CINC'S THEATER ARMY: Should It Command and Control Both Operations In The Combat Zone and Logistics In The Communications Zone?

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CINC'S THEATER ARMY: SHOULD IT COMMAND AND CONTROL BOTH OPERATIONS IN THE COMBAT ZONE AND LOGISTICS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE?

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ABSTRACT

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By Major Jerry T. Mohr, USA. 43 pages

In August 1990, Iraq's brutal army invaded Kuwait, and threatened to de-stabilize the entire Persian Gulf region, the source of the industrial countries' major supply of oil to run their economies. To deter further Iraqi aggression, the United States Central Command deployed to Saudi Arabia along with Third Army, Central Command's army component command and theater army. Unlike other U.S. theater armies in Western Europe and Korea, Third Army was assigned both logistical duties in the communications zone and control of operations in the combat zone. This is interesting to note since war in the Middle East requires extensive logistical support with its scanty infrastructure as compared to the regions of Korea and Western Europe.

The purpose of this monograph is to study and compare two alternatives from the perspective of the unified commander-in-chief. One alternative suggests structuring the army component into one dual purpose headquarters, a theater army headquarters, that controls both combat operations in the combat zone and logistical activities in the communications zone. The other alternative suggests forming two separate command and control headquarters, an operational headquarters to control combat operations in the combat zone and a logistical headquarters to control logistics in the communications zone.

This monograph examines the writings of both classical and modern theorists regarding span of control of logistical activities in the communications zone and combat operations in the combat zone. In addition, the monograph investigates three sources of doctrine: U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and, the recently emerging, Joint doctrine. Furthermore, the monograph investigates cogent historical examples from the World Wars. The analysis reveals that the alternative calling for separation of responsibilities between logistics in the communications zone and combat operations in the combat zone better serves the unified commander-in-chief. This alternative enables the theater army to focus on logistical support in the communications zone. Likewise, the operational headquarters devotes itself to combat operations in the combat zone. Regarding this conclusion, the monograph recommends that the Army form two headquarters: a contingency theater army for logistics and a contingency field army for operations when the number of corps exceeds the CINC's span of control.
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I. Introduction

In August 1990, Iraq's Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait threatening the political stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. Before invading, the Iraqi leader feigned complete innocence, denying any aggressive intentions. Meanwhile, his army postured itself along the Iraq-Kuwait border. Shortly thereafter, the Iraqi army attacked Iraq's virtually defenseless neighbor, torturing, murdering, raping, and plundering. Driving deep into the oil emirate, Saddam Hussein's army stopped only after reaching the Kuwaiti-Saudi border, alarming the peaceful Saudi monarchy. Reinforcing Saudi fears, U.S. satellite reconnaissance photos clearly showed Hussein's vast strength along the Saudi border, more than enough to defend his captured territory. This suggested that Saddam Hussein's forces were merely conducting an operational pause before resuming their attack south to seize the Saudi oil fields. Quite understandably, this threat of continued Iraqi aggression alarmed not only the Saudi monarchy, but also the world's industrialized nations which rely heavily on Arab oil fields to fuel their economies.

World indignation over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and concern for political stability in the volatile Middle East prompted the United Nations (UN) to require its member nations to implement the UN's tough economic sanctions. As a result, the United States, along with many other allied nations, deployed its military forces to the Middle East to enforce a trade embargo against Iraq. As the principal military headquarters of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) deployed to the
Joining the CENTCOM deployment was Third Army, the descendent of General George Patton's famous army. As the United States Army's senior headquarters in CENTCOM, it formed the army component (ARCOM) headquarters. In addition, Third Army performed the role of a theater army (TA), responsible for sustaining and supporting all U.S. Army forces in CENTCOM.

Usually, theater armies establish a structure similar to the one shown in Preliminary Draft FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations. This structure may include multiple theater army area commands (TAACOM), a medical command (MEDCOM), an engineer command (ENCOM), an air defense command (ADCOM), a transportation command (TRANSCOM), a personnel command (PERSCOM), a signal command, and a civil affairs command (CACOM), among other units. (See Figure One in Annex A) Obviously, these organizations provide logistical support.

Normally, theater armies are not assigned operational roles. For example, in Korea and Germany, the Seventh and Eighth Armies are examples of theater armies, responsible only for logistics. In time of war, these two TA's sustain, support, and train army forces in the communications zone (COMMZ).

In contrast, Third Army's structure and responsibilities in the Middle East did not follow those of the Seventh and Eighth Armies. In fact, Third Army's logistical support structure did not even come close to the doctrinal template mentioned above. For example, Department of the Army decided against activating Third Army's designated army reserve TAACOM, the 377th from New Orleans for deployment, to the Middle East.
Instead, Third Army’s logistician, Major General Pagonis, formed a Support Command (SUPCOM) in lieu of one or more TAACOM's to control logistical units in the COMMZ, including area support groups and petroleum units. In addition, the SUPCOM supervised other TA activities not normally assigned to a TAACOM. For example, the SUPCOM controlled a transportation group, the theater army movement control agency (TAMCA), and the theater army materiel management center (TAMMC), elements that the theater army commander normally commands directly, not through one of his TAACOM’s.

Third Army's deviation from logistical doctrine was not the only difference. The news media claimed that Third Army performed operational duties. In fact, journalists reported that LTG Yeosock, commander of Third Army, was responsible for operations in addition to his logistical duties. Moreover, one newspaper stated that LTG Yeosock was responsible for directing operations for all Army units in the Gulf region. They included the VII and XVIII Corps.

This departure from what may be considered normally-practiced doctrine in the theater armies forward deployed in Korea and Germany appears to be reasonable. In both of those theaters, between the tactical formations and the combined theater command, there exists a combined operational headquarters to command and control coalition forces. Central Army Group (CENTAG) headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) headquarters in Brunsum, Netherlands and Combined Field Army (CFA) headquarters in Uijongbu, South Korea exemplify this standing structure. However, in Saudi Arabia, no standing coalition operational headquarters existed to command and
control U.S. and allied forces in the event of war. Therefore, the absence of a standing coalition field army headquarters must have suggested assigning operational responsibilities to Third Army to reduce the unified commander's span of control in the event of a multi-corps war.

These differences from normally-practiced doctrine do not automatically mean that something is wrong. However, their occurrence in times of war suggest that doctrine needs review. After all, the extensive efforts needed to conduct logistical operations in a region with an extremely poor infrastructure suggest that this job alone is more than enough to fully task a theater army headquarters. In fact, CBS News reported from 'Emerald City,' main base for the TA's logistical operations, that Third Army's 'Camel Express' far exceeds the World War II logistical operation undertaken to support the 12th Army Group, an operation more commonly remembered as the 'Red Ball Express.'20 Besides modern warfare's extensive requirements for logistical support from the COMMZ, the conduct of armored warfare in the open desert presents unparalleled demands on the headquarters responsible for operational control.

