ARMY FROCKING
Does It Increase
Job Effectiveness and Morale?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., Arizona State University, Tempe Arizona, 1977

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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This study examines the Army's frocking policy and evaluates its impact on the job effectiveness and morale of officers. The study reviews and compares current policies of DOD and each of the Armed Services, showing a uneven application of frocking across the services. The study found that, except for officers identified for command positions, the Army does not aggressively seek out officers to frock. Evidence taken from previous research shows which factors have the greatest impact on job effectiveness and morale. A sample survey of CGSOC Class 90-91, replicating previous work conducted at the Air War College, provides insights into current perceptions and attitudes on frocking. The study ties the evidence from the previous research to the sample survey and shows that frocking increases both job effectiveness and morale. The study recommends that the Army expand the practice of frocking officers up to the legal limits established by DOD and Congress.

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ABSTRACT

ARMY FROCKING: DOES IT INCREASE JOB EFFECTIVENESS AND MORALE? by MAJ William Cutter Dorman, USA, 83 pages.

This study examines the Army's frocking policy and evaluates its impact on the job effectiveness and morale of officers. The study reviews and compares current policies of the Department of Defense and each of the Armed Services, showing an uneven application of frocking across the services. The study found that, except for officers identified for command positions, the Army does not aggressively seek out officers to frock.

Evidence taken from previous research shows which factors have the greatest impact on job effectiveness and morale. A sample survey of the Command and General Staff Officer's Course Class 1990-1991, replicating previous work conducted at the Air War College, provides insights into current perceptions and attitudes on frocking. The study ties the evidence from the previous research to the sample survey and shows that frocking increases both job effectiveness and morale.

The study recommends that the Army expand the practice of frocking officers up to the legal limits established by Department of Defense and Congress.
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GLOSSARY

Active Duty List. A Congressionally mandated list of Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps officers. It is required under Title 10, United States Code (10, USC) and contains the names of all officers of that service on active duty.

Below Zone (BZ). That group of officers whose date of rank year group make them junior to the officers in the primary zone, but are also considered for promotion by a promotion board. This zone is "designed for early promotion of individuals who have demonstrated outstanding potential." Nonselection from the BZ "...does not constitute failure of selection [passover]."

Field Grade. Officers serving in the grades O-4 through O-6. This includes the ranks of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel in the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Commander, Commander, and Captain in the Navy.

Frocking. An administrative authorization by the service secretary concerned (Army, Navy or Air Force) that grants officers selected for promotion and confirmed by the U.S. Senate (but not yet promoted) the right to wear the insignia, the uniform and to assume the title of the next higher grade.

Passed Over. Those officers considered at least once in the PZ and not selected for promotion.

Primary Zone (PZ). That group of officers whose current date of rank and year group constitute the majority of those considered for promotion by a promotion board.
Promotable (or selected). An individual identified for promotion but not yet promoted. A centralized board of officers, or promotion board normally accomplishes this process.

Promotion. An individual's advancement from military rank and pay grade to a higher rank and grade.

Promotion Board. The group of officers brought together for the specific purpose of determining which officers to promote. The board regularly examines the records of officers of only one rank. It is normally made up of officers senior by at least two grades of rank to the officers considered.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Under certain conditions...it may be in the best interest of the Department of the Army to allow an officer to wear the insignia of a grade higher than that to which actually appointed. This practice, called frocking, is not a true promotion. However, it is sometimes necessary when an officer's performance of his or her duties would be severely restricted by wearing the lower grade of rank. Generally the United States Army has a restrictive frocking policy.¹

The Army's adherence to a restrictive frocking policy misses an opportunity to effectively and inexpensively increase job effectiveness and help sustain the highest possible level of morale in its officers. Severe budget cuts and troop reductions are imminent and indeed some have already occurred. Within the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress, questions remain as to the future shape and strength of the Army. Soldiers of all ranks wonder about their potential for continued active service. Frocking is one tool the Department of the Army (DA) can use to help lessen such concerns.

Does frocking increase the job effectiveness of individual officers? Is the Army's current frocking policy consistent with its desire to maintain quality officers in the force? Is the Army maximizing the use of its frocking authority? Is there
regulatory latitude for the Army to liberalize its policy? This paper examines these questions and provides possible recommendations on the increased use of this management tool.

The study's basic assumption is that the services continue to promote officers. It is necessary to make such an assumption because without selections for promotion, there is no need for a frocking policy. The other assumptions are: (1) promotions are important to officers because they provide greater responsibility, higher morale, increased job efficiency and effectiveness, and larger personal income, and (2) the longer it takes to promote a selected officer, the less impact the event has.²

The study's primary limiting factor is the scarcity of published articles concerning frocking. This necessitated the liberal use of interview techniques, often over the telephone. Even when interviewed, some personnel managers were reluctant to spend time or effort providing information. This reluctance apparently stemmed from the chaos in the personnel management system caused by the conflicting demands of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and the planned reductions in Army manpower (end strength). No issues of confidentiality or security interfered with the completion of the study.

The study only considered promotions and frocking of active component (AC) field grade officers. The AC faces most of
the force reductions and therefore will encounter the greatest instability. Such instability could possibly engender morale problems. Additionally, very few officers are frocked within the general officer ranks (currently a maximum of 95). Thus, general and flag officers were excluded from the scope of this study.

This study compares the frocking policies of the various services with each other and then assess compliance with DOD policy. This study's significance is that it provides the information for Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army to liberalize their current frocking policies, should they choose such an action.


CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

Very little information exists about frocking beyond the printed policies of DOD and the various services. The available information falls into the following categories: current policy, other published government sources, other government sources, and unpublished papers and theses.

Current Published Policy

Frocking policies among the varied services are fairly consistent, but subtle differences do exist. This section outlines those policies.

The Department of Defense Policy

DOD developed its frocking policy to regulate and standardize the applicable policies of the armed services. The separate services either had no policy and did not flock, or their policy permitted unlimited frocking of those officers selected for promotion.¹

The purpose of DOD Directive 1334.2 was to standardize the frocking policy. According to this Directive, conditions for frocking eligibility are: (1) each officer must be on an approved
promotion list, and must not be delayed or removed from the promotion list; (2) the Senate must have confirmed the promotion list; and (3) the officer must be serving or about to serve (within 60 days) in a billet authorized the next higher grade. In addition, DOD placed a ceiling on the number of frocked officers. This ceiling limits the four services to no more than 95 frocked general or flag officers, and allows frocking of up to three percent of each service's aggregate field grade ceiling as described in the U.S. Code. DOD also requires the services to inform each frocked officer that he gains no monetary entitlements, seniority, time in grade, or the legal authority of the next higher grade.  

The Army Policy

As stated in the previous chapter and in compliance with the guidance from DOD, the Army frocking policy is more restrictive than the DOD policy. Army Regulation (AR) 624-100, Promotions of Officers on Active Duty governs the Army frocking policies. As directed by DOD, frocking applies to only two broad categories of officers: those promotable to and within the field grades, and those promotable to or within the general officer ranks.

For field grade officers, the regulations outline five occasions when a command authority may frock an officer. These are: (1) when assuming command of either Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
units, (2) when selected by DA to assume a Project Manager position, (3) when assigned as a Professor of Military Science, (4) when assigned as instructors at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and (5) when the "interest of the United States and image of the U.S. Army would otherwise be severely jeopardized." In each case, the officer must either currently occupy or be within two days of occupying a position authorized the next higher grade.

Frocking requires officers to wear the rank insignia of the next higher grade. The officer continues to wear the frocked rank unless he is removed from the promotion list. He may perform official functions of the frocked rank, but only if specifically permitted by regulations. He may not perform functions prescribed to the higher rank by law or DOD Directive, such as administering nonjudicial punishment reserved for officers of the higher grade.

In accordance with DOD policy, frocked officers do not receive pay and allowance increases at the higher grade rates, nor do they receive any increase in injury compensation or death gratuities for their survivors. The frocked officer does not gain seniority relative to peers for future promotion consideration. His time in a frocked status does not count as time-in-grade (TIG). Neither the officer's Identification (ID) Card nor his official DA photograph may reflect the frocked rank. Likewise, the officer's authority to wear the new rank is not
recorded on official orders (the correspondence authorizing the 
frocking is filed in the individual's assignment folder). It 
should be noted, though, that the officer's performance is judged 
(officially rated) in the higher grade, frocked or not.

The Navy Policy

The Navy policy is similar to the Army's. The Navy only 
frocks promotable officers that are in, or soon will be in 
assignments authorized the next higher grade. Those assignments 
include commanding officers and executive officers, sea duty 
billets with a Sea/Shore code 2 or 4, billets approved as "Major 
Material Professional [MP] Assignments" assignments to jobs on 
the DOD Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL), and student slots at 
any of the armed services' staff or war colleges to include the 
Industrial and National War Colleges.

As in the Army, frocked Navy officers do not gain 
monetarily or in ways that might advantage their promotion 
potential. They receive no pay or allowances of the higher 
grade, no time in grade credit, and no legal authority of the 
higher grade (such as increased disciplinary powers found under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice) until actually promoted. 
The Navy also prohibits increases in household goods weight 
limits for frocked officers when on permanent change of station 
(PCS) orders. Unlike the Army, however, the Navy does allow 
froked officers to indicate their frocked rank on their ID Cards 
and to receive "all privileges" of the higher grade.
The Air Force Policy

In accordance with DOD policy, Air Force officers may only "pin early" (they do not use the term frock) once promotion is confirmed by the Senate and upon formal approval by the Air Force Military Personnel Center. As with the other services, the frocked officer neither gains monetarily or in seniority.

The Air Force policy is the most restrictive. It allows for early pinning only when it is essential for an officer's performance of duties and then normally only in international situations, such as in assignments to NATO or attache duty. Final approval authority is the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. However, frocked officers future assignment must be to a billet authorized the next higher grade. An officer can not already be in such a billet, performing duties effectively, and be "known in the lower grade."

The Marine Corps Policy

The Marine Corps revised its frocking policy in 1987 to conform to DOD's policy. Accordingly, it reiterates the standard guidelines found in each of the other service's regulations. Like the Army, the frocking of a Marine officer "...must be essential to the officer's ability to perform the assigned duties and must clearly serve the best interest of the Marine Corps."

