LONG-TERM PLANNING IN NATO--A TOOL TO ENHANCE THE ALLIANCE'S OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS?

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LONG-TERM PLANNING IN NATO: A TOOL TO ENHANCE THE ALLIANCE'S OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS?

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

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DISCLAIMER

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Long-term Planning in NATO: A Tool to Enhance the Alliance's Overall Effectiveness? AUTHOR: Dieter K. Tietz, Lieutenant Colonel, German Air Force

The introduction of a long-term planning process in NATO has already improved force planning in the Alliance. Refinement of that process, and greater planning authority of the NATO staffs can significantly increase NATO's overall cost effectiveness. Creating the conceptual framework and long-term planning guidance will reduce the cumbersome process of trying to harmonize nationally and separately derived mission need documents before any armaments cooperation and weapons system development can be attempted. Shrinking resources Alliance-wide put increasing emphasis on the effectiveness of remaining forces. Only a "top-down" approach to defense planning and acquisitions can eliminate parallel development efforts and also avoid gaps in force capabilities due to unharmonized rational force contributions to the Alliance. More planning authority for the NATO staffs and agencies could also clear the path to a more integrated force structure and, maybe, eventually to integrated forces--a concept which has been successfully tested with the NATO-owned and NATO-operated E3-A AWACS fleet.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Tietz is a General Staff officer in the German Air Force, currently serving as a student at the USAF Air War College. Trained and employed as a fighter pilot in Germany, he graduated from the German General Staff Academy in 1973. Since then he has been closely associated with a variety of planning aspects, holding a number of different positions in national and international planning and systems management staffs. After graduating from the Air War College, Lieutenant Colonel Tietz is scheduled to serve as the German Advisor on the Air University faculty.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

No doubt, the Alliance can make its resources militarily more effective. No doubt, we can better exploit those military capabilities in which the West has a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. . . . Gorbachev. . . the most effective Soviet leader since Lenin. . . has succeeded in shaking up the Alliance, but he must not succeed in unraveling it. . . . The remarkable change in Soviet behavior. . . reflects not only the clear-cut superiority of the Western system, but also the solidarity of the Alliance's military posture.

Dr. James Schlesinger

Thesis: Refinement of the long-term planning process of NATO and greater authority in planning guidance, at the expense of the individual member nations, can significantly enhance the cost effectiveness of NATO's forces and eventually prepare the way to central planning and procurement.

The general topic of this study is long-term planning: The need to look far ahead, the various problems associated with attempting to shape the future, the benefits long-term planning can promise, and possible solutions for overcoming some of the current problems. However, since the inception of the study, rapid improvements in East-West relations, dramatic political changes within Eastern Europe, and the immediate prospect of very significant conventional and nuclear arms control agreements have put in question the validity of the NATO treaty in general. "If the Warsaw Pact
is Past, What is the Future of NATO?" I therefore believe there is a need to briefly discuss the probable future of NATO before I address the need for, and the possibility of, improving its effectiveness. At a time when the political dogmata that determined international relations for 45 years are tumbling overnight, any prognosis becomes vague. Yet the attempt must be made to ascertain if there is still any merit in promoting NATO's effectiveness and cohesion.

The study is focused on the mechanics of the planning systems. Except for a few practical examples, which should help to visualize the principles, I have disregarded the contents of our planning process. Also, I have resorted to unclassified sources only in order to allow for ease of handling and to accommodate the possibility of a later publication. As official documentation on planning procedures is often classified, this somewhat limited the detail of the discussion and compelled me to look more into the general principles--hopefully thus enhancing clarity.
CHAPTER II

THE FUTURE OF NATO

The ministers of EUROGROUP stated, after their meeting on 27 November 1989, that "... a strong and integral alliance remains paramount for the continued security of the allies on both sides of the Atlantic as well as for supporting political progress. ..." I strongly believe that this statement still holds true despite the political developments that have since taken place.