The above observations on Third Army's organization and responsibilities suggest asking whether a theater army is really capable of handling both operational and logistical duties. More to the point, my research question asks which of the following alternatives better serves the commander-in-chief of a unified command. The first alternative entails assigning responsibilities for both operations in the combat zone and logistics in the communications zone to the army
component, in other words the theater army. The other alternative involves dividing responsibilities between two separate headquarters, one to handle logistics in the communications zone, for example a theater army, and another headquarters to direct operational responsibilities in the combat zone, for example a corps, field army, or army group headquarters.

I intend to structure this monograph as follows. First, I define the criteria. They include feasibility, efficiency, and flexibility. Then I review theory, doctrine, and history relating to the research question. Examining several major theorists, I find Jomini and Van Creveld to offer pertinent insights on logistics. My review of doctrine reveals the current positions taken by the Army, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff concerning span of control of operational and logistical activities. Finally, historical evidence from the World Wars reveals what span of control existed and what methods of command and control worked for operations and logistics. Then, I analyze the research question in light of current force structure and the most likely scenario of America's future wars. After testing the criteria against the alternatives, I draw conclusions. Finally, I make recommendations that the Army should consider regarding its structure. Having completed the above introduction, I want to address the criteria that I intend to apply in determining the better alternative.

II. Criteria

Selection of criteria is important as they determine the effectiveness of this monograph's conclusions. To ensure an adequate comparison, I believe that the following three suffice: feasibility,
efficiency, and flexibility. Before testing efficiency or flexibility against the alternatives, it is important to determine if both alternatives are feasible.

The feasibility criteria asks if each alternative can accomplish the operational and logistical requirements assigned by the unified commander. With that definition established, it is important to delineate what feasibility is not. It will not address whether an alternative is politically acceptable to the Congress given the difficult economic conditions in our country. In addition, it will not address manpower issues and end strength trade-offs, inherent in force structure changes. While both factors are important to a feasibility assessment, in its broadest sense, both lie outside the exclusively operational scope of this monograph. But what happens if one of the alternatives fails the feasibility test?

If the criterion determines that an alternative is not feasible, then the comparison comes to a stop. It makes no sense to compare the alternatives if one, or both, is not feasible. In short, only if both alternatives satisfy the feasibility criterion, am I able to test the alternatives against the remaining two criteria and produce a valid comparison. Next, I want to discuss the efficiency criterion.

Efficiency makes an excellent quantitative criterion. Comparative efficiency asks which alternative accomplishes the mission and yields the least waste in manpower and equipment. Also, comparative efficiency asks which alternative requires the minimum effort. In other words, efficiency asks which alternative has the highest output to input ratio. Though I am unable to conduct tests to obtain quantitative values, I do
expect to determine from my analysis which alternative is more efficient. For example, if a contingency requires the deployment of only an operational headquarters to a mature theater where a TA is presently directing logistics, then it is patently more efficient to deploy a headquarters that is designed to handle only operational matters, not a dual-purpose headquarters. The answers to the above questions determine which alternative is most efficient. Besides feasibility and efficiency, there remains one further criterion by which to judge the two alternatives: flexibility.

Flexibility as a criterion is an important determinant. It asks which alternative can adapt more readily to new conditions, can respond more easily to changing situations, or is more capable of accepting change. For example, it asks which alternative can more easily adapt to unexpected enemy movements in the fluid combat zone. Also, it asks which alternative can react more quickly to enemy interdiction in the COMMZ. In addition, flexibility asks which alternative structure can most easily be tailored for the mission. In short, flexibility has a lot to do with the ability to improvise. The better alternative is the one that can more quickly and effectively improvise. Having thus defined my criteria, I want to examine what military theorists have to say about the two alternatives.

III. Theory

As a classical theorist of war during the age of Napoleon, Antoine Jomini observed an evolutionary change take place in battlefield logistics. He believed that logistics during the age of Frederick the Great and his wars of posts was much simpler than logistics during the
age of Napoleon and his wars of movement. In particular, Jomini recognized that wars of movement resulted in significantly increased movement plans, more extensive supply preparations, more frequent encampments, an expanded medical system for the larger numbers of wounded and sick, and many others. Together, they threatened to overwhelm the commander. As a result, he concluded that staff officers need to "relieve [the commander-in-chief] of the details of execution." 23

It is interesting to note that Jomini's definition of logistics included many items routinely handled by operations staff sections, not logisticians. For example, under logistics, Jomini included preparation of operations orders, attack orders, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and many others. 24 In other words, Jomini asserted that the staff officer must relieve the commander of what modern warfare considers both operational and logistical details.

If Jomini were alive today and saw the army component commander directing combat operations in the combat zone and logistics in the COMMZ within a unified command, I believe he would be shocked. He would see an army component commander supported by a logistical system, inconceivable in his time. During Napoleon's campaign in Russia, the equivalent of a modern armored division's worth of soldiers, 18,000 strong, required approximately 30 tons of supplies by supply wagon despite intensive foraging. 25 Ammunition tonnages amounted to very little. In fact, until 1970, ammunition amounted to less than one percent of food and fodder tonnages. 26 In contrast, Jomini would find the modern logistical system required to support a modern armored division in the Middle East during the recent 100-Hour War with over 500,000 gallons of fuel and
3,000 tons of ammunition per day not including rations and other classes of supply. Not only would the vastly increased scope of logistics overwhelm him, but the increasing complexity of operations would equally impress him. For example, he would see an army component commander busily directing more battlefield operating systems than ever before. As Dupuy clearly demonstrated, the number of battlefield functions and agencies increased from 11 during the time of Napoleon to 30 today. This is an enormous increase. Furthermore, larger headquarters, more elaborate control procedures, and vastly superior battlefield mobility greatly exacerbate control of battlefield operations.

Because he wrote that his staff should relieve the commander of as much logistical detail as possible, I believe that Jomini would conclude that saddling so many operational and logistical responsibilities on the army component commander overburdens him. From this conclusion, Jomini would most likely argue that the army component commander cannot perform both operational and logistical duties efficiently. Thus, I believe that Jomini would recommend that the commander-in-chief (CINC) reduce the span of control of the army component commander by forming two headquarters both of them directly responsible to the CINC, one headquarters to direct operations in the combat zone and one headquarters to control logistics in the COMMZ.

Unfortunately, Jomini's principles predate the advent of modern warfare. Thus, I find them inadequate to judge the alternatives without investigating the thinking of current war theorists. I want to examine the writings of a more modern military theorist which discuss the relationships of operations, logistics, command and control, and span of
control that should provide a telling analysis.

Martin van Creveld is a present day military theorist who addresses the relationship between the role of uncertainty and a commander's style of command. He proposes that greater uncertainty on the battlefield requires a commander to relinquish greater freedom of action to his subordinates.30 Going even further, he suggests that a commander adapt his style of command to the degree of uncertainty involved in the unit's mission.31 Since the alternatives in the research question focus on the differences between activities in the combat zone and the COMMZ, I want to examine how uncertainty impacts on the activities.