Nevertheless, the Marine Corps provides additional guidance that further restricts the practice. Presumably in the
name of fairness, the Marine Corps distributes the number of officers frocked at any given time evenly between billets internal to the Marine Corps and those external to the Marine Corps, such as joint assignments. Additionally, field commanders, major general and above, may recommend only officers in, or soon to be assigned to, billets with "Commander" or "Commanding Officer" in the position title. All requests for frocking pass through Headquarters, Marine Corps to the Commandant for approval.

Other Published Government Sources

The Congressional Record and the United States Code contain the details of the Officer Promotion System defined in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). These sources provided the various rules and laws by which DOD abides.

When pressed for background information on how current frocking policies evolved, ODCSPER initially referenced Senate Armed Services Subcommittee Hearings held in 1987. During those hearings, Subcommittee Chairman Senator John Glenn indicated that he felt that DOD was circumventing the DOPMA officer strength ceilings with the practice of frocking. He primarily questioned the number of general and flag officers being frocked, probably because the total numbers of flag officers are comparatively small (1073 DOPMA authorized, 95 frocked) when compared to field grades strengths (over 30,000 in the Army alone). Senator Glenn’s questions included the field grade ranks, although he did
not specify numbers. Therefore, it reasonable to assume that his concern about frocking related to field grades as well.7

The Congressional Record covering the passage of DOPMA provides interesting insights on the Congress' view of officer personnel management. The Record also lays out the justification for the provisions found in the U.S. Code. These insights, together with the justifications, help explain Congress' purpose in creating DOPMA.

Congress passed DOPMA in 1980. This Act significantly reformed the officer management system in each of the services. Its goals included the creation of uniform laws on the promotion of officers from the separate services, the establishment of "common provisions governing career expectation in the various grades," and statutory limitations on officer strength in the field grades and above.8 The effort to establish uniform laws covering promotions caused changes to occur in the Army Promotion System. The old system of both temporary (Army of the United States-AUS) and permanent (Regular Army-RA) promotions gave way to a single system. This new system ended temporary promotions and has since required Other-Than-Regular-Army officers (OTRA; normally reservists on active duty) to become RA upon promotion to major.

DOPMA also addressed career expectations by establishing promotion goals (or objectives) for officers. Known as promotion
windows, these goals represent the expected time frames for promotion to the next higher grade. Congress designed them to assist officers in their career planning. Table 1 displays the original promotion windows.\(^9\)

**TABLE 1**

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Source: DOPMA

Since DOPMA passed, these promotion window goals have not changed. The service's ability to promote within these windows, however, has decreased. Shown in Table 2 are the current promotion points, as of 24 January 1981.

**TABLE 2**

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Source: CPT (P) Richard P. Mustion, ODCSPER, Headquarters, DA.
The Congress and the Army expected promotions to occur within 12 months of selection.\textsuperscript{10} Therefore, when considering the DOPMA promotion goals shown above, selection for promotion normally occurred between the eighth and tenth year for captains, 14th and 16th year for majors, and 20th and 22nd year for lieutenant colonels. None of this represented a substantive change because the old promotion system's goal was to promote within a year of selection. Even as late as 1988 waiting a year from selection to promotion was considered normal.\textsuperscript{11}

DOPMA also limited the active duty officer strength (grade ceilings). In doing so, Congress intended to improve upon the work started by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. That act also identified grade ceilings and began the personnel management system we know today as "up or out," for the purpose of developing a mature and combat ready officer corps. The claim of poor combat readiness was the impetus for the changes incorporated in the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

\textbf{Other Government Sources}

\textit{Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel}

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) provided several memoranda, letters, and information papers on frocking, thus forming an audit trail for the current policies on frocking. The documents revealed that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Mr.
Chapman B. Cox, formed the current DOD policy in response to questions raised by Senator Sam Nunn at Mr. Cox's confirmation hearings in 1986. At that time, Senator Nunn queried Mr. Cox on the legality of frocking practices in the armed services. Mr. Cox's written reply confirmed that frocking was certainly within the letter and spirit of the law and he added that "...frocking developed in order to increase the effectiveness of an officer selected for promotion during the period between Senate confirmation and final appointment (emphasis added)". In researching Senator Nunn's question, Mr. Cox discovered unequal frocking policies among the services. To remedy this, he instituted DOD controls to standardize the practice across services.\textsuperscript{12} This effort created DOD's current policy.

ODCSPER also provided notional end strength figures on the Army's officer corps for fiscal years 1992-1996. They released these figures on the condition that I present them as illustrative numbers and not factual, as the actual requirements are still undecided. What is important, though, is that these end strengths (Figures 1-3) show a significant reduction in officer strength. Such dramatic reductions may foster perceptions of decreasing promotion opportunities.\textsuperscript{13}
Figure 1. Notional end strengths for majors in Fiscal Years 1992-1996.

Figure 2. Notional end strengths for lieutenant colonels in Fiscal Years 1992-1996.
Figure 3. Notional end strengths for colonels in Fiscal Years 1992-1996.

As the figures show, the trend is clearly downward. In fact, these data indicate that between 1992 and 1996, the numbers of majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels will drop by 11.5 percent, 10 percent, and 10.6 percent, respectively. This may impact on the decisions of some officers to remain in the service.

In 1986, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) asked DA for the authority to frock Command and General Staff College (CGSC) instructors. DA eventually approved this request and subsequently changed the Army's frocking policy. The change gave CAC the authority to frock all instructors of both the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3, whose instructors are part of CGSC and already could be frocked). Ironically, CGSC decided not to
frock their CGSOC instructors because it would then be possible for a frocked instructor to work for or be rated by a promotable, non-instructor (who would not be frocked). CAC argues that this creates a difficult situation between the officers. Frocking, then, was the baby thrown out with the bath water.14

The Leadership Development Study

CAC conducted the Leadership Development Study (resulting in the Leadership Development Action Plan or LDAP) in 1988 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the status of leader development, identify immediate potential adjustments, and determine the direction to take in the next "10-15 years." Most of the LDAP study concerned officers and training issues, but several recommendations pertained to the officer promotion system. Of specific interest, the LDAP observed that promotion lists were taking two or more years to exhaust and that DOPMA goals "...provide useful benchmarks to assist in monitoring the leader development process". Based on these observations, the study recommended that DA "...strive to exhaust all promotion lists within one year..." and that it should move promotion points back within the promotion windows set up by DOPMA.15

Surveys

Two sets of existing survey data provide information on officer concerns and motivations. The Army Research Institute (ARI) and CGSC's Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3)
conducted the surveys. Because the scope of each survey was broad, I reviewed the survey instruments to determine the applicable questions. I then requested only the pertinent data.

The Longitudinal Research on Officer Careers

Each year (since 1980) ARI conducts an Armywide survey of junior officers concerning their attitudes and perceptions of the Army as a career. These are known as Longitudinal Research on Officer Careers (LROC) surveys. The same officers are surveyed year after year to see how their perceptions and attitudes change. Nearly 5600 officers, over 97 percent lieutenants and captains, returned surveys in 1988 and 1989. These latest LROC surveys include data on officers' concerns about their future in the Army. Some of the data collected by ARI through the LROC surveys was material to the subject of frocking. Specific questions asked by ARI provided detailed insights into officer motivations and their perceptions on career opportunities. Dr. Caren M. Carney at ARI provided survey responses from selected questions taken from both the 1988 and 1989 surveys.16

The surveys' applicable questions dealt specifically with officer perceptions of the officer evaluation/promotion system, officer satisfaction with current compensation (pay, retirement, and other benefits), and factors officers consider most important when choosing an Army career. The percentages discussed below are rounded to the nearest whole number. (Note: the percentages do not total 100 percent because neutral responses are not
presented and respondents could provide more than one answer to some questions.)

Figure 4 shows how officers responded to the statement, "The officer evaluation/promotion system is effective in promoting the best officers." Significantly more officers disagreed with the statement than agreed. The results indicate a growing dissatisfaction with either the officer evaluation system or the officer promotion system, and therefore bear on the issue of Frolicking.

Figure 4. Officer responses to the statement, "The officer evaluation/selection system is effective in promoting the best officers." Data from questions III-A-15 & III-A-14 in the 1988 & 1989 LROC surveys, respectively, provided by Dr. Caren M. Carney, ARI.
Insofar as the discontent is with the promotion system rather than the evaluation system, the question arises as to why. If the heart of the problem is the increased length of time spent waiting for promotion, then assumptions on which DOD Directive 1334.2 is based have changed. The survey did not address any distinction between discontent with the promotion system or the evaluation system, thus a more detailed analysis of the responses is not possible. Regardless, the question warrants further study.

The survey results displayed in Figure 5 indicate the motivator for the majority of officers is something other than money, given the current levels of renumeration.
Figure 5. Officer satisfaction with current compensation (pay, allowances, benefits, etc). Data from question III-A-22 in both the 1988 & 1989 LROC surveys provided by Dr. Caren M. Carney, ARI.

Nearly two thirds of the officers surveyed were satisfied with current compensation, such as pay, allowances, and other benefits. These results bear out the old Army saying, "You don't join the Army to get rich." Based on the LROC, we could modify it by saying "You don't stay in the Army to get rich."

Why do officers stay and make a career of the service? The LROC lists 22 factors influencing career decisions and asks officers to identify the importance of each. Figure 6 displays the seven most important factors identified by the respondents. The survey allowed a range of responses, however only those of "extremely important" or "very important" are shown.
Figure 6. Factors considered either extremely or very important to officer career decisions. Data from questions IV-A-1 through 22 in both the 1988 & 1989 LROC surveys provided by Dr. Caren M. Carney, ARI.

Nearly 90 percent of the respondents cited job satisfaction as either extremely or very important in making their career decisions. The Army's retirement benefit package ranked highest of the compensation factors with about 70 percent of the respondents considering its importance significant in their decisions. Pay showed up as the seventh most often listed factor in making career decisions (58 percent), well behind job satisfaction, advancement opportunities, spouse satisfaction, retirement, the Army mission, and promotion slow downs. This indicates that pay, while important to officers, is certainly not as important in career decisions as job satisfaction, advancement opportunities, and several other intangible factors.
The numbers of officers (Figure 6) concerned about slow promotion rates further illustrates the uncertainty within the officer corps about future advancement, and clearly indicates growing discontent in the officer promotion system.

