support Tshombe’s ANC with mobility and fire support. The infantry platoon was a small reaction force for security.30

By 13 August, Olenga had consolidated his hold on Stanleyville and moved on the remainder of the provinces; all the way north to the Sudanese border and east to Uganda. In his absence, atrocities against the civil population in Stanleyville became public rituals. Europeans were, by and large, only harassed as hundreds of Congolese were put to death. But as conditions deteriorated, their treatment became progressively worse. Hoyt and the other four consular staff were imprisoned on 13 August.31

On 19 August Olenga attacked Bukavu with 1,000 rebels riding in trucks. Colonel Mulamba led the ANC defense which stopped the Simbas in tough house to house fighting. JTF LEO C-130’s flew troop reinforcements and CIA T-28’s flew close air support.32

Olenga attributed his defeat to U.S. support of the ANC. Responding to Olenga’s threats on the lives of the consular staff, Hoyt sent a veiled message outlining the impact of American aid to Leopoldville. Ambassador Godley immediately recognized the plight of the American staff.33

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In Washington, a Congo Working Group (CWG) was convened to coordinate actions. An immediate lack of intelligence on the Congo and specifically the Simbas, surfaced. Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or USSTRICOM had any plans for dealing with contingencies short of all out war in the Congo.34

Under direction of the JCS, Adams constructed several options. One involved a covert Special Forces raid to recover the five consular staffers. Detailed intelligence on the size of the Simba force and the location of the Americans was lacking. Also the threat of reprisals against the remaining Europeans evoked caution. A second, more favorable recommendation involved a sizable raid to evacuate the entire foreign national population.35

Meanwhile, Colonel Vandewalle secured control over all military operations against the rebels from Tshombe and Mobutu. His Belgian supported force now numbered 250 mercenaries and several thousand Katangese, backed by the ANC. By early September the mercenaries and the ANC had succeeded in stalling the advancing Simbas and establishing a credible defense.36

The mercenaries were organized in three separate columns, operating independently. The three columns put continuous pressure on the rebel forces from different directions. This stretched the rebels’ already faltering command and control and supply apparatus. But as mercenary
success began to multiply, foreign nationals under Simba control suffered more.³⁷

On 7 October Olenga ordered Christophe Gbenye, the head of the CNL, now in Stanleyville, to execute a foreigner for each Simba that was killed in an air attack. The Simbas were also removing their foreign national prisoners with them as they retreated.³⁸

Tshombe exacerbated the situation by ordering air attacks into Simba territory strictly as reprisals. When the CWG and Ambassador Godley tried to restrain Tshombe, he activated a small mercenary air force of his own. This small force began a program of uncoordinated bombing in Simba held territory, seriously jeopardizing foreign national lives. Tshombe agreed to disband the mercenary air force, only after the U.S. suspended all air support of operations for a week.³⁹

Senior Department of State officials still pressed to continue the original plan using the mercenaries and an African peacekeeping force to subdue the rebels and eventually free the foreign national hostages. On the other side, General Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, backed General Adams. Both strongly advocated immediate military intervention. The CWG was seriously divided but remained reluctant to use force.⁴⁰

The situation in Stanleyville continued to deteriorate with each rebel setback. On 19 October Soumailot
made public threats against the Belgian children of the captive Europeans. On 28 October all Belgians and Americans were arrested. Olenga followed up on 31 October by publicly declaring the Simbas would "exterminate" the hostages in the event the region was attacked.

Following a backlash in world opinion, the rebels announced on 5 November that they considered the Americans and Belgians prisoners of war. This muted outright concern and even raised hopes for negotiations.

However on the same day one of the mercenary columns successfully attacked Kibombo and Kindu. As the rebels were defeated and withdrew, they began killing their non-Congolese hostages. Only an all night march and attack by the mercenary column prevented a massacre in Kindu.

Debriefings of Europeans, following the successful liberation of Kindu, confirmed fears that the Simbas had no qualms about murdering hostages in the face of defeat. Hostages had been systematically gathered prior to the attack. As defeat grew closer they were prepared for execution. Only the swiftness of the mercenary advance and supporting air attacks stopping the actual killing.

General Adams continued to plan a rescue operation incorporating several different options. When the Br'gians became directly involved on 28 October with the arrest of their nationals, chances for combined military action improved. The CWG had been told to consider only action
which kept the Belgians at the forefront of any direct involvement. With the arrests, several Belgian officers indicated that a combined operation may be possible. 45

On 8 November, Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak proposed a combined operation involving American airlift and Belgian paratroops. Following difficult political battles on both sides, permission to plan and organize the mission was given. President Johnson reserved the decision to execute. 46

On 11 November a combined planning conference convened in Brussels, Belgium. U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Dougherty from USEUCOM with two Army officers represented the U.S. operational side of the plan. Lieutenant Colonel Dunn, the JCS action officer on the CWG completed the U.S. team. Belgians present included the Chief of Joint Staff, Colonel Louvigny and Paracommando Regimental Commander, Colonel Laurent. 47

Despite U.S. Department of State pressure to use a company size force, a Belgian Paracommando Battalion was agreed upon as the central focus of the operation. The U.S. would provide one 16 aircraft C-130 squadron and a C-130 command and control aircraft. The Belgians would provide the paratroops and ground support vehicles. Close air support would be provided by the CIA air forces currently in the Congo. 48

Brigadier General Dougherty recommended that USSTRICOM accept command and control responsibility for the
U.S. portion of the operation. General Adams was denied permission to send a staff officer to the planning conference because the plan involved only U.S. air support.  

Ascension Island was selected as an intermediate refueling stop. Because of daylight landing requirements at Ascension Island, the timetable required a decision be made prior to 0640 Zulu hours. This produced an execution time 48 hours later over Stanleyville. Operations Security (OPSEC) dictated the force use night movement as much as possible and explained the operation as a combined training exercise. The plan was divided into three phases and code named Operation DRAGON ROUGE.  

Phase I was the marshaling and air movement phase. It involved air movement of the Belgian battalion and associated equipment from Kleine-Brogel Air Base, Belgium through Spain, Ascension Island, Kamina Air Base, Congo, and finally Stanleyville. The air movement would be controlled by the American commander until the forces were over the drop zone at Stanleyville. Control would then be passed to Colonel Laurent of the Belgian Paracommandos.  

Phase II was the assault. It consisted of the parachute assault of Stanleyville Airport, clearing the airfield, sealing the city, and rescuing and evacuating the hostages.  

Phase III was the airdropping and redeployment of the assault force and hostages.
Several criticisms of the plan surfaced. The CWG wanted to return to the smaller force of one company and stage from three separate locations in the Congo. Fortunately the Belgians stood firm, but the political concerns of the Washington planners prohibited any increase in the size of the force. More to the point, General Adams commented that the time necessary to actually make contact with the hostages was too long.\(^5\)

The Belgian bureaucracy also raised concerns and placed limitations on the execution of the mission. Colonel Laurent was reminded time and again that his mission was not "to make war but rather to conduct a humanitarian rescue."\(^5\) At the same time he was cautioned "world opinion will not stand for a large-scale slaughter of blacks in the Congo."\(^5\)

Finally he was warned that "Belgium was not at war and public opinion would not countenance the loss of young draftees in another Congo venture."\(^5\) In view of this guidance the resulting conservative ground assault plan is not surprising.

As Colonel Laurent organized his force, the training levels of his units dictated that the 1st Battalion of the regiment should form the main force. Because the regiment was soldiered with draftees, each battalion was in a different stage of their annual training cycle. And because each battalion contained only two active rifle companies and one reserve, Colonel Laurent was forced to accept a partially
trained third rifle company from another battalion. Security considerations, as well as political legalities, prohibited recalling any of the reservists."

The airlift squadron departed from Evreux and arrived in Belgium on 17 November. Only after a lengthy debate did Foreign Minister Spaak prevail over the CWG, allowing the force to forward position at Ascension Island. The CWG wanted a "demonstrated imminent peril" before it would act. Spaak knew the Simbus were unpredictable and with Vandowalle's offensive beginning the hostages were in serious danger. This, combined with the delivery time from Belgium, was unacceptable."

Despite the efforts at a cover story the press reported the troop deployment from Belgium with speculation that the destination was Africa. The press release was triggered by a Belgian Defense Ministry communique."

As the forward force deployed, the CWG continued to seek a negotiated settlement with the rebels. In a difficult mix of secondary effects, this hindered and helped DRAGON ROUGE. The political efforts distracted the rebel leaders from the possibility of a military rescue. At the same time these efforts diverted the State Department supervisory effort away from coordination with the military on DRAGON ROUGE. In addition the CWG continued to consider a CIA effort that resurrected one of the earlier covert plans. The U.S. effort was far from unified."
The assault force arrived on Ascension Island on 18 November. Although USSTRICOM was to take operational control (OPCON) of the operation on Ascension, the communications element had not arrived. Adding confusion, two different sets of codewords were in use and Air Force communications equipment could not keep up with the volume of classified traffic.

Colonel Laurent worked to incorporate recent changes in the drop method into his tactical plan. B-26's would precede the parachute assault to destroy any air defenses and the paradrop would be done in one continuous pass for all jumpers. Door bundles and jumpmasters would follow on the second and third passes. The ground assault plan also had three phases.

Phase I encompassed the airdrop and airfield clearing. The initial assault troops would have 30 minutes to clear the airstrip to allow the aircraft with armored and communications jeeps to land. One hour later, the remaining rifle company, with the motorized tricycles, would land.

Phase II involved encircling the city by two companies, one each, on the northern and southern edges. The third company would enter the center of the city to liberate the hostages.

Phase III concerned the evacuation of the hostages to the airfield and the security for the force during the evacuation. Linkup with Colonel Vandewalle's column was also detailed.
On 19 November, John Clingerman, former consul to Stanleyville briefed the assembled staffs on Ascension Island. Detailing recent intelligence and suspected hostage locations, Clingerman outlined the likely Simba armaments and reactions. Clingerman did not know of the recent practice of massacring hostages as rebel forces withdrew or suffered air attacks.

The Belgians used their time on Ascension Island to rehearse. Since the Belgians normally jumped C-119's, the C-130 jump procedures were the first priority. With the aircraft procedures mastered, the airfield assembly and seizure was rehearsed several times.

On 21 November the U.S. acceded to Belgian demands to forward station the force at Kamina. The decision was precipitated by Foreign Minister Spaak's public announcement of the force's presence on Ascension Island.

As an afterthought, U.S. CWG planners examined the DRAGON ROUGE plan and felt the assault force was inadequate given the force ratios against the rebels. U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara was approached about American reinforcements, but refused to consider the idea. He did however agree to station another C-130 squadron in Spain to airlift allied forces as reinforcement if necessary.

In order to coordinate the paradrop with Vandewalle's assault on Stanleyville the decision to execute the mission was made on 23 November. Vandewalle's forces consisted of a
mixture of mercenaries, CIA Cubans, and approximately 1,000 native Congolese. The column moved at 1500 hours in order to travel during the night and attack the city at first light.

In spite of good initial progress, three successive ambushes slowed the column and made continued travel extremely dangerous. Vandewalle halted the column at 0330 and did not resume the march until 0530 hours.

The airdrop aircraft departed on time at 0245 hours, rendezvousing with the B-26 escort and arriving over Stanleyville exactly on time. At 0600 hours the paratroops jumped and within 60 seconds the entire first wave had landed.

Assembling quickly, the paratroops received heavy ground fire but set to clearing the airfield of enemy and obstructions. The 55 gallon drums cluttering the runway were filled with water and the abandoned cars had no wheels. All were cleared quickly. Only three jumpers were seriously injured on the drop.

As the control tower and runway were cleared of resistance, enemy prisoners indicated the Europeans were being held in the Hotel Victoria. A short time later a call came in to the Belgian command post that had been hastily established at the control tower. The caller announced that the hostages were imminent danger in the Hotel.

Major Bing, the Battalion Commander, assembled two companies for an immediate assault into town. Minutes later
the C-130's with the vehicles began to land. Chalk Six had an inflight emergency causing it to return to Kamina. Therefore, Chalk Seven was the first to land. Firing from heavy machine guns erupted from around the airfield and the paratroops immediately assaulted the positions."

As the aircraft were first heard overhead the hostages had been forced from the Hotel Victoria into the street by the Simbas. They were lined up four abreast and began to move toward the airport where, they were told, they would be used as human shields.’’

With the first set of armored jeeps available and the third rifle company assembled the assault moved toward town at 0715 hours. Delayed by ineffective sniper fire the column reached the outskirts of Stanleyville at 0740.‘’

Ten minutes later the Paracommandos fought through an intersection and turned down Avenue Sergeant Ketele. As the fighting approached the Simba guards opened fire on the 250 European hostages, killing 18 immediately and severely wounding 40. As Major Mine pushed on to the Hotel with the lead elements, he detached a rifle platoon to provide aid and evacuate the wounded.’’

The battalion staff set up temporary command post to coordinate the evacuation in the intersection and requested medical assistance for the wounded. Sniper and mortar fire assualted the paratroops as they assembled the hostages and
provided first aid. Major Mine redirected one of the rifle companies to protect the evacuation site.\footnote{0}

The remaining two companies pushed ahead with greater speed. The companies quickly broke into independent platoons to search and secure the city. When a platoon reached the Victoria Hotel they secured another 50 hostages. They were escorted back to the intersection and evacuation point.\footnote{1}

By 1030 the approaches from Camp Ketele to the city were secured and by 1200 most of the city had been cleared and secured. Blocking positions were established to protect the evacuation and the airfield.\footnote{2}

The refugees began reaching the airfield on foot by 0830 hours. Minutes later several commandeered trucks brought the first loads of wounded to the flight surgeons on Chalk Twelve. As the remaining wounded were brought in the doctors were overwhelmed and fought desperately to save lives. During the two and one-half hour flight to Leopoldville three more of the hostages died despite tremendous efforts by the medical staff.\footnote{3}

Intensive rebel fire around the airfield compelled Chalk Twelve to take off before it unloaded 600 pounds of badly needed medical supplies. The remaining 30 wounded were evacuated with limited medical support.\footnote{4}

The task force was badly stretched as it searched and secured the city, and still attempted to maintain the
security of the airfield. The rebels counterattacked several times, firing on departing and arriving aircraft.\textsuperscript{5}

At 1100 hours the 13th Company of the Belgian Paracommandos made contact with the mercenary column under the command of Colonel Vandewalle near Camp Ketele. By 1230 the mercenaries occupied their initial objectives at key points in the city. This effectively sealed off the major escape routes from Stanleyville.\textsuperscript{6}

With help of local residents, the men of Vandewalle's mobile column went into the countryside, breaking through roadblocks and ambushes to recover many of the missionaries and farmers. They were brought back to the airfield to join the swelling ranks of those being staged for evacuation.\textsuperscript{7}

The JTF LEO and DRAGON ROUGE C-130's, along with chartered aircraft from Air Congo, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Sabena Airlines and the Red Cross, all began to evacuate refugees from Stanleyville Airport. The Paracommandos tried to maintain security around the airfield but much of the battalion was still deployed in town. Often during the day, the air traffic controllers were forced to change ends of the runway to avoid gunfire at incoming or departing aircraft.\textsuperscript{8}

At 1500 hours, following the 13th Company liberation of 40 hostages in the area of the public market, Colonel Laurent recalled the battalion. At 1745, as one of the last C-130's was landing, the Simbas made a determined attack on
the western end of the airfield. Supported by mortars and witch doctors, the Simbas, apparently drugged, danced and chanted as they attacked. Reinforced by a rifle company and finally, air support, the defending platoon held off the attack.9

As the battalion was recalled Major Mine established a perimeter defense around the airfield. This included the nearby European hospital. The Belgian surgery team had been flown in from Kamina to operate on a badly injured paratrooper. During the day, 1,400 refugees had been evacuated with approximately 200 remaining in the hangar at the airfield.9

As the Paracommandos consolidated their defense for the night, another operation was already underway. As concern for other hostages in large cities grew, planners envisioned several more assaults to intervene before disaster struck. Another planning conference had been convened in Brussels from 18 to 20 November. As a result, follow on operations DRAGON BLANC in the city of Bunia, DRAGON VERT in Watsa, and DRAGON NOIR in Paulis, were conceived.91

Colonel Laurent expected this possibility and gathered his staff at the airfield to plan further contingencies. As Colonel Laurent assembled his leaders, the torrent of world opinion opened up. The intervention was unanimously and loudly deplored by Third World nations. This made political decision-making in Washington and Brussels for
follow-on operations even more difficult. The senior State Department advisor on the Congo, George Ball quotes President Johnson (referring to the missionaries who did not depart when warned) as telling him:

"That he did not want to 'get tied in on the Congo and have another Korea or another Vietnam just because of somebody wandering around searching for Jesus Christ."

Original plans called for one company each to be dropped on the follow-on objectives. Based on the performance of the Simbas and the size of the towns, Colonel Laurent felt this was completely inadequate. He required a minimum of two companies for each operation. His men had now been awake for the best part of three days. In addition the shipment of parachutes included only enough for one more operation if two companies were used.

Based on the vicious backlash of world opinion, and the physical limitations of Laurent's forces, both Belgium and the U.S. agreed to only one more operation. Priorities were changed after hostages had been debriefed. Paulis seemed to possess the greatest threat. Estimates numbered hostages close to 300.

Colonel Laurent and Major Mine met on the morning of 25 November to finalize detailed plans. Colonel Isaacson, the USSTRICOM liaison officer, was also present. Laurent and Isaacson both felt the B-26's alerted the defenders but General Adams insisted they stay in the plan. Laurent and
Mine agreed that one company should secure and clear the airfield while the second moved immediately into the city.  

At 2200 hours, 25 November Chalk Seven for the upcoming Paulis assault landed at Stanleyville to begin loading. Because there had not been time to redeploy the Paracommandos to Kamina, the airfield at Stanleyville would be stretched to capacity to stage the next operation.

By 0400 all aircraft had loaded at Stanleyville and returned to Kamina to refuel and make final preparations. At 0500 the assault formation took off from Kamina. But Colonel Isaacson had misunderstood the drop heading, requiring all the aircrews to recompute their approach to Paulis enroute.

Heavy ground fog caused a "No Drop" on the first pass in order to positively identify the drop zone. At 0602, taking heavy ground fire the Paracommandos executed DRAGON NOIR. The fog worked to the paratroop's advantage screening them from the emplaced defenders. Major Mine, with several troops, quickly captured the control tower as other groups moved toward initial objectives. The airfield was clear for the follow-on airland chalks by 0630 hours.

At 0700 a platoon secured 50 hostages at a Christian Mission near the center of town. Unfortunately twenty hostages had already been tortured and executed during the two nights immediately after Stanleyville fell.

Evacuation operations were moving smoothly and by 0850 hours 200 refugees had been moved out of Paulis. The
armored jeeps and motorized tricycles conducted the mobile patrols executed by Vandewalle men in Stanleyville. During a dozen separate patrols they recovered scores of Europeans either hiding or fleeing Simbas and returned them to the airfield.¹⁰⁰

At 1600 hours, following a final sweep of the city, Colonel Laurent recalled his paratroops and established a perimeter around the airfield. Approximately 150 refugees awaited evacuation on the next set of flights scheduled for 1200 hours the following day.¹⁰¹

The flights arrived on schedule the following day and by 1610 hours the final C-130 lifted off from Paulis. The Paracommandos had lost one dead and five wounded while rescuing 375 hostages.¹⁰²

On 28 November the Paracommandos boarded the C-130’s and departed for Belgium. The mercenaries continued to fight for months until, on 29 March 1965, the government in Leopoldville announced the rebellion was at an end. JTF LEO was disbanded in August 1965.¹⁰³

In November 1965 General Mobutu seized power in a bloodless coup and began to stabilize the political situation in the Congo. Recognizing the Congolese were not in a position to administer the country for some time, Mobutu evoked African pride as a rallying point for national unity. The Congo was officially renamed Zaire in recognition of the African historical name.¹⁰⁴
At the strategic level, concern by both America and Belgium about world opinion permeated all aspects of military planning for an intervention. Both countries understood that action must be swift and yet not devastating. In some cases, as with the CWG, the concern became crippling.

Initially the use of surrogate and covert forces solved part of this problem. However when it became apparent that hostage lives were in direct danger, immediate action was required. Thus, concern for the lives and safety of the hostages was initially a paramount issue.

The coalition approach yielded benefits in the arena of world opinion. It precluded Belgium of being accused of unilateral forced entry into the Congo once again. For the U.S. it focused efforts on a support role to avoid direct intervention.

The coalition diluted attacks on the operation as an attempt to reestablish colonialism. U.S. involvement meant that efforts by the Soviets in the Security Council could be blocked and Belgium protected from immediate sanctions.

National political concerns by both nations impacted directly on the tactical operations of the mission. Limitations imposed by Belgium almost hamstrung the execution to the point that it could not accomplish the mission. U.S. concerns dictated that the intervention force should be so small that it would have been massacred as it hit the ground.
Tactical requirements were considered only secondarily and brought into perspective only by forceful personalities holding firm on crucial points.

Congolese sovereignty complicated matters as Prime Minister Tshombe sought his own solutions which undermined the coalition efforts. Tshombe also lacked concern for the welfare of the hostages and was primarily concerned with long term consolidation of his power base. Yet the U.S./Belgian coalition was forced to respect the sovereignty of the Congo and work diplomatically to coordinate efforts.

Negotiations also played at part at several different levels. Ultimately they may have produced a solution on their own, but it is doubtful. More importantly, at the operational level they distracted the Simbas and maintained some neutral ground. This prohibited the Simbas from taking drastic actions until the intervention was well under way.

At the same time, the U.S. did not synchronize its actions well at the strategic level. Several organizations and agencies were concurrently planning different approaches with little coordination or guidance. These different plans often moved into the initial stages of execution with even less coordination and usually at cross purposes. The diverse elements of national power were not collectively brought to bear on the Congo problem in an organized effort.

Basing and staging rights were critical to the operation. The use of Ascension Island required permission
form Britain that was quickly given. Other areas which were closer were not feasible either for security reasons or poor diplomatic relations. The use of Ascension required the force to forward stage into the Congo before operations commenced.

At the operational level, a lack of timely and accurate intelligence plagued efforts from the beginning. Information on the Simbas and their motivations as well as possible behavior hampered estimates and assessments at each stage of planning. In some cases lack of intelligence limited options outright.

In this same respect, existing contingency plans had not considered this type of involvement in the region. In spite of the fact that countries and situations are often too numerous to allow detailed planning on each one, no generic plan existed. This meant that each detail of the operation had to be created from scratch and greatly increased the chances that some major element or concern would be overlooked.

Only the fact that several agencies and headquarters created several simultaneous plans alleviated some of these problems. They also had the luxury of several months to review their plans and update them. If immediate action would have been necessary, significant problems and a sub-optimal plan would have resulted.
A convoluted, layered and at points confusing chain of command did not facilitate ease of coordination and execution. Belgium sent a tailored staff, centered on the operators to the critical planning conferences. The U.S. sent staff officers, not directly related to the operation. It was fortuitous that several of these officers later became involved. The best tactical planning occurred once the air element and the ground assault force met together in Belgium.

The use of USSTRICOM as a control headquarters did little to assist the operation. General Adams was removed from the planning and even from the actual execution. The USSTRICOM liaison officers interfered with direct coordination that almost inflicted failure on the second airdrop. The USSTRICOM communications package did not arrive in time to contribute and the code word system from other plans only confused the operators.

On the other hand, the use of the C-130 airborne command and control platform greatly assisted local communications. It allowed the operational nets to be monitored and gave the operational commanders sufficient information to make timely and correct critical decisions.

Forward positioning of the force had both positive and negative aspects. It greatly reduced the transit and reaction time for operations once the decision had been made. The force became much more responsive. But the move also aroused interest and almost compromised the entire operation.
Media reporting and responsibility became issues as the movement of forces increased speculation. Governmental agencies in Belgium divulged information to the press on two occasions that could have been disastrous to the hostages. In any event, the Simbas were warned of the potential intervention and made preparations. It is fortunate that they were as disorganized as they were or hundreds more hostages could have been killed.

At the tactical level, long range, heavy lift transport aircraft were essential to the operation. The need for rapid force build up and swift action necessitated a sizable airborne force. U.S. C-130's were able to cover the required distances with the necessary weight, accept combat damage and accomplish the mission.

The airborne assault and airfield seizure were very successful. It is difficult to evaluate the extent that Colonel Laurent's political cautions influenced his conservative plan. It is important to note that he changed the approach on the DRAGON NOIR. During the second operation he quickly moved forces into town in search of hostages. This additional emphasis made the assault much more effective.

Intelligence hampered the tactical operations also. Outdated information as well as a lack of specifics made detailed planning difficult. If specific, up to date, information on the hostage killings had been available to
Colonel Laurent, he may have adjusted his timetable for the assault on Stanleyville.

A clandestine advance party, infiltrated into Stanleyville would have paid large dividends. Little would have been lost once the movement of the force was broadcast. A small force could have located the hostages and given them local security from them Simbas until the paratroops arrived in force. This would have resolved some of the gulf between the mission to secure a large airfield and make a timely rescue operation.

The simultaneous, coordinated attack by the paratroops and mercenaries made up for the size and armament of the paratroops. The surprise attack diverted the Simbas and subsequently forced them to fight in two different directions. This was clearly beyond their capabilities. The arrival of the mercenary column allowed Colonel Laurent to secure the airfield and Colonel Vandewalle's men to establish some manner of order in the town.

The inclusion of an aircraft dedicated to medical aid was critical to the survival of many of the wounded hostages. Timely, intensive medical care overcame some of the shortfalls in the ability of the airborne force to rapidly locate and secure the hostages. Even if the paratroops had entered town earlier, some killing or wounding of the hostages would probably have been unavoidable.
Breaking the assault force into small units once they entered the urban area was essential. The paratroop platoons covered more area, quicker and were able to secure hostages before further deaths occurred. The unit's ability to function in small groups while maintaining their overall objectives greatly speeded the securing of Stanleyville.

The armored jeeps and motorized tricycles gave critical mobility and firepower to the advancing paratroops. The tradeoff in airframes and lift to include this portion of the force was excellent judgment. In both assaults the mobile elements were required to make extended patrols to secure hostages in rural areas. Without these assets many more hostages would have been killed after the assault forces departed.

Thus, the airfield seizure and subsequent airland of reinforcing elements was crucial to the tactical success. Units were given the mission to quickly clear the airstrip to facilitate aircraft landing. Manual labor, as well as vehicles "hot wired" with special kits assisted in moving debris and troops.

The logistics of airborne operations made important impacts in several parts of the operation. Notably, the second and subsequent operations were constrained by a lack of parachutes that had to be airlifted in. Requirements were based on earlier staff plans with no flexibility built in. This limited the follow-on operations to one.
Airfield capacity also became a factor when the assault forces could not be redeployed from Stanleyville in time for the second operation. Staging operations from a limited airfield almost slowed loading to the point that the operation could not be carried out. It was fortunate that one member of the U.S. Air Force element had extensive experience in staging airborne operations. He identified the problem but even with his completely dedicated efforts, the timing was very close.

In the final analysis the evacuation operations were just as important as the actual combat. The paratroop battalion task organized to allocate forces to insure the evacuation went smoothly. Air traffic controllers were included in the assault force. Security of the airfield was maintained and the hostages were given food, water and medical treatment.

Colonel Laurent was able to improve evacuation procedures during DRAGON NOIR based on the earlier experience in Stanleyville. Accounting and processing improved as well as procedures for an organized hasty debriefing to accumulate information on other possible hostages and their location.
THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT, 1975

On 12 May 1975 at approximately 0012 hours, Eastern Standard Time (EST), the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez was fired on and boarded by armed naval forces from Cambodia. The ship had been operating in international waters 60 miles from the Cambodian coast and 8 to 12 miles from the Wai Islands "traversing a standard sealane and trade route".

Unknown to the captain and crew of the Mayaguez, other ships had been illegally detained in the area recently. Cambodia sought to expand its maritime territorial control of the area by intimidation and force. The ship was forced under its own power toward the Cambodian port of Kompong Song and its crew of 40 held captive.

Planning for military options began at the instruction of the President Ford at an initial NSC meeting, 1205 12 May. Military reconnaissance flights had already been dispatched to search for the Mayaguez, reaching the area at approximately 1030 EST. The aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea was ordered about steaming enroute to Australia, while the destroyer-escort USS Holt and the destroyer USS Wilson were also ordered to the area. The 1st Battalion 4th Marines in Subic Bay, Philippines (alerted by Adm. Gayler) and 2nd Battalion 9th Marines, Okinawa (alerted by Gen. Burns) were put on alert. Admiral Gayler, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINC PACOM) was controlling operations as the senior military commander in the theater.
He was acting on instructions from General Jones, acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 13 May while diplomatic efforts were ongoing and the ship about 1 mile of the coast of Koh (Kaoh) Tang Island, A-7 Corsairs (carrier launched attack aircraft) were permitted to engage and sink Cambodian patrol boats prohibiting the Mayaguez from being moved closer to the mainland. Lieutenant General John Burns, USAF, Commander of Seventh Air Force and United States Support Activities Group: Thailand was established as the commander of all operations directly regarding the Mayaguez, subordinate to CINCPACOM. On 14 May the forces necessary for a military rescue were in position. But at the same time the crew of the Mayaguez was being moved by fishing boat to Kompong Som despite air interdiction efforts.

Gen. Burns organized the command and control (C2) of the operation around a forward deployed command post utilizing an EC-130 Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) with Colonel Anders, USAF in charge. It is important to note that the evacuations surrounding the fall of South Vietnam (Saigon) and Cambodia (Phnom Penh) had just been completed. Several of the staff sections and officers in this operation played major roles in that contingency effort. The ABCCC and Col. Anders had filled the same role during the evacuations as they were performing now (as had the CH & HH-53 crews).
Time was considered essential to the NCA/NSC and Gen. Burns and his staff. The forces assembled on 14 May represented an odd collection of the combat elements available locally. A Marine company of only two platoons had just arrived from the Philippines and the remainder of the assault force was comprised of Air Force Base Security personnel.

The only special qualification these forces possessed, was that they were available. The Air Force security forces had only minimal combat training and the Marine contingent was too small. The best thing that could be said was that they were better than no forces at all.

The difficult decision to execute with available forces or wait for more suitable elements to arrive had to be made. While the pros and cons of force build-up were being weighted the diplomatic efforts continued.

Eventually Gen. Burns decided the mission required the additional manpower and combat training of the 2/9 Marines due to arrive midday on 14 May. Because of briefing, planning and rehearsal time the operation was planned for first light on 15 May. CINCPACOM approved this plan.

Unknown to the American planners the ship’s crew had been taken to Koh Rong Som Lem, just outside of Kompong Som harbor. The Cambodian captors, in response to the American attacks and persistent show of force decided to release the
crew the following morning on the same fishing boat which
brought them in. Debriefings of the hostages determined
later that the air activity and attacks on the patrol boats
made a dramatic change in the captors attitude.

After several diplomatic appeals to release the ship
and its crew failed, President Ford, in concert with the
National Security Council (NSC) and in compliance with the
War Powers Act, at 1650 hours 14 May approved the use of
military action. The rescue operation had three
objectives; the rescue of the 40 man crew (still believed to
be on Koh Tang), the recapture of the SS Mayaguez and bombing
Kompong Som to cut off reinforcements.

The strategic objectives were further defined and
amplified by Gen. Burns with operational objectives.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Rescue the Mayaguez crew.</td>
<td>1. Prevent the crew from leaving Koh Tang.</td>
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<td>2. Seize, search, and clear Koh Tang.</td>
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<td>3. Secure and evacuate the crew.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Secure the SS Mayaguez.</td>
<td>1. Prevent the SS Mayaguez from leaving Koh Tang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Seize the SS Mayaguez intact and remove it from contested waters.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Destroy reinforcements attempting to reach Koh Tang.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Conduct air strikes on military targets at Ream and Kompong Som.</td>
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Forces were divided and limited resources allocated
based on these objectives. The 2/9 Marines would serve as
the island landing force, deployed in a heliborne assault in
two waves. The 1/4 Marines would serve as the SS Mayaguez boarding force, lifted by helicopter to the USS Holt and then to conduct a ship to ship assault boarding one hour after the initial 2/9 landing.

