IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEAD?

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEAD? (v)

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In a speech on 2 August 1990, President Bush approved the base force concept proposed by the CJCS. In so doing he approved of the death of the Navy’s traditional independence. The question explored in this paper is whether his approval also killed the maritime Strategy. The paper reviews the original concept of the MS and the debate surrounding it, focusing on the role of the Navy’s traditional independence. It then analyzes the effect of the Chairman’s base force, explaining that because the CJCS is now the ultimate authority over the MS, the loss of the traditional independence is of more importance to the Navy than the reduction of deployable aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG). The paper then assesses the consequences of this change as they were expressed in the revision to the MS, noting that the Navy has elevated the Marine Air Ground Task Force to a coequal status with the CVBG as a central element of the MS. It concludes that the MS has been reborn purple.
Abstract of
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In a speech on August 2, 1990, President George Bush approved the base force concept proposed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In so doing he approved of the death of the Navy’s traditional independence. The question explored in the paper is whether his approval also killed the Maritime Strategy. The paper reviews the original concept of the Maritime Strategy and the debates surrounding it, focusing on the role of the Navy’s traditional independence. It then analyzes the effect of the Chairman’s base force, explaining that because the Chairman is now the ultimate authority over the Maritime Strategy, the loss of its traditional independence is of more importance to the Navy than the reduction of deployable aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG). The paper then assesses the consequences of this change as they were expressed in the revision to the Maritime Strategy, noting that the Navy has elevated the Marine Air Ground Task Force to a coequal status with the CVBG as a central fighting element of the Maritime Strategy. The paper concludes that the Maritime Strategy is not dead, but has been reborn with a purple skin.
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IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEAD?

August 2, 1990 was a memorable day for the US Navy. As Saddam Hussein's forces invaded neighboring Kuwait, the only US military forces in position to respond immediately were US Navy forces forward deployed in the Persian Gulf. This capability was a classic demonstration of the utility of the Maritime Strategy, a strategy designed to give national decision makers the option of quickly engaging an enemy with forward deployed naval forces. Even as Iraqi troops were pouring across the Kuwaiti border, however, on the other side of the world, President George Bush was speaking about planned changes in US defense policy which would threaten the very existence of the Maritime Strategy. Important as Iraq's actions were for the security of the Persian Gulf, for navalists, the President's words may ultimately be considered to have been much more significant. Listeners might have missed it, but his short speech about the shape of the post-Cold War military sounded the death knell for the independence of the Navy. The question is whether it also doomed the Maritime Strategy. Although the basic tenets of the Strategy were being borne out that day, will August 2, 1990 be remembered as the day the Maritime Strategy died?

The thesis of this paper is that despite the President's words, the Maritime Strategy is very much alive. Although very different than originally conceived, the Strategy remains a vital component of the National Military Strategy.
THE CONCEPT

Although the concept had been in discussion among strategists for several years, as a discrete entity, the Maritime Strategy first appeared in 1982 in response to a request from Admiral William N. Small, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Although he was merely asking for a briefing that could provide strategic guidance to the Navy staff to use during budget development, the briefing that resulted was an innovative distillation of naval strategic thought that proved so popular it quickly became the official statement of the Navy's strategy.

Identified from the beginning as the maritime component of the National Military Strategy, the Maritime Strategy postulated a three phase offensive naval role in the event of escalating tensions with the Soviet Union. The first phase was simply crisis control in situations which had the potential to grow to global superpower confrontation. The goal would be to apply sea power to deter war, but should deterrence fail, the strategy envisioned that naval forces forward deployed for execution of phase 1 could easily transition to war. In this second phase, they were to seize the initiative and establish maritime superiority by destroying Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and elsewhere as a prelude to a concentrated fleet movement toward Soviet home waters. Such a movement would come in the third phase in which the Navy carried the fight to the enemy. The goal of this phase would be to complete the
destruction of the Soviet fleet in order to then seek war termination on terms favorable to the US and its allies. The strategy was not envisioned as a war winning strategy in and of itself. Rather, the goal was to use maritime power in combination with the efforts of the other services and forces of US allies to compliment the effort on the central front in Europe.3

