IR WAR COLLEGE
RESEARCH REPORT

A METHOD FOR COLLECTIVELY MEASURING THE OPERATING TEMPO OF
INDIVIDUALS IN MARINE CORPS UNITS—WHY AND HOW

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A METHOD FOR COLLECTIVELY MEASURING THE OPERATING TEMPO OF INDIVIDUALS IN MARINE CORPS UNITS - WHY AND HOW

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In lieu of an executive summary a Point Paper has been attached as Appendix A. The results of this analysis are better served by preparing an overview in this fashion to forward through the U. S. Marine Corps chain of command.
Lieutenant Colonel James L. Whitlow was born in Denver, Colorado and reared in Edna, Texas. A graduate of the University of Texas at Austin, he entered the United States Marine Corps in February of 1966. In addition to tours at the University of Texas ("bootstrap"), Headquarters Marine Corps, and the Second Marine Division, he has served throughout his career primarily in A6E Intruder Squadrons at MCAS Cherry Point, N. C.; MCAS Iwakuni, Japan; Nam Phong, Thailand; and on the deck of the USS John F. Kennedy. During his most recent assignment from 1985 through 1989, as Executive Officer and then Commanding Officer of VMA(AW)-533 through two Carrier Deployments to the Mediterranean, LtCol Whitlow gained a great deal of experience and exposure to individual problems of Marines which were related to an extremely high operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Motivated by the Career Planning interviews conducted with Marines in his command, he became interested in pursuing the development of a methodology for bringing into sharper focus the adverse effects of high OPTEMPO upon individuals. The effort commenced with an informal study during his tour in VMA(AW)-533 and is continuing with the development of this paper. LtCol Whitlow expects to be a 1990 graduate of the Air War College, and return to MCAS Cherry Point for further service.
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A METHOD FOR COLLECTIVELY MEASURING THE OPERATING TEMPO OF INDIVIDUALS IN MARINE CORPS UNITS - WHY AND HOW?

During a conference of career planners at Headquarters Marine Corps in September of 1989, high operating tempo (OPTEMPO) was identified as one of the major problems effecting their ability to retain high quality first term enlisted Marines. In a related phenomenon, Marine Corps wide separation surveys have seen claims of too much "Family Separation" climb over the past two years to the number one cause for not reenlisting. A particularly disturbing trend is that this increased attrition because of high OPTEMPO applies to career Marines as much as first termers. As a truly expeditionary force, this is an elusive problem for the Marine Corps. Forward deployment is its stock and trade. To be prepared, units must be on the move. The Corps may, however, be approaching an OPTEMPO break-even point, beyond which the negatives outweigh the positives.

There are many aspects to the high OPTEMPO dilemma. To quote the Commanding General of the Second Marine Division in a December '89 message to the Commanding General of Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic:

"From my perspective, the negative impact of the present pace is discernible in the following categories:

A. Effect on morale and family cohesiveness produced by repeated and sustained deployment periods."
B. Degradation of maintenance readiness from increased equipment usage and corresponding reductions of maintenance opportunities.

C. Hazarding the ability of platoon and company size units to train toward basic tactical proficiency because of their leaders' enforced focus on "high-level" or "special" exercises and training requirements.

D. Changes in priorities without corresponding funding modifications will require reprogramming of budgetary costs."

The General's message clearly points out many harmful effects of a training tempo that is set too high. While there are a variety of statistics used to measure aspects, such as low equipment readiness or low training readiness, the impact on people is more difficult to analyze. Development of data about individual Marines begins when the unit commander provides input through the Unit Diary into the Marine Corps' Manpower Management System (MMS). This system accumulates data on individuals which is in turn used by assignment monitors as a basis for moving people in and out of the Fleet Marine Force (operating units). Controls used, such as Date Arrived U.S. from tours where Dependents were Restricted (DAUSDR), were developed in an era when individual Marines were assigned on a rotating basis to fixed units overseas. When the Marine Corps shifted in 1976 from a program of rotating individuals overseas on a 12 month basis to a Unit Deployment concept of rotating stabilized units overseas on a six month basis, controls such as DAUSDR lost much of their utility.

A separate control measure, referred to as Accumulated Deployed Time (ATD), was initiated in conjunction with the Unit Deployment Program. It
theoretically provides a basis for reassigning personnel once they "update" their DAUSDR by compiling 365 days of Accumulated Deployed Time during their tour in the unit. This has worked fairly well for communities with an adequate manpower base. From a control perspective, however, the DAUSDR only protects the Marine from individual unaccompanied orders to an overseas billet. As long as he stays in a unit that rotates on only a six month Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) basis, he can (theoretically) remain in the unit indefinitely. This is great for unit readiness, but hard on young families.

When a particular community is so active that Marines are required to remain in the unit significantly beyond the 365 day mark and morale or retention begins to be a problem, very few management mechanisms give the situation visibility at a high enough level to make a correction. Individuals locked in a deploying unit must rely primarily on the unit commander to restrain operations or transfer problem personnel from the command. When certain skills are in short supply, however, transfer may be out of the question. Additionally, slowing the pace is an option very often completely out of the unit commanders control. He must respond to tasking from higher headquarters, and he has a responsibility to prepare the whole unit for combat.
Are there ways at the higher headquarters level to identify those units or communities that have this problem? The answer is yes - but the statistics that could give it visibility are not being correlated with units. They are associated only with the individual assignment process. Data such as Accumulated Deployed Time is not compiled by unit at any command level. Today there is no measuring system, except the voice of the commander, that collectively addresses the impact of OPTEMPO on individuals within a particular unit or perhaps within a tactical community.

The purpose of this paper is to: first, examine what major Fleet Marine Corps Commanders have to say about OPTEMPO of the individual Marine and its impact; second, detail the operating pace of eight selected Battalion/Squadron level units within the FMF and compare some related statistics; third, generate an "Average Accumulated Deployed Time" and "Unit Manning Profile by Deployment Status Code" for the eight units from MMS data; and fourth, analyze the potential benefits of generating this data across the board for units within the FMF as a management tool.
WHAT DO FIELD COMMANDERS SAY?

In order to get a broader perspective, I requested information from six CONUS based major Marine Corps Commands and received replies from five. Additionally, I requested amplifying information from Headquarters Marine Corps, which ended up being of very little value. The following is a summary of the views from the commands. Without exception it shows great concern similar to the message quoted above. There is also a sense of frustration emanating from the responses which suggests that it is a problem that is very hard to deal with.

The following commands responded to the request for information:

- Headquarters, FMF, Atlantic
- Headquarters, FMF, Pacific
- Second Marine Division (Dec '89 msg substituted for direct response)
- Second Marine Aircraft Wing
- Third Marine Aircraft Wing

1. Is excessive OPTEMPO a morale or retention issue?

Four of the five commands indicated - yes. Only Third MAW indicated that while it is a constant concern, "particularly in units that are very busy in between..."
UDP and MEU (SOC) deployments", it does not present a significant morale or retention problem at present.

2. **How has OPTEMPO been rated on separation surveys?**

The Marine Corps separation survey lists 34 possible reasons for separating from the Marine Corps. Of those related to OPTEMPO, "Too much family separation" has the most direct correlation to adverse affects caused by deployment. It is rated by the responding commands as one of the top three reasons given for the decision to separate. Marine Corps wide it is the number one reason given.

3. **Do current feedback mechanisms give you accurate, timely indicators of potential morale/retention problem areas? Have you established any unique feedback tools in your command?**

The Marine Corps Enlisted Separation Survey was the only formal feedback mechanism used by all commands. It is interesting to note that all results of the survey are forwarded directly to Headquarters Marine Corps for analysis. While local officials manually review the surveys, no automated analysis is done with the results at the major command level.

Second Marine Aircraft Wing also utilizes a commanders survey. The results of a recent one are attached to their response (Appendix D).
4. **What is your view of the amount of family separation that should be expected of our enlisted Marines over the course of a career or an FMF tour?**

There was no command position on this question by any respondent. FMFPac estimated that family separation in west coast based combat arms and helicopter MOS's range from 50-70% of the time assigned to any operational unit. They also alluded to a primary aggravating factor stating that there are "**very few alternatives for lower ranking combat arms Marines** who become 'burned out' due to the repetitiveness of operations during their first enlistment. There are simply not enough billets to provide alternating tours into and out of the FMF. During FY88, there were 8600 "B" billets for corporal and below, against an active duty population of 96,000."

When the question was put to wing chaplains within Third MAW the response was "(1) Six-month deployments are too long and should be shortened by half, and; (2) No more than approximately 25% of a Marine's tour in the Wing should be spent in a deployed status."

In one survey of commands within Second MAW, a squadron commander offered that "commanders should be required to justify deployed time requirement over and above 35-40%."
5. Has your command established any unique support mechanisms, or operational policies that minimize the adverse impact of high OPTEMPO and increased family separation?

Support mechanisms – yes. All have put emphasis on improved family support facilities aboard their bases. Second MAW and Third MAW have each developed unique support structures for the families of deployed Marines. In Second MAW it is called Family Readiness or a "Key Wives" program. In Third MAW it is termed the "Family Action Contact Team (FACTeam) Program". Details of both programs are attached to their respective responses (Appendix D).

IN SEARCH OF THE RIGHT STATISTIC - NOT SO SIMPLE

The total impact of fast paced OPTEMPO upon the "people factor" within a unit is hard to quantify statistically for several reasons. First, Marines assigned to the unit come and go. Some may be reassigned to another unit after only one deployment, while others may remain in a unit for several unit deployment cycles. This depends largely upon the MOS and availability of Marines within the total manpower structure of the Corps for reassignment.
A second phenomenon that makes the total impact of high OPTEMPO within a unit hard to measure is that there are many levels of unit deployment that may affect portions of the command differently. Deployments by the entire command are easy to define, and their effects are uniformly spread. The whole unit simply packs up and goes. Training detachments of various sizes, however, will affect parts of the command differently. For example: when organizing a small detachment (DET) it is rarely advisable to move the administrative/record book function, so Marines with that MOS accumulate little deployed time on DETs. Conversely, there is always a requirement for certain MOS's such as maintenance control and flight line personnel within an aircraft squadron. Marines with these MOS's simply rotate staying at home and being on the DETs when they are between major unit deployments. Frequency of participation becomes a function of the size of the unit. Small detachment training (DETs) affects individuals within a unit differently.

Another complicating factor is that squadrons/battalions are often task organized or augmented with personnel from outside the basic unit. Small detachments from other units tasked for support are derived from units that have an entirely different OPTEMPO profile. Usually the personnel from these
supporting commands are extremely busy. With all of these complicating factors understood, it will be useful now to examine actual data from high tempo units.

EIGHT SELECTED UNITS

In an attempt to define a method that will give senior commanders insight for effective and timely decision making, I have identified eight FMF units for study. Selection of these units was not random. These squadrons and battalions have relatively constant OPTEMPO demands placed upon them from higher headquarters. I selected units that have either just completed a full six month unit deployment (UDP) or those who have been stabilized in preparation to an upcoming major deployment. Listed below are the battalions or squadrons with their reason for selection:

**Marine Aircraft Group - 14**
1. VMA(AW)-224 Supports forward deployment of A6E Sqdns
2. VMA(AW)-533 Just returned from UDP (Iwakuni)

**Marine Aircraft Group - 32**
3. VMA-331 Supports forward deployment of AV8B Sqdns
4. VMA-231 Just returned from UDP (Okinawa)

**Fourth/Eighth Marine Regiments**
Support forward deployment of infantry battalions to Sixth Fleet
5 - 2d Battalion 8th Marines  Just returned from UDP
6 - 2d Battalion 4th Marines  Stabilized and preparing to deploy
Second Marine Regiment  Supports forward deployment of infantry
                          battalions to WESTPAC
7 - 3d Battalion 2d Marines  Just returned from UDP
8 - 1st Battalion 2d Marines  Stabilized and preparing to deploy

"UNIT" OPERMPO

Before attempting to analyze data about individuals within the eight units, let us look some unit statistics beginning with the number of days over the past two years that the unit has actually been deployed from home base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Det</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-224</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-533</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-331</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-231</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 8th Marines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 4th Marines</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>no response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Listed below is the number of days between return from a major deployment (defined as 5 months or longer) and the beginning of subsequent training deployments of over 10 days away from home base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number of days for family adjustment following a major deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-224</td>
<td>134 days *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-533</td>
<td>93 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-331</td>
<td>45 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-231</td>
<td>No recent deployment of 5 months or more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 8th Marines</td>
<td>150 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 4th Marines</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>64 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Heavy Workups for Carrier Qualifications (CQ) commenced within 30 days of arrival back in the U.S., however, the actual CQ deployment was only 2 days for the aircrews and 10-15 days for a small number of maintenance personnel.
COLLECTIVE "INDIVIDUAL" OPTEMPO BY UNIT

Before beginning this section I must acknowledge special assistance provided by the Information Systems Branch of the Manpower Department at Headquarters Marine Corps, especially CWO Helmbrecht and Sgt Buzzard. Their willing help and superior expertise produced the software which provided information listed below (Average Accumulated Deployed Time, Unit Manning Profile by Deployment Status Code, and Unit Date Current Tour Began). This information would not otherwise have been available in this format. 9

AVERAGE ACCUMULATED DEPLOYED TIME

There are a variety of data and codes assigned to individuals within the MMS system which, if compiled by units, may be useful in determining the impact of a unit's OPTEMPO upon individual Marines within the command. The first of these is Accumulated Deployed Time (ATD) which we have previously discussed. MCO P1080.35 (PRIM) defines ATD as follows: 10 "This data element is designed to be used only by FMF units as identified in MCO 1300.8 and represents the individual
Marine's total time in days deployed while joined chargeable to an FMF unit. Each ADT entry will adjust the Date Arrived U.S. where Dependents were Restricted (DAUSDR) to compensate for periods spent in a deployed status. Periods of ADT of less than 10 days will not be reported or accumulated. Listed below is a special report generated at Headquarters Marine Corps which provides information as to the minimum and maximum amount of ADT listed for an individual within each of the eight selected units. It also provided the average individual ADT for the unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max *</th>
<th>Avg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-224</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-533</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-331</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-231</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 8th Marines</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 4th Marines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Once an individual reaches 365 days while assigned to the unit his DAUSDR is updated to that date and his ADT goes to zero.