Aircraft of the USS Coral Sea would fly four cyclic strikes against targets in Cambodia. B-52s were positioned on stand-by in case the initial show of force failed or in the event that an asymmetrical response was called for.22 Critical assets were the helicopters needed for transport and assault. Only eleven were available, which necessitated cutting the boarding party from six to three helicopters. This was done in order to give the island landing party enough lift to move sufficient combat power in the first wave.23 The size of the -53s also proved a problem. Both the boarding party and landing party had severe difficulties landing the large helicopters on the USS Holt deck and the narrow beach.24

The boarding party assaulted on time, following an aerial CS (tear gas/riot control agent) attack. The boarding was unopposed and the ship quickly searched and declared secure, 62 minutes after the initial boarding. Evidence of recent activity remained but no Cambodians were found.25

The landing operation went far worse. As the eight large helicopters landed, heavy ground fire quickly downed three and caused two others to pull off with severe damage before unloading troops. A well prepared Khmer Rouge
infantry company was dug in and separated the Marines into three groups and pinned them down. Marines were in no position to rescue captives and were fighting for their own survival. Carrier based air cover and the Air Force AC-130H gunship kept the Marines from being overrun on the beach. As the Marines fought to gain a beachhead, the Khmer Rouge government announced that it would release the ship in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. Unclear about the fate of the crew, President Ford delayed the first airstrike against Kompong Som until a reply could be sent. Later the airstrike was allowed to continue, but it was further delayed by the need to refuel. The next two strikes continued as planned, preventing any possible reinforcement of Koh Tang island. The fourth strike was terminated on the recovery of the crew by the USS Wilson from the fishing boat.

As word of the safety of the crew was passed confusion on what to do with the beached Marines reached a peak. A second wave was launched, recalled and finally redirected back to Koh Tang. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Austin, commanding the Marines ashore was not told of the crew rescue and was still worried about placing them in danger with his ground and air fires against the Khmer Rouge defenders. As four of the five helicopters of the second wave landed LTC Austin learned of the rescue and the probability of his forces being evacuated.
Carrier based tactical air support continued to suppress the beach defenses, but now the emphasis was on evacuation of Koh Tang. OV-10 propeller forward air controllers (FACs) finally arrived on station to allow continuous control of the close air support by the same FAC.\textsuperscript{34}

The Marines had made some progress against the determined defenders and the two groups on the west side of the island had linked up. This left the small group from one helicopter holding on the east side. Priority of the evacuation effort went to the east side.\textsuperscript{35}

Col. Anders in the ABCCC continued to orchestrate operations from the aerial platform. He passed immediate control to the newly arrived FAC to coordinate the evacuation effort. With the naval gunfire support of the USS Wilson and the AC-130H gunship the Marines on the East beach were evacuated by helicopter. Approximately two hours and six helicopter lifts later the Marines on the west beach were also successfully evacuated in an orderly withdrawal.\textsuperscript{36}

The crew of the Mayaguez had been returned to the ship which was soon under way by its own power toward Singapore.\textsuperscript{37}

The U.S. had lost a total of 15 dead, 3 missing, and 50 wounded. In addition, 23 other airmen had been killed on 13 May when a CH-53C crashed during the initial repositioning of forces to respond.\textsuperscript{38}
There is little doubt that the military operations to rescue the SS Mayaguez were successful in achieving the strategic objectives outlined by the President. The crew and the ship were secured and the reinforcement of Koh Tang Island was prevented. Was this more a matter of operational design or default? Was it the assault or the show of force that provoked the release of the hostages?

Which particular elements of the military operation contributed to the success and which did not or were counter-productive? Could the captive crew have been rescued by force of arms if they had not been released?

Answering these critical questions brings several issues into the discussion. Organization, command and control, intelligence, weapons systems, technology and force structure made positive and negative contributions which will be addressed individually as they apply to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the response.

At the strategic level, possibly the largest single factor contributing to the ultimate success was the large U.S. show of force immediately following the incident. It centered primarily around air power and air support. This point has two aspects: the overt presence of armed aircraft and engagement of Cambodian naval vessels sent an immediate message, and the movement of aircraft (particularly aircraft carriers & B-52's) signaled a second, more ominous message."
Thus, it is entirely possible that the strategic concern of the safety of the hostages could have been accomplished with only the show of force. These initial actions also jeopardized the safety of the hostages the least.

The political pressure brought to bear by China and other nations on Cambodia is a question which cannot be adequately answered. Presumably it had some effect. The Khmer Rouge government's release of the crew prior to direct operations indicates that the probability or intent of military actions rather than the action itself was significant. Cambodia surely understood the consequences of its actions given the U.S. force build up and displays.

In analyzing the strategic objectives, it is important to note that the crew could probably not have been rescued successfully with the forces available. This is true whether they faced determined captors or just some Khmer Rouge militia holding prisoners.

Intelligence efforts had not properly tracked the crew. Military operations sacrificed surprise and quickly bogged down. The ad hoc nature of the force prohibited sophisticated operations. Regardless of other efforts, had the crew suffered, the mission would have been a strategic failure.

Dulger, in *Americans at War*, argues that the intelligence system did commendable work and that it could
not have been expected to locate the crew given the available assets. The fact still remains that for a successful rescue operation, the target must be pinpointed in detail. Whether the intelligence did an admirable job with available assets or not, it still fell short of the requirement. This only underlines the importance of in-depth networks which do not solely rely on surveillance platforms or tactical reconnaissance.

Rescue or intervention forces must know what they are fighting, how the captors are equipped, and where the captives are located in order to be successful. The information must be accurate, responsive to changes, and it must be timely. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and possibly Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in or around Kompong Som may have alleviated this critical problem.

The large, overt conventional attack on both the SS Mayaguez and Koh Tang Island during daylight sacrificed surprise and probably would have endangered the crew if they were present in either location. It is not difficult to believe that the Cambodians were dug in and well prepared for the Marine assault.

In a contingency situation, the element of strategic surprise is often lost up front. The enemy has acted and the friendly forces are now forced to react. The enemy, in turn, expects the friendly reaction and plans against it from the beginning. This makes tactical surprise that much more
important. Because the enemy knows you will ultimately act, the key is to achieve surprise in where, when and how.

The isolation of the Mayaguez and the attempts to preclude the movement of the crew were wise. Military action was still possible as long as the ship remained outside a major port or urban area.

The lack of strategic resources limited options and forced acceptance of a marginal plan. No specially trained or equipped forces existed to attempt a complex mission of this nature. Even if they had, it is questionable whether they would have been deployable in a reasonable time.

At the operational level, conventional forces did fulfill an important role in isolating the incident and enemy forces. If specially trained forces were available, the conventional force requirement of stopping movement and surveillance would have been essential.

The layered and confusing chain of command made initial coordination difficult and produced redundant instructions. The alert of two separate Marine forces by two different commanders is only one example of confusing action and duplicate instructions.

The ad hoc nature of the force and the requirement for immediate action precluded detailed planning, rehearsals, and sophisticated operations. Two separate Marine forces were used, in conjunction with Air Force aircraft and crews. An operation of this significance and complexity requires
forces which train together on similar missions and are capable of achieving tactical surprise, quick reaction, surgical application of firepower and adaptation to a changing situation.

Experience and prior training made up for large gaps in planning and rehearsals. The fact that major staff elements and the helicopter crews had just completed similar missions eased execution and probably saved lives. This brings out the value of training exercises and contingencies to cover inevitable gaps in expeditious mission planning.

Another element which assisted the short suspense on the operation was the early planning efforts of those directly involved. These early plans served as a basis for later, more elaborate plans and saved time and effort by assembling known information. Thus, even though early planning efforts are almost always superseded, they are important time savers and organizational tools.

The use of the C-130 ABCCC was a significant aid in the coordination and command and control of the operation. It was able to monitor the different radio nets and keep abreast of the changing tactical situation. This was critical as events on the island deteriorated and helicopters were lost. It was unfortunate that the Marine assault force commander did not have an element with the ABCCC, so that when he lost his transportation someone could have controlled the battle.
At the tactical level, long range, heavy lift aircraft were an essential element of the operation. Even maintenance availability severely affected plans and the tactical operations. Tactical surprise and the shipboard landing required specially capable aircraft with specially trained crews.

Carrier air operations and close air support also proved crucial to operations. Both the attack on the Cambodian mainland and the support of the Marines on the beach were critical assets to the overall mission. Without the close air support on the island it is doubtful whether the Marines could have held out long enough to be safely evacuated.

Along with the carrier air support, the Air Force AC-130 gunship provided accurate heavy weapons fire to support operations. The C-130 was able to remain in position for extended periods and because of its target acquisition and sighting systems, deliver extremely accurate supporting fire for the Marines.

In a politically motivated decision, the President seriously disrupted the airstrike on the Cambodian mainland. Without understanding the implications of placing a hold on the strike, a critical decision was made. Although it did not affect the overall outcome and no lives were lost, it had all the possibilities. This is an excellent example of how
improved communications and ill-advised political decisions can have dramatic consequences on an operation.

Marines and aircrews lost valuable sleep trying to coordinate details such as signals, tactics and techniques while simultaneously working out the overall plan. A standing, well-trained force would have been able to use Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and experience to quickly put together a comprehensive plan.

Navy SEALs (Sea, Air, Land Teams) or Marine Force Recon elements were not task organized as part of the force to provide real time tactical intelligence. This type of asset could have been clandestinely inserted to locate the hostages and even provide for some measure of protection during the follow-on landing.

Poor communications with the ground assault forces precluded the Marines from knowing the hostages were safe. In this case the information was probably not critical but in other situations it could have been essential. All elements involved in the operation needed constant communications with the operational headquarters.
OPERATION JUST CAUSE: PANAMA INTERVENTION, 1989-1990

During February and March 1988 growing tension between the Panamanian government of dictator Manual Noriega and the United States caused a dramatic reappraisal of the military situation in the old Canal Zone. Contingency planning began and U.S. in-country forces were reinforced with Military Police and an aviation task force.

In June 1988 XVIII Airborne Corps was designated the Joint Task Force headquarters for contingency planning with U.S. South (USARSO) as a subordinate planning cell. This was a critical decision, as earlier plans centered on in-country forces as the command and control (C2) nucleus reinforced by Continental U.S. (CONUS) forces. Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) believed the USARSO staff was not sufficient in depth or numbers to orchestrate a complex joint contingency operation.

USCINCSO remained in overall command and supervised the various planning conferences. Operations were divided into roughly two categories, combat and post combat or stability operations. XVIII Airborne Corps was responsible for the combat operations and OPLAN BLUE SPOON. The 361st Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade (Reserve), which was allocated to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), was responsible for post combat operations and OPLAN BLIND LOGIC.

These two plans were not deliberately compartmented, but because the units were separate and one a reserve...
component it was difficult to bring all the planners together simultaneously. The SOUTHCOM J-5, supervised the planning of the 361st and BLIND LOGIC. The XVIII Airborne Commander did not receive a detailed brief on the provisions of the plan and its requirements.4

Relations between the governments of Panama and the U.S. continued to deteriorate. Operations NIMROD DANCER and NIMROD SUSTAIN reinforced in-country forces with a brigade task force of mechanized and light infantry. U.S. forces began a program of active freedom of movement exercises, exerting rights guaranteed under the Panama Canal Treaties. Operation BLADE JEWEL evacuated U.S. dependents from the country under an accelerated time table.5

The May 1989 elections and the subsequent October 1989 coup attempt brought several new factors to light. In negating the election results Noriega displayed his determination to stay in power. The severe beatings of the opposition candidates were administered by paramilitary Dignity Battalions organized by Noriega. This previously dismissed element required revaluation.6 Similarly, when the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) demonstrated the ability to deploy forces from outside Panama City quickly in response to the coup a second re-evaluation followed.7

OPLAN BLUE SPOON, renamed OPLAN 90-2 incorporated several changes based on the previous two major events. Forces were increased, including a brigade of the 82nd
Airborne Division, to deal with the re-evaluated threat. The concept of the operation now reflected the need to simultaneously engage 27 objectives, rather than initially controlling Panama City and gradually working outward. This would prevent PDF redeploying forces in response to the intervention.

In December 1989 relations collapsed with a Panamanian declaration of war against the U.S. on the 15th. The following day Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz was shot and killed when the auto he was riding in eluded capture at a PDF roadblock. A U.S. Navy officer and his dependent wife who observed the shooting were detained and severely beaten.

On Sunday 17 December 1989 President Bush ordered the execution of OPLAN 90-2. (The codename was changed from BLUE SPOON to JUST CAUSE.) The XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Stiner was notified immediately but postponed initiating the 18 hour notification sequence until early the following morning. He felt surprise was essential and felt a Sunday alert, following the previous week of field training, and only one week prior to Christmas, given the situation, would tip the hand. All elements in Panama were put on alert.

On 18 December LTG Stiner gave the notification order and an advance party for Joint Task Force South (JTFSO) deployed to Fort Clayton Panama to establish the headquarters and communications. At 1825 hours Panama local time (Romeo)
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) execute order was received. It designated D-Day/H-Hour as 20 December 0100 hours local.\textsuperscript{11}

The joint task force was organized around subordinate task forces and not service component lines. This recognized the preponderance of ground forces and their actions rather than a truly joint operation. Each subordinate task force was responsible for a specific geographical area and mission. The single exception was the Joint Special Operation Task Force (JSOTF) which was responsible for all Special Operations in Panama. However, even the initial stages of the operation, the Special Operations forces were divided into subordinate task forces with distinct missions.\textsuperscript{12}

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<th>TASK FORCE</th>
<th>INITIAL MISSION</th>
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<td>RED...........</td>
<td>Secure the airhead at Torrijos/Tocumen Airport &amp; Secure Rio Hato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACIFIC.......</td>
<td>Secure objectives in and around Panama City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAYONET.......</td>
<td>Secure Ft. Amador, the Commandancia and civil agencies in Panama City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATLANTIC......</td>
<td>Secure Ft. Espinar, Ft. Sherman, Ft. Davis, Madden Dam and the town of Colon/Coco Solo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMPER FI.....</td>
<td>Secure Howard Air Force Base &amp; Bridge of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF.........</td>
<td>Capture Noriega, Secure legitimately elected officials from the negated May elections</td>
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Three potential sources of compromise caused the Commander JTFSO to advance H-Hour by 15 minutes to 0045 20 December. A Cable News Network (CNN) news story televised troop mobilizations from Fort Bragg, North Carolina and questioned the readiness exercise cover story; Cubo sent an encoded burst transmission to Panama as the air transports were picked up on Cuban radar; and a State Department
representative called a senior Canal Commission official with a warning to stay off the streets. 13

All in-country forces were able to react to the change and assaulted their objectives at 0045 hours. Execution times for the Ranger airborne assaults were not changed. 14

Air Force C-130 Airborne Command and Control Centers (ABCCCs) provided communication linkage and assisted in command and control during the air movement and subsequent parachute assaults. 15 Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and XVIII Airborne Corps had tactical command posts (TAC CPs) conducting critical coordination from these aerial platforms until ground forces were firmly established.

At the same time a widespread ice storm was delaying the departure of the 82nd Airborne Division's brigade. Fortunately initial elements were substantial enough to be dropped on time and assist Ranger elements in completing the seizure of Torrijos/Tocumen Airport. 16

Major initial actions included the storming of the Commandancia by a mechanized infantry company team, Ranger elements seizing Torrijos/Tocumen Airport and assaults on several key installations of the PDF. 17 The 82nd Airborne Division's Division Ready Brigade (DRB) began a parachute assault at 0200 to complete the seizure of Torrijos/Tocumen Airport and stage for follow on air assaults. 18
In spite of the potential security leaks tactical surprise was achieved in many locations. The previous exercises and a consistently high tempo of operations diluted many of the normal intelligence indicators for the Panamanians. One notable exception was Battalion 2000, which began moving toward Panama City. A Special Forces contingent deployed as a forward recon element at the Pacora River Bridge successfully engaged a column moving to reinforce Panama City and held the bridge until relieved the following day.

Delays in the arrival and marshaling of the 82nd Airborne elements caused the air assaults against PDF garrisons to be postponed. Originally scheduled to be conducted under the cover of darkness, they were undertaken at first light. Assault forces came under heavy ground fire as helicopters fought their way into landing zones to drop troops. High humidity and temperatures took their toll as troops maneuvered against PDF garrisons, but all initial objectives were taken by dark on D Day.

AC-130 Air Force Special Operations fire support aircraft flew constantly and were partially credited with much of the initial success. Their sophisticated weapons and targeting systems allowed for precise engagement of targets even during darkness. This gave ground forces much needed fire support without endangering nearby civil population and critical infrastructure such as power stations and water supply.
Manual Noriega eluded surveillance and was now at large in Panama. Several key members of his staff found their way to foreign embassies and sought asylum. Finally on D+4, Noriega succeeded in doing the same, entering the Papal Nunciature.²⁴

Assaults into outlying cities to secure PDF garrisons and searches of Panama City for loyal Noriega followers continued for several days. PDF deserters and members of Dignity Battalions looted local businesses and occasionally deployed snipers against U.S. forces. As portions of major cities were secured and PDF garrisons reduced, conventional commanders of the 7th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions found themselves responsible for large scale relief and administrative efforts.²⁵

Infantry units reestablished law and order by erecting checkpoints and moving patrols in residential areas. Key facilities such as power sub-stations and water pumping facilities were closely guarded. Business districts had already been heavily looted, but guards and patrols stopped further losses.

A curfew was enforced to prevent crime and clandestine movement of arms and supplies to the remaining Noriega loyalists. Personnel were checked against lists of known Noriega supporters and detained when identified.

At the same time, Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) units broadcast instructions and warnings over the local
radio and television stations. Information on the objectives of the American intervention and missing persons kept the population up to date on events.

Department of Defense requests for a presidential callup of reserves was turned down. This included the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade (Reserve) which had been singularly responsible for planning the post-hostilities portion of operations. Planners immediately began to work out a volunteer callup to augment assault forces with essential Civil Affairs follow on support. In addition the active duty 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was deployed in total from Fort Bragg to serve as a stopgap until volunteers could be assembled.25

As part of the effort to re-establish legitimate Panamanian government, the legally elected candidates of the May elections had been sworn in by the President of the Panamanian Human Rights Committee just prior to H-Hour.27 In order to preserve secrecy and protect the candidates, the swearing in ceremony took place in the main conference room at Fort Clayton.

Critical Panamanian government facilities were seized and secured by U.S. forces to prevent damage and hasten a return to normal civilian government functions.28 Official records were collected to build a case against Noriega and determine the extent of official corruption.

280
Provisions for displaced persons had been made and a camp, established at the American High School, soon filled to capacity. Refugee problems had been complicated when members of the Dignity Battalions began starting fires around the Commandancia to obscure aerial observation and create confusion. The resulting residential fires consumed the Chorillo district rendering hundreds of families homeless. However despite logistical hurdles the camp functioned well and was cited by the International Red Cross as "one of the best it had ever observed".

Sporadic fighting continued but aggressive search operations and a "money for weapons" program yielded substantial benefits. Local broadcasts by PSYOPs units detailed the "money for weapons" program and gave descriptions and announced rewards for wanted personnel.

Coordination surfaced as one of the most significant problems. Intelligence reporting channels overloaded and unit boundaries occasionally blurred. Several potential targets were searched multiple times by different forces while others waited days for a response.

The PDF was officially disbanded and a new element, the Public Forces of Panama (FPP) was established. Senior officials of the Noriega regime were arrested and detained while an intensive retraining program was instituted for lower ranking soldiers and police. Human rights, ethics and
proper police procedures were stressed. Joint patrolling with U.S. Military Police began on D+4.

On D+14 Manual Noriega surrendered to U.S. forces and was immediately transferred to waiting Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents for extradition to the United States. Local security and stability operations continued as large elements of the 7th Special Forces Group and Civil Affairs reserve volunteers arrived in country. They began to relieve combat troops of occupation, administrative and humanitarian assistance duties.

12 January 1990, D+23 XVIII Airborne Corps redeployed to Fort Bragg and the Joint Task Force was stood down. Command and control of the remaining elements in Panama was turned over to Task Force Panama. Operation JUST CAUSE ended and Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, with the responsibility for long term operations in Panama, commenced. At the same time a new element, U.S. Military Support Group-Panama was created to coordinate and oversee security assistance and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) programs.

* * * * *

At the strategic level the use of overwhelming force with operational and tactical surprise in support of clear objectives met with rapid success. President Bush clearly outlined the four strategic goals of the operation:

2. Ensure the safe operation of the Panama Canal.
3. Support democratic institutions.
Military planners were able to transfer these clear strategic objectives into military objectives.

Interference with the theater Commander in Chief (CINC) was minimal once the initial civilian decision to execute the operation were made. The Joint Chiefs of Staff kept the National Command Authority updated on events and provided a communication link and guidance. Details of conducting operations were left to General Thurman.

The established contingency plan for operations in Panama laid an essential foundation for success. Recent events had necessitated changes which were made in a timely manner and disseminated to all participants. Commander input at senior levels by the units that would ultimately execute the plan was key. The problems encountered in attempting to implement the BLIND LOGIC portion of the plan can be linked directly to the separation of the planning unit from those eventually tasked to execute.

The strategy of incrementally reinforcing forces in Panama allowed the U.S. to increase force levels without sending too strong of a message. Combined with the accelerated dependent withdrawals, the forces available were sufficient to protect U.S. citizens. This simultaneously demonstrated U.S. resolve and prepositioned sufficient forces to overcome opposition.

The decision to reorganize and rebuild Panama's security forces had a large impact on tactical operations.
Units were encouraged to surrender and casualties were minimized. This kept bitter fighting to a low level and encouraged quick resolution. Detainees were treated well and only identified Noriega supporters were imprisoned.

At the operational level integrated joint operations and communications, complementary use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces, centralized intelligence and rapid deployability were key elements.

The use of C-130 ABCCC command and control aircraft facilitated constant control of operations and real time exchange of intelligence. Coupled with the Secure Enroute Communications Packages (SECOMPs) on the C-141s, the airborne assault forces were updated enroute as conditions changed.

A single communications call sign and frequency document allowed elements to rapidly contact other units and make coordination. A common Communications/Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) was essential to an operation depending on rapid joint support of different assault forces.

Based on the nature of the PDF and the threat they presented an integrated assault of mixed forces was designed to make maximum use of limited assets. Special Operations Forces were given critical, sensitive high value targets that complemented the overall operation. Mechanized forces were task organized to augment light forces for attacks on strong positions and for rapid mobility.
The selection of the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters as the Joint Task Force (JTF) had several benefits. It allowed the different service elements to pool their intelligence assets into a single intelligence center. This centralized organization received and disseminated all critical information on the operation. This provided a single focal point for information.

Another benefit was the use of a tactical headquarters, organized for tactical operations augmented with service and regional experts to control the mission. This produced an experienced, well coordinated headquarters on short notice with depth in the specific area. It did not unnecessarily layer the chain of command and allowed for streamlined decision making.

Early realization that follow-on or stability operations would be required was critical to the eventual outcome. Although the Presidential decision to not mobilize reserve units caused some problems, the JTF was at least mentally prepared to improvise and establish law and order.

Media reporting and speculation brings up the point of media responsibility. In compromising the mission, the media broadcast of the airlift from Ft. Bragg could have been responsible for hundreds of American deaths.

Incorporating training exercises and troop deployments into an overall deception plan was critical. In many cases the PDF were completely confused when massive U.S.
forces actually attacked. The delayed responses and confusion provided the time and tactical advantage for success.

At the tactical level, long range, heavy lift aircraft made the airborne assault and subsequent rapid reinforcement possible. Only a massive force could have simultaneously destroyed the 27 objectives necessary to minimize PDF reactions. Without this airlift, the elements of surprise would have surely been lost.

The combination of an airfield seizure and parachute assault was a significant contribution to a rapid force build up. It allowed the quick assembly and staging of forces for follow-on air assaults and provide a secure airstrip for airlanding heavy equipment.

The use of AC-130 gunships compensated for a large mechanized force with heavy fire support. It allowed a rapidly deployable paratroop force to overcome forces equipped with light armored vehicles and substantial defensive positions. The accurate fire control and target acquisition permitted precise engagements, limiting collateral damage and civilian casualties.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) units were invaluable as they persuaded PDF units to surrender and guaranteed safe treatment. They were able to almost simultaneously broadcast information to the population to maintain their safety and tell them what was happening.
Tactical Civil Affairs teams quickly surveyed public utilities and were able to focus efforts to restore minimal public services following the combat operations. They coordinated refugee movements to safe areas and facilitated the introduction of the "money for weapons" program.

Tactical units found it initially difficult to transition to stability operations, but quickly established law and order and began to provide humanitarian relief. Food distribution and medical services were critical services that only the armed forces were organized enough to provide on an interim basis. Civil Affairs teams coordinated these efforts, and were able to link existing governmental agencies to the armed forces to expedite a return to normal operations.

The provision for the refugee camp at Balboa High School saved many lives and contributed to the rapid restoration of law and order. Large numbers of homeless refugees, roaming the streets would have drastically complicated the military operations.

The "money for weapons" program showed impressive responses almost immediately. The program served a dual purpose of infusing some badly needed, short term capital into the economy and at the same time gathering weapons that could potentially outfit an insurgency.
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER 4, PART II

OPERATION MUSKETEER: THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1956


3. Thomas, Suez, 16, 25; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91; Robertson, Crisis, 23 thru 25.


5. Thomas, Suez, 29 thru 31; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91; Robertson, Crisis, 67.

6. Thomas, Suez, 31 thru 33; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91; Robertson, Crisis, 71 thru 74; Carver, War Since 1945, 240.

7. Thomas, Suez, 22; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91; Robertson, Crisis, 11 thru 12; Carver, War Since 1945, 240; Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 10 thru 15.

8. Thomas, Suez, 22; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91; Robertson, Crisis, 146; Carver, War Since 1945, 240; Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, 5 thru 15.

9. Thomas, Suez, 21; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91; Robertson, Crisis, 17 thru 18, 48; Carver, War Since 1945, 240; Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, 4 thru 5.

10. Thomas, Suez, 21 thru 22; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91; Robertson, Crisis, 148, 157 thru 174; Carver, War Since 1945, 240 thru 241; Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, 29 thru 31.

11. Thomas, Suez, 58, 61, 71 thru 74; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91, 92 thru 93; Robertson, Crisis, 161 thru 162; Carver, War Since 1945, 241.


41. Thomas, Suez, 145 thru 146; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91, 98 thru 99; Robertson, Crisis, 276; Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, 184 thru 186.

42. Thomas, Suez, 147 thru 153; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91, 98 thru 99; Robertson, Crisis, 276.

43. Thomas, Suez, 139, 155 thru 170; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91, 92 thru 93, 98 thru 99; Robertson, Crisis, 147; Carver, War Since 1945, 244 thru 245.

44. Thomas, Suez, 139, 155 thru 170; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91, 92 thru 93, 98 thru 99; Robertson, Crisis, 147; Carver, War Since 1945, 244 thru 245.


46. Thomas, Suez, 58, 61, 71 thru 74, 112 thru 115, 139, 155 thru 170; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91, 92 thru 93, 98 thru 99.

47. Thomas, Suez, 58, 61, 71 thru 74, 112 thru 115, 139, 155 thru 170; Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 91, 92 thru 93, 98 thru 99.


49. Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 93, 101 thru 102; Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, 63, 80 thru 81, 110.

50. Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 94 thru 95.


OPERATION DRAGON ROUGE: CONGO INTERVENTION, 1964


2. Reed, 111 Days in Stanleyville, 117 thru 118; Odom, Dragon Operations, 4 thru 5; Ball, The Past, 322.

3. Reed, 111 Days in Stanleyville, 57 thru 58; Odom, Dragon Operations, 4 thru 6.
4. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 117 thru 118;

5. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 59 thru 61; Odom,
*Dragon Operations*, 4, 6 thru 8; Ball, *The Past*, 322.


7. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 9, 53, 57, 60;
Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 4; See also Belgian Congo Peacekeeping Operations.


11. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 59 thru 61;

12. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 59 thru 61;


14. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 4, 59; Odom,
*Dragon Operations*, 8.


17. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 3, 11 thru 12;
Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 10; Ball, *The Past*, 323.

18. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 12 thru 14;

19. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 12 thru 14;
Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 10; Ball, *The Past*, 323.

20. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 12 thru 16;
Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 10; Ball, *The Past*, 323.


44. Reed, *Ill Days in Stanleyville*, 179; Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 41 thru 42.

45. Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 42.


70. Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 75.


84. Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 111.


89. Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 118.


100. Reed, *111 Days in Stanleyville*, 268 thru 269; Odom, *Dragon Operations*, 139 thru 142.


THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT, 1975


32. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 75 thru 78.
33. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 75 thru 78.
35. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 75 thru 78.
37. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 82 thru 83.
40. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 46, 92.


42. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 86, 91 thru 92.


44. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 46 thru 48, 35 thru 78.

45. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 40 thru 41, 44.

46. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 87 thru 90.

**OPERATION JUST CAUSE: PANAMA INTERVENTION, 1989-1990**

1. Author's personal historical summary of Operation Just Cause compiled from Center for Army Lessons Learned and USARSO documents; Frank H. Akers Jr. et al., *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, 3 Vols., Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin (Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 1990), I-4 thru I-5.

2. Author's historical summary; Akers, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, I-4 thru I-5.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Peters, Commander 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Interview by David J. Schroer, 8 March 1990, Fort Bragg, N.C.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Peters, Commander 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Interview by David J. Schroer, 8 March 1990, Fort Bragg, N.C.

5. Author's historical summary; Akers, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, I-4 thru I-5.

6. Author's historical summary; Akers, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, I-4 thru I-5, Key Events Summary.

7. Author's historical summary; Akers, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, I-4 thru I-5, Key Events Summary.

8. Author's historical summary.

9. Author's historical summary; Akers, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, I-4 thru I-5, Key Events Summary.

10. Author's historical summary.

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11. Author's historical summary; Akers, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, I-4 thru I-5, Key Events Summary.

12. Author's historical summary.

13. Author's historical summary.

14. Author's historical summary.


16. Author's historical summary.

17. Author's historical summary; Akers, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, I-4 thru I-16, Key Events Summary.


19. Author's historical summary.


24. Author's historical summary.


26. Lieutenant Colonel Peters, Commander 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Interview by David J. Schroer, 8 March 1990, Fort Bragg, N.C.

27. Author's historical summary.

28. Author's historical summary.


32. Author’s historical summary; Akers, *Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned*, III-5 thru III-6.


34. Author’s historical summary.

35. Author’s historical summary.

36. Author’s historical summary.

37. Author’s historical summary.

CHAPTER 4, PART III

COMBATTING TERRORISM

Combatting terrorism consists of the passive measures of antiterrorism and the active measure of counterterrorism. This study will focus on the active or counterterrorism measures.

The six case studies in this section focus on incidents involving terrorist organizations whose primary methods are focused on terror. This separates the terrorist from the insurgent who may use terror as one of many tactics in his overall arsenal. The incidents cover a range of environments and methods of sponsorship. The Mogadishu hijacking was carried out by a relatively small group while the Iranian Embassy seizure was sponsored directly by the host government.

The case studies involve a range of responses as well. Munich represents very direct confrontation, whereas the Achille Lauro is a post mortem operation. Entebbe is a very large operation while the Flight 847 hijacking permitted no operation at all.
Many of the case studies blur the distinctions between the different levels of war. The incidents are relatively small, but because of their nature they command national attention. In an effort to maintain the consistent application of the analytical framework, some license is taken in this section on assigning factors to the levels of war.

