LIEUTENANTS PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AN INSTITUTIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL (I/O) AND OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT (OPD) CONTEXT

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1990

AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
January 1990
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Lieutenants Professional Development in an Institutional/Occupational (I/O) and Officer Professional Development (OPD) Context

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This paper examines the Air Force officer corps in terms of the needs of its junior officers for a grounding in officership. It validates the I/O concept of military professionalism and compares it with recent trends in the Air Force to combat careerism that have been codified under the term OPD.

The paper evaluates the degree of institutionalism among junior Air Force officers and attempts to discover what mechanisms exist to draw them away from institutionalism and toward a more occupational outlook. The relationship of OPD to I/O is discussed and lieutenants development programs are compared among the four Services.

The paper concludes that, while OPD made a major contribution toward moving the Air Force officer corps away from careerism, it missed the mark in terms of institutionalizing lieutenants. Subtle changes in emphasis in OPD are necessary to counter this, and an initiative originally recommended by the OPD Working Group but not approved, should be reconsidered.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Ullman has been an education and training officer for most of his twenty year career. His interest and expertise in the military education of junior officers stems from assignments as a faculty member at Squadron Officer School and at West Virginia University where he was selected the outstanding Air Force ROTC instructor in the nation for 1979.

Colonel Ullman has been intimately involved in the concept of Officer Professional Development (OPD) from its inception in August 1987, when he was selected to be a member of the OPD Working Group chartered by the Chief of Staff, USAF. As the member most acquainted with education issues, he was responsible for many of the OPD initiatives in the area of professional military education.

Colonel Ullman’s education and training experience also includes command of a basic military training squadron, and assignments as Assistant Chief of Staff at Air University headquarters and Chief of the Professional Education Programs Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF.

Colonel Ullman is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, and holds a bachelors degree in History from Rutgers University and masters degrees in College Student Administration from New York University and Public Administration from Auburn University-Montgomery. He is currently a student at the Air War College.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In August 1987, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Larry D. Welch, approved the creation of the Officer Professional Development (OPD) Working Group under the auspices of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel. This group, headed by the Deputy Director of Personnel Plans, was directed to work in tandem with the Officer Evaluation System (OES) Group formed earlier at the Air Force Military Personnel Center to examine and to recommend changes to those institutional processes in the Air Force personnel and education systems that promoted "careerism" over "professionalism."

Though the resulting changes were ambitious and beneficial, they missed the mark in one important area—the institutionalizing of newly commissioned officers. The OPD Group concentrated both on reducing careerism and on promoting professionalism, but may not have devoted enough effort to defining the latter. The result was that certain initiatives critical to the overall effort were not approved. Had the case for these initiatives been made more strongly and presented in the context of a sociologically recognized construct such as Moskos' institutional/occupational (I/O) thesis, the result may have been different.

The unease with careerism that spawned OPD was not new in 1987. The tendency for Air Force officers to "map out" careers to "fill the squares" necessary for advancement—early Professional
Military Education (PME), selection for the Air Staff Training Program (ASTRA), a masters degree, major command or Air Staff jobs as early as possible—was evident in the 1970s. In fact, an Air Force-wide study late in the decade (Impact 77) identified some disturbing tendencies in this direction and suggested some causes. They included: changes in society at large, the normal effects of ending a war, the impact of the McNamara era, a concern at all levels over erosion of benefits, and a loss of the leadership's self-esteem through Vietnam criticism, including the over-centralization that resulted (1:36-38). Some senior leaders at the time, notably General Wilbur Creech, commander of Tactical Air Command, decided to attack the last cause. His philosophy of pushing decisions down to the lowest possible level and instilling a sense of pride and ownership in small, unit-level teams spread during the early 1980s. General Welch took this philosophy with him when he became Chief of Staff in 1986.

The detrimental effects of careerism were recognized by officers outside the Air Force. In August 1986, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Roger A. Wrolstad wrote that reform, whatever its source, should be directed at "...one common human characteristic that has a disastrous effect on the military's ability to perform in battle—careerism." He called it the "taproot of military disintegration." (2:26)

Wrolstad blamed careerism on three things: the conservative nature of soldiering which is characterized by resistance to change; modern materialistic society which requires tangible evidence of success, and, most of all, the peacetime system itself, "...in which careerists soon realize that
advancement is assisted by their ability to create an illusion of professional competence..." through artificial measures. He went on to list four major effects of careerism that erode military effectiveness: cronyism and a struggle to attach oneself to a "sponsor," becoming a syncophant in the process; superficiality, where complex ideas and hard choices are reduced to cliches, and style triumphs over substance; personal aggrandizement above that which is normally associated with rank and status; and selective accountability with loyalty to superiors or one's career rather than to the institution. (2:26)

Wrolstad recommended a treatment that begins with a recognition of the problem and then applies a Service-wide regimen from the highest levels down to the grassroots. This was precisely the way General Welch approached the problem in the Air Force with the OPD and OES Groups in 1987-88.

The OPD Group made 25 recommendations from assignment and utilization policy to military education. These were presented to General Welch on 12 January 1988. He subsequently took the OPD initiatives to two CORONA meetings of the Air Force senior leadership to get major command reaction, and also directed they be presented to the Air Force Council. The majority of the initiatives were approved and implemented by the appropriate functional offices of primary responsibility beginning in 1989.
CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHY OF OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The philosophy behind OPD is grounded in the idea that it is better for the Air Force (or any military Service), and therefore better for the nation, if its corps of officers behaves in ways that support larger, institutional goals in peace as well as in war. But what kinds of behavior characterize this "institutional" orientation? What kinds of behavior are "anti-institutional?"

A general answer to the first question can be found in popular American culture. The public we serve knows what "service" means when it comes to the military. The following quotes (3:311) illustrate the point:

They looked upon themselves as men who lived by higher standards of behavior than civilians, as men who were bearers and protectors of the most important values of American life, who maintained a sense of discipline while civilians abandoned themselves to hedonism, who maintained a sense of honor while civilians lived by opportunism and greed.

from The Right Stuff

I go anywhere in the world they tell me to go, any time they tell me to, to fight anybody they want me to fight. I move my family anywhere they tell me to move, on a day's notice, and live in whatever quarters they assign me. I work whenever they tell me to work...I don't belong to a union and I don't strike if I don't like what they're doing to me. And I like it. Maybe that's the difference.

from A Country Such as This

The opposite of this selfless dedication to service is a kind of freedom available only to civilians. It is not necessarily
the freedom to live by hedonism, opportunism or greed, but the freedom to behave in ways that are motivated by more self-serving stimuli--money, comfort, personal power and prestige. In the civil sector this comes from the world of work, from the occupation. In general, we judge success in an occupational sense by how well we perform the specialized tasks associated with the occupation. Does this mean that the concepts of institutionalism and occupationalism are mutually exclusive; that the perfect military man is unconcerned with occupational expertise and the successful civilian has no institutional loyalty or values? We characterize both as professionals, but what do we mean by that? What mix of institution and occupation is the best in the military profession and how do we decide which behavior falls into which category?

Charles Moskos introduced the institutional/occupational (I/O) thesis in 1977. To Moskos, "An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good." (C:16) Members of an institution see themselves following a calling, being apart from the rest of society, functioning in a culture under rules that are unique. They identify primarily with those who share this uniqueness, regardless of what tasks each performs in support of the institution. They are motivated by internal and intrinsic rewards and compensated largely "in-kind."

On the other hand, "An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace. Supply and demand...are paramount." (C:17) Members of an occupational group see themselves as sharing a set of skills and tasks designed to accomplish certain definable ends. They have some say in compensation and working conditions (usually
through unions) and determine their relative value in terms of skill in the specialty. They are motivated by extrinsic rewards such as pay and identify more with like specialists outside the employing organization than with the interests of the organization itself or its other members in other specialties.

Beginning in the 1960s, the American military was recast by a Department of Defense oriented toward systems analysis and econometrics. (4:290) The effectiveness of the military Services has been analyzed in the same way as has the cost-effectiveness of organizations in the private sector. (5:15) In addition, there has been considerable pressure for military compensation to move away from internal rewards like on-base housing, exchanges, commissaries, comprehensive medical care, and non-appropriated fund activities such as open messes toward monetary rewards with emphasis on cash bonuses for those with particular occupational skills. (5:200)

This orientation, coupled with strong societal trends, helped move the military away from its traditional institutional and paternalistic way of life and brought it into the occupational civilian mainstream in several ways. The requirements of equal opportunity for minorities and women resulted in more centralized decision-making as well. This trend toward centralization was also aided by the explosion in the automated management of information in the past two decades. The All Volunteer Force made the Services market themselves in ways they felt could compete with civilian employers (with the notable exception of the Marine Corps). (5:17) Congressional support for the military was also easier to obtain when arguments were couched in terms of the market place. (5:15)
Simple desire on the part of military members for "the better things in life" put more and more military spouses to work, and military families who lived, worked, worshipped, shopped, and socialized off-base became more common. While some of these trends have been slowed in the 1980s, the nature of American society is such that they are not likely to go away.

Beginning with Samuel Huntington in the 1950's, sociologists studying the military have recognized that the massive interface between the military and society at large that characterized World War II profoundly changed the nature of the United States professional military. Even before 1941, the American military tradition included a strong military-civil relationship. Eschewing large standing professional armies, the United States relied on the civil sector to provide the troops to fight its wars beginning with the local militias of the Revolution. Therefore, in order for the modern military to meet its manpower needs with high quality recruits and officer candidates and to represent and defend American values, it must reflect the larger society. However, the effectiveness of the military lies, to a great extent, with its level of professionalism—"...the obligation to serve the general interest... instead of, rather than in addition to, one's own self-interest." (6:40).