**Note: MMS System at Headquarters presently shows the 2/8 RUC as deployed and not updated.
The Deployment Status Code is another bit of information entered into the MMS by the unit to portray certain information concerning the individual Marine. Quoting MCO P1080.35 (PRIM), "The DSC identifies a Marine's deployment status during a current FMF tour. This data element is used by the CMC (MMOA and MMEA) to determine a Marine's eligibility for assignment and to monitor unit personnel strengths. The DSC identifies Marines who are scheduled for, serving on, have completed, or who are not scheduled to participate in future deployments of at least 5 months duration." Again, this is a piece of information collected about individuals which, if sorted by unit, may give information as to the impact of OPTEMPO within that unit or community.
Before looking at the Units, let us examine the definition of each code.

**DEPLOYMENT STATUS CODES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>blank</td>
<td>Unknown DSC is reported if a Marine just joined an FMF unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No deployments* completed and Not scheduled for deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Scheduled for or serving on first deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Completed first deployment, and not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Completed first deployment, and is scheduled for or serving on second deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Completed second deployment, and not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Completed second (or greater) deployment, and is scheduled for or serving on third (or greater) deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Completed third (or greater) deployment, and is not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The term "deployment" in these definitions refers to periods of 5 consecutive months or more.*
The following is a profile by actual manpower numbers and percentages for each DSC code within each of the eight units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-224</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-533</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-331</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-231</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 6th Marines</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 4th Marines</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*1st Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Date Current Tour Began is the date that an individual joined the unit. Listed below is the assignment date of the individual that has been there the longest and the one who has been there the shortest period of time. The third column is the length of time to date for the tour of the Marine who has been in the command the longest. An average length of service within the command or "Unit - Date Current Tour Began" may be instructive here but it is not yet available.

### Assigned to the Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LONGEST</th>
<th>SHORTEST</th>
<th>LONGEST TOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-224</td>
<td>800517</td>
<td>900105</td>
<td>10 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-533</td>
<td>780405</td>
<td>691207</td>
<td>12 yrs 1 mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-331</td>
<td>800229</td>
<td>900113</td>
<td>10 yrs 3 mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-231</td>
<td>810407</td>
<td>891221</td>
<td>9 yrs 1 mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D Battalion, 6th Marines</td>
<td>(NO DATA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D Battalion, 4th Marines</td>
<td>830311</td>
<td>891230</td>
<td>7 yrs 2 mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>820802</td>
<td>900109</td>
<td>7 yrs 9 mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>830329</td>
<td>890725</td>
<td>7 yrs 2 mo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUAL OPTEMPO DATA - AN ANALYSIS

In the past few pages we have looked at two types of data, unit statistics and MMS information about individuals. Additionally we have made some unique unit correlations of the MMS data. Our objective is to find a method of flagging an area of potential personnel problems resulting from high unit OPTEMPO. We have intentionally looked at deploying units which will be most at risk for this type of phenomenon.

The first set of data was unit statistics detailing the number of days deployed over a 2 year period. This information put figures to a simple fact of life in the Marine Corps, "being in the FMF is being on the road." There was some spread in the actual number of days deployed by unit and by community, and some variation as to the use of detachments. All were quite busy, however, with an average of over 300 days deployed in a two year period. While it is interesting that there is no routine method of compiling this type of information at a level beyond the major command level, this data appears to slittle light on just how the fast training pace actually effects individuals in a command. Are there sufficient individual Marines rotating through the unit to offset adverse personal effects caused by a high OPTEMPO? At face value a comparison of these unit statistics
simply doesn't go far enough toward answering this type of question or determining when individuals of certain units or communities are bearing more than their fair share of the OPTEMPO burden.

The next set of statistics dealt with individual data compiled by unit; Average Accumulated Deployed Time, Manning Profile by Deployment Status Code, and Unit - Date Current Tour Began. In each case we compiled, averaged, or sorted the data about individuals by unit, attempting to gain insight into those which may require OPTEMPO adjustment or closer management.

Our first attempt was to average accumulated deployed time within the unit. The numbers were surprising in that analyzing them by unit provided very little insight into the broad impact. There were Marines in the unit with only 1 day of accumulated deployed time, and there were some with up to 364 days, but no more. The minimum numbers indicated only that there were people in the unit that had just started accumulating deployed time toward their next DAUSDR. There was no way, however, to differentiate between individuals who were fresh recruits working for their first control date, and senior Marines who had been on 3 or 4 unit deployments - recently updated their DAUSDR for the third time - and were too critical to the unit to be transferred. In any particular snapshot of the
data, they both would have a small amount of accumulated deployed time. At the other end of the spectrum were Marines with high numbers. Similar to individuals from the previous group, an individual with high numbers may have been in the unit for 2 years or 10. He was simply at a point in the accumulation of deployed time at which he was just about to update the DAUSDR control date in the MMS system. With the minimum and maximum numbers clarified, it is easy to understand that without changing the method of recording the ADT data, simple averaging is essentially meaningless for our purposes. While “Average Accumulated Deployed Time” sounds like precisely the information we are seeking, in actuality unit analysis of this particular bit of information (from data as it is currently recorded in the MMS) is of very little value.

Another part of our analysis of individual data was an examination of the Date Current Tour Began with a view toward gaining insight into just how long a Marine was assigned to a unit. From the data we can generalize that Marines in ground units are usually assigned for a shorter period of time. While we were not yet able to get the actual average time within a unit (information to follow), it is clear from the look at those assigned the longest that there is a significant difference between aviation units (Marine assigned the longest - averaged 10 years, 4 months) and ground units (Marine assigned the longest - averaged 7 years, 4 months).
The Date Current Tour Began represents, however, only the amount of time assigned to that particular unit. It is possible to move from battalion to battalion or squadron to squadron and continue to deploy. In such a case the Marine may go on two deployments with one unit accumulating 360 days, and if he is subsequently assigned to another deploying unit within the FMF, the Date Current Tour Began will show that he has only recently joined the unit. His accumulated deployed time, however, will be high and continuing to build. Again, this information is interesting, and while it may give us a clue as to where the chances are greater for the existence of a high individual OPTEMPO, it is not productive as a positive indicator.

The analysis with the most potential without changing any collection methods is clearly the Unit Manning Profile by Deployment Status Code. For ease of reference let me repeat the previous data using only percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-224</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-533</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-331</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-231</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 6th Marines</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 4th Marines</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What can we determine about the eight units from this data (Note: DSC code definitions are located on page 11). I will frame the analysis around a generally accepted goal of retaining a Marine in a unit until he has completed two major deployments and then transferring him to a non-deployable unit for a rest.

Analysis of the DSC profile indicates that VMA(AW)-224, over and above all others, is clearly in the danger zone with regard to OPTEMPO. The unit is staffed with 23% Code 5's, those who have completed or will complete 3 or more straight deployments and are scheduled for the next one. An additional 22% are defined as either Code 4 or 6 (completed two or more deployments and not scheduled for future deployment). With the high incidence of Code 5's, I believe that further study would support a finding that there is a high correlation between this 22% Code 4/6's and attrition from the Marine Corps by reason of objecting to high unit OPTEMPO. The ability to make this observation alone validates the merits of this methodology as an indicator.

Another observation is that there is a clear difference between groups. The two A-6E squadrons in MAG-14 (224 & 533) have a high incidence of Code 5's. Meanwhile the two Harrier squadrons in MAG-32 (331 & 231) are manned in such a
fashion that 90% and 95% (respectively) of the manpower within the unit are Code 2 or less, have completed but one major deployment and are not scheduled for another. This clearly has implications for the decision maker. There may be an explanation for this apparent disparity and indeed conversations with the commanding officers of these two Harrier units indicate that they are exceedingly busy with multiple detachments. Also, it is true that the situation may change as Harrier squadrons begin the Unit Deployment Program again. There is, however, sufficient disparity to warrant further examination and the possibility of a manning or operational change for the units involved. Again, the DSC profile shows utility as a management tool.

Similarities in the profile of two units in the 2d Marines is further support for the accuracy of this data as an indicator. Consistency in the manning profile indicates close personnel management with 98% and 90% (respectively) Code 4 or lower, thus meeting with our guideline assumptions. While the similar profiles within the regiment indicate consistency in manning policies, deviations between groups and regiments cause a question as to whether differences in interpretation of the rules governing an assignment of DSC codes may exist. For example, What does the phrase "not scheduled for any future deployments at this time" mean to the administrator who will input the DSC code into the
MMS system? Does it mean the Marine is being separated from the Corps prior to the next deployment; or the Marine is being transferred prior to the next deployment; or the unit is not operationally scheduled for a major deployment in the foreseeable future? It may mean any or all of these. This indicates some reason to recommend further study of our application of DSC Codes with a view toward verifying interpretation. Such a study along with expanded utilization of the Unit Manning Profile by Deployment Status Code may produce a rationale for expanding the Code system.

If our goal is to transfer troops after the second major deployment, then it would appear that as many Marines as possible should be code 4 or less. Four of the eight units analyzed fall into this profile with 98%. Three units have 10% or more code 5 and 6, and in the case of VMA(AW)-224 it is 28%. In this particular profile I believe the percentage of Code 5's is the data to key on for identifying units that are manned with individuals that are being excessively tasked, and for understanding just what is going on with personnel assigned a Code 4. In VMA(AW)-224's case with 23% code 5, there is a good chance that a large number of the 17% Code 4's represent attrition. This can be contrasted with the case of 1st Battalion, 2d Marines with 21% Code 4's but only 3% Code 5. In that case it seems reasonable to expect that the high number of Code 4's represents effective
accomplishment of our goal of transfer prior to the third deployment vice attrition.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As discussed at the outset, there is reason to believe that the operating tempo of FMF units within the Marine Corps is becoming an obstacle to retention and may be affecting morale in some units. With a possible cut back of land based forward deployment sites in the future, it is also likely that the OPTEMPO required of Marine FMF units will remain unchanged or perhaps increase in response to increased demand for sea based units from the various CINC's. Mechanisms used to control the adverse impact of OPTEMPO upon individuals (eg. DAUSDR, Date Current Tour Began, etc.) were developed prior to the advent of the Unit Deployment Program. While they are still effectively used for individual assignment purposes, there is no system which presently gives visibility to the collective impact of OPTEMPO upon individual Marines. In other words, while one can call up a Marine's name in the MMS to find out his current deployment status and determine the amount of time that particular Marine is spending on the road, no system exists from which one can generalize about collective individual OPTEMPO within the Marine's unit, a group of units, or an entire MOS community. An effective management tool is missing.
Unit analysis of individual data in the MMS system can provide this link. The software methodology to accomplish these comparisons were developed within the Manpower Department at Headquarters Marine Corps (Code MIS) in response to this study. The concept of Average Accumulated Deployed Time by unit can provide useful insight, however, it would require the following relatively simple change to our method of recording the data. Instead of zeroing out the Accumulated Deployed Time each time a Marine achieves 360 days, continue to update the DAUSDR at each 360 day interval, but continue to build the deployed day tally until the Marine is transferred. With this simple change, the system will allow for an accurate unit analysis showing a real average for the total amount of Accumulated Deployed Time being experienced by Marines within that unit, that group, that MOS, or that skill community.

The most promising analysis, that can be effected without any change to a method of collecting data, is a comparison of Unit Manning Profiles by Deployment Status Code. Analysis based on the percentage of Code 5's within a unit has merit as an exceptional indicator. It also seems likely that there are other relationships that can be developed, such as the probability that units having a high percentage of Code 5's also have high attrition factors in Code 4's and 6's.
It is recommended that a minor adjustment be made to ADT recording and Average Deployed Time be promulgated by Unit as a management tool. Additionally, it is recommended that promulgation of a Manning Profile by Deployment Status Code be endorsed. Complete study of relationships in this profile may increase its potential as a management tool and accrue even more benefit for individual Marines and the families of Marines assigned to high tempo units.
NOTES

1. Reference an article titled "OP TEMPO Foils Corps Career Planners Work" on page 4 of the 11 September issue of the Navy Times.


4. Commanding General 2d Marine Division message to the Commanding General Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic (020001 Dec 1989 - unclassified). The entire text of the message is attached as Appendix B.

5. Author's opinion.

6. A copy of one of the 6 requests for information from major CONUS commands (all letters were similar) and copies of all of the responses are attached as Appendices C and D.

7. A copy of the letter requesting information from Headquarters Marine Corps along with the response is attached at Appendix E.

