THE IMPACT ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
OF A MILITARY OFFICER AS THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DANIEL A. McCUSKER, MAJOR, USAF
B.A., Saint Michael's College,
Winnski, Vermont, 1977

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991

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The Impact on the Intelligence Community of a Military Officer as the Director of Central Intelligence.

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Given the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) necessity to allocate Intelligence Community assets, including military intelligence assets; and, given the DCI's responsibility to determine the Intelligence Community's priorities to meet future challenges; the purpose of this thesis is to determine if the DCI should be a military officer. This thesis uses historical examples and research to establish the Intelligence Community's structural, leadership, and budgetary parameters and future challenges that define the DCI's operational environment. The study uses these parameters to examine the positive and negative factors of a military officer and of a civilian leader as the DCI. The study establishes a matrix using DCI characteristics, incumbent background, and success or failure to determine a relationship between military officers and success. The study determines that it does not matter if the DCI is civilian or military. The study indicates there is no correlation between successful leadership of the Intelligence Community and a military or civilian background. It determined that other discriminators are necessary and more important to the DCI's successful leadership of the Intelligence Community. They are: (1) willingness to actively engage the Community issues; (2) longevity in the position; (3) leader credibility within, and outside, the Intelligence Community; and (4) an understanding of the Intelligence Community and how it operates.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF A MILITARY OFFICER AS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE by Major Daniel A. McCusker, USAF, 139 pages.

Given the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) necessity to allocate Intelligence Community assets, including military intelligence assets; and, given the DCI's responsibility to determine the Intelligence Community's priorities to meet future challenges; the purpose of this thesis is to determine if the DCI should be a military officer.

This thesis uses historical examples and research to establish the Intelligence Community's structural, leadership, and budgetary parameters and future challenges that define the DCI's operational environment. The study uses these parameters to examine the positive and negative factors of a military officer and of a civilian leader as the DCI. The study establishes a matrix using DCI characteristics, incumbent background, and success or failure to determine a relationship between military officers and success.

The study determines that it does not matter if the DCI is civilian or military. The study indicates there is no correlation between successful leadership of the Intelligence Community and a military or civilian background. It determined that other discriminators are necessary and more important to the DCI's successful leadership of the Intelligence Community. They are:

1. Willingness to actively engage the Community issues.
2. Longevity in the position.
3. Leader credibility within, and outside, the Intelligence Community.
4. An understanding of the Intelligence Community and how it operates.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY OF TERMS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. STUDY DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Statement</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations and Definitions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance of the Study: An Introduction to Intelligence in the National Arena</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance Part II: The Link Between National and Departmenal (Military) Intelligence</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART I. BACKGROUND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LITERARY REVIEW</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Documents</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsanctioned and Unauthorized Accounts; Media Reports and Documentaries</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-official Documents</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused and Broad Scholarly Studies</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Second Opinion</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. HISTORICAL SETTING</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence's Historical Underpinning</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Community Develops</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## PART II. DISCUSSION

### Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUTURE CHALLENGES</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where the Community is Today; The Structural Challenges</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Leadership Dimension</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Power of The Budget</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Challenges</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN DIRECTOR</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Director's Community Performance</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendixes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Evolution of U.S. Intelligence Policy</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Directors of Central Intelligence and Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY OF INTELLIGENCE TERMS

CIA  Central Intelligence Agency. Founded 1947.

CIG  Central Intelligence Group. The non-statutory predecessor of the CIA from 1946 - 1947.

DCI  Director of Central Intelligence. Currently the primary advisor to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence, and also the head of CIA. The head of the CIG was also called the DCI.

DDCI  Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Position established by law (National Security Act) in 1953.

DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency. Under the Secretary of Defense, responsible for military intelligence as opposed to individual military service intelligence needs. Founded in 1961.

DoD  Department of Defense.

GDIP  General Defense Intelligence Program. The budget for national-level defense intelligence activities, part of the larger NFIP.

HPSCI  House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

IAB  Intelligence Advisory Board. During the CIG-era, a group of the heads of civilian and military intelligence agencies to advise the DCI.

IAC  Intelligence Advisory Committee. Successor to the IAB in 1947, helps the DCI to coordinate intelligence and set intelligence requirements. Replaced by the USIB in 1958 and by the NFIB in 1976.

ICS  Intelligence Community Staff. Responsible for assisting the DCI in management of Intelligence Community budgetary and programmatic activities. Established in 1972.
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The intelligence component of the Department of State.

IRAC Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee. An interdepartmental group that advised the DCI on intelligence community budget from 1971 to 1976.

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff. The senior military advisors to the President, who are, individually, the heads of the respective services. Established in 1947.

NFIB National Foreign Intelligence Board. A group of senior intelligence officials who advise the DCI on intelligence production, review, and coordination, and the intelligence budget. Established in 1976.

NFIC National Foreign Intelligence Council. An offshoot of the NFIB, advising the DCI on intelligence management issues.

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program. The consolidated budget and program for U.S. national foreign intelligence.

NSA National Security Agency. The agency responsible for intercepting and analyzing foreign communications and for maintaining the security of U.S. government classified communications. Established in 1952.


NTM National technical means. A phrase in various strategic arms control agreements referring to intelligence collection systems, including satellites, ground radars, etc.

OMB Office of Management and Budget. The office in the executive branch that is responsible for assessing various departments' and agencies' budget requests and passing a final recommendation to the President.
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense. The civilian component of the Defense Department.

PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. A group of experienced individuals outside the government who review intelligence operations and analyses. Established 1961, disbanded in 1977, and reestablished in 1981.

SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

USIB United States Intelligence Board.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1. The Intelligence Community .......................... 14
2. DCI Performance Factors ........................... 117
Intelligence is an important part of any decision process. It allows heads of state to steer clear of conflicts and it aids in the military commander's victory. In the United States (U.S.), the apparatus that provides intelligence to both the President and military commanders is called the Intelligence Community. The Community was established within a greater framework for national security that came out of lessons learned from World War II. The framework was created by the National Security Act of 1947. The act also identified the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the Intelligence Community's head.

During the National Security Act's formulation, there was an overriding fear that the military would dominate (via the DCI) the civilian authorities' judgments and decisions. Congress made firm provisions to prevent just such an occurrence. The President and the National Security Council (NSC) preside over national security policy formulation. The DCI reports directly to the President through the NSC. The DCI position is a civilian one. The agency that directly supports the DCI (the Central Intelligence Agency--
CIA) is also a civilian organization. And, although a military officer can be appointed to the position of DCI, certain military relationships are prohibited (most importantly is any command relationship).²

The framers and Congress have ensured that the Intelligence Community cannot be dominated by the military's departmental interests. Political judgments are considered and made above the DCI level and are not subject to military reporting and evaluation. However, the DCI is responsible for Intelligence Community coordination and priorities. And by volume, the Department of Defense (DoD) is the government's biggest intelligence information consumer.³ Within the current structural confines, the study's purpose is to determine if a military officer should be the DCI.

Issue Question

Given the DCI's necessity to allocate Intelligence Community assets and determine priorities to meet future challenges, should the Director of Central Intelligence be a military officer?
Objective

This thesis, using historical examples and research, examines the positive and negative factors of a military officer and of a civilian leader as the DCI. It identifies the positive institutional attributes and programs active duty military officers and civilians have provided to the Intelligence Community, as a whole, and in particular, to the DoD. Finally, given U.S. future global challenges, this thesis analyzes the pros and cons of having a civilian or military officer appointed to the position of DCI.

Limitations and Definitions

The thesis focus is the military officer's or civilian's effect on the Intelligence Community. It evaluates DCI influence over the Intelligence Community; in particular, the DCI's ability to influence resource management in relation to the DoD's intelligence organizations. Specifically, it examines a military officer's and civilian's capability to effectively prioritize and allocate intelligence assets in support of both national and departmental requirements.

This project will utilize only unclassified sources. The published literature demonstrates there is a wide range
of unclassified material available. Because of the research question's nature, classified material's exclusion has no relevance and will not affect the thesis conclusions. Classified material, as it affects this and any research project, is discussed in Chapter Two, "Literary Review."

The term DCI refers to the greater meaning of manager of a community of agencies. His actions, when separate from the Intelligence Community and as the manager of CIA or advisor to the President, are so identified. Please note this study includes a glossary and several appendixes to aid the reader. Operations, as it is used in "the operational side of the CIA," refers to the traditional role of human resource intelligence—the person to person contact for the purpose of gathering information. At no point will covert action be discussed or included in examples.

**Delimitations**

The thesis acknowledges, but does not analyze, the DCI's role as the CIA manager, or his role as the President's senior intelligence advisor. The study will not examine the DCI's (upward) relationship to the President. The (downward) relationship of President to DCI will only be
addressed as it pertains to, or limits, the DCI’s Intelligence Community responsibilities.

This study will not look at any structural changes to the Intelligence Community. Nor will it look at using DoD personnel—in their official capacity—to fill the position of DCI; i.e., DoD or Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) control of the Intelligence Community.

This study does not look at the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) position even though the National Security Act makes provisions for the possibility of a military officer filling the DDCI position.

Assumptions

The first assumption is that the DCI position is open to a military officer. The National Security Act of 1947 authorized the DCI position and, when it was amended in 1953, the DDCI position. The Act further stipulates that only one of the two positions can be an active duty or retired military officer. However, it does not require either position to be filled from the military ranks. Therefore, the assumption is that the DDCI will not be a military officer at the time of DCI selection. It is
further assumed that there are capable general officers and that the DoD is willing to give them up.

Second, the thesis assumes the criteria established for evaluating the DCI's Community role (i.e., his ability to persuade Congress, or his need for departmental requirements knowledge) will not adversely affect the criteria for his other roles of CIA manager and the President's senior intelligence advisor. To illustrate, if one measure of Community success is DCI credibility to the Congress, it will not inhibit the DCI's role as the senior advisor to the President.

The third assumption is the Intelligence Community structure will not change. The Intelligence Community's evolution is detailed in Chapter Three. Although some faults in this structure will be identified, it will be to illustrate the difficulties inherent in the DCI's position. The illustrations are not a prelude for structural change proposals.

Methodology

Methodology centers on literary research. The emphasis is in three areas. The first is a survey into the
background and factors surrounding the Intelligence Community's establishment with the DCI at its head. The second is the current requirements and constraints and the future challenges for an incumbent DCI. The third is a historical look at the DCI position as it pertains to the Intelligence Community performance. This study will review and/or incorporate viewpoints of Congress, the executive branch, participants, and scholars.

To answer the thesis question, this study will evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of a military officer and then a civilian in the position of the DCI and compare the two options. To do this, the study attempts to answer the following secondary questions:

-- What are the historical perceptions of a military officer and a civilian as the DCI?
-- What are the DCI's current structural and operational constraints?
-- What future challenges face a DCI and Intelligence Community?
-- What qualities and capabilities have military officers brought to the position of DCI? And, what qualities and capabilities have civilians brought to the position of DCI?

While these questions are interrelated, to the extent possible, they will be addressed separately.

In exploring the DCI's historical perspective, the research will address events and documents that define the
DCI's Community role. It also will look at what limited his ability to execute his Community responsibilities. Lastly, it will look at why a military officer or civilian was chosen and if that nomination lived up to expectations.

The National Security Act of 1947 and Presidential Executive Order (EO) 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," dated December 8, 1981, are the current, official documents that define the DCI position and the Community's responsibilities. Many other factors also play under the surface defining and limiting the DCI's ability to function as the head of the Intelligence Community. These, as they pertain to the DCI position, will be addressed.

The research then focuses on the future environment. What are the challenges that a future DCI must face? Many sources claim subject-area expertise. A survey of the opinions, bracketed by the criteria for knowledge and source validity (discussed in Chapter Two), will establish the general categories of Intelligence Community challenges.

A return to the historical data is needed to determine the qualities and attributes a civilian or military officer brings to the DCI position. Past DCIs will be examined for their strong points and their weaknesses. An evaluation
will point towards generic qualities that are present and desirable in a military officer, a civilian, or both.

Once this information is laid out, the discussion will turn to conclusions. These will be drawn from a comparison of the qualities versus the challenges. Which person—military or civilian—is more equipped to function as the future Intelligence Community leader? This answer will answer the thesis question.

Relevance of the Study: An Introduction to Intelligence in the National Arena

Nations need intelligence for political, economic, and military pursuits. From the beginning of written history, governments and military strategists recognized intelligence as vital to a nation's very existence. Sun Tzu, the Chinese military theorist writing in 500 BC, discussed the importance of knowing and understanding your adversaries.

About foreign relations, he stated:

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.  

About strategic intelligence, he said the following:

Spies are a most important element of war, because upon them depends an army's ability to move.  