Since we are not a militaristic society, we cannot expect the civilian world to provide recruits who already have (or even understand) the professional military perspective. We must protect the unique aspects of our institution from dilution in the society in which we are immersed.
The infusion of...people with moral and ethical backgrounds that may differ considerably from military concepts of ethics and morality can erode professional effectiveness and cohesiveness. For these reasons, the profession must set clear moral and ethical patterns linked with the best patterns in society. (6:2)

Also, because it is not the military's job to change society, we must accept the burden of socializing new members while not allowing ourselves to become isolated from society at large.

The real issues are...the intensity and extensiveness of the civil-military interface and the moral and ethical codes that society provides for the profession." "Thus, the moral and ethical patterns of the military profession must be linked with society on the one hand and stem from the unique purpose of the profession on the other. (6:9)

Perhaps then, a certain amount of occupationalism in the military is inevitable. Should we be concerned with it? Does it actually hurt the institution and the nation? If so, just how much of it can we stand?
CHAPTER III

EFFECT ON THE MISSION

The traditional military picture of a tight-knit, highly professional and altruistic team like that described in the quote from The Right Stuff has been the ideal for centuries. This type of military institution, all other things being equal, has always been more effective than a mass of individuals collected temporarily for the purpose of conducting a war. Even in the modern age of citizen armies pioneered by the levee en masse at the end of the eighteenth century there was a highly cohesive officer corps to hold the troops together and motivate them to make the ultimate sacrifice. Battles have doubtless been won both by sheer force of numbers in men and material and by brilliant generalship alone, but when both sides are evenly matched in terms of tangible assets, it seems reasonable to expect the army with the greater institutional identification to have the superior commitment to win.

A danger with placing too much reliance on occupational motivators to perform a military mission is that these purely extrinsic rewards "...may create behavior that will not be performed in the future except for even greater extrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards, moreover, can weaken intrinsic motivation." (3:5) In the extreme, this could mean that a military member, used to monetary reward for performing a critical task, might refuse to perform that
task if outside forces reduced or eliminated the reward. This is even more likely in peacetime, when the immediate consequences of such dollar-driven behavior do not appear to directly affect the security of the nation. Losing these people and/or their motivation would have a very real effect on readiness.

Some sociologists feel that an I/O orientation may explain attrition rates. (3:34) Members who identify more with a specialty than with the institution will respond to economic incentives and leave the military as long as they perceive the greener grass is on the outside. While officers with an institutional perspective are less likely to respond to these temptations, they too can be driven away by occupationalism. Though willing to accept a great deal of personal inconvenience or even hardship for the institution, they may be disillusioned if they feel their Service is responding too much to occupational trends. When they no longer see their way of viewing the organization as predominant or valued, they may either become occupational themselves and open to economic incentives from civilian society, or decide the organization no longer values what they value and leave in disgust. "In a private enterprise society, the military establishment could not hold its most creative talents without the binding force of service traditions, professional identification, and honor." (7:422).

A computer assisted telephone interview survey done in 1988 under the sponsorship of HQ USAF/DPXA showed a relationship between career intent of officers and their degree of institutionalism. Those with intentions of making the Air Force a career had a 59% institutional preference while those who were noncareer had only a 28% preference (8).
Finally, excessive occupationalism and identification with the civilian sector can deprive the United States of the extremely valuable opinion of its professional military. If the military leadership eventually functions and thinks like the larger society, who will advocate the uniquely military point of view when critical decisions on national policy must be made? Even if we cannot expect a high level of institutionalism in the entire military establishment, we must have an officer corps to lead it that is as institutional as we can make it.
CHAPTER IV

THE INSTITUTIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL THESIS IN THE AIR FORCE

The I/O thesis is particularly relevant to the Air Force because of its reliance on technological specialization as well as its relatively short history and subsequent dearth of tradition.

According to Frank R. Wood, the Air Force and its officer corps, "...because of their extensive use of technology,...tend to be most susceptible to increasing specialization and a diffused sense of purpose...They face the greatest pressure for occupationalism..." (3:27) This is not a recent phenomenon and can, in fact, be traced back to the Air Force's earliest years.

The Air Force was conceived around new technology. The airplane was only two decades old when the officers at the Air Corps Tactical School began to develop the doctrine upon which the arguments for a separate Air Force were based—the decisive effects of strategic bombing. The conceptual thought of Douhet was given practical life in the 1930s by technology: a strategic bomber that could outfight any enemy in the air (the Boeing B-17) and a bombsight that could deliver the ordnance directly on the "industrial web" (the Norden). In the 1950s, to match the technology that gave it life and meaning, the Air Force consciously identified itself with the American corporate structure, even designing a uniform that looks like a military business suit compared to that of our parent Service, the Army. This tendency is
mentioned by Maj Gen Jeanne Holm, USAF (Ret) in another context when speaking about the Defense Department in 1949, she says that the Air Force, "...by its own admission resembled a large industrial organization more than did its sister military services." (9:138) Morris Janowitz, writing in 1960, saw a danger in this as he compared the leaders who had come out of World War II with those of the future.

The Air Force, in particular, as constituted at the end of the 1950-60 decade, was confronted with the deepest crisis. Its organization was dominated by heroic leaders, who had risen to the top by accumulating managerial (broad leadership) skill. The imbalance of the future will come from the larger concentration of military technologists who will rise to the very top. (7:426)

Wood describes surveys of Air Force officers since the late 1970s in which close to half consistently think of themselves as specialists working in the military rather than military professionals. The 40-50% who think of themselves as military professionals tend to have what Wood calls "officer identities." While I do not agree that all of these are characteristic of an institutional orientation, most are. They include: viewing the military as a way of life, not a job; accepting that personal interests must take a back seat to operational requirements; seeing Air Force people as *spur*; living on, rather than off, base; planning to remain in the Air Force for at least 20 years. (3:32) The military involvement of people with a predominance of these officer identities "...is value oriented, broad based, and long term." (3:33) They are heavily involved in the military subculture and much less so in the civilian community. "Home" is where they are assigned. Spouses are not heavily involved in the civilian work world.
Their peers without these officer identities place primary importance on their specialty and the satisfaction of doing it well. Their limited social interaction in the military context is reserved for those who do what they do. They identify with and plan to join civilians who perform their specialty, particularly when drawn by extrinsic rewards. Interested primarily in their specialty, they resent being asked to perform other, unrelated tasks such as administration, management, or supervision. From an I/O perspective, a preponderance of these officers does not bode well for the leaner, tighter Air Force of the future.

Many members will become extremely specialized, and the body of knowledge which is common to all will diminish. Each will instead be interested only in that information which assists him in maintaining his own expertise. If this happens, then what will become of the sense of corporateness embodied in the military? (10:10–11)
SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL SURVEY

In 1986 Squadron Officer School (SOS) began surveying newly arrived students on the subject of professionalism to provide a basis for a seminar on officership later in the program. They added questions designed to categorize the respondents to others devised by Moskos and Wood (3:293–6) to indicate a preference for institutionalism or occupationalism. While the survey has been revised once during the last three years, the I/O questions have remained essentially the same.

I selected 20 of these questions and examined the answers of almost 5000 respondents over the past 3 years (Appendix 1). The respondents all indicated having five or less years of active service when they filled out the survey and were therefore all lieutenants or junior captains at the end of their "formation commissioning years." They included various sources of commission (19% USAFA, 42.2% AFROTC, 23.1% UTS, 8.7% other) and were both rated (21.6% pilots, 15.6% navigators) and nonrated (62.3%). Married officers were in the majority (54.6%). With the exception of question 126 which asked about career intent, the survey items I selected all had possible answers that indicated an I/O orientation. Some related to preferences for specific things (rewards, lifestyle, etc.), while others asked the respondent to identify with an idea or a value or with others who share an idea or value.
The results show a generally more institutional identification than an occupational one. More respondents chose an institutional answer on 14 questions and preferred an occupational answer on only 5. However, though the majority seems more institutional, there is enough occupationalism to cause concern. For example, while a slight majority agree that duty always comes before personal or family consequences and an unwanted assignment should be accepted (questions 117 and 119), more than a quarter do not think so. An institution that depends on duty always coming first can hardly expect to function if only half its leadership can agree with these statements. Similarly, the responses to questions about the separation of off-duty from on-duty activity (questions 118, 124, and 138) show a sizeable minority (up to 30%) who do not feel they are officers 24 hours a day.

When questioned about preferences between traditionally military factors and those more a part of the civil sector, the officers did not always prefer the institutional answer. In the area of pay vs benefits 28.7% would like their benefits turned into dollars, 55.8% would not live on base even if economics did not play, almost 40% could not give unequivocal support to joining an officer's club, and when asked what factors would be most or least influential in keeping them in the Air Force, more chose the occupational option in the areas of base pay, nonpay benefits, and job security based on promotion opportunity.