In the combat zone, leaders deal intensively with soldiers who can easily succumb to the plethora of modern weapon systems. Rifle and artillery fire are daily occurrences. The threat of dying is pervasive. Indeed, soldiers constantly fight the fear of it. They force themselves to expect death among their friends. In fact, they avoid forming close friendships for fear of losing them. Soldiers live from moment to moment, never knowing when and where the enemy will suddenly appear. Stressful conditions are the norm. Communications are often sporadic. Thus, certainty is extremely elusive. This lack of knowledge makes leaders extremely uncomfortable. In short, uncertainty flourishes in the combat zone.

On the other hand, the environment in the COMMZ promotes certainty. Leaders and soldiers deal more with things such as highly technical equipment that helps to divert their attention from their fellow man. Things tend to remain the same. In addition, the typical mission in the COMMZ involves activities including medical care, repair
work, and establishment of logistical bases. Work can be much more satisfying accomplishing constructive aims instead of destruction. Life is much more organized. Living conditions in the COMMZ often include hot showers, tents, and cots, not the dirty, cold, and hard ground familiar to the combat soldier. The imminence of death is not pervasive. In fact, there is an expectation of surviving when located tens, even hundreds, of miles from the front. Communications are much more secure and accessible. More telephones are available. Thus, soldiers naturally think of the COMMZ as safe. Certainty permeates the COMMZ. In conclusion, there exists a vast difference in certainty between soldiers trying to survive in the combat zone and soldiers in the COMMZ.

It makes sense that commanders in the combat zone must take into account the environment in which their units live. After all, the soldiers' environment helps to form his attitudes that influence how he receives orders from his commander. Likewise, the commander's personality and attitude can influence the soldier's attitude. Thus, a different style of command can significantly affect the manner in which orders are carried out and how successfully a unit performs. As mentioned above, Van Creveld suggests that commanders of operational units adapt to this uncertain battlefield by permitting subordinate commanders greater flexibility. Subordinate commanders need to make decisions on their own as the fast-paced, complex modern battlefield does not provide them the luxury to wait for guidance from their superior. In any event, the environment of the combat zone requires the commander to command and control with a less centralized command style.

Conversely, commanders of logistical units can take advantage of
the greater degree of certainty in the COMMZ. Better communications allows them to establish greater control over the logistical system. The commander can interject himself into the flow more easily to ensure some high priority project is accomplished. Less attention to daily survival enables soldiers to increase their output. In sum, the environment of the COMMZ enables the commander to command and control with highly centralized command styles.

Van Creveld goes on to contrast the two styles of command preferred by logistical and operational organizations. He writes that logistics is a function-oriented command system while operations is an output-oriented command system. Although improvisation or adaptability is included as a logistical imperative, logistical units do focus on efficiency, doing the job with minimal effort and waste. Likewise, operational units focus on flexibility, adapting to changes quickly and easily.

From the discussion above, it is easy to understand that a theater army commander responsible for both operations and logistics faces a dilemma. The efficiency and the flexibility of a unit is a function of the style of command employed. One side of the dilemma suggests that the commander could attempt to fit the right style of command to the right type of unit. The other side of the dilemma suggests that the commander employs one style of command favoring either combat operations or logistics.

Looking at the first side of the dilemma, I suppose a commander could attempt to employ two widely divergent styles of command. However, he would suffer from much waste and excessive effort to accomplish the mission. Style of command includes the normal control measures that a
commander uses from day to day. They include standard operating procedures, reports, directives, inspections, and regulations. Style of command also impacts on the organization. A logistics organization tends to be more horizontal, employing a wider span of control. This is done owing to the greater degree of centralization. On the other hand, operational organizations tend to be more vertical due to less control and more uncertainty. In order to use two styles of command, the commander must create two sets of each of the above measures of control. Then, he and his staff must remember to employ the control measure allowing a wide latitude of freedom against the operational unit and the control measure centralizing control against the logistical unit. Obviously, this solution is nigh impossible. No commander or staff wants to double their workload preparing twice as many control measures. In particular, the heat of combat makes this solution totally unacceptable. In short, efficiency suffers.

On the other side of the dilemma, if a commander employs only one style of command for both combat operations and logistical activities, then one or the other activity suffers from an inappropriate command style. Either logistical units fail to operate efficiently or operational units suffer from restrictive control measures that hinder initiative, stifle maneuver, and do not take full advantage of the highly mobile equipment that the modern Abrams tank and Apache helicopter offer.

Another modern writer on military theory is John D. Stuckey who wrote "Echelons above Corps" in *Parameters*. He says that there always exists a need for an echelon above corps to provide logistical support. He goes on to say that this is true even if only one corps
deploys to the CINC’s area of responsibility. For example, a headquarters must exist at an echelon above the corps to manage those activities conducted outside of corps boundaries or those activities outside the realm of a corps. These activities include the use of theater ballistic missiles, air defense, electronic warfare, communications, construction engineers, military intelligence, military police for control of enemy prisoners of war, civil affairs, personnel replacement, medical hospitals, and many others. It is easy to understand that a corps commander involved in operational matters and the many logistical activities within his Corps Support Command (COSCOM) does not have surplus time to direct activities normally conducted outside the realm of the corps. In short, Stuckey believes that the CINC must always have a structure at some echelon above corps to provide logistical support.

In contrast, a need does not always exist to command operational forces at an echelon above corps. With a span of control that consists of only one operational corps and the normal array of service components, the CINC can easily manage. He may even be able to handle more than one corps without an intermediate headquarters depending on the situation. The point is that there is almost always a need for a theater army headquarters, or some similar logistical headquarters, to support the operational corps while there is not always a need for an intermediate operational headquarters between the deployed corps and the unified command.

However effectively the principles of military theorists make their case, the theorists’ views are not always accepted. In contrast,
doctrine represents the currently accepted thought and practice of a nation's armed forces. Thus, it can produce some fresh insights into the research question.

IV. Doctrine

There are three sources of doctrine that may help answer the research question -- U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and Joint doctrine. I begin with United States Army doctrine.

Pertinent army doctrine is found primarily in two sources, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, and Preliminary Draft Field Manual 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations. Both manuals address the relationship between the unified command and the theater army.

FM 100-5 states that the "Theater army is normally the Army service component command in a unified command." Furthermore, it says that current examples of theater armies include Third, Seventh, and Eighth Armies. Moreover, it says that "The theater army as the service component has both operational and support responsibilities." However, it says that the CINC has the authority to assign "exclusively operational missions, solely logistic tasks, or a combination of both types of responsibility" to the TA.

The preliminary draft of The Army in Theater Operations addresses the TA in much greater detail. FM 100-7 states that the CINC has wide latitude in determining how to structure his organization. In particular, the field manual states that the CINC has the authority to choose either alternative posed in the research question.