This study examines these case studies to determine whether certain key elements make common contributions to the success or failure of the individual operations.

**THE MUNICH OLYMPICS, 1972**

At 0400 hours, 5 September 1972 eight terrorists broke into the Israeli section of the Olympic Village in Munich, West Germany housing the athletes and coaches. Two Israelis were shot as they resisted and nine others taken hostage. Police were notified by escaping athletes and they sealed off the immediate area and set up a command post. Because the terrorists had entered from two different directions, the escaping athletes only saw one group of four. Thus the police were badly misled into thinking there were only four and then later five terrorists.¹

Newsmen were still able to get within shouting distance of the terrorists. Demands were passed for the release of 234 prisoners held in Israel and 2 Red Army Faction terrorists held in Germany. Unless their demands
were met the terrorists threatening to kill two hostages every half hour. 3

Negotiations continued for 17 hours without any major concessions made. German volunteers were offered as substitutes for hostages but this was refused. Sharpshooters were moved into position with orders to shoot only if the terrorists tried to escape. Crowds continued to gather and film crews freed from covering the suspended games began to cover the hostage crisis. 4

Several calls were made by the terrorists to Palestinian organizations which were not accepted. The negotiators began to feel that the terrorists had been isolated from their support and could become suicidal. 4 As international pressure mounted the West German government felt the terrorists could not be delayed much longer. 5 As a result the West German government planned to move the terrorists to a more vulnerable location and take direct action. 6

The government offered to fly the terrorists out of the country with the hostages. This was accepted and a bus arrived to move the group to a nearby helipad. It was only now that the police realized that there were eight terrorists rather than five. 7 Preparations, including the number of snipers, were all geared to five terrorists. 8 It was too late to change plans and police marksman that had been positioned along the route found no opportunity to engage.
The terrorists and their nine hostages were then transported by two helicopters to Furstenfeldbruk Airport about 15 miles from Munich. The West German government promised a 727 to take the terrorists and hostages to Cairo.

Prior to the arrival of the two helicopters German Police units were positioned around the Airport to assault the terrorists if the opportunity presented itself. Here also only five snipers were positioned to engage eight terrorists.9 Upon arrival the terrorists demanded to be flown to an unannounced destination. The government believed at the hostages would be killed in flight if allowed to have and ordered the snipers to fire when the terrorists became visible.10 The government assumed that if the leaders were killed the remaining terrorists would surrender.11

Thus, as two terrorists returned to the helicopters after checking the waiting aircraft the shoot order was given.12

Finally opening fire they killed only one terrorist initially, wounding the second and a gun battle started that lasted almost an hour. During the shooting all the hostages and a policeman were killed by the terrorists. One helicopter pilot was wounded and one helicopter exploded and burned with hostages on board after a terrorist threw a grenade inside.13

* * * * *

A significant factor at the operational level contributing to the failure was the police strategy of
offensive action against multiple targets with limited assets. Sharpshooters could have been concentrated at the airfield where the highest probability for an engagement existed. The police sacrificed the advantage of their mass and firepower. They reacted to the terrorists rather than maneuvering them toward a well thought out, comprehensive engagement plan.

On the positive side, the police used good judgment in moving the terrorists toward Furstenfeldbruk Airport. The isolated location and low volume of activity allowed the police much more freedom of movement and latitude in actions. This also minimized the possibility of collateral civilian damages or injuries. Any movement by the authorities to press the terrorists toward an environment structured by them takes initiative away from the terrorists.

Two major problems at the tactical level confronted the police when the decision to use force was made. Inadequate intelligence on several critical questions and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the snipers were essential shortfalls.

The first was the intelligence error on the number of terrorists and the failure to provide back up snipers to compensate for more. Although fleeing athletes were debriefed on the number of terrorists, few cross checks were made to confirm this information. Thus, critical actions were planned and executed on the basis of only partial information.
On a larger scale the background of the terrorists and their connections was not completely understood. The lack of information meant that the reaction of the terrorists to the refusal of the Palestinian groups to accept their phone calls could not be adequately gauged. A concern that the terrorists felt isolated and possibly suicidal compounded pressure and the need to act quickly. This may or may not have been an accurate assessment.

Intelligence on the terrorists was badly flawed causing too few sharpshooters to be deployed at the critical place. Decisions were made based on assumptions about the terrorists backing and their stability. Had better, more detailed intelligence been available a comprehensive plan and more informed decisions may have resulted.

The second major problem came to light only later when it was discovered that the policemen had difficulty with a shoot to kill order. Special permission had to be obtained because capital punishment is not legal in West Germany. Complicating this legal aspect, were the vague ROE which dictated when the snipers were actually to engage the terrorists. Sniper coordination and timing were critical, and imprecise orders created additional stress. This had a decided psychological effect on the police sharpshooters and may have contributed to the initial failure to kill the exposed terrorists.
The policemen had not been trained for hostage situations of this complexity, nor was there a command and control unit available with experience in terrorist situations. Thus policemen with little terrorist experience were attempting to negotiate and simultaneously prepare a delicate operation. The lack of a dedicated, well trained force severely limited options.

Although difficult to assess, media coverage must have increased pressure on decision makers. Some argue it was internally or locally generated by the decision makers. This meant the pressure was more perceived than real. This perception may have forced decision makers to feel backed into a corner on their options. Some limitations on media coverage and direct access to the terrorists would have given the authorities more control over the situation.
OPERATION THUNDERBOLT: THE ENTEBBE HOSTAGE RESCUE, 1976

On 27 June 1976 Air France Flight 139 was commandeered by five hijackers of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine shortly after departing a refueling stop in Athens. The aircraft was a French Airbus with 245 passengers and 12 crew enroute from Tel Aviv to Paris. Flight 139 was diverted to Benghazi, Libya for refueling and then on to Entebbe Airport in Uganda.¹

All of the non-Jewish passengers were released in Benghazi. France hesitated to act, possibly fearful of terrorist reprisals at home. Israeli government officials felt they were alone in protecting their citizens against terrorism, and moved toward action.

Almost immediately, Israeli intelligence received a detailed description of the terrorists and the direction of the eventual destination from Scotland Yard, as a result of a pregnant passenger being released in Benghazi.² The broadcasts from Radio Uganda also indicated the terrorists were being supported by the Ugandan President, Idi Amin.³ The picture of a well planned, professional hijacking began to grow.

The terrorists demanded the release of 53 other terrorists from several different countries by 1 July.⁴ Following an offer of negotiation from Israel an extension of three days was granted and a total of 148 passengers were released and allowed to fly to Paris from Uganda. ⁹³
Israel

- International boundary
- District (mehozi) boundary
- National capital
- District (mehozi) center
- Railroad
- Divided highway
- Other road

The 1967 Israeli proclamation that Jerusalem is the national capital is not recognized by the United States Government.

Mediterranean Sea

GAZA STRIP (Israel occupied; status to be determined)

The map shows the geographical boundaries and major cities of Israel, including the Gaza Strip, and indicates the non-recognition of Jerusalem as the capital by the United States Government.
passengers and the crew of 12 remained at the Entebbe Airport. 5

Detailed planning for military options began immediately by the Chiefs of Staff following notification that Flight 139 was missing on 27 June. Initial estimates misconstrued the participation of Adi Amin and the Ugandan government as innocent. Plans centered on a small raid with an evacuation to follow under normal conditions. 6 As it became clearer that the government of Uganda sponsored the hijacking, plans began to focus on a larger, self contained, raid incorporating a complete evacuation. 7

As time went on, more terrorists arrived in Entebbe and support from Idi Amin increased. Security around Entebbe Airport also appeared to increase and the Israelis realized they would have to contend with Ugandan government troops along with the terrorists. 8

On 1 July the general concept of landing C-130 transports on the airfield and storming the tower was agreed upon. The Israeli counterterrorist unit was given responsibility for detailing the ground plan with the Golani Brigade and paratroopers in support. 9 An airborne command post would be used to monitor the overall operation and control the mission while in flight. 10

Intelligence continued to be assimilated. Israeli advisors who had recently left Uganda were called in along with the Israeli Ambassador to Uganda and Idi Admin's
ex-pilot. All had detailed information on the airport and the surrounding buildings. Other information detailing the composition of the terrorists, their actions and the disposition of the hostages also continued to come in.11

The air fleet consisted of 2 Boeing 707s, one command and one medical, four C-130 transports and a fighter cap of F-4 Phantoms.12 The most difficult problem was getting the force to the target. Uganda was eight hours flying time and even with extended fuel tanks none of the aircraft could complete the trip without re-fueling.

Kenya provided the ultimate answer by clandestinely allowing the fleet to land and re-fuel. The command aircraft refueled enroute while the assault aircraft planned to refuel either in Uganda or in Kenya. On the return leg the assault force were even allowed to place the seriously wounded in local hospitals during the refueling stop.13

A second option for re-fueling at Entebbe Airport was kept open and a specially manufactured pump was brought along in the event it was needed. Due to the concern for the safety of the aircraft, gunfire, exploding MIGs, and separate runways, the Nairobi, Kenya option was used.14

The operation was organized with an overall commander, Major General Yekutiel Adam and the air movement commander Major General Benny Peled in the airborne command center. The overall ground force commander, Brigadier General Dan Sromon was with the troops on the ground. The
ground forces included elements of the Golani Brigade and paratroopers holding the airfield and protecting the C-130s. They were broken into two groups called the Securing Force and the Assault Force."

On the morning of 2 July the order, outlining the plan, was issued to the counterterrorist force by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jonathan 'Yoni' Netanyahu, the assault force commander. Practices began immediately afterward. The assault force consisted of:

1. The terminal assault force.
2. The close cover force.
3. The peripheral protection force of four armored personnel carriers (APCs).

The terminal assault force and close cover force of 34 men rode to the terminal building in two Land Rovers and a Mercedes sedan appearing as a Ugandan military column.

During the next two days detailed rehearsals were conducted, working out details and verifying the plan. A final combined rehearsal was conducted with all participants on a full scale mock-up of the Entebbe Airport in southern Israel.

The air fleet departed shortly after 3 PM, 3 July. They flew instruments and radar for the next eight hours to arrive on schedule in the precise location, just off the end of the runway at Entebbe Airport. Strategic and tactical surprise had been achieved and the runway remained lit. The four aircraft were staggered at half-mile intervals and landed on separate runways in pairs. They stopped well away
from the terminals and unloaded the Assault and Securing Forces. 10

The Assault Force immediately deployed to the Tower/Old Terminal complex to secure the hostages. Two guards were engaged and killed enroute with silenced pistols.20 Once again the assault force achieved surprise and found the terrorists caught unaware. During the shooting that followed four terrorists were killed and three captured. Five soldiers and four civilians were also casualties.21

A C-130 was called to taxi up to the old terminal and the hostages were immediately loaded.22 Medical teams attended to the wounded and all the hostages were accounted for. One hostage had been taken to a local hospital several days prior and would never be seen again.23

The Securing Force lit torches to light the runway and proceeded to secure the airfield. A Ugandan force of approximately 20 soldiers was engaged and stopped trying to approach the airport. Several Soviet built MIGs were also destroyed along with the radar and control tower.24

Fifty-three minutes after the first C-130 touched down the hostages were taking off enroute to Nairobi to re-fuel and return to Israel.25 All of the Israeli wounded and equipment were re-loaded, except for the special fuel pump which was left behind. The last C-130 took off with the assault force 99 minutes after landing.26 The only soldier killed at Entebbe was the assault force commander, LTC
Netanyahu by a shot fired by a Ugandan soldier from the control tower during the terminal building assault.

* * * * *

Several key elements contributed to the overall success of the Entebbe rescue. At the strategic level clear guidance was issued about the importance of the safety of the hostages at whatever cost. Clear Rules of Engagement (ROE) determined how potential targets would be engaged. They were rehearsed by all members of the assault force until they became second nature. This demonstrates the close linkage between a strategic objective and the corresponding tactical requirement.

Difficult political permission was arranged to allow the force landing and refueling options outside of Entebbe. These basing/staging rights were critical to flexibility on the objective. If the C-130's had been forced to refuel at Entebbe, an aircraft may have been damaged or greater numbers of casualties resulted. Time necessary to refuel would have increased the likelihood of encountering more reinforcements.

The strategic use of negotiation to enhance the operational capabilities of the plan were important. Related to the dual strategy of "fight & talk", the negotiations bought precious time for the tactical operations.

At the operational level, military planners quickly established a task force, commanded by the most qualified service person available. Portions of the overall plan were
divided and principle actors given planning responsibility. Most importantly, the planners were the operators. Those who would have to do it, got the opportunity to determine how it would be done. Regular in-progress briefings were established to insure all members of the task force were in concert.

Planning commenced early and was continually updated as new intelligence became available. Decision makers were presented with a basic plan to work with and then adjusted as new information became available. This is much preferable to waiting until the majority of the information is available to begin planning.

Long range, heavy lift, low level infiltration aircraft outfitted with precision navigation electronics were key to the entire operation. Few other countries would have allowed landing rights, and security problems would have been compounded had the C-130s not been as capable. Strategic worldwide mobility is an important factor. Although the number of aircraft is much more limited than that required for conventional conflict, it is complicated by the technology and special equipment required for clandestine operations. This is further compounded by the need for highly trained, qualified crews to conduct the operations.

Both operational and tactical surprise were essential. The tactic of landing on the objective followed by a swift, determined assault was extremely successful. The
terrorists and Ugandans were capable and willing to kill the hostages. But surprise at all levels prevented reaction by the terrorists. Intelligence, long range aircraft and a well executed, fast moving plan all contributed to the ultimate success of this operation.

Detailed intelligence of all aspects of the operation was clearly critical. Intimate knowledge of the Entebbe Airport, the Ugandan military, the hostages situation and the terrorists made detailed planning and rehearsals possible. Had the force not known where the hostages were being held on the airfield, a search could have cost precious minutes and the element of surprise, costing hostage lives in the end.

All possible sources were queried in order to produce intelligence. Anyone connected with the operation was debriefed and the information collated, assessed and forwarded rapidly for use by the assault forces. Thus the collection effort and the integration of information made major contributions.

The detail and speed necessary are a degree beyond that essential for conventional operations. Information on dimensions and construction of buildings and political background of personnel are decidedly different than battlefield requirements. Many of the requirements can only be provided by HUMINT type sources rather than other collection means.
Well trained and rehearsed ground assault forces secured the area before the terrorists could turn on the hostages. The specially trained counterterror forces were reinforced with other more conventional elite forces for additional security. Conducting several partial and full scale rehearsals, even in the compressed time available made the distinct units operate smoothly together.

Unity of ground command and planning was vested in a single headquarters who would also be responsible to execute the plan. Command and control relationships were clearly outlined so that each element understood its responsibility and limits of decision making authority. This allowed important details, like the addition of the Mercedes, to be quickly evaluated and incorporated into the plan. It also allowed for quick decisions to be made on the ground, during the operation without confusion.

Specially tailored communications kept the entire chain of command informed on the progress of the operation. Actions of the different elements were coordinated by eavesdropping and issuing instructions at pre-arranged decision points. This helped smooth the flow of the operation and allow individual elements to concentrate on the immediate situation. The airborne command and control platform was able to monitor all communications and make appropriate adjustments without lengthy reports or inquiries.
The mix of forces complemented the abilities of each, reducing redundancy and allowing maximum participation. The conventional infantry forces secured the airstrip while the specially trained assault force attacked the tower. The armored personnel carriers provided the necessary protection and firepower to repel reinforcements. Even in a very specialized operation a mix of forces was needed to meet the anticipated threat.

Finally, adequate and immediately available medical treatment saved the lives of many of the injured hostages. Although requiring additional aircraft space and lift this also demonstrates the direct impact of a strategic requirement on the tactical plan and execution.
OPERATION MAGIC FIRE: THE LUFTHANSA-MOGADISHU HIJACKING, 1977

On 13 October 1977 at 1130 hours, Lufthansa Flight 181, a Boeing 737 enroute from Majorca to Frankfurt, was hijacked by four Palestinian terrorists. The terrorist had smuggled 2 9mm pistols, six home made hand grenades, and 60 pounds of plastic explosive through the Spanish customs. The aircraft was carrying 86 passengers and crew.¹

The aircraft was immediately diverted to Rome and then to Larnaca, Cyprus. The terrorists demanded the release of ten Red Army Faction terrorists held in West German jails, two terrorists held in Turkey and 15 million dollars.²

Counterterrorist option planning began with the alert of the Grenschutzgruppe-9 (Border Protection Unit 9: GSG-9) by the German Interior Minister shortly after the government was aware of the hijacking. The GSG-9 is a branch of the German Border Patrol, subordinate to the Ministry of Interior.³ The unit was specifically created in the aftermath of the Munich Olympics in 1972.⁴ It is by design not part of the Ministry of Defense in order to be able to conduct paramilitary operations within the country.

28 GSG-9 men and 30 medical and communications specialists on a Boeing 727, pursued the hijacked 737. They followed the aircraft to Larnaca but were denied permission to attempt a rescue by the Cypriot government.⁵

During the next four days Flight 181 was directed by the terrorists to Bahrain, Dubai, South Yemen and finally
Mogadishu, Somilia. While in Aden, South Yemen the terrorist leader killed the captain of Flight 181, demanding that West Germany had 40 minutes to fulfill their demands. This ended all doubts about whether armed intervention should be used.

In an effort to buy time the West German government stated that it conceded to terrorist demands and agreed to fly 11 jailed terrorists to Mogadishu. President Said Barre of Somilia had agreed to several other governmental appeals, carrying heavy diplomatic pressure, to allow a rescue attempt. The terrorists agreed to a seven hour delay while Flight 181 and the jailed terrorists were flown to Mogadishu.

As the GSG-9 force was enroute from Crete, where it had been holding, an Israeli television employee monitored several transmissions made in the clear from the GSG-9 aircraft back to Germany. Knowing he had a news "scoop" the employee returned to the station with transcripts of the messages. At 2100 hours, 17 October, Israeli television, in a questionable act, televised news of the impending raid and released the information to the wire services. By special request of the German government, no further broadcasts were made. Fortunately, the terrorists were not informed and Arab protests to Somilia were not immediate enough to end the raid.

At 0200 hours, 18 October the GSG-9 force landed, unobserved by the terrorists, at Mogadishu. The assault
force deployed immediately, surrounding the aircraft, pinpointing the location of the terrorists and preparing the starboard doors for demolition. A pre-arranged radio message outlining complications was sent to Flight 181, causing the terrorists to gather in the cockpit to discuss the changes.

Using special spike microphones the assault force confirmed the location of the terrorists in the cockpit and at 0207 hours stormed the aircraft by blowing open the fuselage doors and emergency exits. Flash-Bang stun grenades were used to blind the terrorists for six seconds while the GSG-9 force closed on the cockpit and killed three of the terrorists and wounded the fourth. None of the passengers or crew were seriously hurt.

When the jailed terrorists in West Germany learned of the failure of the hijacking three principle members of the Red Army Faction committed suicide. (A fourth attempted but failed.) This is largely regarded as the end of the Red Army Faction as a viable terrorist organization.

In response to the hijacking and specifically the murder of the captain, the International Federation of Airline Pilots threatened a 48 hour worldwide strike unless the United Nations took immediate action. The UN produced a resolution, approved by the vast majority of the General Assembly, condemning hijackings and hostage taking as a means to gain release of political prisoners. Several nations who had openly supported terrorists earlier voted for the
resolution when faced with being cut off from international air transport.\textsuperscript{15}

\* \* \* \* \*

Several factors contributed to the success of this delicate operation. Operational and tactical surprise along with split second timing and a plan executed by a highly trained force available on a moments notice were significant. The overriding concern for the safety of the hostages makes tactical surprise an essential element. Operational surprise is also clearly desirable. The fact that the assault force was capable of getting on the aircraft, placing charges, forcing an entry and killing the terrorists before they could massacre the captives is exceptional.

At the strategic level, the concept of the state's sovereignty in actions on its territory is important. Cyprus denied the counterterrorist force the option of using force on the island. In the same respect, political pressure had to be brought to bear against President Barre to allow the operation within Somilia. Cyprus used its sovereignty to prevent the operation; Somalia's sovereignty was permissively violated to conduct the operation.

Negotiation was used as a tool to move the initiative away from the terrorists and gain time for a successful operation to be mounted. This is an important adjunct to the idea of force in structuring the operational area for the counterterrorist unit.
The availability and level of training of the GSG-9 are significant factors. The assault force was well trained in advance and ready when called upon to react with minimum notice. This allowed for immediate deployment and broadened the scope of options available to the government. Their capability to execute the split second timing necessary to make the plan work speaks well of dedicated counterterrorist forces. Also the ability to correctly use the munitions and force an entry of an aircraft without significant harm to the passengers was essential.

Strategic mobility to allow the force to shadow the terrorists and be reasonably available was important. Although the force was limited in size, the requirements for aircraft capable of landing under black out conditions and having long ranges is essential.

Sophisticated communications equipment allowed the assault force to pinpoint the terrorists and determine their exact number prior to forcing their entry. This, coupled with the anticipated need to concentrate the terrorists in the cockpit and the deception of a false radio message, significantly enhanced the chances of success.

However, it must be noted on the negative side that in spite of the sophisticated communications equipment the assault force used, the long range operational level communications link almost compromised the entire operation. Had the wire services inadvertently used or broadcast the
information on the ongoing mission it could have had tragic results. Fortunately the only broadcast was on Israeli television and not directly available to the terrorists.

As an aside, the intercepted message and the subsequent broadcast of its contents brings up the question of media involvement and responsibility in sensitive operations dealing with hostages and violent terrorists. Government control and security is one facet however media responsibility is also an issue. Regardless of security measures, an alert reporter may piece together critical details of an upcoming operation. Thus media responsibility and cooperation become important aspects of operations.

Surprise and security at all levels is critical to missions involving hostage rescues. The advantage of seconds is critical to saving hostage lives and killing terrorists after a forced entry or assault.

This is an excellent example of how detailed plans and well supported tactics could be easily negated by some peripheral aspect (such as a situation report back to headquarters) of the operation with dramatic consequences. On the other hand, the counterterrorist force used all available methods, i.e. stealth, deception, communications, advanced munitions, to increase their chances of success.

In closing it is also important to note that the Airline Pilots Association accomplished a substantial shift in international positions on supporting terrorists without
any military force. The economic sanctions, threaten by the boycott, achieved their purpose and served as a deterrent to overt, state sponsored terrorism.
OPERATION EAGLE CLAW: IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION, 1980

On 14 February 1979 a mob of Iranian revolutionaries broke into the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran in search of fleeing SAVAK (Iranian Secret Police) Officers. One Iranian employee was killed, two Marine guards wounded and seventy Americans held hostage. The revolutionaries demanded the U.S. return the Shah of Iran, from exile, in exchange for the safety of the captives. During the interim, the Iranian government was finally able to quell the rioters and arrange for them to leave the compound. Despite this warning of the growing danger, the U.S. maintained the embassy staff in Tehran.

On 4 November 1979 militant students stormed the American Embassy in Tehran again in support of the Iranian revolution. 66 Americans were taken hostage and held inside the compound. No immediate demands were made and the new revolutionary government made no attempt to stop the students or release the captives. Less than two weeks later thirteen hostages were released, the remaining 53 kept inside the embassy compound.

U.S. military planning began immediately for a rescue operation. Because initially time was thought critical and any strike presumed to have to originate from sea, a group of Marine pilots were selected and began training for long range infiltration. The U.S. Army counterterrorist force Special
Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D) was put on alert and given an initial intelligence briefing. Over time a complex plan involving all four services and extending over two days in-country emerged. Two Army assault forces were needed to secure the embassy compound and the downtown foreign ministry, where other American hostages were held. An Army Ranger force was needed to secure the extraction airfield. Long range Air Force aircraft were necessary for insertion and extraction and Navy/Marine helicopters for work in and around Tehran. Finally two Navy aircraft carriers were necessary to launch the helicopters and provide air cover for the operation.

As the crisis dragged on, refinements were made in the plan and rehearsals conducted. A clandestine advance party was established in Tehran to provide ground transport and real time intelligence for the assault force. An on-site recon of the desert landing and refueling site, Desert One, was made and a landing light system installed. Basing and staging rights were arranged with Egypt and Oman.

On 24 April 1980 the forces had been positioned and the decision had been made. The Rangers, Delta Force and Special Forces were in Egypt while the eight helicopters began their 600 mile formation flight from the Arabian Sea. The assault and security forces were flown on C-141 transports to Masirah Island off Oman to link up with waiting C-130s to fly on to Desert One.
Meanwhile the helicopters began to encounter problems. The first of two huge clouds of suspended dust forced them to fly totally on instruments and raised internal aircraft temperatures to 96 Degrees. Then #6 helicopter had a rotor blade malfunction indicator and was forced to land to check on it. As the crew confirmed the loss of nitrogen from the rotor blade, #8 helicopter landed and evacuated the crew. All sensitive items and documents had been removed but the crew did not destroy the helicopter in order not to draw attention to the mission.¹¹

The C-130 transports and fuel tankers flew on to Desert One and arrived on time despite the same weather conditions. The hidden beacon lights worked correctly and all aircraft were on the ground awaiting the helicopters.¹²

As the formation continued through the second dust cloud #5 helicopter lost its internal navigation system. The formation was now fragmented and in the dust cloud unable to see each other. #5 struggled on for a time but unsure of its position and approaching a 9000 foot ridge without knowing exactly where aborted back to the USS Nimitz.¹³ This brought the available helicopters to six, the minimum number all commanders agreed was necessary for success.¹⁴

At Desert One security elements were forced to engage and blow up a fuel truck along a road adjacent to the landing area. A bus with 40 Iranians was also forcibly stopped and its passengers now being held.¹⁵ These were relatively minor
problems and could have been overcome had later events turned out better. More than an hour and a half late, the remaining six helicopters arrived at Desert One.16

As they were refueling word was passed to Colonel Beckwith, the assault force commander, that another helicopter had broken down. Investigating, he found that #2 helicopter had lost its backup hydraulic system and could not safely proceed.17 A hasty meeting of the key leaders confirmed the previously agreed upon decision to abort with less than six helicopters.18

Instructions were relayed to abort and reload the transports. As #3 helicopter repositioned to refuel, in the tremendous dust that all the running engines caused, it collided with the Air Force C-130 tanker. An immediate explosion and fire engulfed the two aircraft.19

The abort instructions were quickly changed to evacuation instructions. Men were quickly loaded onto transports and the helicopters abandoned, some with critical sensitive equipment still on board. The commanders had planned a carrier based airstrike to destroy all remaining equipment.20

Eight personnel had been killed, five wounded and the mission clearly compromised. President Carter canceled the planned airstrike over concern for the bus passengers left in the area.21
After 444 days of captivity the hostages were finally released following a negotiated settlement.²²

* * * * *

At the strategic level the operation had a single focus: the safe evacuation of the hostages. However the President did complicate an already difficult plan with prohibitions against killing Iranians unless absolutely necessary.²³ This prohibition was designed to minimize international backlash by holding Iranian casualties to the minimum. This constrained operations and brings up the question of how much latitude is proper and/or acceptable in conducting military operations.

International political agreements that provided basing and staging rights were clearly essential. Logistics and infiltration requirements would have been insurmountable without the assistance of Egypt and Oman. Before the operation commenced, several strategic non-military conditions had to be established to structure the operation for success.

At the operational and tactical levels several elements contributed to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. It is difficult to separate these two levels because of the central focus of the operation and because the President canceled the preplanned accompanying airstrike.²⁴ Therefore all the actions directly surrounded and supported the actual rescue itself.

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Time was initially considered an essential element with a rapid operation planned. This would have capitalized on the poor organization of the revolutionaries and kept the issue more visible. On the other hand, it is clear that infiltration forces were not available and trained to an acceptable standard to conduct the operation immediately. Long range, clandestine infiltration became a major stumbling block of the entire operation.

The proximate cause of the failure was clearly the maintenance problems of the three helicopters. The Holloway Report, commissioned by the JCS to investigate the operation, criticizes the aircraft and aviator selection and training also. It is unfortunate that the Special Operations HH-53s were only just rolling off the assembly line and that they would not fit on a carrier elevator. Regardless the importance of a reliable long-range infiltration aircraft was critical.

Pilot and crew training shortcomings can be argued from the standpoint that it was clearly an ad hoc organization. Little or no special operations training, excepting the Army Delta element and the Air Force C-130 crews, made training and rehearsal time much more critical and basic. Although there were no pilot/crew failures (other than the final crash, which is difficult to argue) several changes during training resulted as incapable crew members were replaced. This caused turbulence and consumed valuable training time.
At the operational level the Holloway Report was critical of the Joint Task Force (JTF) organization. An overriding concern in almost all decisions was Operational Security (OPSEC). This drove the organization of the task force, intelligence operations, training, personnel selections and most importantly operations. The comment on the headquarters organization is overly critical but the remainder of the OPSEC considerations are valid.

The intelligence organization was compartmentalized under JTF Intelligence Officer (J-2). Rather than establishing an intelligence task force (ITF) under the supervision of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) the JTF J-2 had only liaison officers to various agencies as information conduits. This slowed and obscured many intelligence requests. Although there were no outright intelligence failures it is clear that better organization would have assisted the operation.

On the positive side the insertion of a clandestine element to provide ground transport and real time intelligence was an outstanding success. Major Meadows and his cell accomplished all aspects of their mission and were a vital asset.

The OPSEC aspects of the training and personnel selections were often the primary concern. The requirement for tight security cannot be argued but when it takes precedence over selecting the best person or conducting a
full rehearsal it becomes counterproductive. Had specially trained and earmarked forces been available much of this problem could have been eliminated.

During operations the OPSEC problem became most pronounced. Pilots were prohibited from talking to weather forecasters and C-130 pilots were not aware of the role of the helicopters. This is cited as a primary contributing cause for the helicopter pilots not being warned of the ominous dust clouds. Added to this was the prohibition of radio transmissions which kept critical decision from not only commanders but also from other actors.

The plan was clearly complex and required the precise coordination of many unrelated and previously untrained elements. No headquarters capable of planning or executing joint special operations on a standing basis existed. Personnel with little special operations background were placed in key positions.

However planning was started early and provisions for changes dictated by new intelligence were accepted. The ground force was by and large responsible for planning and executing its portion of the operation. This combined an intimate knowledge of the plan with flexibility by the key operators.

Detailed Rules of Engagement (ROE) were established which enable a swift and correct response to the intervention by the civilian bus into the operation. The well thought out
ROE prevented unexpected occurrences from becoming detrimental to the operation and minimized unnecessary casualties.

Personnel and forces were selected not because of their experience but because of existing ties to segments or details of the plan. The helicopter pilots are probably the best example of this. Rather than selecting trained Air Force Special Operations crews and transitioning them to the RH-53, Marine pilots were selected because of their knowledge of carrier operations and the RH-53.
On 14 June 1985 TWA Flight 847 was hijacked shortly after leaving Athens by two terrorists of the Islamic Jihad armed with 9mm machine pistols and hand grenades. The aircraft had been enroute from Cairo to Rome and was carrying 153 passengers and crew. The terrorists demanded the release of over 600 Shi’ite Muslims captured during the invasion of southern Lebanon and held in Israel at the Atlit Prison Camp.

The aircraft was diverted first to Beirut and upon landing 17 women and two children were released. The terrorists reiterated their demands and forced the aircraft on to Algiers. Once again upon landing, 18 women, a child and two Arab men were released. The plane was then refueled and forced to return to Beirut.

Flight 847 returned to Beirut and shortly after landing an American Navy diver, Robert Stethem, was beaten, shot and his body thrown onto the runway. This action was followed by repeated demands and threats to kill the remaining Americans.

The Amal faction of the Shi’ites in Beirut took charge of the passengers moving them out of the airport. The passengers were split into small groups of two or three and quartered in various safe houses throughout the area around Beirut. The Hiabollah faction retained control of the aircraft and the captain, copilot and navigator. The crew
remained on-board the aircraft using the auxiliary power unit to run the electrical and air conditioning systems.  