The concept of using sea power to offset the strength of a continental power was a classic maritime strategum in the tradition of Sir Julian Corbett. No matter what pitched land battles might be offered or opened by a continental power, a sea power can and should use its maritime mobility and flexibility to choose the time and place of battle. More importantly, by attacking the continental power on its flanks, the maritime power can directly affect the major battle ashore by forcing the continental power to withdraw forces from his chosen area of battle to defend his flanks, one example of which was the British Peninsula Campaign against Napoleon.4

THE DEBATE

Proponents of the continental approach to warfare and other critics greeted the Maritime Strategy with extreme skepticism and engaged its proponents in an intense public debate.5 Although the debate raged throughout the 1980’s the strategy proved to be extremely popular, not only for its original function as a
strategic guide for budget preparation, but also as a focus for
discussion of warfighting strategies, as well as a rallying point
for supporters of the Navy. On an intellectual level, the Navy
and its supporters had captured the high ground. Because the
maritime strategy was carefully tied to the National Military
Strategy, the Navy had established the terms of debate. Despite
the best efforts of the critics to discredit the concept, the
debate itself kept both the strategy and the Navy very much in
the public eye. 6

On a more practical level, the Maritime Strategy proved to
be an exceptionally useful argument for the Navy on Capitol Hill.
Throughout the 1980's the Navy was unusually successful in
convincing the Congress to fund its programs. Supporters and
critics of the Navy alike agree that to a large degree this
success was made possible because the Navy and its supporters
were able to articulate an easily understandable strategic
concept in the Maritime Strategy. Even though it spoke only of
the application of military power at sea, common sense seemed to
suggest that it was coherent with the national military strategy
which required coordination of the environment-specific elements
of US military power. 7 Thus, despite the continuing debate,
there was a general consensus in the Congress that the Navy's
programs were supportable because they were well grounded in the
National Military Strategy. As the changes in the Soviet Union
became apparent, however, and Congressional perspectives and
priorities began to shift, the Maritime Strategy became something
more of a problem than a help for the Navy with Congress.

Since the foundation of the Maritime Strategy was a scenario based upon a protracted conventional war with the Soviet Union, as the perception of a Soviet threat eased, the scenario became increasingly more improbable and difficult to defend. Although Navy leaders recognized the changing situation and began to evolve the strategy, the views they expressed were not dramatically different than those that had been expressed throughout the 1980's. Despite the apparent change in Soviet intent, their argument went, Soviet naval capabilities had not been reduced, but were, in fact, increasing as older ships were retired and a modernization program continued apace. Further, since the world remained a dangerous place, the Navy still needed to be able to respond quickly to regional crises around the globe. The official Navy view was, therefore, that the highly capable, flexible, and forward deployed Navy centered on the aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) that had been designed and built for war with the Soviets was the appropriate Navy for the post-Cold War world. 8

This line of argument was not popular on Capitol Hill, and those Navy officials who appeared before Congress to testify in support of the 1991 defense budget using arguments based on the Maritime Strategy encountered disbelief and skepticism. 9 For many on the Hill, both the Maritime Strategy and the National Military Strategy were perceived to be seriously out of date. The dramatic collapse of the Communist world had so drastically reduced the perception of threat that they saw little necessity
for and had little patience with those who espoused a maritime or military strategy which required the maintenance of a large, expensive navy. Coming as it had coincident with a severe fiscal crisis in the US, many in the Congress saw the changed threat as an opportunity for significant cuts in the military which could yield large budgetary savings. Serious proposals which advocated across the board cuts of as much as 50% of the active force, were being favorably discussed on Capitol Hill. One Congressional proposal which was accorded great respect by other Congressmen was set out by Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. His carefully thought out concept for a restructuring of the armed forces and their missions would have radically reorganized the US military and could have had a significant effect on the Navy by reducing its forces, its forward presence, and shifting some of its basic missions to other services.11

THE SPEECH

It was against this background that the President outlined his vision of the shape of the post-Cold War military in a speech at the Aspen Institute on August 2, 1990. Acknowledging the significant changes taking place in the world security situation, Mr. Bush announced that the active duty military services would be reduced 25% by 1995. Rather than proportion the cuts equally among the services, he indicated that they would be made selectively. The governing criteria for the reductions would be to
create forces that could maintain four enduring security interests of the US; to continue deterrence of potential enemies, to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild the forces that were to be cut should that be necessary. Although the speech was visionary, on the political level it served a much more practical purpose. Because it was a Presidential policy statement, it pushed aside the Congressional proposals and established the terms of debate, which recaptured the initiative on changes in the military for the Administration.

