ACHIEVING MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN AN ERA OF CHANGE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War a reassessment is underway regarding all aspects of American military strategy and force structure. Although naval force structure is being reduced due to fiscal pressures and a lessened Soviet threat, the requirements for forward presence and regional sea control remain valid. The Navy's task is made more complicated by the increasing number of military capabilities of regional powers and an unwillingness on the part of American national decision makers to relinquish global naval presence. This paper includes a discussion of Bush Administration military strategy, the changing threat, and the difficulties faced by the Navy in adapting to the new environment. It also includes a review of three alternative options for achieving maritime superiority in an era of a smaller United States naval force structure. The conclusions reached are that (over)
(Block 19 cont.): the requirement for maritime superiority remains but that a change of "habits of mind" will be necessary to achieve it.
Abstract of

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Persian Gulf War was still in progress in February 1991, when the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified on Capitol Hill. Although they discussed the war and its progress, their main topic was "...restructuring and reducing American military forces to adapt to changes...and to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era." Describing an era of lessened Soviet threat and reduced resources for defense spending, both men were eager to articulate the Bush Administration's vision of the future role of American armed forces in protecting our national interests. In their minds, however, the one thing that had not changed was the necessity for the United States to maintain maritime superiority, a factor described by General Powell as being "...essential to our ability to protect global US interests and to project power..." It was clear from their testimony that both men believed that future American strategy would continue to have a strong maritime component.

It is ironic that this declaratory support of maritime superiority comes at a time when the naval forces to achieve it are diminishing and when some analysts have concluded that
during the Persian Gulf War, "...it does not look like the Navy's contribution on the offensive side was very important..." More importantly, this expressed need for maritime superiority also comes at a time when the Navy's leadership is investigating how the naval force structure developed for global conventional war against the Soviet Union can be used effectively against less specific, but potent, regional threats.

This paper will discuss some of the options for achieving maritime superiority in this new era of smaller naval force levels and a less specific threat. To accomplish this I will review the changed environment and its impact on the employment of military forces. Secondly, I will discuss the difficulty encountered in using naval forces in a traditional manner towards achieving the goal of maritime superiority in this new environment. Finally, I will propose some conventional force options which may be of value in pursuit of this goal. It is my intention to limit this discussion to the conventional dimension only. The strategic nuclear dimension, although definitely a part of maritime superiority, is, at present, an issue for the United States and the Soviet Union only and is beyond the scope of this paper.
CHAPTER II

THE CHANGED ENVIRONMENT

The changing threat. The events of the last two years have changed the international environment radically and altered the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in particular. Although Defense Secretary Cheney was restrained in his hopes for future progress in arms control between the two nations and for continued economic and political reform within the Soviet Union itself, he reached two conclusions which could have significant impact on future American security requirements. First, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact as a military organization, he concluded that "...the threat of short warning, global war starting in Europe is now less likely than at any time in the last 45 years." 1 Secondly, because of the Soviets' internal economic problems and General Secretary Gorbachev's expressed desire to improve relations with the West, Mr. Cheney stated that, "...the Soviet ability to project conventional power beyond its borders will continue to decline..." 2 As Elliot Cohen wrote, this change will require some adjustment on our part because for "...forty years our national security establishment has had the strategic assumptions of the cold war hard-wired into its...habits of mind..." 3 One "habit of mind" that will certainly require
adjustment will be the need to address regional issues independent of an East/West context.

The new military strategy which is appearing in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War has this distinctly regional focus. In a collaborative article which appeared in the April 1991 edition of the U. S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps concluded that due to regional problems ranging from poverty and ethnic strife to drug trafficking, "...international turmoil, aggression, and conflict are not things of the past." In some respects this threat may be more difficult to deal with than a global Soviet threat. In a briefing prepared by the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603) on which the above article was based, the authors acknowledged that the economic and political needs for the United States to remain engaged internationally were unchanged by the new strategic environment. However they also concluded that "...[In] the absence of a galvanizing Soviet threat, current...allies will be less willing to subordinate their national interests to a common purpose..." While this conclusion may be overstated in light of the experience of the international coalition against Iraq, it is likewise safe to assume that the United States will be unable to routinely form as broad a coalition in pursuit of its national goals. One need
only remember recent concern with the potential reaction of the Arab members of the anti-Iraq coalition to an Israeli retaliatory strike against Baghdad to understand the fragility of such international efforts.