The draft manual goes on to discuss why and how the CINC might exclude operational responsibilities from the TA commander. Reasons for
doing so include reducing a theater army commander's excessively large span of control. To accomplish this, the CINC is authorized to reassign operational responsibilities from the TA to another army force (ARFOR). For example, the CINC could establish a numbered field army as an ARFOR to assume operational responsibilities over several army corps while the TA focuses solely on sustainment and support.

A different scenario may find the CINC with only two army corps. He may designate each corps an ARFOR depending on his span of control. In this manner, he avoids cluttering the operational chain of command with an unnecessary intermediate headquarters, for example a theater army or a numbered field army, between himself and his two corps commanders.

To summarize Army doctrine, it is neutral favoring neither alternative. It simply states that the theater CINC has wide latitude in structuring the army portion of his war fighting organization. Besides Army doctrine, the doctrine of the Army's brother service offers some telling insights from its perspective on operations at the boundary between ground and sea warfare. The marine air ground task force concept of the United States Marine Corps doctrine unquestionably belongs within the scope of this monograph.

The Marine war fighting concept, the marine air ground task force (MAGTF), separates operational from logistical responsibilities under the senior MAGTF commander level. The MAGTF is the Marine concept for the employment of Marines.

Structurally, all MAGTF's are virtually identical. Each MAGTF consists of a command element controlling three subordinate elements. The subordinate elements include an aviation combat element, a ground
combat element, and a combat service support element.\textsuperscript{47}

Though all MAGTF's comprise these same three elements, they come in different sizes. MAGTF variants include a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with a reinforced infantry battalion, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) with a reinforced infantry regiment, and a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) normally with a single Marine Division.\textsuperscript{48}

The MAGTF command and control structure is different from the Army. The MAGTF normally includes a single commander for each of the following: ground operations, aviation operations, and combat service support or logistics.\textsuperscript{49} In turn, they are directly responsible to the MAGTF commander.

Remarkably, the role of the MAGTF commander is almost a mirror image of a unified CINC, though on a smaller scale. The MAGTF commander commands a force structure which includes single ground and air components. He integrates air support into the fight. However, the MAGTF commander is different in one respect from a unified CINC. The MAGTF commander never delegates logistical responsibilities to his air or ground component commanders. He retains direct responsibility through a single subordinate logistical command structure. Only he balances the priorities among the three MAGTF components.

The above discussion reveals many of the similarities between the alternative of separating operations in the combat zone and logistics in the COMMZ within the unified command and the MAGTF concept of separating logistics from operations; however, there is one major difference. The MAGTF combat service support commander controls logistics not only in the COMMZ, but also in the combat zone for the expeditionary commander.\textsuperscript{50}
In other words, ground combat element units contain no logistical units of any type as they are totally dependent on the combat service support group for logistical support.51

The doctrinal sources, discussed thus far, demonstrate that the Army holds an ambivalent position as to whether the CINC should assign both operational and logistical duties to a single commander or assign them to different commanders. (Admittedly, Army doctrine does not govern the CINC's actions. However, the CINC must deal with the Army structure and doctrine offered to him.) On the other hand, the Marine Corps clearly favors a ground commander for combat operations and a separate logistical commander for logistical activities both subordinate to an overall MAGTF commander.

Until recently, no other source of U.S. ground or joint doctrine existed. However, emerging doctrine in the joint arena promises fresh insight from the unified commander's point of view.

Since Congress reorganized the Department of Defense, the services began several initiatives in the joint arena including the development of joint doctrine to improve the integration of service war fighting and logistical capabilities at the unified command level. Of these initiatives, emerging Joint doctrine manuals experienced tremendous growth. One was the publication of a test manual on joint logistics which addresses planning, execution, and authority for logistics in the unified combatant commands.

The joint logistical manual, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, clearly states that the combatant commander must have command and control of both operational and logistical functions and has wide
latitude in forming his logistical structure. He alone determines if the selected course of action is logistically feasible. He alone establishes logistical priorities. He alone has the authority to establish a single logistical manager responsible for distributing common items. That is, he can direct a single component, normally the dominant user, to manage logistical operations of a selected commodity for all services in the theater. Examples of such commodities include line haul, port operations, base development, and water support. For instance, in U.S. Forces Japan, the sub-unified CINC tasked the Air Force as the single manager for all aviation fuel within the sub-unified command. Furthermore, the CINC should control the intra-theater distribution system. Despite this new logistical authority at the CINC's level, the control of theater logistics is left in the hands of the theater component commanders.

In the unified command, the army component command is the TA which normally is responsible only for logistical activities. As mentioned earlier, Seventh and Eighth U.S. Armies are current examples of theater armies that are assigned only logistical responsibilities. However, if the unified commander assigns operational, in addition to logistical, responsibilities to the theater army commander, then potential for trouble exists.

If the CINC assigns the theater army commander as the single joint logistical manager for certain common commodities as part of his logistical responsibilities and tasks him with operational commitments, then this would place the theater army commander in a conflict of interest. For example, suppose the CINC designates a service other than
the army component as the main effort and assigns a supporting role to the theater army commander tasked with both operational and logistical responsibilities. Obviously, a temptation arises to short change logistical support to the component commander of the other service assigned with the main effort in favor of the theater army's supporting effort. If this occurred, the theater army commander would be violating the CINC's guidance. Almost as a prescient warning against this problem, the joint logistical manual declares that subordinate commanders of a unified command "are not in a position to determine their need for a specific commodity or service. This judgment is made by the common superior..." in other words, the CINC. 58

Another potential problem could occur when the CINC assigns the theater army commander with responsibilities for both logistics and operations. Quite naturally, these two areas compete for his constant attention. Both of them demand his full attention. It would not be unnatural that one or the other suffers. And since logistics is often held in less esteem than operations, human nature predicts more often than not that operations will bask in the glow of attention to the detriment of logistics.

To conclude from a joint doctrinal point of view, assignment of both operational and logistical responsibilities to the theater army commander can lead to a lack of efficiency. Saddled with both responsibilities, the theater army commander may be tempted to ignore the CINC's guidance, consciously or unconsciously. Typical reasons include service parochialism and personality difference. The result is often wasted effort, in other words, inefficiency. In short, joint doctrine
favors assigning operational and logistical responsibilities to separate commanders, both directly responsible to the CINC. In conclusion, Army, Marine Corps, and Joint doctrine favor the alternative where the CINC assigns operational and logistical duties to two different commanders, the theater army commander and some other ARFOR commander.

However, doctrine may not always be valid or accepted. Often, it includes more theory than practitioners of war are willing to accept. Therefore, I want to examine military history to determine what it has to say about the research question.

V. Historical Evidence

During World War I, the control of the logistical organization in the communications zone (known then as the Services of Supply) became a controversial issue for General of the Armies Pershing's Allied Expeditionary Force. As American involvement increased, logistical support for the buildup of American forces became congested at French ports which in turn led to slow turnaround times for shipping. As a result, political and military officials in Washington strongly favored placing the Services of Supply directly under their control. However, Pershing argued strongly against this. He believed that the general in charge of the services of supply must work directly for the commander-in-chief. In the end, Pershing's view won over Secretary of War Baker. The precedent was set. The services of supply (the future communications zone) remained under the control of the overseas commander, the man on the spot.