Separation of the passengers and distribution throughout a hostile and uncontrolled city made military action virtually impossible. Safety of the hostages remained paramount and that could not be guaranteed with the little information available on their location and the strength of their captors. This was compounded by the two different groups, Hisbollah and Amal acting together in the control of the hostages.  

During the next 17 days negotiations by U.S. diplomats and UN officials were conducted. The terrorists held 39 passengers and crew hostage. On 30 June 1985 in response to a bargain with the Israelis the remaining hostages were released unharmed to the Red Cross and transported to Damascus, Syria. Two months later a TWA crew was allowed into Beirut to reclaim the aircraft and fly it out to safety.  

The hostages had been treated well overall and none were injured. The tremendous media attention throughout the length of the hijacking did much to publicize the Lebanese Shi’ite cause. This was certainly a consideration in the final outcome.  

* * * * *  

Critical to the analysis of this terrorist incident is the question of why the military option was not used. The
The key element was the dispersal of the hostages into the Beirut area. The terrorists maintained the initiative allowing them to take events beyond the capabilities of symmetrical military intervention. An asymmetrical response, not directly linked to the hostage situation was not considered. A secondary concern was the permission to act inside another sovereign country.

The single act of dispersing the hostages created several difficulties which would have to be overcome to mount a successful rescue operation. The hostages were broken up into small groups of two to four and dispersed throughout the Beirut area. It would have taken a massive intelligence effort merely to locate the hostages. In some instances the hostages were moved regularly to avoid any possible pinpointing.

The control of the hostages by a loose organization such as the Amal faction actually worked in the terrorists favor. The chain of command and its base areas were not well known and its support by the population was widespread. An in place Human Intelligence (HUMINT) net was probably the only way of locating all of the hostages.

As with insurgent organizations, the underground support network was critical to the successful operation of the terrorists in this instance. By having a popular base of support in the local population it was impossible to isolate likely hostage locations in order to plan operations. In
this way the support structure provided excellent security for the terrorists.

Once located, any action to rescue the hostages would have to be coordinated and timed to strike all the locations simultaneously to prevent slaughter of the captives. In addition to being difficult it would have required a large assault force to cover all of the hostage sites. The difficulties presented continue to expand from this point. For instance, the large force requires coordinated transportation to all the locations prior to the assault. Meeting these requirements and preserving security in a distant country racked with civil war were not attractive options.

Several points are clear from this incident. The terrorists should not be allowed to maintain the initiative. Beirut tried to turn the plane away but relented when the captain informed the tower he was declaring a fuel emergency. Proactive actions should have been undertaken before circumstances reached a critical point. Once the terrorists were in an area from which they could draw support, the problems of a rescue magnified to the point of impossibility.

This speaks for structuring the terrorists into a plan of the governments choice early, before events severely limit options. Well trained, instantly alert counterterror forces are required for this type of strategy, as well as support from other nations to allow staging and actual operations.

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Media attention also played a major role in the final outcome of the terrorist incident. Interviews with the hostages were conducted and became significant world news events. The terrorists were able to publicize their plight and gain a measure of world sympathy for the cause. The reasonable treatment of the hostages reinforced this favorable image, as did individual hostage testimonies.

It is almost impossible to control world media on this scale. Therefore it is more important to attempt to assess the impact media is having on the incident and predict the reactions. Using these predictions can open options for strategic planners and evaluate more clearly available alternatives against the threat to the hostages and desired outcome.

In this way negotiations can use media to meet potential terrorist objectives and gain the release of hostages if a threat to their safety is not high. Media coverage can be shaped to portray certain aspects without the countries involved appearing to accede to terrorist demands.
THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING, 1985

On 7 October 1985 the Italian owned cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked by four terrorists of the Palestine Liberation Front shortly after leaving Alexandria. The ship was not the intended target of the terrorists. They had planned a suicide raid on the Israeli port of Ashdod, a port of call of the ship, and were apparently discovered cleaning their weapons. After taking over the ship, the terrorists demanded the release of 50 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The ship, carrying 123 passengers and a crew of 315, was diverted toward Tartus, Syria while negotiations were ongoing. When the hijackers demands were not met on 8 October Leon Klinghoffer, an American confined to a wheelchair, was shot through the head and his body thrown overboard. The hijackers were denied permission to dock in Tartus and forced the ship to return to Port Said, Egypt.

The hijackers were convinced to surrender to Abu Abbas, a senior Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official, who was later credited with planning and organizing the operation. The Government of Egypt on 10 October, despite vehement U.S. protests, allowed the four terrorists, Abu Abbas and his aide to depart Cairo on an EgyptAir flight to Tunisia. But U.S. intelligence inside Egypt pinpointed the location of Abbas and the flight he would be on. Egyptian authorities, when questioned, stated he had already left the country.
Planning for a military interception by the U.S. had commenced as soon as the terrorists were released in Egypt. A Chicago ham radio operator intercepted a conversation between President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger flying on separate aircraft with incompatible communications security equipment. The President was emphatic that the aircraft be intercepted and landed on "friendly territory".

Four U.S. F-14 fighters, launched from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Saratoga intercepted the EgyptAir flight south of the Island of Crete. After the airliner was refused permission to land at both Tunis and Athens, the pilot was directed to follow the U.S. fighter escort to Sigonella, Sicily.

On the ground, the plane was simultaneously surrounded by U.S. counter-terrorists and Italian carabinieri. The Italian police refused to allow the U.S. Forces to take the terrorists into custody provoking another round of U.S. protests. The four terrorists were charged by the Italians with murder, kidnapping and hijacking. The Italians also denied requests to extradite the terrorists for prosecution in the U.S.

Abu Abbas and his aide were released and allowed to fly to Rome on the EgyptAir 737 and then on to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Once again the U.S. protested loudly and asked
that the Italian Government retain the two until evidence of their participation in the hijacking could be presented."11 The Italian Minister of Defense resigned in protest of the lack of support to the U.S. by Italy. His action precipitated the collapse of Prime Minister Craxi's coalition government.12

Diplomatic relations with Egypt and Italy were strained to the breaking point and world opinion was mixed between extremes, calling the interception "serving justice" and alternatively "air piracy".13 The four terrorists were eventually tried in Italy and given varying sentences.14

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The Achille Lauro serves an example of an operation not constrained by the strategic concerns of hostage safety. At the strategic level, international agreements broke down and terrorists were allowed to go free after committing murder. As a final recourse the U.S. conducted unilateral action in international airspace to recover the terrorists before they reached a friendly country.

Sovereignty was a critical issue while the terrorists remained in Egypt. Outside elements were precluded from taking action on Egyptian soil without permission. Thus, despite public statements of concern by the Egyptian government, privately they succeeded in sheltering the terrorists.
Later in Italy, sovereignty also became a pointed issue when the Italian authorities insisted on taking custody of the terrorists. U.S. bases are still sovereign host nation territory, which left U.S. forces little choice.

International political pressure was successfully applied to deny the airliner permission to land at both Tunis and Athens. Israel had also made prior arrangements to take action in the event U.S. operations failed.

Intelligence played a vital role at the operational level. Without knowledge of the location and flight plans of the terrorists the mission could not have been conducted. Intelligence also indicated Abu Abbas had masterminded the operation and may have even provided proof of this fact.

Detailed planning ensured the link between the escort aircraft and the airliner took place. Adequate coverage of the area as well as coordinated inflight refueling made the intercept possible. The U.S. gained the initiative and maneuvered the terrorists into the position where U.S. authorities could take action.

At the tactical level, the use of strict Rules of Engagement (ROE) and skilled, disciplined troops prevented a tense situation in Sigonella from turning into a violent exchange. An unwise move at Sigonella would have turned an otherwise successful mission into an international tragedy.
In a larger sense, the incident had profound consequences. Italy’s failure to cooperate fully with the U.S. led directly to the government losing popular support. Diplomatic relations were stretched between the U.S. and both Egypt and Italy. On the other hand, the U.S. sent a clear message: responses may not always be made only while hostages are directly at risk. Although not a truly asymmetrical response in the same terms of the Libya raid, it used an indirect approach to take action. This also sent a message to the sponsors of terrorism in the world.
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER 4, PART III

MUNICH OLYMPICS


OPERATION THUNDERBOLT


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23. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, 123; Rosie, The Directory of International Terrorism, 44.

24. Netanyahu, "Operation Jonathan", 22; Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, 121.

25. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, 11, 124.

26. Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, 11.

OPERATION MAGIC FIRE


3. Livingston, The War Against Terrorism, 179 thru 180.


5. Livingston, The War Against Terrorism, 180.


10. Livingston, The War Against Terrorism, 68 thru 69.


**OPERATION EAGLE CLAW**


5. Bolger, *Americans at War*, 100, 126, 146.


   Bolger, *Americans at War*, 103 thru 104.

   Bolger, *Americans at War*, 104.


17. Holger, Americans at War, 117; Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission, 83 thru 84.

18. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission, 38 thru 41; Holger, Americans at War, 118 thru 119.

19. Holger, Americans at War, 119 thru 120; Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission, 87 thru 90.

20. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission, 91 thru 94; Holger, Americans at War, 120 thru 121.

21. Holger, Americans at War, 121.


23. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission, 59 thru 61; Holger, Americans at War, 137 thru 140.


TWA FLIGHT 847


2. Rosie, The Directory of International Terrorism, 280; Testrake with Wimbish, Triumph Over Terror, 67 thru 100.


4. Testrake with Wimbish, Triumph Over Terror, 98 thru 99, 194.

5. Testrake with Wimbish, Triumph Over Terror, 98 thru 99, 194.

7. Testrake with Wimbish, *Triumph Over Terror*, 204 thru 208, 212.

8. Testrake with Wimbish, *Triumph Over Terror*, 181 thru 212.

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**THE ACHILLE LAURO**


7. Smolowe "Piecing Together the Drama", 31; Bolger, *Americans at War*, 371.


The operations selected as case studies for this section are all United Nations (UN) sponsored peacekeeping operations. These are not the only types of peacekeeping operations which have been undertaken. Individual governments, as well as regional organizations have contributed to peacekeeping efforts throughout the world.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are unique in several aspects. Most importantly they are sanctioned by the UN either through a vote of the Security Council or the General Assembly. This gives UN forces an immediate credibility, a sanctioned mandate, and general recognition of impartiality.

UN forces also have a public mandate which specifically governs how the forces is employed and what missions it may undertake. These terms of reference are a matter of international law. The peacekeeping force cannot arbitrarily resort to an army of occupation, as a single national force might.
Peacekeeping operations are organized following a favorable vote of the United Nations. There are important distinctions involved in whether the Security Council or the General Assembly votes the actions.

The UN Security Council is the only body which can impose a peacekeeping force on a group of belligerents without their permission. The force may also operate freely on the affected nations' sovereign territory for an indeterminate period. This action requires a unanimous vote of the Security Council. It is for this reason that permanent members are generally excluded from becoming directly involved in operations.

The General Assembly, on the other hand may vote for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation, but it is subject to the agreement of the parties involved. The affected nations' also have final authorization on the national composition of the force. The force may only remain while the host country agrees to its presence.

This provision was not originally contained in the UN Charter for the General Assembly. It was amended following the Korean War in anticipation of a deadlock in the Security Council.

From a strategic and operational standpoint, it is important to know exactly how the peacekeeping operation was conceived. This will, in many ways, determine the character of the operations and may serve to limit the forces mandate.
UN peacekeeping operations historically span a range of activities and show a variety of organization and composition. In the four case studies examined here UN forces range from a small group of observers, prohibited from interrupting operations, to a large intervention force which eventually conducts unilateral operations.

Despite this wide variety of forces and methods, this study examines these case studies to determine if common elements exist which uniformly contributed to the success or failure of the operations.

**INDIA–PAKISTAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1948–1990**

In August 1947 the terms of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 went into effect. The 500 princely states previously under British colonial government were allowed to decide independently whether to become part of India or Pakistan.\(^1\) Geographic location played a major part in this decision, seconded by religion. India was predominantly Hindu; Pakistan primarily Moslem.

The decision by the border states of Jammu and Kashmir to become part of India angered Pakistan, who refused to acknowledge the decision. Kashmir was ruled by Hindus but populated by a majority of Moslems. Pakistan felt justified in denouncing the decision as not representative of the majority of the inhabitants. India promised a plebiscite to resolve the matter but Pakistan felt it could not be a free and unbiased election. Fighting broke out in late 1947.\(^2\)
The matter was brought before the United Nations (UN) Security Council on 1 January 1948. In response, on 20 January the Security Council established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). Originally the three member body, later increased to five and augmented with a military advisor, was charged with reestablishing peace, coordinating a plebiscite and installing military observers, if necessary.

On 1 January 1949 India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire and Lieutenant General Delvoie of Belgium was appointed as Military Advisor to the Commission. By early February General Delvoie had coordinated a cease-fire line and installed 20 UN military observers. Under General Delvoie's control these observers became the United Nations Military Observation Group - India / Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

UNMOGIP was divided between the two armies and two man military observer teams were stationed with the forward units in the field. They were tasked with supervising the implementation of the cease-fire and reporting impartially back to the Military Advisor. This required three major tasks:

1) investigation of complaints and efforts to settle the complaints, 2) determination of the order of battle of the two armies and other troop information, and 3) control of civilians.

Observers were directed to investigate and report, avoiding any interference in operational matters.
When incidents occurred, observers were tasked to investigate immediately, normally from both sides simultaneously. This often involved separating Indian/Pakistani patrol clashes on the border."

Information on the respective orders of battle is provided to the Chief Military Observer to preclude force build up by either side. This information is used by the UN only, and maintained as strictly "Top Secret".

Civilian control refers to the 500 meter demilitarized zone on either side of the cease-fire line. Although civilian police are charged with this responsibility, military units from one side or the other often become involved. The observers task is to discourage military involvement and assist in turning matters over to the respective civilian police as quickly as possible.

In March 1950 the Security Council acted on the recommendation of UNCIP and terminated the organization based on the inability of India and Pakistan to come to terms on the matter of the plebiscite. UNMOGIP was established as an independent organization with the Chief Military Observer reporting directly to the UN Secretary-General. Observers were furnished to UNMOGIP by ten countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden and Uruguay) with the total varying between 35 and 67 during the period 1949 to 1964.
The presence of UNMOGIP helped serve as a deterrent until 1965 when fighting between India and Pakistan broke out again. Both countries disputed areas in the Rann of Krutch and this caused massive fighting along the entire India-Pakistan border in August 1965.4

On 22 September the UN Security Council demanded a cease-fire and withdrawal of military forces. UNMOGIP, increased to 102 observers, supervised the cease-fire and subsequent withdrawals in Kashmir. The United nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was established to supervise the cease-fire along the remainder of the India-Pakistan border.5

UNIPOM was staffed by 90 observers from ten countries (Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria and Venezuela). The Chief Military Observer for UNMOGIP had oversight responsibility for both organizations.6 They were tasked to observe and report cease-fire violations and the progress of withdrawals but, once again, had no authority to intervene.7

On 10 January 1966 India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw military personnel and occupy positions held prior to 5 August 1965. UNMOGIP and UNIPOM were tasked with monitoring the withdrawals and subsequent occupation of the old cease-fire line.8

On 26 February 1966 the withdrawals were completed and UNIPOM was dissolved. UNMOGIP was thereafter gradually reduced to 45 observers.9
Observer operations continued, as they had prior to 1965, until 1971 when fighting broke out once again. In response to the independence movement in East Pakistan, fighting between the armies of India and Pakistan commenced on 3 December along the entire border. Bitter fighting continued until 17 December when India and Pakistan once again agreed to a cease-fire.\(^2\)

Pakistan agreed to allow UNMOGIP to supervise the cease-fire but India refused. Observers were allowed to operate on Pakistan's side of the temporary cease-fire line while those attached to the Indian Army were restricted.\(^1\)

In July 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement recognizing a "Line of Control" conforming to the 1949 cease-fire line. However India continued to restrict its UN observers while Pakistan cooperated with the original agreements.\(^2\) The UN position held that only the Security Council could withdraw UNMOGIP's mandate and India should act in accordance with the original agreements.\(^3\)

India has not submitted any cease-fire violations to UNMOGIP since January 1972, while Pakistan continues. Facilities are provided to the Indian portion of UNMOGIP and liaison maintained, but observer functions limited.\(^4\) In October 1985 UNMOGIP was reduced to 39 observers and continues to fulfill its mandate in Kashmir.\(^5\)
At the strategic level the most important element which led to the success of the UN peacekeeping operations was the prior agreement by India and Pakistan to cease hostilities. The peacekeeping force served primarily as the impartial agency to supervise the agreements already made. In this way the UN forces were immediately recognized as being impartial and gained a large measure of respect.

The fact that the original mandate required the observers to report and specifically not interfere with operational matters implied a measure of unattached integrity. The obvious concern that UN forces represent the United Nations, with a varied representation on hand, gives the force an inherent credibility.

This case demonstrates how a UN commission devoted to several tasks evolved into a peacekeeping force. The issue of coordinating a plebiscite was the original priority. That fell into obscurity when neither country could agree on the conditions and military observers became a full time mission. The commission was then terminated and the observer group expanded.

It is also important to note that the only UN forces were observers and not large UN peacekeeping forces. It is clear why the mandate was not to interfere but to investigate and report. This is well within the capabilities of the observer group. The mission of an impartial observation team between agreeing nations is considerably different than
having to forcibly separate belligerents and maintain a
demilitarized zone. The resources required were well matched
to the task at hand, and the task was specified and mutually
agreed upon.

At the operational level, the chain of command in
this case was dedicated to an exclusively military mission.
The UN Chief Military Observer reports directly to the UN
Secretary-General. Thus UNMOGIP is singularly focused on its
military duties of investigating violations and reporting.
There are no ancillary duties associated with civil
development or humanitarian assistance.

During the intermittent phases of active hostility
the UN forces did not in any way interfere with the ongoing
operations. When the two belligerents were ready to come to
terms the UNMOGIP remained an impartial force, capable of
supervising and coordinating talks, disengagements and
withdrawals.

Only after January 1966 when India refused to
continue with the bilateral nature of the UN force did the
effectiveness of the operation suffer. Even today, operating
solely on the Pakistan side, the UNMOGIP fulfills a valuable
function. Patrolling the cease-fire line and investigating
violations, even if only from one side maintains an impartial
presence. This facilitates a measure of common ground
between the two countries and a mechanism to resolve
differences originating from the confrontation.
At the tactical level, the assignment of observer teams to front line units is a decided advantage. Observers are aware of unit operations and status, giving them an area background and familiarization with the units involved. Their proximity to forward positions allows rapid response to areas of conflict. This rapid response enhances quick resolution and the ability to keep events from escalating. It also facilitates rapid investigation and reporting to preclude removal of evidence or changing the appearance of a violation. The attachment of UN observers to forward units also acts as a deterrent, limited as it may be.

At the individual observer level, the accuracy of reporting, map locations and force positions have tremendous potential to become an international incident. Only accurate, thorough investigation and reporting can build a basis of credibility and respect.

The UNMOGIP mission to supervise the application of legal jurisdiction insures that civilians in the disputed areas receive fair treatment. Without this supervision it is likely that the military units that occasionally become involved would show preferential or brutal treatment depending on the civilians nationality. This would only increase local resentment and lead to longer term problems in the area.

The presence of a standing peacekeeping force has allowed for a more rapid return to a cease-fire once
aggression broke out. Observers were able to verify cease-fires, limiting the conflict and stopping a bitter stalemate from occurring. Their presence encouraged talks aimed at cease-fire and force withdrawal.

In the larger sense, the mission of the United Nations in resolving the underlying differences has not been as successful. Some argue that with the pressure of direct conflict removed the incentive to negotiate for a lasting agreement is not very high.
BELGIAN CONGO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1960-1964

In 1959 the Belgian Congo had a population of 14 million divided between 200 tribal groups. Only 17 Congolese were university graduates. Belgium had ruled the territory as a colony, producing one of the highest living standards in Africa, but with little internal social, educational or political development.

In response to a growing Congolese nationalist movement and the sweeping decolonization of other parts of the continent, Belgium agreed in January 1960 to grant the Congo independence. Interim elections were held in March and a provisional constitution put in place in May 1960.

In early June 1960 a provisional parliament compromised and divided the two senior governmental positions between the two leaders of the most prominent political factions. Joseph Kasa-Vubu was installed as President and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister. Patrice Lumumba had organized the Congolese National Movement and was rumored to have Soviet sponsorship. On 30 June 1960 the Congo was abruptly granted full and complete independence.

Some measures and precautions were taken by the Belgian government in an effort not to completely abandon the colony. Many key Belgian colonial technical and administrative personnel remained in a provisional status to ensure a smooth transition. Belgium retained two major military bases in the country garrisoned with Belgian troops.
**Notes on map name changes:**

- Zaire - Congo (Belgian)
- Kisangani - Stanleyville
- Kalemei - Albertville
- Mungbere - Paulis
- Kinshasa - Leopoldville
- Mbandaka - Couquilhatville
- Lubumbashi - Elisabethville

Shaba Province - Katanga Province (With minor alterations)
Haut-Zaïre Province - Haut-Congo Province
Belgian officers filled all the leadership positions in the Congolese Army, the Force Publique."

In addition, the United Nations, through Dr. Bunche, the Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, offered an extensive technical assistance program for the country. Dr. Bunche was on hand for the independence ceremony and stayed on for discussions during the next several days."

On 5 July 1960 the Force Publique mutinied in the Leopoldville garrison over pay and promotion issues. They imprisoned the Belgian officers, some of whom were later shot. A complete breakdown in law and order followed with violence and atrocities being committed largely against Europeans. As the Europeans fled the anarchy, almost all governmental services collapsed."

Prime Minister Lumumba refused to request Belgian assistance, acceding instead to many of the mutineers demands. The Force Publique was renamed the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC) and the Belgian commander replaced by a Congolese. Major-General Victor Lundula now commanded the ANC with Colonel Mobutu as Chief of Staff."

These changes did little to bring the ANC under control as violence and atrocities continued to spread. Dr. Bunche asked the Belgian Ambassador to withhold intervention by Belgian troops and presented Prime Minister Lumumba with a plan for UN assistance.
Dr. Bunche's plan focused on military advisors and technical assistance rather than military aid. Dag Hammarskjold, UN Secretary-General, felt he could support this type of assistance without necessarily convening the Security Council for a lengthy debate. This way action could be taken swiftly."

Two related events occurred which would be the first of several dramatic changes of the entire situation in the Congo. Both events recognized the inability of the ANC to effectively establish law and order and promote governmental authority.

On 11 July Belgian troops intervened to stop the bloodshed and protect Belgian citizens who had not yet left the Congo. World opinion condemned the action, but several internal factions welcomed the outside intervention. They realized the ANC would be totally consumed with reacting to the Belgian intervention. They also wagered that if they were friendly with Belgian interests they could receive substantial support. The President of Katanga controlled one of these factions.

When Belgian troops entered Elisabethville, the provincial capital of Katanga, provincial President Moise Tshombe declared the secession of the province. Support by Belgian business interests and a non-communist political platform motivated his action. These two events dashed any
hopes the UN Secretary-General had of solving the Congo's problems by sending in a handful of advisors.”

The vast majority of the mineral wealth of the Congo lay in the copper mines of Katanga. A large Belgian mining company, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, owned and operated these mines. Tshombe and the mining interests sought to separate these mines from the Congo. Tshombe announced that Katanga would not be part of a Soviet dominated Congo. The mining companies feared this as well.”

The Belgian mining company supported Tshombe’s efforts in several areas. The company paid taxes to Tshombe rather than the national government. Ore was transported through Angola rather than through normal routes to avoid national taxes. Company stock, owed to the national government, was withheld and company industrial facilities were used by Tshombe’s forces to produce war material.”

Belgian officers still led the Katangese Gendarmerie. It was the local unit which did not mutiny when the remainder of the Force Publique had in early July. These Belgian officers, augmented by mercenaries, supported Tshombe’s efforts and were far superior to any other ANC leadership.”

On 12 July, Congolese President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba sent a joint communiqué requesting United Nation assistance “to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a
threat to international peace". This referred to the Belgian intervention and not the internal strife.

As the UN was considering the request for assistance the Congo government also requested assistance from the Soviet Union against the Belgians. Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev immediately deployed transport aircraft and shipped more than 100 heavy trucks to Lumumba’s government.

On 13/14 July the UN Security Council met, authorizing the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to provide military assistance in order to restore law and order and called on Belgium to withdraw its troops. The Soviets did not veto these measures.

A United Nations force composed of seven battalions (Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and Tunisia) and augmented with a Swedish battalion from United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip was dispatched. Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) was headed by Dr. Bunche as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative. Two subordinates, the Force Commander and the Head of Civilian Operations, supervised military and civilian affairs respectively and answered to Dr. Bunche. General Carl von Horn was appointed as Force Commander controlling all UN military personnel.

The original UN force numbered about 4,000 and the Civil Operations staff approximately 2,000. The Secretary-General made clear that although the force was in the Congo
at the government’s request, it remained under UN command. He also stipulated that UN forces would act only with the ANC and not in conjunction with or against any foreign armed forces. Its primary purpose was to assist the Congolese forces in restoring law and order and supervising the withdrawal of the Belgian forces.  

UN forces began arriving on 15 July. Belgian forces, outside of Katanga, coordinated their withdrawal as UN forces entered in sufficient strength.

UN forces were armed with weapons but only for self-defense. They were authorized to respond to armed attacks and to hold positions they occupied if threatened. They were expressly forbidden to take the initiative in the use of force.

As UN forces were deployed in an area they immediately secured key installations such as water and power plants. Patrols on main streets and in retail districts allowed transport and business to resume normal functions and ensured law and order. ONUC often had to disarm uncontrolled ANC elements to protect human rights and stop unnecessary violence.

On 17 July Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu demanded the pace of Belgian withdrawal be speeded up or they would seek further Soviet assistance. The Security Council largely ignored the demand. They endorsed the original plan and requested Belgium speed the withdrawal of troops.
In an effort to put down the Tshombe secession in Katanga, Prime Minister Lumumba expected UN forces to attack in support of the ANC. The Secretary-General refused and the UN Security Council affirmed the need to enter Katanga with UN forces, but strictly ruled out any participation in the internal conflict.26

On 12 August, after several confrontations between secessionist forces backed by Belgians were avoided, the Secretary-General personally led the UN forces into Katanga. This broke the deadlock and Belgian forces agreed to withdraw as UN forces advanced. Tshombe however, did not back down and continued in his bid for secession.27

The Belgians voluntarily withdrew their forces from the military bases in the Congo and turned them over to the ONUC. A complete withdrawal of regular Belgian military forces was accomplished in six weeks following the first arrival of UN forces.28

At the same time however, several tribal uprisings occurred and the province of South Kasai seceded. These disturbances were brutally put down by Lumumba with elements of the ANC. Often out of control once dispatched, the ANC committed hundreds of atrocities and alienated the civil population. This considerably complicated the ONUC task of assisting the ANC to become a professional force capable of maintaining law and order.29
On 5 September, President Kasa-Vubu dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba provoking a crisis and forcing a new set of circumstances on the ONUC. Lumumba refused to recognize the dismissal and the Parliament backed him. Colonel Mobutu organized a coup installing a Council of Commissioners supporting Kasa-Vubu and Kasa-Vubu dissolved the Parliament.  

Each of the major rival factions had armed forces which were loyal to that group. Lumumba was supported by Soviet arms and advisors which sought to establish a foothold in Africa. Katanga and South Kasai affirmed their secession and continued to build mercenary forces against the massed ANC forces waiting to invade both areas. Government services broke down and violence erupted as each faction vowed to resist the other by force.  

On the night of 5 September the ONUC closed Leopoldville airport preventing further Soviet aide to Lumumba. Following violent street demonstrations the radio station was closed the next day.  

The Soviets vetoed several resolutions in the UN Security Council to prohibit nations from contributing military aide to the rapidly deteriorating situation. They also condemned the closing of the airport and sought the withdrawal of the ONUC.  

The ONUC was caught between several violent, often uncontrolled factions. No single group controlled more than
its own armed faction, leaving no central government to 
coordinate with or restore order. ONUC attempted to protect 
the political leaders of the different factions, which 
provoked reprisals against the UN troops.35

On 8 November 1960 eight Irish soldiers of ONUC were 
killed when their patrol in Katanga was ambushed by tribesmen 
loyal to Tshombe. On 24 November the ANC attacked the UN 
guarded Ghanaian Embassy in Leopoldville, killing one and 
wounding several others.36

On 27 November Lumumba attempted to leave 
Leopoldville enroute to his political stronghold in 
Stanleyville. He was apprehended by ANC elements loyal to 
President Kasa-Vubu and was detained in Thysvilee. Factions 
in Stanleyville demanded his release.37

On 17 January, Lumumba and two others were taken to 
Elisabethville. This was supposedly done to prepare for 
their release. A UN commission later determined that Lumumba 
had been murdered on 17 January "probably in the presence of 
high officials of the Katanga provincial government".38 The 
UN had been powerless to prevent the murders, although the 
Secretary-General protested his apprehension several times.39

Word spread of the deaths, provoking riots and 
vioence by different factions either supporting or opposing 
Lumumba. As the threat of all out civil war loomed, several 
countries withdrew their contingents from ONUC. The forces, 
which had been inadequate to the massive task before, were
now reduced from 20,000 to 15,000. The Soviets continued to discredit ONUC and now refused to recognize Hammarskjold as Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{40}

On 21 February 1961 the Security Council, with France and USSR abstaining, authorized ONUC to take:

"appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort." \textsuperscript{41}

The Security Council also called for the withdrawal of all foreign military not under UN command, immediate removal of all mercenaries, reorganization of the ANC and opposition to the secession in Katanga.\textsuperscript{42}

President Kasa-Vubu came under intense pressure following Lumumba's death. The UN Secretary-General and an independent Conciliation Commission established by the General Assembly advocated a meeting of the different factions. Kasa-Vubu consented and although the Lumumba and Tshombe factions were not represented, a conference was held and progress made. Kasa-Vubu agreed to replace the Council of Commissioners with a provisional candidate, Joseph Ileo, acceptable to both central factions.\textsuperscript{43}

On 4 March 1961 the ONUC garrison in Matadi was attacked by ANC troops, who feared the authority allowed in the new resolution, and forced to withdraw from the city. The Secretary-General responded by reinforcing ONUC to a total strength of 18,000.\textsuperscript{44}
In April, despite ONUC warnings Tshombe conducted an offensive in northern Katanga to capture the towns of Manono and Kabalo. After Tshombe's forces secured Manono, ONUC forces intervened and stopped the advance. ONUC then established and maintained a demilitarized zone between Manono and Kabalo.  

President Kasa-Vubu continued to make political progress under the auspices of the UN Conciliation Commission. But as leaders negotiated, the uncontrolled rival ANC units continued their brutal atrocities. In late April an ONUC Ghanaian detachment was suddenly overrun by the ANC and 44 of its soldiers brutally murdered.  

On 22 July 1961 President Kasa-Vubu reconvened Parliament. At his request Cyrille Adoula was installed as Prime Minister forming a government of national unity. Although some factional leaders, such as Antoine Gizenga of Stanleyville, refused to cooperate, sincere political progress had been made.  

On 28 August 1961, Tshombe publicly acknowledged and supported a ONUC roundup of mercenaries in Katanga. Behind the scenes the only foreigners turned over had already been recalled by Belgium. Several hundred mercenaries remained with his forces, including a special political police force.  

The political police conducted a campaign of genocide against tribes not loyal to Tshombe. Primary targets were
the Baluba tribesmen in Elisabethville. By 9 September 35,000 had been terrorized into leaving the city and occupied a refugee camp near the ONUC garrison. Relief efforts of food and medicine had been arranged while the ONUC pressed Tshombe on military issues.