Within the Department of Defense, the President's speech also validated the effort of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to reshape of the military. Despite opposition from the individual uniformed services, the speech was clear and unequivocal Presidential support for the base force concept that had been developed by Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In separate studies they had conducted a thorough review of US strategy and concluded that major changes in force structure and deployment patterns were possible. The new strategic concept not only would reduce forces, but also would realign those remaining forces under consolidated geographic and functional commands.

The development of the base force concept was important not only for its dramatic result, but more importantly, for the process by which it was carried out. In a major departure from post-World War II military tradition, General Powell, as Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, was able to conduct a study into a very contentious issue without the active participation of the individual uniformed military services. Prior to 1986, such a study would have been virtually impossible without the involvement of the uniformed service chiefs because decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were corporate in nature and had to be arrived at by consensus. This meant that each service chief had a vote (or veto) on all issues which came before the JCS whether or not they directly concerned his service. Under that system, had there been direction from the Secretary of Defense to find force reductions of the above magnitude, the responsibility of the individual chiefs to be an advocate for their service within the JCS would likely have clashed with their responsibility to act as a member of the corporate body for the good of the country. In such a situation it is entirely probable that they would have been unable to agree.

What made the study possible was the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which transferred the duties then being performed by the corporate JCS to the Chairman. Although not specifically mentioned in the Act, a major motivator in the effort to consolidate control in the person of the Chairman was a Congressional perception of and frustration with the Navy’s tradition of independence and freedom of action. Believing itself unique among the services because of its ability to operate without close involvement with either the Army or the Air Force, the Navy had historically resisted
attempts at service unification, preferring instead the intricate staffing of the pre-1986 JCS system that had carefully balanced each service's responsibilities and concerns. Despite intense opposition from distinguished Navy leaders and partisans, the Goldwater-Nichols Act laid the groundwork for the elimination of the Navy's independence by giving the Chairman unprecedented power to determine and articulate the military strategy that is laid before civilian authorities. As long as Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. was Chairman the effects of the Act on traditional methods of cooperation among the Joint Chiefs were relatively mild. By the time General Powell assumed the office in October 1989, however, the strategic reevaluation made necessary by the combination of fiscal crisis and waning Soviet threat made full imposition of the CJCS powers authorized by the Act inescapable. Since the Act also transferred control of the Joint Staff from the corporate JCS to the Chairman, General Powell was able to control the study without the previously customary central role of the individual services. For the Navy, the results of this change in procedure were momentous.

THE EFFECT

Most observers would assume that the major effect of the base force concept on the Navy would be the reduction in CVBGs from 14 to 11-12. Although the loss is clearly important to naval operations, for those more knowledgeable of mainstream
naval thinking, the more serious effect was the loss of the Navy's traditional independent control over planning for employment of naval forces.

At first glance, this assertion may be difficult to comprehend, especially since US naval capabilities have been centered around the CVBG as the basic building block of naval power since 1942. Originally developed to defeat Japanese naval power, it has evolved into the smallest unit capable of projecting power and sustaining offensive action in the face of a three dimensional threat of air, surface, and submarine attack. Moreover, as technology has improved, the CVBG has been invested with increasing capability, reinforcing its capacity to defend against concentrated enemy attack and execute its assigned power projection mission. The CVBG was the unit of power envisioned for execution of the maritime strategy, the sine qua non of naval power. Although it has been repeatedly attacked by critics as too vulnerable in an age of cruise missiles, too expensive in an era of fiscal problems, or inconsequential in terms of the mission assigned, its utility and success in a wide variety of employments over the years have convinced successive Presidents and normally parsimonious Congresses to fund a powerful and flexible CVBG force.

To understand, therefore, why the loss of 2-3 CVBGs could be considered less important than the loss of independence, it is necessary to understand the history of naval operations. In the days when communications with ships at sea were extremely diffi-
cult, admirals were often simply given a task and then expected to use their training, experience, and ingenuity to carry it out. Because navies were so difficult to redirect once they were out of sight of land, political authorities were forced to recognize that operations at sea were elementally different than operations on land. Thus, they acknowledged that the degree of control normally associated with military operations ashore was impractical at sea. Despite dramatic improvements in communications, this tradition of independent operations has persisted to the modern era, but not without increasing concerns expressed by political and military authorities.