It should be noted that this World War I controversy over control of the logistical organization in the COMMZ labored between control by
officials in Washington versus control by the commander-in-chief. Obviously, this did not highlight the issue that confronts us today. It took moving the CINC from the primary role as a ground forces commander to a the role as the joint/combined commander responsible for all air, ground, and sea forces in the theater of operations to reveal the full nature of today's controversy.

During the early planning stages in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War II, American Army officers debated whether senior American ground force commanders, that is army group commanders, should control both operational and logistical functions. An early commander of the United States Army's European Theater of Operations (before the arrival of General Eisenhower), LTG Jacob Devers, favored combining responsibilities for both operations and logistics under a single U.S. General Headquarters. Incidentally, he modeled his proposal on the World War I headquarters of General of the Armies Pershing which controlled both logistics and operations as discussed above. However, General Marshall, the Army chief of staff, "wanted the combat headquarters free to focus on combat." In fact, he served as a member of Pershing's staff. As such, Marshall must have observed how responsibility for both operations and logistics of the American forces affected Pershing's conduct of operations as a ground force commander within the Allied coalition under the supreme commander, Field Marshal Foch. Thus, I believe that Marshall's position on Pershing's staff in World War I, convinced him that separation of operational matters from logistical responsibilities better serves the operational commander directing combat operations.
Once General Eisenhower assumed command of European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), he ended the debate. His decision freed the senior ground force commander, the army group commander, from logistical concerns. Eisenhower ostensibly retained control of administration and services as commander of ETOUSA in addition to his operational responsibility as supreme commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). However, General J.C.H. Lee, his deputy in ETOUSA, controlled the daily activities.

Besides the issue of which level of command controls the communications zone, General George Patton, commander of the Third Army, reported an additional problem in the logistical system, offering a solution to fix it. During the difficult days of supply shortages in September 1944, he observed that the logistical organization in the communications zone was too inflexible. Specifically, he believed that General Lee's logistical organization developed misplaced priorities that actually hindered combat operations instead of supporting them. Indeed, Patton argued that if the operational units practiced the inflexible procedures developed by the logistical organization, they would have lost the war already. Up until that time, General Lee's logistical organization in the communications zone determined supply priorities without any supervisory controls from SHAEF to arbitrate supply grievances among the various operational commands and the communications zone. Soon afterwards, General Eisenhower implemented Patton's suggested solution to the problem by designating the SHAEF logistician to arbitrate supply priorities among 12th Army Group, General Lee's logistical headquarters, and the Air Corps. This action ensured
that General Eisenhower retained firm control of logistical support for combat operations.

This issue implicitly revealed that Eisenhower's decision to keep the communications zone under his control through General Lee at ETOUSA was correct. If 12th Army Group had control of the communications zone, then the Air Corps probably would have complained. If the Air Corps had control of it, then 12th Army Group probably would have complained. As long as General Lee's logistical command in the communications zone retained control without close review from SHAEF, then the operational commands complained. Only the unified commander's firm control of the logistical organization through his logistician ensured that the logistical system supported combat operations.

The above reveals that retaining control of operational and logistical responsibilities at the unified command level worked in the ETO in World War II. In fact, Eisenhower's and Marshall's strong beliefs on this issue suggest that they believed that their solution was instrumental to success on the battlefield. On the other side of the world in the China-Burma-India theater, the British Army provides an example where a combat commander realized the hindrance of managing both responsibilities for combat operations and logistics in the lines of communications area.

As commander of 14th Army in Burma under the 11th Army Group, General William Slim conducted combat operations against the Japanese. Ostensibly, the 11th Army Group commander-in-chief, General Giffard, was the senior ground force component commander under Admiral Mountbatten who was the commander-in-chief of Supreme Allied Command South-East Asia.
In November 1944, 11th Army Group became Allied Land Forces South-East Asia and General Oliver Leese assumed command as commander-in-chief.

The 11th Army Group and ALFSEA acted as a theater of operations and 14th Army acted as its principal ground force component for several reasons. First, Slim's senior repeatedly allocated combat divisions and logistical resources to the 14th Army. Second, he coordinated and allocated tactical air assets to the 14th Army. Third, he also coordinated and provided air lift assets. Fourth, he allocated amphibious assets to 15th Corps operations in the Arakan region in support of the 14th Army's operations in the interior of Burma. And finally, both General Giffard and General Leese were commander-in-chiefs indicating their greater independent status that a typical ground force component commander would not enjoy. Thus, I believe that Slim's command constituted a ground force component under an independent joint, and later a combined, command (ALFSEA was a combined Anglo-American command).

In 1944 and 1945, Slim and his 14th Army campaigned to stop the Japanese attack to sever the Allied line of communication with China and then switch over to a counteroffensive to destroy the Japanese Army in Burma. After several weeks of hard fighting, Slim successfully defeated the Japanese attack in the battle of Kohima-Imphal which significantly degraded the Japanese forces in theater.

As he planned the counteroffensive at the conclusion of the Kohima-Imphal operation, Slim realized that his operation would cover much territory vastly increasing his area of responsibility. He would
direct operations in the battle area and logistics along the lines of communications connecting his army to the support base. 85 (Today, the U.S. Army labels these areas as the combat zone and the communications zone. 86) As Slim mentioned in his book, he looked back on his logistical tail almost as much as he looked forward into the battle area. 87 Therefore, Giffard relieved Slim of responsibility for the lines of communication area or COMMZ to reduce his span of control and permit him more time to devote his attention to operations and logistics in the combat zone. 88

Slim continued his planning and execution of the next phase, the destruction of the Japanese forces defending in the Mandalay-Meiktila region. 89 British forces deceived the Japanese into believing that the main attack would come in the vicinity of Mandalay. 90 But in reality, the British committed their main effort against Meiktila completely turning the Japanese defenders out of their positions along the Irrawaddy River, a classic turning movement. 91

Thus, I believe that a major part of General Slim's success was directly attributable to his relief from responsibility for logistics in the lines of communications area. This action significantly reduced his span of control. It also enabled General Slim to devote his full attention to operations and logistics within the combat zone.

The U.S. Army in Vietnam provides a more recent example where the commander-in-chief assigns responsibilities for combat operations and logistics to different commanders. The commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, separated the theater army, U.S. Army Vietnam, responsible for logistics, from his operational commands.
Despite that fact that Vietnam was not a strategic and operational victory, it was clearly a demonstration of tactical and logistical success. In fact, the U.S. military never lost a tactical battle. In addition, the First Logistical Command, subordinate to U.S. Army Vietnam, provided the best equipment and care for the American soldier.