And about tactical intelligence, he further explained:
By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. . . . We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split into factions. . . . And if we are thus able to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.  

Sun Tzu knew that regardless of which national power element (political, economic, or military) a ruler chose to employ, he would depend on intelligence to guide his decision. 

Intelligence is viewed in two respects—product and process. Sun Tzu refers to the information (product) itself. In this realm, intelligence is defined as: 

A product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for planning. 

The premier national-level intelligence customer is the nation's leader—in our case the President—who uses the intelligence product to exercise national power. The Rockefeller Commission put it succinctly when they reported:

Without sound intelligence, national policy decisions and actions cannot effectively respond to actual conditions and reflect the best national interest or adequately protect our national security. 

-10-
Intelligence is also a process. The process of intelligence is best described by the intelligence cycle concept. The intelligence cycle is a series of events starting with the policy makers identifying their needs, then intelligence organizations gather information, turn it into finished intelligence, and then pass the intelligence product back to the policy makers. This cycle is most commonly described in five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production and analysis, and dissemination. According to Jeffrey Richelson, in his book *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, this process is large, complex, and costly. He states:

The United States collects information via reconnaissance satellites, aircraft, ships, signals and seismic ground stations, radar, and undersea surveillance as well as traditional overt and clandestine human sources. The total cost of these activities is probably in excess of $20 billion per year.

This intelligence process is accomplished through a group of loosely federated agencies and organizations within the U.S. government. The current Presidential Executive Order, EO 12333, identifies this group as the Intelligence Community. Its members include: the CIA; the National Security Agency (NSA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); offices within the DoD for collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at
the Department of State; intelligence elements of the Military Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and, the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS).\textsuperscript{12}

The Intelligence Community refers, in the aggregate, to those executive branch agencies and organizations that conduct the variety of intelligence activities which comprise the total U.S. national intelligence effort. In total, their responsibility is to collect, produce, and disseminate information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other executive branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{13}

There are two problems with this type of system. The first deals with intelligence as a product. Because these intelligence organizations are within independent departments of the U.S. administration, there is a recognized problem in defining what the U.S. national leaders need to know. Different departments and agencies have different opinions and different priorities, given the turbulence of the world, and these priorities do not necessarily mesh at the national level.
The second problem deals with the intelligence process. Obviously the U.S. must maintain its intelligence capabilities (collection, analysis, etc.,) at a level that meets its strategic (diplomatic, economic, and military) objectives. In 1975, the Murphy Commission began its discussion of the Intelligence Community's state of affairs by acknowledging that:

The maintenance of intelligence capabilities of the highest competence is essential to national security and to the effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy.\footnote{14}

However, in fiscally constrained times, this "maintenance of capabilities" cannot include duplication in the Community's different agencies' efforts. Coordination is imperative. There can be no unnecessary overlap. Assets must be shared and priorities set for intelligence collection and analysis.

The person responsible for the highest level intelligence process and product coordination is the DCI. He is the senior intelligence officer--responsible for coordinating all U.S. foreign intelligence activities and advisor to both the administration and Congress. The Community, and the National Command Authority relationship, is shown at Diagram 1.
This dichotomy—the need for central planning and coordination pitted against the decentralized intelligence processing system—was deliberately established. The current national foreign intelligence machinery has its origins in a larger, more comprehensive legislative effort to unify the armed services and the national security apparatus. The product of this effort is called the National Security Act of 1947.

The National Security Act of 1947 (and subsequent FOS) charge the DCI with developing and implementing the policies, guidance, plans, programs, and budget of the nation’s national foreign intelligence effort. This effort is formally called the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). The most important aspect is consolidating the NFIP budget and submitting it to the President.

Relevance Part II: The Link Between National and Departmental (Military) Intelligence Requirements

While intelligence supports the national security apparatus and national policy makers, it also supports departmental requirements and decisions. As the Persian Gulf crisis demonstrated, nations settle disputes with diplomatic (political), economic, and military tools. As
the conflict developed, different departments and agencies needed different types and amounts of intelligence.

As the military became involved, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the individual service chiefs, and the Commander of U.S. Central Command used intelligence to make department-level assessments and projections. They included force application assessments and logistical requirements for the Kuwait theater of operations.

In general, the DoD, Department of State, and other department and sub-department organizations use intelligence for current decisions and long range planning. Obviously, the President and the NSC do not need the level of detail or particular focus that the different departments need.

What complicates these two (department and national level) intelligence requirements is that they are both satisfied from the same assets. Satellite and other forms of technical collection as well as human-sourced intelligence are valuable sources for both strategic and departmental (sometimes called tactical or military) intelligence. Consumers of both types of intelligence create competing demands. Jeffery Richelson framed the
problem well when he wrote:

As real time capabilities expand and programs grow, tactical users will be in greater competition with strategic and non-military [Washington policy makers] users than ever before—a competition that will manifest itself in regards to both tasking and the nature of new technical collection systems.15

The lion's share of intelligence for both national-level requirements and department-level requirements come from national assets. These assets are part of the NFIP; and the DCI has overall responsibility for the NFIP.

An example of a departmental requirement's dependency on national assets is order of battle (OB) information or enemy force movements. Although well below President-level threshold, OB is critical in developing the commander's limited-risk force requirements. OB information, however, is gleaned mostly from the NFIP assets, such as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). This is called the national-tactical interface. These assets are not controlled by the military and must be shared with other departments in the Intelligence Community like CIA, Department of State, and FBI.

Another example is weapon system acquisition. The DoD requires a link between new weapons systems and their ability to counter future threats. The organizations
responsible for validating this linkage are DIA and the Services' intelligence organizations. They, in turn, depend on the different Services' technical intelligence centers (the Air Force's Foreign Technology Center, the Army's Missile and Space intelligence Center, etc.) for the technical assessments or future threats. These centers, in turn, depend on national assets to provide them with raw data for their assessment process.

There must be a balance between national and departmental intelligence—between what the President personally needs and what departments (like the DoD) need to support the President. It is the DCI's responsibility to make those decisions in the form of NFIP priorities for collection and analysis and in developing the Intelligence Community's plans, programs and budgets.

Intelligence is an important input to all diplomatic activities and international economic sanctions, embargoes, and other measures. Without good intelligence, each will fail. But intelligence becomes critical when it supports the military. The military's first responsibility is deterrence. The military depends on intelligence to ensure they are credible and ready for any challenge. The military's second responsibility, when deterrence fails, is
to win on terms favorable to the U.S. Intelligence is also critical then, because there is no higher plane for escalation once the use of military force is committed. War is the final plateau. The military must have every means at its disposal to win.

Further, as it is with all endeavors, intelligence is clearly a military power multiplier. In military conflicts, intelligence has often provided the key to victory. ULTRA intelligence gave the allies Hitler's most guarded secrets. Other examples include the German victory at Tannenburg (WW I), and the U.S. naval victory at Midway (WW II).

There are also examples of intelligence's military value during peace time. The best is the U.S.'s knowledge of Japan's minimum battleship position during the 1930's treaty negotiations which was vital to limiting the arms escalation in the Pacific area.¹⁶

Reduced defense budgets call for greater intelligence efforts. As budgets force raw military numbers to shrink, foreknowledge in the form of intelligence--particularly its tools and products--will become critical to a shrunken military's ability to maintain an edge against a potential enemy.
However, in times of tight budgets and costly technology, national technical systems are too costly to replicate for different department priorities and needs. The military must compete with other agencies and policy makers for limited national intelligence resources. A balance, between national priorities and departmental priorities (which, granted, support national priorities), must be maintained. As the DCI develops the Community's goals, objectives, and priorities; it is important that he ensure the policy makers in DoD--and military commanders in particular--also use, and benefit from, the nation's intelligence machinery.

In developing and prioritizing policies, plans, and programs for the future, the DCI must make tough choices on how and where to expend our limited national intelligence resources. His choices must ensure the intelligence effort's benefits are shared throughout the Intelligence Community. The decisions must be informed and deliberate. Decisions made today will affect the Community into the next century. They must be informed and deliberate. The Intelligence Community's fate, more than ever, rests primarily on the Director of Central Intelligence's shoulders. This study will determine if a military officer
or a civilian should be the DCI and "shoulder" the responsibilities associated with running the Community.
1. The proper title for this legislation is An Act to promote the National Security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security. The short title is the "National Security Act of 1947" and will be cited as such throughout this study.


3. Ibid, 163.


6. Ibid., 82.

7. Ibid., 27.


13. ibid., 59943.


15. Richelson, 144-5.

PART I. BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been an explosion of intelligence-related writings since the congressional and presidential commissions of the mid-seventies brought the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Intelligence Community into the limelight. During the period 1975-1976, four separate commissions investigated the conduct of the CIA and the Intelligence Community. They worked independently of, and sometimes in spite of, each other. Three were intelligence specific and include: Vice President-chaired Rockefeller Commission, Senate-sponsored Church Committee, and House-sponsored Pike Committee. The fourth, the Murphy Commission, entitled The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs, addressed intelligence in some detail. The watershed after 1975 is also due to an amendment to the Freedom of Information Act in 1974 that opened the CIA and the Intelligence Community to public scrutiny.

Although there are some exceptions to the rule, the literature quality also experienced a quantum leap. Prior
to 1975, most works were either official accounts or, if they were attempts at objective evaluations, lacked the sound evidence and concrete examples to reinforce their statements and findings. In any event, the literature today is extensive and growing. Government documents, books, personal memoirs, journal publications, and personal opinions flood both the written and spoken media.

This explosion has both positive and negative aspects. While sheer magnitude and diversity provide considerable opportunities for research, the volume does not make this an easy job. The researcher must be extremely judicious in separating the wheat from the chaff. The task at hand is to determine who has inside information; by virtue of their position or because they spent the effort to gain an insider's understanding of the intelligence arena. What is the writer's status and does he or she have the experience, expertise or authority to express a valid viewpoint?

To be powerful does not mean the source is correct. Sometimes there are no correct answers. Other times the writer's position on the issue must be examined in light of the position he or she holds (or held). That is to say, to a certain extent, where you stand is where you sit. Is the article under review a personal attempt to justify past action or are the opinions and thoughts a genuine position
put forth for the future benefit and betterment of the intelligence profession?

Writers who review the literature devise different types and numbers of categories to define and describe the sources available. Stafford Thomas, in his article "On the Selection of Directors of Central Intelligence," identifies only three categories: Speculative-Evaluative, Descriptive, and Objective-Analytical.1 These categories focus on the author's intent and the style in which he or she wrote any particular article. At the other end of the spectrum is Stan Taylor's "Intelligence and National Power." This article uses seventeen categories--by historical era, subject, and intent--to divide and sub-divide the intelligence literature.2

Stuart Farson, in a recent article entitled "Schools of Thought: National Perceptions of Intelligence," reviewed the available literature and identified seven intelligence literature categories.3 For simplicity, the author will use Farson's categories. These include fiction, official documents, unsanctioned or unauthorized accounts, media reports and documentaries, semi-official documents, focused scholarly studies, and broad scholarly studies.

-27-
While Farson's categories frame the chapter's discussion, the review addresses the utility to the study of the different sources (as opposed to categories). For example, the first category, fiction, includes John Le Carre's *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, and Tom Clancy's *Hunt for Red October*. Enjoyable reading, but of no value to this research.

**Official Documents**

The second category is official documents. These are primary research sources. They include those from Congress, the different administrations, and the various commissions and groups that studied the subject.

Congressional sources include congressional committee reports and floor deliberations during the construction, passage, and various revisions to the National Security Act of 1947. They also include the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) confirmation hearings. These documents give insight to the intent and evolution of thought in the legislative branch.

Other congressional documents are excellent secondary information sources. The Library of Congress' Congressional
Research Service published a compendium of documents, hearings, and other records detailing the development of the intelligence portion of the National Security Act of 1947 entitled *Legislative History of the Central Intelligence Agency as Documented in Published Congressional Sources*. This document includes both House and Senate hearings and gives excellent insight into the different views and concerns of the day's power brokers as the bill was being formulated. The different Congressional committees sought out the opinions of other Senators and Representatives, the Secretaries of War and Navy, operational commanders of World War II, intelligence leaders, private citizens, and veterans of the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS). This document provides the researcher with an excellent source to review the different arguments and concerns of the day and to trace the DCI position's development.

Unfortunately, this document also proves the frailty of a source. It is as complete as could be compiled in 1975. However, several years later Congress released previously classified testimony. The House's Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments held some hearings in "executive session." The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released this testimony in 1982 after several partial, but inadvertent, disclosures.
This "new" 1947 testimony includes that of General Vandenberg (then DCI), Allen Dulles (with OSS experience and soon to be a DCI), Rear Admiral Thomas Ingis (Office of Naval Intelligence), and others involved with intelligence of the day. This source provides additional candid remarks about the issue of a military officer versus civilian filling the DCI position. Without this source, the researcher would miss some of the intelligence professionals' opinions.