Other questions asked the respondents to categorize themselves by association. When asked which of three groups they most identified with, only 25.4% (the smallest number) chose the institutional answer—the Air Force officer corps. The most popular
choice was the most occupational—people in one's career field (39.3%). Although pilots were only slightly less institutional than the overall group of respondents on most questions, they differed most markedly on this question with almost 63% identifying most closely with those in their specialty. In the same vein, the survey introduced Moskos' concepts of "calling," "profession," and "occupation," and asked the officers where they thought they stood. The responses must be considered in the context of the definitions provided in the survey. While it was clear that "calling" and "occupation" are opposite extremes, the definition of "profession" was open to interpretation. While much of the literature on the subject says there is such a thing as the military professional who practices the art and science of war, it is unlikely that the definition provided in the SOS survey conveyed this meaning. The survey definition used terms like "special expertise" and "a skill level (following) intensive...training." To most officers in the early stages of their careers, these terms probably bring career specialty to mind.

Therefore, the answers to the three questions that deal with these concepts show very weak institutional identity. Only 41% think "calling" should characterize an officer. The reality is even worse. Only 20.3% feel their own behavior falls into this category. The results for pilots are lower. While it is apparent that these junior officers have not totally rejected the unique institutional aspects of the profession of arms, they may be unsure about just what a professional officer is supposed to be. They also seem to be unwilling to accept the institutional "ties that bind" without at least evaluating them first in a civilian, occupational context.
CHAPTER VI

THE GOALS OF OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

General Welch committed the Air Force to OPD in 1988 to address the erosion of officer professionalism and dedication to service described at least partly by the I/O thesis. Among other things, OPD was designed to encourage Air Force officers to behave in a way that puts the institution ahead of the individual and permits them to apply the military's special expertise in support of national security objectives. But, as Huntington asks, "What is the specialized expertise of the military officer? Is there any skill common to all...and yet not shared with any civilian group?" (11:11) What makes the military officer's profession unique and relates it to the institutionalism that promotes cohesiveness and effectiveness?

"At first glance...the officer corps appears to contain many varieties of specialists, including large numbers which have their counterparts in civilian life. Engineers, doctors, pilots, ordnance experts, personnel experts, intelligence experts, communications experts—all these are found both within and without the modern officer corps... Yet a distinct sphere of military competence does exist which is common to all, or almost all, officers and which distinguishes them from all, or almost all, civilians. This central skill is...the management of violence." (11:11)

If indeed the management of violence (as opposed to its execution) is an expertise or competence that most military officers must have and that expertise or competence is exercised best in an institutional environment, OPD should be designed to recognize this
common sphere and build the institutional perspective that supports it. Although this was one of the underlying aims of the OPD Working Group, its charter was limited to only those institutional processes embodied in the Air Force officer personnel and education systems.

The OPD philosophy, now officially articulated in AFR 36-23, attempted to place the institution and its mission first, using a professional officer corps whose abilities and effectiveness vary with seniority.

Professional development includes those actions and experiences that enhance an officer's ability to perform his or her job and thereby contribute to the mission of the Air Force as level of responsibility increases. (12:1-2)

An officer's professional development involves gaining the necessary depth and breadth of experience to improve performance and potential..."The most important indicator of potential is the way the officer performs daily in his or her job. This performance includes the quality of the specific work...and...more universal qualities the officer possesses. (12:1-3)

Under OPD, the "depth" mentioned above is the primary objective of the company grade years and involves training and "work that enhances (both) career-specific professional competence and provides opportunities to develop leadership abilities." (12:1-1a)

"Breadth" involves experiences outside the specific career area and normally includes career-broadening and staff assignments. It is most appropriate for senior majors and Lt colonels and only rarely for captains. Colonels require a balance of depth and breadth with a wide range of leadership experience and skills.

While the above describes the assignment context of OPD, the role of professional military education (PME) is to "parallel and support the requirements of appropriate jobs." It should
...build upon a solid foundation of officership laid during precommissioning. The uniqueness of the profession and the particular values and culture of the military officer corps are the bedrock on which all future professional development is based. The focus for company grade officers should be on developing the skills needed to enhance their career specific competence, to include officer leadership. Therefore, leadership and communication skills are paramount, and are a primary focus of the Squadron Officer School, the Air Force’s company grade PME. While building on the foundation laid by earlier instruction, the focus for the field grades and, therefore, of Intermediate Service School should shift somewhat to the effective management of people and resources as well as those skills required for effective staff work. Lieutenant colonels and colonels must understand not only the skills taught in earlier PME, but also the elements of aerospace force employment and the policy considerations that drive them. This is the role of the highest level of PME, Senior Service School. In the final analysis, the appropriate role of PME in officer professional development is the right PME at the right time with the right focus. (12:1-3c)

At first glance the OPD philosophy and role of PME seem consistent with the goal of enhancing institutionalism in the Air Force. However, a comparison between the OPD philosophy as originally written by the OPD Working Group and the words that now appear in AFR 36-23 is troubling.

When discussing the "most important indicator of potential" (the behavior for which the officer will be rewarded), AFR 36-23 identifies daily job performance, which includes "the quality of the specific work" as well as "more universal qualities the officer possesses." The original intent of the OPD Group was that the Air Force should reward both performance of duty (rather than peripheral activities or "square-filling") coupled with the officership attributes common to the profession of arms which the OPD Group called "universal officer qualities." This carries a different connotation than "universal qualities an officer
possesses" which could include qualities not exclusive to the military profession.

When describing the appropriate professional activities of a company grade officer, the OPD Group wished to convey the equal importance of career-specific competence and leadership qualities common to all officers. In AFR 36-23, this became "career-specific professional competence" and "leadership abilities." The addition of the adjective "professional" implies that it is the specialty that makes one a professional, not membership in the officer corps. The substitution of "abilities" for "qualities" implies that leadership in a military context is a menu of skills rather than the virtual way of life it should be for a military professional.

While these differences may not seem very important, they indicate a denigration of the value of more universal officerhip qualities, particularly at the junior level, in favor of an emphasis on skill-specific performance. In other words, while OPD's overall goals are institutional, it seems to contradict itself with respect to the officer with less than four years commissioned service. Officership is treated as a worthy foundation to be taught prior to commissioning, but is then moved to the back burner while the officer concentrates on learning an occupational skill.
CHAPTER VII

THE FORMATIVE COMMISSIONED YEARS

Most of us believe we form the bulk of our personalities very early in life. The same can be said for those who aspire to be military officers. Officer candidates bring preconceived ideas about the military into Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC), the USAF Academy (USAFA), and Officer Training School (OTS); but these ideas are modified by the education and experience that follow. OPD recognizes that one of the most important functions of all precommissioning programs is to instill in the potential officer a sense of what the commission really means. This focus on the responsibilities of officership is appropriate for the precommissioning level because it is fundamental to all that follows and must be instilled early, so that subsequent experiences can be seen through the appropriate lens.

AFROTC, USAFA, and OTS are similar but not identical. The relative length of the courses and the military vs civilian environment are major variables. Curricula are broadly standardized through the Commissioning Education Memorandum of Understanding, and all three programs teach some form of Air Force organization and structure, national security issues, management/leadership, professional knowledge (location/function of base services, etc), officership, Air Force history and traditions, and communicative skills.
The OPD Group recommended a critical review of all curricula to remove information that might promote careerism, such as the promotion system beyond the company grades, career development emphasizing selection to colonel as the minimum successful career, etc. This information was to be replaced with a concentration on the company grades—depth in the career specialty and developing leadership qualities. However, the OPD Group felt that precommissioning can best support OPD by developing the correct mindset in new officers—one that orients them toward behavior that emphasizes the institution rather than the individual.

The essence of the OPD recommendations for precommissioning programs was that the focus of all must be on officership, on developing a self-image or state of mind that recognized the unique roles and responsibilities of the professional commissioned officer. This included an emphasis on service vice self (a calling, not a job), fewer rights and more responsibilities than a civilian executive (being subject to both military and civil courts, fraternization), leadership over management, the importance of teamwork, the responsibilities of command, and recognition that one is an officer first and a specialist second. The OPD Group agreed that the basis of officership lies with values and traditions established in military history, embodied in military leaders of the past, and forged in war. Other subjects would continue to be taught, but officership was to be the central theme at the entry level.

A related initiative recommended that recruiting emphasis be focused on what the applicant could do for the Air Force, not the other way around. Academic measures should be complemented by
measures of adaptability to military life through personality characteristics like altruism, integrity, etc.

Colonel Wayne Gosnell complained a decade ago that the Air Force was making occupationalists of its junior officers, but he did not blame the precommissioning programs. He believed that the best officership education could not possibly lay the necessary groundwork for an institutional outlook unless it took place in a real world military context.

...the precommissioning programs can at best...plant the seeds from which professional, dedicated, competent military officers develop. The feeding and nurturing which allows this development to take place must be done during the first few years of active military service. It is during these years that the young officer moves from the classroom and theory to the 'real' Air Force and begins to learn what his profession is all about... (13:2)

By "profession" Gosnell did not mean flying an airplane (although he himself was a military pilot) or programming a computer. To him, professional expertise is gained through Huntington's two phases of professional education: "the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background, and the second imparting the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession." (11:9) However, the specialized skills referred to by Huntington do not mean occupational skills, since these do not define the profession of arms. "The second...phase of professional education...is given in special institutions operated by or affiliated with the profession itself." (11:9) These educational institutions are not flying or technical training schools, they are PME schools.