For the US Navy, the tradition of naval independence in the modern era was validated by its experience in World War II. Although the Central Pacific campaign was clear and convincing evidence that by itself the Navy could achieve spectacular results against a country uniquely vulnerable to sea power, against a continental state it was recognized that sea power had limited relevance unless it was applied in close coordination with land power. The central lesson of the war, therefore, was that in a global conflict, a combined arms approach was the key to success. The issue was how best to achieve that coordination.

Navalists contended that due to the essential and enduring differences between war at sea and on the land, the Navy could be of most value to the effort ashore if it retained freedom of action, i.e., the ability to apply its power at the most
advantageous point as determined by the Navy. Others, notably senior military commanders, argued that since the navy was needed to get the Army ashore and to support it until the battle moved too far inland for sea power to affect it, they should have control of naval forces similar to that which they exercised over their land and air forces. Though acceptable command arrangements were ultimately worked out, command and control arrangements between the Navy and the Army had been difficult throughout the war. In the view of senior military officers, the Navy's obdurate insistence upon maintaining its basic independent freedom of action, even when operating in direct support of a major Army effort ashore, was seen as unnecessary and a potentially dangerous split in the unity of command. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was a case in point. 20

Against this background, the post-war efforts at service unification take on more meaning. For navalists, the 1948 organization of the Department of Defense, the demotion of the Secretary of the Navy from the Cabinet, and the effort to consolidate naval aviation under the Air Force were misguided attempts to reduce the Navy's independence by stripping it of its influence and control over maritime operations. In spite of these efforts, the Navy was able to retain effective control over its operating forces through an August, 1948 agreement with the Secretary of Defense, which was subsequently endorsed by President Truman and issued as Department of Defense Instruction 5100.1. This instruction, which defined the roles and missions
of the armed services, granted control over the internal structures and composition of the operating forces, as well as responsibility for the formulation of tactical doctrine, to the parent service.\textsuperscript{21} This control over how the forces were to fight was to become a key factor in continued Navy freedom of action after 1968. In the DOD reorganization passed that year by Congress, independent control over the Navy's operating forces passed from the CNO to the unified commanders.\textsuperscript{22} Although this would appear to have been a setback, by combining its doctrinal control over employment of forces with its ability to dictate where they were to be employed through influence in the corporate JCS structure, the Navy retained an effective lock on the planning for the employment of Naval forces. Although the unified commanders were specified as the warfighters, the plans they prepared had to be reviewed and approved by the corporate JCS. Thus, if the unified commanders envisioned employing naval forces in any manner different from the Navy view, the Navy's blocking position in the corporate JCS could have prevented approval of the plan. In such an atmosphere, the Navy was able to maintain its tradition of independent naval planning.

This tradition of independence was an important element of naval thinking in the post-war era. Although international or budgetary climates would cause occasional retrenchment, Navy statements throughout the post-war period reveal a strikingly consistent offensive orientation that would have been lacking had
the Navy not perceived itself as a somewhat independent element of national power. Despite this tradition, however, there was a fairly common perception that the Navy's strategic thinking was generally focused on issues that had little relevance to the battle on the Central Front. Thus, when the Maritime Strategy was advanced by the Navy as a means to influence events on the ground in Europe, it was seen by many as a bold resurgence of independent naval thinking, a perception that was greatly enhanced as naval officers and others eagerly grasped the concepts of the strategy. In the years that followed its appearance, a virtual avalanche of articles, books, and papers were produced which used the Maritime Strategy to justify weapons systems, develop operational concepts, rework operational plans to defend geographic theaters, and apply the concepts to operations with allied navies. Ironically, as discussed above, it was that very independence that was at least in part responsible for the Congressional perception of naval obstinacy that led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Even as the Navy was displaying this resurgence in strategic thought, the tradition of independence that fostered it and the system under which it flourished were passing away. By articulating a new strategic concept which the Navy had no voice in developing, the Chairman undercut the tradition. With the Presidential endorsement of the Powell study on August 2, 1990, the traditional pattern of naval independence was broken. It is clear that while the Navy may still have responsibility for
developing forces and determining employment patterns, it no longer has control over the strategy for employing those forces. As the single authority for integrating and presenting strategy to civilian authority, the Chairman now has ultimate control over the Maritime Strategy. This begs the obvious question.