First initiatives for western defense cooperation began soon after World War II. They initially aimed to prevent any possible recurring aggression by Germany, but, already the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) of 1948 encompassed broader political goals which eventually led to the involvement of the North American nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. From the beginning NATO was designed not only as a military alliance, but also, as spelled out in Article 2 of the Treaty, as a political agency with the task of "... further development of peaceful and friendly international relations. ... promoting conditions of stability. ... encourage economic collaboration. ..." The Soviet Berlin-Blockade and the Korean War soon made the Soviets the most obvious threat to western democracies,
particularly in Europe. The defense of Western Europe, however, required the involvement of West Germany and, after attempts failed to tie a German defense contribution into a closer European Defence Community (EDC), West Germany eventually became part of NATO. Almost simultaneously, communist East Germany, along with the rest of Soviet dominated Eastern Europe, became part of the Warsaw Pact. As the prospective battlefield of any military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and, with the "Iron Curtain" splitting one nation into two enemies, the two Germanies became the symbol of the archrivalry between western democracies and communist tyranny.

Within the last few months, suddenly, and much faster than anyone ever dreamed possible, internal problems in the Soviet Union and all of Eastern Europe made the Soviet empire start to crumble, brought liberalization, democratic developments, abolishment of the Communist Party as the only legitimate source of power, and the promise of German reunification. The Soviet Union has started unilateral force reductions and has offered arms control agreements for Central Europe, which in that theatre could significantly reduce the superiority of Soviet conventional forces and possibly eliminate the Soviet's capability of a surprise attack.

With "peace breaking out all over" has NATO met its goal, and can it be filed away under history? From a purely
military point of view that could probably be debated once all arms control measures on the horizon have materialized. Yet, Soviet military capabilities would even then make it a military superpower, second only to perhaps the US." As recently as 11 February 1990, the US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, explained before the US Congress why the Soviet Union will remain a formidable threat for the foreseeable future. "... even if one would agree with the following statement: "... if the military threat declines, the relevance of NATO will inevitably decline with it..." NATO's political role would still remain valid. The more Europe grows together, the more important it will become for it to speak "the same language" in security policy matters--be it as an equal partner to the US within the Alliance or be it as one European voice to the Soviets in future arms control arrangements.

Undoubtedly the implementation of currently discussed force reductions will decrease the size of the military threat. It is however, quite likely that the general public will overestimate that effect. The danger is very real that the efforts still required to provide continued security in the form of financial resources and manpower will be less and less willingly provided. For the Alliance that would mean
that we would--more than ever--have to strive to do better with less.

The following quote may serve as the overall conclusion to this chapter: "It seems safe to predict that as long as no other viable alternatives for assuring international security are in sight, NATO will retain a relevance that goes well beyond that of any other alliance, past or present."
CHAPTER III

LONG-TERM PLANNING

General Considerations

In lieu of a common definition, I will describe planning as devising methods and procedures which can assist in achieving a goal oriented to the future. Defense planning aims to achieve an optimum effect, with the resources expected to be available, against a foreseen threat. Thus the goal—the mission—and the circumstances under which that mission must be accomplished, determine how that can best be done by providing proper strategy, tactics, weapons systems, manpower, leadership, training, infrastructure, and support.

Modern war is characterized by ever increasing technological complexity and highly sophisticated weapons systems. These systems require significant time and huge amounts of money for development and production. Today, it may take seven to ten years to field a new major weapons system such as a fighter aircraft. Research and development (R&D) costs are often prohibitive for smaller nations and only economies of scale may allow production at affordable costs. Cooperative arms procurement and the pooling of the required resources can help to overcome that problem. However, experience with such projects shows that the added need for
coordination and agreement between the nations involved adds significantly to the time required for procurement. The multi-role combat aircraft "MRCA-TORNADO" was produced as a NATO project with three participating nations and became operational about 15 years after its first conceptual inception. The additional time required must largely be attributed to the difficulty in harmonizing national mission need documents as these were separately developed without a common (NATO) conceptual umbrella.

The high cost of modern weapons systems has yet another effect: The life cycle of these systems necessarily becomes longer. In-service times of 20 to 25 years are not unusual anymore. The time span from the definition of a weapons system's basic capabilities to the eventual employment in its envisaged mission could, therefore, reach up to 40 years.¹

The conclusion is that all these factors constitute a compounding problem for the military planner. On one hand he needs to plan further and further ahead while on the other hand the problems he faces in doing so increase.