The point being that intelligence, by nature, is secretive. Even a generic topic as this thesis requires source evaluation and confirmation. All sources, including official government documents, must be evaluated within the period they were written and tested against newer material. As new information becomes available, older sources become at best, dated, and at worst, incomplete. This should not inhibit the researcher. Nor does it mean the article or author is wrong, just that the information available at the time led the author to that particular conclusion.

Official documents also come from the executive branch. By studying executive letters, testimony before Congressional committees, and Executive Orders (EO) and directives that deal with the intelligence activities; the researcher can further glean the administration's position.
The latest executive communication is EO 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, issued on December 8, 1981. This order defines the Intelligence Community and outlines the DCI's responsibilities in dealing with the Community. This order comes the farthest in providing the DCI the power to truly manage the Community.

Other intelligence related executive correspondence range from Truman-era Presidential Directive entitled *The Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence Activities* (which set up the prelude to the CIA, the Central Intelligence Group--the CIG) to Carter-era EO 12036 and Ford-era EO 11905 (both also titled *United States Intelligence Activities*). These and other administration sources provide a good historical audit trail to study DCI responsibility development.

They also illustrate different administrations' attempts at mid course corrections, and attempts to redefine their beliefs and goals. For example, President Kennedy's letter outlining the primacy of the DCI's coordination role and President Nixon's announcing the Intelligence Community's reorganization were attempts to correct the imbalance between the DCI's CIA responsibilities and those to the Community.
Bridging the two branches of government sources are the various government commissions. Congressional- and administration-sponsored investigative groups have studied the U.S. intelligence apparatus throughout the life of the National Security Act. Within a year of its inception, the Dulles Commission was criticizing the CIA and the DCI. The findings of these groups also lend some insight to the attempts at mid course corrections and to the thoughts of the period.

The Rockefeller Commission, for example, stated:

In making this [DCI] appointment, consideration should be given to individuals from outside the career service of CIA. . . . Experience in intelligence service is not necessarily a prerequisite for the position; management and administrative skills are at least as important as technical expertise. . . . [and] no Director should serve in that position [DCI] for more than 10 years.\textsuperscript{11}

The Rockefeller Commission also led to President Ford's EO 11905, United States Intelligence Activities, the first of several EOs that tried to outline the Intelligence Community responsibilities.

Unsanctioned and Unauthorized Accounts: Media Reports and Documentaries

This group is the third and forth categories from Farson's article. They are lumped together for two reasons.
First, they are a balance to official government accounts by revealing facts and portraying accounts of what happened that otherwise would not see the light of day. Second, the authors in both categories often times have ulterior motives for publishing; from a change of belief or disgruntled employee to the profit of selling of ideas, books, or newspapers.

Philip Agee's account of CIA's Latin American activities, in his book *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, and Frank Snepp's Vietnam War commentary in a *Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End: Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam* are two examples of the former category. *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, by Bob Woodward, and the leaking of the Pike Committee findings to CBS news (before they could be officially purged of classified information and released) are two examples of news media involvement. The concern to the researcher is to ensure that the account, regardless of how it became public, is a complete and credible picture. The researcher must guard against sensationalism the media commonly, but subtly, uses to sell its products.

The researcher must also ensure the unauthorized account is a complete account and not the author's selective release of information to buttress his point of view. The
leaker of information--deliberately by the administration or illegally for some other reason--may have an agenda different than that of the government. This is not to say the pure facts are not correct, they usually are. To separate fact from biased opinion and to establish a complete picture versus selectively chosen details, however, the research must understand the author's mind set.

That also does not mean these categories of sources are of no value. On the contrary, some publications are extremely valuable to this research. Woodward's book, Veil, gives a good account of both William Casey and Admiral Bobby Inman's selection. When these different accounts are coupled with other works in this particular field (such as Congressional hearings and the analysis done by Thomas Stafford in "On the Selection of Directors of Central Intelligence," discussed below), a pattern emerges that aids in thesis development.

Semi-Official Documents

This, the fifth category, includes the authorized writings, such as personal memoirs and biographies, of people in the intelligence business. This includes Admiral Stansfield Turner's Secrecy in Democracy: The CIA in
Transition and William Colby's Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. They also include some earlier works such as Lyman Kirkpatrick Jr.'s The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities.

One must be careful during review of this category as well. As noted before, official information becomes dated quickly. Information the censors would not allow for someone's work might be acceptable for release in a later article. The researcher must also be aware of the book's background. While all these publications add an element to the research, they also may be tainted in one way or another. A writer from CIA might not have the same Community view as a person from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

Some of these accounts might be in response to the above category (unauthorized or media accounts)—trying to set the record straight, as it were. Admiral Turner's book is a good source to examine efforts, during the Carter years, to strengthen the DCI's Community responsibilities. However, his comments, especially on the CIA, have to be tempered with the realization that his actions as a DCI were not highly regarded by many in the intelligence arena. An excellent case in point is the so called "Halloween
Massacre." His explanation for eliminating 820 positions in the Directorate of Operations is couched in such terms that it is obvious he is answering his critics.¹⁴

The same is true with Colby's book. Understanding that Colby's DCI tenure ended in the midst of congressional investigations colors his observations and justifications for the actions he took in a different hue.

Nonetheless, these are also invaluable sources to explain some of the humanistic aspects of the DCI position and selection. Admiral Turner's book, Secrecy in Democracy, reflects on President Carter's decision to appoint an active duty military officer. Unfortunately, it does not discuss Turner's decision, halfway through his tenure as DCI, to retire his commission.

**Focused and Broad Scholarly Studies**

Parson's last two categories are excellent outside analysis and opinion sources. Two broad scholarly study examples are Richelson's encyclopedic look at intelligence entitled The U.S. Intelligence Community and Charles Ameringer's textbook primer called U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History.
Farson cautions that they, too, must be critically analyzed. He warns the reader of cultural and personal biases of the author. He uses the example of Roy Godson's Comparing Foreign Intelligence to point out that Godson has a "major investment" in furthering Godson's particular point of view. Just because a source comes from academia does not preclude false premises, incomplete work, or hidden agendas. In general, these writers' allegiances and agendas are not as easily recognizable as the authors from other categories.

A Second Opinion

A second approach is to categorize the literature by the author's background. This is a simpler way to categorize the current and topical articles from newspapers, magazines, and journals. In this approach, the researcher looks for the qualifying background to make the author an authority on the subject he or she is addressing.

The researcher must look for sloppiness or lack of attention to the details. Victoria Price, in her study entitled The DCI's Role in Producing Strategic Intelligence Estimates, claims the "central coordinating institution of the Intelligence Community has been the USIB and its subcommittees, and [is] now [the] NFIB." In 1979--the
date of her article—the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) had been operating for eight years. Granted, she was writing about the substantive arena and the ICS's responsibilities lay in the budget, plans, and programs arena of the Community. But, the ICS was clearly a major player in the DCI's attempts to coordinate the Community during the time she wrote.

This example also further emphasizes the problem of research and analysis becoming outdated or overtaken by events, mentioned before. Since her article appeared, there are now at least three Community-wide intelligence centers that deal with substantive intelligence coordination on a particular subject. While not "central" coordinating mechanisms, the DCI Counterterrorist Center, the DCI Counterintelligence Center, and the Counternarcotics Center, with their daily, Community-wide coordination and communication, are certainly major factors in the coordination process of the Community.¹⁷

With the reservation and understanding that material and opinions become dated quickly, intelligence experts express their opinions in many reputable periodicals, magazines and books. Some more common publications include International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-

-38-
intelligence, Foreign Affairs, International Studies Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Harvard International Review, and Signal magazine. In these articles, the writer speaks, not of experience (the government will not allow such things) but instead, from experience. By reviewing the author's background and previous stands, the researcher can determine the validity of the point argued.

Besides the authors mentioned above, writers include administration-associated employees and experts on intelligence such as Ann Armstrong (Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), Robert Gates (Vice-chairman, National Security Council and past DDCI), and Lieutenant Generals Perroots and Odom (past directors of Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, respectively).

On the Congressional side, Senators Boren, Cohen, and Warner (present or past members of the congressional intelligence oversight committees), have expressed opinions in both the media and on the record in Congress. The private (or consultant) side is equally represented with past employees of the intelligence agencies, experts who work in related industries, and others who are consultants or otherwise tied closely to the Community.


5. ibid, 4.


10. Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, known as the Rockefeller Commission (Washington, D. C., 1975), 17.


CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL SETTING

Intelligence has been used by United States leaders since this country's inception. Throughout this history, however, intelligence was viewed as parochial. Different departments and agencies operated their intelligence operations autonomously and even competed for entry to the President. Rarely was the intelligence process a coordinated process in support of the national security and objectives. It was not until just prior to World War II that the U.S. began to seriously consider centralizing an intelligence effort.

A product of that consideration was the National Security Act of 1947. The Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). It loosely defined the central coordination responsibilities and other intelligence activities but left intact the different departmental-level intelligence organizations and capabilities. In 1947, those were principally in the military services, the State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Over time, this has created problems in the national level functions of intelligence. For a variety of reasons, the DCI has consistently been called upon to further centralize intelligence activities. In doing so, the vision of CIA and the DCI in 1947 no longer resembles the reality of today.

Intelligence's Historical Underpinnings

As the United States prepared for World War II, policy makers realized they needed to coordinate the different intelligence agencies' efforts. In July, 1941, President Roosevelt named Colonel William J. Donovan the Coordinator of Information (COI). He reported to the President and his responsibilities included the authority to collect, analyze, and report to the President all information which bore on national security.

In June 1942, the COI was restructured as the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) and put under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) control. The new directive also gave the OSS added responsibilities, authorizing the group to plan and operate special services, a forerunner of covert action now conducted by the CIA. Although the OSS was disbanded with the end of World War II (October 1945), at least the ideas of a centralized intelligence process and product were established.

-43-
The OSS, and its termination, was a manifestation of a larger debate among government intelligence organizations. Before President Roosevelt's death, General Donovan proposed a centralized intelligence apparatus for peacetime. The other intelligence organizations, however, were very turf conscious, envied the OSS and stonewalled the proposal. Meanwhile, the Bureau of the Budget and State Department convinced President Truman that it should be the State Department that provided the President with high-level intelligence. The State Department failed to live up to the President's expectations.

As with all decisions in a democratic society, the outcome of the security debates following World War II was a compromise. As detailed in a recent article by Thomas Troy, President Truman chose between two intelligence structure proposals for America's post-war national security. While the State Department convinced the President they would provide him with high-level intelligence, they proposed an elaborate and interconnected system of department committees and coordinating groups to coordinate intelligence and national security policy making.

The military's proposal can be traced to General Donovan's original proposal. Between 1944 and 1947, it
surfaced in several different forums: Donovan's proposal, Truman's 1946 Presidential Directive, the Eberstadt Study, and drafts of the National Security Act (discussed below). The proposal basically called for a central agency controlled by the Department Secretaries (at the time, War, Navy, and State) and by inference, the chiefs of the different services' intelligence branches. This proposal was crafted, Troy claims, so that the intelligence apparatus, and with it access to the national policy makers, was left securely in military hands. Ray Cline claims the Navy brought the proposal to the forefront because they were afraid of Army domination.

Unifying the military departments (War and Navy) is not a new concept. Studies date back at least as far as the debate over a general staff at the turn of the century. In 1945, Congress again requested a study. This time it fell to James Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy. Forrestal passed the tasking to Ferdinand Eberstadt, with an added twist: if unification was not the answer, what was?

Eberstadt recommended against unification. Instead, he proposed three services and three Secretaries, all tied together by a coordinating Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and a Secretary for National Defense (later titled Secretary of Defense). Eberstadt went beyond the original request's
defense aspects and recommended a permanent coordinating mechanism to link foreign and military policy--the National Security Council (NSC). Under the NSC he proposed a centralized intelligence agency that reported through the NSC to the President.\(^7\) Eberstadt's study sounded very similar to Donovan's proposal of one year earlier.

While recommending a strong central agency, however, the Eberstadt study added that departments (such as military and State) needed their own independent intelligence capability. This dichotomy stemmed from a pragmatic approach to the problem. The Navy-backed proposal sought a central organization strong enough to prevent any other organization from dominating everything but weak enough that it did not threaten the Navy's own affairs.\(^8\) Because of the Navy's spoiling action, "central then came to mean a coordinating body that would act to orchestrate--but not assume--the functions being performed by the individual departments."\(^9\) The Eberstadt's defense integration and policy making study became the framework for the National Security Act of 1947.

One more development occurred between the death of the OSS and the National Security Act of 1947. Three months after the OSS was disbanded, President Truman established by
Presidential Directive a second centralized intelligence apparatus called the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). This Directive came in the form of a proposal from the military's Joint Intelligence Staff.