The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) Pre- and Post-Course Survey

At the start and conclusion of each CAS3 class, the students, almost exclusively captains, complete a survey covering different aspects of their military experience and professional education. Several questions address the effect of a staff leader's rank on the quality of instruction. The surveys include these questions because the school administration is concerned about the policy of using only lieutenant colonels as staff leaders. This policy occasionally requires the Commandant to frock promotable majors in staff leader positions. By determining student impressions about the importance of rank on instruction, CAS3 hopes to either validate or invalidate this policy.

Several questions addressed the perceived impact of rank on credibility if instructors were junior lieutenant colonels, senior majors, or junior majors. The CAS3 surveys asked students to identify whether rank had a definite or marginal positive impact, no impact, or definite or marginal negative impact on instruction. Their responses were compiled into the categories of positive impact, no impact, or negative impact (Figures 7-9).
The data represents the positive responses to the survey questions from CAS3 classes 1990-1 through 1990-5 (approximately 1700 students). CAS3 made no attempt to define junior or senior, leaving the definitions entirely to the individual's interpretation.17

![Bar chart showing positive impact of the staff leader's rank on instruction. Data from questions 44 through 46 in the pre-survey and 79 through 81 in the post-survey provided by Ellen Godfrey, CAS3.](image)

Figure 7. Positive impact of the staff leader's rank on instruction. Data from questions 44 through 46 in the pre-survey and 79 through 81 in the post-survey provided by Ellen Godfrey, CAS3.

Note that at the beginning of the course, nearly 60 percent of the students perceived that higher rank (lieutenant colonel) had a beneficial impact on instruction. This was true even when the students considered senior majors as instructors, though to a somewhat lesser degree. Despite the lower percentage of students answering the same way in the post-survey, nearly 41
percent still considered lieutenant colonel staff leaders a positive impact. This is a significant number when compared to those who considered senior and junior majors positive impacts (17.7 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively).

Figure 8. No impact of staff leader's rank on instruction. Data from questions 44 through 46 in the pre-survey and 79 through 81 in the post-survey provided by Ellen Godfrey, CAS3.

Because captains typically work for lieutenant colonels and majors in their units, perhaps they consider having to work for them while students as nothing extraordinary. Thus, they bring with them no salient expectations regarding the rank of the staff leader and the quality of instruction. This accounts for the relatively high numbers of responses to this neutral response. The slight difference in the pre-course results
between lieutenant colonels and senior majors is insignificant, while the drop between the senior and junior majors is attributable to the student understanding of what those two terms mean.

The increased numbers of students stating "LTC rank has no impact on instruction" in the post-course survey compared to the decrease in the lieutenant colonels' positive impact suggests that for at least some students, their expectations of their instructors were not met. Additionally, the course design (small group instruction simulating a battalion staff) reinforces the students' view that the use of lieutenant colonels as instructors is nothing more than business as usual. This may explain the increase in the percentage of students stating that lieutenant colonel rank has no impact on instruction.

As stated above, majors also routinely teach and mentor captains. Why, then, do the students view majors in a less positive light? The argument above does not explain the drop in neutral responses regarding majors and the survey does not provide the answer. Careful examination of the data in Figures 7 & 8 shows that the student perceptions shifted downward (negative) during the course. Not only did fewer students indicate majors have a positive impact on instruction (Figure 7), fewer students stated that majors have no impact on instruction. Figure 9 dramatically portrays this shift.
Figure 9. Negative impact of staff leader's rank on instruction. Data from questions 44 through 46 in the pre-survey and 79 through 81 in the post-survey provided by Ellen Godfrey, CAS3.

While Figure 9 indicates a slight increase in the negative impact of lieutenant colonels during the course, students became very skeptical about using majors as staff leaders. Not only did the students see majors impacting negatively on instruction prior to the start of the course, but that impression was somehow strengthened during the course.

The difference between the pre-survey and post-survey data regarding both junior and senior majors is the key to the information in Figures 7-9. The data show students perceive that instructor experience within the same grade positively impacts on student perceptions about the quality of instruction. In the Army's "up or out" system of personnel management, rank is the
clearest indicator of that experience. Student faith in that rationale explains the differences not only between lieutenant colonels and majors, but also between junior and senior majors.

Because there are no staff leaders wearing major's rank, it is not clear why this drop in the neutral response and even why the questions are included in the survey. Plainly, student responses shifted from generally favorable or neutral impressions of majors (at least in the instructor role) to a more negative view, especially for junior majors. Unfortunately, the survey data does not provide a reason why the students' views concerning majors became more sharply defined during the course. The question remains to be answered as to why this shift toward their negative impressions. This question deserves more study, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Regardless, CAS3 students perceive higher rank as having a positive effect on a staff leader's ability to instruct (job performance).

**Unpublished Papers and Theses**

Three papers provided insights to the issue of frocking. LTC Peter W. Lindquist, U.S. Air Force, and MAJ Daniel J. Murawinski, U.S. Air Force, while students at the Air University, argued in separate papers that the Air Force should adopt a more liberal frocking policy. CPT Colin O. Halvorson, U.S. Army, in his thesis for his Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) Degree (CGSC, 1975), wrote on the variables effecting motivation and job satisfaction. These officers wrote their papers prior to
the publication of the DOD policy listed above, thus some of their assumptions may no longer be valid. However, their observations concerning motivations, morale, job satisfaction, job effectiveness, or the use of frocking as a management tool remain pertinent.

LTC Lindquist's paper, "Frocking: An Effective Management Tool," explored the issue of frocking in the Air Force and its potential use as an organizational effectiveness tool. He claimed that frocking would not only increase morale but efficiency as well. The officer's increase in efficiency stems from the growth of influence and credibility in the work environment because he wears a higher rank. LTC Lindquist surveyed his Air War College classmates to gain their perceptions about frocking. Although they were predominantly Air Force officers, their views relate to job performance and effectiveness and therefore cross service boundaries. Selected responses to the survey are listed below in Table 3.18
TABLE 3
SELECTED AIR WAR COLLEGE STUDENT OFFICER PERCEPTIONS ON FROCKING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>% AGREE</th>
<th>% DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal frocking is in the military's best interest</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual morale impacts on organization ability</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank is important for job completion</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frock only key positions</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank important to job efficiency</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frock all field grades across the board</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal frosting policy would boost morale</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frosting is generally acceptable</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers more effective with higher rank</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative policy is detrimental to morale</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank has no impact on effective mission accomplishment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frosting would be a positive motivator</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Linquist, "Frocking" 41-47.

These results indicate that most senior field grade officers believe officers gain positive benefits in morale and job effectiveness when frocked. If this survey accurately reflects officer perceptions and 94 percent of the surveyed officers feel that bad morale has a negative impact on job efficiency while between 60 and 70 percent believe that frocking would increase morale, then it follows that frocking would improve job efficiency.
MAJ Murawinski argued that despite the substantial pay raises that occurred in the early 1980’s, the Air Force needed to satisfy higher needs if they wanted to improve officer morale and retention. By higher needs, Murawinski was referring to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory, in which Maslow put forward the idea that most people whose basic needs are met (i.e., food and shelter) and are adequately paid, try to satisfy ego needs. These needs include self-esteem, of which the need for achievement is a part, and reputation, of which the needs for status and the deserved respect of one’s fellows are parts.\textsuperscript{19}

In his thesis "Motivation and Job Satisfaction of Middle Level Career Army Officers", CPT Colin O. Halvorson, U.S. Army, compared the motivation of Army officers with their civilian counterparts. He found that officer motivation stems from being given responsible jobs and job performance. Additionally, motivation is reinforced by recognition, praise and promotion. He also found that these items far outweigh other motivational tools such as pay. Table 4 shows CPT Halvorson’s findings.\textsuperscript{20}
TABLE 4

1975 CGSC STUDENT OFFICER PERCEPTION OF VARIABLES PROVIDING JOB SATISFACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOB SATISFACTION VARIABLE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work itself</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permitted to do work in own way</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful completion of the task</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praise for work</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates did a good job</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given supervisory responsibility</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in status</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in pay</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Halvorson, "Motivation and Job Satisfaction," 46.

It is important to note that pay ranked lowest of the listed variables providing job satisfaction. Also, increases in rank (promotions, independent of pay raises) are nearly twice as important as pay to career officers. This strongly suggests that officers receive greater satisfaction from pinning on a higher rank than receiving the associated pay increases.


2 U.S. Department of Defense, Frocking of Commissioned Officers, Department of Defense Directive Number 1334.2. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 13 March 1987), 1-3 (hereafter as Defense, Frocking). Note that the release or publication of a promotion list does not infer Senate
confirmation. That is a separate action. After the Service Secretary approves a list and publishes it, the respective service sends it to the Senate for confirmation.


5 U.S. Air Force, *Promotion of Active Duty Officers* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 6 June 1990), 9-10. This publication applies only to officers under the rank of brigadier general.

6 Commandant of the Marine Corps to All Marines, "Frocking of Marine Corps Officers," TD, 5 February 1987, All Marine (ALMAR) Message #023/87, 051805Z Feb 87, 1. This ALMAR message referenced Marine Promotion Manual, Volume 1, Officer Promotions, and stated that the policy outlined would be incorporated in this manual. The updated manual was unavailable to the author.

7 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, *Department of Defense Officer Promotion Procedures*, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 3 March 1988, Committee Print, 3 (hereafter as Cong., Senate, Subcommittee, Promotion Procedures).


9 Ibid., 18. As a related issue, much discussion has occurred in official and unofficial print in the last several years concerning whether or not these goals were points for selection or actual promotion. The House Report cited above clearly Congress' intention was that the services promote officers within the time frame listed in the table.