ONUC demanded that Tshombe comply with the UN resolutions and started another, unilateral, roundup on 13 September. The UN forces were attacked by Katangese forces led by mercenaries. Supported by a single jet fighter, the Katangese forces prevented the ONUC from entering Elisabethville or securing any more mercenaries. Operation MORTHOR lasted for eight days. Indian troops finally took the Post Office and radio station. No more mercenaries were captured and only a handful of Tshombe loyalists. The fighting resulted in 50 Katangese and 11 UN troops killed.

On the night of 17 September 1961 Dag Hammarskjold flew to Ndola, Rhodesia to meet with Tshombe and press for a cease-fire. While attempting to land, the plane crashed, killing all aboard. Controversy still surrounds the crash. Many reports dispute the two official board findings ruling out sabotage and indicating pilot error. The facts that the aircraft circled over Ndola for an hour after the final radio contact, an unidentified body was found in the wreckage and that one crewman had been shot, all add to the mystery.

Negotiations were taken up by Mahmoud Khairi, Chief of ONUC Civilian Operations and on 13 October a cease-fire
was signed. As a precaution Ethiopia, India and Sweden sent jet fighters to join its troop contingents.³³

As Katangese violations of the cease-fire became commonplace, the ANC massed troops on the Katangese border and in November attacked. There were only minor, mixed successes as the mercenary-led gendarmes repelled most ANC incursions.²³

On 24 November 1961 the Security Council authorized the use of force to remove Katangese mercenaries. Tshombe responded with a violent campaign of terror directed against the ONUC. Katangese forces established roadblocks and cut ONUC forces in Elisabethville from their supply lines. Tshombe refused to negotiate in good faith, hoping the violence would cause contributing nations to withdraw their troop contingents.⁵⁴

Fighting broke out on 5 December, with ONUC forces holding key positions until reinforcements could arrive. On 15 December, sufficiently reinforced, UNOC forces carefully launched an offensive to retake key areas of Elisabethville. Conscious of collateral damage and not wanting any civilian casualties UN forces were strictly limited in their use of firepower. In three days the ONUC had reestablished its freedom of movement in the city.⁵⁵

During the heavy fighting the UNOC made full provisions for relief operations, escorting civilians out of contested areas and providing food and shelter. It required
an entire battalion to secure the Babula refugee camp outside of Elisabethville. UN forces and the camp came under several sustained attacks by Tshombe gendarmes. As soon as heavy fighting ceased the ONUC forces established law and order, cooperating with local authorities as completely as possible.

On 20 December at Kitona, Tshombe met with Prime Minister Adoula and agreed to support the central government. Implementation of the agreement was stalled by Tshombe. Talks eventually broke down in June 1962.

In another effort, Secretary-General U-Thant, in August 1962, proposed a plan of national reconciliation. Adoula and Tshombe agreed to the plan in principle but implementation in Katanga stopped.

During early December 1962 Katangese forces again fired on ONUC positions, and continued for six days. UN forces did not return fire but held their positions. Once permission was received, UNOC responded with a full fledged offensive and secured all of Elisabethville and a 20 kilometer radius by 30 December. The offensive continued until 4 January when ONUC forces occupied all major population centers in Katanga except Kolwezi.

Following negotiations between Tshombe and the Congolese government, Tshombe agreed to cease all resistance and allow the ONUC forces free entry into Kolwezi. On 21 January 1963, UN Indian troops occupied Kolwezi and Tshombe
loyalists were protected by a general amnesty. Organized resistance and support of secession ceased. During 24 days of fighting the ONUC forces lost 10 killed and 77 wounded, while Katangese casualties were not known. 69

Throughout 1963 the government, with ONUC assistance, worked toward the reintegration of Katanga. The gendarmerie was reorganized while the government of the province was rebuilt. Exports from the mines began moving and financial integration of Katanga back into the Congo followed. UNOC forces continued to enforce law and order as well as conduct extensive relief efforts throughout the country. 69

With hostilities brought to a close, the Civil Operations branch of the UNOC was finally given a free hand in assisting the Congo toward independence. Conducting a wide range of programs, from relief to inland waterway navigation engineering, the technicians established a firm foundation for Congolese administration. 69

ONUC forces were originally funded through the remainder of 1963, with a projected phase out of the end of the year. Although no firm termination date was established UN plans worked toward that goal. 69

By special request of Prime Minister Adoula a reduced force remained until mid-1964, continuing assistance and civil programs. On 30 June 1964 all UN forces withdrew from the Congo. 69

* * * * *
The Congo peacekeeping operations outline the dangers associated with becoming involved in the internal conflicts of a nation or state. It demonstrates that even the United Nations, with a mandate to intervene, had serious problems, and holds potential lessons for nations seeking a course of intervention. Whether one considers the conflict between the internal factions and the central government or between the Belgians and the Congo, there was no mutual agreement to respect a peacekeeping force.

The force was required from the beginning to establish its authority. This often had to be done through the use of force. It is fortunate that Belgium agreed to unilaterally withdraw its troops in coordination with advancing peacekeeping forces.

In the case of the Congo, none of the basic groundwork was laid to ensure the smooth operation and eventual success of the UN forces. From the initial agreements with Prime Minister Lumumba it is obvious that there was no common agreement on the intent of the force. Tshombe sought to remove the Belgian intervention, while the UN mission outlines the establishment of law and order as a primary task.

Outward appearances indicate that Lumumba publicly agreed to the force for one reason, while privately he sought to use it to bolster his own security forces. When the
Secretary-General refused to cooperate in this manner the mission of the force began to suffer.

The UN concern for the sovereignty of a nation is paramount. However, when the central government broke into factions the UN forces were placed at a disadvantage. Greater initiative, early on, on the part of the Security Council to expand its mandate would have helped considerably.

The inactivity and the inability to act by the UN forces only led to larger problems later on. Had the mandate been expanded earlier, law and order could have been established over the different factions. A type of martial law could have been imposed and the murder of Lumumba prevented. The same is also true of the lack of authority the UN forces had over the ANC. Their brutality only served to widen the conflict and cause more problems as time progressed.

It is commendable that the force was able to perform as well as it did, given Soviet attempts to discredit the mission and covertly overthrow the central government. On the other hand, it is clear that Belgium continued to aid Tshombe in his efforts to secede. This also undermined the efforts of the UN and the peacekeeping force.

The issue of national and international will is also raised in conjunction with Tshombe's deliberate attacks against the UN forces. These attacks were designed to wear down the member nations resolve to maintain their forces as
part of the UN peacekeeping effort. Even in peacekeeping operations the antagonist can utilize a strategy of protracted conflict and attrition to chip away at national will and resolve.

At the operational level, the command and control organization was headed by a civilian. General von Horn felt that this was not an effective organization, especially while the majority of the mission remained a military one. In Soldiering for Peace, General von Horn recounts the difficulties in working through this command structure. It is clear that some personality conflicts existed, and political concerns often directly frustrated military peacekeeping operations.

The case study points out however that the peacekeeping operations were undertaken within the framework of a political agreement. It is difficult to determine whether the fault lay in the organization, or in the different actors' inability to coordinate their actions. It is clear that the fact that they failed to integrate their actions compounded the strategic difficulties imposed on the peacekeeping effort.

On the positive side, the closing of the Leopoldville Airport and radio station quickly diffused a dangerous situation. Soviet war materials could not enter the country easily and this slowed the pace of direct confrontation. Also during a critical period the inflammatory propaganda was
stopped and the population allowed to return to a more normal condition. Even though these actions brought sharp criticism, they were timely and effective.

The civil operations branch of the UN forces was not truly effective until the peacekeeping forces established a measure of security in the country. Only then were the resources available for the public works projects and training programs for the police and ANC. Normal economic and social structures required a degree of security and stability before life could be considered normal and some type of progressive program undertaken.

At the tactical level, individual UN forces were required to establish law and order and maintain it. Actions as simple as routine patrols in urban areas and markets brought stability back. Protection of essential services and facilities augmented the governments internal security and guaranteed the population electricity and water. These simple guarantees substantially reduced tensions and assisted in returning the population to a normal existence.

Tactful, but effective disarming of selected ANC elements was also a critical element in moving toward success. This protected individual human rights, prevented atrocities and made the UN forces respected and credible in the eyes of the civilians. In the long term it protected the ANC from themselves by not aggravating an already poor situation with the general population.
Terrorist attacks and unwarranted combat actions required the UN forces to maintain a constant vigil. Even a concerted effort could not protect all the UN forces from determine attacks by rival factions. It is deplorable that Tshombe encouraged attacks against the UN forces in order to destroy their credibility with the home governments.

As the use of force was authorized the peacekeeping operation became more of a contingency intervention force to subdue the opponents of the central government. UN forces conducted offensive operations supported by close air support and at times even heavy weapons.

Constantly at the forefront of all activities were the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the need to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties. Because the UN forces were directly involved in conducting operations they had a large measure of control in these areas. Urban areas were avoided as assaults moved on enemy positions. Weapons use was strictly limited and absolute necessity rather than tactical doctrine dictated authorization.

The contribution of disciplined, well trained individual soldiers cannot be overemphasized. Precise application of firepower rather than indiscriminate violence was key to subduing the Katanga forces without instilling bitter hatred. Compassion and concern for the local population characterized all operations. Only the necessary force was used and then efforts quickly reverted to
establishing law and order with a return to normal life. In this aspect the UN forces were able to accomplish what the ANC was utterly incapable of.

Once units had separated or withdrawn, UN forces quickly established demilitarized areas which they patrolled. These areas protected the population and helped isolate the opposing armed forces. They also freed the ANC to pursue other duties. Had the ANC been more capable this would have served as a force multiplier.

In addition to the combatant duties involved in subduing Katanga, humanitarian missions became a major part of operations. Securing, controlling and providing basic needs for refugees consumed large parts of the field strength of the UN forces. Public health and nutrition were major concerns as large groups of refugees gathered for protection in small camps adjacent to the UN forces. Shelter, food distribution, security and administration were added to the list of unit tasks necessary to the success of the Congo operation.
WEST IRIAN (PAPUA) PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1962-1963

Following the Second World War both the Netherlands and Indonesian claimed West New Guinea (Papua). Indonesia was recognized as a sovereign state by the Netherlands at The Hague in 1949. However, this did not settle the political future of West New Guinea. The Netherlands continued to claim the territory and, in 1954, Indonesia brought the matter before the United Nations.

The General Assembly could not reach agreement and relations continued to deteriorate. The Dutch were growing weary of the burden of the colony but did not want to release it unconditionally to Indonesia. Finally, in 1961, based on a General Assembly resolution calling for independence for territories in trust, the Netherlands agreed to turn the colony over to the United Nations. The proposal called for the United Nations to administer the colony "until such time as the people declared their preference for the future".

The Indonesians saw this as an attempt to deprive them of territory rightfully theirs. In January 1962 the Indonesian Navy attacked the Dutch East India Fleet with torpedo boats. One torpedo boat containing a large quantity of weapons was sunk. During the March to June period Indonesia dropped paratroops into the interior and battles with the Dutch Marines followed.

In May 1962, U.S. diplomat Ellsworth Bunker, acting as mediator, developed a solution. International political
pressure was focused on Indonesia to accept the UN solution which the Netherlands had already approved. The United Nations would administer the colony for not less than one year and not more than two years. Then it would be turned over to Indonesia for administration until a plebiscite could be conducted to allow the West Irians to decide their future. UN administration would begin immediately with the turnover to Indonesia to take place not earlier than May 1963. 

In order to quell the military violence and enforce the cease-fire, a 1,500 man United Nations Security Force (UNSF) was immediately dispatched from Pakistan. This force was later augmented with a flight detachment from the United States and one from Canada. Brigadier Indar Rikhye, the UN Secretary-General’s Military Advisor was sent to supervise the cease-fire and begin preparations for the installation of the UN administration.

In addition to the deployment of the 1,500 man peacekeeping force to separate the belligerents, administrators for every aspect of government would be needed. Volunteers in public works, agriculture, law, economics, security and public health were recruited from all over the world. Key Dutch administrators were asked to remain for the interim period. British military officers were assigned to the militia and police.

Indonesians were also included to facilitate the eventual transfer one year later. Officials were selected to
posts they would eventually control and worked subordinate to the UN administration until the turnover."

Senor Bennett, who had been the UN Secretary-General's Deputy Chef de Cabinet, was appointed as the UN Administrator. All aspects of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), including the peacekeeping forces, came under the control of a single civilian. UNTEA functioned as a civil government, with the military forces as one of several subordinate departments. The peacekeeping force was commanded by Brigadier-General Said Ud Khan of Pakistan.

For the first time the United Nations controlled all aspects of a territory's day to day functioning. The dense jungle covering much of the island made the peacekeeping forces much more than just a military force. Their transport and patrolling activities included surveys and census along with public health duties.

The most difficult task was to locate the Indonesian paratroops and convince them to surrender since hostilities had ceased. Radio broadcasts, leaflet drops and patrolling with Indonesian volunteers were finally successful in locating the majority. The Indonesian paratroops, UN Pakistanis, Papua Volunteer Corps (militia) and the civil police formed a four part interim security force for West Irian.
Along with the 1,500 man UN Security Force, 21 military observer teams were deployed in the main cities and towns. They were composed of volunteers from other UN peacekeeping organizations from many different countries. In addition to maintaining the cease-fire these observer teams functioned as local administrations preparing the populace for transfer to Indonesia."

On 1 May 1963 the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia was completed. The countrywide plebiscite was scheduled and eventually conducted in 1969. Unanimous results voted to remain part of Indonesian territory. The administration in place continued to function smoothly."

The Netherlands was able to exit gracefully and the colony was much better prepared to work toward autonomy or assimilation into Indonesia. A bloody international/civil war was averted and stability in the region continued."

* * * *

At the strategic level, the West Irian operations were predominantly civilian in nature with the military peacekeeping forces in support. The UN administration effectively reorganized the entire government in a short time and took over day to day functional control.

Once again the strategic framework for success was well laid by international mediation and agreement prior to the UN peacekeeping forces' arrival. The agreements made it clearly in everyone's benefit to cooperate with the UN
administration and move away from conflict. In spite of a
dual focus (civil and military), the mission for the UN
forces was well laid out and remained more a matter of
execution than a need to modify the ground rules.

Operationally the United Nations organization was
headed by a civilian, with the military peacekeeping and
security functions subordinate to him. The respective
functions of the military and civilian branches were
definitively outlined and operations were well coordinated.
This may have been easier to accomplish in the atmosphere of
relative peace and security of West Irian.

Personnel integration at all levels became a major
task for the organization. The long term view of continued
administration under Indonesia was incorporated from the
beginning. Dutch officials, remaining by special request,
were gradually phased out while Irians were trained and
Indonesians integrated into the functioning administration.
Plans for advancement were detailed as well as an ongoing
institutional training program for the different segments of
the administration.

UNTEA was only a skeleton organization. UN
peacekeeping forces became defacto local administrations, as
the only dependable link to the central government, acting as
extensions of UNTEA. Civil police duties, public health,
transportation, communications and census tasks all were part
of the day to day operations of the military observer teams.
Another unusual aspect of the Irian operation was the use of psychological operations used to bring in the Indonesian paratroops operating deep in the interior. Radio broadcasts and leaflet drops of specially prepared messages succeeded in the surrender of the soldiers and their incorporation into the security force. Even tactics developed for offensive purposes have unforeseen and important individual applications in other areas.

Tremendous dedication on the part of the military and civilian branches allowed the effective, peaceful transfer of West Irian the following year. Superb individual efforts by the peacekeeping forces brought a measure of civil administration to the remote areas and quality training to the security forces. Only well trained, motivated soldiers could have accomplished so much in so little time.
In 1875 Britain acquired Cyprus as a colonial territory. Cyprus is an island of 3500 square miles in the Mediterranean. It is located 40 miles from the mainland of Turkey and 70 miles from the shores of Syria. Despite its position, its population is 77% Greek and only 18% Turkish.

Cyprus' strategic importance as a Mediterranean base capable of supporting the Suez Canal, and the increasing domestic strife, prompted Britain to announce on 28 July 1954 that the colony should not expect independence. This angered several factions in Cyprus. Many in the Greek majority favored Enosis or unification with Greece; others favored independence. The Turkish minority favored unification with Turkey. Almost none favored continued administration by the British.

Violence generated by Greek Cypriot guerrillas started in late 1954 and Britain declared a State of Emergency on 27 November 1955. For the next four years Greek insurgents led by General Grivas fought British troops. In December 1959 Archbishop Makarios, the prominent spokesman for the Greek Cypriots, accepted a plan sponsored by Britain, Greece and Turkey for independence of Cyprus in order to stop the bloodshed.

Problems between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority continued as the island became independent. Dual village administrations were established and the government...
organization was flawed in several key areas. Turkish Cypriot Vice-Presidential veto power and constitutionally mandated administrative positions held by Turkish Cypriots stymied all political effectiveness.

Domestic and international diplomatic efforts broke down and on 21 December 1963 two Turkish Cypriots were killed and a Turk and a Greek wounded. Heavy fighting followed and factional leaders lost control of their organizations.

On 26 December British, Turkish and Greek forces intervened in order to establish a cease-fire. Turkish and Greek forces quickly began to support their respective sides and the British were left to bring a halt to the violence. From December until March the British forces worked diligently to separate the two belligerents.

In February 1964 Cypriot President Makarios, with the support of the Guarantor Powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey), requested a United Nations peacekeeping force. In March the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus and by June it was fully operational. The resolution defined the objectives of the force as:

"... in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) consisted of military contingents from Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). This was the first time a permanent member of the Security Council (UK) was allowed to contribute forces. Acceptance of the UK contingent was key because of their current presence on the island. Logistic bases were established at the British military facilities on the island at Dhekelia and Akrotiri."

A civil/military organization was established as the controlling headquarters. The military Force Commander controls the peacekeeping operations while the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General is the civilian head of the UNFICYP. The Special Representative is responsible for encouraging a permanent peaceful settlement to the conflict. He has a civilian secretariat with members from 25 different countries. They orchestrate the financial, administrative and legal aspects of the peacekeeping operations."

Together the Force Commander and the Special Representative form a two man team in the leadership and coordination of the UN responsibilities.

For the first time the UN force also included a 170 man United Nations Civil Police (UNCIVPOL) detachment with contingents from Australia, Austria, Denmark and Sweden. The civil police served as observers and investigators in all matters relating to the exercise of civil authority. The detachment was broken down, often into individuals working at
local Greek or Turkish police stations as both liaison and observer. The rationale was that policemen were better trained than soldiers to deal with problems involving civil law and civil rights."

Cyprus was divided into six regions to maintain deployment integrity of the national contingents. These six regions corresponded with the administrative districts of the island. The capital of Nicosia was split along community lines between the Danish and Finnish troops. The Canadians took the northern sector of the island, the British the southern, the Irish in the northwest and the Swedish in the east."

The terrain, the civil population and the necessary tactics of these six regions produced three dramatically different types of operations. The Danish and Finnish troops conducted operations in urban areas. The Canadians and Irish separated belligerents directly opposing each other in difficult mountainous terrain. Finally the British and Swedish patrolled the remaining two-thirds of the island with vast areas and little direct confrontation.

The Danish and Finnish contingents probably had the most difficult mission. Disputes and fighting had been especially bitter between the Greek and Turkish communities of the capital. A single street was declared the "Green Line" separating the two communities and patrolled constantly. Belligerents were always within rock throwing...
distance and events had the potential to escalate quickly. Visible presence, excellent discipline of troops and special alertness proved the tactics of success.14

The Canadian and Irish forces patrolled the slopes of the Kyrenia and Troodos mountain ranges. The Greeks and Turks had taken opposing positions in the mountains forming long defensive lines separated by only several hundred meters of "no man's land". The UN forces established static Observation Posts (OPs) and patrolled along the narrow strip of "no man's land". Active patrolling and shows of force kept the frequent exchanges of gunfire from escalating into pitched battles.15

The Swedish and British forces patrolled large tracts of land without the established community or defensive lines facing off against each other. Individual towns often had both Greek and Turkish areas peacefully coexisting. Rapid reaction forces to provide a presence and separate belligerents before minor events escalated became the key requirement.16

During early 1964 Turkey increased arms infiltration by small boat into the two fishing villages of Kokkina and Mansoura. The arms supported the Turkish freedom fighters and contributed to destabilizing the fragile cease-fire. The Cyprus government pressed the UN forces to stop this illegal arms traffic but intervention of this typo was not within the mandate spelled out in the forces charter. Diplomatic
efforts by the Special Representative to the Turkish government were unsuccessful."

The Cyprus government responded by moving a 2000 man National Guard force into positions around the villages. On 3 August a Cypriot Navy patrol boat was fired on from shore. Two days later firing erupted between the ground forces. Turkish Air Force ground support aircraft intervened and strafed the National Guard positions. In spite of the Turkish air cover Cypriot government forces launched an attack on 6 August and drove the defenders into a small perimeter around the two villages."

UN Swedish forces were withdrawn on 5 August when the heavy ground fighting commenced. A cease-fire was arranged by the UN Force Commander on 10 August and the UN troops immediately reinserted between the belligerents. Unfortunately during the heavy fighting UN forces were not present and thus unable to influence events in any way. Casualties were high on both sides and feelings only became more bitter.""

The Cyprus government enacted an island wide embargo on any supplies moving into Turkish controlled areas. Conditions in Kokkina and Mansoura deteriorated rapidly. Refugees had swarmed into the towns as the National Guard captured outlying positions. Heavy mortar and artillery shelling destroyed many buildings and there were few medical supplies. Through patient negotiations the UN Force
Commander finally persuaded the government to allow humanitarian shipments in mid-September.  

The uneasy peace continued until summer 1966 when the ongoing provocative actions of General Grivas, commanding the Cypriot National Guard, almost resulted in reviving the civil war. In the villages of Mora and Melousha minor incidents were used by the Cyprus National Guard Commander as excuses for brutal reprisals. In each case rapid troop deployments by the UN forces prevented government attacks and reduced tensions. General Grivas was forced to withdraw his government troops on both occasions but the incidents only served to undermine other ongoing efforts.

Military actions were only as small part of the UN forces operations. UNFICYP had a political department which coordinated many humanitarian aspects of operations which the peacekeeping forces actually executed. The supply embargo caused severe hardships in many areas which the UN forces constantly worked against. The distribution of humanitarian supplies, movement of doctors and school teachers all became day to day activities of the UN forces.

At the same time UNCIIVPOL, the civil police detachment, arranged for farmers to plant and harvest crops in disputed areas. They provided impartial supervision in the many contested or split villages and coordinated such things as livestock grazing and water usage.
In late summer of 1967 an isolated event in the village of Ayios Theodhoros rekindled the fires of hostility. Turkish Cypriots living in one section of the village denied the visiting Greek Cypriot policeman from the next village passage through the village. Sporadic shooting erupted with the weekly visits and the policeman was forced to use an alternate route.\textsuperscript{24}

UNFICYP worked at negotiating a settlement when the Turks demanded a lifting of the blockade in return for police free passage. The Cypriot government refused but agreed to withhold violence while the UN worked on a solution.\textsuperscript{25}

On 14 November 1967 the Cypriot government lost patience and a police patrol escorted with armored cars and infantry moved through the village. There was no response from the Turks. Despite requests from the UN forces General Grivas, apparently wishing to provoke an incident, conducted a second armed patrol on the 15th.\textsuperscript{26}

This time shots were fired and the government forces attacked. In a battle lasting ten hours, 22 Turks were killed and 9 wounded. The British Royal Green Jackets remained in position as the UN force and were able to give detailed accounts of the fighting. This was critical in establishing an early cease-fire and later in establishing the extent of government provocation.\textsuperscript{27}

War between Greece and Turkey was only narrowly averted by the diplomatic efforts of Senor Bennett and Mr.
Cyrus Vance from the United States. As U Thant's personal representatives, they shuttled between the three governments moderating a reconciliation. General Grivas was recalled to Greece on 19 November and calm returned to the island. Economic blockades and movement restrictions were lifted in December by President Makarics. An uneasy stalemate continued on the island and the UN stepped up efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the fighting. From early 1968 until mid 1974 several key UN diplomats worked toward multilateral talks aimed at reaching an agreement on the underlying issues of the civil war. Talks appeared to be moving closer to a solution in 1974 but events overtook the diplomatic efforts.

In 1971 General Grivas had escaped from Greece and moved into hiding on Cyprus. He formed a new underground organization of extremists, EOKA B, favoring unification with Greece. The new organization committed many terrorist acts and were plotting against President Makarios.

On 2 July 1974 President Makarios demanded the Greek government withdraw the Greek officers commanding the Cypriot National Guard. General Grivas had died in January but the movement he established was strong and bitterly opposing the withdrawal of Greek officers, moved against the President. On 15 July they staged a coup against President Makarios. He barely escaped with his life and a completely new round in the Cypriot Civil War began.
Greek Cypriots now fought each other as pro- or anti-Makarios factions competed for power. Internal conflict was not covered in the UN mandate, forcing the UN forces to improvise on difficult decisions. The Greek officers who mounted the coup named Nicos Sampson, a well known enotist, as President. Turkish Cypriots saw this as an immediate threat to their rights and well being.\[37\]

On 20 July Turkish airborne forces landed north of Nicosia and seaborne forces landed east of Kyrenia. These forces linked up and when they threatened the international airport, UN forces halted them. Peace talks were called in Geneva but broke down in August and Turkey mounted a 40,000 man invasion.\[33\] Fighting was extremely bitter. In areas where UN observer forces were forced to withdraw, unnecessary damage and civilian deaths often occurred.\[34\]

Turkish forces controlled almost half of the island and the Turkish Cypriot Vice President declared a temporary separate federated state of Turkish Cypriot autonomy. Despite several UN resolutions calling for troop withdrawals, Turkish forces remained.\[35\]

On 22 July 1974 a special humanitarian and economics branch was established as part UNFICYP headquarters. Its primary function was to do whatever it could to alleviate the suffering of the civil population caught up in the fighting. Approximately one-third of the island’s population was
homeless. UNFICYP humanitarian branch became the coordinator of all relief efforts to assist the refugees.36

Today Cyprus is partitioned by a "green line" running diagonally from northwest to southeast through the center of Nicosia. This line varies in width from 20 meters to seven kilometers.37 The UN forces remain, separating the belligerents, occupying the neutral "green line" with patrols and outposts.

UNFICYP continues to perform such diverse tasks as water and sewage system maintenance in the disputed areas to fire-fighting and medical relief. These missions are accomplished along with its mandated peacekeeping duties. The UN forces often act as security during religious services and supervise agriculture in the buffer zones.38 UNFICYP not only keeps the peace, but the guarantees the livelihood of many.

* * * * *

At the strategic level, the predominant national powers involved in the unrest came to an agreement prior to peacekeeping forces being deployed. The exception were the British forces which became defacto peacekeepers when the violence broke out. Agreement in this case was even more critical to success because of the large influence the external nations, Turkey and Greece played in the conflict. The agreement facilitated a clear statement of mission for
the UN forces and forced outside interests to publicly acknowledge the legitimacy of the operation.

Because of the early success of the British forces and their offer to allow access to bases for UN forces, British troops were included in the peacekeeping force. This was the first time that a permanent member nation of the UN Security Council was permitted to participate directly in peacekeeping operations. Permanent members had not been permitted in the past in order to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest by a nation in the Security Council.

The incident in the village of Ayios Theodhoros demonstrates the disproportionate significance of a minor event. The confrontation almost incited an international conflict over the ability of a man to walk through a village. This degree of political sensitivity places extreme demands on the peacekeeping forces, and shows how difficult attaining stability can be.

At the operational level, the UN operations in Cyprus were controlled by a parallel structure with coequal civilian and military heads. This is a departure from the normal unity of command and a senior/subordinate relationship. The military commander commanded UN forces and supervised peacekeeping, while the Secretary-General's Special Representative supervised all other aspects of operations. These included relief efforts, civil administration, negotiations and the civil police.
UNFICYP was the first peacekeeping force to employ detachments of the UN Civil Police. This demonstrates the realization that conflict resolution involved specific civil operations as well as military. In addition to maintaining peace, law and order the United Nations began to work toward guaranteeing human rights.

Also significant at the operational level was the flexibility and adaptability of the different forces in relation to their location on the island. The forces organized, conducted operations and occupied territory in response to what was required in the region rather than any dogmatic blueprinted plan.

This approach also maintained the national contingents as units under their internal chain of command. This is far superior to having to split the force up into many small detachments which are often isolated from their national command structure.

Intelligence was a major element in the ongoing ability of the UN peacekeeping forces to counter the provocative moves of General Grivas. Anticipation of the National Guard’s attacks on Turkish Cypriots allowed the UN to intervene with forces to stop the aggression. Many disputes were solved before General Grivas was able to make an issue of them.

In many instances the UN Peacekeeping Force Commander functioned as an intermediary between opposing sides.
Knowledge of the local grievances, timely response and credibility allow him to adjudicate incidents and negotiate a return to normal daily life without a serious escalation of violence.

The Force Commander also became the defacto humanitarian representative of the Cypriot population. His appeals allowed UN forces to move medical and food supplies into disputed areas while the belligerents remained deadlocked. It was only after repeated efforts by the Commander, that the island wide embargo was lifted. This embargo had only increased tension and provoked more violence. As an impartial representative, the UN was able to assist the government in realizing just how counterproductive some actions were.

At the tactical level, well trained and disciplined forces made a substantial contribution. Restraint and compassion by the UN forces improved relations between the Cypriots and built credibility for the peacekeepers. Use of persuasion and non-violent intervention required cool tempers and good judgment. These tactics facilitated a rapid reduction in violence and a quicker return to peaceful existence. The benefits of these tactics are multiplied when compared to the lasting bitter recriminations and reprisals following a bloody encounter.

Strict Rules of Engagement (ROE) guided the use of force for the UN forces. These ROE served a dual purpose.
They served notice to the belligerents that under certain circumstances that force would be used. But more importantly they formed the framework of restraint for the UN forces in specifying in detailed terms when force was allowable.

Mobility was key in several instances in the rapid concentration of UN forces to counter an aggressive act. Helicopters and armored cars assisted the relatively small forces monitor large areas and still be able to concentrate quickly. As several incidents demonstrated, the rapid intervention of UN forces between opposing sides was often enough to reduce tension and prevent violence.

Even during periods of direct conflict the UN forces fulfilled the invaluable function of impartial recorder, documenting the action and reporting to the United Nations. This unbiased record allowed the other external nations to receive accurate reports and in some cases be dissuaded from further support of aggression. Because of the force's established credibility this reporting served the local community with accurate chronicles to address fault in the proper places and quell unfounded rumors.

Their presence undoubtedly served as a deterrent in preventing belligerents from using unnecessary violence to achieve their goals. Human rights and collateral damage were closely monitored, forcing combatants to be more cognizant of the consequences of their actions.
Equally important to the peacekeeping operations at unit level were the humanitarian relief efforts undertaken by the UN forces. Medical aid, transportation, food distribution, public health, and refugee support were integral to day to day operations.

As the situation stabilized the UN forces fulfilled a quasi-administrative role in the rural areas. Supervising disputed areas and representing authority, the UN forces were often called on to perform governmental functions by both sides when the central government proved incapable.
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER 4, PART IV

INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1948-1990


**BELGIAN CONGO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1960-1964**


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WEST IRIAN (PAPUA) PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1962-1963


**CYPRUS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1964-1990**


CHAPTER 4, PART V

ANALYSIS & COMPARISONS

This section of the study analyses and compares the elements of success and failure from the conflicts detailed in the preceding four sections. The effects of common elements are examined in terms of their impact on the different conflicts. Chapter 5 discusses the trends associated with the more essential or critical common elements.

Initially the conflicts within the four operational categories are examined. Following the first stage comparison, a collation of all four operational categories is done to determine any trends and analyze common effects on the conflicts.