8. A copy of one of the letters requesting information from the eight selected units and all responses received are attached as Appendix F. Information appearing in the data which can not be found in the responses was received directly from the unit by phone.

9. A copy of the three computer outputs forwarded from Headquarters Marine Corps Manpower Department (Code MIS) are attached as Appendix G.

10. The pertinent page (ADT) from MCO Pio.4(PRIM) attached as Appendix H.

11. The pertinent pages of MCO Pio.4(PRIM) is attached as Appendix I, with complete definitions of Deployment Status Codes.
LIST OF APPENDICES

A. Point Paper summarizing major findings of the paper, drafted in lieu of an Executive Summary.

B. Complete text of CG 2d MarDiv message 020001Z Dec 89, subject OPS TEMPO.

C. Letter from LtCol J. L. Whitlow to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic dated 11 Dec 1989. Letters to all other major commands were exactly the same.

D. Responses to the letter requesting information from major commands.
   - Letter from Lt Col Manning (FMFLant G-1) to LtCol J. L. Whitlow dated 10 January 1990.
   - Letter from Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, (undated) with a wide variety of enclosures.
   - Letter from the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-1), Third Marine Aircraft Wing dated 12 January 1990 with enclosures.
   - CG 2d MarDiv message in Appendix B substitutes for a response to the request for information.


F. Letter from LtCol J. L. Whitlow to the Commanding Officer of VMA(AW)-533 requesting information (letters to all of the remaining 7 selected units were identical). Also attached are all of the written responses.

G. Three Computer outputs from Headquarters Marine Corps (Code MIS)
   - "Active Deployment Time" - Computer analysis dated 25 Jan 1990
   - "Date Current Tout Began" - Computer analysis dated 25 Jan 1990
   - "Table of Unit Data by Deployment Status Code" - Computer analysis dated February 1990

H. Excerpt from MCO12805(PRIM) page 8-7 (Accumulated Deployed Time)

I. Excerpt from MCO12805(PRIM) page 8-87 (Deployed Status Code)

J. AU Defense Analytical Study Administration Forms
APPENDIX A
Subj: A Method for Collectively Measuring the Operating Tempo of Individuals in Marine Corps Units - Why and How

Ref: (a) Study under the subject title conducted at the Air War College April 1990 - Available upon request
(b) CG 2d MARDIV 020001Z Dec 89

1. Background. As detailed in reference (a) high OPTEMPO is increasing named as a cause for retention/morale problems. FMF Commanders are showing concern, as evidenced in reference (b). With reductions in Army Forward deployment, demands for sea based Marines will continue to drive a high training and operating pace. There is no current Marine Corps system to provide insight for the senior commander into the collective impact of high OPTEMPO upon individuals.

2. Discussion.
- Present systems do not provide sufficient feedback or insight
  -- Separation Survey - feeds straight to CMC
  ---- Little automated feedback for FMF commands
  ---- Administration of SS has been poor (data questioned)
  -- No other "cross the board" systems (some local).

- Individual control mechanisms are inadequate
  -- DAUSDR originated prior to UDP
  ---- No protection against continuous 6 month deployments
  -- In fast paced UDP cycle "Date Current Tour Began" doesn’t mean stability

- CO’s increasingly unable to slow the pace (hi-vis operations, hard requirements for training prior to deployment)

- Need system to provide insight for senior decision makers

3. Recommendation. Unit analysis of individual MMS data

- Most promising is Unit Manning Profile by Deployment Status Code
  -- Percentage of Code 5’s is a key indicator
  ---- Definitions and Sample on next page
  -- Many profile relationships to be studied
  ---- eg. high percentage of Code 5’s vs high attrition, low morale

- Unit Average Accumulated Deployed Time
  -- Requires change in recording ADT:
    Continue to update DAUSDR at 360 days, but don’t zero ADT on update
  -- High potential for simple analysis
DEPLOYMENT STATUS CODES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>blank</td>
<td>Unknown DSC is reported if a Marine just joined an FMF unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No deployments* completed and Not scheduled for deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Scheduled for or serving on first deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Completed first deployment, and not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Completed first deployment, and is scheduled for or serving on second deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Completed second deployment, and not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Completed second (or greater) deployment, and is scheduled for or serving on third (or greater) deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Completed third (or greater) deployment, and is not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The term "deployment" in these definitions refers to periods of 5 consecutive months or more.

REAL WORLD EXAMPLE ACCURATE AS OF FEBRUARY 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Manning Profile by Deployment Status Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-224</td>
<td>1 13 9 32 17 23 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AW)-533</td>
<td>1 32 2 50 2 12 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-331</td>
<td>1 11 79 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-231</td>
<td>1 3 67 2 1 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 8th Marines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 4th Marines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 2d Marines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*
IMMEDIATE ROUTINE

FM CG SECOND MARDIV

TO CG FMFLANT

SUBJ: OPS TEMPO

A. CG FMFLANT 081200Z NOV 89
B. CG 20 MARDIV 140142Z NOV 89 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQUESTED RECOMMENDATIONS FOCUSED ON CANCELLATION OR
   REDUCTION OF CURRENT AND FUTURE ACTIVITY LEVELS.

2. MY CUMULATIVE VIEWS CONCERNING DIVISION OPTEMPO ARE EXPRESSED
   IN MY MESSAGE TO MY COMMANDERS, REF B. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, THE
   NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE PRESENT PACE IS DISCERNIBLE IN THE
   FOLLOWING CATEGORIES:
   A. EFFECT ON MORALE AND FAMILY COHESIVENESS PRODUCED BY
      REPEATED AND SUSTAINED DEPLOYMENT PERIODS.
   B. DEGRADATION OF MAINTENANCE READINESS FROM INCREASED
      EQUIPMENT USAGE AND CORRESPONDING REDUCTIONS OF MAINTENANCE
      OPPORTUNITIES.
   C. HAZARDING THE ABILITY OF PLATOON AND COMPANY SIZE UNITS TO
      TRAIN TOWARD BASIC TACTICAL PROFICIENCY BECAUSE OF THEIR LEADERS'
      ENFORCED FOCUS ON "HIGH-LEVEL" OR "SPECIAL" EXERCISES AND
      TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.
   D. CHANGES IN PRIORITIES WITHOUT CORRESPONDING FUNDING
      MODIFICATIONS WILL REQUIRE REPROGRAMMING OF BUDGETARY COSTS.

3. REVIEW OF THE DIVISION TEMPO IS UNGOING IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE
   ACTIVITIES, BUT SO FAR WITH MARGINAL RESULTS:
   A. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE MAJOR RECURRING OPTEMPO EVENTS
      (E.G., UUP, LF6F, AND NEC-FOCUSED EXERCISES) RESULT FROM HIGHER

WMU(5) .. INFU FOR CG SECOND MA(10)
WMU(1) .. 66(4) W6=3(2) W6=2(1) WCR(4) 3000
WMU(1) .. 66(1) W6=4(2) W6=3(1) WCR=4
WMU(1) .. 66(1) W6=3(1) WAP=0(1) WCF=0(2) WSEC(4)

RTO: 048-000/COPIES: 0002

CG SECOND MARDIV

IMMEDIATE ROUTINE

FM CG SECOND MARDIV

TO CG FMFLANT

SUBJ: OPS TEMPO

A. CG FMFLANT 081200Z NOV 89
B. CG 20 MARDIV 140142Z NOV 89 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQUESTED RECOMMENDATIONS FOCUSED ON CANCELLATION OR
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WMU(5) .. INFU FOR CG SECOND MA(10)
WMU(1) .. 66(4) W6=3(2) W6=2(1) WCR(4) 3000
WMU(1) .. 66(1) W6=4(2) W6=3(1) WCR=4
WMU(1) .. 66(1) W6=3(1) WAP=0(1) WCF=0(2) WSEC(4)

RTO: 048-000/COPIES: 0002

CG SECOND MARDIV
POLITICAL/MILITARY DECISIONS. CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REDUCTIONS WOULD REQUIRE HIGH-LEVEL SUPPORT.

THE RELATIVE INFREQUENCY OF JCS/CINC DIRECTED EXERCISES
(E.G. OCEAN VENTURE/QUAL SHIELD) DIMINISH THEIR UPTEMPUS IMPACT.
HOWEVER, AS THE OBJECTIVES OF THESE TYPES OF EXERCISES FOCUS ON C3I
AND JOINT INTEROPERABILITY, THUMP PARTICIPATION IN WHAT ESSENTIALLY
ARE "SCRIPTED" SCENARIOS IS NOT REQUIRED NOR RECOMMENDED. MANEUVER
ELEMENTS CAN EFFICIENTLY BE REPRESENTED BY COMMAND ELEMENT "CELLS"
IN A TEST ENVIRONMENT.

C. HIGH-COST TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS TO GEOGRAPHICALLY DISTANT
AREAS DESERVE PARTICULAR SCRUTINY:

(1) CAX'S ARE A PRINCIPAL OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE AND
VALIDATE OUR MAGTF DOCTRINE; BUT ALSO COST FMFLANT UNITS MORE,
PARTICULARLY IN TOP/STOP, THAN ANY OTHER TRAINING EVENT. IF FUTURE
FUNDING AND END-STRENGTH REDUCTIONS ARE AS SEVERE AS ANTICIPATED, AN
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATION MAY BE WARRANTED: CONDUCT FMFLANT CAX'S
AS IEAT'S WITH 22 CELLS REPRESENTING MANEUVER ELEMENTS. ALTHOUGH
SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN FUNDS AND DEPLOYMENT TIME WOULD BE REALIZED,
I AM CONCERNED THAT OUR INFANTRY ON MARINES WOULD UNFORTUNATELY BE
DEPRIVED OF SUPERB DESERT-UNIQUE TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES. FURTHER,
OUR MARINES WOULD NOT EXPERIENCE THE VISUALLY IMPRESSIVE LIVE-FIRE
EFFECT OF OUR AIRGROUND TEAM. EXPECTED MONETARY SAVINGS, HOWEVER,
AND THE AVAILABILITY OF LOCAL AND PROXIMATE INFANTRY WEAPONS RANGES
APPROACHING THOSE RESIDENT AT MCAGCC, MAKE OUR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
WORTHWHILE. ADDITIONALLY, IN ORDER TO GAIN FULL VALUE FROM EACH
BUDGETED EVOLUTION, WE SHOULD CONSIDER EXPANDING CAX IEAT'S TO
"B" LEVEL FIRE SUPPORT COMUUNICATION EXERCISES. ALL TRADITIONAL FIRE
SUPPORT SYSTEMS, INCLUDING TANKS AND IONS, WOULD STILL BE FULLY
REPRESENTED. THIS CHARGLE WOULD DOUBLE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMAND
AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS TO COORDINATE LIVE FIRE SUPPORT AND PROVIDE
VALUABLE TRAINING TOWARDS OUR GOAL OF "TRAIN AS WE WILL FIGHT".

(2) MANEUVER IN THE CONTINUED AT PRESENT FREQUENCY
AND FORCE LEVELS. THE TRAINING IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN FUNDAMENTAL
LEVELS OF ARTIC AND MOUNTAIN EXPERTISE REQUIRED BY EXISTING CONPLANS
AND THE GRIMMING IMPORTANCE OF LIC.

(3) THE ANNUAL NEXWALEX FOR 20 TANK BN', INVOLVES AN 8-WEEK
DEPLOYMENT IN FT. PICKETT, VA, AT A TOTAL COST OF 326 K. THIS
EXERCISE CAN BE CANCELLED DURING THOSE YEARS WHEN NON-AVAILABILITY OF
INFANTRY BN'S REQUIRE SCHEDULING OF A TANK BN CAX. TANK BN
CAN EXECUTE ALL INDIVIDUAL AND CREW CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
AT 29 PALS, THE PROJECTED 43-ANNUAL SAVINGS TO THE DIVISION ARE
EXPECTED TO BE SIGNIFICANT.

(4) EXPRESS SHURO IS A SEMI-ANNUAL FNING EXERCISE CUNDUCTED
BY 10TH MARINES AT FT. BRAGG, N.C., INVOLVING 6 WEEKS OF DEPLOYMENT
TIME AND 444 K IN TOTAL COSTS. I BELIEVE ONE EXERCISE CAN BE
COMBINED WITH OTHER TRAINING WITHOUT DEGRADING COMBAT READINESS.
THE REMAINING EXERCISE COULD BE MORE PROFITABLY CUNDUCTED AT
VIEWGROVE, PH, IF OPPORTUNE USE SCHEDULED USAH LIFT IS AVAILABLE. THE
OVERALL REDUCTION FOR FOUR MAN WOULD APPROXIMATE ONE MAJOR
DEPLOYMENT PER ANNUM. THIS INITIATIVE APPEARS FEASIBLE BUT REQUIRES
AN SUPPORT DURING QUARTERLY FLI SLED CONFERENCE.
D. DIVISION PARTICIPATION IN AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTERS ON THE
QUARTERLY TCAT, REQUESTED CAT, AND SCHEDULED SPOTLX'S; NO REDUCTION
IS RECOMMENDED. ALTHOUGH ALL THREE EVENTS SUFFER FROM "LAST MINUTE"
SHIP AVAILABILITY CHANGES, WE FULLY SUPPORT THIS TRAINING TO MAINTAIN
OUR AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING AND TO ACHIEVE CERTIFICATION IN OUR FIRE
SUPPORT AND AVY COMMUNITIES.
E. THE REMAINDER OF OUR DEEP EVENTS ARE INTERNALLY GENERATED;
"CERES" TO PREPARE AND EVALUATE UNITS PRIOR TO ODP AND
LPEF DEPLOYMENTS; INSEA EXERCISES TO FAMILIARIZE FREQUENTLY
ROTATING STAFF OFFICERS WITH UNIT STAFF PROCEDURES; BILAT EXERCISES
TO MAINTAIN REGIONAL FAMILIARIZATION AND ORIENTATION. I INTEND TO
CONTINUE THESE EVENTS.
F. ADDITIONALLY, THE PROPOSED PURCHASE OF PROPERTY IN THE SANDY
PUN AREA WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TRAINING
OPPORTUNITIES AROUND CAMP LEJEUNE. MORE TRAINING AREAS WILL REDUCE
OUR TTT/TOZ COSTS TO SUPPORT TRAINING ELSEWHERE. I FULLY SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED PURCHASE OF THE SANDY PUN PROPERTY.