10 Ibid., 16, 25.


12 Cox, TLS, 19 February 1986.

13 Data provided by CPT (P) Richard P. Musteron, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 8 February 1991.
Lieutenant General Elton, DCSPER, to Major General McNair, TRADOC (AT2L -PO), "Frocking of Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) Staff Leaders/Instructors," TD, 5 February 1986, Department of the Army Message 0521452 Feb 86, 1; Chief of Administration to the Deputy Commandant, CAC, 15 Mar 1988, "Frocking Instructors-Information," CGSC, CAC, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1-2. The electronic message listed first provides authorization to the Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and through him to the Commander of CAC, to frock all instructors in CGSC that are otherwise eligible. Other messages, copies of which are in the author's possession, concern the initial request to frock these officers and subsequent clarifications.


Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, "ARI Research Shows How Company Grade Officers View the Army," ARI Newsletter, 3 (October 1990): 4-5; ARI provided copies of the 1988 and 1989 Longitudinal Research on Officer Careers. Responses provided on the 1988 survey, Section I, question 18, Section IIIA, C and D, questions 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 22, 31, 35, 45, and 54, and Section IVA, questions 1-25. Responses provided on the 1989 survey, Section I, question 23, Section IIIA, C and D, questions 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 22, 31, 35, 45, and 54, Section IVA, questions 1-25 and Section VII, questions 25 and 26 from the 1989 survey.

Data provided by Ellen Godfrey, Chief of Evaluations and Standards, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS. Total respondents for the pre- and post-course surveys numbered, respectively, as follows: Jr LTC-1723, 1692; Sr MAJ-1720, 1691; Jr MAJ-1699, 1690.


CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology outlined in the initial research proposal included only a literature review supplemented by personal interviews. It did not include a CGSOC student survey. However, the first few interviewees suggested conducting such a survey, as did my seminar group. As it turned out, the interviews provided little significant data; they did however strongly suggest the need for a survey of the CGSOC student population. Finding LTC Lindquist's paper during the literature search provided the final impetus to conduct my own survey to replicate and extend the earlier work.

The Student Survey

The survey of CGSOC students was assembled by first selecting many of the same questions that LTC Lindquist used at the Air War College in 1987.¹ This was done to compare the responses of the two different populations, hoping to identify certain trends. Additionally, the survey included several questions intended to substantiate results found in the LROC, CAS3, and CPT Halvorson's data.
The Office of Evaluations and Standards (OES), CGSC, generated a random sample of 288 student officers for study. This sample included only U.S. Army officers. The surveys were distributed personally to each student's classroom mail box. One hundred seventy-three returned the survey, representing a 60 percent response rate and approximately 18 percent of the total U.S. Army officer student population.

Despite the efforts to ensure a random selection, the possibility of bias exists in the survey. This bias stems from the Army’s student selection process which selects the top 50 percent of all eligible Army officers for attendance at CGSOC. As such, the sample population may not present an accurate representation of all Army officers. The sample includes officers from most branches of the Army. These officers have between 10 and 14 years of service in the Army. Another possible source of bias is the 60 percent response rate. Within these limitations, this sample represents a good cross section of mid-career officers based on their professional background, maturity, and branch experience.

The two part survey consisted of 26 questions, one response allowed per question. Part one (seven questions) requested background information on each officer, such as rank and experience with frocking. The officers also provided their opinion concerning their length of time on their respective promotion lists. Part two (19 questions) asked the officers to
either agree or disagree with statements concerning frocking policy, morale influences, and rank impacts. Also, the officers cited the single most important benefit of promotion and frocking from a given list of responses.

Instructions at the end of the survey invited the officers to provide written comments on the back of the answer sheet. These instructions gave no guidance about what to include in the comments. Thirty-eight students provided comments about frocking or the promotion system in general. Of these, only one had previously been frocked. Appendix A includes the specific comments.

Part One

Table 5 lists the numbers and percentages of officers, by rank, in the sample population, and compares this percentage to the rank structure of the total student population. This comparison shows that the rank distribution of the sample matches that within the class. One respondent did not provide his rank,
but did complete the remainder of the survey, thus accounting for 173 total respondents.

**TABLE 5**

**STUDENT SURVEY RANK DISTRIBUTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Sample Population</th>
<th>Student Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPI (P)</td>
<td>21 (12%)</td>
<td>141 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>144 (85%)</td>
<td>872 (85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ (P)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td>12 (1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers of MAJ (P)s are not maintained by CGSC, therefore percentages for MAJ (P)s are included with MAJs. Data as of March 1991. 1991 CGSOC Survey.

Of these officers, only 7 percent had ever been frocked. Other background information on the sample includes:

a. 19 percent had ever been selected BZ.

b. 43 percent had been on a promotion list for more than two years; 30 percent between 1 1/2 to 2 years; 7 percent between 1 to 1 1/2 years.

c. 80 percent thought that the time spent between selection and actual promotion excessive.

d. 73 percent stayed in the same job at least ninety days after one of their promotions.
e. Of those who stayed in the same job, 45 percent felt that the higher rank increased their job effectiveness or efficiency.

The responses concerning length of time on a promotion list was cross-tabulated with those stating the time was excessive. Figure 10 shows the comparison of these responses.

![Comparison of officers' time spent on promotion lists and their opinion as to whether that time was excessive. 1991 CGSOC Survey.](image)

Figure 10. Comparison of officers' time spent on promotion lists and their opinion as to whether that time was excessive. 1991 CGSOC Survey.

Not surprisingly, these numbers reveal considerable frustration with the current promotion system. They also suggest that officers expect promotion within a year of selection, the DOPMA goal. The "yes" responses jump from nearly zero when waiting time is under 12 months and increase notably as the time
increases. Likewise, "no" responses decrease steadily as time increases (the small percentage showing an opinion for under six months is because only two officers reported promotions within six months of selection). When they wait longer than a year, officers view the wait as excessive. Officers view the failure of the promotion system to keep pace with DOPMA goals as a broken promise.

Part Two

This section of the survey also had two parts. The first part, questions 8 through 24, deals with student opinion concerning frocking policy, morale influences, and rank impacts. The last two questions (25 & 26) comprise the second part and ask student opinion on the benefits of promotions and frocking.

Tables 6-10 display the responses to questions 8 through 24. Note that the numbers rarely total 100 percent (because respondents could provide a neutral response).

Frocking Policy

Only two statements about frocking policy in the survey met with general agreement of the surveyed officers. One of those (frocking is generally acceptable) had more than half agree, while almost two thirds believe the Army should frock only key positions. The responses taken as a whole, represent a significantly different attitude about frocking than found in LTC Lindquist's survey.
### TABLE 6

**SELECTED CGSOC STUDENT OFFICER RESPONSES ON FROCKING POLICY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>% AGREE</th>
<th>% DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal frocking is in the military's best interest</td>
<td>38 (58)</td>
<td>51 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frock only key positions</td>
<td>61 (46)</td>
<td>31 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frock all field grades across the board</td>
<td>25 (53)</td>
<td>63 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal frocking policy would boost morale</td>
<td>37 (67)</td>
<td>54 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frocking is generally acceptable</td>
<td>52 (68)</td>
<td>33 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative policy is detrimental to morale</td>
<td>21 (37)</td>
<td>56 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frocking would be a positive motivator</td>
<td>42 (65)</td>
<td>41 (25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the responses to the same question from LTC Lindquist's survey listed in Table 3. 1991 CGSOC Survey.

These results clearly indicate that while frocking is generally acceptable to the officer corps, most officers would prefer a reasonably conservative (restrictive) application of it. The students overwhelmingly rejected the idea of frocking all field grade officers. The results show an even split regarding the motivational aspects of frocking.

The same questions, when asked of just previously frocked officers, provide a wholly different view. Not only does a higher percentage view frocking as an acceptable practice, but
male of them consider a liberal policy in the Army's best interest.

TABLE 7
PREVIOUSLY FROCKED CGSOC STUDENT OFFICER RESPONSES ON FROCKING POLICY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>% AGREE</th>
<th>% DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal frocking is in the military's best interest</td>
<td>58 (58)</td>
<td>25 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frock only key positions</td>
<td>58 (46)</td>
<td>33 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frock all field grades across the board</td>
<td>42 (53)</td>
<td>50 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal frocking policy would boost morale</td>
<td>42 (67)</td>
<td>33 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frocking is generally acceptable</td>
<td>67 (68)</td>
<td>17 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative policy is detrimental to morale</td>
<td>42 (37)</td>
<td>50 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frocking would be a positive motivator</td>
<td>50 (65)</td>
<td>25 (25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the responses to the same question from LTC Lindquist's survey listed in Table 3. 1991 CGSOC Survey.

Of interest here is that these officers support a liberal frocking policy and see frocking as a positive motivator by a ratio of about two to one. Obviously these officers have a perspective that differs from the others, but their small numbers do not carry the trend.
Morale Influences

The survey addressed two questions concerning morale. There is obvious agreement that morale definitely impacts on the effectiveness of both individuals and organizations. Table 8 shows that no significant difference exists in the opinions of the respondents to either LTC Lindquist's survey or the CGSOC survey. Additionally, the analysis of responses from previously frocked officers found no significant difference between them and the rest of the CGSOC respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>% AGREE</th>
<th>% DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual morale impacts on organization ability</td>
<td>92 (97)</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morale impacts on job performance</td>
<td>98 (98)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the responses to the same question from LTC Lindquist's survey listed in Table 3. 1991 CGSOC Survey.

Rank Impacts

Seven questions concerned the impact of rank on personal considerations and job efficiency. As with frocking policy in general, the percentage of the CGSOC officers agreeing with the statements about rank impacts is less than those in LTC Lindquist's survey. This does not negate the obvious trend. Of those responding either positively or negatively, a clear majority
consider rank important to job completion, job effectiveness, and job efficiency. This closely replicates the results of LTC Lindquist's work. More than half of the officers consider rank important to job completion and almost two thirds feel that rank is important to effective mission accomplishment. Yet, the students made a distinction between job effectiveness versus job efficiency, evidenced when less than half state that rank is important to job efficiency.

All of these results are consistent with their responses as to whether or not higher rank increased their effectiveness/efficiency when they stayed in the same job after promotion. Almost half (45 percent) felt that their effectiveness increased in the same job after promotion.