**National Defense Planning Systems**

Long-term planning has only been attempted since the sixties and, in fact, is not even the rule in all Alliance nations yet. As long-term planning must consider the overall national strategy, it is often subject to changes in the
political arena. Due to these facts and to the generic problems involved, there have been continuing attempts to improve the system. The defense planning systems of the German Armed Forces and of the US shall serve as examples for national planning systems of Alliance members.

The Planning System of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr)

The current Bundeswehr planning system originated in the late sixties and is centrally controlled in the Ministry of Defense. Its aim is "to optimize the ability of the Bundeswehr to fulfill its mission within given constraints and at acceptable risks."² At the same time it is to provide the required transparency for parliamentary control, as the government is fully accountable for the economical use of public resources.

Combat units of the Bundeswehr are practically totally integrated into the NATO alliance, which requires national planning to be fully coordinated with NATO planning. In fact, the official NATO strategy and defense policy decisively determine German national strategy documents.

The Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) are established by the Minister of Defense in accordance with the mission of the Bundeswehr as provided for by the constitution and the parliament. The document covers at least the next 15 years. The Military Strategic Goals (Militäerstrategische Zielsetzung), based on above political
guidelines, determine Germany’s strategic position in the Alliance. They are produced by the Chief of the Joint Staff and approved by the Minister of Defense. The Concept of the Bundeswehr is again a responsibility of the Chief of the Joint Staff and provides the framework for multi-service concepts and the strategic concepts of the individual services. From the concepts and NATO’s Force Planning Cycle, the services develop their contribution to the Bundeswehr plan which is coordinated and approved by the Chief of the Joint Staff.\(^3\) The Chief of the Joint Staff recently received even more direct authority over the service chiefs in his overall responsibility for Bundeswehr planning.\(^4\) Implementation of the Bundeswehr plan and constant control and supervision complete the planning cycle (see Figure 1 on page 22). Implementation, Control, and Supervision rest ultimately with the Chief of the Joint Staff.\(^5\)

The Bundeswehr plan covers the mid-term and long-term planning phase, i.e., the next 15 years, in annual steps. It is the basis for the government’s broad financial planning in the mid-term (see Figure 2, page 23). Budget planning again rests with the Chief of the Joint Staff and is detailed in internal documents.\(^6\) Armament planning procedures (see Figure 3, page 24) have been jointly established by the Chief of the Joint Staff and the Chief of the --civilian--armament division in the MOD. The development and procurement of military
hardware to satisfy the military user's needs, is a responsibility of the civilian armament sector, however, while in constant dialogue with the user. It can probably be understood from just this broad description of the German Bundeswehr planning system that the Chief of the Joint Staff has a very strong central position in the overall planning process—from the strategic concepts down to approving individual projects to be submitted to the budget plan.

The overall mission of the Bundeswehr is split into individual functional tasks not only aiming to ensure that the whole mission spectrum is covered, but also to avoid unnecessary overlap of capabilities and responsibilities. Such tightly controlled budget plans, especially during times of scarce defense resources, mean that increasing a capability in one service will most likely result in another service losing that capability. Close Air Support (CAS) and Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) may serve as a case in point: If the German Army can convince the Chief of the Joint Staff that it requires additional deep attack capability, i.e., an attack helicopter or a long-range missile system like MRLS or ATACMS, this would automatically result in a reassessment of air force capabilities and probably a subsequent cut in the German Air Force's capability to conduct CAS or FOFA interdiction. The national planning system is set up as if
the German Army, German Air Force, and German Navy constituted a closed loop defense system with complimentary capabilities. While currently NATO's ground forces fight primarily as national corps, NATO's air forces—in accordance with the recognized principles of war—are centrally controlled. This allows their most effective employment wherever the operational situation warrants it, disregarding the nationality of the ground forces being supported. This, I believe, clearly proves that purely planning for one's national forces in a quasi closed loop national planning system will often not provide the most effective military contribution to an alliance which has an integrated structure in war.

Another factor which can significantly affect any national force planning is the prerogative of politics over military issues. Political decisions are often influenced by broader considerations than just defense matters. While that is certainly legitimate, it can have quite a negative effect on the military capabilities of the whole Alliance—and it lends itself to misuse in favor of parochial interests.