THE QUESTION

Is the Maritime Strategy dead? The answer is yes . . . and no. If one considers it to be what its critics have always maintained it was, i.e., a Navy-only, go-it-alone prescription for a glorious charge of the naval light brigade on the Kola Peninsula, then the Maritime Strategy is indeed dead. If one considers it to have been justification for a 15 CVBG Navy, or indeed for CVBGs themselves, then the Maritime Strategy is likewise dead. On the other hand, if one considers the Maritime Strategy to be precisely what the Navy has always said it was, i.e., the maritime component of the National Military Strategy, then it most emphatically is not dead. In many ways it is different from the strategy articulated throughout the 1980's, but it is alive and kicking.

The differences in the Maritime Strategy are both subtle and significant. They were made necessary by changes in the basic concepts of the National Military Strategy, which were outlined by Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
on March 12, 1991.\textsuperscript{25} The concepts are deterrence, power projection, forward presence, force reconstitution, collective security, maritime and aerospace superiority, security assistance, arms control, and technological superiority. At first glance these bear a striking resemblance to the concepts of the previous strategy, but there are key philosophical differences. The differences, the transition of forward defense to forward presence, coalition warfare conducted with strong alliances to collective security, and maritime superiority to maritime and aerospace superiority, had a major effect on the Maritime Strategy.

Recognizing the changing global strategic environment, the revised National Military Strategy considers the most likely threat to US interests to be crises arising from instability in the former Third World.\textsuperscript{26} As a result, the emphasis of US military activity has shifted from global containment of Communism and readiness for war (forward defense) to global stability, i.e., influencing events where US interests are at stake (forward presence). Similarly, the transition from collective defense, i.e., coalition warfare with strong alliances, to collective security is an important philosophical shift. Collective defense requires a common perception of an external threat. Since the Soviet Union is no longer perceived as enough of a threat to compel collective defense, collective security, an arrangement which implies transitory military coalitions under a common political umbrella, was viewed as much more useful in
dealing with future crises. Finally, the shift from maritime superiority to maritime and aerospace superiority is a clear implication that in future military actions the Navy will not necessarily be acting alone.

For the Maritime Strategy the effect of these changes was profound. Although the basic elements of the Strategy remain the same, i.e., deterrence through the forward deployment of highly capable, flexible naval forces, the shift in emphasis altered the definition of terms. For navalists, the best means of crisis response is through forward defense which can best be attained by keeping CVBGs constantly deployed to traditional operating areas in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. The revised defense philosophy considers such constant deployments neither necessary nor possible. Influencing events in a given region through the application of military power does not require maintaining CVBGs constantly on station. Forward deployed CVBGs may provide the President the option of using the most capable, balanced, and politically independent forces available, but they are not the only option.

Recent political trends clearly indicate that mobile, flexible, and joint power projection capabilities will be required in the future, but nothing indicates that all contingencies will be intense enough to warrant using CVBGs. Scenarios which require a multiple CVBG projection of power such as the ELDORADO CANYON operation against Libya or a massive infusion of joint US military power such as the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM operation against
Iraq are likely to be few and far between. Most will likely be lesser contingencies, in which US interests can be adequately represented by some different, lesser degree of military power. If the Maritime Strategy was to remain viable for such contingencies, it needed to be able to provide other options.

THE ANSWER

The primary focus of the new defense strategy as outlined both by the President and the Chairman was on regional threats to US interests. CVBGs are exceptionally useful tools of retribution, but for contingencies at a level of violence lower than punitive strike (e.g., non-combatant evacuation operations, presence, etc.), the Maritime Strategy had to develop a more flexible approach to conflict in the mid range of the spectrum of violence. This was not a rejection of the previous strategy, but was, rather, an addition to it made possible by refocusing its basic tenets on a different threat scenario. The point was to integrate the Maritime Strategy more thoroughly into the full range of the National Military Strategy.