**TABLE 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>% AGREE</th>
<th>% DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank is important for job completion</td>
<td>56 (67)</td>
<td>19 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People offer greater respect with increased rank</td>
<td>82 (88)</td>
<td>18 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank important to job efficiency</td>
<td>42 (55)</td>
<td>31 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers more effective with higher rank</td>
<td>44 (62)</td>
<td>28 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank has no impact on effective mission accomplishment</td>
<td>17 (20)</td>
<td>64 (70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the responses to the same question from LTC Lindquist's survey listed in Table 3. 1991 CGSOC Survey.
The figures listed in Table 10 show once again that a
difference exists in the attitudes of previously frocked
officers. These officers highlighted the importance of rank in
job completion. Notice, though, that the same distinction is
made between effectiveness and efficiency.

TABLE 10
PREVIOUSLY FROCKED CGSOC STUDENT
OFFICER RESPONSES ON
RANK IMPACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>% AGREE</th>
<th>% DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank is important for job completion</td>
<td>75 (67)</td>
<td>17 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People offer greater respect with increased rank</td>
<td>92 (88)</td>
<td>0 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank important to job efficiency</td>
<td>42 (55)</td>
<td>17 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers more effective with higher rank</td>
<td>50 (62)</td>
<td>25 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank has no impact on effective mission accomplishment</td>
<td>33 (20)</td>
<td>58 (70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the responses to the
same question from LTC Lindquist's survey listed in Table

Another aspect of rank that this portion of the survey
addresses is the amount of respect accorded officers throughout
their careers. Both LTC Lindquist's survey and the CGSOC survey
clearly show that officers are accorded greater respect with
higher rank.
Question 25 in the survey asked the students to identify the greatest benefit of promotion. Figure 11 outlines their responses.

![Bar chart showing responses to the statement "The greatest benefit of promotion would be...". The responses are: (1) increased responsibility, (2) personal recognition, (3) increased personal status, (4) ability to work more effectively/efficiently, and (5) increased pay. 1991 CGSOC Survey.]

Their responses reaffirm MAJ Murawinski's argument and the results found in the LROC and in CPT CPT Halvorson's paper indicating that officer motivation is not based on pay, but rather things such as job responsibility, satisfaction, and recognition.

As stated above, only 7 percent (12) of the officers had ever been frocked. Despite this low number, these officers
provide an interesting assessment of the perceived benefits associated with frocking (figure 12).

![Bar Chart]

Figure 12. Comparison of previously frocked and never frocked officers' responses to the statement "The greatest benefit of frocking would be...." Responses available were: (1) increased responsibility, (2) personal recognition, (3) increased personal status, (4) ability to work more effectively/efficiently, and (5) increased morale. 1991 CGSOC Survey.

These results indicate frocked officers believe that frocking actually increases an officer's ability to work more effectively or efficiently. Rather surprisingly, none of the previously frocked officers consider responsibility, personal status, or increased morale the greatest benefit of frocking. Perhaps these benefits are rolled up in personal recognition, but even that response is overwhelmed by those feel that the greatest benefit is the ability to work more effectively/efficiently.
Note that while many of the never previously frocked officers opined that work effectiveness/efficiency would be the greatest benefit (33 percent, 52 responses), almost twice as many (60 percent, 94 responses) believe that the more personal factors of recognition, status, and morale would be the greatest benefit. All of this supports Mr. Cox's assertion to Senator Nunn that frocking increases an officer's effectiveness.

Written Comments

Most of the written comments were against liberalizing the Army frocking policy. Their comments reinforced the survey data which recognized a need to frock officers in key positions, such as commanders or in joint and combined assignments. Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine how many previously frocked officers provided comments.

Discontent with the promotion system and the long waits on promotion lists provided a constant theme through nearly all the written comments. Many of the comments stated that frocking was not the issue that should be addressed at all, but rather the extremely long periods of time spent on promotion lists. Start dates for promotions from a newly released Army promotion list are uncertain at the time of publication. Not only that, but despite ODCSPER's promotion plans, monthly promotion figures fluctuate so dramatically that selectees are rarely sure how many promotions will occur from month to month. This fluctuation causes subsequent promotion list start dates to remain uncertain.
The few comments supporting a more liberal use of frocking questioned why the Army has positions authorized higher ranking officers than what is traditionally assigned in those positions; promotable captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels working in billets authorized the next higher, and occasionally the second higher, rank. Furthermore, the officers do not understand the policy of rating a promotable officer in these positions as if he held the higher rank when, in most cases he is not permitted to wear the higher rank. This policy puts the promotable officer, with no experience at the higher grade at a distinct disadvantage against the officers already at the higher grade when it comes to selection board actions.

Another recurring theme of the comments was the apparent inconsistency between the various services' promotion systems and frocking policies, in particular the Navy's (in fact, the only previously frocked officer providing a written comment indicated his concern about this). The students believe that the Navy regularly frocks its officers. While the Navy did liberally flock its officers in the 1970s and early 1980s, since DOD Directive 1334.2, this is no longer true. Nevertheless, the student perception is reinforced by the fact that many of the Naval officers attending CGSOC, or assigned to CGSC as staff and faculty, either currently are or had been frocked upon arrival. This is in accordance with the Navy's policy discussed in CHAPTER 2, as this is a joint assignment for both the students and the
faculty/staff, but puts the Army students at a perceived disadvantage when dealing with the Naval officers.

It also appears to the students that a significant difference exists in the Army and Navy promotion systems as it pertains to the publication of promotion lists. When Navy promotion lists are published, the selectees are confident about the date of their promotion, plus or minus a month.\(^2\) Army officers have not had any confidence regarding promotion dates in years.\(^3\) To the Army officers who provided comments to the survey, this does not seem fair.

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2. Author's conversations with Commander Handley, USN, Instructor, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Nov 1990, and Commander Robert A. Dorman, USN, North Island Naval Air Station, San Diego, May 1990. At the time of each of these conversations, these officers indicated that they knew the approximate date of their actual promotion to the rank of Commander. Then Lieutenant Commander Dorman was promotable but would not be frocked because of the tightening of the Navy's policy. He expected his promotion to take place on 1 October 1990 (which in fact it did). Commander Handley, on the other hand, expects promotion in either December 1991 or January 1992. He was frocked because of his status as a member of the CGSC staff and faculty, a joint billet for Naval officers.

3. LROC data shown in Chapter 2, Figures 4 and 6; author's conversations with Major (P) Susan Kepler, CGSOC, Majors Mike Bettez, Kevin Brice, Mike Clark, Gregg Hill, and Captain (P) Bren Flanigan, USA, Students, CGSOC, Ft. Leavenworth, Nov 1990 through Feb 1991; student comments provided with the CGSOC survey in Appendix A.
CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Army Frocking Policy

The Army frocking policy is clearly within the letter and spirit of DOD Directive 1334.2. Though originally examined because of Congressional concerns about the legality of frocking, DOD designed its directive to standardize the practice across the services. Despite some differences in application between the services, DOD accomplished this to a reasonable degree.

The officers interviewed and surveyed overwhelmingly declined to indorse the idea of frocking all officers promotable to and within the field grades. Evidence from LTC Lindquist’s survey suggested that idea would be agreeable to the less senior officers attending CGSOC. However, such was not the case. The CGSOC students not only rejected such a liberal frocking policy, but they indicated that frocking should occur only in key positions, thereby validating that portion of the current Army policy.

It is curious that most never officers not previously frocked perceive the greatest benefit to frocking as something personal to the officer, perks such as recognition or personal
status enhancement. As pointed out earlier, that is not the perception of the previously frocked officers. They agree with former Assistant Secretary Cox’s assessment that frocking increases an officer’s job effectiveness.

But the question remains, why do the majority of officers in the sample perceive personal perks as the greatest benefit of frocking rather than increased job effectiveness/efficiency? A widespread theme in the written comments of the survey provides a hint. Students described the practice of frocking as "dishonest" or a form of "cronyism", others suggested that frocking "cheapens" promotions. Still other comments indicated that officers would find the experience "cheap and unsatisfying" or that officers should all "wait their turn." Each of the comments came from an officer who had never been frocked. Comments like these sound emotional and trivial. Could it be that the frustration these officers feel because of slow promotions creates professional jealousy? One officer "...found it difficult to accept..." claims Junior to him being frocked. He eventually "...grew to resent it." It appears as if the majority of officers who waited their turn, would have everybody wait their turn, regardless of the potential benefit for the Army.

Obviously, the small numbers of frocked officers responding to the CGSOC survey provides inconclusive evidence that frocking increases job effectiveness. For that reason and
because of the dramatic difference in responses between these two groups of officers, the question warrants further study.

**Frocking, Job Effectiveness, and Morale**

How does frocking relate to job effectiveness? Frocking enables an officer to perform his job more effectively. The CGSOC students state so, the Army regulation states so, and the former Assistant Secretary of Defense states so. With this in mind, why does the Army have less than one percent of its field grades frocked when they are authorized to flock up to three percent? Would it not be more effective and efficient to maximize the use of the flocking tool in accomplishing the Army's mission? Currently, the Army has fewer than 250 officers frocked in the field grades. This represents less than one percent of the Fiscal Year 1991 field grade end strength. With an aggressive flocking policy, one that seeks out officers eligible to pin early, the Army could flock nearly 500 more officers (at current strength levels) and still remain within the guidance laid out by DOD.

CGSOC instructors provide an interesting illustration. As pointed out in Chapter 2, Army regulations specifically allow the flocking of both CGSOC and CAS3 instructors. There is not a problem with the instructors for CAS3; currently, all of them are lieutenant colonels in lieutenant colonel positions. Lieutenant colonel is the authorized rank for all CGSOC instructors as well.
However, most are majors. Current CAC policy reflects the concern expressed by CAC's Chief of Administration in 1988.2

There is concern that frocking CGSOC instructors creates inconsistency and resentment within departments [of the school]. Branch/Committee Chiefs may be senior by date or even have higher sequence numbers [on the promotion list]... but a frocked instructor will still wear the higher grade. Unless CGSC obtains approval to frock all promotable MAJ's, concerns of inconsistency will not be resolved.