Because the threat is regional rather than global does not mean that it lacks substantial lethality. The proliferation of high technology weapons in developing nations is a legitimate cause of concern. The damage caused to U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58), U.S.S. Tripoli (LPH 10), and U.S.S. Princeton (CG-59), by relatively inexpensive minewarfare systems is worthy of note. On the higher end of the technology spectrum, it is estimated that 26 countries currently operate diesel submarines while a total of 51 possess some type of anti-ship cruise missile. The British experience during the Falklands/Malvinas campaign is also instructive in this regard. During the operation, the British lost two ships and had a third significantly damaged by Exocet cruise missiles. The fear of subsequent Exocet attacks on British forces became a factor which restricted the flexibility of the Royal Navy in employing its naval forces. Somewhat unnoticed in the publicity that accompanied the Exocet strikes was the effectiveness of the relatively low technology attacks by Argentine air forces which sank four British warships and damaged eight others with gravity bombs alone. Similarly,
British concern with a single Argentine diesel submarine resulted in the expenditure of over 200 pieces of British antisubmarine ordnance against non-submarine contacts. The relative threat posed by the possession of high technology weapons in quantity by regional powers becomes more pronounced as "...major military powers reduce forces and pull back from forward positions..." It is also important to note that this regional threat is multi-dimensional and countering it will require the continued use of anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, and anti-surface systems.

Finally, there is the ambiguity of a threat described as "regional instability." Absent another wolf in wolf's clothing such as Saddam Hussein, it may be difficult to convince current friends and allies of the threat posed by an individual regional power especially if they have significant economic ties with our adversary. The "New World Order" will be in Eliot Cohen's words "...a world not of 'good guys and bad guys' but of 'gray guys'." The changed force structure. Coincident with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1991, President Bush outlined his vision of a new national security strategy "...where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence..." This strategy of peacetime presence, nuclear deterrence, crisis
response, and the ability to "reconstitute" forces in the event of a resurgent Soviet threat will be supported by a military policy based on a force structure termed "the base force."

This base force, so named because it is considered the "basic minimum" below which the nation could not meet its national security requirements, involves reducing current forces by nearly 500,000 personnel over the next five years and restructuring the remaining military establishment into several "force packages." While the final structure of this base force remains the subject of considerable debate, it is being used for force planning and will have considerable impact on the forces available to the Navy for execution of national strategy.

The naval component of the base force will be composed of 450 ships (including twelve aircraft carriers) and three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) by 1995. This force represents an 18 percent reduction from current force levels and a 25 percent reduction from the 600 ship plan of the early 1980's. In his FY 1992 Naval Force Posture Statement, Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Kelso, indicated that the risk inherent with this smaller force will be offset through greater reliance on high technology weapons systems and platforms in the submarine and surface forces, a continuing program of modernization, and a revised naval reserve concept based on the FF-1052 class.
frigate and involving nearly 25 percent of the Navy's surface ASW forces. He also implied that this smaller force will require a change in deployment patterns which can no longer depend on the "...traditional assumptions of Cold War confrontation." This deployment impact must remain at the forefront of this discussion as presence requirements are reassessed. The FY92 force structure is intended to support a full-time forward deployed carrier force of between two and three carriers assuming a 30 percent peacetime deployment tempo. The base force structure assumes that two carriers will be forward deployed routinely, one in the Western Pacific and one in the Mediterranean Sea/Persian Gulf. It is worthy of note that three carriers permanently deployed is the same deployment posture maintained during FY84 when the total force was roughly 50 ships higher than that predicted for FY95.