The first phase of education to gain professional competence should take place in college (one of the reasons every
commissioned officer must be a college graduate) and in precommissioning programs. Unfortunately, the Air Force's perceived need for technically specialized degrees for many career fields significantly narrows commissioning opportunities for those with a broader, less technical college education. "...specialized career patterns can detract from (Huntington's) first phase of expertise (and therefore) ...military persons might neglect to obtain the broad background necessary to serve as the foundation for expertise." (10:10)

Gosnell relates that he was constantly reminded, both before and after commissioning in the early 60s, that he was an officer first and a pilot second. He suspected that, in 1980, most young pilots saw their roles in reverse. In an effort to get some anecdotal evidence for his contention in 1989, I asked several junior captains at various bases what they list as their occupation or profession on their IRS form 1040. While the vast majority of support officers wrote "Air Force officer" or "military officer," all the pilots but one wrote "pilot," "Air Force pilot," or "fighter pilot."

Gosnell places the blame for this over-identification with Air Force specialty on "...the almost total emphasis placed upon occupationalist performance during (the) first few years of service."

The Air Force takes a young college graduate, gives him a commission as a second lieutenant, places him in a work environment that is almost totally occupationally oriented, and then is surprised five or six years later when that officer looks upon the Air Force as an occupation and lacks dedication and commitment to the Air Force as an institution and a profession. (13:14)
He went on to complain that,

...from the first day of the young officer's career on active duty Air Force education and development is oriented almost exclusively toward the requisite technical skills (i.e. job or occupational skills) while sadly neglecting the development of professional knowledge or the corporate profession of arms. (13:16-17)

Now, ten years later, OPD seems to have legitimized that complaint.

While OPD emphasizes depth development for company grade officers in policy documents, it also rewards it very directly. The OES is a part of OPD which is highly performance oriented. Although the performance that is evaluated on both the Performance Feedback Worksheet and the company grade Officer Performance Report (OPR) includes areas related to officership, the emphasis is on specialty skills. (Appendix 2) The forms ask the rater to evaluate leadership in terms of how well the ratee "sets and enforces standards, works well with others, fosters teamwork, displays initiative, and (is) confident in (his/her) own ability," and rate professional qualities to the extent that the officer "exhibits loyalty, discipline, dedication, integrity, and honesty, adheres to Air Force standards, accepts personal responsibility, and is fair and objective." However, these evaluations on the OPR are simply "pass/fail." The officer either meets the standard (the vast majority) or does not. The parts of the OPR which truly communicate are sections IV, VI, and VII.

Sections II and III describe the mission of the unit to which the ratee belongs and the job the ratee performs in support of that mission. These descriptions set the stage for section IV which is titled "Impact on Mission Accomplishment," which is "...designed
specifically...to document performance unique to...primary duties."

(14:19) While this type of performance is again mentioned in the instructions for sections VI "Rater Overall Assessment" and section VII "Additional Rater Overall Assessment," there is no specific guidance on other types of performance that demonstrate purely officer qualities. This despite the fact that paragraph 3-3.d. in the OES regulation (AFR 36-10) says "DPRs are assessments of both duty performance and performance as an officer..." However, the very next entry, paragraph 3-3.e., adds "DPRs document each officer's unique qualities and abilities as demonstrated in job performance" and fails to identify any other kind. (14:18)

None of these rules prohibit comments that evaluate the ratee's officer'ship as long as the comments do not touch on some prohibited area. Nevertheless, from the policy guidance in AFR 36-10 to the fact that "Job Knowledge" comes ahead of both "Leadership Skills" and Professional Qualities" on both forms, the perception that the OES is designed to reward specialty performance in the company grade officer above all else is clear.

The reasons behind this approach to evaluation are understandable. Evaluation based on "ticket-punching" or "square-filling" activities unrelated to the appropriate pursuits of a junior officer are discouraged by the OES as they should be. Unfortunately, it leaves little room to evaluate the officer on how well he or she knows and values the profession of arms. These things could be assessed on the Promotion Recommendation Form (PRF), but they will not be if the officer making the recommendation believes depth development is the only laudable activity for a
lieutenant or captain. Finally, what goes on a PRF means little to an officer in the formative years, because the first truly competitive promotion does not come until the majors board.

Nevertheless, one might legitimately ask why the precommissioning programs cannot provide a strong enough officership foundation to weather the occupational storms of the formative commissioned years? The answers lie in diversity and time.

While the three programs have generally standardized curricula, they have too little in common to guarantee the same preparation to every second lieutenant. USAFA conducts its precommissioning instruction in an essentially military context over a four year period, interspersing officership instruction with academic instruction. Without arguing the merits of the academic curriculum (technological vs liberal) the Academy has the best opportunity to develop a solid professional foundation in officership. OTS has the military environment, but must do its job in only 12 weeks. It shares an advantage with USAFA in that graduates of both programs usually go directly onto active duty (albeit formal training and not the "real" Air Force).

AFROTC produces the largest number of officers. Its major weaknesses are the overwhelmingly civilian context in which the instruction is given (except at schools like Texas A&M, Norwich, and the Citadel) and diversity of instruction from detachment to detachment.

Despite the fact that lesson plans are the same for all, the relative isolation of AFROTC units (including multiple field training locations) make total uniformity of instruction difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, the message the officer candidate
receives on officership is as much a function of the individual AFROTC instructor as it is of AFROTC as a whole.

Finally, AFROTC graduates have, in the recent past, been subjected to delays of several months before being allowed to come on active duty. These delays, coupled with up to a year of flying or technical training, put a great deal of distance between the officership instruction in the precommissioning program and the first taste of the operational Air Force.
According to current OPD guidance, an officer's first formal professional education outside his or her specialty comes at the first tier of PME. The OPD initiatives with respect to PME were conceived and presented originally as an integrated four-tier program built on the foundation provided by the precommissioning initiatives.

This PME philosophy of building on the foundation laid by precommissioning education was official policy in the pre-OPD three-tier system. Squadron Officer School (SOS) was for first lieutenants and junior captains, offered a 54% opportunity in residence with correspondence available, and was focused primarily on leadership. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) was for majors (though, until recently, captains were eligible for nonresident enrollment), offered around a 20% opportunity in residence (combined with other intermediate service schools) through a central selection process tied to promotion with correspondence and seminar available, and was focused primarily on warfare studies and resource management. Air War College (AWC) was for lieutenant colonels and colonels, offered about a 12% opportunity in residence (combined with other senior service schools) using a central selection process with correspondence and seminar available, and was focused primarily on aerospace doctrine and strategy.
OPD divided the officer corps into four relatively distinct phases with different education needs: newly commissioned officers needing solid grounding in officership, company grade officers needing the leadership qualities necessary to carry out their jobs through supervision, field grade officers (defined as majors and lieutenant colonels) needing the knowledge and perspective to add breadth through career-broadening assignments such as staff jobs, and colonels needing an ability to think in even broader and more global terms in order to prepare themselves to develop strategy and plan for and conduct the employment of aerospace forces in war.

The OPD recommendations for PME were based on these educational needs and assumed all officers would complete all phases of PME at the appropriate times. The OPD Group recommended changes in all three current PME levels and added a fourth to bridge the gap between precommissioning and SOS.

Assuming lieutenants have acquired a foundation of officership that can survive the necessarily narrow emphasis on skill development characteristic of the formative period, the proper role of PME for captains is to teach leadership. While SOS does this well in the resident mode, it needed to be configured to give this education to all eligible officers, particularly in the active duty line. The OPD initiatives for SOS, therefore, recommended a continued focus on leadership with a streamlined curriculum allowing 100% attendance opportunity for captains with 4-7 years commissioned service. In response, SOS cut the course by 1.5 weeks and added one class per year beginning 1 January 1989.

In order to offer a resident education at the intermediate level to as many majors as possible, the OPD Group also recommended
streamlining ACSC with its major focus on the command and staff skills needed to begin the broadening phase of professional development. To reach the maximum resident audience the course was to be cut by half and offered twice a year. Due to political considerations indirectly related to the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, implementation has been postponed until at least academic year 1990-91.

The only OPD initiative with respect to the AWC program was to restrict attendance to colonels. This initiative was not approved. The OPD Group felt that the attendance opportunity and curriculum focus at AWC were appropriate. However, the Group recommended changes in the process for selecting students at both AWC and ACSC.

The system of using the order of merit from the major and lieutenant colonel selection boards to establish a "schools list" was not consistent with the goal of rewarding performance and potential as it occurs and of giving all officers the educational tools necessary to succeed at each phase. With the schools list, an officer excluded at promotion selection got a mixed message of success and failure and was denied any opportunity for the best quality PME (residence) at that level. On the other hand, an officer placed on the schools list "locked in" at least an opportunity for residence education for the next few years and became a member of an elite that was often self-perpetuating.

The OPD approved initiative decoupled the school selection process from the major and lieutenant colonel selection boards and made any major eligible to attend ACSC and any lieutenant colonel eligible to attend AWC. Actual selection will be done by major
commands with a central board making the final student-to-school match.
CHAPTER IX

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR LIEUTENANTS

Based on the belief that each level of PME must build upon the previous level, the OPD Group felt the most critical education level was the first. It not only provides the foundation upon which all subsequent PME is based, it is the lens through which every aspect of the military profession is subsequently viewed. In short, officership, introduced in precommissioning, must be kept fresh and alive until it is formally reinforced in SOS. However, the realities of these early years make this extremely difficult.