The statement above ignores the issue of job effectiveness in the classroom. The instructors and students interviewed clearly stated that an instructor's ability to teach CGSOC students is hampered if he wears major's rank. This does not detract from their abilities as instructors, but rather indicates that the students are more critical, less receptive, and tend to behave differently with instructors who are peers. This difficulty in completing their assigned mission impacts on job effectiveness as well as morale.3

Care must be taken when using frocking to increase job effectiveness/efficiency. The CAC position also illustrates the dilemma that careless application of frocking can cause. Haphazard use of frocking as a tool can have a detrimental impact on non-frocked officers' morale. Several students commented on the negative impact on morale caused by inconsistent and random frocking.
Nevertheless, the CAC position protecting the feelings of a few branch chiefs may very well be counter-productive. The evidence suggests that frocking instructors would improve their job effectiveness. The instructors interact with dozens of students daily, teaching, advising, and otherwise mentoring them. Should the Army refrain from frocking these instructors to placate the sensitivities of a couple of branch chiefs? This reasoning does not make sense.

Adding instructor responsibilities to branch chief duties and job descriptions is one solution to the CGSC instructor problem. Requiring branch chiefs to serve as Academic Counselors/Evaluators (ACEs) or on MMAS thesis committees in lieu of (or in addition to) regular platform duties, could easily justify this change. Thus, CAC could frock all instructors, thereby increasing the overall job effectiveness in the classroom, without negatively effecting the morale of the branch chiefs.

**Army Promotions**

Promotion remains the clearest indicator of success and experience in the Army. The old conventional wisdom in the Army held that a successful career in the Army was to "make" colonel before retirement. In today's environment, that wisdom is changing. Many officers no longer see colonel as the attainable goal, their expectations have lowered to lieutenant colonel and some believe that major is only reasonable. There are various
reasons for this, but they all stem from Congressionally mandated budget constraints forcing a reduction in the size of the Army. The Army can do little to stop this, nor is stopping it particularly desirable for the nation, however officials at DA must proceed cautiously to prevent over-reaction on the part of the Congress and unnecessary hardship for the soldiers in the force.4

In view of its size reduction efforts, the Army is trying to maintain the highest quality force possible. As part of its effort, the Army has increased the frequency of certain promotion boards in recent years. It has done this for two reasons: (1) to identify quickly those officers it wants to keep by selecting them for promotion, thus encouraging them to stay in the service and (2) to identify as many officers as possible for eventual elimination from the service. By law, most of these "passed-over" officers must leave the Army after their second non-selection for promotion. The separation of these passed-over officers assists the Army's undertaking to adjust its officer strength to the new, lower ceilings.

Beyond frocking lies the larger issue of time spent on promotion lists. The increased number of published promotion lists and the reduction of officer end strength (hence, slots available into which officers can be promoted) has created a notable increase in the amount of time that officers spend waiting for promotion, once selected. The CGSOC survey
highlights this, showing 43 percent of the respondents having spent two or more years on a promotion list and another 30 percent between 18 and 24 months. The DOD policy concerning frocking clearly indicates that while delays between selection, Senate confirmation, and promotion are inevitable, even "customary," promotion normally will take place within a year of selection.5

The 1988 Majors promotion list illustrates the failed execution of the DOD policy. The first promotions from that list, published in March, 1988, occurred in August, 1989 and the last officer promotions from it were on 1 October 1990. That is a minimum wait of 18 months for each officer on the list and a wait of two years, eight months for some. Below the Zone (BZ) selectees on the present list were told by their branch managers not to expect promotion for 32 months (from the publication date of the list).

Recently, DA began efforts to reduce time on promotion lists. When originally developed, promotion lists include plans that lay out the projected time needed to promote all the officers on the list. DA bases these plans on projected longues over a set period of time. DA also considers the number of officers selected for promotion. The 1989 majors list had a promotion plan covering a span of 17 months. In trying to reduce the waiting time for promotable captains, DA modified the plan to
12 months. While this action is admirable, the wait time on the list for some will still be more than two years.

It is ironic that those waiting longest on the list are the BZ officers, outstanding officers selected "early" for promotion ahead of their peers in their respective year group. It is hard to rationalize selecting someone BZ and then, keep him or her on a list for several years while expecting their morale and motivation to stay high.

Officers spend anxious weeks and months anticipating the promotion board’s results. Those results, a published promotion list, essentially determine which officers can remain in the service. Thus, selection for promotion is a primary indicator of each individual’s success relative to his or her peers. Seeing one’s name on a promotion list increases morale by providing a feeling of accomplishment and recognition for hard work and faithful service.

However, selection itself provides few if any tangible symbols of that hard work and faithful service. Some of the tangible symbols associated with promotion are wearing the higher rank, receiving the increases in pay and allowances, and assuming greater responsibilities. Army regulations provide for distinctions to be made between promotable officers and others of the same rank. The most important of these, identified previously, is the requirement to evaluate promotable officers as
if they held the higher grade when in positions authorized the higher grade. Consider the importance of evaluation requirements. Since the Army rates officers as if they wear the higher rank, those same officers are placed at a disadvantage relative to the more senior officers in the population who do wear it. Each interviewed officer indicated that their ability to perform in their assigned positions would have been significantly improved had they been frocked. Again, this was born out by the previously frocked officers responding to the survey.

Yet, distinctions remain between promotable officers and officers of the next higher grade. Frocking causes those distinctions to be less clear. There are no outward signs that the frocked officer is frocked. He appears and is addressed as if actually promoted. Non-frocked, promotable officers of his actual rank (the rank prior to frocking) must accord him the respect due a superior, while to the officers of the higher rank his is a peer. Written comments on the survey, discussed above, indicate that officers perceive flocking as an attempt to gain the advantages or perks of the higher rank, and they generally disapprove of liberal flocking. The reality might be that the majority of officers desire to maintain their rank advantage over the junior officers for as long as possible. Frocking nullifies that desire.
In many cases, the promotable officer does not receive branch qualifying "credit" for having served in the disadvantageous position. The CPT (P) serving as an infantry or armor battalion operations officer (S3) provides a prime example. Officers not promoted during their tenure as S3 are not considered branch qualified and must do the same job again as an actual major in order to be competitive in their branch. However, if the same officer gets promoted to major on the last day as the S3 and his OER reflects the higher rank, then he receives credit.

The LROC's data suggests many factors contribute to an officer's decision to stay in the Army, job satisfaction preeminent among them. CPT Halvorson proposes that an officer's job satisfaction stems from the work itself, freedom to work in individual ways, successful completion of tasks and recognition (praise for work). How, then does the Army provide job satisfaction to its officers? It promotes them.

The CGSOC survey indicates that promotion gives officers greater responsibility and recognition. Recognition clearly relates to job satisfaction, but how does responsibility? Consider the following argument. Promotion increases an officer's responsibility. The survey data illustrates this, as does the Army command structure. Incremental increases of responsibility associated with command at each rank demonstrate this. Captains normally command companies, majors rarely
command, but when they do it is normally at company level, lieutenant colonels command at battalion level, and colonels command at the brigade level. Whereas companies are occasionally commanded by lieutenants, field grade commands are not performed by officers of a lesser rank than that which is authorized (except, perhaps, in time of war). The only way to gain one of these commands is to have been selected for promotion. Thus, the responsibility increases with promotions.

Along with the increased responsibility goes increased freedom of action to complete the job(s). This latitude, or authority, expands significantly as rank increases. The authority of a company commander pales when compared to that of a his brigade commander, a colonel. The commander's authority encompasses everything in the subordinates' life from what time he must awaken and his day to day calendar, to judicial and non-judicial authority for various crimes or misbehaviors. The scope of the responsibility and authority may be witnessed by considering the size of the relative commands. Most companies have between 50 and 150 soldiers in them, battalions (lieutenant colonel commander) 800-1000, and brigades up to 5000.

Now consider recognition. Promotion is not just an indication of "future potential", as that tired cliche declares, but in reality is recognition of accomplishment and hard work. Nearly three quarters of CPT Halvorson's respondents stated that recognition was a prime factor in job satisfaction. The second
most often cited benefit to promotion by CGSOC officers responding to the survey was recognition.

Nevertheless, promotion is more than personally satisfying. It bestows enhanced ability to perform the same function that just the day before the officer did not have. A promotable captain on staff is just another captain to the rest of the staff, but the newly promoted major gains in authority and status. It becomes instantly easier for him to conduct business. The CAS3 students hint at this with their perceptions on the impact of rank on the quality of instruction. Likewise, the previously frocked officers responding to the CGSOC survey verified this in their responses to the question concerning frocking.

The pay aspect of promotion cannot be ignored. Most officers welcome the pay raise that promotion brings, though the raise is rarely substantial. Still, officers with growing families must consider the rising cost of family needs, from gasoline to food to housing. Because of this, the Army cannot disregard the importance of money in officers' career decisions. However, as the evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3 clearly shows, officers remain in the service for reasons other than pay.

The LROC shows that growing numbers of junior officers are weighing promotion slow downs in their career decisions and their dissatisfaction with the promotion system. Officers fear
removal from the service given that future manpower strengths are certain to decline. Until Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm dominated the pages of Army Times, articles appeared weekly regarding budget and manpower cuts. Since Desert Storm's successful conclusion, these articles have reappeared and the cuts are beginning.8

The evidence presented suggests that the Army could frock more officers and improve job effectiveness/efficiency. As there are no costs directly involved with frocking an officer, the Army could improve its effectiveness/efficiency very inexpensively. Additionally, morale could be positively influenced with an even-handed, aggressive frocking program that consistently seeks out officers to frock. Considerable concern exists in the Officer Corps regarding the management of promotions and the broken promises regarding DOPMA. These concerns negatively influence morale and officer career decisions. The Army must begin a determined effort to combat this negative influence by bringing the promotion system in line DOPMA's goals and reinstilling officer confidence in it.

1 Conversation with CPT (P) Mustion, 24 January 1991. The number of promotable officers awaiting Senate confirmation prior to frocking amounts to another couple of hundred. These figures change from month to month as actual promotions and Senate confirmations occur.