4. IN SUMMARY, IT APPEARS THAT EXTERNAL COMMITMENTS DRIVE DIVISION
DEPLOYMENT. IT IS HOPED THAT THE UNCHANGING THREAT OF OUR HISTORICAL
ADVERSARY AND THE INCREASING EVALUATION OF OUR FORWARD-BASED PRESENCE
IN THE PACIFIC WILL REDUCE SII MAHIDIV'S COMMITMENTS. MORE
QUANTITAVE, APPROVAL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS VOICED IN PARA
TO KEPT IT UNPAIRED. FINALLY, I INTEND TO REDUCE ALL PLANNED TENT'S,
FEX'S AND CPAK'S TO A LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL READINESS.

737960/1697/336 3 UP 5 \1 0031 330700:297 020001Z DEC 89
CG SECOND MAHIV

...
From: LtCol J. L. Whitlow, U.S. Marine Corps  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic  
Norfolk VA 23515-5001  

Subj: Request for Information  
Encl: (1) Proposed Problem Statement for Defense Analytical Study  

1. I am one of five Marine students in the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL. In the course of our curriculum, we have the opportunity to study some facet of the Defense establishment with a view toward honing analytical skills and providing useful information for decision makers. The enclosure briefly describes my topic. It is a subject that is on the hearts and minds of many unit commanders as they seek ways to minimize the adverse effects of high OPTEMPO on morale and retention within their unit. With the specter of force structure cuts at hand, and the very real possibility that CINC's will require at least as much forward deployment as in years past, maintaining high morale within our units will require a more analytical view toward developing an appropriate OPTEMPO.

2. In the course of studying this topic, I hope to accomplish the following:
   a. Clarify the problem (if it exists).
   b. Examine feedback mechanisms, and recommend improvements.
   c. Provide recommendations that may minimize adverse effects.

3. In order to provide an accurate study, I need input from your commanders. Accordingly, I am soliciting your views on the following questions:
   a. Is excessive OPTEMPO a morale or retention issue for any individuals, units, or groups of individuals/units within your command? (MOS peculiar?)
   b. How has OPTEMPO been rated on separations surveys over the past three years? Does it correlate to any specific units or MOSs?
   c. Do current feedback mechanisms give you accurate, timely, indicators of potential morale/retention problem areas? Have you established any unique feedback tools in your command?
d. In a peacetime environment, without funding or force structure constraints, what is your view of the amount of family separation that should be expected of our enlisted marine over the course of a career, and over the course of a 3/4 year operational tour?

e. Has your command established any unique support mechanisms, or operational policies that minimize the adverse impact of high OPTEMPO and increased family separation?

3. Realizing that this is a busy time of year, I will be most appreciative of any assistance you can give me in developing this information. It would be of great benefit if I could receive a reply by 15-20 January 1990. For any clarifying information, please call me at (AV) 285-2122.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

LtCol USAF
From: Lieutenant Colonel Michele Manning, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
To: Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Whitlow, U. S. Marine Corps

Subj: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

1. In response to your request, the following general comments concerning the three primary major subordinate commands (MSC’s) of the II Marine Expeditionary Force are forwarded:

   a. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing

      (1) Is OPTEMPO a morale or retention issue for any individuals, units, or groups of individuals/units within your command? Yes. One particular MOS stands out (6467, Aircraft Integrated Weapons System Technician QMA), as the Wing population is 37, with only 2 currently deployable. The other 35 do not intend to reenlist, and the primary reason given is OPTEMPO.

      (2) How has OPTEMPO been rated on separations surveys over the past three years? OPTEMPO has been the number one reason for separation on questionnaires over the past three years.

      (3) Separation surveys are the only tools used at this time.

      (4) In a peacetime environment, without funding or force structure constraints, what is your view of the amount of family separation that should be expected of our enlisted Marines over the course of a career, and over the course of a 3 or 4 year operational tour? No response.

      (5) Has your command established any unique support mechanisms, or operational policies that minimize the adverse impact of high OPTEMPO and increased family separation? Yes. An extensive Family Readiness Program, run by a civilian coordinator, Ms. Phyllis Price, Autovon 582-3236.

   b. 2d Force Service Support Group

      (1) Yes. No particular MOS, or unit.

      (2) Number 3 on Questionnaires.

      (3) Enlisted Separation Questionnaires are only tools used presently.
Subj: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

(4) No more than 2 deployments a tour, offset with FAP billets as a break.

(5) Yes. Wife's Clubs and Family Readiness Center.

c. 2d Marine Division

(1) Yes. 03XX and 08XX retention/morale very low of first term Marines.

(2) Number 3 on Questionnaires. All deploying units in Division.

(3) Enlisted Separation Questionnaires.

(4) No answer provided.

(5) Yes. Family Readiness and Wife's Clubs.

2. POC at FMFLant is Lieutenant Colonel M. Manning, Autovon 564-6329/6281. The individuals at the MSC's who personally deal with separation surveys and could perhaps provide a more detailed picture are:

a. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 1stSgt Reese, Autovon 582-5916.

b. 2d Force Service Support Group, GySgt Lundstrom, Autovon 484-1334.

c. 2d Marine Division, MGySgt Thibault, Autovon 484-2116.
From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Whitlow, USMC, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 36112-5000
Subj: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Ref: (a) Yr ltr of 14 Dec 89

1. FMFPac does not have a career planner, retention officer, or SNCO billet on the staff. Visibility on retention statistics and separation surveys as well as attitudes and perceptions encountered by unit career planners are therefore very limited or not readily available. However, correspondence from major subordinate commands, telephone discussions with CMC (MMEA-6) and west coast and Hawaii career planning offices, and discussions with FMFPac staffers with recent FMF command or staff experience have revealed some information which may be useful for your requirements as stated in the reference. There has been insufficient time to gather much hard statistical data so the following responses are largely based on impressions and recall by involved individuals.

a. OPTEMPO is indeed a major contributor to dissatisfaction among Marines, especially during the first two enlistment periods. Further, the impact of OPTEMPO is of increasing concern to leaders and retention planners, not only because of the obvious demands for long work days and frequent and/or extended separations, but also for correlative affects on other aspects of military life.

(1) The effect of the pressures resulting from family separations is being felt across a much larger proportion of junior enlisted. Increasingly, first and second termers are married or have parental responsibilities. The youth, inexperience, low income, and lack of sophistication of these families exacerbate the problems normally associated with long hours and separations.

(2) Long hours and frequent deployments are the most obvious, direct consequences of high OPTEMPO. However, perhaps of equal concern is the 'ripple' effect of that activity. The young Marine with no family considerations is increasingly becoming frustrated by the limitations on other activities imposed by unceasing operations. Individual training often suffers due to exercises. The opportunity to pursue off duty education becomes very limited. Establishing any type of social life outside the military environment is very difficult.
(3) The cumulative effect of unrelenting exercises and deployments is frustrating and exhausting across the entire spectrum of combat arms, support and service support, and aviation MOS's. Retention difficulties are most acute in combat arms and aviation. The Marine Corps offers very few alternatives for lower ranking combat arms Marines who become 'burned out' due to the repetitiveness of operations during their first enlistment. There are simply not enough billets to provide alternating tours into and out of the FMF. During FY 88, there were 8,600 'B' billets for corporal and below, against an active duty population of 96,000. A large portion of these 'B' billets are MOS specific, i.e., 01, 04, 30, etc. Aviation Marines may find more job satisfaction, but the same frustrations of high OPTEMPO can push them into the increasingly lucrative civilian sector demanding their skills. For example, a large number of airline mechanics are reaching retirement as airlines and aircraft manufacturing continues to expand. The competition in the civilian economy for trained aircraft technicians is growing even more rapidly than that for pilots.

b. Separations surveys are collected at the unit level and either submitted directly to HQMC or consolidated at the senior MSC. Inquiries to HQMC and joint career planning offices revealed that high OPTEMPO becomes a larger factor against reenlistment as the individual becomes older and has more military experience. However, financial concerns, advancement/assignment opportunities, and unsuitability of the military life are of equal or larger concern to many first and second termers.

c. Commanding generals of divisions, wings, and FSSG's receive feedback from commanders and their staff career planners as well as from HQMC. The information is gathered by separations surveys and personal interviews by career planners and commanding officers. The existence of unique feedback tools at any command level is not known.

d. Estimates of separations for west coast based combat arms and helicopter MOS Marines range from 50 percent to 70 percent of the time assigned to any operational unit. Marines in fixed wing squadrons deploy less often unless their squadron is assigned to a Navy carrier air group. As previously indicated, combat arms Marines can expect little relief from the OPTEMPO until they become sergeants and are eligible for more non FMF assignments. Hawaii Marines tend to be deployed less often but for longer periods due to the logistics involved in unit movement to CONUS or other off island training areas.

e. Support mechanisms or groups exist normally at the battalion/squadron level, with involvement and support from higher
commands. Each unit's method is structured to fit that unit's particular needs according to the local environment, the character of the unit's operations, the composition of the dependent population, etc. Most are variations of the Navy's Ombudsman Wives program developed for ship crew dependents. Installations have Family Service Centers and various counselling activities to provide assistance. Operational policies, on the other hand, are far more difficult to develop with minimization of OPTEMPO as the goal. Most operations/deployments are externally driven and out of the control of the local commander. The unit commander will normally attempt to tailor the unit's activities with personal/family considerations in mind, but quite often the timing and nature of operations forces those considerations to become secondary. Any break in exercises and deployments must be used for intense individual training, maintenance, etc.

2. In summary, the steady increase in OPTEMPO over the last 8-10 years may have reached a point of diminishing returns, i.e., the gains in readiness realized from numerous realistic exercises and deployments are being eroded by increasing dissatisfaction, decreasing morale, and loss of experienced personnel. However, a careful balance is critical. Readiness remains the priority. Further, the level of OPTEMPO must allow the Marine, especially the younger individuals, to be busy a majority of the time. Otherwise, boredom may become as acute a problem as overactivity.

3. Headquarters, FMFPac action officer is Maj Burton, G-1/PRB, AUTOVON 477-6228.

Richard E. Burton

By direction
From: Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Whitlow

Dear Lieutenant Colonel Whitlow

1. As a recent commander of VMA(AW)-533 I'm sure that you are familiar with many of the commitments that drive the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing's OPTEMPO. During FY-89 this Wing flew a record 155,477 flight hours and our goal for FY-90 is nearly 158,000 hours. As you can appreciate the Flight Hour Program is only a small part of OPTEMPO. The percentage of personnel on hand in relation to our T/O has decreased over the past couple of years while our world wide commitments have increased.

2. The solution to reducing our OPTEMPO is as simple as it is difficult -- reduce our commitments. Unfortunately, regardless how busy our schedule gets, certain training events are required to keep our aircrew proficiency at an acceptable level for real world contingencies; however, whenever possible we have reduced or combined unit training deployments, and reduced Wing directed events.

3. To assist you in your research, I've enclosed copies of some recent studies on our OPTEMPO. Good luck in your endeavors at Maxwell.

R. A. GUSTAFSON
SYNOPSIS OF "RETENTION OF QUALITY MARINES" RESPONSES

SUBJ:  ANSWER TO CC 2ND MAW MSC 151356Z APR 89

- OPTEMPO: The number one reason for our problems in 1st Term Retention.
  - Family Separation: OPTEMPO is even affecting our seasoned Marines. Our Jr. Enlisted and Jr. Officers as well are finding this much family separation intolerable over the long haul.
  - Education: Our Jr. Marines are finding it difficult to enroll/complete any type of off duty education. Tuition assistance money is lost due to inability to complete college courses.
  - Time off is often used as a method of building morale and rewarding our young Marines. Current OPTEMPO decreases the opportunity to use this tool.

- PROMOTION: The statement "HQMC is working on the problem" is not convincing our young Marines to stay.

Note: We believe HQMC now has the "Big Picture" and the fix to the problem is being implemented. However, this will take some time to spool up and FY-89 Marines will probably not be around to benefit.

- JOB SATISFACTION:
  - Lack of Recognition: Paragraph 3 of MWSG-27's response says it best. Also the "Time Off" method of recognition is limited by the OPTEMPO.
  - Poor Pay is a problem we all live with.
  - Lack of Responsibility: No opportunity to exercise their authority due to "Micro-management".