The OPD Group recognized a serious gap in officer education between precommissioning and SOS that allows young officers to interpret their first, formative active duty experiences through (in some cases) an incorrect perspective. As Gosnell explained, it is imperative that lieutenants interpret their environment as professional military officers, not ex-civilian college students who have just been taught a particular skill. During the often extended period between commissioning and completion of formal training the young officer is in an environment in which he or she is surrounded either by civilians or by other officers engaged in learning the same skill and destined for similar jobs. This narrow focus during the formative commissioned years can easily dull identification with all officers, past and present, rated and nonrated, Air Force and non-Air Force who share the profession of arms. It is much too easy, after being recruited with incentives related to the chance to
fly rather than to simply serve as an officer, waiting months for a UPT class and spending another year in pilot training, to believe that one’s profession is "pilot" and not "military officer."

To firmly reestablish the officership foundation that must carry lieutenants through the necessarily specialized environment of their formative commissioned years, the OPD Group recommended institutionalizing a Lieutenants Professional Development Program (LPDP) at every command. To provide minimal competition with the unit-level integration necessary for success in the first assignment, to interfere as little as possible with essential depth development, and to encourage decentralization, the proposed LPDP encompassed the following elements:

a) A common core of information which recognizes that all lieutenants have the profession of arms in common and that focuses on those things that make the profession unique—the responsibilities and restrictions a military officer accepts: fraternization, health and welfare of subordinates, limitations on political activity, conflict of interest rules, 24 hour/day duty, representing the Air Force to the civilian community, force of orders, officer-NCO relations, integrity, setting the example in both word and deed. All would be tied to and in preparation for the common SOS experience.

b) Enough flexibility to allow relearning the unique elements of the profession in a local (and more believable) context. For example, lessons would be taught using familiar Wing organization situations, by senior Wing leadership instead of other junior officers. The teaching method could fit the needs of the unit to which the lieutenant is assigned—class meetings in squadron day rooms, central classrooms, Officers Club, etc. and would be taught full time in two or three days or part time over a longer period.

c) Length that would not take away from depth development. Therefore the entire course should not exceed 25 hours, should be tailored to fit the schedule of the primary job, and should be given as soon after arrival in the unit as possible. d) Protection from being subverted into a vehicle for unrelated ancillary training or for instruction not directly related to pure, blue-suit officership.
While the LPDP concept was approved in spirit, some major commanders expressed concern that mandating what appeared to be another level of PME in the first few years could be seen as undermining the effort to focus lieutenants on their primary jobs. This initiative was therefore not included as part of the Air Force-wide changes produced by OPD and left up to the discretion of each major command.
RECENT HISTORY OF LIEUTENANTS PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

While some commands used lieutenants programs prior to OPD, they were neither standardized nor focused on officership. In the early eighties the most common LPDP was the program developed and run out of the Air University (AU) Leadership and Management Development Center (LMDC). Due to fiscal constraints that reduced manpower at LMDC (renamed the Center for Professional Development (CPD) by the time OPD was born) the course material was suffering in currency and quality.

The initial OPD recommendation for a lieutenants program temporarily revitalized the concept of LPDP at AU. CPD and SOS sponsored a paper on the subject by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Boyer, a Research Associate at the Center for Creative Leadership.

Boyer's Company Grade Professional Development Program (CGPDP) is a course designed to address areas of low competency in leadership and management skills that were identified by a needs assessment. The assessment was done by the Commissioning Education Committee (CEC) from 1986 to 1988 and included 2300 first lieutenants with at least 3 years active duty.

The CEC needs assessment found,

...that by the third year of active duty, many junior officers, while technically talented, are "leadership impoverished." These deficiencies are evident in their abilities to motivate, provide negative feedback, assign responsibility, and give personal counseling to subordinates. (15:3)
Specifically, responses from both 2300 lieutenants and their 2300 supervisors rated 10 task areas lowest. They were: discipline, reads others, motivates others, corrects behavior, gives negative feedback, team building, determines appropriate response, assigns responsibility, follows up, and personal counseling.

According to my conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Boyer, the same survey administered to USAFA graduates of the class of 1982 and their supervisors produced the same results.

While leadership and officership are not synonymous, in the military context they share several characteristics. An officer who is reluctant to employ disciplinary measures, motivate subordinates to achieve unit goals, correct inappropriate behavior, or spend time building an effective team is failing as a leader. He or she is also demonstrating a failure to grasp the special requirements of officership. The type of discipline unique to the military must be judiciously and consistently employed by the officer corps, troops must be motivated to risk their lives on the orders of their officers, counter-productive behavior must be eliminated before it can affect mission accomplishment and cost lives unnecessarily, and few military objectives can be attained by individual actions. In fact, it could be argued that officership is simply the unique context in which an equally special kind of leadership takes place.

While CPD was struggling with funding for their LPDP and the CEC and Boyer were compiling and analyzing their data, several major commands remained very interested in some type of lieutenant's education. In the Fall of 1989 I asked 11 commands about their programs. Nine responded. By and large, these commands had used the LMDC/CPD LPDP and continued to run it (or a similar,
locally-tailored program) without outside assistance. For example, Air Force Space Command has a command-wide program that is patterned after the CPD course and was in the process of convening a needs assessment panel to review its goals and curriculum. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) conducts a lieutenants course at Wright-Patterson AFB that is similar to the CPD program, but does not attempt to provide the course to AFLC officers at other bases because their numbers are too small. Similarly, Air Force Systems Command runs only one program at Brooks AFB. Air Training Command (ATC) ran a command-wide standardized LPDP designed by LMDC from 1984 to 1987. As the result of a suggestion under the auspices of the Command Management Improvement Program, the mandatory aspect of the "ATC Officership Course" was rescinded and left up to wing and center commanders. Today, not all ATC bases run programs and those that do use a variety of approaches.

An LPDP was instituted by Alaskan Air Command at Elmendorf AFB in 1987. Response was excellent, with the exception of the F-15 community. This course depended on one person running it as an additional duty and on CPD course materials, and has recently become moribund. While Air Force Communications Command does not have a command-wide LPDP because their officers are spread so thinly around the world, the Standard Systems Center at Gunter AFB does have one. While this course is mostly a combination of leadership/management topics, basic officer "survival skills" like communication and the OES, it also includes 8 out of 40 hours on subjects such as officership, senior NCO Relations, Ethics, and a Project Warrior/POW presentation.
The involvement of some of the largest commands is more clearly divided. Military Airlift Command (MAC) has used the LMDC/CPD LPDP since 1984 and 8 of 12 MAC bases are currently conducting the program. However, when and if the CPD course is discontinued, MAC has no plans to substitute a program of its own design. Tactical Air Command (TAC) does not have any program at any base though some wings have used the LMDC LPDP in the past. Their command education staff believes that lieutenants professional development should be left to individual supervisors. Strategic Air Command (SAC), on the other hand, has embraced the concept of lieutenants education.

SAC began developing its LPDP almost immediately after the February 1988 CORONA at which the OPD initiatives were presented. A few months later, the SAC staff contacted members of the OFD Group and asked for an outline of subject matter relating to officership. They were provided with an outline for a 20-hour sample course which used TAC as the theoretical user (Appendix 3). The initial SAC pilot LPDP was very similar to the OPD Group's outline, though it used a combination of senior officers and more junior facilitators rather than senior officers alone. The civilian education specialists in HQ SAC/DPAE suggested the military portion of the program be supplemented with a management skills portion taught by civilian professors and contracted out to a college or university much like the older Minuteman Education Program. This two-part LPDP was tested at Offutt AFB and Ellsworth AFB in early 1989 and was approved SAC-wide later that year.

In an effort to interest other commands in their approach to LPDP, SAC briefed their program to the Worldwide Personnel
Conference in September 1989. The response was largely characterized by polite interest, but no rush to jump on the bandwagon. The less than enthusiastic reaction may be due in part to the perception that the SAC LPDP involves a civilian contract. The education services officer at one large command commented that "we don't have the money to contract a program like SAC's." Obviously the civilian portion of the SAC LPDP has, at least for some, overshadowed the more valuable (and cheaper) military part.
CHAPTER XI

SISTER SERVICE LIEUTENANTS EDUCATION

Lieutenants Professional education is addressed in all three sister Services. There are many similarities in the way in which they approach the subject, beginning with the fact that, structurally, none makes a clear separation between education and training as does the Air Force. Virtually all education and training is the responsibility of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the Army, of the Chief, Naval Education and Training who reports directly to OP-01 in the Navy, and of the Deputy Commander for Education and Training, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) in the Marine Corps. All three Services conduct precommissioning programs, as well as Basic and Advanced Officer Courses for O-1s and O-2s related to their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). There are differences, however, in how these courses are integrated.

The Army conducts both screening and training/education in its precommissioning programs in a manner very similar to the Air Force. The instructional program is based on the first of three levels of Military Qualification Standards (MQS I). They then send new lieutenants to basic courses taught by the various branches where a common core of instruction geared to platoon level (MQS II) is integrated into branch training and given the branch flavor. MQS III is integrated into the Advanced Course at the company/battalion level and covers many subjects that the Air Force addresses in SOS.
This approach would be similar to the Air Force's integrating a common core of instruction into all ATC technical and flying training programs. Those subjects common to all Army officers are covered at all three MQS levels and designed to build upon each other, each in a different military context, and according to an official 1988 TRADOC letter, "serves as the vehicle for integrating the efforts of our schools, units, and the individual officer." (16:1) The responsibility for MQS at all levels lies with the Center for Army Leadership at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

While it is somewhat difficult to pick out those subject areas of MQS II that relate specifically to officership, the following are part of the core of instruction given to all Army lieutenants:

- Ethical Solutions
- The Officer as Role Model
- Professional History of the Army
- Responsibilities of the Profession of Arms
- The Professional Army Ethic
- Leadership Doctrine
- Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of Officers (including Officer-NCO Relations)
- Military Law (16:atch 2)

The goals of Navy precommissioning are similar to those of the Army. After commissioning, all unrestricted line officers receive a one week Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET) course as part of basic skill training. LMET is given in conjunction with the Division Officer Basic Course at either Coronado, California or Little Creek, Virginia. Aviators, submariners, and surface warfare officers receive the LMET tailored to their respective specialty basic course. The LMET was developed
under contract by identifying the qualities and competencies that characterize the successful division junior officer (initially in surface warfare) and designing a curriculum to teach those qualities and competencies.