ADM Kelso is correct in concluding that a change in assumptions regarding deployment areas and forces is required in this era of regional threats and diminished naval assets. What may also be required is a change in some of the navy's traditional assumptions involving the utility of naval forces in the developing world.
CHAPTER III

THE NAVY'S PROBLEM

The problem of tradition. The relative ease with which naval forces can be employed in peacetime and crisis situations has made warships the military option of choice throughout the history of the United States. A comprehensive analysis of post-World War II military operations conducted by the Brookings Institution in 1978 determined that naval forces participated in over 80 percent of the 215 incidents studied and were the sole participants in nearly half. Based on their analysis, the authors concluded that "...the Navy clearly has been the foremost instrument for the United States' political uses of the armed forces: at all times, in all places, regardless of the specifics of the situation." 1 This historical attractiveness of the navy as a political instrument becomes apparent with cursory review. Naval operations are conducted worldwide, can be of a duration dependent on the circumstances, and are less complicated politically to use than ground forces. Historically, naval forces "...can be used more subtly to support foreign policy incentives—to underscore threats, or warnings, or promises, or commitments...and they can do so without...tying the President's hand." 2 This
peacetime employment of naval forces has included missions of presence, naval demonstrations, and the use of force.

Presence operations have been the most common of these missions with warships serving as "...visible signifiers...of [the] country's intentions and commitments..." Routine deployments have been used to place forces in areas of traditional conflict and to assert a "natural right" to use a given body of water to prevent the tacit legitimation of excessive maritime claims. While peacetime presence serves rather general political/military functions, naval demonstrations are intended to provide "crisis stability" in specific situations. While these may involve a "courtesy port call" by a single ship to an area of concern, in practice during the past ten years it has involved the deployment of a carrier battle group to the crisis area. The action is intended to demonstrate national resolve while simultaneously providing the operational commander with additional forces. For example, although a total of eight surface units were assigned to the Persian Gulf-based Middle East Force at the start of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, this naval force was augmented by two aircraft carrier battle groups within five days.4

Naval enthusiasts claim that the greatest advantage of naval forces beyond their mobility is their flexibility of
employment. Naval strategist James Cable writes that although "...limited naval force is most economically employed when the mere threat achieves the objective..." he foresees the "...frequent use...of limited naval force...as an alternative to war." It is the desire to retain this perceived flexibility that provides the greatest difficulty when a decision must be made to modify current patterns of deployment. The Persian Gulf decision to immediately surge two carrier battle groups to the region despite the presence of a substantial surface force there is instructive. First, it leads to a questioning of how much conventional deterrence was provided by the "presence" of the eight ship Middle East Force. This questioning is consistent with the Brookings Institution's conclusion that "presence" and other "...low level uses of force may be disregarded by..." decisionmakers who may not perceive important U.S. interests to be involved...[and] may calculate that they will be able to successfully cope..." with those forces that the United States may bring to bear. The second major impediment to the Navy's ability to change its current deployment patterns lies with the National Command Authority's perception of what constitutes effective naval force. In 1985, Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, stated that during his five years on the National Security Council Staff that"...the first question asked,
whenever there was a crisis...[was] 'Where are the carriers?; Where is the Marine Amphibious Ready Group?' 8 As Secretary Cheney's comment that "...a robust navy to control the world's oceans..." 9 will be a key element of the new strategy indicates, this pattern of thought remains with the national leadership and will be difficult to change.

The problem of "success". Another problem facing the Navy in this era of change is the legacy of the 1980s when spokesmen such as John Lehman justified naval force levels and employment practices in terms of "The Maritime Strategy." Although proponents of the strategy stressed that it covered the entire spectrum of violence from peacetime presence to strategic nuclear war, its ultimate purpose was "...the early, forceful, global use of naval power in a future war with the Soviet Union." 10 The 1985 House Armed Services Subcommittee testimony alluded to earlier provides an example of how the Maritime Strategy was presented. Each application of maritime power across the spectrum of conflict was described in an US/Soviet context and the force was constructed accordingly. John Lehman's statement that "...we wouldn't need a Navy if there weren't hostile forces threatening our maritime interests..." 11 takes on a new perspective in light of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact when that threat has been the Soviet Union.
While the Soviet Union remained the principal threat to American maritime interests the assumption that the carrier battle group could also deal effectively with threats in developing nations was never openly challenged. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, the aircraft carrier-based naval force structure is coming under closer scrutiny for its effectiveness in a regional conflict environment. The initial analysis of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience provides mixed results. Citing early force arrival, ability to concentrate force, and the diversion of Iraqi forces to prepare for the amphibious assault that never came, the Commander of the Central Command naval component asserts that the "...flexibility of naval power proved a big winner." There is also general consensus that the naval blockade of Iraq, which included 7000 ship interceptions and nearly 1000 boardings, was a success. On the other hand, there is also a developing perception that the Navy made little direct contribution to actual combat success. An April 28, 1991 article in the Los Angeles TIMES reported that Navy aircraft comprised less that 16 percent of the total Persian Gulf air forces and that carrier aircraft dropped less than 10 percent of the "smart bombs" used. There is also a growing percentage of observers who have concluded that the naval force developed
to counter the Soviet Union will be unable "...to fight
regional conflicts at an affordable cost." 14