Armament cooperation, for example, has long been recognized as a cure for many of the Alliance's military problems. Shared R&D, reduced production cost due to economy of scale, enhanced operational capabilities through standardization and interoperability, and simpler logistical
support could be some of the results of this cooperation. Yet
national economical considerations or the required technology
transfer have all too often negated greater overall Alliance
cooperation—and thus effectiveness. And, while NATO so far
could provide general planning guidance, it lacked any direct
authority to change national plans.

The US Defense Management

The US has just undertaken a major review of its
planning procedures and specifically of the defense
acquisition process. Figures 4 through 7 (see pages 25
through 28) may suffice to shed some light on the planning
process. Remarkable is not so much the intention "... to
realize substantial improvements in defense management
overall ..." and "... actions the Congress could take
which would contribute to the more effective operation and
management of DOD.", as these are principal problems that
everybody seems to be fighting. Remarkable is the fact that
more emphasis is placed on long-term planning guidance in the
restructured Defense Planning Guidance, whereas previously
acquisition seemed to dominate the planning process. The
revision also reflects the recognized need for a more central
authority in the planning process to achieve better
coordination and harmonization of the plans of the individual
services. Which is, in fact, the very same principle that
could enhance NATO planning as a whole.
Though the US planning process differs significantly from that of other NATO nations, some of the common problems are apparent—the predominant one being that of international cooperation. It is ironic that disarmament agreements with the USSR or the Warsaw Pact must always be in the form of treaties, but armaments cooperation agreements among NATO Allies are never thought worthy of a treaty.

While being aware that there is an active interphase between the NATO planning process and US planners, one notices that it is nowhere specifically addressed in US long-term planning documents. Only the National Security Strategy of the US has a lengthy paragraph on the need for and emphasis on cooperation with the other allies of NATO.

In one other aspect, however, US long-term planning is unique. While defense efforts of European NATO allies are largely, if not completely in support of NATO, US planning is under the auspices of world-wide employment options and can, at least to a significant degree, never become completely optimized to the European theatre.

In general, however, it can be safely stated that US long-term planning will still have margin for improvement if one intends to improve NATO's overall effectiveness.

**NATO Defense Planning**

Actual experience in peacetime cooperative programs over the last 35 years is cause for both hope and despair. In a real sense NATO has already achieved a level of peacetime defense cooperation unique in the history of
alliances. It has a functioning peacetime command structure, a variety of multinationally funded programs, and a frequently updated set of common plans and force goals. But these accomplishments tend to mask the fact that NATO is still basically a classic alliance of sovereign states—composed of 14 disparate national force structures, each with its own doctrine, procedures, tactics, and equipment, its own national logistic support, research/development, procurement, and training establishment and overhead. The wasteful overlap and duplication are enormous. Lack of standardized or even interoperable equipment is more the norm than the exception. That more has not been done, despite recurrent efforts over the years, is testimony both to the strength of local nationalism and to the potentialities if only this and other obstacles could be overcome.13

Granted, the above statement was written a few years ago and is very critical—but by and large it still holds true, despite the fact that since then NATO has undertaken a number of efforts to provide national planners with long-term guidance in order to better harmonize national planning efforts.

The NATO Defense Planning Cycle

The fact that the NATO Defense Planning Cycle is only a mid-term procedure, without this being reflected in its name, indicates that until roughly 10 years ago NATO had only this five-year plan. Based on a military appreciation by the Military Committee (MC), the Ministerial Guidance has NATO commanders determine their needs for the next five years in the form of Force Proposals. These, after close consultation with the nations, are presented to the Defence Planning Committee (DPC). The ones accepted are passed to the nations
as Force Goals for the next five years\textsuperscript{14} (See also Figure 8 on page 29)

The effectiveness of this kind of planning was never overwhelming, as the continued coordination process, which is part of this procedure, guaranteed practically that a nation wouldn't be challenged with a goal that wasn't already covered in their plans. But even with all good intentions it would have been difficult to accept a new challenge, as many nations had already committed all their funds. One extraordinary exception, though, was the procurement of the NATO E-3A AWACS fleet which happened in the mid-term and did require a major reshuffle of national defense budgets for the European Allies.