2 Chief of Administration to the Deputy Commandant, CAC, 15 Mar 1988, "Frocking Instructors-Information," CGSC, CAC, Ft
Leavenworth, KS; information concerning CGSOC and CAS3 instructors is as of 24 January 1991.

3 Author's conversations with Commander Handley, USN, and Major (P) Susan Kepler, USA, Instructors, CGSOC. Also Majors Mike Bettez, USA, Kevin Brice, USA, Mike Clark, USA, Mike Hanks, USAF, Gregg Hill, USA, Charles Romans, USMC, and Captain (P) Bren Flanigan, USA, Students, CGSOC, Ft. Leavenworth, Nov 1990 through Feb 1991.

4 The public debate over the future of armor and mechanized forces raged for a period after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the opening of Eastern Europe. That debate included questions on whether or not the future Army needs these forces at all. To many, both in the Army and out, this debate could very easily have led to the sort of over-reaction that saw significant demobilization of forces after World War II and the "Hollow Army" of the 1970s. Since the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the subsequent events that debate has waned.

5 Defense, Frolicking, 2.

6 For information on the Congress' opinion of the success or failure of an officer relative to his or her selection for promotion see Cong., House, Armed Services, Report, 19-20.

7 In all but two of the cases, the officer was in a position authorized the higher grade. Of the other two, one was assigned according to his current rank and the other was in a position authorized two grades above his own.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations apply to the Army frocking policy, job effectiveness and the promotion system.

1. DOD and Congress should clearly define the relationship between the numbers of frocked officers allowed in the DOD Directive 1334.2 and the aggregate end strength allowed in the U.S. Code.

2. DOD should conduct a comparison study of each of the services' promotion systems in an effort to standardize the length of time officers spend waiting for promotion once selected.

3. DA and Army field commanders should aggressively seek out officers eligible to frock within the legal limits established by DOD and Congress.

4. DA should modify the Army frocking to allow for the frocking of officers in branch qualifying positions, such as operations officer (S3) or executive officer (XO).

5. DA should reduce the delay officers experience between publication of promotion list and actual promotion.
6. DA should frock officers when they have been on a promotion list for 24 months; frock regardless of the position held by the officer.

7. The Army, Research Institute, or other qualified agency, should conduct additional research to validate the effect of frocking on an officer's ability to work more effectively/efficiently.

8. CAC should frock all eligible CGSC instructors; study the addition of instructor responsibilities to branch chief duties and job descriptions.

Other recommendations are:

1. The various branches of the Army should allow branch qualification credit to promotable officers assigned in branch qualifying positions, whether the officer is frocked or not.

2. The Army Research Institute should continue to conduct the LROC survey as a way for DA to gather and assess the attitudes of its officer corps.
APPENDIX

SURVEY ON FROCKING

The Survey

This questionnaire surveys your personal feelings and opinions on flocking—the practice of permitting officers to wear the rank of the next higher grade before actual promotion—in the U.S. Army. The survey has two parts. Part one asks for specific, individual background information. Part two requests your responses to statements associated with flocking policies, morale influences, productivity and job effectiveness impacts, and people expectations.

The information will be used for my research, analyzing flocking as a morale and job effectiveness tool. Each student response is guaranteed absolute confidentiality. This is ensured by not requesting identifying data. Your time completing this survey is greatly appreciated.

Please mark your answers on the attached Marks Sense form (CGSC Form 96) using a #2 pencil, ensuring you blacken each space completely. Do not fill in blocks A-D on the upper half of the answer sheet.
PART 1

1. What is your current rank?
   a. CPT (P)
   b. MAJ
   c. MAJ (P)
   d. LTC
   e. LTC (P)

2. Have you ever been frocked?
   a. Yes
   b. No

3. Have you ever been selected for promotion from below the zone?
   a. Yes
   b. No

4. Longest length of time between promotion notification and actual promotion?
   a. More than 24 months
   b. 18-24 months
   c. 12-18 months
   d. 6-12 months
   e. Less than 6 months

5. Did you feel this time to be excessive?
   a. Yes
   b. No

6. At the time of actual promotion (pin-on) to major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel (as applicable), did you ever stay in the same job, for at least 90 days?
   a. Yes (go to question 7)
   b. No (skip to question 8)

7. For those staying in the same job at pin-on, did the new rank add to your effectiveness or efficiency?
   a. Yes
   b. No

(GO TO PAGE 3)
PART 2

USING THE SCALE BELOW, INDICATE YOUR LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS.

a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree

8. A liberal frocking policy (frocking as many officers as eligible to field grade and general officer ranks) is in the best interests of the Army.

9. Individual morale impacts upon an organization's ability to get the job done.

10. Rank is an important factor in getting the job done.

11. People offer you greater respect as rank increases.


13. Frocking should only be used for general officers.

14. It is important that people occupying the same type and level job be the same rank.

15. Frocking should only be used for certain key positions.

16. Rank is an important factor in getting the job done more efficiently.

17. Frocking should be applied "across the board" for all promotable field grade officers.

18. A liberal frocking policy would be a boost to morale.

19. Frocking as a general practice is an acceptable policy.

20. An individual is more effective in getting the job done with a higher rank.

21. People expect greater accomplishments as rank increases.

22. A conservative frocking policy is detrimental to morale.

23. Your rank has no impact on your ability to effectively accomplish the mission.

(GO TO PAGE 4)
PART 2 (cont)

USING THE SCALE BELOW, INDICATE YOUR LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS.

a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree

24. In these times of small promotion increments, frocking as many people as possible would be a positive motivator.

INDICATE THE RESPONSE THAT BEST DESCRIBES HOW YOU WOULD COMPLETE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS.

25. The greatest benefit of promotion is ________.
   a. Increased responsibility.
b. Personal recognition.
c. Increased personal status.
d. Ability to work more effectively/efficiently.
e. Increased pay.

26. The greatest benefit to frocking would be ________.
   a. Increased responsibility.
b. Personal recognition.
c. Increased personal status.
d. Ability to work more effectively/efficiently.
e. Increased morale.

IF YOU HAVE SPECIAL COMMENTS OR CONCERNS RELATIVE TO FROCKING, PLEASE WRITE THEM ON THE BACK OF THE MARKS SENSE ANSWER SHEET (CGSC FORM 96).

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. WHEN COMPLETED, RETURN THE ANSWER SHEET TO YOUR SECTION SURVEY REPRESENTATIVE NLT COB THURSDAY, 7 MARCH 1991.

(END OF SURVEY)
### Survey Responses

1. **CPT (P)**: 2  
   **MAJ**: 144  
   **MAJ (P)**: 3  
   **LTC**: 4  
   **LTC (P)**: 0

2. Yes: 12  
   No: 121

3. Yes: 33  
   No: 140

4. More than 24 months: 75  
   18-24 months: 52  
   12-18 months: 26  
   6-12 months: 18  
   Less than 6 months: 2

5. Yes: 136  
   No: 35

6. Yes: 123  
   No: 43

7. Yes: 58  
   No: 65

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25. Increased responsibility ........................................58
Personal recognition ..................................................43
Increased personal status .............................................9
Ability to work more effectively/efficiently ........................25
Increased pay ............................................................34

26. Increased responsibility .............................................10
Personal recognition ..................................................33
Increased personal status .............................................41
Ability to work more effectively/efficiently ........................60
Increased morale .........................................................23

Written Comments

1. Conservative policy is best. "Real" field grades or GOs [general officers] know who is frocked. Frocked rank means less. Frocking should only occur when the higher rank is essential: Bn Cmd., work with foreign armies, etc.

2. Only officers who are promotable and are serving in a command position (i.e., Bn, Bde, Div, & Corps) should be frocked. Everyone else whether PZ or BZ should wait their turn. If our chain of command wanted us promoted they promote and pay us for the increased responsibility. Only those (and I mean non-team players) who are selfish, incompetent, and cannot work with others who are the same way are the only ones that want to get frocked. Concerning overseas assignments: FAO [Foreign Area Officers] & others should be frocked on a cases by case basis.

3. I strongly disagree with frocking. It's the Army's way of getting cheap help. If the Army needs to frock you for a job, then they need to promote you!
4. Frocking is just an attempt to provide a short term fix to the promotion problem. It doesn't address the problem, it just tries to apply a temporary fix.

5. Frocking is of greatest benefit for those who work with civilians or those who do no know the individual is frocked, not actually promoted to the grade being worn. Frocking should be limited, however, it should be controlled at installation level, not MACOM (Major Army Command). An individual to be frocked should be frocked BEFORE going to the position requiring the higher grade.

6. In NATO jobs, usually the LOWEST rank is 0-4. USAREUR (U.S. Army, Europe) often sent captains to conferences. Establishing credibility (read JOB EFFECTIVENESS) was TOUGH. CPT (P) means very little to a German, Belgian, British 0-4; a frocked 0-3 (to 0-4) solves the problem.

7. Frocking should be reserved for specific positions such as Bn Cmd, Bde S-3, etc. Wholesale frocking just "cheapens" this grade process.

8. Should be like the Air Force-require promotion lists to be exhausted the year they are released.

9. Rank only effects efficiency in certain positions-those requiring interaction with others.

10. I was a 1LT (P) and my company commander was a 1LT (P). I had been in the unit almost 16 months as XO (executive officer) when he arrived. The unit would have respected him more had he been an 0-3, instead, many came to me because of my seniority in the unit. I was a Bn S-3 and Bde S-3 in 1AD (1st Armored Division) as a CPT (P). I remained a CPT (P) my entire year as Bn S-3 and 4 1/2 months as a Bde S-3. I spent 7 1/2 months as an O-4 Bde S-3. The Bn S-3 job was not difficult as a CPT (P). I dealt with Co. Cdrs. who knew I wasn't their buddy. Bde S-3 was a different matter. I was the only CPT (P) Bde S-3 in VII Corps. I had incredible difficulty dealing with division staff as a CPT (P). I also had 0-4s who were Bn S-3s in my Bde that I oversaw. My personality assisted in making things easier, but frocking in this case would have been great. My boss even told me that he wished he could frock me. When I made O-4 things were different. The division staff was more cooperative. Subordinate 0-4 S-3s were more receptive to direction. My conclusion is that anyone in an S-3 position, XO, or job of great responsibility needs to be frocked. I hope you can help get the policy discussed.