The Navy’s dilemma. The problem facing the Navy as the
national security establishment shifts from the Eurocentric
focus of the last 45 years to a regional orientation is that
the basic desire of the national leadership to have "maritime
superiority," or the ability to control the seas, remains
unchanged. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy
and Resources cites America’s need to "...continue our naval
predominance..."15 while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff speaks of the need for Atlantic Command naval forces
"...capable of establishing and maintaining sea control...[and]
conducting forced entry operations...", the need for a
"...presence in the Mediterranean and in the...Persian Gulf..."
and of a Pacific Command where "...[forward] presence will be
primarily maritime..."16 Such statements imply that although
the national security establishment wants a smaller navy it is
reluctant to modify the deployment requirements accordingly.
It is worthy of note that during 1990-91 while over 100 ships,
including six aircraft carriers, were deployed to the Persian
Gulf conflict, the UNITAS South America commitment was met,
naval units were involved in anti-narcotics operations off the
coast of the United States, and a major non-combatant
evacuation operation was conducted in Liberia. While such
performance satisfies the ego, it raises questions of how the Navy will be able to meet such commitments in the future with a smaller force without changing its deployment practices.

The issue facing the Navy as it begins this era of change is whether its forces will provide the capability to control the seas. This issue occurs at a time when the Soviet Union is retaining substantial naval power relative to its cutbacks in other forces, where potential regional adversaries have the capability to field a multi-dimensional threat, and while questions are developing about the capability of the existing naval forces to deal with regional conflict. It appears that the Navy's leadership must broaden its view of the alternatives available to meet the regional challenge while not losing ground with respect to the Soviet threat.
In the April 1991 *Proceedings* article noted above, the Secretary of the Navy and his co-authors wrote that it "...is time to challenge our ground rules and assumptions." The changed international environment, the fiscal pressures within the United States to reduce defense spending, and the uncertainty inherent with the breakdown of the bi-polar international system which has existed for the past 45 years combine to make the achievement of maritime superiority under all conditions a difficult proposition. In spite of this atmosphere of change, there is still the pressure for "business as usual." The continued pressure to maintain forces in their "traditional deployment hubs," such as the Mediterranean, remains strong as indicated by the continuation of UNITAS and other traditional operations while a significant portion of American naval power was committed to the Persian Gulf. There is also the desire to hedge against the Soviets who continue to modernize their strategic submarine fleet and who have deployed their first class of conventional aircraft carriers. This concern with "maldeployment," or being out of position to deal with a crisis effectively has not changed with the changing environment.
These pressures aside, one can make some conclusions on which new alternatives for force employment will be based. First, absent a global threat by the Soviet Union, the requirement for maritime superiority in most crises will be one of local sea control. In Desert Shield/Desert Storm there was no effective threat to prevent free use of the sea lines of communications by coalition forces when outside the Red Sea/Persian Gulf theater. This experience was similar to that of the Royal Navy in the Falklands/Malvinas campaign and may be a safe assumption for future regional planning. Secondly, a carrier battlegroup may not be immediately available in the theater of operations as naval force levels decrease. As noted above, the base force provides for only two forward deployed carriers, a point also raised by ADM Kelso in his posture statement. Because of this, national decision makers may be forced to use forces other than the aircraft carrier to augment on scene naval units in the event of a crisis. Further, if Blechman and Kaplan's conclusion regarding the high correlation of carrier employment in crises and Soviet interest or involvement is correct, other naval units may be acceptable alternatives to a carrier battlegroup for crisis control. Third, the capability of many regional powers to present anti-ship missile, air, and submarine threats will require that naval forces used in contingency operations have capabilities
in each of these warfare dimensions. Finally, because the environment of future contingencies may not be as supportive as that of Saudi Arabia in terms of availability of modern facilities or ability to employ our forces at will, contingency force packages may require some form of mobile air power and the ability to insert troops. With these assumptions in mind it is worthwhile to review some alternative force employment options.