According to comments made to me by the Training Program Coordinator, Chief of Naval Technical Training, LMET is largely a survival course designed to teach skills for the first-time supervisor. There are only about 1.5 hours of contact time devoted to subjects directly related to officership: Team Building and Ethics and Values.

The Marine Corps uses its precommissioning programs primarily for screening. Once they have commissioned a physically and mentally qualified and motivated lieutenant, he or she is sent to the Basic Officer Course taught at the Basic School at Quantico Marine Base, Virginia. Since the Marine Corps is relatively small, all officers attend at Quantico and receive the same instruction. MOS training takes place at advanced courses in and out of the Marine Corps.

The Marines believe that the most fundamental role of their education/training process is teaching what it means to be an officer. Motivation in this direction is critical. It is exemplified in a comment I recorded during a briefing to Air War College students by a Marine general officer intimately acquainted with training and education: "If someone comes to us because he wants to fly the F/A-18, we don't want him... We only want people who want to be officers of marines."

The Marine Basic Officer Course teaches many subjects common to Air Force precommissioning programs and SOS, but at a time
when most Air Force officers are receiving instruction only in their specialty. Made up of almost 1560 academic hours, its purpose is "To educate the newly commissioned Marine officer in the high standards of leadership traditional in the Marine Corps in order to prepare him for the duties of a company grade officer in the Fleet Marine Force." (17:1-1) Two of its three main goals are: "To develop an understanding of and commitment to the leadership responsibilities and standards of conducts expected of a Marine officer," and "To educate the officers on the structure, values, and philosophy of the Marine Corps and, thereby, to develop a unity of purpose shared by the entire leadership of the Corps." (17:1-2) The course provides appropriate "knowledge, attitudes and values," and "...the officer students are continually exposed to and taught those intangible traits and characteristics that distinguish them as Marine officers." (17:1-3)

About 20 hours of instruction are specifically related to issues that apply to officerhip in any military Service. They include:

- The Meaning of the Commission
- Challenges to Future Leadership
- Professional Reading Program
- Responsibilities of Leadership
- Military Professionalism
- The Role of the Staff NCO
- Fraternization
- The Demands of Combat on an Officer
- Speaker on Motivational Military Leadership
- Marine Corps History
- Adherence to the Code of Conduct (17)
As world events move the United States Air Force closer to a smaller, tighter active force constrained by budgetary limitations, the requirement for a totally dedicated and professional officer corps increases. The officer corps will be most effective as a relatively small, closely knit cadre that studies and understands the unique aspects of the military profession so it can lead and train future forces that may be called up to augment the standing forces. Military officers cannot afford to be peacetime careerists or bureaucratic managers of human and material resources like many of their civilian counterparts. Similarly, officers must avoid too much identification with their occupational counterparts in the society at large or be prepared to lose that which sets the professional military apart.

No matter how well the case for an institutional versus an occupational officer corps is made, there is no longer any way it can be totally institutional. The peacetime environment in which it operates (including Congress), the search for a credible threat in the era of Gorbachev, and the society from which its members come and in which they must live all dictate a degree of integration with civil institutions that military professionals cannot avoid. The
most reasonable goal should be to minimize occupational integration and maximize the institutional aspects of the profession wherever and whenever possible.

OPD was a good start. It, to a large degree, put the house in order in those personnel and education areas that touch every officer. It reversed the trend toward centralized control and execution that kept officers from exercising real leadership as military professionals, and it provided a structure that encouraged and rewarded appropriate behavior, and that made sense. But OPD is only two years old and still has some problems.

Despite the opinions of many observers and some disturbing trends in the SOS data, a substantial number of young officers seem to be on the right track. They seem to sense what is expected of them, but are confronted with mixed signals, particularly after commissioning. The Air Force needs to send a consistent message to all of them from the very beginning. That message should be that they are officers first and specialists second; that they are practitioners of the profession of arms before they are programmers or personnelists; that serving a greater good is better than serving themselves; and that they have more of those things that really matter in common with other officers than with civilians who share their occupation.

OPD in its present form does not send that message clearly. As long as the Air Force recruits using occupational incentives like the chance to fly a fighter or work in a state of the art engineering lab, it starts off behind the power curve. Then, despite disparities in environment and duration, the precommissioning programs do their best to teach the common officer
characteristics and responsibilities. But commissioning brings complications. Some officers remain in a civilian environment and forget the message, most go to flying or skill training where the common bonds of officership may rarely be mentioned. All arrive at their first assignments with occupational skills fresh in their minds and the institutional lessons of officership a fading memory.

If that memory is revived, it is done by mentors, individuals (usually superiors) who believe in the profession of arms and who lead by example. This is the best way to teach officership and make it stick, and where it happens it makes a lasting impression. The problem is, not every junior officer has such a mentor. It is possible that, in too many cases, the mentor that makes the biggest impression is himself an occupationalist. This is most likely in first assignments where role models tend to practice the same specialty as the lieutenant.

The occupational tendency is reinforced by some of the tenets and realities of OPD. The lieutenants' focus is to be on "depth development." This, by itself, is clearly occupational. The fact that depth is to be built upon a solid and constantly reinforced foundation of officership seems to have been lost in the shuffle. OPD in its present form leaves the impression that officership is something you learn about before you are commissioned and that then becomes subordinate to depth until promotion to major, when both become subordinate to gaining breadth of experience. Even the officership aspects of leadership are put off until at least the four year point when the SOS eligibility window opens. The OES reinforces this perception by appearing to encourage evaluation on purely occupational performance for lieutenants.
It is therefore not surprising that a substantial number of junior officers approach their first career decision point with a detached view of their place in the military. They have not been presented with the all or nothing requirement—of a true institutionalist to either accept or reject, and instead make their decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis.

Though there is no way to guarantee that every lieutenant will get the message and arrange his/her priorities accordingly, some kind of common "re-blueing" is at least part of the answer. Both the Army and the Marines use this approach, believing that officership/leadership must be taught when the young officer is developing his/her self concept as a professional and in conjunction with skill training—perhaps to offset its occupational tendencies.

A common core of instruction to reinforce institutional officership is critical during these formative years and it cannot be left to mentors who may be passing on the wrong perspective. However, I do not believe it is ATC's job to do it for the whole Air Force. While today's OPD has missed the mark in some ways, its emphasis on decentralization and unit/command identification is right on target. Officership is infinitely more believable in a practical/operational rather than an artificial/training context. While the subject matter and objectives of such an Air Force-wide program should be the same everywhere, the way it is taught does not have to be. An LPDP (or whatever one calls it) must have a local or command flavor to be really true to the philosophy of OPD.
CHAPTER XIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Air Force must make some adjustments missed by OPD and implement one OPD initiative that was previously not approved. This will provide the best opportunity for the officer corps of the future to maximize institutionalism. This also means deciding that the Air Force wants its officers to be military professionals first and communicating that desire clearly and consistently from the beginning of their careers.

The Air Force must put less recruiting emphasis on occupational incentives like flying and explain the often unpleasant aspects of officer responsibilities to officer candidates even at the risk of turning them away. The lower accessions expected in the future may make the 90s the best time to begin this approach. The Air Force might also look at Huntington's first phase of expertise and try to bring in officers with broader backgrounds in the liberal arts. Perhaps the range of specialties that require an engineering degree is not as great as previously supposed.

OPD needs to make a clear statement of the value of officership throughout the career and communicate it widely, starting with AFR 36-23 and AFR 36-10. The impression that depth development is the only worthwhile pursuit of the company grade years must be changed and officership made number one at all levels with depth the focus in the early years only to preclude broadening too early. In the same manner, the OES should reintroduce some
measure of professional qualities, if only to the extent that they specifically enhance unit mission accomplishment.

Finally, the Air Force should implement a mandatory LPDP along the lines of the original OPD Group initiative. This concept is pure blue-suit, designed to produce an emotional as well as an intellectual response. It must be flexible, and make the most of local leadership and situations. The core content, once developed, would have a very long shelf life since the unique aspects of the military profession do not change very often. Responsibility for developing the core, as well as suggested lessons and support material, is rightly the province of Air University. However, each command should have complete freedom of execution as long as every lieutenant receives the course, the core subjects are covered, and the program is not diluted by any other type of training.

These recommendations refine the OPD concept with regard to junior officers. They recognize the research and discussion about I/O theory and other concepts of military professionalism that have occupied many respected social scientists over the past 20 years. They also reflect the beliefs and goals of true military professionals, even if they do not take the time to think of their profession in these terms. Military institutionalism, however desirable, must be taught to the young so that they may pass on these same beliefs and values to those that follow them. When these beliefs and values become part of every officer, their continuation can be safely left to informal mentors. But until that time arrives, some formal steps are needed. The need was articulated ten years ago by a very senior Air Force officer and, unfortunately, it
I have a disquieting feeling that perhaps our officer training programs have not met our needs in terms of what an officer is all about...The young officers really don't seem to grasp that a military organization is uniquely different from any other institution in this country...A common finding among our young officers is that they have never heard that their purpose in serving...is to lead forces on or over the battlefield or support those who do.