Comprehensive studies undertaken within the Navy staff indicated that viable options for dealing with global instability already existed with the Navy's well developed amphibious capability. Although it had always been considered a major component of maritime power, the Marine Corps had not possessed a central role in the Maritime Strategy as it was originally developed in
the 1980's. Since the Strategy was based on a protracted conventional war with the Soviet Union, the major Navy concern had been fleet action and power projection against the Eurasian heartland, a role which did not envision forcible entry by amphibious warfare. In the revised international environment, however, the Marines' ability to create over-the-beach power projection packages tailored to a particular situation became a major asset. The result was the elevation of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to a position coequal with the CVBG as a central element in the revised Maritime Strategy. 27

This expansion in warfighting focus not only dealt with the changing threat to US interests, but also recognized that the 25% force reduction mandated by the base force would effectively prevent continuation of the existing pattern of forward deployment if that pattern were solely focused on CVBGs. The post-World War II pattern had been to deploy the CVBGs to hubs in the traditional operating areas where US and Soviet interests overlapped at likely points of crisis. The revised Maritime Strategy postulates that the reduction in bilateral tension with the Soviet Union will allow the Navy to break out of that pattern to operate over a broader area, with different configurations of combat power. CVBGs can still operate in those hubs as necessary, but along with MAGTFs (especially when escorted by surface action groups), the central elements of the Maritime Strategy are freed up for the full range of missions from presence to regional warfare. This revised operational concept, designed to be em-
ployed independently or in concert with assets from other services, provides a critical capability for dealing with the uncertainties of the revised threat. 28

Although the revised Maritime Strategy represents a significant shift in Navy thinking, for the theater CINCs it represents no real change in warfighting capability. CVBGs still operate as prescribed by Navy doctrine providing the same range of power projection options as they did under the old Maritime Strategy. Similarly, MAGTFs, which have always been forcible entry options available to the CINCs, operate under Navy/Marine Corps doctrine. What is different for the CINC now is that he is no longer faced with obdurate Navy insistence on the use of CVBGs in all situations. Thus, when dealing with the challenges and tasks posed by the instability of a multipolar world, a CINC has more than one preferred Navy option to consider. While this may seem to be an obvious point, in terms of corporate Navy support to theater CINCs, it is most significant. The revised Maritime Strategy is an unambiguous statement of Navy intent to work within the joint system.

The essential point to be taken from this discussion is not simply that the Maritime Strategy has evolved, but to note how quickly it happened and how thoroughly it integrates naval capability into the revised National Military Strategy. The effort to revise the strategy only began after a 23 August 1990 memorandum from the CNO. 29 Despite the loss of its independence, by publishing the revised strategy within a few short
months of the public disclosure of the Presidential guidelines and the base force (which meant obtaining CJCS support for the revised concept before going public), the Navy demonstrated that it had retained the intellectual capacity necessary to determine its own future. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the theater CINCs may be the designated warfighters, but how they fight the war with naval forces is still very much being determined by the Navy.

THE CONCERN

This does not imply that all is sweetness and light within the Navy. Despite the clear leadership evident in the revised strategy, not everyone within the Navy agrees with its new direction. Private and public concerns have been raised that the force reductions might require surging from one geographic region to another with a reduced ability to protect national interests in the early stages of a crisis. Moreover, routine USN missions such as fleet exercises with allies, presence missions and naval diplomacy would have to be curtailed to support such a regional surge. The more basic fear is that the assumptions that underlie both the Presidential direction and the base force simply might be wrong. If so, the U.S. may be required to reestablish a more aggressive defense posture vis a vis the Soviet Union. A reduction in maritime forces, especially in deployable CVBGs, could effectively preclude that capability, especially if the
previous level of commitment is required. If so, the mid-range naval missions postulated by the revised strategy might have to be curtailed.30

How such concerns will affect naval force levels and the Maritime Strategy in the future is far from certain, but for the immediate future they will not. By designing a revised strategy, the Navy demonstrated that no matter what the rapidly changing world environment may portend for naval forces, the maritime component of an integrated National Military Strategy was flexible enough to handle it. August 2, 1990 may not be remembered as the day the Maritime Strategy died, but it could be called the day it was reborn with a purple skin.
NOTES


6. The overall effect of the debate is best described in Swartz, op. cit.


18. 'New Study Challenges Validity of U.S. Carrier-Based Maritime Strategy,' Inside the Navy, July 2, 1990, pp. 8-9. See also Komer, Mearsheimer, and Beatty, op. cit.


20. At Leyte Gulf, Admiral Halsey operated in support of General MacArthur's troops ashore, but also had tasking from Admiral Nimitz which told him that should the Japanese aircraft carriers appear, their destruction was a primary task. Because he went after the Japanese carriers, he allowed Japanese battleships to get close to the landing area. E.B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), pp. 342-343.


24. Over six hundred such articles are cataloged in Swartz, op. cit.

25. Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Statement Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, committee draft, pp. 2-3.


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