The tailored employment option. This alternative was expressed in the OP-603 briefing and is based on the alternate use of aircraft carrier battle groups and "special task groups" centered on an AEGIS cruiser or destroyer 3 to achieve local sea control. These groups, which could include amphibious ships with embarked Marines, would operate from several "deployment hubs" where they could close one another and concentrate their force in the event of regional crisis in either of their deployment areas.

This option has a certain attractiveness. First it allows naval forces to maintain a presence level similar to that achieved currently in spite of a smaller total force level while keeping the overall navy deployment ratio at the 30 percent level desired by the Navy's leadership. Secondly, the AEGIS weapons system will provide the air defense capability necessary to operate effectively in a regional cruise.
missile/air threat environment. Further, the special task group would have a power projection/strike role inherent with the TOMAHAWK cruise missile or embarked Marine forces. It is worthy of note that special task forces of this type have been used successfully in a variety of operations in the past. In 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deployed a small task group centered on the amphibious helicopter carrier U.S.S. Guam to Kenya to demonstrate American support for that nation during a regional crisis with Uganda. This option was selected over surging the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise into the area. More recently, AEGIS cruisers have become principal platforms in the Carribean counter-narcotics operation as their availability has increased. These surface ships provide an enhanced air surveillance capability without the political difficulties that deployment of a carrier for the same purpose might have caused. Further, the force used in the "Operation Sharp Edge" Liberian evacuations may also prove a model for this type of special task group. Composed of an air-capable assault ship (in this case an LHA), two other amphibious ships, the embarked MEU (SOC), and a destroyer, this force provided a variety of combatant and non-combatant capabilities across a range of mission areas, including a limited forced entry capability. Although the Liberian situation was relatively benign, one can envision the expansion of this group to include
an AEGIS/TOMAHAWK cruiser and an additional ASW unit in more hostile circumstances.

The national carrier option. The smaller carrier force of the base force will necessarily lead to some changes in the way these ships are employed. As noted in the various Navy documents describing new employment options, carriers will alternate with special task groups or other combinations of ships as a means of achieving forward presence and regional sea control. The base force concept as expressed by both GEN Powell and ADM Jeremiah assumes that two carriers will be forward deployed, one in the Mediterranean or Persian Gulf and the other in the Western Pacific. The remaining carriers will most likely remain in the vicinity of the United States in various stages of readiness. In his annual statement, ADM Kelso predicts that three carriers could be on station in the same vicinity within 25 days based upon a 30 percent deployment ratio and this type of readiness posture.6 The surge capability could be enhanced through a change in carrier scheduling policies. Although carriers are currently scheduled on a worldwide rather that fleet specific basis their deployments tend to follow a set pattern. Atlantic Fleet units relieve one another in the Mediterranean and Pacific Fleet ships follow a similar process in the Far East. However, carriers on occasion deploy beyond their normal operating areas
and routinely transfer between fleets for major overhauls and service life extension periods. Given the new environment it might be worthwhile to consider shifting scheduling authority for these ships from the unified command's naval component commander to the National Command Authority. Such action would, in essence, make the aircraft carrier a "national asset" due to its unique power projection capability. One-to-one carrier turnovers would not be required as the carrier might be deployed to a different region where it would replace or augment the "special task group" already in the vicinity. By this means, the ability for national decision makers to tailor carrier deployments to a rapidly changing regional situation could be enhanced and the carrier's flexibility exploited to its maximum potential.