In sum, historical evidence from the World Wars and Vietnam decidedly favors one alternative. The commander of a unified command should separate operational and logistical responsibilities between two different commanders both under his direct control. Having examined the above historical cases where commanders confronted the issue of assigning both operational and logistical responsibilities to the ground force commander, let us examine several remaining items before testing the alternatives against the criteria to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

VI. Analysis and Conclusions

Several relevant issues do not fall under the categories of theory, doctrine, or history. One particularly important issue concerns the determination of the region of the world in which the United States Army will most likely fight its next war. This is important because the likely location of America's next war impacts on the Theater Army's force structure as I demonstrate below. First, I must determine the most likely region in the world for future wars. Then, I must explain why American political leaders would risk committing military force in that region. After all, conflict can occur in many locations in the world, but the U.S. does not necessarily commit military force in each crisis
The underdeveloped regions of the world offer the most likely scenarios for America's next war, in particular the poverty stricken regions. Constant strife due to abject poverty and hunger and the unwanted intrusion of western culture, religious values, and languages in these regions threaten political stability. At the same time, these people are fully aware of the relatively luxurious lifestyles in western society. Together, these conditions fester to produce intolerable frustrations. As a result, they create fertile soil for the growing acceptance of charismatic leaders devoted to communist or religious fundamentalist ideologies and bent on usurping power from the people's lawful government. In the view of these long suffering peoples, they have little to lose even if their new rulers lead them to war.

Another scenario that promises potential for future conflict includes underdeveloped regions with new found wealth. The sudden generation of tremendous amounts of money quickly fuel the people's expectations for fast economic development. However, existing governments are often unable to satisfy their people's rapidly rising expectations. Then along come unsupported promises of immediate economic success from unscrupulous leaders. Blinded by prospects of golden prosperity, the people offer little resistance. As a result, these opportunistic leaders find it easy to seize power.

Unfortunately, emerging leaders in the above cases often spread conflict beyond their borders into neighboring countries. And worse yet, regional power imbalances tend to encourage these leaders to take advantage of their weaker neighbors. The result is less stability and
thus more frequent wars in the underdeveloped regions of the world.

Supporting the above argument in his new book *The Transformation of War*, Martin van Creveld writes that most wars in the future will primarily involve low intensity conflicts. More to the point, he points out that the great majority of these wars presently occur in the underdeveloped regions of the world and are likely to continue.

In contrast, people living in well-developed regions of the world are less likely to wage war. First, people in these regions of the world tend to be contented with life. Thus, they have little reason to resort to aggression. Second, they normally maintain modern professional armies. As a result, regional balances of power are stable, effectively deterring war.

Even though most future conflicts may well occur in the underdeveloped regions of the world, that does not automatically mean that the U.S. will participate in them. In fact, American political leaders do not commit military force carelessly. They decide to use military force only upon the determination that America’s vital interests are threatened. After the Second World War, the United States decided from time to time that certain vital interests required the commitment of American military forces and resources. These vital interests included the containment of communism, the defense of democratic values, the promotion of free markets, the guarding of strategic waterways, and the protection of American citizens. Although communist ideology is thoroughly discredited today, the need to secure the remaining vital interests remains as strong as ever.

It is in the underdeveloped regions of the world where these vital
interests are most often, if not most seriously, threatened. First, strong democratic traditions do not exist there. Many totalitarian leaders run roughshod over the rights of their own people, let alone the rights of American citizens. Second, as mentioned above, newly discovered natural resources located in that part of the world are connected to Western consumers by commercial shipping passing through strategic waterways. The growth of free trade requires safeguarding navigable waterways. As a result, there is a high probability that circumstances will develop, prompting the American government to commit U.S. military forces in the underdeveloped regions of the world.

The likely prospect of future war in the underdeveloped regions of the world impacts on the CINC's force structure and in particular his theater army. As alluded to earlier, one common element in almost all underdeveloped regions of the world is the absence of any significant infrastructure necessary for economic success. Underdeveloped nations usually possess few modern roads, electrical power plants, oil refineries, sources of potable water, airfields, seaports, and sanitation plants.

In order to prosecute war in the world's underdeveloped regions, the CINC requires vastly greater logistical support. This is especially true with the logistically dependent American military. Thus, the CINC's force structure in these regions must include a TA that is more logistically oriented than would be required to wage war in the well-developed regions of the world. As mentioned earlier, the theater army can expect to control a vast array of subordinate commands including the MEDCOM, ENCOM, PERSCOM, CACOM, ADCOM, TAMCA, TAMMC, TRANSCOM, and
several TAACOM's. Naturally, a greater requirement for logistics means larger and more TA subordinate commands. As the TA logistical structure expands, it is more likely that the TA commander's span of control will become unmanageable. Thus, the CINC is highly unlikely to add operational duties on top of the enormous logistical responsibilities of the TA commander in an underdeveloped region of the world. In short, the most likely location of America's next war affects the CINC's TA command and control structure. Similarly, the expected size of the next war also impacts upon it.

The size of American forces deployed in the next war is unlikely to exceed one army corps. First, James Schneider, professor for military theory, at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's School of Advanced Military Studies, suggests that outdated logistical infrastructure in the underdeveloped regions of the world will restrict the deployment size of a military force.98 Second, according to van Creveld in his new book, The Transformation of War, small-scale wars will predominate to the degree that regular armed forces will eventually wither away.99 At a minimum, this suggests that the size of military forces in future wars will decrease. Another noted author, Chris Bellamy, supports this view. He wrote in The Future of Land Warfare that future wars in some underdeveloped regions of the world will involve fewer forces.100 In sum, the above evidence suggests that instead of recent wars employing multiple corps subordinate to a field army, future wars will employ multiple divisions subordinate to a single army corps.

Recent American practice in combat suggests that the Department of Defense will continue the current trend of deploying joint Army and
Marine Corps forces to a theater before the army reinforces a unified command with more troops. The Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, and the 100-Hour War exemplify this joint practice in American armed conflict during the past 45 years. For example, the Marine Corps will deploy a MEF alongside an army corps before the Army deploys a reinforcing corps. The 100-Hour War is a good example of this. Also, one would think that the unified commander would form a numbered field army to control the army corps and the MEF, but experience suggests otherwise. In the 100-Hour War, the CINC kept the army corps and the MEF under their own component headquarters. In short, the size of the CINC's army component in the next war will most likely not exceed one army corps.

The above analysis relates to the research question as follows. If the army component of a unified command includes a single army corps, then it makes little sense for the CINC to order the army component commander, in other words the theater army commander, to direct combat operations. With only one assigned corps, the TA is an unnecessary operational layer of command. Obviously, the CINC's span of control can easily accommodate direct command of a single corps.

However, the United States must retain some capability to command and control several army corps in a war. In fact, after suggesting that future wars will most likely involve fewer forces than recent experience, Chris Bellamy admits that "...the unexpected will happen." For example, an all out Soviet attack on Western Europe or a limited war against a significant threat such as the Iraqi army could easily require the commitment of more than one army corps. Since Vietnam, the U.S.
committed the Army only three times. Yet, only one instance required the
commitment of two army corps. A valid requirement exists to field some
operational headquarters to direct operations of more than one corps and
relieve the CINC's span of control. Thus, the conclusions and
recommendations below must address this very real possibility.