- LEADERSHIP:
  - Too many petty regulations.
  - Not being treated with respect.
  - Perceived double standards.
POSSIBLE LOCAL PROBLEM AREAS WITH RECOMMENDED SOLUTION IDENTIFIED BY THE SQUADRON/GROUP COMMANDERS

These are the Squadron/Group Commanders responses in order by which most commonly referred to:

- **OPTEMPO**: OPTEMPO is certainly the most commonly identified problem as this affects many areas. Such as Family Separation, Education, Time Off, etc... (Areas referring to this are highlighted in yellow.)

  -- Recommended Local Solution:

    -- Commanders should be required to justify deployed time over and above 35% to 40%.

    -- Consolidate Training to reduce family separation between deployments.

    -- Well deserved "Time Off and Weekends" remain untouchable while in garrison. Highlighted areas in 223's and 231's response cover this area well.

- **PROMOTION**: Although Promotions are HQMC controlled, there are areas that we can improve on locally; (Areas highlighted in yellow)

  -- Relocate Meritorious Promotion Auth to Cpl and Sgt to the Squadron level on a quota basis; (332's response covers this in detail.)

**NOTE**: Most refer to promotions as a HQMC problem. However, many locally controlled areas affect promotions.

  -- Lack of ability to grant time off makes it difficult to use programs such as MUL's, Off Duty Education and Recruiters Assistance to improve their composite scores.

  This area is broken down to many other areas that we can affect locally. (Areas)

  -- Lack of Recognition:

    - Awards: Individual Awards must be increased and reaching the "work force" in a timely manner.

    - "Time Off" is an excellent tool however, as addressed earlier a difficult one to use due to the OPTEMPO.

    - Insure that any and all types of personal awards and certificates are recognized in formations.

  -- Lack of Responsibility: No opportunity to exercise their authority due to "Micro-Management."
 Due to an increased OPTEMPO and decrease in personnel our "Supervisors" are now the "Work Force".

NOTE: There is no recommended fix for this locally.

LEADERSHIP: Too many petty regulations, not being treated with respect and perceived double standards seem to all run together regarding local remedies. UN viên đề un (creaued OPTEMPO and decrease in personnel our "Supervisors" are now the "Work Force".

NOTE: There is no recommended fix for this locally.

LEADERSHIP: Too many petty regulations, not being treated with respect and perceived double standards seem to all run together regarding local remedies. (UN VICLES IN KE)

- Too many petty regulations and not being treated with respect refer to regulations generally set by HQMC (i.e., alcohol in the bks, urinalysis testing, etc.).

- Recommendation: Use the "sane man" approach and always insure there is a "logical reason" for doing what we do.

- Perceived double standards: Paragraph 3a of MAG-29's response refers to weight control.

- Recommendation: Regulations set by HQMC or locally pertain to all of our marines equally. "Double Standards" is something that cannot be tolerated within 2d MAW.
DECLINE IN FIRST TERM RETENTION

- WHO CARES?
- FIVE YEAR GRAPH
- COMMENTS
- THE FUTURE?
- THE BOTTOM LINE
WHO CARES?

Lt. Gen Cook Msg Jul 88...

"Statistics reported at the end of 3rd quarter reflect a low retention of first-termers and careerists. Request your evaluation and necessary corrective action..."

Gen Gray Msg Apr 89...

"...we now face an equally imposing problem with retention of our high quality first term Marines. Believe it or not, some of our good Marines are leaving our ranks because they don't believe we really value their contributions to our Corps!!!"

Lt. Gen Hudson Msg Apr 89...

"...agree with consensus of Carolina Generals that promotions, assignments, and lateral moves are among the most important factors that affect reenlistment of our first term Marines."

Maj. Gen Gustafson Msg Apr 89...

"...as I have said before I am concerned about our ability to retain our quality Marines. This is particularly true of first termers..."

Second Marine Aircraft Wing

52
2ND MAW FIRST TERM
REENLISTMENTS VS. EAS POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 85</th>
<th>FY 86</th>
<th>FY 87</th>
<th>FY 88</th>
<th>FY 89</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>430</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21.1%)</td>
<td>(19.9%)</td>
<td>(19.0%)</td>
<td>(17.8%)</td>
<td>(26.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Enlisted
- EAS Population

Second Marine Aircraft Wing
COMMENTS

**Squadron CO**

'The operational tempo (MTI's, mini-det's, Alpine Warrior, Cold Winter, Solid Shield) is too intensive. Extensive separations from family members contribute to marital and financial problems.'

**Group CO**

'Too much family separation is closely tied to OPE TEMPO and while I agree, much is beyond Group and even Wing control. The 6 month build up prior to LF6F CONUS departure usually includes 90 plus or minus nights away from home.'

**Spouse**

'My husband has been home a total of 3 weeks in the past 4 months and is leaving again today.'

---

[OPE TEMPO] Second Marine Aircraft Wing
Comments

*Group CO*

'Square away enlisted promotions once and for all. Further, promotions must be equal across the board and not skewed because of imbalances in MOS's. Attrition imbalances through retirements, releases, etc. Every Marine must know that at a certain stage in his career he has a chance to be promoted. This expectation is critical.'

*Squadron CO*

'...If I could tell a young LCpl or CPL "you will be promoted in Jan 92" many of them would stay. They want to know what is going to happen to them.'

*Squadron CO*

'Lack of promotions: The average Marine is promoted to Lance Corporal within the first year of active duty and, depending upon their MOS population and composite score requirement, averages 2-3 years before they are promoted to Corporal. Regular promotion opportunities need to be increased to fix this problem.'

[FAIR CAREER POTENTIAL]

Second Marine Aircraft Wing


**Comments**

*Squadron CO*

'When there are SNCO's working 10-14 hours a day on aircraft side by side with the junior Marines, it is sometimes almost impossible to take the time to sit down with the individual Marine for the one on one counselling session to point out shortfalls and to praise them for a job well done, and get home to rest up for the next day's work.'

*Squadron CO*

'...If we want to retain quality Marines, then we need to treat them as quality Marines.'

*NCO*

'No recognition or off-setting compensation for long working hours or a job well done.'

*NCO*

'Leaders don't show respect for NCO's, that they are not incorporated into elemental decision making processes/that their ideas and opinions are not sought.'

[Leadership]

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Second Marine Aircraft Wing

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The Future?

*In FY 90 the number of first-termers (as defined in retention reporting) drops from approximately 1600 to about 800.*

*The drop is due, in part, to the number of 6 year enlistments written during FY 86.*

*How will these smaller numbers in FY 90 affect our first-termser retention in FY 90?*

*What reenlistment patterns will the 6 year enlistees exhibit when the opportunity for their first reenlistment rolls around?*

-WILL THEY 'BEHAVE' LIKE FIRST-TERMERS, OR WILL THEY EXHIBIT AS A GROUP THE HIGHER RETENTION RATES OF THE INTERMEDIATE TERM MARINE? -
THE BOTTOM LINE

'Although 'op tempo' is an imprecise term it has a close relationship to the total work environment in which the individual Marine functions and subsequently forms perceptions on reenlistment and career potential.

"Op tempo" that is not properly managed may contribute to a breakdown of positive leadership techniques, isolate junior Marines, and increase junior Marines' dissatisfaction with the Marine Corps as a career.

"Fair career potential" is a complex, individual perception that must be addressed at a personal level with each Marine.

As leaders we must deliver the results our Marines expect and deserve.
ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE

R 061515Z DEC 89 ZYB PSN 783816J33

FROM CG SIXTH MEB//G3//

TO CG FMFLANT

INFO CG SECOND MAW -
CG FOURTH MEB
SECOND SRI GROUP

BT UNCLAS //N03000/

SUBJ: OPS TEMPO

A. CG FMFLANT 081200Z NOV 89

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE REFERENCE, THE OPS TEMPO OF THE 6TH MEB AS IT RELATES TO OUR MSE’S IS PRIMARILY LIMITED TO OUR ANNUAL MPF EXERCISE. MMC’S ARE ONLY CONDUCTED BIANNUALLY AND ARE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL. OUR MPF EXERCISE IS A JLS DIRECTED REQUIREMENT AND IS THE ONLY EXERCISE OPPORTUNITY THAT THE 6TH MEB CE HAS TO TRAIN WITH OUR MAW IN THE MPF ROLE. THIS IS CONSIDERED MINIMAL FOR OPERATIONAL READINESS OF THE MPF MEB. WHILE WE AGREE THAT OPS TEMPO MUST BE ADDRESSED, THE LOSS OF THIS ANNUAL MPF EXERCISE WILL SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE FORCE OVER THE LONG TERM.

2. THE EXTENT OF FMFLANT’S OPER TEMPO IS FELT PRIMARILY BY THE MSE’S AND NOT BY THE CE. EXERCISE AGILE SWORD, BATTLE STAFF TRAINING (BST), AND THE LFTCPAC MPF STAFF PLANNING CRS ARE THE ONLY 6TH MEB-GENERATED EXERCISES/TRAINING THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR MSE’S. EXERCISE AGILE SWORD IS AN IMPORTANT WORKUP FOR OUR ANNUAL MPF OPERATION, AND BST AND THE STAFF PLANNING CRS HAVE PROVEN MOST VALUABLE IN DEVELOPING STAFF EXPERTISE AND IMPROVING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CE AND OUR MSE’S. IN RECOGNITION OF THE HIGH OPER TEMPO OF OUR MSE’S, WE ARE CURRENTLY PLANNING AGILE SWORD ’99 TO BE CONDUCTED AT CAMLEJ IN A SIMPLE, BUT STILL EFFECTIVE, MANNER WHICH WILL CAUSE OUR MSE’S TO INCUR THE LEAST AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCE DRAIN AS POSSIBLE.

3. SINCE OUR MSE’S ARE NOT DEDICATED SOLELY TO 6TH MEB, AND MUST
CONTINUE TO BE ALERT TO INNOVATIVE
THAT MIGHT FURTHER REDUCE THE TEMPO WITHIN THE FACILITY.
From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Third Marine Aircraft Wing, MCAS El Toro, Santa Ana, CA 92709
To: LtCol J. L. Whitlow 465 74 5462/7511 USMC, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5000

Subj: OPTEMPO, MORALE & RETENTION

Ref: (a) Your ltr of 14 Dec 1989

Encl: (1) Summary of Separation Surveys (Officer & Enlisted)
(2) Third MAW Order 1750.5
(3) MWSS-373 FACTeam PROGRAM

1. This letter responds to your request in the reference for information related to the effects of OPTEMPO on morale and retention and the existence/utility of feedback mechanisms used in this command to alert commanders to OPTEMPO problems. Let me say at the outset that much of what I will offer is subjective because of the enigmatic nature of the concept of OPTEMPO and because of the inherent difficulties associated with measuring morale. I will provide some statistical information that depicts how former Third MAW Marines felt about family separation as a reason for getting out but even this data is somewhat inconclusive because such time away from the family is only a part of the larger OPTEMPO issue.

2. OPTEMPO in Third MAW is a function of several variables which are not unique to this command. These variables include manpower availability, aircraft/equipment readiness and commitments such as participation in the Unit Deployment Program, MEU (SOC) floats, Combined Arms Exercises, various MEB and higher-level exercises, Weapons & Tactics Instructor Course support, drug enforcement ops, and the myriad of squadron-level training evolutions (including FRS ops) so vital to warfighting readiness. We are a busy command but, from where I sit, we’re not so busy that either morale or retention is adversely affected to an alarming degree.

3. Naturally, certain types of units and certain MOS’s feel the pinch more than others. Not surprisingly, our helo squadrons and support type units (MWSS/MWCS) participate to some extent in virtually all major evolutions in addition to the internal training they must accomplish. Within these units, personnel in MOS’s which may be undermanned tend to meet themselves coming and going but there is a minimum of inequity due to the close management of these assets at all levels, including HQMC. It is my sensing that most Third MAW Marines and their commanders expect to be busy and, in fact, strive to stay that way. The Commanding General keeps a very close eye on the level of activity throughout the Wing and demands that his commanders do the same. OPTEMPO, therefore, does not appear to cause
significant morale or retention problems in Third MAW. It is a constant concern, though, particularly in units that are very busy in between UDP and MEU (SOC) deployments. Family separation, whether in large chunks or smaller increments, has the same effect on morale and retention.

4. Enclosure (1) depicts a summary of data from several hundred questionnaires administered to separating Third MAW Marines here at El Toro during a portion of CY 89. Unfortunately, for your particular purposes, these questionnaires don’t specifically probe the OPTEMPO issue as such and the results are not tabulated by MOS or unit. They do, however, reveal that many separating enlisted Marines are more concerned about pay & allowances than family separation as a primary reason for getting out. Lack of perceived promotion opportunity is also cited with virtually the same frequency as family separation as a factor in deciding not to reenlist. The picture is a bit different among officers who list family separation as the most important reason for their decision to become civilians. A revealing statistic not included in the enclosure is the fact that the Third MAW was the only major command in the Marine Corps to achieve reenlistment goal for FY89. Additionally, the Third MAW Career Planner has informally canvassed the Career Planners throughout the Wing and he reports no visible evidence of a negative effect on retention caused by OPTEMPO/family separation. For a broader view of reasons for separation throughout the Marine Corps I would recommend that you call HQMC (MMEA-6), AVN 2.4-2646/2868. This branch is the repository for all separation survey questionnaires completed at major commands.