This Presidential Directive (dated January 22, 1946) established three entities. The CIG, with resources "donated" from the existing intelligence agencies, gathered and evaluated intelligence and then disseminated it to national policy makers. The CIG was controlled by what was then a new term—a Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI was a military position. He reported through an oversight body comprised of the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State and the President's personal representative. This body was called the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). It appears there was one thing the different agencies (Navy, War, State, FBI) agreed on; "they did not want a strong central agency controlling their collection programs."

It should be noted that President Truman set the CIG apparatus in motion by Presidential Directive. Congress had yet to approve any central intelligence organization or DCI by legislation. This Directive, in a way, preempted Congressional efforts to fix intelligence at the national level and set the baseline for the intelligence portion of any future national security apparatus. Congress would
tinker with new proposals, but would not fundamentally alter the existing setup.

It is also interesting to note that the National Security Act's original thoughts (the Eberstadt Study) and writers were from the military (as opposed to civilian or State Department). Rear Admiral Sours (Naval Intelligence) wrote Eberstadt's intelligence section. Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations) and Major General Lauris Norstad (Director of Plans and Operations, War Department General Staff) were the original bill's authors and relied on the Eberstadt Study's conclusions for the legislation's intelligence section.

When Admiral Sherman and General Norstad began to write the National Security Act, they too did not attempt to delineate the responsibilities of this new centralized intelligence agency. Instead, they deferred to the DCI (at the time General Vandenburg) to write separate legislation on the CIA's charter and administrative responsibilities.

Congress also did not go into great debate or detail over the DCI or CIA. The only real debate centered around the fear of giving the President a blank check with regards to intelligence, and the fear the CIA would grow to become a
"Gestapo"-type organization. This fear transcends the debate over military versus civilian and strikes at the core of the centralized information (and therefore centralized power) problem. Although an important issue, it is beyond the scope of this study. What is important to understand, however, is that Congress's original legislation sought to limit the CIA's and DCI's powers, not strengthen them.

The National Security Act of 1947 created by legislation a National Security Council (NSC). The NSC replaced Truman's NIA. Under the NSC, the CIA and DCI position were established. The stated purpose for establishing the CIA was for intelligence activity coordination among government departments and agencies, as well as the correlation, evaluation, and appropriate intelligence dissemination in the interest of national security.14 After congressional debates and amendments, the National Security Act of 1947 charged the DCI, through the CIA it should be noted, with:

- Advising the NSC on intelligence matters; making recommendations for intelligence coordination;

- Correlating and evaluating intelligence, then disseminating it within the government;

- Performing, for the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the NSC would determine could be more efficiently accomplished centrally; and,
Performing other functions and duties related to intelligence as the NSC would, from time to time, direct.¹⁵

The idea was to create a central clearing house for intelligence before it reached the President and the NSC. This hierarchy of organizations did not happen.

While stating in broad terms what the DCI's responsibilities were, it failed to make the DCI strong enough to lead the Community. The act waffled when it came to the DCI's responsibilities. It states that the departments and other government agencies will continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence.¹⁶ As detailed earlier, this was due to other agencies' concerns that they have their own, independent capabilities. Further, the act also did not give the DCI the power of consolidating a budget. It also did not delineate who, if anyone was responsible for coordinating future plans, programs, or policies.

These omissions set into motion an intelligence apparatus with many agencies dealing in and with intelligence, one of which believing it was the "central" (CIA) agency, and a director (DCI) responsible to the NSC and the President for coordinating the actions of all the agencies. Although the National Security Act was amended at various times, the basic provisions that legislatively
creates the CIA and the DCI and gives them powers and duties are not substantially different than the original.

The lack of a strong delineation of the agency's responsibilities in regard to centralization proved to be a fatal flaw in the attempt to centralize the national strategic intelligence structure. As early as 1948, a study chaired by Allen Dulles was criticizing the DCI for Community coordination failures. But this is a fundamental problem. The more the DCI uses and strengthens the CIA, the less likely the other agencies will cooperate with the DCI.

A Community Develops

Some researchers of intelligence development espouse the belief that the National Security Act's intention was to provide the best of a centralized and decentralized system. Regardless of the original intention, over the next forty years the U.S. intelligence apparatus grew of sheer necessity into a complex and large undertaking. The Intelligence Community, with the various and diverse membership, has survived and flourished for three reasons: (1) the need for specialized departmental intelligence; (2) an interdependence developed among them as the parent
departments (DoS, DoD, Department of Justice, etc.) strive to support national objectives; and (3) the insistence by the national policy makers for competitive analysis as a hedge against strategic surprise.

Within this Community, obviously it would be inefficient—and expensive—for the intelligence services purposefully to create duplicate mechanisms to collect, analyze, and disseminate the same information. Each Department (State, Defense, Justice, Treasury) cannot afford to buy its own satellites, for example. To guard against unnecessary redundancy and, more importantly, to ensure that all intelligence bases are covered efficiently, Presidents since World War II have directed the DCI to exercise leadership and coordination over the different departments and agencies that dealt in intelligence; the real intent of the National Security Act. The most recent charge to the DCI, in this and other respects, is contained in Executive Order (EO) 12333, issued by President Reagan in December 1981. (Chapter 4 discusses EO 12333 in more detail.)

The CIA's evolution as a separate and independent intelligence collector and producer, however, put the DCI in a difficult position vis-a-vis the Community. If he associated himself too closely with CIA (his power base) he is viewed as being tainted when dealing with other
intelligence organizations. If, on the other hand, he tries to distance himself from CIA, he loses his resources and ability to conduct coordination.

This double responsibility—or in the jargon; dual-hatted role—of the DCI did not start out that way. The wording from the National Security Act states it is the Agency's duty (and not the DCI), to advise, recommend, correlate and evaluate. This is a subtle but important difference. It infers that the CIA was to be above the other agencies, or at least first among equals—the hierarchy mentioned above.

Why CIA immediately built an independent and competing collection and analysis capability instead of a community coordination capability is critical to the historical examination of the Community, but is beyond the scope of this study. What is important to understand is that the DCI has two distinct responsibilities.

Commission after commission, both executive and Congressional, noted the flaws inherent with the dual-hatted DCI and recommended ways to correct it. They all agreed that when attempting overall management within the structure of the Community, the DCI failed. Historically, this is due
to the lack of bureaucratic tools. Specifically, the National Security Act did not give the DCI the power of the budget, resource allocation, or tasking of the entire Community. The DCI was reduced to cajoling the other Community members for cooperation and coordination.

The problem that these studies attempt to deal with is in the initial legislation, as discussed earlier. The National Security Act's vague description of the DCI's duties is a problem when he attempts to be the overall intelligence effort manager--his intended role. According to Lyman Kirkpatrick Jr., a CIA insider from the start, Truman's intent in creating CIA was to correlate and evaluate intelligence activities and data, not to produce it. If this was put into practice, the hierarchy of intelligence organizations (mentioned earlier) would have evolved.

Presidents from Truman to Reagan have recognized this problem and have scrambled to bolster the DCI's power to coordinate and lead the Intelligence Community through executive orders and presidential decrees. What has transpired is a series of moves by the executive branch to try to match this independent and ever growing Intelligence Community with the original intent of the National Security Act. Commissions, special studies and Congress have
consistently advised administrations to correct the perceived deficiency in control and add direction and guidance to the group of intelligence organizations.

Some Presidents tried bolstering the DCI's Community role by selection of a particular person and others by decree. In January 1962, President Kennedy picked a proven administrator, then explicitly reaffirmed DCI McCone's Community coordination authority in a public letter.\textsuperscript{20} Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan issued Executive Orders on intelligence activities that specifically outlined all the players' responsibilities. While the first two charged the DCI with the Community coordination role, they fell short of giving him the authority to enforce it. In the end, his power rested in his personal relationship with the President and his reputation within the Community.

In addition to CIA as an agency for coordination, another facet of the DCI's ability to coordinate the Community has always been by committee. The first being the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), established in 1947. This committee, made up of the heads of the different intelligence agencies of the day (the Military Services, State Department, FBI), was to aid the DCI in the coordination of the community effort. It was replaced by
the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) in the 1950's and by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) in 1976.

Various offices and committees have also been set up, under this mechanism, to help the DCI with coordinating various Community aspects of the national effort. Some of these organizations have had fruitful and lasting lives, others have not. The most senior intelligence officers' forum, the NFIB, still meets today. Others that the DCI has established for his use include the National Intelligence Program Evaluation (NIPE) Staff in 1963, the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) in 1971, and the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) in 1972. As will be discussed in later chapters, it is through both clear DCI responsibility delineation and Community participation (through the various committees) that the DCI will effectively coordinate America's intelligence effort.
END NOTES


4. Cline, 90.

5. Troy, 250-251.

6. Williams, Legislative History of the CIA, 217.

7. Ibid.

8. Cline, 90.


11. Cline, 90.


13. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the


16. Ibid.


20. Ibid., 193-4.
PART II. DISCUSSION
As developed in the previous Chapter, originally the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were to be one in the same vis-à-vis Intelligence Community responsibilities. Scholarly experts, congressional testimony, and President Truman's memoirs all agree that the first and foremost reason for establishing the CIA was for the programmatic side of intelligence—department and agency's intelligence activities (plans and programs) coordination.

A second reason for establishing the DCI position falls from the first: the correlation, evaluation, and appropriate dissemination of various intelligence products to policy makers in the interest of national security. The DCI and CIA were supposed to stay one level above the collection of raw intelligence, fusing the different products for national consumption. If they had only dealt in the process of developing intelligence—the fusion, or coordination, of plans and programs—and the correlation of national estimates (instead of actually producing original
intelligence products), they could have been an effective arm of the National Security Council (NSC). According to Anne Armstrong (the current chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, or PFIAB), the DCI position was originally to be a leadership tool for the President. The DCI would ensure that the Community was complying with the policy makers' desires in general (read NSC) by enforcing a coordinated intelligence strategy, and the President, in particular, by correlating the different intelligence reports into national estimates.

However, CIA did not stay strictly in the coordination business for long. Unable to extract cooperation from the other agencies in producing national intelligence estimates (a form of coordination and evaluation), it branched out into the collection and original analysis arena; and with it, moved into the intelligence-as-a-product arena.

At the Community level today, therefore, there are two separate and distinct DCI responsibilities. First, he is the manager of the CIA, a producer of intelligence; and second, he is the coordinator of intelligence production within the Intelligence Community. The Community responsibility was always the DCI's, but was intended to be accomplished by, and through, the agency he controlled. By inference, the CIA would have been superior to the different
departments' intelligence organization. Each of these looking to CIA for direction and guidance.

Instead, what developed was a Community with many diverse agencies, each with an independent power base, and all competing with each other. The Community today is basically a confederation with a weak central point and strong individual units that can resist many of the DCI directives. As independent as they are, however, they are not, by themselves, self sufficient. Nor does the structure allow them to be totally independent. Reality dictates that these agencies share a limited resource base. There is a subsequent dependence upon each other to satisfy their own departmental objectives as well as a necessity to collectively support national objectives. In essence, they have two masters, the department head and the DCI. Within the Department of Defense (DoD), therefore, intelligence policy and coordination comes from two individuals; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Coordination and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) and the DCI.

Within the Intelligence Community, the DCI is charged with the responsibility to prepare a budget, establish priorities for collection and analysis, and develop plans and policy for the future. And it is from this Community
structure that the different departments will get the national system support they need to carry out their departmental requirements (objectives). A good example is the DCI's emphasis on language qualified intelligence professionals. This requirement will spill over into the military's departmental requirements for language qualified personnel to debrief enemy prisoners of war.

It is critical, then, for the DCI to know the substantive intelligence and intelligence management issues that effect the whole Community and be persuasive and credible--within and outside of the Community. Without the proper supervision, direction, guidance, and coordination from a central figure (in this case the DCI), the Intelligence Community will be neither responsive to policy makers' needs nor will there be an economy of operations.6

This chapter discusses challenges that the current parameters pose to the DCI. They include the structure, resources, and leadership. The chapter then goes on to discuss a fourth DCI challenge: the future.

Where The Community is Today:
The Structural Challenges

As described in Chapter Three, there were requirements that dictated the creation of a hybrid centralized-
decentralized intelligence apparatus. Politics and differing functional missions are but two reasons. There are also some system characteristics that the DCI can take advantage of; one is competitive analysis.

There are, however, some structural aspects that challenge the DCI's success. The first comes from the "advantage" mentioned above. Competitive analysis is a double-edged sword. Although it is a valued hybrid system by-product in the analysis area, competition among the agencies is a hindrance in other areas. In theory, departmental objectives arise from national objectives. Therefore, departmental intelligence requirements (to satisfy the objectives) should be national requirement subsets. All departmental requirements would be building blocks to create national requirements.