The intent is not to display a series of inviolate solutions to problems. The discussion focuses on key elements that must be analyzed in the conduct of the conflicts. Examination of the effects of these elements should serve as a guide for future analysis.
The relationships of different elements at the different levels of war are also important. Strategic options affect the operational campaign and the tactics used. Tactical successes may lead to strategic or operational defeat because they contributed to unimportant elements or were counterproductive to critical ones.

The consistency of the elements of success/failure, or lack of it, across the different conflicts and operational categories is the focus of this analysis. Likewise the consistency of relationships and results of those different elements is central to providing a framework for viewing future conflicts.

**LEGEND FOR THE ANALYSIS CHARTS**

The charts that follow each section summarize the analysis of the individual conflicts and a comparison within the operational categories. Elements marked with an X under success or failure highlight the significance of that element and whether it contributed generally to success or failure. Comparison charts highlight the elements by using a + to indicate association with success and a - to indicate failure. Combination signs such as +/- or an X in both the success or failure columns indicates the element had a mixed but significant impact.

The charts are provided to illustrate overall trends and key issues. They also serve as a guide to refer back to
portions of the text for more detailed explanations of a particular issue.

**INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY**
(Refer to Figures 4-V-1 thru 4-V-6)

The four case studies examined two diverse national approaches to counterinsurgency. Figures 4-V-1 through 4-V-6 summarize the analysis conducted earlier. This section compares the larger aspects and common trends of the four case studies. Issues are discussed in descending order from the strategic elements to the tactical. National background is provided to give perspective to the comments and further analysis.

When the experiences of France in Indochina and Algeria are compared with the British experiences in Malaya and Kenya several dramatic differences surface immediately. Fundamentally the two countries have almost diametrically opposed approaches to counterinsurgency. France sought to impose a primarily military solution on the insurgents while Britain took a more integrated solution.

Before the respective strategies are examined, the basic conditions in Britain and France must be analyzed. Both countries were devastated economically and socially following World War II. Britain had not been occupied and therefore, did not suffer the political schism between the resistance and the collaborators. Different political positions existed in Britain but did not span the drastic
INDOCHINA, 1945-1954
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

**STRATEGIC**
- Government commitment to conflict
- Stable domestic government
- Primary reliance on military solution
- Social integration
- Treatment of civilian population
- Limited economy
- National will
- External national involvement

**OPERATIONAL**
- Well organized insurgency
- Military government
- Security of terrain / population
- Intelligence
- Focus on eliminating insurgents
- Develop indigenous armed forces
- Improve civil administration
- Gain support of population
- Tough methods
- Conventional tactics

**TACTICAL**
- Intelligence
- Counterguerrillas
- Well trained, disciplined forces
- Heavy / light operations
- Harsh treatment of population
- Close air support
- Mobile columns
- Airborne OPNS / AERIAL RESUPPLY

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FIGURE 4-V-1
MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948-1960
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

STRATEGIC
- PRIMACY OF CIVIL AUTHORITY
- CIVIL / MILITARY / SOCIAL PROGRAMS
- SOCIAL INTEGRATION
- RULE OF LAW
- ECONOMIC BOOM
- NATIONAL WILL
- CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE ORG
- EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT
- INTEGRATED ADMINISTRATION

SUCCESS / FAILURE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

OPERATIONAL
- WELL ORGANIZED INSURGENCY
- CIVIL GOVERNMENT / LEADERSHIP
- SECURITY OF POPULATION
- ATTACK INSURGENT ORGANIZATION
- INTELLIGENCE
- SECONDARY FOCUS: ELIMINATE INSURGENTS
- ISOLATE INSURGENTS
  - RESETTLEMENT
  - FOOD DENIAL
- POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES
- DEVELOP INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES
- IMPROVE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
- GAIN SUPPORT OF POPULATION
  - CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS
  - IMPROVE STANDARDS OF LIVING
  - EXPERIENCE
  - UNCONVENTIONAL TACTICS
  - JUNGLE FORTS
  - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)
  - SECURITY PREREQUISITE FOR CIVIL OPNS

SUCCESS / FAILURE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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X
X
X

TACTICAL
- INTELLIGENCE
  - COUNTERGUERRILLAS
- AIRBORNE OPNS / AERIAL REsupply
  - SMALL UNIT OPS / DEEP PATROLS
  - RESETTLEMENT
  - FOOD DENIAL
- POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES
  - WELL TRAINED DISCIPLINED FORCES
  - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)
  - CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS
  - "AIR SUPPORT"
  - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
  - MONETARY REWARDS

SUCCESS / FAILURE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

FIGURE 4-V-2
KENYA EMERGENCY, 1952-1960
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

STRATEGIC
• PRIMACY OF CIVIL AUTHORITY
• CIVIL / MILITARY / SOCIAL PROGRAMS
• SOCIAL INTEGRATION
• RULE OF LAW
• NATIONAL WILL
• CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE ORG
• EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT
• INTEGRATED ADMINISTRATION

OPERATIONAL
• RELATIVELY WEAK INSURGENT ORG
• CIVIL GOVT / PARALLEL LEADERSHIP
• SECURITY OF POPULATION
• ATTACK INSURGENT ORGANIZATION
• INTELLIGENCE
• SECONDARY FOCUS: ELIMINATE INSURGENTS
• ISOLATE INSURGENTS
  • RESETTLEMENT
  • FOOD DENIAL
  • POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES
• DEVELOP INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES
• IMPROVE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
• GAIN SUPPORT OF POPULATION
• CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS
• IMPROVE STANDARDS OF LIVING
• AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
• EXPERIENCE
• UNCONVENTIONAL TACTICS & ORG
• FOREST FORTS
• MEDIA ATTENTION
• SECURITY PREREQUISITE FOR CIVIL OPNS

TACTICAL
• INTELLIGENCE
• COUNTERGUERRILLAS
• AIRBORNE OPNS & AERIAL RESUPPLY
• SMALL UNIT OPNS / DEEP PATROLS
• RESETTLEMENT
• FOOD DENIAL
• POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES
• WELL TRAINED, DISCIPLINED FORCES
• PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)
• URBAN OPERATIONS
• CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS
• "AIR SUPPORT"
• RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
• MONETARY REWARDS
• AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

FIGURE 4-V-3
# ALGERIAN REVOLT, 1954-1962
## ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

### STRATEGIC
- Government commitment to conflict
- Stable domestic government
- External support
- Primary reliance on MIL solution
- Lack of social integration
- "Tough methods"
- Limited economy
- National will
- "Centralized intelligence"

### OPERATIONAL
- Well organized insurgency
- Civil government / military policy
- Secure terrain / population
- Attack insurgent organization
- Intelligence
- Focus on eliminating insurgents
- Isolate insurgents
  - Physical barrier system (isolate country & insurgents)
  - Quadrillage
  - Resettlement
- Develop indigenous security forces
- Failure to improve civil admin
- Gain support of population
- "Tough methods"
- Experience
- Unconventional tactics
- Desert outposts
- Vigilantes & reprisals
- Media attention
- Psychological operations (PSYOP)

### TACTICAL
- Intelligence
- Counterguerrillas
- Air assault helicopter ops
- Resettlement
- Population control measures
- Well trained, disciplined forces
- Heavy / light operations
- Harsh treatment of population
- Urban operations
- Civil military operations
- Close air support
- Mobile columns
- Overreaction

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**FIGURE 4-V-4**
## SUMMARY OF INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY
### COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC</th>
<th>INDOCHINA</th>
<th>MALAYA</th>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>ALGERIA</th>
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<td>- GOVT COMMIT TO CONFLICT</td>
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<td>- STABLE DOMESTIC GOVT</td>
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<td>- PRIMARILY MIL SOLUTION</td>
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<td>- EXTERNAL NATL SUPPORT</td>
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<td>- ECONOMIC BOOM</td>
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<td>- LIMITED ECONOMY</td>
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<tr>
<td>- EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVT</td>
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<td>- INTEGRATED ADMINISTRATION</td>
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| OPERATIONAL                                 |           |        |       |         |
| - INSURG ORGANIZATION                       |           |        |       |         |
| - CIVIL GOVT / MIL POLICY                   |           |        |       |         |
| - CIVIL GOVT & LEADERSHIP                   |           |        |       |         |
| - MILITARY GOVT                             |           |        |       |         |
| - PARALLEL LEADERSHIP                       |           |        |       |         |
| - FOCUS: ELIM INSURG                        |           |        |       |         |
| - ATTACK INSURG ORGAN                       |           |        |       |         |
| - ISOLATE INSURG                            |           |        |       |         |
| - PHYSICAL BARRIER                          |           |        |       |         |
| - QUADRILLAGE                               |           |        |       |         |
| - RESETTLEMENT                              |           |        |       |         |
| - SECURITY OF POP                           |           |        |       |         |
| - FOOD DENIAL                               |           |        |       |         |
| - POP CONT MEASURES                         |           |        |       |         |
| - INTELLIGENCE                              |           |        |       |         |
| - DEVEL INDIG SEC FORCES                    |           |        |       |         |
| - IMPROVE CIV ADMIN                          |           |        |       |         |
| - SUPPORT OF POP                            |           |        |       |         |
| - IMPROVE STAND OF LIVING                   |           |        |       |         |
| - AGRICULT DEVEL                            |           |        |       |         |
| - "TOUGH METHODS"                          |           |        |       |         |
| - SECURE TERRAIN                            |           |        |       |         |
| - SEC PREQ FOR CIV OPNS                     |           |        |       |         |
| - CIV-MIL OPNS                              |           |        |       |         |
| - MEDIA ATTENTION                           |           |        |       |         |
| - EXPERIENCE                                |           |        |       |         |
| - UNCONVENT TACTICS                         |           |        |       |         |
| - DES/FOR/JUN OUTPOSTS                     |           |        |       |         |
| - VIGILANTES & REPRISALS                    |           |        |       |         |

**FIGURE 4-V-5**
### SUMMARY OF INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY (CONT.)

#### COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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<th>KENYA</th>
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<td>RULES OF ENGAGEMENT</td>
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**FIGURE 4-V-6**
range of those in France. Politically Britain was much more stable and singular in purpose than France.

The political stability of Britain translated into a strong and consistent policy regarding the conduct of colonial transition and counterinsurgency operations. France on the other hand, changed policy in wide mood swings each time a different coalition government rose to power. Thus France's basic inability to arrive at a consistent policy toward the conduct of operations had a cascading effect on all the subordinate, derivative operational and tactical programs.

Both countries suffered economically but the surge in internal economic development in Malaya enabled the comprehensive social programs and security forces to be funded. Although France received large amounts of U.S. foreign aid while conducting operations in Indochina and Algeria, the support was primarily military. Aid was often surplus U.S. military equipment from World War II. This fed France's preconception of a military solution and distracted efforts toward social and economic development.

France and Britain had extensive experience in colonial conflicts and rebellion prior to World War II. However, Britain was much quicker in reassessing the changing threat and revising its strategy. Insurgents were able to organize during World War II and nationalist movements gained momentum.
Allied efforts to establish resistance organizations during World War II assisted these insurgent organizations. Following World War II, the insurgents learned from Mao's success and improved their internal organization. Thus the insurgents of post-World War II were much better organized and equipped, more sophisticated, encouraged by Soviet and Chinese successes and had much wider public support.

France neglected this evolutionary development and sought to defeat the insurgents with the same, primarily military, solution. Britain accepted the need for basic change and social development. Britain's decision to grant independence but dictate the succession of governments was directly opposite to France's efforts to maintain the "status quo".

From these radically different perspectives the two countries developed the operational level programs and campaigns necessary to defeat the insurgents. Britain took the indirect approach: establish effective government, gain the support of the population, eliminate the insurgent support. France focused on fighting: destroy the insurgent forces, gain a military victory.

Arguments are often made that France was defeated by external support and not because of a fundamentally incorrect strategy. External support played a major role in Indochina and, to a lesser degree, Algeria, but this external support was largely military, used to combat military operations. In
Algeria, France effectively isolated the country but did not address the internal causes of the insurgency. This was a primary cause of failure.

In Malaya and Kenya external support was not a major factor, but the security forces still required several years, and the application of social development, to defeat the insurgents. External support would have required a larger military commitment to provide initial security but the basic causes of the insurgency still needed simultaneous attention.

National will is linked to domestic political stability. Conflicts on the fringes of national interests that extend over prolonged periods are difficult to justify. National will erodes over this extended period and the natural tendency is to press for a resolution of the conflict. This tendency is exacerbated by a poor domestic economy, world opinion and perception of the nationalist cause and conduct of operations. In granting independence, Britain avoided the domestic question of support for the conflict. It was characterized as a battle between freedom and communism. France on the other hand had to contend with liberal politicians who sought an end to colonialism.

Conduct of operations also becomes a factor as media attention and world opinion question the methods used. France's use of harsh treatment and the "tough methods" heightened public concern and made political positions more difficult. Britain's "rule of law" approach justified
security forces actions on the domestic front and gained a measure of world approval.

Beside the obvious moral questions involved in comparing the "rule of Law" and the "tough methods" the short or long term nature of the approach must be considered. France was forced to negotiate from an inferior position in both Indochina and Algeria. Although the military approach resulted in at least a military stalemate with the insurgents, this was only the immediate result. Few of the basic causes of the insurgency had been addressed and relations between the French and Algerians had sharply deteriorated. A temporary defeat of the insurgents may have been achievable but the question of how long it would last must be asked. France only created the conditions for a much more effective and bitter insurgency to follow. The solution would have required a harsh and repressive administration to achieve any stability.

Malaya and Kenya moved into an era of self-determination and continued good relations with Britain. When the society, along with the political situation, was stabilized the two ex-colonies prospered.

The short term success of the "tough methods", especially during the Battle of Algiers, cannot be ignored. The "tough methods" produced results. The long term effects of these results must be carefully considered. What is the price of suspending all human rights? France did not have to
answer that question because larger events made it irrelevant.

Although unquestionably successful, the "tough methods" produced irrevocable side effects that ultimately undermined all other efforts. Moral issues aside, the "rule of law" is the fundamentally sound approach, even though it produces few short term results.

Britain's focus on an integrated, indirect solution brought all the elements of national power (political, economic, informational, and military) to bear on an integrated problem. The insurgency was not merely a military problem. It was manifested in that manner but was not confined to that singular fundamental cause. Social, economic, political and informational causes sparked the military action.

The integrated strategy of the British experience addresses these other causal elements in priority before addressing the military portion of the insurgency. Social development, economic programs, education, and political reform are all used to address the root causes of the insurgency. Fundamental to this approach is the prerequisite of security to the developmental programs. This prerequisite of security requires a coordinated military and non-military effort to foster meaningful, effective change. Non-military programs executed in the absence of security are subject to the uncontrolled uses or abuses of the insurgents. The
population must be protected before it can be expected to act on the government's behalf.

Essential to this philosophy are two organizational structures. The first is a fully integrated, but supremely efficient, governmental bureaucracy. The second is a centralized intelligence gathering and processing organization.

The integrated administration is able to coordinate and assimilate the different resources and requirements to implement all elements of national power quickly and effectively. Security is developed in support of the priority indirect programs. Programs are executed in concert to make maximum use of limited assets. Execution is directly tied to policy guidance even from several diverse sources. Therefore, individually successful programs are coordinated to produce a sum greater than the individual parts. Programs which cannot survive in isolation are guaranteed support.

The centralized intelligence agency focuses on the primary importance of information. In the same way the integrated administration coordinates execution, the intelligence agency maximizes the use of limited sources and reports. The information is coordinated and assessed quickly from a variety of different perspectives. The organization gathers information on many different subjects in depth to provide a central information pool. Trends can quickly be established and planning done with complete, up to date information.
At the operational level, the level of insurgent organization is very important. Well organized insurgent groups are more resilient and difficult to penetrate. They are harder to isolate from the population and can coordinate information and operations quicker. The security forces must assess this level of organization and coordinate their response to it. Well organized insurgent groups will require greater, more comprehensive efforts to produce acceptable results.

Government forces need to use the least disruptive and coercive measures possible to achieve the desired ends. If programs are considered on a scale of intensity, population control measures are low and full scale resettlement is high. Simple measures, such as curfews may be sufficient in some areas to isolate a poorly organized insurgency. Other more comprehensive, and more disruptive measures, such as full scale resettlement may be needed to defeat other, more organized, insurgents. Although necessary, these efforts must be planned and executed with high standards or the disruption, instability and bad feelings from the population could overshadow all other efforts.

The case studies show diverse methods of leadership from completely civilian to completely military. Clearly the military government in Indochina matched the reliance on a military solution. This does not have to be the case.
Whether the High Commissioner in Malaya wore civilian clothes or not does not change his philosophical direction. It does change the perception of him and effects world opinion and public outlook. The strategic primacy of civil authority may require some perspective in application.

Depending on the level of violence and operations in Malaya and Kenya, parallel leadership existed to control the colony. More importantly, the military element of national power consistently fulfilled a supporting role to the other, indirect programs. The primacy of civil authority may be more a question of philosophical outlook than actual leadership organization.

The diversity of the two different national perspectives is further demonstrated with their translation into operational programs. More traditional military objectives such as securing terrain and use of large conventional military units highlight the French focus on a military solution by targeting the insurgents.

The application of the wide range of social programs by the British indicates the different elements of national power being used. Resettlement, civil military operations and food denial programs directly complement the strategic objectives of the British approach. Government effectiveness is the focal point and the population is the primary target.
Isolating the insurgent and security of the civilian population are actually two sides of the same coin. The civil programs require security before they can be effective and the insurgents need to be separated from their support (internal and/or external). By cutting this link, the government can simultaneously provide a measure of security and deny the insurgent valuable support.

The government can accomplish isolation using a variety of programs at the operational level. Physical barriers, resettlement, security force garrisons and even indigenous local forces such as the Home Guard may be used individually or in combination.

Conventional tactics dictate that all available means be brought to bear on the enemy for the greatest effect. This is no doubt true here also but the enemy (insurgent) in the British methodology is not the primary focus. Government programs must be assessed carefully for their effects on the population that is the central focal point. Even though certain measures may cripple insurgent efforts, they may be counterproductive to long term development programs.

Equally important is the execution at the tactical level. Merely designing a successful program at the operational level does not guarantee its success in the field.

French methods of focusing on the insurgent failed to recognize the ability of the insurgency to regenerate itself.
If root causes of the insurgent problem were not addressed, insurgent losses were quickly replaced by a large pool of willing volunteers. For example, at times the number of weapons dictated active insurgent strength rather than the number of men.

Even military defeat only forced the insurgents to revert to a lower level of activity while it rebuilt its organization and returned. Often the results of the military defeat placed such a burden on the population that they were further alienated in the beginning of a vicious cycle.

In this light, support of the population was largely immaterial to French efforts, while it was essential to British. Even in Algeria, the French ignored the potential of the Algerian population by allowing the "pied noirs" to conduct uninterrupted reprisals against the Algerians. This increased the bitter animosity between French and Algerians, sowing the seeds for continued conflict.

Following the French defeat in Indochina, efforts were made in the French military to analyze the cause of the failure. Contrast these completely military operations of Indochina with the beginnings of an integrated approach in Algeria. Although predominantly military in focus, the application of other programs, such as resettlement and the SAS teams, are used with some positive effects.
The element of experience is considerable in the later conflicts. Britain was able to transfer key personnel from Palestine to Malaya with first hand operational experience. As events in Kenya deteriorated, personnel were, in turn, transferred from Malaya to Kenya to establish operations. This same effect can be seen when the French Airborne units arrive in Algeria from Indochina and operations improve.

At the tactical level the number of successes, even in the French columns is impressive. The well trained and disciplined troops of both armed forces proved able to carry out many tasks successfully. The key was whether these tasks contributed or detracted from the eventual outcome.

Contrast the use of more traditional military operations in the French and British tactical execution. The adaptation of these methods to counterinsurgency operations are worth noting. Security and eventual elimination of the insurgent is important. It cannot be done in isolation to effect a long term solution.

However, the British use of more sophisticated, unconventional and smaller military operations more closely supported the overall British plans. Large scale military operations are by their nature harsh and non-selective in their application. With the population as the central focal point, the British sought to avoid alienation caused by large operations. Situation dependent, the importance hinges on
the assessment of the desired outcome weighing against the resulting costs. Once insurgents are isolated from the population, large scale operations may be the most effective method on some types of terrain.

The successful cordon and search operations conducted by both armies in urban areas crippled the insurgent support organizations. Intelligence was the focal point of both operations. The difference lay in the methods of gathering the necessary intelligence. French methods centered on the "tough methods" while British methods focused on Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and monetary rewards.

The use of PSYOPs and monetary rewards are more consistent with the "rule of law" while the "tough methods" follow the application of military strength. Both produced excellent short term results. The "tough methods" eventually forced condemnation of the French in world opinion while operations in Kenya proceeded.

Complex rules of engagement (ROE), requiring shouted orders to halt and surrender before firing, often frustrated British soldiers operating on deep patrols. In the short term, at the tactical level, they allowed insurgents to escape and foiled hasty ambushes. Although difficult for soldiers to understand, they followed instructions in a disciplined manner. This tendency convinced many insurgents that the government was more concerned with their surrender than eventual death. In the long run, at the operational
level, these strict ROE aided operational PSYOP surrender efforts and built respect for the government programs and security forces.

The lowest common denominator may be termed individual execution. The regular portion of the security forces in all four conflicts were made up largely of elite units with well trained, disciplined forces. The attitude of the forces was dramatically different.

British forces were constantly exhorted to be compassionate with the local population and treat them with respect in all endeavors. French forces generally held the local population in low esteem and treated them with contempt.

Government programs depended on quality execution, often at the individual soldier level. Security forces directly represented governmental authority and their efforts translated into support or alienation of the population. Strategic and operational efforts were quickly reduced to individual soldiers and became not so much what they did, as how they did it.
These case studies outline a number of important elements that led to the success or failure of the operations. All of the cases detail operations outside the sovereign territory of the primary nations involved. Although this focuses on the international aspect of peacetime contingency operations, many of the same lessons will be applicable to domestic operations. More importantly, the international interventions raise more complex issues for examination and analysis.

The discussion in this section parallels the earlier analysis as issues are highlighted in descending order, beginning at the strategic level. Comparison and contrast with the background information is used to determine the relative impact of each different element.

Coalition warfare was a desirable element for the countries involved in the Suez Crisis and the Congo Intervention. It helped diffuse hostile international pressure and was a prominent issue in the United Nations Security Council. Abstentions from critical votes delayed unfavorable actions, bought time or even forced issues to the General Assembly. The coalition also allowed countries to pool assets complementing strengths and weaknesses on each side.

Opposite the coalition aspect, security and speed of action are also major considerations. When more actors are
### Suez Crisis, 1956

**Elements of Success / Failure**

#### Strategic
- Coalition Warfare
- Security of a Strategic Choke Point
- World Opinion / United Nations Action
- International Political Pressure
- National Will
- Deception
- Surprise
- Economic Conditions

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#### Operational
- Swift, Decisive Operations
- Sufficient Forces
- Heavy Lift, Long Range Aircraft
- Media Attention / Compromise
- Combined Command & Staff
- Surprise
- Early Planning
- Joint Operations & Communications
- Conventional Chain of Command
- Air Superiority
- Logistical Constraints / Requirements

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#### Tactical
- Surprise
- Airborne Opns & Airfield Seizure
- Air Assault Helicopter Operations
- Heavy / Light Operations
- Military Opns on Urban Terrain (MOUT)
- Aircraft Carrier Operations
- Close Air Support
- Intelligence
- Unconditional Surrender

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**Figure 4-V-7**
CONGO INTERVENTION, 1964
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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FIGURE 4-V-8
### THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT, 1975
#### ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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<tr>
<td>• AC-130 Spectre Gunship</td>
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<td>• Intelligence</td>
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<td>• Experience</td>
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<td>• Lack of Special Ops Forces (SOF)</td>
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**FIGURE 4-V-9**
## OPERATION JUST CAUSE, 1989
### ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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<td>• Security of Strategic Choke Point</td>
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<td>• World Opinion</td>
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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Swift, Decisive Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Sufficient Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Heavy Lift, Long Range Aircraft</td>
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<td>• Intelligence</td>
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<td>• Media Attention / Compromise</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Surprise</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>• C-130 ABCBC AIRBORNE COMMAND POST</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Joint Operations &amp; Communications</td>
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<td>• Direct Chain of Command</td>
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<td>• Mission to Rebuild Security Forces</td>
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<td>• Corps HQ as JTF HQ</td>
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<td>• Deception</td>
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<td>• Existing Contingency Plans</td>
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<td>• Mobilization</td>
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<td>• Airborne Opns &amp; Airfield Seizure</td>
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<td>• Air Assault Helicopter Operations</td>
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<td>• Heavy / Light Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Mil Opns On Urban Terrain (MOUT)</td>
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<td>• Small Unit Operations</td>
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<td>• Rules of Engagement (ROE)</td>
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<td>• Close Air Support</td>
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<td>• AC-130 Spectre Gunships</td>
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<td>• Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Clandestine Advance Party</td>
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<td>• Special Operations Forces (SOF)</td>
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<td>• Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)</td>
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<td>• Civil Military Operations (CMO)</td>
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<td>• Refugee Camp Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Monetary Rewards (Money for Weapons)</td>
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**FIGURE 4-V-10**
### SUMMARY OF PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

#### COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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<thead>
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<td>Base/Stage RTS</td>
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<td>National Will</td>
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<td>Sovereignty</td>
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<td>Pol Dec &amp; Tact Opns</td>
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<td>Deception</td>
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<td>Media/Compromise</td>
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<td>Isolate Op Area</td>
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**FIGURE 4-V-11**
### SUMMARY OF PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPNS (CONT.)

**COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACTICAL</th>
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<td>• AIR ASSLT HELO OPNS</td>
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<td>• HEAVY/LIGHT OPNS</td>
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<td>• SMALL UNIT OPNS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>• AC-130 GUNSHIP</td>
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<td>• STABILITY OPNS</td>
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<td>• REFUGEE OPNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>• MONETARY REWARDS</td>
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**FIGURE 4-V-12**
included the ability to reach a rapid consensus and maintain tight security declines dramatically. This explains, in part, why the two U.S. operations were unilateral. Had the U.S. been able to involve other Latin American nations in JUST CAUSE, some of the harsh criticism of the operation may have been muted.

World opinion and United Nations' action are carrying greater weight in the strategic decision making arena. It is more difficult for a nation to take unilateral action and ignore the international consequences. Therefore, if action will receive international criticism another method of minimizing the impact is to conduct rapid, decisive operations.

In the simplest sense, it may be easier to ask forgiveness than permission. Although this concept can be construed many ways, the intent is to minimize the negative world opinion and its impact on operations. Intervention in the sovereign affairs of a nation will almost always be condemned, but if done correctly this condemnation can be short lived and less intense. This is especially true if the operations do not cause extensive civilian casualties and collateral damage. In the same sense, refugees must be well cared for and provisions made for compensation for losses.

The different case studies surface an apparent dichotomy in objectives for contingency operations. Security/protection of citizens or foreign nationals is a
predominant cause for mounting operations. This must be taken in perspective, as there is usually a higher political aim surrounding the intervention. Once innocent civilians are safe, then intervention forces often turn to stability operations to reestablish law and order. The relative importance of the civilians to the operation may range for all-encompassing to a mere justification for action. In either case, they are an important aspect of the mission.

Safety of civilians may well depend on swift, decisive operations. Initially groups may be disorganized and unsure of their eventual objectives. Actions taken early can capitalize on this disorientation and often accomplish the mission with fewer forces and less risk. For an altogether different reason, these operations require surgical firepower to minimize collateral damage and civilian causalities. Safety of the critical personnel depends on precise firepower and strict rules of engagement.

Security of a strategic choke point may also require military intervention. Again, rapid, decisive operations may determine the difference between overall success or failure. Possession may mean negotiating from a position of strength rather than weakness. Military operations are used in support of a larger non-military strategic objective involving the use of an indirect approach.

As colonial powers lost their possessions, basing and staging rights increased in importance. Even the United
States, with its strategic deployability assets required basing rights to mount major operations. Britain and France could not have assaulted Egypt if Malta and Cyprus had not still been under British control. The emphasis on rapid operations and minimizing the international pressure makes clandestine assembly in a friendly area almost essential. A consideration is the amount of international pressure a supporting country can sustain if operations are extended from permissive bases.

National sovereignty becomes an extension of this issue. It involves not only support but the ability to conduct operations. If world opinion is a concern and the host government is consulted, then the same problems of coalition warfare are encountered. What may begin as a common effort with consistent objectives can rapidly transform into a complex operation. Thus, the relative benefits of coalition action and national sovereignty must be balanced against the anticipated effects of world opinion.

The Congo is an excellent example of just how diverse and complex governmental positions can become. Tshombe clearly had his own agenda, which was often counterproductive to the American/Belgian coalition efforts. Unilateral actions may have been much more effective but international political concerns prohibited Belgium from an appearance of unilateral intervention in the Congo again. The concern of
international opinion actually outweighed the stated purpose of the operations: to secure and protect foreign nationals.

National will is also a major consideration. Again, swift, decisive operations can alleviate some of the potential problems associated with national will. Once operations cease, budgeting and other prior restraint methods are of only minor concern. However, as operations with tenuous linkages to national purpose or security drag on, public support is destined to trail off. However, the more pronounced the threat becomes, the less this is an issue.

Operation JUST CAUSE is an example of how links can be portrayed to maximize public support. Safety of Americans abroad has a direct link to American purpose. This was a much easier objective to publicize and for which to garner public support than an abstract notion such as canal security. Objectives such as the security of the Panama Canal are more difficult because they do not directly affect most American’s lives.

For the reasons outlined earlier, a show of force may be preferred to actual operations. It compromises strategic and operational surprise but may accomplish the desired objectives. Capabilities must be considered and the show of force must be credible. If sufficient capability to accomplish actual operations, either symmetrical or asymmetrical, is not demonstrated than the effect may be
counterproductive. In the largest sense, gradualism must be weighed against swift, decisive operations.

Political decisions by senior officials directing tactical operations carry the issue of gradualism one step further. Once military operations are authorized, how many and what types of strategic restraints are permissible? A simple answer is impossible but some points are clear.

Forces often become immediately at risk, as elements such as detailed planning, surprise, and synergy of weapons/timing are lost. Strategic commanders must outline their intent and highlight options they are considering. Operational commanders must give detailed assessments of consequences to aid senior level decision makers when time is short. Tactical commanders must be made aware of decision points and plan appropriate branches to the basic plan. Finally, communications must support real-time information flow to preclude jeopardizing the forces involved.

Elements such as international political pressure and basing rights concern the political element of power. National will and world opinion involve primarily the informational element of national power. Shows of force and surprise revolve mostly around the military element of power. But the economic element of national power must also be considered.

Britain's economic vulnerability led to a unilateral cessation of operations. The monetary crisis carried more
weight than the United Nations' resolutions. The condition of the national economy impacted directly on military success. Recognizing relationships such as this only further emphasize the integration of all elements of national power and their direct impact on military operations.

At the operational level, the use of swift, decisive action has already been discussed. Closely allied to it is the element of sufficient forces. The temptation to employ insufficient forces because of either a lack of deployability or timing can be great. Again, gradualism can void surprise and make earlier surmountable objectives infinitely more difficult. Commitment of overwhelming forces creates a synergistic shock effect that capitalizes on surprise and increases the momentum of operations.

A direct variable on the question of sufficient forces is the asset of heavy lift, long range aircraft. Rapid response with sufficient forces, by its nature, dictates massive airlift. Power projection, even on a limited scale, requires an inventory of capable aircraft that can be focused for operations swiftly. This applies to both fixed wing and helicopters. A balance of forces with a mix of capabilities enhances the ability to cover a wide range of contingencies.