Another relevant issue is the Army 'saying' that an army should
train as it intends to fight. Since the CINC can probably expect to
commit only one army corps in some underdeveloped region of the world in
the next war, then the theater army should expect to manage only
logistical activities. Furthermore, the CINC should command the army
corps directly.

The converse to the above army 'saying' is also true; an army
performs in war as it trains in peace. To illustrate, suppose that a
CINC assigns both operational and logistical planning responsibilities to
a theater army in peacetime. Then, after several years of planning and
training the CINC's and the TA staff for this command structure, suppose
that U.S. political leaders declare war requiring only one corps. If the
CINC suddenly decides to assume direct operational control of the single
army corps from the TA commander, then major disruptions will occur.
This is not beneficial to the unit during transition to war. In other
words, it is the nature of a well-developed bureaucracy to resist change.
And the higher the level of command, the more inertia is involved. The
CINC's staff will not have trained to assume direct control. The TA
staff will naturally find it difficult to relinquish control. In
addition, other complications disrupt operations. Suppose that the TA is
assigned the lineage of a numbered field army that possesses a famous
history and is associated with a well-known heroic commander from a past war. As the commander and his staff realize that they will not carry on the tradition of combat operations and instead will conduct the 'less' glamorous job of providing "mere" logistical support, pressure will naturally build for the TA to retain operational control. Human nature shows time and again that this is true. Therefore, the army "saying" that a unit will fight as it trains suggests that an army should structure its command and control organization for the more likely war.

As my last relevant issue, I want to address the pervasive influence of technology on logistics in the COMMZ, in other words, the theater army headquarters. Clearly, the continued advancement of technology has vastly increased the extensive logistical structure necessary to support an army. The enormous differences between the Sopwith Camel and the F-15 Eagle, the tank of 1918 and the M1A1 Abrams, Stalin's organs and the multiple launch rocket system, and Holland's first submarine and the Los Angeles class attack submarine exemplify the on-going technological revolution. These vast improvements in machinery demand an exponential increase in numbers of spare parts, mechanics, and logistical units. In fact, warfare throughout this century demonstrates a growing need for skilled manpower to maintain the increasingly complex war machines in constant readiness. No technological improvement in the near future suggests that this trend will reverse itself. Thus, this analysis suggests that a theater army commander's already extensive logistical duties will continue to grow ever greater.

As noted earlier, the first step in assessing the alternatives is the determination of feasibility. History offers a sound means of doing
History shows that a single commander can control both multiple numbers of subordinate operational commands and the communications zone. Napoleon is one example. In 1805 during the campaign that led to the victory at Austerlitz, he commanded the communications zone and also directly commanded multiple corps. Another example is General of the Armies Pershing during the First World War. As commander-in-chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force, he first commanded several corps as commander of First Army and the communications zone. Late in the war, he commanded both First and Second Armies and the communications zone. And finally, as recently as the 100-Hour War, the contingency Operation Desert Storm in the Middle East, the 3rd Army commander controlled operations of two army corps in the combat zone and logistics in the COMMZ. In conclusion, it is feasible for the army component command to command and control operational responsibilities in the combat zone and logistical activities in the COMMZ.

History also shows that the CINC can divide operations in the combat zone from logistics in the communications zone. As mentioned earlier, Eisenhower is a prime example. He divided command of American logistics from combat operations between his deputy, General Lee, and General Bradley. General Giffard is another example. He assumed control of the lines of communications from the 14th Army commander, enabling General Slim to concentrate on the counteroffensive. And finally, General Westmoreland, commander-in-chief of U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, provides another example. He divided responsibility for combat operations and logistics between the operational field forces and
U.S. Army Vietnam, the theater army.

History shows that it is feasible to prosecute a war employing a dual-purpose headquarters responsible for both operations and logistics just as it is feasible to do so with two separate headquarters. In addition, as mentioned earlier, while Joint doctrine favors one alternative, Army and Joint doctrine enable the CINC to employ either alternative. Having determined this, I want to test efficiency and flexibility against the alternatives.

As efficiency is the more easily understood and observed criterion, I intend to address the efficiency of employing a TA headquarters directing both operations and logistics. First, the dual-purpose headquarters cannot focus its efforts on one area of responsibility. It must divide its supervisory responsibilities between operations in the combat zone and logistics in the COMMZ. As mentioned earlier, Slim found it difficult to look back at logistics in the COMMZ almost as much as he looked forward at combat operations.

Second, the dual-purpose headquarters must employ a large number of soldiers on its staff in order to perform both operational and logistical functions. If the next war is likely to require the commitment of only a single army corps, then it makes little sense to maintain a theater army staff at full authorization to direct both operations and logistics. The CINC would probably assume direct control of the single army corps to reduce decision cycle time by eliminating an unnecessary intermediate headquarters.

Third, the dual-purpose theater army headquarters develops a terribly enlarged span of control. As stated earlier, the theater army
span of control includes a large number of subordinate commands including the MEDCOM, ADCOM, TAMCA, TAMMC, ENCOM, and many others. If the country's next war is most likely to occur in an underdeveloped region of the world, then the logistical requirements would fully tax the TA commander. In addition, if the next war unexpectedly involves several army corps, then the CINC is likely to request the commitment of a numbered field army to direct combat operations, rather than dangerously overextending the TA commander's span of control.

Fourth, as mentioned earlier, an analysis using van Creveld's book, Command in War, suggests that a dual-purpose headquarters would suffer from a commander's attempts to employ two styles of command for operational and logistical units or one style of command for all units. Clearly, both methods are an inefficient use of time, soldiers, and resources.

On the other hand, the alternative separating responsibility for operations in the combat zone and logistics in the COMMZ is clearly more efficient. First, this alternative allows each headquarters to concentrate on only one function. The operational headquarters focuses on operations in the combat zone while the logistical headquarters concentrates on logistical activities in the COMMZ.

Second, the theater army headquarters retains only the manpower necessary to direct logistical activities. This alternative avoids enlarged, bloated, over-staffed headquarters. I believe that the smaller the headquarters in war, the more efficiently they perform.

Third, the TA's span of control includes only the logistical units required to sustain and support the CINC. This alternative avoids
assigning the responsibility of directing multiple corps in combat
operations to the TA commander and his staff already fully burdened by
the extensive logistical organization necessary to prosecute war in an
underdeveloped region of the world.

Fourth, as mentioned earlier, the TA commander is able to custom
fit one style of command to his logistical organization. The staff and
subordinate commands work with a single set of standard operating
procedures, reports, inspections, and other control measures. Improved
efficiency results. Therefore, the employment of two separate
headquarters, one directing operations in the combat zone and the other
controlling logistical activities in the COMMZ is far more efficient than
the dual-purpose headquarters. Having assessed the efficiency criterion
against the alternatives, I want to address flexibility.