Rarely is it this clear. In the day-to-day bureaucratic "trenches"—where there are constant fights for survival, weekly budget reviews, and a myopic view of events—there are also constant battles between view points and frames of reference. History is filled with substantive and programmatic examples of agency competition. A typical one, as discussed by Mark Lowenthal, is the mid-1960's CIA-Air Force battle over who should control the space systems.7
In the Intelligence Community, such subjects as budget, influence, access to policy makers, and prestige are jealously sought and guarded. This creates an environment that is counter productive to cooperation and coordination. The DCI must overcome the hesitation to cooperate without stifling competition in analysis. To do this, he must understand the Intelligence Community, its players, and the issues of the day. Lowenthal used the above example (while McCone was DCI) to demonstrate the need for a DCI to vigorously address his Community responsibilities.

A second structural aspect challenging the DCI is the requirement that he be a coordinator without explicitly giving him the power to do so. As previously described, the National Security Act is quite general about the DCI's duties. The challenge today is to function outside of, and in spite of, the original structure (CIA) that the National Security Act gave him to do such coordination.

It is the DCI's responsibility to balance the duties of running the CIA with the duties of coordinating the Intelligence Community. The DCI must be a strong manager and a credible leader within the Intelligence Community so that he can effectively orchestrate his responsibilities and duties (coordination and cooperation) within the Community. Many commissions and study groups have faulted the DCI's
Community role. Commenting on this very problem, the Murphy Commission said it the bluntest:

[The DCI is] responsible for coordinating the activities of the entire Community. . . . [this] responsibility has never been fully carried out.9

Executive Order (EO) 12333 has come a long way in the attempts to detail the DCI's specific duties but a general lack of acceptance within the Community continues to exist. Therefore, the DCI must be forceful in his pursuits and must thoroughly understand his role and the role of each of the individual agencies in order to gain their trust and lead the Community.

The third, and most complex, aspect of the structure challenge the DCI faces is the diversity of the members of the Intelligence Community. By nature, intelligence is a staff function as opposed to a line function. With the exception of CIA, each intelligence entity is separate from the DCI. There are a lot of intelligence organizations because there are so many departments, agencies, headquarters, commanders, and senior policy makers.

Each intelligence agency has its own structural and functional autonomy or are part of an autonomous departmental structure.10 The DCI must reach into, and affect, analytical operations, collection priorities, and
budget decisions of small parts of larger and diverse bureaucratic organizations. These organizations (Departments of Defense, State, Justice, etc.) have different (and perhaps more pressing) priorities than the DCI and do not look at intelligence in the same light as the DCI.

The DCI's ability to effect the departmental priorities (or at least protect the intelligence equities and priorities) is an absolute necessity. As pointed out earlier, there is a desperate need to coordinate agencies' activities and a dependence among each other to carry out the departmental tasking. Even the CIA cannot accomplish its mission without products supplied by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other DoD agencies.

The Intelligence Community members rely on each other for critical information during portions of the intelligence cycle. The Community is interconnected and interdependent. There is a mixing and blurring between departmental intelligence requirements and national objectives requirements. Two examples of this dependence were given in Chapter 1: order of battle information and weapon system acquisition support via "threat" data.
In order for the Intelligence Community to collectively fulfill its obligation to satisfy national level requirements, there is a natural and sometimes dictated dependence on each other. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is collected by one agency, but is distributed to other agencies for analysis and inclusion into their own intelligence products. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) uses SIGINT to help build orders of battle, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses SIGINT for counterintelligence, etc. These are examples of the lateral dependence between agencies.

The different departments also have a vertical dependence between national level and departmental level intelligence activities. A prime example is the military attache. The attache collects and disseminates military intelligence (order of battle, training capabilities, and economic and political information) for military as well as national level purposes. The attaches' activities and reporting support the analysis functions of the CIA, DIA, military services, and others.

Within the National Security Act structure, the DCI has a responsibility to coordinate the Community with some, but limited, specific legislative power to fall back to. He
must work with diverse agencies in a naturally competitive environment. It is an environment encouraged (at least in part) by the policy makers he serves. This requires the DCI, personally, to be forceful, knowledgeable, and credible in the field of intelligence.

The Leadership Dimension

The DCI as the Intelligence Community leader has existed since WW II. And as discussed above, the costs of individualism are prohibitive; the distinction between national and departmental intelligence and policy are blurred; and, the distinction between departmental boundaries are blurred. The second challenge then, is defining and instituting a viable leadership scheme that will foster productive coordination within the Intelligence Community. The coordination will take the form of accepting the DCI's policies, plans, programs, and budget.

Administrations use many reasons to justify a particular selection for DCI. Stafford Thomas wrote a study that contends these reasons fall into four categories. These categories are conceptually distinct and mutually exclusive and include administrator, policy consultant, policy implementer, and partisan choice. These
categories will be accepted on face value. The impact behind this type of selection criteria is the issue.

The DCI is responsible for leading a central agency and for coordinating the decentralized agencies by developing policies, plans, programs, and budgets for the effective use of limited resources. The Community's successful measure is how well the different departments are coordinating their efforts, how well their different requirements are being satisfied, and how little overlap exists. Again, the DCI's coordination responsibilities were never clearly defined, but the necessity to coordinate has intensified with the introduction of advanced technology. Within Thomas's range of categories then, the DCI must have certain qualities to be effective within the Community and ensure all departments benefit from the national intelligence effort. These qualities are what will allow him to be an effective leader, for what ever reason (policy consultant, political hack, etc.) the President chose him to be the DCI.

Obviously, agency diversity precludes a leadership style of constant supervision or direct administrative coordination. Among the different agencies, there are functional and allocation rivalries. Intelligence agencies
are independently strong and each defends its administrative jurisdiction. This intense competition between components means national intelligence activity control, direction and guidance must be a DCI's top priority but will be very hard to achieve. Presidents have attempted to correct the lack of DCI Community power right from the start. An abbreviated outline of the Community's evolution is in Appendix 1.

The bottom line is: to be effective, a DCI must rely on his leadership ability. This leadership must be active, forceful, visible, and informed in order to elicit Community cooperation and coordination.

The Power of the Budget

The two preceding challenges--structure and leadership--would not be of particular significance if the Intelligence Community's resource base was not limited. Today, that limitation means the DCI must burn a candle at both ends. He must pay for new technical intelligence collectors that are increasingly more expensive while the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget--the pool of money for national intelligence--declines.

EO 12333 is the most current "marching orders" for the DCI. The DCI is required to develop objectives and
priorities to respond to future needs. He must also provide specific guidance to the Intelligence Community regarding these objectives and priorities. It further gives him full responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence. This includes the authority to task other intelligence organizations, the authority to decide on conflicts in tasking development of the NFIP budget, and authority to implement and evaluate the NFIP.\textsuperscript{13}

What this means is, within the greater congressional and Office of Management and Budget's budget constraints, the DCI decides how the money is spent, where the emphasis will be, and which programs to cancel. The DCI has full budgetary control--through the National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC)--over the other organizations of the Intelligence Community. The NFIC is a consultive body made up of the intelligence agencies leaders. The DCI uses this forum for advice (not necessarily consent) on budgetary and programmatic issues.

It is through this latest EO that the DCI has gained further budget control and therefore the Intelligence Community direction and character. This is the power--a stick in the form of money flow control--that a future DCI needs to overcome the competitiveness and independence of
the Intelligence Community agencies and enact future cooperation and coordination. The DCI will need the budget power to posture the Intelligence Community to be as ready as possible to face all future challenges.

In this chapter's introduction, there was a discussion of the problem within the Community of two bosses. This situation is really pronounced when discussing the budget. It is important to understand that there are two programs that govern the intelligence resource allocation. NFIP is one such program; Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) is the other. NFIP controls all the national foreign intelligence activities. The NFIP equates to the Intelligence Community. The TIARA program, deals with the departmental (in this case, military) intelligence activities--activities normally associated with the theater and battlefield commander's concerns. According to official statements by the Secretary of Defense, TIARA includes three programs:

Tactical Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition; the Defense Intelligence Support Program; and the tactical Cryptologic Program.¹⁴

To illustrate the two boss problem, Air Force Intelligence operations receive money, guidance and tasking from two different sources: NFIP and TIARA. National organizations like DIA are also affected with the same problem.
The DCI controls the NFIP-associated money but TIARA falls under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence's (ASD/C3I) control. To demonstrate how the challenges of structure, leadership, and budget are related, NSA, DIA and the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division all come under both the ASD/C3I's and the DCI's purview. Again, referring to EO 12333, the DCI is charged:

Together with the Secretary of Defense, [to] ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between national foreign intelligence programs and Department of Defense programs.15

The budget squeeze's impact on the actual intelligence product is greater than in the past because the mix of programs within the DCI's purview has changed greatly in the past two decades. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reliance has given way to a reliance on technically collected intelligence. This requires highly technical and expensive assets that heighten the dependence agencies have on each other discussed above. Further, Intelligence Community members must not only share the collection assets, but analysis and dissemination assets too. Lastly, as the military commanders see what intelligence can provide, they create more applications for its use, taxing the intelligence assets even more.
An illustration is again found in the SIGINT arena. The responsibility for collecting SIGINT rests squarely with the National Security Agency (NSA). The SIGINT product, however, is used by every other intelligence organization for departmental and national objectives. The Intelligence Community cannot build and man every system, to collect every requirement, for every agency. Therefore, the DCI must establish priorities for the assets we have and constantly review them for relevant and effective collection and analysis (production) strategies. He must be the Community's honest broker.

Plans and programs for future SIGINT assets must also be reviewed and prioritized to assess how they effect both NSA's and the other agencies' ability to fulfill their missions. In limited funding environment, future SIGINT programs must also be weighed against other intelligence disciplines (such as imagery). The DCI must reach into the DoD, into the NSA, and affect the SIGINT priorities--be they the future collection assets or the current collection and analysis regimes.

Because all national objectives are fulfilled through both departmental requirements and national requirements, the DCI has to dictate priorities to all the Community intelligence organizations. With rising costs and shrinking
budgets, future assets must also be shared and technologies must be procured that supports both multiple priorities and requirements. Intelligence assets must work across intelligence discipline lines. Within this limited budget, the DCI must orchestrate the different agencies' needs despite the natural Community competitiveness and despite the perception that he is favoring the CIA (his agency).

The challenge of affecting the Community's budget, wherever it lies, is reaching critical proportions as the DCI faces the future. DCI Casey's early- to mid-1980s decisions are just now reaching fruition. Plans and programs that are considered now will not be put into operation until the next century. Budget decisions must be made with full understanding of both intelligence and intelligence management issues. The structure, the budget, and leadership will all determine the DCI's future success.

**Future Challenges**

The Intelligence Community has always faced future challenges. Every new President and DCI urge the Community to do greater things and rise to the challenges of the day. Each new era claims to face new unprecedented challenges. In reality, although the problems become more complex, the
Intelligence Community has always faced the same types of problems and the DCI has attempted to deal with them—sometimes successfully, sometimes not. Intelligence, by its nature, is a perishable product and there will always be a need to see what is beyond the next hill.

Today, it is the problem's dimensions that are different. Judge William Webster, the current DCI, said:

[There is a] dramatic increase in the number and diversity of subjects the Intelligence Community now is required to address, the number of consumers who use our product, and the resources we need to provide what is asked of us.\textsuperscript{16}

The rush of data flowing into the Community today is only matched by the unpredictability of the wild course of change. The future challenges facing the DCI include:

- Substantive saturation of the analytical capabilities.
- Complexity of the organizational structure.
- Limited resources compared to the required expenses.
- Successful exploitation of technical achievements.

Substantively, the Intelligence Community must deal with a changing world and different emphasis. The pace and scope of global events as we forge into the twenty-first century is dizzying. There will be complex treaty monitoring requirements, emerging regional powers with
accompanying political and economic upheaval, and growing transnational issues such as terrorism, narcotics and weapons and technology proliferation. These substantive problems are additive to, not in lieu of, the established Soviet Union problem-set and the worldwide indication and warning/crisis management problem-set.

The challenges require sophisticated and discriminating analysts. Professionals who can work on several different issues and demonstrate how the issues interconnect. We can no longer collect everything available. We must decide very early in the collection phase what is important. This requires a heightened awareness among agencies of each other's requirements and it requires sharing information and finished intelligence rapidly and efficiently. It is the DCI, as the leader, that must nurture, develop, and insist on these capabilities for the intelligence professionals.