As we drift toward the job concept and away from a military rank system...it's no wonder our young officers keep comparing "options" in the private sector--the only difference some of them see is a change of clothes.

In my view, we should review our officer training curriculum to insure it meets our basic officer needs--leadership, military history, how our ground and sea forces are employed, as well as the meaning of a commission and officership.

General B. L. Davis,
Commander, Air Training Command quoted by Gosnell (13:1)
APPENDIX 1

SOS PROFESSIONALISM SURVEY EXTRACT

N=4698 officers with 5 or less years of active duty (21.8% pilots, 15.6% navigators, 62.3% nonrated; 54.6% married).

The following questions asked the respondents to STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, DISAGREE, STRONGLY DISAGREE, OR EXPRESS NEUTRALITY. Responses given below combine those choosing AGREE OR STRONGLY AGREE and those choosing DISAGREE AND STRONGLY DISAGREE.

AGREE: 75.9% (all) 77.0% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 13.0% (all) 11.3% (pilots)

116. Personal interests and desires must take second place to operational requirements.

AGREE: 77.2% (all) 76.8% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 9.5% (all) 9.2% (pilots)

117. Military personnel should perform their duty regardless of personal or family consequences.

AGREE: 51.5% (all) 48.2% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 25.5% (all) 27.6% (pilots)

118. As long as no law is being violated, what I do in my private life should not concern the Air Force.

AGREE: 30.1% (all) 33.4% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 52.9% (all) 48.6% (pilots)

119. No one should be forced to accept an assignment against his/her will.

AGREE: 26.4% (all) 27.2% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 52.0% (all) 50.8% (pilots)

124. Differences in rank should not be important after duty hours.

AGREE: 24.5% (all) 25.3% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 56.7% (all) 56.7% (pilots)

126. I plan to stay in the Air Force at least 20 years.

AGREE: 52.4% (all) 45.1% (pilots)
130. I would prefer that the advertised dollar value of military "benefits" be added to my pay and the "benefits" stopped.

AGREE: 28.7% (all) 29.7% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 52.5% (all) 51.7% (pilots)

131. Professional military education at specified career intervals is vital in nurturing competent and professional military officers.

AGREE: 78.6% (all) 72.2% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 6.9% (all) 9.5% (pilots)

132. I have a deep personal commitment, a "calling," to serve the nation.

AGREE: 71.0% (all) 71.5% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 7.2% (all) 8.2% (pilots)

135. Disregarding all economic considerations, both positive and negative, I would prefer to live in base housing.

AGREE: 20.9% (all) 16.5% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 55.8% (all) 60.6% (pilots)

136. Military members should be allowed to collectively bargain on issues like pay, benefits, and health services.

AGREE: 23.3% (all) 21.9% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 53.1% (all) 53.8% (pilots)

137. If I suddenly became rich (independently wealthy as a result of inheritance, sweepstakes, etc.) I would continue my military career until retirement.

AGREE: 48.8% (all) 43.6% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 21.8% (all) 22.0% (pilots)

138. Military personnel should not be tried under the UCMJ for purely civil offenses.

AGREE: 25.5% (all) 27.1% (pilots)
DISAGREE: 47.8% (all) 43.8% (pilots)

The following question asked for specific answers.

146. Which of the following do you most closely identify with?

The Air Force officer corps: 25.4% (all) 22.1% (pilots)
People in my career field (pilot, engineer, etc.): 39.3% (all) 62.9% (pilots)
People in my unit or workplace: 29.9% (all) 11.9% (pilots)
None of the above: 3.2% (all) 1.4% (pilots)

54
The following questions asked the respondents to rank nine factors as to their importance in influencing them to stay in the Air Force. Responses include the percentage that chose a factor as the first or second highest (TOP) and the percentage that chose a factor as the lowest or second lowest (BOTTOM).

Base pay TOP: 20.5% (all) 17.6% (pilots) BOTTOM: 20.2% (all)

Nonpay benefits TOP: 9.3% (all) 8.2% (pilots) BOTTOM: 41.5% (all) 44.7% (pilots)

Retirement system TOP: 17.0% (all) 14.1% (pilots) BOTTOM: 28.6% (all) 31.8% (pilots)

Stable family life TOP: 18.5% (all) 19.8% (pilots) BOTTOM: 33.8% (all) 29.1% (pilots)

Patriotism TOP: 24.3% (all) 22.3% (pilots) BOTTOM: 14.8% (all)

Job satisfaction TOP: 58.0% (all) 71.8% (pilots) BOTTOM: 3.0% (all) 1.7% (pilots)

Professional status TOP: 21.8% (all) 20.5% (pilots) BOTTOM: 13.9% (all) 14.9% (pilots)

Esprit de corps TOP: 10.8% (all) 12.1% (pilots) BOTTOM: 28.3% (all) 25.0% (pilots)

Job security based on promotion opportunity TOP: 19.4% (all) 13% (pilots) BOTTOM: 14.2% (all) 16.6% (pilots)

The next questions relate to Moskos’ concepts, and were introduced as follows:

Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Jr. describes three alternate concepts of military social organization: calling, profession, and occupation.

A calling is characterized and legitimated in terms of institutional values. The purpose transcends individual self-interests in favor of a presumed higher good.

A profession is characterized by special expertise, a skill level formally accredited after long, intensive academic training.

An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, prevailing monetaray rewards for competencies.

166. Which one of these concepts do you think should characterize an Air Force officer?

CALLING: 41.0% (all) 32.8% (pilots)

PROFESSION: 52.5% (all) 61.7% (pilots)

OCCUPATION: 5.2% (all) 4.3% (pilots)

167. Which one of these concepts most closely describes your actual behavior in your Air Force life?
The next questions recognized that the respondents' roles as Air Force officers could be composites of the three concepts. They were asked to enter the percentage of each element using increments of 10 percentage points. The results below show what percentage of the respondents chose one of the extremes (calling or occupation) as comprising more than 30% of their role as officers.

**Calling:** 32.7% (all) 30.4% (pilots)
**Occupation:** 14.9% (all) 15.4% (pilots)

187. Do you belong to the Air Force Association?

**Yes:** 50.1% (all) 56.5% (pilots)
**No:** 35.6% (all) 30.9% (pilots)

In question 188 the respondents were asked what they would do if joining the officer's club were truly a "free choice" decision. Options were I WOULD DEFINITELY JOIN, I WOULD PROBABLY JOIN, DEPENDING ON LOCATION AND CLUB PROGRAM, I MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT JOIN, I WOULD PROBABLY NOT JOIN, AND I WOULD DEFINITELY NOT JOIN. The results below combine the first two and the last two options.

**Would Join:** 50.7% (all) 52.8% (pilots)
**Depends:** 30.9% (all) 28.5% (pilots)
**Would Not Join:** 9.0% (all) 9.8% (pilots)
AFR 36-10  1 August 1988

| 1. RATEE IDENTIFICATION DATA (Read AFR 36-10 carefully before filling in any item) |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| 2. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) | 3. SDN | 4. GRADE | 5. DAPEC |

<table>
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<th>6. PERIOD OF REPORT</th>
<th>7. NO. DAYS SUPERVISION</th>
<th>8. REASON FOR REPORT</th>
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<td>From:</td>
<td>Thru:</td>
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| 10. ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, LOCATION | 11. FAS CODE |

<table>
<thead>
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<th>11. UNIT MISSION DESCRIPTION</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. JOB DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>1. DUTY TITLE:</th>
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<tr>
<td>2. KEY DUTIES, TASKS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES:</td>
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<tr>
<th>IV. IMPACT ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>V. PERFORMANCE FACTORS</th>
<th>DOES NOT MEET STANDARDS</th>
<th>MEETS STANDARDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Job Knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Has knowledge required to perform duties effectively.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strives to improve that knowledge.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 3. Leadership Skills | | |
| Sets and enforces standards. Works well with others. | | |

| 4. Professional Qualities | | |
| Exhibits loyalty, discipline, dedication, integrity, and honesty. | | |
| Adheres to Air Force standards. Accepts personal responsibility. | | |
| Is fair and objective. | | |

| 5. Organizational Skills | | |
| Plans, coordinates, schedules, and uses resources effectively. | | |
| Meets suspenses. | | |

| 6. Judgment and Decisions | | |
| Makes timely and accurate decisions. Emphasizes logic in decision making. Retains composure in stressful situations. Recognizes opportunities. Requires minimal supervision | | |

| 6. Communication Skills | | |
| Listens, speaks, and writes effectively. | | |

AF Form 707B, AUG 88

COMPANY GRADE OFFICER PERFORMANCE REPORT

Figure 3-3. AF Form 707B (Front).
VI. RATER OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Performance feedback was accomplished consistent with the direction in AFR 36 10. (If not accomplished, state the reason.)