The Expeditionary Force Package (EFP) approach. A third means by which regional maritime superiority could be achieved is through a "building block" approach to force construction. This method would cross service lines and could be tailored precisely to the contingency at hand. The EFP would be a policy of earmarking specific units to act as components of a maritime expeditionary force and requiring certain levels of readiness of these units for the period of their assignment. The theater EFP would have ground, sea, and air components determined by factors such as the proximity of an aircraft
carrier to the theater, the availability of aerial or sea ports, and the willingness of regional powers to accept the presence of American ground forces. Given a Persian Gulf scenario where the Pacific carrier battlegroup and amphibious ready group are stationed in the Northern Arabian Sea, an EFP could be established in the Northwestern Pacific by deploying a Special Task Group there and by earmarking appropriately sized land-based air force and army units to deploy to that are if required. This contingency planning arrangement would permit the maintenance of naval presence in an area essentially the same as currently patrolled in spite of the smaller naval force level planned for the base force. This option could help to offset concerns of maldeployment expressed by naval planners and the national leadership.
It would be foolish to deny that the international environment has changed dramatically over the past two years. The Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist as a military organization, the Soviet Union is in the process of confronting serious internal economic and political problems, and the major Western powers have found that they could form an effective military coalition with non-Western nations to defeat a regional military threat. But with these changes has also come uncertainty based, in part, on an underlying suspicion of the Soviet Union and the reality that the USSR will "...remain the only country that can destroy us and our way of life...in thirty minutes."  

Superimposed on this concern is the growing capability of regional powers to establish hegemony over their neighbors at the same time that the ability of the United States to exercise its military power globally is in the process of being reduced. In the words of RADM Thomas Brooks, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the "...world is different--but it is not necessarily safer."

As much as the world has changed, there are still numerous economic, political, and military reasons for the United States to remain globally engaged. This regional focus brings with it
the requirement to continue our traditional policies of forward presence and crisis response in spite of smaller force levels. Because of an inability to predict the location of future threats to our interests and the traditional utility of naval forces in terms of mobility and flexibility to satisfy these response requirements, we must, as I. Lewis Libby testified, "...continue our naval predominance as an element of protecting ourselves and our far-flung interests." Although questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness of maritime forces in achieving policy goals and in persuading regional adversaries to modify their behavior, these forces have the capability to provide the unified commander with substantial military power in circumstances where access to regional facilities may not be readily available. The deficiencies alleged in the Navy's Persian Gulf performance are not inherent defects and can be overcome by changes in equipment and tactics. Further, as one analyst concluded, "...between the declining U.S. [military] base structure overseas and the increasing sophistication of weaponry, the Navy's role should grow in both frequency and intensity."4

What has changed is the assumption of the Maritime Strategy that the "Navy can go it alone" in a regional crisis. Sending the nearest carrier battle group to a crisis area is no longer the routine solution to the problem and has become more
difficult as the chances of having a carrier in the vicinity decline with force structure and the capabilities of local adversaries increase.

The solution to achieving maritime superiority in this era of change will be found, in part, in the change in assumptions called for by Secretary Garrett, ADM Kelso, and GEN Gray. The national leadership, in general, and the Navy’s leadership, in particular, must assess the effectiveness of force building options such as those provided above. It is reasonable to expect that these options will be multi-service innovations aimed at occasionally achieving "maritime predominance" through the use of non-naval means.

The era of change brings with it the need for change in traditional practices that has led one writer to propose that in the future traditional maritime missions must be placed in a national context. The result is a continuation of the need for maritime superiority but for the achievement of that objective by other means.
Chapter I


Chapter II

1. Cheney, p. 4.

2. Ibid.


5. OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603) Briefing, "Meeting the Challenges of a Dynamic World: Naval Policy for the 90’s and Beyond," October 1990, slide number 3.

6. Ibid., slide 4.


15. Ibid. , App. 1. p. 3.


Chapter III


2. Ibid. p. 41.


6. Ibid., p. 88.


9. Cheney, p. 11.


Chapter IV

1. Garrett, p. 36.


3. OP-603 Briefing, slide 22.


Chapter V


5. Ibid., p. 120.
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