Organisationally, there is a growing requirement to supply non-traditional intelligence organizations (Customs, Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency) with intelligence products. This strains an already requirement-burdened system. Additional organizational strains will occur to the Community with budget and manpower cuts, escalating
technology costs, and a growing cry to reorganize the Community.\textsuperscript{17}

The budget challenge was mentioned before but it bears repeating here. Logically, if there is a deluge of requirements for a changing world, there should be a corresponding increase in the capability to handle that need. This will not be the case. In fact, for the near term, it will decrease. And, it is the next few years' budgets that will determine the Community's capabilities for the next century. In December, 1989, the \textit{National Journal} reported Judge Webster as saying he put together a budget addressing all members' aspirations. But he also clearly understood that some programs the Community wanted to do would not get done and other programs would have to be cut back.\textsuperscript{18} The budget challenge is already in full swing.

Another future challenge aspect is processing the vast amount of collected information. This overlaps the two previous aspects of quantity and budget. The true measure of success in dealing with the new substantive challenges and overcoming the Community's organizational strains is if the people who need intelligence, get it and understand it, in time to act on it.
There is an data explosion and a resultant requirement to process it. Technology has given the Community huge vacuum-like collectors to literally vacuum the globe looking for tidbits of information. Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to improve the human assessment dimension of the processing phase. The information flow must be filtered before it gets to the analyst. Departmental requirements are increasing as are national requirements. The human dimension, the intelligence professional that must make intelligence from all the information, cannot handle the new demands by his-or herself. The Community cannot increase its staffing to exploit the technological successes so it must collect even smarter and front load the processing and screening of information. Only the filtered information should reach the analyst. And the analyst must further filter it for the policy makers.

In the future, traditionally separate disciplines in intelligence will blend together. Economic and military analysts will both look at aggression (Japan and the European Community are prime candidates for economic aggression). Technology must serve and support such diverse requirements as law enforcement, treaty monitoring, and long range forecasting. The Intelligence Community, in the form of the DCI, needs to address all the issues and support departmental requirements so the departments can support the
national policy. There is a need for mixing technical and human resource reporting. A need to front load as much filtering as possible. And, the Community must nurture an intelligence corps of professional analysts and specialists.

Commenting on DCI William Casey's preference for human intelligence over technically collected intelligence, Angelo Codevilla and Gregory Fossedal wrote:

> When the Pentagon argues for new technology, it met stiff resistance from the entrenched intelligence bureaucracy [read CIA and NSA]. Casey never could get excited about machines. So he punted, signed the budget requests put before him, and the bureaucracy committed the bulk of the U.S. intelligence budget into the mid-1990's to the technical approaches conceived in the 1960's and 1970's.\(^1\)

Whether this is a fair assessment of Casey's action is not as important as the subtle points of being forceful and committing resources well into the future. If Casey's actions committed resources through the mid 1990's, today's DCI commits them into the next century.

The DCI, therefore, must be proactive in the Community. He must address the debates between human and technical collectors, and between inexpensive satellites and huge vacuum cleaner satellites and propose bold new solutions. Once decided, the DCI must forcefully commit resources and ensure the Community supports the decisions.


8. Ibid.

9. The Murphy Commission, 94.


13. Ibid., 59943-4.


15. EO 12333, 59944.


18. Morrison, 3042.

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN DIRECTOR

As earlier chapters described, the National Security Act stipulates that a military officer can hold only one of the two top positions—the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) or the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Previously, under the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the DCI was designated a military position and was under the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) control.

It is important to understand the framework of the discussions during 1945 to 1947. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was to be a coordinator; a big brother to the other intelligence organizations. The DCI would be the CIA director. He did not wear two hats and there was no separation of duties between the CIA and the Intelligence Community. They (DCI/CIA) would gather the intelligence from the other agencies, synthesize it and present it to the national policy makers. Civilians and politicians understood that if the DCI were military—and the military
establishment could control him—the military establishment could control the intelligence flow to the President.

As legislators formulated the National Security Act in 1946-7, the military's prevailing thought was they would still control the DCI and the CIA. This was particularly true if the National Security Council (NSC), to which the DCI would report, was about to be stacked in the military's favor. The original NSC membership included the Secretaries of War (soon to be Army), Navy, soon to be created Air Force, and State. Congress was concerned about such military predominance.

Who should be the central coordinator of intelligence—a military officer or a civilian—predates the National Security Act. It came to a head, however, during the congressional testimony. The testimony's tone implies that the administration's original intent, or at least congressional interpretation of the intent, was to give the CIA a military influence by putting a military officer in command. Thomas Troy's analysis of the Intelligence Community's origins indicates the DCI position under the CIG system was a military position; and, during the legislative drafts of the National Security Act, it changed to a civilian position.1
During the National Security Act hearings, there was a two-part question concerning the DCI position: Who should be the DCI, and for how long? Most witnesses agreed that any DCI should spend a decent amount of time at the helm. There was even discussion about setting a statutory service length (six or eight years) much like the JCS Chairman.

When it came to military versus civilian, however, there were differing opinions. General Eisenhower's view on military versus civilian staffing of the DCI position was accommodation. He said:

One of the difficulties of that [civilian appointment] comes in getting a man who will understand intelligence. . . . We believe that the man going up there must have very considerable training in this intelligence business. . . . I do believe there are arguments on both sides of the thing. If I knew I could get the civilian I wanted and knew he would stay there 10 years, I believe I would be content myself.²

General Vandenberg (the former CIG director and a former Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the War Department) agreed with General Eisenhower. He said staffing did not make a difference, except for:

. . . initially, the military are very loath to trust their top secret information to someone over whom we do not have the ability to penalize by court action if they divulge some of this. . . . Now, if we can put a military person in there initially and let him organize this thing and let the flow of information get fully established, after that period it makes no
difference whether it is civilian or military, and the information will continue to flow.³

But when the committee asked Allen Dulles (a civilian with OSS experience), his response was different. Instead of accommodating the military, he was forcefully against an active duty military officer as the DCI. He said:

I believe the agency which is to be entrusted with assembling and analyzing intelligence should be predominantly civilian rather than military and under civilian leadership.⁴

Further, he believed that whomever took the Director of Central Intelligence post should make it his life's work. The Director and his immediate staff should shed their rank and "as it were, take the cloth of the Intelligence Service."⁵

Dulles pointed to military intelligence with their constant changes in Chiefs of Intelligence as an example. He claimed the constant turnover in those positions, and the perception that the posting was only a stepping stone in career progression created an impression that intelligence was a step-child in the military. That perception crippled their efficiency and their prestige. Constant change destroyed morale and prevented long-range planning. As further proof, he pointed to the first three DCIs, whose combined tenure lasted only fifteen months.⁶
This difference in opinions, between the military and civilians (championed by the State Department), was, and still is, indicative of a greater, and more fundamental, disagreement between institutions regarding the idea of centralized intelligence. The State Department believed central intelligence should focus on economic and technical information in time of peace, while the military felt national security depended on military information. This cuts to the bone of this thesis: what is the correct intelligence mix and who can best determine how to obtain it? The obvious implication with the new setup and a centralized intelligence agency was that the winner would have greater access to the President.

The National Security Act's military framers did not address the military control issue directly in their drafts. And, as this chapter's beginning points out, the Act today reads:

[The DCI and DDCI shall be appointed] . . . from among the commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in active or retired status, or from among individuals in civilian life:
Provided, however, That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in active or retired status.7

Further, with the National Security Act amendment in 1949 that added the Secretary of Defense but excluded the
service secretaries from the NSC, the military lost its ace in the hole for control of the DCI position. The DCI and the CIA, if not independent, were certainly away from any direct military control.

The debate over civilian versus military DCI did not end with the enactment of the National Security Act. One year later, Allen Dulles conducted an official study of the new intelligence apparatus. In his final report, he took the opportunity to state his view that when a military officer becomes the DCI, he should resign his commission; and, that the CIA would benefit from civilian leadership.8

With the military versus civilian DCI issue undecided by the framers of the legislation, historical precedent on the military versus civilian DCI is equally vague. (See appendix A for a time line chart on DCI/DDCI manning.) Most administrations exercised the military option and filled one or the other positions with a military officer (primarily the DDCI position). DCI Admiral Turner during the Carter administration and DDCI Vice Admiral Inman during Reagan's first two years are the two most recent examples. Other Presidents (like Bush, Reagan, and Ford) chose not to place military officers in either position.
Individual Director's Community Performance

As established in previous chapters, the original intent behind the CIA's creation was to establish an organization that would coordinate the various Intelligence Community organization's activities. Although the CIA grew beyond its intended role (by going into original collection and production of intelligence), it never became the supreme coordinator envisioned. In part, because from the very beginning, the DCI was challenged by the other Intelligence Community organizations.

The remainder of this chapter evaluates the individual DCIs' performance as a Community leader and identifies weak and strong incumbents. The evaluation of a DCI will deal only with his success or failure as director of the Community. For example, two DCIs took office during periods of very low morale throughout the Intelligence Community, John McCone (Bay of Pigs) and George Bush (Church Committee). Without going into details at this point, McCone was able to positively influence both the CIA's and the Community's operations; while Bush was only successful with CIA's morale.
The Beginning

The first two DCIs were Rear Admiral Sidney Sours (January to June 1946) and Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg (June 1946 to May 1947). Both officers served as DCI to the CIG. Although their accomplishments are noteworthy, their efforts were directed towards establishing a viable central organization (the CIG) and not towards the Community as a whole. As such, an assessment of their deeds is beyond the scope of this study.

Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the third DCI, was the first to be a DCI under the National Security Act of 1947 (May 1947 to October 1950). Admiral Hillenkoetter was a career naval officer with some experience in foreign affairs as an attache from 1933-5, 1938-41, and 1946-47 and as an intelligence officer to Admiral Nimitz.9

Admiral Hillenkoetter was unsuccessful in his efforts to advance the interests of his new agency in its central coordination role. It was during Hillenkoetter's tenure that Allen Dulles's 1948 study, as mentioned earlier, criticized the DCI's failure to coordinate Community intelligence activities.10 The Intelligence Advisory Council (IAC), made up of all the intelligence agencies'
chiefs, was acting more as a directing body to the DCI than the advisory body they were supposed to be. This falls in line with the prevailing thought by the military of how the Community would operate.

Also during this period, the other Community agencies refused to cooperate in the DCI's national estimates process by not sharing their intelligence products. Perhaps the worst example of his inability to coordinate was the Intelligence Community's failure to warn the policy makers of the Korean invasion. Even though the intelligence was available—the military and CIA both predicted it—the Community was unable to effectively communicate their concerns to the policy makers.

It is hard to find a sympathetic commentary on Admiral Hillenkoetter's tenure. Ray Cline, who worked in the OSS and the CIA, called him "one of the weaker Directors." Two other writers were more direct. One describes him as having no bureaucratic clout, the other was kinder, claiming Hillenkoetter was too junior to meet the demands of a rank-conscious Washington bureaucracy.
The Formative Years

In contrast to Admiral Hillenkoetter, General Walter Bedell Smith (October 1950 to February 1953) was a forceful and dynamic administrator and leader with both military and diplomatic experience. General Smith was a career Army officer. He had exceptional administrative and managerial experience as the Chief of Staff for Generals Marshall and Eisenhower. The positions gave him experience coordinating in a multidimensional environment with competing interests and needs. He also gained an appreciation for foreign affairs and the value of intelligence while serving as the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1949.\textsuperscript{14}

He revised the IAC to DCI relationship so that the IAC advised, rather than supervised, the DCI.\textsuperscript{15} He actively prodded the Intelligence Community towards coordination and centralization. He was responsible for establishing the Office of National Estimates, and with it, a true national estimates coordinating mechanism. The military's cooperation and intelligence sharing would come, begrudgingly, later. Also, the National Security Agency's (NSA) creation, and with it greater coordination and national-level direction, has its origins in a General Smith memo to the NSC.\textsuperscript{16}
General Smith was well acquainted with the Washington bureaucracy and a senior and respected officer. "[General] Smith took charge. He moved rapidly and effectively." He used his influence and experience to his advantage as the Community leader. He was successful at advancing Community cooperation and coordination because he was knowledgeable, credible and willing to engage the issues.

The fifth DCI, and first civilian, was Allen Dulles (February 1953 to November 1961). Dulles came to the job with a solid operational intelligence background. As the head of the OSS's office in Berne, Switzerland, he was an accomplished and very successful spymaster. Working for the Department of State from 1916 to 1926 gave him diplomatic experience. Prior to his DCI appointment, he was the Deputy Director for Plans (the operation side of CIA), the DDCI, and as already noted, he was part of a 1948 study group that evaluated the DCI's performance.

Dulles all but invented the DCI job, especially as it relates to the CIA director. His testimony was influential during the National Security Act's drafting. He critiqued the incumbents through commissioned studies and he served as the DCI for over eight years. His tenure as a DCI is still the longest.