Recalling that flexibility describes the ability to adapt and
improvise, the dual-purpose headquarters appears to improve the CINC’s
flexibility. A dual-purpose headquarters gives the CINC the capability
to delegate operational control to a dual-purpose theater army
headquarters quickly. In the situation where the CINC has only a purely
logistical theater army, this flexibility is absent.

However, a closer examination of the dual-purpose headquarters begs
the question whether this larger headquarters can respond rapidly to
changing situations, in other words, whether the larger dual-purpose
headquarters actually possesses flexibility. The larger a headquarters
becomes, the less able it can adapt to new situations. There is a
tradeoff between the improved flexibility the CINC accrues by employing a
dual-purpose headquarters and the reduced flexibility the CINC suffers
from the growth of an enlarged staff.

A TA commander could attempt to overcome these criticisms by employing a split staff under a single command structure with a deputy TA commander to supervise logistics while the TA commander directs combat operations. However, this alteration to the dual-purpose headquarters begins to look much like the other alternative. A split staff involves an even larger organization with the associated waste endemic to large organizations. The split staff idea is a compromise between the two alternatives. It tries to remove the criticisms of the dual-purpose alternative. But it results in a terribly enlarged headquarters unable to accomplish its mission as efficiently as a smaller TA headquarters and a small planning headquarters prepared to deploy for the unexpected large war. Furthermore, if the CINC decides to assume control of combat operations, for example a war involving only one army corps, then the split staff headquarters deploys many more soldiers than necessary to command and control the logistical activities. Finally, the split staff can also result in a loss of unity of command. One staff works for the CINC while the other staff works for his deputy. The alternative involving two completely separated headquarters, one directing combat operations and the other responsible for logistics is the wiser choice.

The above analysis shows that the criteria efficiency and flexibility compete with each other. Efficiency decidedly supports separating the two types of commands for several reasons: supervisory focus, bloated headquarters, span of control, and differences in styles of command. On the other hand, employing a theater army headquarters to manage both operations and logistics adds some degree of flexibility by
providing a single headquarters to do both jobs. However, this alternative also suffers from the reduced ability of a larger headquarters to respond as rapidly to changing situations.

This uncertain increase in flexibility from the employment of a dual-purpose headquarters is not worth the clearly demonstrated loss in efficiency. As shown earlier, the majority of future wars require no more than one corps. Thus, it makes little sense to assign both operational and logistical responsibilities to the TA when it will most likely never direct combat operations.

This solution leaves the upper end of the combat spectrum without an intermediate operational headquarters. However, the formation of a contingency field army headquarters, limited to a small size primarily for planning purposes, returns flexibility to the CINC without reducing the efficiency of a logistical TA headquarters. This addition enables the CINC to deploy a small contingency field army headquarters to direct multi-corps operations in the combat zone.

Moreover, the contingency field army possesses an attractive feature. It adds flexibility to the CINC located in a theater with an assigned TA. For example, after the U.S. mobilizes in the event of war in Europe, the contingency field army can provide the AFCENT commander-in-chief or CENTAG commander a trained up field army headquarters. Currently, there are no standing field army headquarters between the army group commanders and the corps commanders. In the event of a protracted war in Europe, the ability to deploy a standing field army headquarters without an unnecessary TA adds flexibility. (As mentioned earlier, U.S. forces in Germany already have the Seventh Army as the TA.) American
deployment of additional divisions and the associated activation of additional corps along with the participation of several French corps would quickly exceed the span of control of the two AFCENT army groups. In short, the formation of a contingency field army headquarters not only returns flexibility to the CINC in the underdeveloped regions of the world, but it also adds flexibility to the CINC in Europe.

Of course, there is one obvious question. Since some commander must ultimately be responsible for both operations and logistics, why is it better to join operations in the combat zone and logistics in the communications zone at the level of the unified commander and not the theater army commander? First, Joint doctrine addressed earlier strongly urges the CINC to control logistics. He must determine logistical priorities. Assigning both operations and logistics to the theater army commander can interfere with that control. Second, the CINC is better positioned to handle responsibility for both functions. He is at a high enough level to avoid becoming overly involved in detail. He does not integrate combat functions while the ARFOR commander does. Thus, the CINC must join control of combat operations and logistics at his level, not at the TA commander's level.

After considering the underdeveloped regions of the world where the next war is most likely to occur, I believe that efficiency and flexibility clearly favor one alternative. An operational headquarters controls combat operations while the theater army headquarters directs sustainment and support in the COMMZ. This division of responsibility provides the CINC with a more efficient unified command where he retains direct control of logistics through a logistical command. More to the
point, he hears first hand the logistician’s yea or nea regarding a proposed operation. It is not filtered through a subordinate commander responsible for both logistics and combat operations. The criticism that the CINC loses flexibility by losing a dual-purpose headquarters is a tradeoff with an enlarged organization. In addition, a closer analysis reveals that most future wars involving the United States will include only one army corps which the CINC will most likely control himself. To account for the small probability of a multi-corps war in a theater where no standing coalition operational field army headquarters exists, a contingency field army headquarters returns flexibility to the commander.

Besides the supporting evidence mentioned in the preceding analysis, theory, doctrine, and history also clearly support dividing responsibilities for logistics and operations between the TA and the unified command/ARFOR. Jomini recognized the need to relieve the CINC of the details. Today, we see the continued exponential growth of logistics since his day and conclude that logistics alone overwhelms the theater army commander. In addition, Joint doctrine decidedly supports forming a logistical organization directly under the control of the CINC. Also, the historical cases in the Second World War demonstrate that the CINC should control logistics. And finally, the exponentially growing size of logistics to support the technologically superior weapon systems continues to add ever greater demands to the CINC’s logistical system.

In summary, the dual-purpose theater army is not the solution. The alternative that assigns only logistical responsibilities to the theater army better serves the CINC of the unified command.
VII. Recommendations

First, the unified commander should assign only logistical responsibilities for the COMMZ to the theater army commander. For example, CENTCOM should limit Third Army responsibilities to logistical activities in the COMMZ.

Second, the unified commander should retain operational control of the army's combat forces directly under himself if his span of control permits. For example, CENTCOM should examine if it is possible to retain direct command and control of the VII and XVIII Corps.

Third, if the unified commander's span of control does not permit him direct control of multiple combat forces, then the CINC should request the deployment of an operational headquarters to direct combat operations. For example, if the commander-in-chief of CENTCOM determined that his span of control of the VII and XVIII Corps in addition to the joint special operations task force, and the air force, navy, and marine corps components to be unmanageable, then he should request the deployment of a field army headquarters separate from the theater army ARFOR.

Fourth, to provide for the field army headquarters mentioned in the preceding recommendation, the Army should establish a small contingency numbered field army headquarters to prepare for the unlikely, unexpected war where multiple numbers of corps exceed the CINC's span of control.

Fifth, the Army should assign a former corps commander to command the suggested contingency field army. This action reduces the possibility of personality disagreements, rank structure conflicts, and arguments over lack of previous corps command experience.
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