The unsatisfying response to the Defense Planning Cycle, and the disparity of national plans, led in the seventies to a number of isolated long-term planning initiatives and eventually in the eighties to a series of long-term planning documents which laid the basis for deliberate long-term planning.

\textit{NATO's Long-Term Planning Procedures}

NATO's Conceptual Military Framework (CMF) contains an assessment and military-political guidance. It is augmented by the Major NATO Commanders' CMF documents and further regional or functional long-term concepts like the SHAPE Tactical Air Concept (STAC). A number of Long-Term Planning Guidelines (LTPG) provided conceptual long-term guidance for
particular functional areas. This hierarchy of document can provide the background from which Mission Need Documents (MND) can be developed. This way a better coordination of national procurement and force structure plans towards the common goal can be achieved.

NATO still has little authority to direct national planning. The long established cooperation of the National Armament Directors is a voluntary attempt to more effectively produce armaments, whenever individual allies see a possible benefit from that cooperation. In an attempt to make that cooperation more fruitful, two specific procedures have been developed: (1) the Phased Armaments Planning System (PAPS) and (2) the Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS) (see Figures 9 and 10, pages 30 and 31). Both aim at providing guidance to the nations on how the national armament plans can better meet the military needs of the Alliance and create additional opportunities for cooperations.15

NATO Infrastructure Planning

Infrastructure planning is the only area where NATO has direct authority over planning measures. A program, extending over 12 years, is built on agreed financial contributions by NATO member nations. The nations then submit infrastructure projects to NATO. NATO harmonizes these projects with the force planning cycle, screens the projects for feasibility, and arranges them in order of priority.
After approval of a slice (budget year) by the DPC, the implementation process starts. Contracts are placed after international competitive bidding. Though administratively somewhat cumbersome, the infrastructure planning process is generally considered a success.

Other Encouraging Achievements

NATO program management has been tried in a number of other projects. Generally, the additionally required coordination makes NATO management more cumbersome and bureaucratic than national management. Some multinational weapons system projects and specifically C³ projects were eventually managed by NATO as it proved to be the only way to coordinate these systems properly between a large number of participants.

I would consider planning, procurement, and operation of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Fleet, to be one of NATO's more successful endeavors. Generally, armaments cooperation between the smaller number of European Allies has been reasonably successful. The Independent European Program Group (IEPG), initially often considered a competition to the transatlantic armaments cooperation, is growing more and more into the role of becoming an equal partner to the US, actually facilitating the dialogue between two partners—the US and Europe—instead of the US having to coordinate with 13 independent allies. The
"two-pillar" theory seems to be developing into a viable option for the future development of NATO, also on the political level, not only for arms procurement.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

NATO has provided Europe with its longest peaceful period in history. In fact, the current liberalization process in Eastern Europe can be attributed to NATO's efforts and standfastness vis-à-vis 40 years of Soviet threat. Created not only as a military defense alliance but also as a means of achieving political goals by promoting peaceful international relations and economic cooperations, NATO would still have its political role even if the Soviet threat to Europe were to completely disappear.

As matters stand right now, however, NATO still has a formidable military mission. Economic problems in many of its member countries and a widespread euphoria about the political development in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself will probably result in shrinking defense resources Alliance-wide. More than in the past, that will require making more effective use of the resources that remain available.

Central planning guidance can provide better possibilities for armaments cooperation and more cost-effective use of our resources. It can prevent duplication and gaps in the Alliance's force capabilities. The need for
cooperation has long been recognized, but progress generally has been slow mainly due to national peculiarities and predominant national interests. It appears that the central management of some projects by the Alliance itself has been more successful in promoting the common cause than voluntary cooperation between member nations. I, therefore, consider it only prudent to consider additional ways to transfer planning authority to NATO itself. The upcoming economic amalgamation of Western Europe and the gradual political unification process should facilitate the transfer of common tasks to NATO. After the process of providing the conceptual framework and long-term planning guidance has been further refined, NATO should gradually receive more planning and management authority to further enhance harmonization of national force contributions. Planning and procurement should in the end become the task of NATO agencies, with nations contributing to a NATO budget—much in the same way NATO has managed infrastructure for quite some time.
The System of Bundeswehr Planning

Bundeswehr planning is a continuous process implemented in four phases:
- establishment of goals,
- development of the plan,
- implementation of planning, and
- planning control and supervision.