5. Concerning feedback & support mechanisms, Third MAW has established Family Action Contact Teams (FACT) in every squadron/battalion. These teams, composed of unit wives, are naturally most active just prior to and during unit deployments and they have proven invaluable in smoothing out the bumps associated with family separation. In reality, these teams perform both the support and the feedback function because they can be a useful source of information even when units are at home base. Considering that there are always 5-7 units on long-term deployment (UDP & MEU) or working up, plus all the local squadron deployments, detachments and exercise support packages, these FAC Teams get a good workout. Enclosure (2) is a copy of the current Third MAW order on the FACT Program and enclosure (3) is a summary of how one of our units implements the concept.

6. I am reluctant to state a command position on the matter of how much family separation should be expected of our enlisted personnel during the course of a normal tour/career. By Marine Corps policy, deployable Marines should plan on two six-month "pumps" overseas during a 3-year tour to establish a DAUS (DR) prior to transfer. When I ask this question of our wing chaplains, they generally answer in two parts: (1) Six-month deployments are too long and should be
shortened by half, and; (2) No more than approximately 25% of a Marine's tour in the Wing should be spent in a deployed status.

7. Summary comments: OPTEMPO is a top-priority issue in Third MAW, not because it generates morale or retention problems, but because of the natural inclination of units to want to stay busy on the one hand and the concurrent desire of the Commanding General and his COs to strike the proper balance on the other. By survey and through the opinions of those who stay abreast of OPTEMPO, family separation, morale, etc., I conclude that an admittedly high OPTEMPO in this command does not produce clearly defined or significant morale or retention problems. The potential for such problems to occur is always there especially when units maintain a busy schedule in CONCUS and then deploy overseas for six months. But our unit commanders, senior SNCO leaders, chaplains and FAC Teams are successful in the early identification of problems related to OPTEMPO/family separation.

8. I am available (AVN 997-4135) should you require clarification or additional information. You've chosen a "soft" concept to try and get your arms around. Best of luck. I hope the observations in this letter will be of use.

S. M. DAY
Colonel USMC
SUMMARY OF SEPARATION SURVEYS (OFFICER & ENLISTED)
APR - OCT 89

BACKGROUND

- Separation survey lists 34 possible reasons for leaving the USMC.
- Those related to OPTEMPO include:
  - Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want
  - Too many PCS moves
  - Too much family separation
  - Dislike field duty
  - Dislike deployments aboard ship
  - Working hours too long

- Only the family separation choice was listed by more than 2% of enlisted Marines surveyed.

OFFICER RESULTS

- Total surveyed: 141
- Top 5 most important reasons for separating from the Marine Corps
  - Too much family separation (15.6%)
  - Unable to sufficiently plan/control career (9.2%)
  - Feels performance record not competitive for promotion (7.8%)
  - Too much paperwork (7.1%)
  - Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation (6%)

ENLISTED RESULTS

- Total surveyed: 1030
- Top 5 most important reasons for separating from the Marine Corps
  - Pay and allowances too low (18.6%)
  - Too much family separation (12%)
  - Not enough promotional opportunity (11.4%)
  - Poor leadership of immediate supervisor (9%)
  - Too many petty regulations (4.6%)

ENCLOSURE (1)
WING ORDER 1750.5

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Family Action Contact Team (FACTeam) Program

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 1750.1A
(b) 5 U. S. C. Subsection 552a (Privacy Act of 1974)

Encl: (1) Commanding Officer FACTeam Duties/Responsibilities
(2) Sample Letter of Appointment for Chairpersons
(3) Wing Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 FACTeam Duties/Responsibilities
(4) MCAS, El Toro Assistant Chief of Staff, Training/Training Audio Visual Support Center (TAVSC) Services
(5) Deployed Unit Information Hotline

1. Purpose. To promulgate policy and procedures for the implementation of the FACTeam within the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW).

2. Cancellation. WgO 1750.4.

3. Information. As emphasized in reference (a), the family is an important part of the military team. The morale and job performance of Marines are directly related to the well-being of their families. As official representatives of Marine Corps families, the Family Action Contact Team (FACTeam) plays an essential role in establishing and maintaining communication among the commander and spouses as well as providing a means for wives, with mutual concerns and problems, to seek help and share camaraderie.

4. General. To ensure a smoothly functioning support program for routine operational commitments, (e.g., short deployments to CAXs, AOTs, Cold Weather Training) six-month deployments afloat/in Okinawa, and for unscheduled deployments during crisis situations, FACTeams will be active at all times within 3d MAW groups.

5. Action

a. Commanding Officers will provide support for FACTeams per enclosure (1) and designate chairpersons as depicted in enclosure (2). Reference (b) authorizes the release of wives' addresses and phone numbers to the FACTeams.

ENCLOSURE (5)
b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 will provide support for FACTeams per enclosure (3).

c. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Training, MCAS, El Toro has made available, on a not to interfere basis, FACTeam support per enclosure (4).

d. Enclosure (5) provides Hotline information/procedures.

e. The Family Services Center (FSC) will provide those services inherent within their organization and charter to the FACTeam. In addition, the FSC FACTeam coordinator will maintain and issue FACTeam Notebooks to designated Commanding Officer Chairpersons six months prior to a deployment. These notebooks are designed to augment present group and squadron FACTeam Programs.

[Signature]

R. A. BROWN
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: L1/L2/L3
COMMANDING OFFICER FACTTEAM DUTIES/RESPONSIBILITIES

Commanding Officers will:

1. Designate the chairperson (preferably the group/squadron/detachment commander or executive officer's wife) from among spouses within the command.

2. Publish an official letter appointing the chairperson (enclosure (2)).

3. Assist spouses selected to serve as chairpersons and team leaders in obtaining appropriate information and training from the FSC.

4. Establish detailed procedures to ensure that FACTeam members are able to perform their duties.
   a. For deployed squadrons, designate the group executive officer as the liaison officer/point of contact (POC) for the deployed squadrons' FACTeam.
   b. For deployed detachments, designate the squadron executive officer as the liaison officer/point of contact for the deployed unit's FACTeam.
   c. Direct that monthly meetings be held by liaison officers with chairpersons of deployed units to assist with problem areas and support/planning requirements.
   d. Provide the FACTeam with a unit alpha roster noting the home addresses and telephone numbers of married service members within the organization.

   (1) Reference (b) provides for the release of this information with the consent of the individuals listed.

   (2) Those individuals not wishing to participate may so by notifying a FACTeam member or the Commanding Officer.

   e. Provide an official roster of FACTeam chairpersons to the appropriate group and squadron executive officers with copies to the Group Chaplain, Wing Special Services Officer and Wing Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

   f. Judicious use of "postage paid" indicia for FACTeams will be approved by the appropriate group/squadron commanding officer per established directives. Existing command Family-grams and

ENCLOSURE (1)
other Family Service Center information mailings will be used to announce FACTeam activities and any other official U.S. Government information of importance to Marine Corps members and their families. Information concerning voluntary organizations may be included if it supports the health and welfare of command personnel and their families. Unofficial support of this nature must be gratuitously provided by the sponsoring organization.

5. Establish a Deployed Unit Information Hotline within the group and ensure it is operational and current on a continuous basis per enclosure (5).

   a. Provide weekly information to the group and separate squadron commanders concerning significant events or activities which may be of interest to dependents.

   b. Ensure that classified information is not compromised.

   c. Coordinate the transfer of this information to the assigned telephone answering machine provided by the group (this coordination can be accomplished by a designated group/squadron staff FACTeam member as appropriate).

   (1) The answering machine will be located within the group's or squadrons' spaces.

   (2) Maintenance will be provided by the appropriate S-4.

6. Provide special assistance to FACTeams as required (e.g., personnel to assist wives set up tables, athletic equipment, etc., for FACTeam events when requested).

7. Ensure, upon completion of the FACTeam chairperson's and team leaders' tour, that these wives receive appropriate recognition of their performance.

   a. A Certificate of Commendation from the Commanding General, 3d MAW is appropriate for squadron level chairpersons.

   b. Team Leaders and squadron/detachment level chairpersons should be recognized by appropriate letters/certificates from squadron commanders.

ENCLOSURE (1)
SAMPLE LETTER OF APPOINTMENT FOR CHAIRPERSONS

From: Commanding Officer,
To: Mrs. Marvin Marine

Subj: APPOINTMENT OF FAMILY ACTION CONTACT TEAM CHAIRPERSON FOR X SQUADRON/GROUP

Ref: (a) Chairperson's Handbook for FACTeam Deployment Program

Encl: (1) Duties/Responsibilities of FACTeam Chairperson

1. You are hereby appointed Chairperson for the Family Action Contact Team (FACTeam) for X Squadron/MAG.

2. The enclosure outlines the duties and responsibilities of FACTeam chairpersons.

3. It is requested that you contact the MCAS Family Service Center at your earliest opportunity for assistance and guidance.

4. I invite you to visit with me and my executive officer at an early date to discuss the FACTeam Program.

5. The reference provides detailed information regarding the FACTeam and is available at the Station Family Service Center.

I. M. COMMANDER

ENCLOSURE (2)
WING ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-I FACTEAM DUTIES/RESPONSIBILITIES

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-I will:

1. Serve as the point of contact for the 3d MAW with the MCAS Family Services Center for FACTeam matters.

2. Serve as the point of contact within the Wing for all FACTeam matters.

3. Exercise staff cognizance over the 3d MAW FACTeam program and provide technical guidance to commanders.

4. Support the Group/Squadron FACTeam workshop program by assisting wives in arranging seminars and other training as requested.

5. Assist Group/Squadron FACTeams in securing unit areas for events such as picnics, homecoming reunions, holiday events, etc.

6. Ensure that instances of inadequate support of authorized FACTeam activities/requests are investigated and appropriate authorities are advised so that corrective action, if required, can be taken.

7. Provide administrative support, not available at the Squadron/Group level, which does not duplicate or replace the support of the Family Services Center.

ENCLOSURE (3)
The TAVSC is available to provide the following on a not to interfere basis:

1. Assist FACTeams in converting Beta video tapes to VHS if necessary in order for wives to view tapes sent by deployed units (many Naval vessels have only Beta machines for recording messages to FACTeams).

2. Tape FACTeam activities for viewing by deployed personnel. Such requests will be forwarded via the squadron's/group's FACTeam point of contact or chaplain.

ENCLOSURE (4)
DEPLOYED UNIT INFORMATION HOTLINE

1. Answering machines will be provided to the Groups for use in the unit deployment and MEU deployment programs.

2. The answering devices will be attached to telephone lines located in the Group/Squadron area. These machines, when in use, will be employed on a 24 hour basis.

3. Deployed aircraft/squadron/detachments commanders or their designated representatives will provide weekly information to the aircraft group commanders concerning significant unit events or activities which may be of interest to dependents. Messages, Naval Speedletters, or telephones may be used to provide information to higher headquarters. Commanders will ensure classified information is not compromised while passing this information.

4. The aircraft group commanders or their designated representatives will pass the information to the designated individual on their staff or FACTeam member responsible for attending the telephone answering device. The information will be updated weekly or as often as needed/possible. The format for the telephone message will follow the form provided in page 2 of this enclosure.

5. Dependents may leave messages as required at the end of the recorded message. The designated Hotline attendant will review the messages daily.

6. Answering device telephone numbers will be publicized as broadly as possible in such publications as the Plan of the Day, group newsletters and pre-deployment booklets.

7. A log of all calls received will be maintained to determine usage factors, to modify content, and for future general planning purposes.

ENCLOSURE (5)
FACTeam WEEKLY TELEPHONE TRANSCRIPT FORM

Aircraft Group: _______ Date: _______ Message Number: _______

Deployment: _____________

"Thank you for calling (Aircraft Group) FACTeam information hot line. This is an updated message for the week of _______ through ____________ ."

Date

ENVELOPE (5)
COMMANDING OFFICER FACTEAM DUTIES/RESPONSIBILITIES

Commanding Officers will:

1. Designate the chairperson (preferably the group/squadron/detachment commander or executive officer's wife) from among spouses within the command.

2. Publish an official letter appointing the chairperson (enclosure (2)).

3. Assist spouses selected to serve as chairpersons and team leaders in obtaining appropriate information and training from the FSC.

4. Establish detailed procedures to ensure that FACTeam members are able to perform their duties.

   a. For deployed squadrons, designate the group executive officer as the liaison officer/point of contact (POC) for the deployed squadrons' FACTeam.

   b. For deployed detachments, designate the squadron executive officer as the liaison officer/point of contact for the deployed unit's FACTeam.

   c. Direct that monthly meetings be held by liaison officers with chairpersons of deployed units to assist with problem areas and support/planning requirements.

   d. Provide the FACTeam with a unit alpha roster noting the home addresses and telephone numbers of married service members within the organization.

   (1) Reference (b) provides for the release of this information with the consent of the individuals listed.