11. Timing is also important i.e., Frocking CPT to MAJ prior to assuming an S-3 job or Frocking CPT to MAJ in an S-3 job.
12. Better than frocking-promote the soldier upon selection (minimum 1 month, maximum 6 months after selection)! If the Army cannot promote, don't select! If we (the Army) must select and cannot promote-then frock!

13. Frocking should be ALL OR NONE. Most (P)s are serving in the job of the higher rank ANYWAY. You are rated as a "P" by PERSCOM [Personnal Command] at the higher rank e.g. a CPT (P) is profiled against majors as well, so why not authorize wear of the rank? A NO COST policy to frock all officers immediately upon publication of the list would make a major positive impact on morale. Pay is a relatively private matter and the pay could be awarded as promotions currently are (off of the list in sequence order as possible within the budget constraints)

14. Frocking policy should be uniform across all services-especially in times of increased emphasis on joint service assignments. Promote us faster - frocking is a waste.

15. I have witnessed several frocking incidents throughout my military career. And in the majority of the incidents, the individual being frocked was no more qualified or capable of increased responsibility than his peers who were not selected. Frocking seems to be a vulgar form of cronyism that is practised on a subtle level. Those individuals who have been frocked (in the incidents I witnessed) are usually members of the inner circle or the favorite sons. Their increased stature in rank is resented by subordinates and peers and the unit's productivity in all incidents decreased sharply.

16. Frocking should never be allowed - not even for general officers. Its dishonest...a MAJ (P) is a MAJ (P), not an LTC. Two possible exceptions where frocking of anyone (enlisted or officer) might be warranted: (1) in combat (actually on the battlefield) to replace heavy casualties; and (2) as required by treaty or protocol (e.g., attaches). Frocking is, again, dishonest.

17. Officers should only be frocked when in command positions.

18. I feel that there is generally more frustration associated with frocking than benefit. The question is, where do you draw the line on who gets frocked and who doesn't if a "liberal" policy is implemented?? Those that are "selected" may feel a morale boost and may be better able to perform their job, however, the detrimental effects on those promotable officers that are not frocked may be detrimental to their performance and OVERALL, outweigh any benefits. It should be an "all or nothing" frocking-everyone on a list or only for key LEADERSHIP positions (i.e., Bn/Bde/Div Commander). Just as there are frustrations associated with the Army awards system, - (one individual receives an MSM [Meritorious Service Medal] for an end of tour
job that was of less responsibility and significance than a peer who only received an ARCOM [Army Commendation Medal]. I feel that trying to determine who gets frocked and who doesn’t, based on job, responsibility, etc. will only create more problems and frustrations than benefits in morale and work effectiveness. Personal satisfaction is knowing that you’re on a list, and those that you deal with in your job, that feel rank is important in how they deal with you, will also know that you have been selected.

19. I am not very enthusiastic about frocking, though I see some benefits. I believe it’s appropriate only when any individual is working/will work in a position which is authorized the higher rank.

20. We should frock only those individuals assuming command who have not yet attained the authorized rank of the position they’re filling. It is not necessary for any other purpose in the Army.

21. I feel that if you’ve been recognized for promotion then there should not be a lag from being selected to pin-on. Long waiting lists serve no purpose. Either shorten the promotion list procedures or frock those on the field grade and general officer promotion lists.

22. Frocking should only be used for key positions (commanders, chief of staff, etc.).

23. If a CPT can do a major’s job, then obviously the requirement doesn’t need to be for a major. Promotion should be the reward for past performance. Frocking stems from frustration with a slow promotion system. If a person wears the next rank, he should also be paid. Condoning frocking means the military will be filled with officers being paid a pay grade lower than what they wear.

24. If the Army puts you in a position requiring a higher grade with increased responsibility, then they should PAY you for it - not frock you!

25. I held a major’s position for a year before promotion. This did not bother me personally. However, my branch felt there were times I could better support them if I had been a major. Once promoted, interface with other agencies became easier. Other captains being frocked to major was damaging to my morale. I gave numerous briefings to general officers, foreign dignitaries, and VIPs. I also ran an independent operation that fell to 50 percent strength overall and 20 percent in officers. Officers with only instructor duties were frocked as an inducement for volunteering as small group instructors. I found it difficult to accept captains pinning on major’s rank immediately after making the list. Over time, I grew to resent it. I would support no
frocking or a frocking policy that promoted officers to the next rank if they were assigned duties matching that rank, and promotion would occur while in that position.

26. While I don’t subscribe to a liberal frocking policy, I feel that extended time on promotion lists (pending pin-on, 12-18 months) has a negative impact on personal morale, therefore, during periods of small promotion increments, frocking should be increased to decrease length of time between notification and pin-on. In addition, in the joint assignment arena, I feel it is essential that personnel occupying the same type and level job as their sister service counterpart (NATO also), be the same rank.

27. Rank is only important because it is a function of time. As you get more experience, rank increases. To frock soldiers early doesn’t change this. Frocking lets the Army do more with less. For the service, this isn’t good. An LTC should do and LTC job. Make the [unreadable] job do its job. Don’t kill the hard working guys.

28. The present frocking policy of the US Army is particularly detrimental in joint assignments where you find a Navy guy of your same rank that has been frocked and an Air Force person that goes by Major (selectee) while you are still a Captain (promotable).

29. You’re missing the point! Frocking is a significant morale detractor when the policy is different between the services. With more officers in joint assignments, this is a significant issue. Example (real-life): A Navy officer gets frocked early and becomes immediately senior in rank to the person he was just working for, even though junior in effective date of rank. Frocking must become standard policy throughout the services or don’t do it at all.

30. Frocking of key positions (i.e., cdrs, GOs, etc.) is important from the "perception" standpoint only - peers assume that the frocked individuals are on an equal footing. But these people, based on their positions, do not need to be frocked because of the perceptions of their subordinates-rather it is the perceptions of their peers. I have observed situations on a corps staff where a key member of the staff was a promotable LTC, while the other corps staff principals were colonels. This had a detrimental influence upon the organization with the LTC (P) in charge, particularly during corps exercises. Not all positions should be eligible for frocking, but the policy should be expanded to key staff positions (i.e., S/G-1 through S/G-5) and all field grade commander positions. (I served 25 months as a commander - 4 months as an unfrock CPT (P) and the remainder as a MAJ.) While I enjoyed a successful command, it would have been much easier if I had been frocked before assuming command. The Army needs to recognize that in some branches, commanders are 0-4

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positions and should be eligible for frocking, if a CPT (P) is in the position. This is particularly important since many CPTs are on promotion lists for 2+ years!

31. Frocking should be a last resort to facilitate efficient operation of the chain of command. The only circumstances I have seen warranting it were to give the same level of rank to an individual who had to exercise authority over peers who had already pinned on the rank. To frock officers otherwise smacks of the old hollow Army with inflated ranks and questionable authority. Further, to allow for a policy of frocking relieves the MILPERCEN (Military Personnel Center - the original title of PERSCOM) and other Army managers of having to deal with the problems of length of promotions and other rank related problems. Officers will find it a cheap, unsatisfying experience.

32. Frocking circumvents the real issue, which is the need for the Armed Services (particularly the Army) to reduce the time between promotion and selection for promotion. It would be far better to backlog promotions than to backlog promotees. Additionally, the disparity in frocking policies between the separate branches of the service will cause problems, especially in the joint arena.

33. The Navy routinely frocks its officers if they are serving in positions that authorize the increased rank. The Army does not. A CPT can spend his entire S-3 job period in a promotable status while trying to do the work of a MAJ. Particularly because we must operate in a joint environment, frocking policies in all the services should be the same in intent.

34. I see frocking as totally meaningless & of no benefit. I spent over half of my captain years in MAJ/LTC positions. I don’t think what you’re wearing on your shoulders has much to do with how you can accomplish a particular job. I consider it an INSULT to be told, "...you can do an LTC’s job as a CPT, we won’t pay you an LTC or MAJ pay, but we’ll frock you so you can pretend you’re a MAJ." My husband is in the Navy where all enlisted and officers are frocked and I think it’s dumb. Meaningless. I can see frocking only in circumstances where it is diplomatically necessary - military attaches, etc. I personally would never accept frocking.

35. Frocking as a policy should be employed in those instances where serving in the current grade MIGHT BE perceived as being somehow disadvantageous to the officer. (Example, an officer serving in a joint or combined position should be frocked to minimize frustrations/confrontations with not being the right grade for the job.) Frocking simply for the sake of letting an officer pin on the next higher insignia of rank is not going to improve morale.
36. My observation of frocking has been that it is not consistent or uniformly applied. An example - I had thought that it was a policy that only was available to command slots (i.e., MAJ (P) frocked to LTC for Bn Cmd). But I've seen an instance - maybe two - where a CPT (P) on a list behind me while I was a CPT (P) get frocked as a J-3 (joint duty tour) Admin Officer, yet I (more senior) in a similar staff position (J-3 Ops) wasn't frocked. It didn't effect my job performance but did indicate the current inconsistency with the policy.

37. I commanded a 440 man battery (an O-4 command) as a CPT (P). Although offered the opportunity (by the CG) to be frocked to O-4, I chose not to pursue this avenue which would have required DA approval. I did not feel it was at all necessary, even though I had 13 Majors, 6 LTCs, 2 O-6s, and 1 O-8 in my unit. Everyone knew that I was the Btry Cdr and wearing O-4 rank would not have increased my authority one iota. Efficiency is not a function of rank, it is a function of competence.

38. A CPT who is a Bde S-2 must fight like hell on a staff who probably has at least two majors. A major who is a Bde S-2 does not have to fight the problem of being junior. Bde S-2 slots are major slots. CPT (P) S-2s at Bde may eliminate some of the "junior syndrome" if frocked as a major. Do not support automatic "frocking". Will create too much of a "Is he a real major?" environment. I used example of a CPT (P) to major, applies to all such situations.
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