Forward positioning can alleviate some of the shortfalls in deployability and response time but may void surprise. Available assets are weighted against the
possibility of compromise and the requirement for basing or staging rights.

Intelligence is essential to effective decision making. Information must be timely, accurate and well disseminated. Once the decision to commit forces is made, that information is critical to maintaining rapid operations with precision firepower and at times limited mobility. The balance between sufficient forces and strategic deployability is determined by available information and the subsequent assessment. If either is flawed, the result could be disastrous.

The impact of media attention, and in some cases irresponsibility, led directly to operational compromise. In some instances this created only minor problems, but the potential for complete failure is high. Operational security must be an important aspect of the operation. Credible deception programs targeted at friendly media may be more important than those targeting the enemy commander. Military commands must work in conjunction with the media to provide responsive information that does not compromise operations. Adjustments can be made in exchange for responsible reporting. A comprehensive plan would incorporate both.

Existing contingency plans and early planning are closely related. Most of the case studies indicated that early planning, even if subsequently changed, saved time and provided a foundation for further action. To a larger
degree, existing contingency plans would be very valuable. Even generic plans using general scenarios would be much better than starting from scratch with limited time. Operation JUST CAUSE provides ample evidence of the effectiveness of following existing plans that have been modified with current intelligence and force structure.

These plans must be a joint effort in order to accurately plan all aspects of deployment, ground operations and support. Invariably rapid response operations will require Air Force and Navy participation to take advantage of all available assets. Communications and joint staffs must be made available for effective command and control.

The combined command and staff organizations are a direct outgrowth of the coalition warfare at the strategic level. In both the Suez intervention and the Congo the combined organizations were extremely effective and separate operations would be difficult to imagine. In rapid paced, fluid situations an integrated staff is essential for adequate command and control.

An additional concern is a streamlined chain of command for responsive decisions, rapid information flow and a high teeth to tail ratio. Conventional images of rank and organization should give way to tailored organizations built on mission requirements, governed by the principles of effective span of control. For instance, it is not necessary for a division headquarters to deploy if only one brigade is
committed to a corps headquarters acting as the Joint Task Force (JTF). The JTF is capable of managing the brigade, while the division headquarters would only insert an unnecessary layer into the chain of command.

At the higher tactical and operational levels this makes management of assets and efficient communications packages very important. The C-130 Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) is an example of one solution. Needing only a small staff, it is deployable and reliable. It is air refuelable for extended operations and covers a wide range of communications capabilities.

Units and equipment should be identified for use during contingency operations. They should exercise these types of scenarios often and develop a habitual relationship with corresponding joint service units. This creates experience and institutional memory, evolves concepts, and precludes being forced into using ad hoc organizations.

Mobilization should be avoided because of the limited time available, security and political sensitivities. Therefore, essential forces should be earmarked and maintained on active duty for use in contingency operations. This includes traditionally low visibility forces such as Psychological Operations units and Civil Affairs detachments. These units should be regularly exercised in conjunction with other earmarked forces.
Complex logistical requirements must be anticipated and provided for. Limited deployability will often prevent a large logistics build up. The mission must be carefully analyzed to determine the necessary requirements with some measure of flexibility. Critical items, such as parachutes, must be stocked in locations that can be made available in a relatively short time. Fast paced operations require the same detailed branches and sequels from the logistical standpoint as they do from the operational side.

Airfield capacities arose as an issue during operations in the Congo. It was overcome but the lesson is clear. Deployment, staging and airflow require detailed planning that incorporates all variables. This same lesson had been learned earlier during the intervention in Lebanon and again later during operations in Grenada. In both of those cases it materially affected operations.

The ability to isolate the operational area has several benefits. It simplifies the concern of civilian casualties and collateral damage while limiting support for the opposition. It requires seizing and maintaining the initiative that works to the opponents disadvantage.

Unusual aspects of an operation must be planned for in advance. For example, the mission to rebuild the national security forces in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE. Conventional units do not have the capability to conduct these types of missions. Specialized units such as U.S. Army
Special Forces are required. They in turn require planning and preparation time for complex operations requiring long term training and supervision.

Realistic timetables for these long term requirements should be included in original planning estimates. Strategic planners and decision makers must understand the commitment in terms of time, resources and potential problems these types of missions require and structure their efforts accordingly.

At the tactical level the use of airborne and heliborne assault forces was very valuable. Large forces were built up quickly and deployed into several different areas simultaneously. Tactical surprise and the ensuing shock effect was increased while the considerations of limited ground mobility and firepower were also considered.

Particularly effective was a mix of forces using tailored organizations of heavy mechanized forces in combination with light infantry. Several options for the deployment of these forces included prepositioning or a simultaneous amphibious landing and link up. If sufficient assets are available, air transport and airlanding can be accomplished following an airfield seizure.

Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) were significant in several of the case studies. This is a difficult task to master and requires specialized training. Conventional units seldom devote critical training time to
MOUT. During conventional war urban operations are avoided and therefore not as critical to mission success. Scope of operations and locations of objectives dictates that MOUT will often be required during contingencies. Units earmarked for contingency operations should therefore give MOUT a high training priority.

Rules Of Engagement (ROE) took on great emphasis as forces sought to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. These rules required individual soldier evaluations of each situation before force could be applied. Often complex and usually changing with the situation, they were a leadership and training challenge. Any efforts to simplify the ROE and make them more easily understood paid benefits in execution. Forces that have contingency missions must give ROE priority training using realistic scenarios.

Forces with limited organic firepower, deployed in isolation and over extended distances, made good use of close air support and carrier based aircraft. Close air support was used in lieu of heavy ground fire support. Although it was flexible and lethal, like ground fire support weapons, close air support is generally an area suppression weapon. Care must be taken to coordinate targets and relative threats to protect friendly forces and still minimize collateral damage and civilian injuries.

Assets like the U.S. AC-130 Spectre gunship solved some of those problems. Using sophisticated electronics to
acquire targets and then deliver precise firepower, the AC-130 is a critical asset. It is vulnerable in a high air defense threat, so its use must be calculated against the enemy capabilities. Like the ABCCC it is rapidly deployable and gives a capability far in excess of its proportional cost.

As an adjunct to military operations, soldiers were required to conduct a range of medical and humanitarian support missions. Once fighting subsided units were tasked with stability operations to reestablish law and order among the local population. Refugees had to be provided for and essential governmental services had to be reestablished.

Military Civil Affairs units provided the linkage between the existing local government and the military forces to coordinate these efforts. Combat units quickly took on police and engineer functions. Deployment capabilities precluded large contingents of Military Police and Engineers arriving in time to assume these missions directly. Thus, units with contingency missions must anticipate these realities and train accordingly.
COMBATTING TERRORISM
(Refer to Figures 4-V-13 thru 4-V-19)

This section compares and contrasts the six different case studies in the earlier section on combatting terrorism. Common elements are highlighted as they applied to each case and compared to the different situations. Strategic issues are discussed first, with operational and tactical issues following. Figures 4-V-13 through 4-V-19 summarize the earlier analysis.

One of the primary considerations in counterterrorism is the safety of the hostages. This translates directly into carefully planned and executed operations to eliminate the terrorists while safeguarding the hostages. Care must be taken, when using force, to act swiftly with precision firepower. However, there are other options available.

In order to maximize the available options the concept of initiative must be gained and maintained by the government forces. This maneuvers the terrorists into actions and areas which favor the government forces and allow greater freedom of action. One example of initiative is isolating the terrorists and the hostages in an area favorable to the government. Another might be the exchange of hostages for government substitutes.

Negotiations play a major role in maneuvering the terrorists. Time, concessions, information and even release of the hostages can be gained through negotiation. Even if
## THE MUNICH OLYMPICS, 1972
### ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Safety of hostages</td>
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<td>- Media coverage</td>
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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>- Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Pressure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Intelligence</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Isolation</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Command &amp; control</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ad Hoc Organization</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>- Legal aspects of conflict &amp; engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Vague instructions</td>
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**Figure 4-V-13**
### THE ENTEBBE HOSTAGE RESCUE, 1976
### ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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<tr>
<td>BASING/STAGING RIGHTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMMAND &amp; CONTROL</td>
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<td>LONG RANGE, HEAVY LIFT AIRCRAFT</td>
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<td>AERIAL COMMAND &amp; CONTROL PLATFORM</td>
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<td>EARLY PLANNING</td>
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<tr>
<td>SURPRISE</td>
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<tr>
<td>SURPRISE</td>
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<tr>
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**FIGURE 4-V-14**
## LUFTHANSA HIJACKING - MOGADISHU, 1977
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<td>SOVEREIGNTY</td>
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<td>ISOLATION</td>
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<td>COMMAND &amp; CONTROL</td>
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<td>WEAPONS/DEMOLITIONS TECHNOLOGY</td>
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**FIGURE 4-V-15**
IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION, 1980
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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<td>* SAFETY OF HOSTAGES</td>
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<td>* BASING/STAGING RIGHTS</td>
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<td>* RESOURCES</td>
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<td>* INTELLIGENCE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>* COMMAND &amp; CONTROL</td>
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<td>* COMPLEX PLAN</td>
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<td>* OPSEC</td>
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<td>* SURPRISE</td>
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<tr>
<td>* CLANDESTINE ADVANCE PARTY</td>
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<td>* COMMUNICATIONS</td>
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FIGURE 4-V-16
# ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING, 1985
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>• ASYMMETRICAL RESPONSE</td>
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**Figure 4-V-18**
# SUMMARY OF COMBATTING TERRORISM
## COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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<th>IWA</th>
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<tr>
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<td>MEDIA/COMPROMISE</td>
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| OPERATIONAL |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| NEGOTIATIONS |   |     |      |      |     |     |
| RESOURCES |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| WORLD PRESS |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| INTELLIGENCE |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| ISOLATION |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| CMD & CONTROL |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| AD HOC ORGAN |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| LG RANG ACFT |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| AERIAL CMD & CON |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| EARLY PLANNING |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| SURPRISE |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| OPER MOBILITY |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| COMPLEX PLAN |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| OPSEC |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| TERR SUPP ORGAN |     |     |      |      |     |     |

| TACTICAL |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| ROE |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| TRN'D FORCES |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| SURPRISE |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| INTELLIGENCE |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| COMMTECH |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| WPNS TECH |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| HEAVY/LT FORCES |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| MEDICAL SUPPORT |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| LEGAL ASPECTS |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| EVAC OPNS |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| CLAND ADV PARTY |     |     |      |      |     |     |
| CARRIER OPNS |     |     |      |      |     |     |

**FIGURE 4-V-19**
the negotiations are substantively unproductive, they can distract the terrorists from other ongoing operations.

Sovereignty is a prerequisite to performing operations outside the territorial limits of the government undertaking operations. This becomes essential in considering where to maneuver terrorists and maximizing options.

In the same sense basing/staging rights are critical. Terrorists often have world-wide mobility or at least access to it. Counterterrorist forces must be just as mobile, while maintaining a posture that permits them to conduct operations. This may require a distant location to be used as a staging area rather than sacrificing surprise by shadowing the terrorists directly.

Terrorist incidents are usually high priority items for news coverage. They can continue for several days or even weeks, while the world is kept abreast of every move. This has the potential to arouse world opinion either for or against military action. The same is true of domestic national will.

Generally terrorist actions are universally deplored but as more information is broadcast opinions may change. Although few condoned the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, the terrorists succeeded in gaining sympathy for their cause through skillful use of news media.
Information on counterterrorist forces and government actions is especially sensitive. Media representatives should be responsible in deciding which information they make available: that cannot be counted on. The case of the Lufthansa hijacking is excellent evidence. Even in Israel, where sensitivities should run higher, the media acted irresponsibly.

International political pressure, national will and media coverage can all be of national importance during terrorist incidents. Options must take into account the impact of these factors and assess the reaction in advance.

Non-military actions may also achieve results. These types of actions are less threatening to the safety of the hostages, but must address very sensitive areas to achieve some direct success.

More likely is the indirect, but nonetheless extremely important, success non-military actions might have. The Airline Pilots Association demonstrated that through the threat of economic and trade sanctions they could influence several countries to stop at least their overt support of terrorists. Once again, this demonstrates the utility of the indirect approach and a long term strategy in dealing with conflict.

Intelligence in all operations is essential, but it is particularly vital in counterterrorist operations. Precision intervention requires detailed information on many
levels for successful action. Safety of the hostages dictates that firepower be absolutely accurate, yet operations must be lightening fast. Thus, information on terrorist background and likely reactions is as important as how many terrorist there are and how well they are armed.

Surgical operations with international attention require very direct command and control linkages. Issues such as national sovereignty and rule of engagement must not be passed through unnecessary, successive layers of command. Decisions must be made quickly and be responsive. The organization and all the physical apparatus needs to support this aim.

Communications must be foolproof and cover the entire range of available networks. They must be rapidly deployable and compact enough for operations under severe circumstances. The C-130 ABCCC is one asset that can perform this function well. Other more sophisticated options are available, but retain the same basic principles.

All operations require some measure of deployability. Most require long range international movement. This requires heavy lift, long range aircraft. Large scale operations might be ultimately dependent on this asset. Although costly to procure and maintain, a fleet of heavy transport is essential to world-wide deployability and power projection.
The TWA Flight 847 hijacking demonstrates the importance of an underground support structure. Similar to the importance of the insurgent support structure, terrorists may also depend on an underground organization. The better the organization, the more difficult it is to penetrate. This, in part, explains the long term hostages such as Terry Waite being held in Beirut.

Ad hoc organizations cannot attain the levels of performance required for military counterterrorist operations. Counterterrorist forces must be well trained and disciplined. Constant focus on hostage situations and counterterror methods preclude any conventional, non-dedicated force from operating very successfully. The command and control organization must be equally trained and centrally focused.

As larger operations are considered, the elements of success reflect a more conventional background. Tactical surprise and intelligence are important regardless. Heavy/Light force mixes and carrier operations are essential elements of larger operations. The threat and type of operation dictates the types of forces deployed. Thus, conventional forces may fulfill an important supporting function in larger operations.

The potential for a hostage to be wounded or killed during counterterror operations is high. Considering the concern over safety of the hostages, immediately available
medical support can be a distinct advantage. Deployable medical units, capable of the full range of life support operations make this possible. The need is dictated by the isolation of the area of operations and whether the host government is friendly or hostile.

Detailed Rules Of Engagement (ROE) combined with meticulous training seek to minimize hostage woundings or deaths. Split second decisions are required before using force on a subject. Making these decisions successfully requires constant drill. The degree of resolution involved makes this a very perishable skill.

Rapidly evacuating hostages may also be required, if the environment is hostile. Well organized, thorough procedures can spell the difference between getting all the hostages out in the dark or leaving one behind. The effect of having one hostage left behind could be as detrimental as one hundred.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
(Refer to Figures 4-V-20 thru 4-V-24)

Figures 4-V-20 through 4-V-24 summarize the earlier discussion and analysis. This section uses the earlier information from the four peacekeeping case studies to examine how the different elements applied in different situations.

Effective peacekeeping operations do not absolutely require impartiality. An occupying power with overwhelming military force may accomplish the same objectives while clearly not impartial. It is, however, desirable to remain impartial. This demands a non-adversarial relationship exist between the peacekeeping forces and all respective sides in a conflict.

The best way to guarantee a non-adversarial relationship is to arrange a prior cease-fire agreement. Several methods, from political pressure to outright sanctions, are available to assist in arriving at a mutually agreeable cease-fire plan. This allows the peacekeeping force to enforce a peace rather than having to create one. Inevitably, when peacekeeping forces are required to use force, as they were in the Congo, they become a central target. This violates impartiality and opens the peacekeeping force to criticism as an intervention force.

Even when the intervention in the Congo was carried out under United Nations mandate, it suffered tremendous
INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1948-1990
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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<tr>
<td>• Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Rapid response</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Supervise civil justice</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Presence • deterrence</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supervise cease-fire / withdrawal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish / monitor demilitarized zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Observers w / forward units</td>
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FIGURE 4-V-20
# CONGO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1960-1964
## ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

### STRATEGIC
- No Prior Cease-Fire Agreement
- Vague Mission Statement
- Multi-National Force
- Use of Force
- External National Involvement
- Sovereignty
- Internal Conflict
- Modified Mandate
- National Will

### OPERATIONAL
- Overall Civilian Head of Operations
- Combination of Military & Civil Opns
- Security Prerequisite for Civil Opns
- Intelligence
- Isolation of Country/Operational Area
- Mission Flexibility
- Mission: Rebuild Security Forces

### TACTICAL
- Disciplined, Well Trained Units
- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Civil Administrative Duties
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Supervision of Cease-Fire
- Est / Monitor Demilitarized Zone
- Supervision of Local Military Forces
- Anti-Terrorism

### FIGURE 4-V-21
WEST IRIAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1962-1963
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

**STRATEGIC**
- Prior Cease-Fire Agreement
- Detailed Mission Statement
- Single Nation Force
- UN Mandate / Impartiality

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**OPERATIONAL**
- Overall Civilian Head of Operations
- Military & Civilian Operations
- Resp for Natl Govt / Civil Admin
- Personnel Integration / Social Devel
- Mission: Rebuild Security Forces

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**TACTICAL**
- Disciplined, Well Trained Units
- Civil Administrative Duties
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Supervise Cease-Fire
- Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

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FIGURE 4-V-22
# CYPRUS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 1964-1990
## ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

### STRATEGIC
- Prior Cease-Fire Agreement
- Detailed Mission Statement
- Multi-National Force
- Use of Force: Strictly Limited
- External National Involvement
- Sovereignty
- Internal Conflict
- Modified Mandate
- Standing Peacekeeping Operation
- UN Mandate / Impartiality

### OPERATIONAL
- Parallel Leadership Positions
- Military & Civil Operations
- Unlimited Access / Freedom of Movement
- Security Prerequisite for Civil Ops
- Intelligence
- Inability to Isolate Country/Opn Area
- Civil Police Detachment
- Mission Flexibility
- National Integrity of PKO Force

### TACTICAL
- Disciplined, Well Trained Forces
- Accurate Investigation & Reporting
- Rapid Response / Mobility
- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Civil Administrative Duties
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Presence - Deterrence
- Supervise Cease-Fire
- Establish / Monitor Demilitarized Zone
- Supervise Local Security Forces
- Anti-Terrorism
- Resettlement
- Refugee Operations
- Supervise Local Justice

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**Figure 4-V-23**
### SUMMARY OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
**COMPARISON OF ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE**

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<td>Ongoing PKO</td>
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| OPERATIONAL                |         |       |          |        |
| Military OPNS Only          | *       |       |          |        |
| Resp Nat'L Govt/Civil OP    |         |       |          |        |
| Comb Mil/Civil OPNS         |         |       |          |        |
| Military Commander          | *       |       |          |        |
| Civil Head of OPNS          |         |       |          |        |
| Parallel Leadership         |         |       |          |        |
| Civil Police Detach         |         |       |          |        |
| Isolation of OPNS area      | *       |       |          |        |
| Rebuild Security Forces     | *       |       |          |        |
| Social Development          |         |       |          |        |
| Security for Civil OPNS     |         |       |          |        |
| Mission Flexibility         | *       |       |          |        |
| Intelligence                | *       |       |          |        |
| Unlimited Access            | *       |       |          |        |
| Nat'l Integrity of PKO      |         |       |          |        |

| TACTICAL                    |         |       |          |        |
| Well Trng, Discp Forces     |         |       |          |        |
| Accurate Invest & Report    |         |       |          |        |
| Rules of Engagement         | *       |       |          |        |
| Civil Admin Duties          |         |       |          |        |
| Humanitarian Assistance     |         |       |          |        |
| Presence * Deterrence       | *       |       |          |        |
| Supervise C-F/Withdraw      | *       |       |          |        |
| Est/Monitor Demil Zone      |         |       |          |        |
| Supervise Local Sec Forces  | *       |       |          |        |
| Rapid Response/Modility     | *       |       |          |        |
| Anti-Terrorism              |         |       |          |        |
| Refugee OPNS                |         |       |          |        |
| Resettlement               | *       |       |          |        |
| Supervise Civil Justice     | *       |       |          |        |
| Psychological OPNS          | *       |       |          |        |
| Observers W/Fwd Units       |         |       |          |        |

**FIGURE 4-V-24**
criticism. Any unilateral power or even small coalition attempting the same could expect no less.

The United Nations' mandate carries a tremendous power. Few factions or nations will voluntarily oppose a United Nations mandate. The subsequent world political pressure would be difficult to stand up against. As an example, a truly disorganized and uncontrolled group, such as the Congolese, would continue to do so. Although Tshombe and the Belgian supported Katangese forces did succeed against United Nations pressure for a time.

External national involvement complicates peacekeeping operations. This external support can create new resistance organizations or rekindle flames of conflict. Often with selfish agendas, the external nations want to exploit the conflict for their own gain and not necessarily the benefit of the native population.

In the same way, an explosion of an internal conflict can negate peacekeeping efforts and rekindle international conflict. These conflicts are generally beyond the purview of the United Nations so that peacekeeping forces cannot intervene. If they do, as in the case of the Congo, they tend to lose their impartiality. Equally serious, they may become the subject of intense criticism from one side, both or even internationally.

Peacekeeping forces are subject to the concerns of sovereignty. The host nation has explicit rights. Some may
be absolute, if the force is present only with their consent. Others may be very limited if the force is mandated by the Security Council. This issue must constantly be considered and operations kept within the guidelines of the mandate.

Both the multi-national forces and a single national force have proven effective. Generally the multi-national force is favored as displaying the concept of the United Nations and is more acceptable to the nations involved in conflict. It is easier to find common ground with a multi-national force.

However, when time is essential and available forces limited, the single national force might be very acceptable, even preferable. In spite of the single nationality, the image of impartiality is important to maintain the force’s credibility.

Like many of the other elements, a prohibition on the use of force is not absolutely necessary but certainly preferable. It maintains the image of impartiality and requires that peaceful means be used to enforce decisions. This often makes the mission difficult but adds to the overall effect of reducing tensions.

The examples of ingenuity and peaceful intervention in Cyprus demonstrate that results can be achieved but actions must be well thought out and coordinated. In this respect intelligence becomes very important. Understanding
the intentions and likely actions of the conflicting groups can make timely intervention possible.

Even rapid and accurate reporting of events can facilitate responses that deter further violence rather than allowing it to escalate out of control. This further requires that the peacekeeping force have unlimited access and freedom of movement. This makes peaceful intervention a much more viable procedure. When mobility is limited by one faction or another, the peacekeepers are prevented from acting when it suits the purposes of that side. This detracts from effectiveness and impartiality.

Overall command and control of peacekeeping operations can be either civilian or military. Both options and even combinations with parallel leadership positions have been successful. The military leadership appears to be more successful when operations are predominantly military. As operations involve both civilian and military activities, a civilian head seems to be more appropriate.

Peacekeeping operations may be limited to strictly military observer functions. They may also cover the entire range of available options, to include responsibility for the national government, as they did in West Irian. Operations are geared to support the ultimate objectives. If separation and supervision is all that is desired then military actions may suffice.
If social development and humanitarian actions are mandated then a full range of social, civil and military operations may be required. Some countries in conflict may be fully capable of the development and welfare of its population. In these cases, only military observer duties may be necessary. The objectives of the mission dictate the organization of the force and the programs it undertakes.

If the peacekeeping forces include humanitarian missions then security is a prerequisite. Even a temporary cease-fire must be put in place before basic services can be attempted. More extensive development programs require that the population be secured so that military action will not destroy limited assets.

Isolation of the country or peacekeeping area may be necessary when external support becomes a factor. The inability of the peacekeeping forces in Cyprus to patrol the coastlines and coastal waters allowed arms and soldiers to be infiltrated on both sides. In the Congo the tactic was much more successful. Closing the airports and ports stopped the vast majority of external support.

Peacekeeping forces may be required to rebuild the host countries security forces as part of a developmental program. This makes impartiality difficult and must be done carefully. Host country desires and uncontrollable elements, such as the ANC in the Congo, can make this an almost
impossible task. Success requires almost total United Nations control, as the operations in West Irian encompassed.

The civil police detachment, first used in Cyprus has found widespread appeal. Underdeveloped countries often suffer from a lack of well trained, professional law enforcement officials. Human rights are generally held in low regard and relations with the population are not always good. United Nations supervision and training programs can begin to turn this deteriorating trend around. Police are encouraged to respect human rights and become involved with the population. The government and the United Nations gain respect and credibility. The population is left with a more professional, service oriented law enforcement establishment.

At the tactical level, it is particularly desirable for peacekeeping forces to be highly trained and well disciplined. Restraint and peaceful intervention require delicate methods and forces that do not respond to provocation. The diversity of tasks that the force must perform as well as the relative isolation, requires that the soldiers be industrious and motivated.

The value of rapid reaction and accurate reporting has already been discussed. It is important to note that the peacekeeping soldier might be required to perform military observation, armed patrols, civilian transportation and food distribution all in the same day. Depending on the overall objectives, the combined civil and military programs often
meet at the small unit level where they are executed by United Nations' forces.

Refugees may be a major problem and require security and humanitarian care. Resettlement efforts may be organized if no long term peace solution appears possible. Large numbers of Cypriots have been resettled under United Nations supervision.

Although usually considered the foundation of peacekeeping duties, supervision of cease-fires and monitoring of demilitarized zones may be only a small part of the force's operations. As the case studies have demonstrated, the other civil, administrative and social duties may be just as important.
COMMON ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE
(Refer to Figures 4-V-5, 6, 11, 12, 19, 24)

This section of the study analyzes why some elements of success/failure are found in more than one conflict across the different operational categories. Several common elements of success/failure have surfaced in comparing the different conflicts and then across the four operational categories. In spite of slight variations in the context and appearance of these elements in each area or conflict, some rough comparisons and generalizations can be made.

For purposes of this study an analysis of these elements and identification of basic trends is important. Critical elements may or may not cross the boundaries of operational areas. Examination of the common elements can determine whether they establish trends in critical elements or whether they are merely common requirements.

At the strategic level few elements are common to all four operational categories. However several are found in two or more of the four. Those elements that are common can be linked to the different elements of national power.

THE INTERRELATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

The relatively unique elements in each operational category interact and combine with different forms of national power to produce a set of dynamic, interrelated foci of power. How well leaders analyze these centers of power and compose operational campaigns to account for them is a measure of their success. In the largest sense, LIC is
### SUMMARY OF INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY

**Comparison of the Elements of Success / Failure**

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**Figure 4-V-5**
### SUMMARY OF INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY (CONT.)
#### COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE

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**FIGURE 4-V-6**
### SUMMARY OF PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

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<td>Intern Pol Press</td>
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<td>Base/Stage RTS</td>
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<td>Show of Force</td>
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<td>National Will</td>
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<td>Sovereignty</td>
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<td>Pol Dec &amp; Tact Opns</td>
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<td>Deception</td>
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<td>Surprise</td>
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<td>Economic Cond</td>
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| Operational                |      |       |       |        |
| Swift Dec Opns             |      |       |       |        |
| Sufficient Forces          |      |       |       |        |
| Long Range Acft            |      |       |       |        |
| Intelligence               |      |       |       |        |
| Chain of CMD               |      |       |       |        |
| Comb GMD & Staff           |      |       |       |        |
| Corps HQ - JTF             |      |       |       |        |
| Joint Opns & Comms         |      |       |       |        |
| Early Planning             |      |       |       |        |
| Exist Op/Cont Plan         |      |       |       |        |
| Surprise                   |      |       |       |        |
| Media/Compromise           |      |       |       |        |
| C-130 ABCCC                |      |       |       |        |
| Isolate Op Area            |      |       |       |        |
| Rebuild Sec Forces         |      |       |       |        |
| Deception                  |      |       |       |        |
| Ad Hoc Orga                |      |       |       |        |
| Experience                 |      |       |       |        |
| Mobilization               |      |       |       |        |
| Logistics Reqmt            |      |       |       |        |
| Air Superiority            |      |       |       |        |
| Fwd Positioning            |      |       |       |        |
| Mercenaries                |      |       |       |        |
| Airfield Capacity          |      |       |       |        |

**Figure 4-V-11**
### SUMMARY OF PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPNS (CONT.)

**COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS / FAILURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACTICAL</th>
<th>SUEZ</th>
<th>CONGO</th>
<th>MADAG</th>
<th>PANAMA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SURPRISE</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABN OPNS/AIRFIELD</td>
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<td>AIR ASSLT HELO OPNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEAVY/LIGHT OPNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>URBAN OPNS (MCUT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMALL UNIT OPNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>RULES OF ENGAGEMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARRIER OPNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLOSE AIR SUPPORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC-130 GUNSHIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CLAND ADV PARTY</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXPERIENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPEC OPERATIONS FORCES</td>
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<tr>
<td>SURRENDER</td>
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<td>MOBILITY</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONV/IL FORCES</td>
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<td>TRNG, DISCP FORCES</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDICAL SUPPORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVAC OPNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS</td>
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<td>PSYOPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVIL MIL OPNS</td>
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<td>HUMANITARIAN RELIEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>STABILITY OPNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>REFUGEE OPNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONETARY REWARDS</td>
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</table>

**FIGURE 4-V-12**
### SUMMARY OF COMBATTING TERRORISM

Comparison of the Elements of Success / Failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC</th>
<th>MUN</th>
<th>ENI</th>
<th>LUFT</th>
<th>IRAN</th>
<th>IWA</th>
<th>A.L.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INITIATIVE</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAFETY OF HOST</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOVEREIGNTY</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASE/STAGE RTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDIA/COMpromise</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC SANCTIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASYMMETRIC RESP</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTER POL PRESSURE</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATIONAL WILL</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| OPERATIONAL                                                              |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| NEGOTIATIONS                                                             |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| RESOURCES                                                                |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| WORLD PRESS                                                              |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| INTELLIGENCE                                                            |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| ISOLATION                                                                |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| CMD & CONTROL                                                            |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| AD HOC ORGAN                                                             |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| LG RANG ACFT                                                             |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| AERIAL CMD & CON                                                         |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| EARLY PLANNING                                                           |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| SURPRISE                                                                 |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| OPER MOBILITY                                                            |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| COMPLEX PLAN                                                             |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| OPSEC                                                                    |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| TERR SUPP ORGAN                                                          |     |     |      |      |     |      |

| TACTICAL                                                                 |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| ROE                                                                      |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| TRAN'D FORCES                                                            |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| SURPRISE                                                                 |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| INTELLIGENCE                                                            |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| COMMO TECH                                                               |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| WPNS TECH                                                                |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| HEAVY/LT FORCES                                                          |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| MEDICAL SUPPORT                                                          |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| LEGAL ASPECTS                                                            |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| EWC OPNS                                                                 |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| CLAND ADV PARTY                                                          |     |     |      |      |     |      |
| CARRIER OPNS                                                             |     |     |      |      |     |      |

**FIGURE 4-V-19**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC</th>
<th>UND-PAK</th>
<th>CONGO</th>
<th>W. IRAN</th>
<th>CYPRUS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Prior Cease-Fire Agmt</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Detailed MSN STMT</td>
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<tr>
<td>• UN Mandate/Impartial</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Multi-Natl Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Single Natl Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Use of Force</td>
<td>+/-</td>
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<tr>
<td>• External Natl Supp</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Sovereignty</td>
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<td>• Internal Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Modified Mandate</td>
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<td>• National Will</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ongoing PKO</td>
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| OPERATIONAL                                 |         |       |         |        |
| • Military Opns Only                        | .       |       |         |        |
| • Resp Natl Govt/Civil Op                   | .       |       |         |        |
| • Comb Mil/Civil Opns                       | .       |       |         |        |
| • Military Commander                        | .       |       | +/-     | .      |
| • Civil Head of Opns                        | .       |       |         |        |
| • Parallel Leadership                       | .       |       |         |        |
| • Civil Police Detach                       | .       |       |         |        |
| • Isolation of Opns Area                    | .       |       |         |        |
| • Rebuild Security Forces                   | .       |       |         |        |
| • Social Development                        | .       |       |         |        |
| • Security for Civil Opns                   | .       |       |         |        |
| • Mission Flexibility                       | .       |       |         |        |
| • Intelligence                              | .       |       |         |        |
| • Unlimited Access                          | +/-     |       |         |        |
| • Natl Integrity of PKO                     | .       |       |         |        |

| TACTICAL                                    |         |       |         |        |
| • Well Trng, Discp Forces                   | .       |       |         |        |
| • Accurate Invest & Report                  | .       |       |         |        |
| • Rules of Engagement                       | .       |       |         |        |
| • Civil Admin Duties                        | .       |       |         |        |
| • Humanitarian Assistance                   | .       |       |         |        |
| • Presence - Deterrence                     | .       |       |         |        |
| • Supervise C-F/Withdraw                     | .       |       |         |        |
| • Est/Monitor Demil Zone                    | .       |       |         |        |
| • Supervise Local Sec Forces                | .       |       |         |        |
| • Rapid Response/Mobility                   | .       |       |         |        |
| • Anti-Terrorism                            | .       |       |         |        |
| • Refugee Opns                              | .       |       |         |        |
| • RelSettlement                             | .       |       |         |        |
| • Supervise Civil Justice                   | .       |       |         |        |
| • Psychological Opns                        | .       |       |         |        |
| • Observers W/Fwd Units                     | .       |       |         |        |

**Figure 4-V-24**
similar to HIC/MIC in the necessity to derive the tactical plans from well thought out operational campaigns which, in turn, were derived from national objectives.