   (2) Those individuals not wishing to participate may do so by notifying a FACTeam member or the Commanding Officer.

   e. Provide an official roster of FACTeam chairpersons to the appropriate group and squadron executive officers with copies to the Group Chaplain, Wing Special Services Officer and Wing Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

   f. Judicious use of "postage paid" indicia for FACTeams will be approved by the appropriate group/squadron commanding officer per established directives. Existing command Family-grams and

ENCLOSURE (1)
1. The keyperson shall be the wife of the CO or XO.
2. The FACTeam members must be wives of officers or SNCO's who volunteer.
3. The S-1 officer shall compile and maintain a list of squadron spouses that includes the names of their husbands, and the address and telephone number where they can be located at. It shall be updated at least once a quarter, and data shall be obtained from newly joined married Marines as a part of their check-in process.
4. An annual brief of FACTeam functions shall be conducted to inform spouses of the role of the team and the service agencies that are available to help.
5. Because of the nature of deployments in this squadron, the members of the team will not be assigned a number of spouses on a continual basis. Instead, spouses will be assigned to an available team member shortly before the Marines depart for the deployment. The member shall then remain responsible for the assigned spouses for the duration of the deployment.
6. Before a deployment a list of married Marines participating on the deployment, complete with spousal data shall be delivered to the keyperson. She shall then divide the list of spouses evenly among the team members who will remain in the El Toro area for the duration of the deployment.
7. When a team member is given her list of spouses, she will contact the individual spouses either by phone or by letter, advising them that she will be their point of contact for the FACTeam for the duration of the deployment, and how she can be reached. The S-1 shall retain a supply of form letters for use by team members in performing this function.
8. A tape recorded message shall not be available during deployments when the squadron maintains a rear detachment at El Toro. The squadron command element, rear element or duty office shall perform this function on such deployments. A recorded message will only be used when the entire squadron deploys.
9. When the entire squadron deploys, a designated officer shall regularly provide the keyperson with an unclassified list of squadron activities. The keyperson will then prepare a newsletter for circulation among squadron spouses.
DUTIES of FACTeam KEYPERSON

1. Maintain regular contact with team members.
2. Assist team members in resolving problems.
3. Maintain regular contact with the MWSG-37 Chaplain on FACTeam matters.
4. Maintain regular contact with the various family support agencies available on base.
5. Maintain regular contact with the MWSS-373 CO/XO on FACTeam matters.
6. Maintain regular contact with the MWSS-37 XO on FACTeam matters when the entire command element of MWSS-373 is deployed with the squadron.
7. Act as the central point of contact between the squadron and the FACTeam when the entire squadron is deployed.
8. Notify the squadron command element of all FACTeam matters that are of a serious or emergency nature.
9. Assist FACTeam members in the performance of their duties, and coordinate the overall effort of the team.

DUTIES of FACTeam MEMBER

1. Maintain regular contact with the keyperson.
2. Act as the main point of contact between keyperson and spouses.
3. Assist spouses in the resolution of personal problems.
4. Refer problems that cannot be resolved to the keyperson.
5. Notify the keyperson of all FACTeam matters that are of a serious or emergency nature.
6. Contact the spouses assigned to your team and advise them that you will be their point of contact for the duration of the deployment.
From: LtCol J. L. Whitlow, U.S. Marine Corps
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps, (MPP/MA)
Washington DC  20380-0001

Subj: Request for Information

Encl: (1) Proposed Problem Statement for Defense Analytical Study

1. I am one of five Marine students in the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL. In the course of our curriculum, we have the opportunity to study some facet of the Defense establishment with a view toward honing analytical skills and providing useful information for decision makers. The enclosure briefly describes my topic. It is a subject that is on the hearts and minds of many unit commanders as they seek ways to minimize the adverse effects of high OPTEMPO on morale and retention within their unit. With the specter of force structure cuts at hand, and the very real possibility that CINC's will require at least as much forward deployment as in years past, maintaining high morale within our units will require a more analytical view toward developing an appropriate OPTEMPO.

2. In the course of studying this topic, I hope to accomplish the following:

   a. Clarify the problem (if it exists).
   b. Examine feedback mechanisms, and recommend improvements.
   c. Provide recommendations that may minimize adverse effects.

3. In order to complete the project, I am requesting access to certain information listed below and current views or additional information available concerning some additional questions:

   Information:

   a. Results of Separation Surveys over the past ten years (FMF only).
   b. Summary of Enlisted Retention Statistics over the past ten years (FMF only).
   c. FMIS Data as to average number of days deployed within the FMF (by unit, by MOS, by Geographic Location).

   Questions:

   d. What role does forward deployment and/or OPTEMPO requirements have in developing force structure or manning requirements?
e. How much deployed time does the average Marine accumulate over the course of a career or in the course of the FMF tour (Ground, Aviation, CS)?

f. Does the Marine Corps have a "standard" concerning the amount of deployed time considered to be the norm, or beyond which is not considered to be advisable?

g. What are the current rotation tour date policies concerning time between DAUS restricted tours?

h. Are there any automated systems which give visibility to accumulated deployed time besides MMS?

i. At what command level is average accumulated deployed time by unit available?

j. Are there any quality of life programs that the Marine Corps is examining with a view towards minimizing the impact of family separation on junior enlisted Marines and their dependents?

4. Realizing that this is a busy time of year, I will be most appreciative of any assistance you can give me in developing this information. It would be of great benefit if I could receive a reply by 2 February 1990. For any clarifying information, please call me at (AV) 285-2122.

Very respectfully,

J.L. WHITLOW
LtCol USMC
From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: LtCol J. L. Whitlow, USA, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 36112-5522

Subj: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Ref: (a) Your ltr of 5 Jan 1990

1. In response to the reference the following information is provided:

a. Results of Separation Surveys over the past ten years (FMF only).

   Response. Due to a low response rate since its inception, cumulative results of the Separation Survey are not yet a reliable source of information. Corrective action is currently on-going, which will stress the importance of survey submission.

b. Summary of Enlisted Retention Statistics over the past ten years (FMF only).

   Response. We do not maintain enlisted retention statistics by location. Since Marines transfer between FMF and non-FMF tours, it is infeasible to ascertain if these tours cause any significant differences in retention.

c. MMS Data as to average number of days deployed within the FMF (by Unit, by NOS, by Geographic Location).

   Response. This request was dropped at your request.

d. What role does forward deployment and/or OPTEMPO requirements have in developing force structure or manning requirements?

   Response. Force structure and manning requirements are continuously reviewed and updated. Forward deployed forces are generally staffed at a higher manning level, but OPTEMPO is not a specific factor in determining manning levels. Current manning levels for MEU (SOC) battalions is 100% of T/O and 100% of staffing levels for battalions on the UDP. The manning level for battalions not forward deployed or based is 100% of the staffing levels of the remaining pool of personnel; efforts are made to share the remaining personnel assets fairly.

e. How much deployed time does the average Marine accumulate over the course of a career or in the course of the FMF tour (Ground, Aviation, CSS)?
Response. To answer this question we would have to take a snapshot of the Marine Corps on a given date and then average the total deployed time. This is too time-consuming to accomplish.

f. Does the Marine Corps have a "standard" concerning the amount of deployed time considered to be the norm, or beyond which is not considered to be advisable?

Response. There is no standard concerning the amount of deployed time considered to be the norm or beyond which is not considered to be advisable other than common sense. Individuals who feel that they have been deployed an excessive amount may request/receive consideration from their monitor for next duty location. The person-to-person method is how we resolve any conflicts in this area.

g. What are the current rotation tour date policies concerning time between DAUS restricted tours?

Response. The current rotation tour date policies concerning time between DAUS restricted tours are:

- There should be a minimum of 24 months between DAUSDR tours.
- The goal is at least 5 years between unaccompanied tours.

h. Are there any automated systems which give visibility to accumulated deployed time besides MMS?

Response. No there isn’t.

i. At what command level is average accumulated deployed time by unit available?

Response. Deployment information is kept at the battalion/squadron level. Those records include deployment information that may not qualify for ADT (not entered in the MMS), because the deployment was less than 10 days in duration. Information on the unit’s deployment can be found in the semiannual Command Chronology.

j. Are there any quality of life programs that the Marine Corps is examining with a view towards minimizing the impact of family separation on junior enlisted Marines and their dependents?

Response. Quality of life programs in the Marine Corps help minimize the impact of family separation not only on junior, enlisted Marines and their families, but on all Marines and their families. The programs offered range from command religious programs, to MWR club and recreation programs, to child care and Family Service Center operations.
Included in the services provided by the Family Service Center that can help the family during a deployment are:

- Pre- and post-deployment briefings
- Deployment support groups for waiting spouses and children
- Employment assistance for spouses
- Relocation assistance
- Financial counseling
- Information and referral services for such things as health care, child care, consumer affairs, etc.
- Personal and family counseling
- Parenting classes
- Child abuse/neglect prevention and intervention
- Assistance to Key Wives organizations and Family Readiness programs

(1) Family Service Centers are located on 18 major Marine Corps installations. In addition, toll-free lines exist at MCB Camp Pendleton and MCCDC Quantico. Information and referral services are available through this manner to family members who may be located away from a major base during a Marine’s deployment.

(2) A specific publication was developed and distributed in 1987 for young children, entitled Daddy’s Days Away: A Deployment Activity Guide for Children and Parents. The purpose of the book is to help children understand why parents have to go away and to keep the absent parent’s image alive during the separation. It has been extremely well received by deploying units.

2. We hope that the information provided can be beneficial to you. POC for any further information or questions is SSgt Carasas at Autovon 224-3440/1519 or Commercial (202) 694-3440/1519.

E. D. BRINDLE
By direction
From: LtCol J. L. Whitlow, U.S. Marine Corps
To: Commanding Officer, WMA(AW)-533, MCAS,
Cherry Point, NC 28533

Subj: Request for Information

Encl: (1) DAS Problem Statement

1. I am one of five Marine students in the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. In the course of our curriculum, we have the opportunity to study some facet of the Defense establishment with a view toward honing analytical skills and providing useful information for decision makers. The enclosure briefly describes my topic. It is a subject that is on the hearts and minds of many unit commanders as they seek ways to minimize the adverse effects of high OPTEMPO on morale and retention within their unit. With the specter of force structure cuts at hand, and the very real possibility that CINC's will require at least as much forward deployment as in years past, maintaining high morale within our units will require a more analytical view toward developing an appropriate OPTEMPO.

2. In the course of studying this topic, I hope to accomplish the following:

   a. Clarify the problem (if it exists).
   b. Examine feedback mechanisms, and recommend improvements.
   c. Provide recommendations that may minimize adverse effects.

3. One of the feedback possibilities I am examining is a method of averaging accumulated deployed time by unit from data within the PMS system. Your unit is one of eight battalion/squadron sized units I am studying. CMC is retrieving and averaging the data in the system for me. In order to properly analyze the data, however, I need the actual number of deployed days experienced by the unit over the past two years. Accordingly, I am asking for your assistance in providing the following data as it pertains to your battalion/squadron:

   Number of days deployed over the past two years.
   Full unit -
   Detachment -

   Number of days between returning from UDP and the next training deployment.

4. Please reply as quickly as you can. Thank you for your assistance. For any clarifying information, please call me at ANONV 875-2122.

Very respectfully,

J.L. WHITLOW
LtCol USMC
From: Operations Officer, Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 224
To: Lieutenant Colonel Whitlow, Air University
Subj: VMA(AW)-224 OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS
Ref: (a) PhoneCon btwn LtCol Whitlow and Major Riemer on 22 Jan 90


2. In accordance with the reference, the following information is provided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIAL SQUADRON DEPLOYMENTS</th>
<th>FULL SQUADRON DEPLOYMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CQ USS America 13-14 Jun 88</td>
<td>WestPac 20 Oct 87 - 26 Apr 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWD Qual MCAS Yuma 19 Aug 88</td>
<td>Red Flag 89-1 5-18 Nov 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTI MCAS Yuma 10 Sep - 27 Oct 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQ USS Coral Sea 8-9 Dec 88</td>
<td>WestPac 3 Apr - 10 Oct 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFTAC Det Yuma 28 Feb - 2 Mar 89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. If we can be of any further assistance, please notify us.

J. D. RIEMER
From: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 2d Marine Division, FMF
To: Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Whitlow USMC

Subj: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Ref: (a) Your ltr undated

1. In accordance with the reference, the following information is provided:

   a. Number of days deployed over the past two years - 301 (of which 20 are days aboard ship).

   b. Number of days between returning from UDP and the next training deployment - 64.

   c. POC WO Wangler Autovon 484-1519.

   By direction
From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines
2d Marine Division, FMF, Camp Lejeune, NC 28542-5513

To: Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Whitlow, USMC, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5522

Subj: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

1. In response to your letter, I took the liberty of including our deployed days from September of 1987 to avoid splitting a deployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Depl.</th>
<th>NK DAS</th>
<th>Unit/Det</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>870930-880327</td>
<td>LF6P</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>880826-881014</td>
<td>TW-88</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>881212-881221</td>
<td>Moutaineering</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>890116-890203</td>
<td>Fort A. F. Hill</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>890412-890501</td>
<td>B/C Workup</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>890531-891109</td>
<td>LF6P</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900311-900331</td>
<td>JWTC PANAMA (UNCLASS)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. As you are no doubt aware, the above deployed dates are not the only indicator of high OPTEMPO. In the past two years we also stood 4 1/2 months on air alert and extended periods in the field for MEU SOC work-ups, MCORE preparation and as aggressors for other battalions in addition to normal field operations.

3. I hope the above information can be of assistance to you in your course study.

M. W. SWANSTON
By direction
From: LtCol J. L. Whitlow, U.S. Marine Corps
To: Commanding Officer, M(AW)-533, MCAS, Cherry Point, NC 28533

Subj: Request for Information

Encl: (1) DAS Problem Statement

1. I am one of five Marine students in the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. In the course of our curriculum, we have the opportunity to study some facet of the Defense establishment with a view toward honing analytical skills and providing useful information for decision makers. The enclosure briefly describes my topic. It is a subject that is on the hearts and minds of many unit commanders as they seek ways to minimize the adverse effects of high OPTEMPO on morale and retention within their unit. With the specter of force structure cuts at hand, and the very real possibility that CINC’s will require at least as much forward deployment as in years past, maintaining high morale within our units will require a more analytical view toward developing an appropriate OPTEMPO.