The basis of planning are the Defence Policy Guidelines – a document which, proceeding from the mission of the armed forces in the Alliance, defines the defence policy interests of the Federal Republic of Germany and the mission of the Bundeswehr.

Bundeswehr planning in the Federal Ministry of Defence

* White Paper 1985, page 350
Timeframe of Bundeswehr planning

Planning years (in principle)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9


15

Long-term planning

Example: Bundeswehr Plan 1986

BUNDESWEHR PLANNING

Life-cycle of defence materiel

Sequence of phases

*White Paper 1985, page 349
Fig. 8-1. The Defense Planning Process

*Hartmann and Wendzel, page 138
FIGURE 5

BPPBS SUMMARY

Here's what it is all about

"TO GET THE NECESSARY MANPOWER, FACILITIES, AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, AND OPERATION FUNDS TO ENABLE THE UNITED STATES TO OVERCOME THE THREAT"

THREAT ↔ STRATEGY ↔ REQUIREMENTS ↔ RESOURCES

RESOURCES NEEDED

RESOURCES AVAILABLE

PLAN

PROGRAM

CINC PARTICIPATION IN THE BPPBS

OSD REVIEW

JCS REVIEW

SECAF & CSAF AF POM APPROVAL

COMPONENT COMMANDER

COMPONENT PLANS & PROGRAMS

POM REVIEW & ADJUSTMENT

OTHER SERVICES

POM INPUTS

*The BPPBS Primer, page 7 and page 48
US PLANNING PROCESS

- The planning process is summarized below

- Diagram of US planning process:
  - National Policy and Priorities
  - Department of Defense Strategy and Priorities
  - Air Force Objectives and Priorities
  - Force Planning
  - Current Operations Planning
  - Planning Input for Program Development

*The BPPBS Primer, page 39
FIGURE 7

US PLANNING SYSTEM

ACQUISITION PROCESS

- Study Alternative Concepts
- Demonstration & Validation (Prototyping)
- Full-scale Development & Testing
- Production & Deployment
- Continued Operation

JROC

Mission Need Statement
Requirements Validation

*Secretary Dick Cheney in Defense 89, page 17
FIGURE 8

Development of force goals in the Alliance

Military Committee

International Staff

Military appreciation

Economic appreciation

Defence Planning Committee

Ministerial guidance

CINCHAN*

SACLANT**

SACEUR***

Force proposals

Military Committee

Defence Planning Committee

Force goals

* Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel
** Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
*** Supreme Allied Commander Europe

*White Paper 1985, page 174
The overall objective of PAPS is to provide a systematic and coherent, yet flexible, framework for promoting co-operative programmes on the basis of harmonised military requirements. It is emphasised that the procedures described in this Handbook are designed for use by nations in as free and flexible a way as necessary for the efficient and pragmatic prosecution of co-operative projects. PAPS is meant to be a tool available as required for conducting programmes on a systematic basis and should not be regarded as a set of formal and mandatory steps in the implementation of CNAD projects.

**MILESTONES**

1. MISSION NEED VQC (MWG)
2. OUTLINE Nato STAFF TARGET (ORST)
3. Nato STAFF TARGET (RST)
4. Nato STAFF RESORT (RMR)
5. Nato DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT (PRDDQ)
6. Nato PRODUCTION (PAP)
7. Nato IN-SERVICE (INSER)
8. NATIONAL ENGAGEMENT INTEGRATION (NABI)