-94-
No other DCI has had such a profound influence on the CIA as an organization. Serving at the critical time in the CIA's history, he was responsible for the CIA as we know it today. As a personal confidant of President Eisenhower and with his brother at the State Department as an ally, he had virtual free reign in shaping a growing and maturing CIA. His emphasis on professionalism in the intelligence services is legend. But, he was first, and foremost, a case officer. And his performance as the Intelligence Community leader is not as shining as it was for the CIA.

Because of his length of service, Dulles was a factor in some important Community developments. He was the DCI during the explosion in intelligence collection technology. The U-2 and SR-71 aircraft were developed and fielded during his tenure. Perhaps more beneficial to the Community, he also committed resources to overhead system development.

However, despite his unique level of influence, his long tenure, and repeated urging by various consultant and study groups, Dulles did little to enhance the powers of the DCI, vis-a-vis the Community. In general, he was a poor administrator. Intelligence Community coordination remained a problem throughout the Eisenhower administration because that aspect of intelligence had little real interest with
Dulles.\textsuperscript{20} In 1975, the Church Committee specifically criticized him for his neglect of Community management.\textsuperscript{21}

The Sixties

John McCone, the sixth DCI (November 1961 to April 1965), was also the first outsider. A republican and successful shipbuilder, he was appointed by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs. He had bureaucratic experience as the Deputy to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.\textsuperscript{22}

DCI McCone had a unique vantage point to begin his tenure. President Kennedy reaffirmed the DCIs' authority to coordinate the nation's intelligence activities in an unprecedented public letter shortly after McCone assumed the DCI position.\textsuperscript{23} McCone's marching orders were quite clear. The fruits of this authority and his leadership were demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Intelligence Community's coordinated and comprehensive interagency intelligence collection and analysis program, throughout the crisis, was testimony to his ability to orchestrate better Community relations and cooperation.
Perhaps more importantly, McCone also vigorously addressed long term Intelligence Community coordination and cooperation. He worked out an agreement with the Secretary of Defense to share, with CIA, the increasingly important overhead reconnaissance programs. This prevented a military monopoly on space-based intelligence assets.  

While this maneuver—to get the CIA in on the space business—seems contrary to Community cooperation, because the DCI appears to be looking out for "his" agency, the DCI must ensure all organizations share the benefits of national systems. With the CIA in on the ground floor of the development of space based collectors, the space systems would also capture national (instead of just tactical) requirements. This goes back to the issue of military versus economic and technical. An example of this would be collecting information on the Soviet wheat harvest, which was important to the CIA and eventually to national policy, but very low on defense's priorities.

DCI McConc also established the National Intelligence Program Evaluation (NIPE) staff to assess the various services of the Intelligence Community. The NIPE was designed to review and evaluate Community programs, cost effectiveness of the those programs, and the effectiveness
of implementing priority intelligence objectives. This is the first time the DCI acknowledged that there were two distinct responsibilities and that these responsibilities needed to be separated. This was also a large step towards a coordinated Community effort. Ray Cline summed up McCone's Community-oriented philosophy when he wrote:

[McCone] was the only one [DCI] who considered his duties as coordinating supervisor of the whole Intelligence Community to be a more important responsibility than CIA's own clandestine and covert programs.25

John McCone was replaced by Vice Admiral William Raborn, Jr., (Retired). Admiral Raborn had a successful U.S. Navy career including the Navy's POLARIS ballistic missile system program director.26 Although he had considerable administrative skills, he had no intelligence background and little influence on the Administration or within the Community. There appears to be no sound, intelligence-related reason for his selection. In light of President Johnson's insecurity with foreign affairs, and the military's domination in Vietnam-related intelligence, it is easy to agree with Harry Howe Ransom when he wrote: "Johnson chose Raborn because of demonstrated administrative skills rather than as a sophisticated person knowledgeable in world politics."27 Ray Cline was more to the point: "The choice for DCI was baffling."28
Regardless of why he was selected, Admiral Raborn lasted only one year as DCI (April 1965 to June 1966). During his tenure, Vietnam continued to grow in importance with the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the Dominican Republic Crisis transpired. Admiral Raborn was willing to try to work the Community issues, but he had no experience in the intelligence arena and no credibility with the other players. His tenure was too short and he made no significant impact on the Community.

The next DCI, the eighth, was Richard Helms (June 1966 to February 1973). He was the first insider to become the DCI since Dulles. Richard Helms was a career intelligence officer. He served in both the OSS and the CIA. His background, like Dulles, was in operations. Also like Dulles, Helms served for a considerable amount of time as the DCI (7 years) and was loved by the CIA intelligence professionals.

Unlike Dulles, Helms made substantial contributions as the Intelligence Community leader and showed good insight for Community matters. He established the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS)--which replaced the NIPE--and gave it broader Community coordination powers.
While the DCI position still did not have the power of a consolidated budget, Helms was very effective in influencing the different members by persuasion and convinced the different agencies to cooperate on a number of issues. For example, when the US Air Force ended their ballistic missile test monitoring program in the Atlantic, Helms convinced the Secretary of Defense to keep the monitoring ships active—monitoring Soviet ballistic missile testing.29

The Seventies

Helms was replaced by James Schlesinger. Prior to serving as the DCI, Schlesinger was the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Schlesinger lasted only six months as a DCI (February 1973 to July 1973) before he resigned to become the Secretary of Defense.30 In the CIA, he is remembered for the drastic personnel cuts—particularly in the operational side of CIA—and, some say, his determination to destroy the operational side of the CIA.

It must be emphasized at this point that the operational side of the CIA does not equate to covert action
The CIA's operational side is better equated to human resource intelligence (HUMINT) collection. For the most part, the CIA's "operations" are the traditional person to person contact for the purpose of gathering information. This is contrasted with the other side of CIA, which is made up of the analysts, engaged in the production of intelligence. Schlesinger's cuts of the operations side of CIA were not designed to stop covert action--which are always Presidentially directed and would be done in any event--but the cuts would inhibit the CIA's ability to collect HUMINT.

The Community aspect of his short tenure was different. While Schlesinger was at the Office of Management and Budget, he conducted a comprehensive study of the Intelligence Community. He had an understanding of the Community and believed the DCI should play a strong and central role. During his tenure, he was able to add credibility to the ICS by adding non-CIA professionals to the Staff. But his DCI tenure was too short to have any true impact on the Intelligence Community. His most important Intelligence Community contributions were during his Secretary of Defense tenure. There he supported William Colby's efforts to consolidate and coordinate the military intelligence organizations' Community contributions.
William Colby succeeded Schlesinger as the DCI and became the tenth DCI (September 1973 to January 1976). Like Dulles and Helms before him, Colby was a career intelligence professional with experience in the operational side of intelligence. Colby's claim to fame was releasing the CIA's "family jewels" to Congress. The "jewels" was a summary of twenty-five years of misdeeds, questionable or irregular activities, and other deep dark secrets the CIA had compiled in the wake of Watergate. Within a year they had made their way to the headlines of the New York Times and Washington Post. His willingness to suffer the immediate pains of a full and very public investigation probably saved the whole Intelligence Community from total disintegration.

Although preoccupied with the congressional inquiries and press revelations, Colby succeeded in moving the Community towards better coordination and cooperation. He developed "Key Intelligence Questions" that, in general terms, defined the Community's collection priorities in the national policy makers' eyes. The Intelligence Community would now respond to what the policy makers needed, not what the intelligence agencies' own operational (departmental) requirements dictated.
He also revamped the Community estimative process with the introduction of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). These subject-matter experts who reported directly to the DCI. Without any CIA staff, they were free to draw upon expertise throughout the Community to draft National Intelligence Estimates. With these two improvements, the Community was now more involved in the full intelligence cycle that ended with finished estimates to the policy makers.

William Colby was replaced by George Bush. This was the first true political DCI appointment and only lasted one year (January 1976 to January 1977). The political nature of his appointment was emphasized twice. Once during confirmation hearing, and again when he became the first DCI to leave because presidential administrations changed. Bush had political and diplomatic experience as Ambassador to the United Nations and to the People's Republic of China. He also had managerial and administrative experience in and out of government.

Bush, an outsider to intelligence, is best described as patient and having a desire to learn. A recent National Review article claimed Bush did "more for [CIA's] morale than any DCI since Allen Dulles." If this was even half
true it was quite a feat considering the disarray the CIA was in after 1975.

Bush did recognize that the DCI had to play a Community role and put emphasis on his Intelligence Community Staff (moving it out of the CIA compound to give the staff the air of independence). And, it was during Bush's tenure that President Ford issued Executive Order 11905, "United States Intelligence Activities." This EO gave the DCI authority over the national intelligence budget for the first time. Nevertheless, his tenure was too short and he did not have Community credibility. While he received paper authority over the budget, he did not have the influence to exercise it. His efforts on the whole were limited to carrying out the initiatives William Colby had started.

After he was elected President, President Carter appointed Admiral Stansfield Turner to be the twelfth DCI. Admiral Turner was a career naval officer with command experience. His last position was as a Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe and therefore he had some experience in politics and diplomacy. Admiral Turner had been a consumer of intelligence, but never a producer. He is best
described as viewing intelligence performance from the perspective of efficiency and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{16}

Admiral Turner was the first military DCI since Vice Admiral Raborn in the mid sixties, and before that, General Smith in the early 1950's. Even he, in his book, wonders how he was selected for the job. During the confirmation hearings, the Senate wanted to know if he could make the important decisions.\textsuperscript{37} The inference being that Admiral Turner might not make the correct decision when that decision went against the wishes of the military. Could Admiral Turner cancel a collection system's production if the Department of Defense was in favor of continuing it? Could a military officer be objective? Was a military officer really free of undue influence? His tenure demonstrated that he could; however, deciding against the military does not mean a correct decision for the Intelligence Community.

It is safe to say Admiral Turner was not widely accepted in the CIA. He is responsible for firing nearly 800 intelligence professionals, the majority again from the operation side of the agency, and he pushed the CIA towards technical collection over human intelligence.
Both of these initiatives go against the traditional attitude of the CIA. While Schlesinger's cuts were designed to cut the "dead wood," Turner's went further. To scale back the Intelligence Community's activities, across the board, is regrettable, but sometimes necessary. To push one discipline of intelligence over another (technical collection versus HUMINT collection) as Turner did, demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the intelligence process. This lack of understanding not only hurts CIA, where the cuts were implemented, but the other intelligence agencies that rely on CIA to collect that aspect of raw data for their fusion into the different intelligence products.

The appraisal of his Community performance, therefore, is harder to evaluate. Bob Woodward claims that by the end of his tenure, Turner was isolated from both the policy makers above him and the Intelligence Community below. He firmly believed in the DCI's central role and he tried to work Community issues. Armed with a new executive order signed by President Carter (EO 12036), Turner attempted to consolidate the DCI's role as Community coordinator and leader. The EO now gave him "full and exclusive authority for approval of the NFIB budget submitted to the President." The EO also beefed up his ability to execute

-106-
his responsibilities within the Community with the establishment of two staffs, one for Community collection management and one for Community resource management.

Turner changed the Community's orientation away from the Soviet Union and directed more resources to the other world problems, global economy and political unrest that would threat U.S. vital interests. He changed Colby's KIQ's to National Intelligence Topics (NITs) which, in the form of questions, framed the long and short term high-priority intelligence subjects. But, according to CIA's own account, by 1980, policy makers believed they had little effect on formulating the requirements that guided collection.

Admiral Turner's tenure was beneficial to the Community because he reorientated the Community towards problems of the future, he continued the consolidation of Community control started by Colby, and because he encouraged development of technology. However, he failed in his attempts to manage the Community for two reasons. First was knowledge. He did not understand the intricacies, rights and responsibilities (called "equities" in the professional jargon) of the individual Community players and he did not understand the whole intelligence process. He
could not appreciate HUMINT's role in the fusion of intelligence disciplines. Second was credibility. He was viewed as a self-serving outsider trying to monopolize power. Because he did not understand the Community and its players, he alienated the very people he was trying to get to cooperate.

Into the Eighties

William Casey became the thirteenth DCI (January 1981 to January 1987) with the change of administration from President Carter to President Reagan. If there was any doubt about Bush's and Turner's appointment, there could be no doubt that Casey's was a political appointment. However, to his credit, Casey did have OSS experience during World War II. He also had some political and bureaucratic experience as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He also served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.⁴²

Much of Casey's activities are still shrouded in the necessary secrecy of the Intelligence Community. He is touted by outsiders and insiders as beefing up the CIA and improving the CIA's morale after the cuts imposed by Turner.
Casey did not have a good basic understanding of the Community when he became the DCI. However, the OSS experience gave him credibility. This helped him when he reverted back to the Helms approach and attempted to gain more Community cooperation and coordination through "ajoling the different members. He also established the National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC). This body is designed to gather the senior members of the Intelligence Community to advise the DCI on programmatic and budgetary issues. It is this forum, where all the members of the Community can participate, that the DCI finally gained more than paper control over consolidating the Intelligence Community's budget.