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VII. ADDITIONAL RATER OVERALL ASSESSMENT

CONCUR ☐ NONCONCUR ☐

NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD, LOCATION

DUTY TITLE

DATE

SSN | SIGNATURE
---|---------

VIII. REVIEWER

CONCUR ☐ NONCONCUR ☐

NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD, LOCATION

DUTY TITLE

DATE

SSN | SIGNATURE
---|---------

Instructions:

All recommendations must be based on performance and the potential based on that performance. Promotion recommendations are prohibited. Do not consider or comment on completion of or enrollment in PME, advanced education, previous or anticipated promotion recommendations on AF Form 709, OER indefinite levels, family activities, marital status, race, sex, ethnic origin, age, or religion.

Rater. Focus your evaluation in Section IV on what the officer did, how well he or she did it, and how the officer contributed to mission accomplishment. Write in concise "bullet" format. Your comments in Section VI may include recommendations for augmentation or assignment.

Additional Rater. Carefully review the rater's evaluation to ensure it is accurate, unbiased and uninfluenced. If you disagree, you may ask the rater to review his or her evaluation. You may not direct a change in the evaluation. If you still disagree with the rater, mark "NON CONCUR" and explain. You may include recommendations for augmentation or assignment.

Reviewer. Carefully review the rater's and additional rater's ratings and comments. If their evaluations are accurate, unbiased and uninfluenced, mark the form "CONCUR" and sign the form. If you disagree with previous evaluations, you may ask them to review the evaluations. You may not direct them to change their appraisals. If you still disagree with the additional rater, mark "NON CONCUR" and explain in Section VIII. Do not use "NON CONCUR" simply to provide comments on the report.

AF Form 707B, AUG 88 (Reverse)

Figure 3-4. AF Form 707B (Reverse).
APPENDIX 3

SAMPLE ACADEMIC OUTLINE

LIEUTENANTS PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (LPDP)

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (TAC)

HOUR

SUBJECT DESCRIPTION (Instructor)

1 INTRODUCTION TO LPDP (Wing Commander or equiv)
   - Officership defined
   - What does Officership mean in TAC?
   - Relationship to "Institutionalism" and military service as a "calling" rather than a job
   - What we will cover during the rest of LPDP
     -- Who will teach--Experienced and successful officers and NCOs from this organization
     -- Your preparation--Limited reading, lots of discussion

2 THE LIEUTENANT'S PLACE IN THE TAC OFFICER CORPS (Wing DO)
   - Concept of MAJCOM and unit identity
     -- Defined by mission
     -- Explanation of TAC and Wing missions
   - Importance of junior officer in TAC
     -- Number of people supervised by lieutenants
     -- Number of primary mission weapon systems controlled by lieutenants

3 WHAT ARE OUR ROOTS? (Active-duty or retired senior officer with interest in military history)
   - Evolution of military officer corps
     -- Purpose of separate corps
     -- Relationship to social class--historical perspective
--- The British regimental system
--- The Prussian officer corps and General Staff
--- The American concept of the citizen-soldier

- Development of the American officer corps
  -- Establishment of military academies
  -- Professional establishment vs the Reserves (militia)

4 COMMISSIONING OATH (Active duty or retired senior officer)
- Same for all US officers
  -- Similar to enlistment oath but with key differences
- Supporting the Constitution
  -- Know what it says about separation of powers, etc
  --- Must support civilian leadership despite personal views (North, Poindexter)
- Take obligation freely
  -- No officer is drafted—CSAF says we only need to volunteer once—oath becomes commitment to serve under any and all circumstances
- Well and faithfully discharge duties of office
  -- Know what the duties of the office are
  -- Carry them out for good of service, not yourself
  --- Get your priorities in order now

5 LEGAL RESTRICTIONS (Staff Judge Advocate)
- Commission means giving up many legal elements of citizenship to better serve the citizenry
  -- Both UCMJ and civil law apply
  -- Limits on political activity (Hatch Act)
  -- Individual actions speak for entire institution
  --- You are your unit, TAC, and the Air Force
- Role as officer makes consequences of mistakes tougher
-- Drug abuse, DWI, homosexuality, poor work habits, disrespect to nation or its representatives often accepted in civilians

--- Not tolerated in military, particularly among officers who set example and enforce rules

6 UPHOLDING STANDARDS (Senior line commander)

- Responsibility of leaders in all walks of life

-- Most true for military since rest of country sees us as entity which they pay to protect their security

--- Solid, consistent standards of behavior inspire confidence

-- Outward appearance makes strong impression

- Professional officers must do three things

-- Know rules of appropriate behavior, dress, courtesy, professional conduct, strict personal integrity

--- Enforce it in subordinates

--- Practice what they preach on and off duty

7 ROLE IN CIVILIAN COMMUNITY (Base Commander)

- US officer has two lives

-- Member of unique, semi-closed military society with strong, narrow traditions and ways of doing things

-- Member of diverse, ever-changing civilian community

- Must deal with both worlds

-- Foster and support special values of military officer corps

--- Paternalism--"AF takes care of its own"

--- Unit social cohesion, support of Officers Club

-- Interact with civilian community

--- Most officers live off-base

--- Spouses work outside military sphere

--- Civic involvement reflects well on military

-- When 2 lives conflict, military must come first
AIR FORCE INSTITUTIONAL VALUES (Active duty or retired senior officer)

- Integrity is key to being professional military officer
  - Honesty breeds trust, and trust is essential to get job done in peace or war
- Officer's word should be his/her bond
  - Troops won't work/fight for officer they don't trust
    - They recognize and copy corner-cutting, square-filling, pencil whipping, unprofessional behavior
  - Non-military society assumes all military officers act like you
    - Reluctant to entrust tax dollars and destructive weapons to people with loose ethical standards
- All come into military with different values, but all must accept single set of values to succeed
  - Hard work is rewarded
  - Do it because it's right, not because it's easy
  - Good of the team more important than good of the member

WORKING RELATIONSHIPS—TOTAL FORCE (Senior MA on base)

- Working with other members of the Total Force
  - Role of DAF Civilians in TAC
  - Role of AFRs, ANG in support of TAC mission

WORKING RELATIONSHIPS—SUBORDINATES (Senior WCO supervisor)

- What subordinates expect in a junior supervisor
  - Integrity
  - Job Knowledge
  - Fairness
  - Leadership
  - Honest feedback
Interest in their welfare
- Backup when they're right
- Correction when they're wrong
- Recognition of their worth to the team
- What all enlisted members expect of a junior officer
  - Integrity
  - Fairness
  - Leadership
  - Respect for their rank and experience

II. WARRING RELATIONSHIPS-FRATERIZATION (Senior Enlisted Advisor)
- Fraternization defined
  - Applies to relationships with either sex
  - Don't make up your own definition
- Serious consequences
  - Makes it hard to do your job as an officer
  - Invers favoritism
  - Can appear sexist
  - Impairs mission accomplishment
  - Is against AF policy and UCMJ
- Tempting for young officer and young airman to relate socially—many generational things in common
- At least one key thing different—you are an officer!

12-13 AN OFFICER IS AN OFFICER (Senior officer with 10 years experience)
- Structure and roles of officer corps in Army, Navy, Marine Corps
- Joint activities in which TAC personnel participate
- Roles of various Air Force officer specialties in TAC
- Ralled
-- Non-rated Ops
-- Mission Support
-- Professional (Medical, JAG, Chaplaincy)

14 HOW TO BE A GOOD LIEUTENANT or WHAT THE CHIEF OF STAFF EXPECTS (AND DOESN'T EXPECT) OF YOU (General officer or Wing DP)

- Primary responsibility is to learn job specialty
  -- Also develop leadership abilities
- Development outside TAC does not begin until you make captain--Squadron Officer School
  -- Designed to improve your ability to function as a captain
- Officer Evaluation System
  -- Performance feedback
  - Officer Performance Report
  -- Promotion Recommendation
- You do best job possible appropriate for your grade, Air Force will take care of you

15-16 LEADERSHIP--KEY TO SUCCESS AS A PROFESSIONAL OFFICER (Active duty or retired officer with combat leadership experience)

- Every officer must be a leader sometime
- Elements of leadership
  -- Concept (principles, attributes, types)
  -- Application
    --- Lessons learned in battle
  -- Beliefs, values and ethics--conflicts they can cause
  -- Character
  -- Knowledge
  -- Problem solving
  -- Communicating
The test of combat (Lance Sijan)

Preparation at Air Force Academy
--- Training and experiences much like yours
--- As combat flyer in Southeast Asia
--- As POW
--- Total adherence to professional military values despite injuries and torture
--- Attempts to escape
--- Inspiration to others
--- Death and transformation into Air Force symbol

The test of a lifetime (A. W. Greely)

Lifetime dedicated to service to country unbroken in war, peacetime, and retirement
--- 47 years in Army (enlisted in volunteers in 1861, retired a Regular major general in 1908)
--- Adhered to same principles in field and political arena
--- Wounded twice in Civil War
--- Commanded black troops and supported civil rights at every opportunity
--- Shared incredible hardships with his troops on Arctic expedition
--- Refused to use subsequent fame for profit (never accepted a fee for any lecture or promotion)
--- Well-known integrity made him confidant of presidents and politicians of all stripes
--- Established first US military air arm
--- "Billy Mitchell called him "greatest single influence on my life"
Active in civic affairs from retirement to death at 93, never sought political office

Virtually unknown today

19-25 WING COMMANDER'S PREFERENCE

- 2 to 5 hours to be used at discretion of commander to cover any local issue important to lieutenants

- Could expand 1 or more of other 18 hours using local unit situations or examples
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Caynak, John P. "Ethics in the Military Profession." Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, 9 November 1976.