**PAPS PHASES & MILESTONES**

* AAP-20, page 5
**AAP-20, Page 2, para 2*
FIGURE 10

PAPS AT A GLANCE

Milestone | Activity/Phase | Acting Body
---|---|---
MND Mission Need Document | Mission Analysis and Long-Term Forecasting/Planning | NATO Military Authority
ONST Outline NATO Staff Target | Identification of a Deficiency | Nation Main Group Main Group Subordinate Body
NST NATO Staff Target | Mission Need Evaluation | Main Group Subordinate Body
NSR NATO Staff Requirement | Prefeasibility | Project Group
NADO NATO Design and Development Objective | Feasibility | Steering Committee
NAPO NATO Production Objective | Project Definition | and Project Management Office
NISEG NATO In-Service Goals | Design and Development | Nation
NADI National Disengagement Intention | Production |

*AAP-20, page v*
CHAPTER I (Pages 1-2)

1. James Schlesinger, U.S. Secretary of Defense 1973-75, now Counselor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in an article in "NATO Review" in February 1989, referring to the changes in East-West relations and their possible impact on NATO's future (Schlesinger, pp. 16-17).

2. A former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Richard Perle believes that the Soviets have practically lost military control over Eastern Europe and that a cohesive Warsaw Pact factually does not exist anymore which raised the question about the further need for the NATO Alliance (Perle, Richard, pp. 8-11).

CHAPTER II (pages 3-6)

1. Communique of the Ministers of the EUROGROUP on 27 November 1989 (Material fuer die Presse Nr. XXVI/24, p. 4).

2. Trevor Taylor, a scientist with the British Royal Institute of International Affairs and former NATO Research Fellow in his book "European Defence Cooperation", p. 15.


4. German rearmament just a few years after the end of World War II was only thought possible under the tight control of its future allies. Contrary to the NATO structure just a few years later, where national Army Corps were put under the operational command of NATO in war, the EDC was planned to be an integrated force.


6. CBS Evening News on 11 February 1990, Secretary of Defense, Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, in a debate in Congress.


CHAPTER III (pages 7-19)

1. These figures are contained in a speech given by the ACOS Air Plans of the German Air Staff to the Armed Forces University in 1977 (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung/FueL VI 1 "Luftwaffenplanung und Planungsvorhaben der Luftwaffe) as well as in the White Paper 1985, p. 351.


5. German Armed Forces College, Department of Education and Research. (Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, "Das Planungssystem der Bundeswehr. Bundeswehrplanung," p. 6).


8. The US Secretary of Defense in a report to the President on defense management. (Cheney, Dick, Defense 89, Special issue, p. 2.)


10. Armaments cooperation is one of the most discussed topics in NATO; three sources have been used here: Cooper and Rupp in NATO's Sixteen Nations, pp. 28-29; Roos, Armed Forces Journal International, December 89, pp. 48-54; and Armed Forces Journal International, August 89, pp. 34-38.


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16. Good examples here are the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS), the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), and the Allied Command Europe Command, Control, and Information System (ACCIS).

17. The E-3A AWACS is the first weapons system procured, owned, and operated by NATO itself, with 12 of NATO's 16 nations participating. The project has been quite successful and is under discussion for further projects like a NATO aerial tanker fleet.
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Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Bereich Ausbildung, Lehre und Forschung, Fachgruppe Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkraefte, Dozent Ruestung. "Das Planungssystem


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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied Administrative Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCIS</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe Command, Control and Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCS</td>
<td>Air Command and Control System (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATACMS</td>
<td>Advanced Tactical Missile System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPPBS</td>
<td>Biennial Planning Programming and Budgeting System (USA)</td>
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<td>BTO</td>
<td>Brussels Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPS</td>
<td>Conventional Armaments Planning System (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIS</td>
<td>Command, Control and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>Conceptual Military Framework</td>
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<td>CNAD</td>
<td>Conference of National Armament Directors</td>
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<td>DAB</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Board (US)</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (USA)</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
<td>Defence Planning Committee (NATO)</td>
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<td>DRB</td>
<td>Defense Resources Board (USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOFA</td>
<td>Follow-On Forces Attack</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff (USA)</td>
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<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council (USA)</td>
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<td>JSPD</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning Document (USA)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>MC</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense (Germany)</td>
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<td>MRLS</td>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launch System</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NICS</td>
<td>NATO Integrated Communications System</td>
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<td>Phased Armaments Planning System (NATO)</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memoranda (USA)</td>
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<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAC</td>
<td>SHAPE Tactical Air Concept</td>
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