2. In the course of studying this topic, I hope to accomplish the following:
   a. Clarify the problem (if it exists).
   b. Examine feedback mechanisms, and recommend improvements.
   c. Provide recommendations that may minimize adverse effects.

3. One of the feedback possibilities I am examining is a method of averaging accumulated deployed time by unit from data within the MMS system. Your unit is one of eight battalion/squadron sized units I am studying. CMC is retrieving and averaging the data in the system for me. In order to properly analyze the data, however, I need the actual number of deployed days experienced by the unit over the past two years. Accordingly, I am asking for your assistance in providing the following data as it pertains to your battalion/squadron:

   Number of days deployed over the past two years.
   Full unit = \[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} d_i \]
   Detachment = \[ \sum_{j=1}^{m} d_j \]

   Number of days between returning from UDP and the next training deployment. \[ \frac{1}{n} \]

4. Please reply as quickly as you can. Thank you for your assistance. For any clarifying information, please call me at AUTOVOY 875-2122.

Very respectfully,

LtCol J. L. Whitlow
LtCol USMC
From: Commanding Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 231  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HDH-4)  
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 32  
      (2) Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing  
      (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic  

Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 1 JULY 89 - 31 DECEMBER 89  

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1F  
Encl: (1) Command Chronology 1 July 89 - 31 December 89  

1. As per reference (a), the Command Chronology for the period 1  
July 89 - 31 December 89 is submitted as enclosure (1).  

B. M. Trapnell  
B. M. TRAPNELL  

Note: 1. USS E. Tecumseh June  
2. any data noted included 7AD of embarked personal  
3. Rough total estimate  

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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Total 816 days  

Hon. Ken Miller  
George T.
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**SAS SKELETON**

**TABLE OF PRUC BY DEPL_STA**

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**FREQUENCY MISSING = 711**
APPENDIX H
CHAPTER 8
UNIT DIARY REPORTING OF INDIVIDUAL DATA ELEMENTS

8001. INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter contains instructions for reporting individual data elements and certain actions not specifically covered in other chapters.

2. Certain data elements in the JUMPS/MMS computer record are controlled by HQMC and cannot be changed by field RU's. All discrepancies in these data elements (such as differences between OQR/SRB, BIR and BTR) will be reported to the CMC (code indicated below).

   a. Officers

      | DATA ELEMENT                        | CMC CODE |
      |-------------------------------------|----------|
      | Active Naval Service Base Date      | MMPR-1   |
      | Expiration of Active Service       | MRRO-5   |
      | Expiration of Current Contract     | MRRO-5   |
      | Component Code                     | MRRO-5   |
      | Contract Legal Agreement           | MMOA-3   |
      | *Permanent Grade                   | MMPR-1   |
      | Date of Permanent Grade            | MMPR-1   |
      | *Present Grade                      | MMPR-1   |
      | Date of Present Grade              | MMPR-1   |
      | Pay Entry Base Date                | MMRB-10  |
      | Additional Military Occupational   | MMOA     |
      | Specialty (in excess of eight)     | MMOA     |

   *If this item is not in agreement with unit records, first determine if the officer's name appears on a selection list for promotion to the grade indicated. If name does appear, no further action is required. If name does not appear on the selection list, request verification of this/these items per paragraph 8005.

   b. Officers and Enlisted

      | DATA ELEMENT                        | CMC CODE |
      |-------------------------------------|----------|
      | Classification and Language         | NA       |
      | Test Score Data                     |          |

8002. ACCUMULATED DEPLOYED TIME (TIC 013 GROUP D)

1. This data element is designed to be used only by FMF units as identified in MCO 1300.8 and represents the individual Marine's total time in days deployed while charged to an FMF unit. Each ADT entry will adjust the date arrived U.S. where dependents were restricted (DAUSDR) to compensate for periods spent in a deployed status. Periods of ADT of less than 10 days will not be reported or accumulated. ADT may be reported as an individual, group, or event entry.
2. ADT will be reported whenever a Marine, as a member of an FMF unit, deploys for a period of at least 10 consecutive days. However, predeployment liaison units and individual training not associated with unit activity will not be counted as ADT. Specific requirements are prescribed in MCO 1300.8. If the entry is for 270 or more continuous days, or a Marine's cumulative ADT totals at least 365 days, a new DAUSDR is automatically established effective the date of return from deployment. Any days in excess of the required 270 or 365 that remain as ADT will update the new DAUSDR on a 2-day-for-1-day basis. This same 2-for-1 adjustment is made to the DAUSDR for each ADT entry that does not meet the above requirements for establishing a new DAUSDR. A Marine's accrued ADT will be displayed on the BIR. The computer will automatically zero the ADT field whenever a Marine is joined by a non-FMF unit. Do not reenter ADT for a previous command, as the DAUSDR has already been updated. Accumulation towards establishing a new DAUSDR must begin anew.

3. Each period of ADT will be reported on the UD immediately upon return from deployment. The date of action will be the date of return from deployment. The following statement will be used only by FMF RU's to report ADT:

```
   ___________        ____________
  04 DEPLOY FR TO LOC
```

Enter six-digit action date

Enter six-digit begin date

Enter six-digit ending date

Enter name or location where ADT was performed (maximum of 20 alphanumerics characters)

NOTE: The action date of the ADT must be the last day of the ADT period reported. This is critical when the total ADT goes over 365 noncontinuous days, or when 270 continuous days is reported, as the computer will use the action date to establish a new DAUSDR.

4. To delete erroneous information use the following statement and report correct information per instructions in subparagraph 8002.3:

```
  ___________        ____________
  DEL DEPLOY FR TO
```

Enter six-digit action date

Enter six-digit begin date of period to be deleted

Enter six-digit ending date of period to be deleted

5. For Marines not having a DAUSDR, a DAUSDR will be automatically generated by the computer the first time ADT is reported. This constructive DAUSDR will be established by subtracting 5 years from the date that the Marine last entered active duty.

8003. ACTUAL TRAINING COMPLETION DATE (TIC 418 GROUP D)

1. The data element "ACTUAL TRAINING COMPLETION DATE" indicates the date a Marine completed training and qualified for assignment of a primary MOS. The date may be used in conjunction with date joined for training to determine actual training time from recruit graduation to MOS qualification.
DEPLOYMENT MONITORED COMMAND CODE

1. The data element DMCC represents a unit that has been designated as a specific deployment unit with personnel staffing controlled by HQMC. The DMCC is reportable only by HQMC. Any discrepancies regarding the DMCC must be addressed to the CMC (MMEA or MMOA) for resolution.

2. The DMCC remains the specific unique unit identifier for units in the FMF that deploy, and remains in the computer record for the duration of the Marine's tour with the designated unit. This data element can only be entered into the JUMPS/MMS at HQMC via the UD and is not reportable by field units. Generally, the designation of "V-series" MCC's for deployed units are used by HQMC.

DEPLOYMENT STATUS CODE/DEPLOYMENT RETURN DATE (ITC 422 GROUP D)

1. The DSC identifies a Marine's deployment status during a current FMF tour. This data element is used by the CMC (MHOA and MMEA) to determine a Marine's eligibility for assignment and to monitor unit personnel strengths. The DSC identifies Marines who are scheduled for, serving on, have completed, or who are not scheduled to participate in future deployments of at least 5 months duration. If the Marine is nondeployable per the criteria contained in the current edition of MCO P3000.15 (UNITREP SOP), as well as not scheduled, enter the appropriate duty status code per paragraph 8043.

2. Descriptions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>Unknown-DSC/DRD should be reported if Marine is joined to an FMF unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not scheduled for deployment and no deployments completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Scheduled for or serving on first deployment of 5 months or more duration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Completed first deployment of 5 months or more duration, and not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Completed first deployment of 5 months or more and is scheduled for or serving on second deployment of 5 months or more duration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Completed second deployment of 5 months or more duration, and not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Completed second (or greater) deployment of 5 months or more and is scheduled for or serving on third (or greater) deployment of 5 months or more duration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Completed third (or greater) deployment of 5 months or more duration and is not scheduled for any future deployments at this time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The DRD identifies the date of a completed deployment of 5 months or more, or the expected date of return from the current or next deployment of 5 months or more. This data element is also used by HQMC for personnel planning. The following rules apply:

   - If DSC = 0 Then DRD must be zero.
   - If DSC = 1, 3, or 5 Then DRD must be future-dated with the expected date of return.
   - If DSC = 2, 4, or 6 Then DRD must be actual date of return.

4. Use the following statement to report, change, or update the DSC and DRD:

   DEPLOY STAT DSC DRD

   Enter one-digit numeric code from above ---
   Enter six-digit date
5. Use the following statement to clear the DSC/DRD field:

DEPLOY STT 0 ORR 0000001

6. When a Marine's DSC changes from a "not scheduled" status (DSC = 0, 2, 4, or 6) to a scheduled status (DSC = 1, 3, or 5) and has been so reported into JUMPS/MMS, but the Marine then becomes "not scheduled" again, report the old DSC/DRD back into JUMPS/MMS. For example, a Marine's DSC/DRD is DEPLOY STAT 2 ORD 8512011, and has been updated to DEPLOY STAT 3 ORD 8610151. When the Marine becomes "not scheduled" again, report 86130 DEPLOY STAT 2 ORD 8612011.

7. As soon as units who assign personnel TAD to MEU's, or elements of a MEU, become aware of whom they will assign, they will report a DSC/DRD to JUMPS/MMS. They will report the correct DSC for the individual and the expected return date of the MEU to which the Marine is assigned for TAD. This DSC/DRD will, in most cases, be reported well in advance of the TO TAD entry. The DSC/DRD must be reported as soon as personnel are identified as participating in a MEU deployment, with the primary goal of 120 days prior to deployment. If for any reason the identified Marine becomes "not scheduled," update the DSC/DRD per the instructions in paragraph 8038.4.

8039. DISBURSING STATION SYMBOL NUMBER (010 GROUP D)

1. Each RU is provided disbursing service by a designated disbursing station. The disbursing station is identified by a four-digit DSSN. DSSN's are listed in the Navy Comptroller Manual, volume 4, appendix B.

2. A disbursing officer symbol is a five-character symbol used to identify a specific disbursing officer and disbursing station. The prefix continues through the alphabet for each disbursing officer successor at that station. Ensure that the four-character DSSN is reported in UD entries. Do not include the alphabetic prefix which identified the disbursing officer symbol. For example, A6091 represents the disbursing officer and station providing service to Headquarters Battalion, HMC. For UD entries, report 6091.

3. Pay accounts of all Marines of a single unit normally are maintained by the same disbursing station. However, some personnel of a unit on TAD, maneuvers, and so forth, may be provided service by a different disbursing station. When these conditions exist, the DSSN must be reported for personnel who are affected. When reporting a JOIN entry, DSSN must be reported if the unit is served by more than one disbursing station. DSSN is not required in the JOIN entry if all Marines of the unit are provided service by the same disbursing station.

4. DSSN changes must be reported by a UD EVENT entry. The change will update the JUMPS/MMS computer tables for the RUC and the primary MCC and all additional MCC's with the same DSSN as the primary MCC. If any additional MCC(s) are assigned to the RUC with a different DSSN, those MCC's will not be affected by the reported DSSN change. A separate EVENT entry must be submitted for any additional MCC's with a different DSSN than the primary MCC.

5. When a Marine is joined or attached excess, the joining or attaching entry effects appropriate changes in the Marine's DSSN. When in addition to a join or attach entry, a DSSN change is reported on a specific Marine, it will require another DSSN change to return the Marine's DSSN to that serving the permanent RUC upon termination of TAD/excess.

6. A record of event entry reporting activation, redesignation, reorganization, or relocation of a unit must include the DSSN and the effective date. See chapter 7, for instructions and examples.

7. DSSN and effective date are reported with the statement shown below. If DSSN is unknown, it may be obtained by contacting the disbursing station.
Proposed Problem Statement for Defense Analytical Study

Whitlow, James L.

List names of other students, if any, who are working on this study:

None

Enter the tentative title of your work, as you think it may appear on your final product:

MINIMIZING THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF OPTEMPO ON MORALE AND RETENTION (USMC)

Using double spacing, type or write your entire problem statement as specifically as you can:

**Problem Statement:**

**Background:** The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps requires a high OPTEMPO in terms of training exercises and forward deployment. Many communities within the Corps are averaging 50-60% time away from home base with no end in sight. This has an obvious impact on morale and retention of those enlisted personnel who have MOS’s within certain communities. Especially those MOS’s with little application outside of the high tempo tactical units they are in.

**Problem:** How much is too much (within a tour - within a career)? In the eyes of the enlisted personnel in question, how is this OPTEMPO measured? Are there aspects of a Marine’s service life that could be changed to minimize the adverse effect? In the development of unit training plans or service career patterns, is there an OPTEMPO point beyond which a commander must be aware that he is possibly sacrificing morale for unit training and expertise? Is there a “rule of thumb” that can be developed to identify that point?

The thrust of this project is to attempt, not only to answer the questions, but also examine existing “feedback” processes with a view toward making them more responsive.