**SOVEREIGNTY**

Sovereignty is an element that was either a stumbling block or a facilitator in several case studies. This is the fundamental aspect of a nation's political power. A nation must have the ability to control actions within its own borders. In this same sense, a government controls the actions that other governments or organizations are permitted to take inside its borders.

In distinction to conventional military operations in mid and high intensity conflict, operations in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) often require permission prior to execution. Military power does not automatically overrule this concept, although it may in certain circumstances.

**INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PRESSURE & WORLD OPINION**

Directly related to the concept of sovereignty are the elements of world opinion and international political pressure. In those cases that sovereignty was ignored the world community usually harshly condemns the action. World opinion is manifested in foreign news media and public demonstrations.

International political pressure can be visible, such as actions in the United Nations or public statements of support or condemnation. It may also be exercised subtly,
using indirect objectives such as treaties or political recognition to maneuver different groups toward desired positions.

World opinion reflects the element of informational power. International political pressure may remain political or manifest itself in economic, informational or military actions.

ECONOMIC ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

A mixture of the elements of national power can and probably will have a direct impact at the operational and tactical level. The impact of economic conditions and actions may also be a major factor.

During the Emergency in Malaya economic conditions contributed directly to the social development programs. In the case of Algeria the economic drain on France was a factor in the domestic schism on policy. In combating terrorism the economic boycott threatened by the airline pilots made a significant impact on worldwide state-sponsored terrorism.

NATIONAL WILL

National will is a combination of informational and political national power. It manifests itself in LIC in many forms. Conflicts that are not directly related to immediate safety and security can be questionable in the public mind. Costly, long term counterinsurgencies or peacekeeping operations are difficult to justify repetitively in budget and national interest arguments.
Safety of U.S. citizens or uninvolved civilians is a common motivation for operations. This is a well recognized justification and brings a strong measure of public support with it. This is one way that sovereignty rights can be overruled during an intervention. Although not a blank check, it is recognized in world affairs as a legitimate motivation to intervene in another country's internal affairs.

EXTERNAL NATIONAL INVOLVEMENT/SUPPORT

Another of the complex factors under consideration is external national involvement. This can take many forms such as political recognition and support, economic and military aid, or even direct intervention. All elements of national power may be involved in external support. Involvement by one nation is often used by another as justification for intervention. This was the case in Cyprus when Turkey landed conventional forces.

INTELLIGENCE

At the operational level, intelligence was often a significant element in success/failure. Intelligence, although important in conventional operations, is much more critical in LIC than HIC/MIC. The amount of detail and degree of resolution required in LIC is infinitely greater. Swift, decisive operations such as peacetime contingencies or counterterrorism must have accurate intelligence to protect lives and still be successful.
Operations involving limited firepower and concurrent security of civilians require intelligence to maintain the initiative and protect innocent lives. The types of intelligence required for these operations is considerably different from HIC/MIC. Detailed knowledge of political motivations, ideologies, infrastructures, international support and civilian demographics are very different from traditional order of battle information.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) take on additional importance as the requirements for imagery fall off. Other non-traditional factors, such as the assessment of whether Panamanians are likely to begin looting business districts, can be critical.

This shift in emphasis requires a shift in assets as well. HUMINT networks cannot be created quickly. It is also difficult to establish them under hostile conditions. Therefore, existing HUMINT capabilities should be maintained in as many areas as possible. Contingencies and terrorist incidents can evolve quickly, requiring instantaneous intelligence. The only possible way to fill the need can be filled is with in-place assets.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL & TACTICAL LEVELS

The combination of elements of national power at the strategic level is reflected in the operational designs. Many successful case studies incorporated civil, social, economic and military programs. This multi-disciplined
approach reflects the non-military causes, and non-military intervening variables of the problem.

Peacekeeping, counterinsurgency and peacetime contingency operations all show varying degrees of integrated operations. Some operations are simultaneous while others require resolution of conflict prior to embarking on civil development. The important aspect of these integrated operations are the ways in which they support the strategic goals, how they are integrated at the operational level and what tactical operations are necessary to execute them.

There are two fundamental approaches available at the operational level. One incorporates the integrated campaign outlined above, while the other relies on a preponderance of military action. The strategic conditions and the operations required will determine which approach will be more likely to succeed.

The fundamental approach dictates the basis for tactical operations, as the case studies clearly demonstrate. Integrated operational plans required multi-dimensional tactical applications, while conflicts such as the French experience in the Indochina War are very narrowly focused on military operations.

This accounts for the similarities of tactical operations between peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations. Regardless of the strategic implications, an integrated operational approach to any of the four conflicts
will result in similar tactical operations. Military units will be responsible for a wide range of duties from combat patrols to food distribution.

**IMPACT OF MEDIA**

A significant concern outside operational capabilities is the impact of media on strategic, operational and tactical success. The case studies demonstrate how media involvement dramatically affected elements at all levels of war. Strategic national will can be undermined as well as immediate compromise of an entire operation. Tactical surprise can be lost or world opinion may be turned against the operation.

Media may require consideration as an extra-national element of power that defies control or even prediction. Its effect must not be underemphasized. Assessments of deliberate and unintentional media involvement must be calculated into strategic and operational plans.

Civilian and military organizations involved in LIC should devise a comprehensive media plan to allow for cooperation without compromise. Common agreements on responsibility and trust at lower levels may preclude operational level problems.
The primary purpose of this study was to determine and then operationally define success in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) using historical examples. The methodology sought common critical elements of success or failure in order to give a focused representation of universal success in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). A two-stage process of analysis initially determined the elements of success/failure for each conflict. The second step compared and analyzed the individual conflicts to establish elements of success/failure that appeared consistently in different conflicts. Finally, these common elements were compared and analyzed to determine if there was a common group of critical elements of success in LIC.

The examination of historical case studies provides valuable insight into the conduct of operations in LIC. Several common elements of success/failure were demonstrated in the analysis of the individual case studies. Several more interesting relationships were outlined in the comparison of
the four operational categories. These common elements within the four operational categories establish a group of, category specific, critical elements of success.

The question remains whether these can be described as universally critical elements of success/failure. The answer is: NO. Recurring elements and identification of trends cannot be equated to essential elements of success in a universal sense.

The analysis of a larger sample of case studies would reinforce trends in several of the isolated elements of success, but would not necessarily guarantee their universal application. The value would be in examining different applications of the same elements and results, given different circumstances. A larger sample of case studies would also uncover other elements of success not considered here. The common elements and trends addressed here cannot claim to be all-encompassing either.

What then, is the value of this study? Although it does not outline a group of common critical elements of success in LIC, it succeeds in a much more important sense. Rather than producing a checklist of essential elements to be inserted into a plan like building blocks, it has reinforced a series of identifiable trends that are indicative of success and established a mental framework to analyze LIC. The study has also outlined the conceptual framework with several historical examples.
The most important aspect of LIC that contributes to success is the application of the full range of the elements of national power to the conflict. Using this strategic basis, an almost infinite combination of variable applications can result. Using the analogy of algebra; the identification of the variable is not nearly as important as outlining the relationship to the rest of the equation.

Understanding how to identify variables, such as external national involvement, and then assessing their impact is the key to success. The case studies outline many variables but more importantly serve as examples of how the different variables interacted with each other to produce the results.

Certain fundamental principles in each operational category can be identified as desirable. These have been discussed in the individual sections and identified. They form the focused picture, but only for that particular operational category. It is beyond the scope of this study to characterize all the possible historical variables and diagram their impact in all areas of LIC.

Several things would be beneficial to U.S. operations in LIC, but a lengthy checklist is not one of them. New variables may evolve at any time. The requirement is for soldiers and civilian administrators who understand how to analyze these variables and produce effective strategies using them.
The historical case studies with their analysis of success and failure diagram the complex relationships present in LIC. Success is determined by several factors that are not always related to the defeat of the enemy, or even military power. This study has amply demonstrated that the diversity of circumstances requires an analysis that progresses in series.

Starting with the desired end state and strategic environment, each situation has a variety of responses that will produce results. This study has followed that process of analysis and given operational examples of the options available. Equally valuable, the study has described the linkages between the levels of war and examined the relationships of the different elements in terms of success or failure.

Thus, the original research question might have been; How can the critical elements of success be determined for the conflict under consideration? This is not to say that each LIC is totally unique. The principles involved in determining whether a course of action is likely to lead to success or failure have been discussed at length. The historical case studies provide examples for each of these principles.

MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mid and High Intensity Conflict (MIC/HIC) are much more linear and one dimensional in their progression than
LIC. The military element of national power applies military campaigns and military tactics to defeat an enemy militarily. LIC requires different applications of the elements of power based on the situation, desired outcome and resources available.

Each element of power and its application add a new dimension to the development of the conflict. The interaction of the elements is important. Some applications can create a sum greater than the parts or a synergistic effect. Other applications can defeat the individual programs because of a lack of mutual support and coordination.

This multi-dimensional aspect of LIC makes generalized applications and lock-step formulas dangerous. Success in LIC begins with a strategic assessment and is consistently derivative. Strategic success is defined and operational campaigns designed to accomplish it. Tactical operations are planned in accordance with the operational guidance.

Casual observers would see no difference between this process than that of traditional operational warfighting. The difference lies in the multi-dimensional aspect of each level's planning and operations. Isolated, even coordinated tactical successes will not lead to strategic success and can be counterproductive if they have not been tightly integrated into the overall effort.
Traditional warfighting is structured to maintain a consistent focus on military success. LIC is not. (Figure 5-1) Conventional operations start with a central focal point and work downward, expanding in a consistent pattern and proportion as the lowest, tactical level is reached. Tactical operations support operational goals that, in turn support the strategic objective. The structure and nature of military command, organizations and doctrine all work to maintain this highly structured environment.

LIC starts with a diverse collection of foci at the strategic level that must be applied to the conflict. These different foci come together at a truncated operational level for integration and application. This makes integration of all four elements of power at the operational level command and staff extremely important. At the tactical level, the range of options expands as the forces execute the diverse programs consisting of several elements of national power.

The operational level actually becomes the focal point for integration and operations. The diagram (Figure 5-2 & 5-3) illustrates how elements of power from the strategic level and tactical operations from the tactical level must be tied back to the operational level command. Tactical operations that are not coordinated with all the applicable elements of power and respective agencies, will often not support the strategic aim. In the same manner,
THE STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT & LIC

CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT  MIC / HIC

MILITARY ELEMENT
OF NATIONAL POWER

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, INFORMATIONAL & MILITARY

STRATEGIC

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL

TACTICAL

MILITARY OPERATIONS

CONSISTENT FLOW FROM A CENTRAL FOCUS WHICH EXPANDS SYMMETRICALLY DOWNWARD; EACH LEVEL SUPPORTS THE OTHER THROUGH SIMPLE DESIGN

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, INFORMATIONAL, POLITICAL & MILITARY OPERATIONS

ASYMMETRICAL FLOW FROM A BROAD FOCUS THROUGH A CHOKING NODE; EFFORT MUST CONSTANTLY BE REDIRECTED TOWARD THE CENTER TO ACHIEVE MUTUAL SUPPORT

FIGURE 5-1
THE STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT & LIC

CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT MIC / HIC

MILITARY ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, INFORMATIONAL & MILITARY

UNCOORDINATED POLITICAL DECISIONS

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL

MILITARY OPERATIONS

INFORMATION & ORDERS FLOW EASILY FROM TOP TO BOTTOM & REVERSE USING THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO COORDINATE ALL ACTIONS

UNCOORDINATED TACTICAL OPERATION

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, INFORMATIONAL, POLITICAL & MILITARY OPERATIONS

UNLESS WELL ORGANIZED, INFORMATION & ACTIONS CAN BECOME UNCOORDINATED, CAUSING DYSFUNCTIONAL OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFORTS THAT DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO MUTUAL SUPPORT

FIGURE 5-2
THE STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT & LIC

CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT / MIC / HIC

MILITARY ELEMENT
OF NATIONAL POWER

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, INFORMATIONAL & MILITARY

COORDINATED ACTIONS

STRATEGIC

OPER' L

TACTICAL

COORDINATED OPERATIONS

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, INFORMATIONAL,
POLITICAL & MILITARY OPERATIONS

ONLY WELL COORDINATED ACTIONS
MUTUALLY SUPPORT THE ORGANIZATION
& THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES; THE
OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF COMMAND IS CRITICAL

FIGURE 5-3
senior political decisions on tactical operations run the risk of creating the incorrect response.

The diagrams (Figure 5-1 thru 5-5) help illustrate why military doctrine for LIC is insufficient, no matter how well written. An interagency, multi-discipline doctrine encompassing all the elements of national power and how they can be integrated is required.

**AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH**

Instead of taking a checklist or blanket principle approach to LIC an alternative is required. Problem solving techniques may be more appropriate than traditional military strategy.

Initially, is the problem correctly defined at the strategic level? Is the fundamental problem the insurgents or the social conditions that motivated them to act? Should the peace be maintained by heavy armed forces from a biased or neutral third party separating the belligerents? Or can it be done by individual observers with rapid communications backed by the power of the United Nations?

What is the desired end state following resolution of the conflict? Does the operation need to change the government in power, or does it need to establish programs for internal social development?

Secondly, how can all elements of national power be efficiently focused on the problem to achieve the desired
result? What is the proper mix or balance of these elements of power? The case studies show a wide range of different mixes. Some led to success while other led directly to failure. The case studies also examine why the respective applications were flawed.

Command and control in one instance may be better suited to a military commander and in others to a civilian head of power. In other circumstances some measure of compromise may be the best alternative. The key is matching the most appropriate option to the given circumstances. The broad guidelines outlined in the analysis section assist in accomplishing this.

Third, how well do the operational plans and tactical executions support the next higher and overall strategic objectives? Are the subordinate plans integrated? Are they compiled by an integrated staff with representatives from all elements of national power? Are they adequately balanced to reflect the relative importance of each different agency?

What agencies, military units and what type of and command and control structure can best execute this operation? These questions can be carried on to whatever level of resolution is required. These questions will often result in complex answers that must be deconflicted and acted upon. The answers are by nature complex because, unlike conventional operations, tactical operations in LIC can have direct strategic implications and vice versa.
Understanding the different options and their relationships to the situation and the desired outcome is essential. How can the means be carefully structured and interrelated to achieve the ends?

U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

The case studies and the analysis of success/failure highlight the shortfalls of current U.S. Army doctrine. The message is clear. Military operations, no matter how well intentioned, will generally not lead to success in LIC.

FM 100-1 and FM 100-5 must be subordinate to an all-encompassing LIC national strategy that incorporates all elements of national power. FM 100-1 needs to develop a model for military and non-military operations that contribute to strategic success. FM 100-5 must differentiate between military and non-military operations. Discussions of the proper balance, timing, combination and integration of military and non-military actions must be thorough. Linkage between the strategic objectives and the various military and non-military options should be outlined. (Figure 5-4 & 5-5)

A consistent flow, from national security strategy to all tactical applications should be apparent. Gaps must be filled with connecting logic. Doctrine needs to outline the shift in emphasis from massed firepower in MIC/HIC to the surgical, limited firepower of LIC.

Conventional doctrine focuses on the force, or the element that will accomplish the mission, as the instrument
MILITARY DOCTRINE & THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
ALL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROUTINE PEACEFUL COMPETITION</th>
<th>PEACETIME COMPETITION</th>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
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<td>INTEGRATED, INTERDISCIPLINARY DOCTRINE &amp; STRATEGY</td>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>MILITARY STRATEGY</td>
<td>MIC / HIC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CURRENT FM 100-1 / 100-5

EXPANDED FM 100-1 / FM 100-5

CURRENT FM 100-20

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THE DOMINANT ELEMENT OF POWER HAS CAUSED DOCTRINE TO BECOME FRAGMENTED INTO EACH RESPECTIVE AREA OF EXPERTISE. LIC REQUIRES AN INTEGRATED, INTERDISCIPLINARY DOCTRINAL APPROACH THAT COVERS THE FULL CONTINUUM WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF POWER

FIGURE 5-4
SPECTRUM OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS</th>
<th>INSURGENCY &amp; COUNTERINSURGENCY</th>
<th>PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS</th>
<th>COMBATING TERRORISM</th>
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<tr>
<td>OBSERVERS</td>
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<td>INTERVENTION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LARGE PORTION &amp; MAJOR IMPACT</td>
<td>SMALL PROPORTION &amp; SMALL IMPACT</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG HAUL STRATEGY</td>
<td>SWIFT, DECISIVE OPERATIONS</td>
<td>IMPORTANCE OF TIME</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Operations within LIC form a continuum with several factors varying in intensity depending on which operational category is concerned. This assists in constructing a mental framework by addressing the conflicts in perspective.

**Figure 5-5**
to implement a military operation. Expanded doctrine should focus on the diverse means a force has at its disposal to accomplish its objectives. The force is a tool used to execute several integrated strategies, encompassing different elements of national power, simultaneously.

The case studies further outline the diversity of the four operational categories. Greater depth in the operational level doctrine is necessary. Individual manuals, possibly FM 100-20/1-4 (one for each operational category), should be dedicated to outlining, in detail, the operational level connection between the elements of national power and tactical level unit operations.

Manuals dedicated to each operational category should diagram the predominant strategic objectives and then trace downward through the various options at each level of war. Direct correlations between objectives and tactics would become more visible.

Current conventional Army doctrine stipulates when an exploitation should be used, how it should be organized and its effects on the enemy. In this same way, military and non-military operations in LIC should be outlined.

The dedicated manuals for each operational category at the operational level could build on the basis of this study. Each element could be first fitted into an overall strategy and then given a detailed description and historical example. This would be an excellent way to portray the
logical progression from limited combat operations, through stability operations to internal development operations.

Tactical level Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) manuals would then fit coherently into an umbrella concept. As the case studies have demonstrated, there are several common operations or elements of success at the tactical level. Although local conditions and cultural variables must be considered, resettlement operations are very similar, whether they are conducted as part of counterinsurgency or peacekeeping refugee relocation. For example, the details of organizing relocation, truck movements, minimum essential services and health care screening should all be documented in TTP manuals.

These TTP manuals are badly needed in the field. Units are forced to constantly reinvent methods whenever humanitarian missions arise. There are certainly good ways and bad ways to organize food distribution systems and points, as well as for establishing refugee centers. There are superior methods for stability operations. These are not currently documented, forcing hit and miss, ad hoc solutions when there is a wealth of historical knowledge available.

Again, this study could be used as basis and expanded upon to develop a historical approach to writing detailed doctrine and TTP for LIC. Although the historical solutions cannot be applied blindly to new problems, they could serve as a valuable starting point for assessment and planning.
The results of the study show general trends leading to success in LIC. The results also clearly indicate that individual conflicts are diverse enough to require dedicated analysis. The pitfalls of trying to massage current conventional doctrine to fit LIC should be obvious. The complex, interdependent nature of Low Intensity Conflict requires detailed assessment and interagency participation, not checklist applications of existing Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS).

Commanders and staff officers need well laid out doctrine to make informed plans and carry out successful execution. Modifying current military platitudes will be counterproductive to the objective of incorporating all the diverse elements of national power into a single, unified effort.

Radically new doctrine outlining the various economic, informational and political initiatives must be created. Appropriate models for integrated organizations and staffs should be developed to serve as guides during crisis situations.

Only with adequate, comprehensive, doctrine to serve as a guide can effective contingency plans be developed to deal with emergencies. Other governmental agencies must become involved in these regional contingency plans, providing sound input and conducting reasonable preparation for ultimate implementation.

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In addition to an expansion of doctrine, an expanded officer education program is required. Currently, Army field grade officers receive no training on peacekeeping or combating terrorism and only limited instruction on contingency operations and counterinsurgency.

Field grade officers will be the action officers on the operational level staffs. They will be responsible for integrating the strategic assets and the tactical operations. Without an adequate understanding of the principle issues and complex interactions involved in LIC they will undoubtedly fall back on conventional military operations. This is precisely the wrong direction to move. The case studies clearly demonstrate the need to limit violence and utilize indirect or unconventional methods whenever possible.

**TRENDS ESTABLISHED IN THE STUDY**

The study was unable to establish universal critical elements of success beyond the four operational categories. In spite of this, several important trends did evolve from the study. They are broad based, usually consolidated from two or three common issues highlighted by the case studies. They carry important implications for the manner in which the Army recruits and trains personnel, writes future doctrine, conducts training, establishes contingency plans and organizes for conflict.
IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER & JUNIOR LEADER

History has shown a gradual evolution toward the importance of small unit formations and better leadership at lower levels. LIC continues this trend at a rapidly accelerated pace.

Reliance on small unit operations, integration of non-military operations and the strategic implications of isolated, individual actions elevate the importance of the individual soldier. Leaders must communicate guidance for action that soldiers, often acting alone, must translate into execution.

Extended operational areas and requirements for rapid response and decision making also enhance the position of the individual soldier. Rules Of Engagement (ROE) require split second decisions. Whether a leader is present or not, these will be individual decisions. Small units working in larger areas extend the chain of command and place greater reliance on initiative and mission type orders.

This trend indicates a continuing need for high quality individual soldiers, capable of semi-independent actions and multiple skills. The current volunteer force has generally improved the overall quality of the U.S. Army and that was reflected in the most recent case study, Operation JUST CAUSE.

Training must focus on developing the desired characteristics of individual leadership, situation
assessment and rapid, informed responses. Small unit exercises and situational training exercises should be stressed.

COMMANDER'S INTENT FROM THE STRATEGIC TO THE TACTICAL LEVEL

Understanding the senior commanders intent is essential to successful operations in LIC. Operations are generally characterized by small unit actions, operating over extended distances, requiring accurate, on the spot decisions. Commanders must clearly articulate their vision of the operation and outline the critical aspects of the execution. Well trained, disciplined soldiers can execute almost any mission correctly if they understand the implications of their actions.

Interaction with civil populations, strict ROE, humanitarian assistance operations are non-traditional missions, not normally associated with combat training. Soldiers must understand the importance of these missions to the operational and strategic objectives.

Using a clearly articulated commander’s intent, the senior level commander can capitalize on the impact of tactical operations at the strategic level by influencing the execution. The importance of coordinated, focused efforts require commanders at all levels to communicate more than just the necessary tasks to accomplish the mission.

This includes the National Command Authority. Just as other trends in LIC are not limited to military
operations, the commander's intent is an broad based concept with interagency application.

**SHIFT IN INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES**

The requirements of intelligence for LIC have already been covered. In summary a balance of national assets needs to reflect the threat of LIC. HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities must be expanded and maintained throughout the world. Contingencies are difficult to predict in a timely manner, requiring in-place assets. In-place assets would, in turn, make earlier prediction and assessment more effective.

**LIMITATIONS OF FIREPOWER**

All four operational categories display a tendency to require limited, precision firepower. Concern for collateral damage, civilian casualties and safety of hostages demand that large, inaccurate weapons systems be prohibited. In some cases, strategy prefers non-military actions as a priority over combat. Counterinsurgency clearly favors discriminate firepower, applied only when absolutely necessary to maintain security.

**DISTINCTIVE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS**

Detailed ROE, integration of non-military programs and small unit operations require an altered unit training focus. Tactics drilled for conventional MIC/HIC operations focusing on massed firepower, maneuver and overwhelming annihilation of the enemy will be counterproductive for units with LIC missions. As stated earlier, small unit operations,
individual leadership, and non-military operations are peculiar skills that need development and training.

Units do not have unlimited training time and resources. Priorities must be determined and choices made. The level of proficiency required and diversity of skills for both conventional and LIC operations require a unit focus. Ultimately, unit commanders must be given a singular priority for training and possible employment.

All units should train to certain minimum skill levels in actions such as stability operations and contingency planning. Other earmarked units should be allowed to focus away from conventional tactics and toward counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and rapid deployment contingencies.

As the case study of the Mayaguez incident and Operation EAGLE CLAW demonstrated, the level of proficiency required for counterterrorist units is extremely high if success is to be achieved. The U.S. now has dedicated, full-time forces for counterterror operations and the necessary support.

**IMPORTANCE OF TIME AT THE OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVELS**

World opinion and national will combine to give time a new importance at the strategic and operational levels. Long haul strategies in peacekeeping and insurgency/counterinsurgency operations require linkages to national security and a commitment by the government and population.
The desirability of swift, decisive operations for combatting terrorism and contingency operations makes mobilization almost impossible and strategic deployability extremely important. This concept of time complements the relative importance of surprise in these two operations.

INTEGRATION OF COMMANDS/STAFFS WITH OTHER AGENCY PERSONNEL

The application of all elements of national power requires a staff capable integrating the diverse assets into a coherent operational and tactical plan. Expertise in each speciality area must be consistent with the overall strategic combination of the elements of national power.

If economic programs are an integral part of the strategic approach, then a representative of that speciality area must be present to integrate these programs at the operational level. Otherwise, an uncoordinated, factional approach to the problem will result and any synergy and even success may be sacrificed.

ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA IMPACT AND INFORMATION FLOW

Media involvement was a significant factor in several case studies. This reflects the growing importance of world opinion and national will. The media can also amplify the natural tendency of low level actions to have widespread implications.

The impact of media is far too important to leave completely to chance. Assessments of impact and a continuous flow of information that supports the overall strategic
objectives must be provided. Accurate information, even if initially unfavorable, seems to be preferred to stonewalling or whitewashing events that are later readdressed.

The impact of media is an intervening factor in the concept of operational and strategic sense of time. Strategies must be outlined in coherent terms so that unrealistic expectations are not encouraged early. In the same respect, any time operations can be conducted swiftly and concluded, chances of overall approval and bringing matters to a conclusion on original terms are increased.

**FURTHER LIMITING OF CONFLICT THROUGH ISOLATION OF AREA**

The War in Korea established the background for the creation of the concepts involved in limited war. LIC operations expand these concepts by further limiting the forces, area and violence associated with the conflict. The concepts involved in limited war must be understood by operational level decision makers. They must accept the predetermined limitations on the conflict and seek solutions within the acceptable limits.

Constant attempts to expand the limits will be counterproductive for all parties involved. Escalation will generally be met with escalation, reaching a point when it escapes the capacity of the belligerents to control. The case studies indicate that a wide spectrum, consistent strategy is generally preferable to a singularly focused, continually escalating one.
CONCEPT OF MILITARY SUCCESS AND STRATEGIC FAILURE

Low Intensity Conflict reverses many elements of traditional warfighting. Because military operations are often only the manifestation of the conflict, military success cannot be directly equated with overall victory. Just as the causes of disease and not the symptoms must be defeated, the root causes of conflict must be attacked for any progress toward ultimate victory. The experiences of France in Indochina and later America in Vietnam highlight this non-traditional aspect of conflict.

UTILITY OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS (SO) IMPERATIVES

Figure 5-6 outlines the Special Operations Imperatives from FM 100-25. Although not universally applicable either, the SO Imperatives provide a sound basis for a mental framework for approaching LIC. These imperatives cover many of the trends and elements of success in broad terms. With further research and some adjustment the SO imperatives could be developed into a doctrinal basis for teaching and discussing LIC.

A combination of the LIC Imperatives and the SO Imperatives provides a framework for the fundamentally different mental approach required for operations in LIC. Historical studies in the four operational categories, such as this one, could be used to illustrate the application of the different principles included in both sets of imperatives. A capstone doctrine would do well to use some
SPECIAL OPERATIONS (SO) & LIC IMPERATIVES
A COMBINATION FOR A BASIS OF SUCCESS IN LIC

SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES

- UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
- RECOGNIZE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
- FACILITATE INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES
- ENGAGE THE THREAT DISCRIMINATELY
- CONSIDER LONG TERM EFFECTS
- ENSURE LEGITIMACY AND CREDIBILITY OF SO
- ANTICIPATE AND CONTROL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS
- APPLY CAPABILITIES INDIRECTLY
- DEVELOP MULTIPLE OPTIONS
- ENSURE LONG TERM SUSTAINMENT
- PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE
- BALANCE SECURITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION

LIC IMPERATIVES

- POLITICAL DOMINANCE
- UNITY OF EFFORT
- ADAPTABILITY
- LEGITIMACY
- PERSEVERANCE

FIGURE 5-6
modification of the SO Imperatives as the basis for an integrated, interagency doctrine.

SUMMARY

The historical case studies and subsequent analysis demonstrate both common trends and unique aspects of Low Intensity Conflict. The common trends have several implications but defy universal application in the form of a checklist for success. This demonstrates the fallacy of attempting to apply conventional doctrinal checklists to LIC. At best the conventional approach will be disjointed and confusing. In the worst case it will be counterproductive and lead to disaster. Even the LIC Imperatives outlined in FM 100-20 cannot be universally applied to all of the case studies. The trends do provide a framework for consideration in establishing doctrine and training for LIC.

The study clearly established the need for an expanded doctrine at the strategic and operational levels. The elements of success/failure outlined for each operational category should form the basis of an expanded U.S. military doctrine at the operational level. Senior capstone manuals should incorporate the aspects outlined in the analysis to establish a consistent doctrine for the entire operational continuum. This doctrine must address all four elements of national power and their relationships during the conflict at different points on the continuum.
Tactical TTP manuals must be researched and written to provide a basis for training, planning and operations at the unit level. Ad hoc solutions cannot take the place of planned and organized operations when time is an essential element at the operational and strategic levels. Historical lessons should provide the basis for standard procedures required to execute the many common tactical operations across the four operational categories of LIC.

The "American way of war" can capitalize on the wide spectrum application of solutions to LIC. Instead of wielding a tremendous military organization against the enemy to overwhelm them, a coordinated, integrated organization, using the full strength of the nation's power, should be focused on the problem. This takes advantage of America's strength in an entirely new dimension, better than purely military solutions alone ever could.

The requirement is for a new approach to organization, planning and operations. Traditionally separated and diverse agencies must become part of the coordinated effort. Civilian groups, not normally associated with conflict, must be included in a widely based integrated doctrine of applying national power to conflict situations.

Military doctrine, training and planning are not sufficient. Civil agencies must be required to take the lead, establish policies and create an integrated strategy at the national level. Once this is accomplished, military
doctrine can accurately portray its proper role in the overall comprehensive strategy. Contingency planning could then encompass the full range of application of the elements of national power. Until this approach is taken, and the "American way of war" is adjusted to include, rather than exclude, all elements of national power, the U.S. will find its success rate in LIC a mixed score.
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