Where Turner was abrasive in his pursuits of consolidating his control over the Community, Casey was the opposite. Laid back and hands off, he carefully chose his battles and tried to come to an agreeable position for all parties involved. In this respect, Casey, with the same mandate in a revised executive order, was able to effectively control the budget and gain Community cooperation and coordination. In fairness to Admiral Turner, Casey's budgets were ones of exceptional growth. The true test of Community control came later when DCI Webster presided over a shrinking budget. However, the good
will and cooperative spirit that Casey build while the budget was expanding allowed Webster to flex his Community muscles when the budget started to shrink.

The fourteenth DCI was Judge William Webster. His tenure just recently ended (May 1991). Judge Webster's tenure will not be evaluated for the study. His efforts are too new and the Intelligence Community's current activities are classified.

Summary

The survey of DCI's demonstrated that the time spent between the duties associated with the CIA and management of the Community is up to the wishes of the DCI and, in part, the emphasis placed there by the President. Also, as the DCI's responsibilities in regard to the Community evolved, they were "paper" definitions much longer than they were actually exercised by the DCI. So that while DCI Bush received paper authority to control the budget, it was ten years later before DCI Webster truly exercised it.
END NOTES


5. Ibid.


7. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Compilation of Intelligence Laws and Related Laws and Executive Orders of Interest to the National Intelligence Community*, Committee Print -111-


12. Lowenthal, 19


14. CIA, 11.

15. Breckenridge, 42.


18. CIA, 13.


22. CIA, 15.


25. Cline, 192.
26. CIA, 21.
28. Cline, 211.
30. CIA, 21.
32. Breckenridge, 60.
33. Cline, 219-21 and Breckenridge, 60.
34. Richelson, 434-5.
41. Breckenridge, 61.
42. CIA, 29.
Robert Gates, the current nominee for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) position and until recently the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), began an article with some White House impressions of intelligence:

"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence" said Jimmy Carter in 1978. "What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?" asked Richard M. Nixon in 1970.\(^1\)

Lyndon Johnson also said:

Policy making is like milking a fat cow. You see the milk coming out, you press more and the milk bubbles and flows, and just as the bucket is full, the cow with its tail whips the bucket and all is spilled. That's what the CIA does to policy making.\(^2\)

These quotations highlight two problems with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) position. First, no matter what the DCI does, someone is not happy. Second, because there is an obvious association between the DCI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), critics blame the CIA for intelligence failures. But they really mean the Intelligence Community. And the DCI is responsible for
that Community. The DCI's responsibility to correlate the nation's intelligence and to advise the National Security Council is one of the few areas that is specifically laid out in the National Security Act. The DCI must do this by getting the whole Intelligence Community to cooperate and coordinate. Only when the DCI uses all technical assets and intelligence professionals efficiently will he truly support the national policy makers.

The thesis question is; "Should a military officer be the Director of Central Intelligence?" The answer is it does not matter if the DCI is military or civilian. The research did not show a casual relationship between background--civilian or military--and success or failure in the Community. There are other discriminators that are more important to the success of the DCI's efforts to lead the Intelligence Community.

A review of past DCI's performance indicates the necessity to have certain traits, regardless of the background. They are:

(1) Willingness to actively engage the Community issues.

(2) Understanding of the Community and how it operates.

(3) Leader credibility within, and outside, the Intelligence Community.

The review revealed that these attributes were not the
exclusive domain of either the military or civilian sector.

Nor did it show a casual relationship between a DCI's background and qualities needed for Community success. What the examination did show was these certain traits were present in varying degrees and quantities for the successful DCI's. It also demonstrated that the traits are related and a DCI must have more than one of these traits to succeed. See figure 2 for a summary matrix of DCIs, performance traits, and success rate.

A second necessity is longevity in the position. In any discussion of military versus civilian selection for the position of DCI, one has to address tenure expectations. In a sense, Dulles was right. He argued very effectively that military members only have one eye on the present job with the other on their future assignment. This was a valid criticism but it also applies to the civilian side. The most obvious example was Schlesinger, who stayed as the DCI only six months before becoming the Secretary of Defense. George Bush was also criticized for using the position as a stepping stone for higher political office. But other, successful DCIs are just as guilty. General Smith wanted to work in the State Department, and became the Under Secretary of State in 1953.
## DCI PERFORMANCE FACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNITY</th>
<th>CREDIBILITY WITHIN/OUT OF COMMUNITY</th>
<th>WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE</th>
<th>TENURE</th>
<th>MIL?</th>
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</table>
The most important attribute is the willingness to engage the issues associated with the Intelligence Community. Without this willingness, the other attributes (knowledge, credibility) will only help the CIA. Within the structure, the DCI's and CIA's responsibilities are not synonymous, and the CIA is in direct competition with the other agencies. The DCI must be willing to carry out his Community duties despite his CIA connection. The structure calls for a DCI that is aggressive and proactive in dealing with Intelligence Community issues. He must be willing to close with and engage the problems that plague the Community. He also must be well versed, knowledgeable, and credible in both intelligence and intelligence issues--to the other leaders of the Community, to the national policy makers and to Congress.

A prime example of lack of willingness is Dulles. He had all the other attributes, but because he did not wish to engage the Community issues, they were not addressed. Willingness, by itself, will not be successful either. An example of this is Raborn. Although willing, he had neither the expertise, credibility, nor time to develop them. As such, he failed.
Therefore, longevity, or tenure, is the second most important factor. Although too much could stagnate the system, a DCI must have enough to establish himself as a leader. While Schlesinger knew the Community and wanted to actively engage issues, his tenure was too short. Conversely, McCone and Casey had enough time to overcome their lack of knowledge and make valuable contributions to the Intelligence Community.

The third factor is credibility. The Intelligence Community structure is such that the different intelligence agencies are within larger, diverse bureaucratic organizations. The Community is also competitive. The DCI's Community responsibilities are not clearly delineated and were very slow to solidify, with the other organizations filling the void. The DCI must understand the Community makeup and actively address his equities within the Community. He must be credible in the field of intelligence in order to establish his position as chief planner and policy maker within the Community. This attribute is hard to develop once on the job because it must be earned.

The DCI must also realize that he will never be an equal to the different department (State, Defense) heads. Therefore, he must balance his attempts to protect his
equities in the Community with a demonstration to the departments of the benefits of a well coordinated and well led Community. His credibility must gain the cooperation of the departments to create an effective and productive Community. Hillenkoetter and Schlesinger both lacked credibility. Schlesinger did not have time to earn it, Hillenkoetter was unwilling or unable to earn it. Both were unsuccessful at leading the Community.

The fourth factor to successfully leading the Intelligence Community is knowledge of the Community. The DCI must know what issues to address and which are not worth the good will needed to resolve them to his satisfaction. Turner was unable to overcome both the lack of knowledge and the credibility in the Community. Casey and McCone, lacking only knowledge, were able to overcome the deficiency.

This study demonstrated the need for a leader of the nation's intelligence effort. The budget for the national intelligence effort has been effectively put in the hands of the DCI with the signing of Executive Order (EO) 12333. To be successful at managing the budget, however, he must know and understand the different intelligence and intelligence management issues. He must be an honest broker of resources for the Community. The DCI must foster productive
cooperation, establish collective goals and policies, and focus the national intelligence effort. He must be focused on the future of the Community. Specifically, he must find ways to process more intelligence, for more customers, with fewer resources.

In summary, there is a clear need for a DCI who can effectively lead the Community. The current reality is a national intelligence structure with a DCI that is both CIA director and leader of a group of loosely federated agencies. The agencies must cooperate to effectively support the national policy makers. Intelligence success in supporting the national policy makers will rest with the successful cooperation and coordination of all the Intelligence Community players. Particularly, there must be coordination and centralized direction of policy planning and budget—all responsibilities of the DCI. This requires that the DCI balance his CIA director duties with those of his Community responsibilities.

Any choice for the DCI position in the future needs to be steeped in intelligence, have a solid understanding of the Intelligence Community, and be an aggressive and willing partner to Community solutions. This person can come from the military or the civilian sector.
Examples such as Helms, Dulles, and Colby demonstrate that "case" officers, although steeped in the operations side of intelligence, do not always make good Community leaders. Likewise, when you contrast Admiral Turner to General Smith, you see that the fact that a person is a military officer does not mean he understands intelligence or can be a successful leader of the Community.

The search for the next DCI should include only those who understand the Community and are committed to working the issues. The candidates should not be limited to the military, nor should they be limited to the CIA. Directors of the National Security Agency or Defense Intelligence Agency, chiefs of the Services' intelligence operations, and other high-ranking, knowledgeable and credible individuals should be active considered.
END NOTES


Appendix 1

EVOLUTION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE POLICY

1942 - The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

1945 - President Harry S. Truman disbans the OSS. Its functions are absorbed by the War and State Departments.

1946 - A Presidential Directive is signed by President Truman establishing the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), under the direction of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA).

1947 - Congress passes the National Security Act replacing the NIA and CIG with National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Establishes concept of DCI as titular head of the Intelligence Community.

1948 - Dulles Study criticizes DCI's failure to coordinate Community.

1952 - President Truman signs secret directive establishing the National Security Agency (NSA).

1953 - National Security Act of 1947 is amended to legislatively establish the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

1955 - A commission is headed by former President Herbert C. Hoover to study U.S. intelligence capabilities. Recommends the establishment of Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence, later becomes the PFIAB during Kennedy administration.

1958 - Congress passes the Department of Defense Reorganization Act, giving the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility for intelligence support to U.S. military commands.

1961 - The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is established inside Department of Defense (DoD) to integrate military intelligence efforts of all the Armed Services.

1962 - Kennedy publicly supports DCI's Community role with letter to DCI McConc. Focus of DCI's Community responsibilities increased to include all U.S. intelligence agencies. Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Program Evaluation (NIPE) established at CIA.
1971 - As a result of Schlesinger study, DCI Community responsibilities redefined again to include review of plans, programs, and a consolidated budget.

1972 - The Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) is established to further Community coordination.

1974 - The Hughes-Ryan Amendment was adopted to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Amendment requires the President to report CIA covert action operations to Congress.

1975 - The Rockefeller (Presidential) Commission recommends restriction on certain activities and improving intelligence oversight capabilities. Found DCI's job too big with CIA and Community responsibilities, recommends relieving DCI of CIA-related responsibilities.

- The Church (Senate) Committee recommends need to restructure relationship between DCI and intelligence agencies to improve management and oversight; recommends strengthening the community role of the DCI.

1976 - President Gerald Ford issues the first Executive Order on U.S. intelligence activities (EO 11905). Strengthens DCI's Community role by giving Intelligence Community Staff separate budget and independent staff.

- President Ford establishes Intelligence Oversight Board.
- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is established by the 94th Congress.

1977 - The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is established by the 95th Congress.

- House's Pike Committee recommends separation of DCI and CIA.

1978 - President Jimmy Carter issues an Executive Order on intelligence activities (E.O. 12036), replacing President Ford's Executive Order. DCI has authority to submit entire budget.

1981 - President Ronald Reagan signs Executive Order 12333 on intelligence activities to replace President Carter's.
### DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

### Historical Tenures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>MIL/CIV</th>
<th>TENURE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sidney W. Sours</td>
<td>RADM</td>
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<td>Roscoe Hillenkoetter</td>
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<td>William Colby</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>9/73 - 1/76</td>
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<td>3/77 - 1/81</td>
<td>Carter</td>
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<td>Civ</td>
<td>1/81 - 1/87</td>
<td>Reagan</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Civ</td>
<td>4/87 - Present</td>
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## DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

### Historical Tenures

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<th>NAME</th>
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<td>Kingman Douglass</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>3/46 - 7/46</td>
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<td>Edwin Wright</td>
<td>Brig Gen</td>
<td>1/47 - 3/49</td>
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<td>Civ</td>
<td>10/50 - 8/51</td>
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<td>8/51 - 2/53</td>
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<td>General</td>
<td>4/53 - 1/62</td>
<td>Dulles/McCon</td>
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<td>Marshall Carter</td>
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<td>Richard Helms</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>4/65 - 6/66</td>
<td>Raborn</td>
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<td>Rufus Taylor</td>
<td>VADM</td>
<td>10/66 - 2/69</td>
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<td>5/71 - 7/76</td>
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ARTICLES


-132-
Taylor, Stan A. "Intelligence and National Power: A Bibliographic Note"; Studies in Intelligence, Vol 31, No 3 (Fall 1987): 129-146.


BOOKS


-139-