Unification of Forces: The Road To Jointness?

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

UNIFICATION OF FORCES: THE ROAD TO JOINTNESS? by LTC Dennis W. Tighe, USA, 58 pages.

This monograph examines whether or not the United States Armed Forces should be unified in order to ensure jointness. Unlike the unification compromise of 1947, this proposal eliminates the separateness of the services. The impetus for developing the monograph came from instances of apparent interservice rivalry, even after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986. This act is supposed to significantly enhance jointness and increase the power of the commanders-in-chief of the unified and specified commands while decreasing the power of the service chiefs—the principal sources of service parochialism. The monograph's hypothesis is that perhaps Goldwater-Nichols did not go far enough; instead, perhaps the answer is to eliminate the autonomy of the separate services through unification. The significance of this monograph is that unlike DESERT STORM, future battlefields will probably require effective joint warfighting skills immediately upon deployment of the forces. The radical step of unification might be the only way to guarantee that on-call effectiveness.

In analyzing the question, the monograph first examines the contributions of the classical theorists to service parochialism. In addition, the paper reviews how organizational theory supports the need for the service bureaucracies and the fact that parochial outlooks are a natural phenomenon in bureaucracies like the military departments. Next, in analyzing the concept of unification, the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability are first applied to a historical case—the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in the 1960s and 1970s, to determine any lessons that might be applicable to the concept of unifying the United States Armed Forces. The principal lessons from the Canadian experience are that Canadian unification is in name only, since the three services are still recognized as separate entities; and that the Canadian government has been unable to achieve all of its long range efficiency and economy goals using unification. As Francis Bacon said: "The remedy is worse than the disease."

The conclusions reached are that neither theory nor historical precedent supports the concept of unification. Moreover, when reviewed against the criteria, unification of the forces is probably not politically feasible, has little chance of being accepted by the people who would be the key players in effecting unification, and is not suitable. The key reason unification is not a suitable solution is that Goldwater-Nichols, while not a perfect solution, already provides the statutory authority needed to ensure jointness. All that is needed now is continuing, effective leadership to ensure that the statute is fully implemented. In short, unification is not necessary for jointness.
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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INTRODUCTION

We are intended to seek and fight the enemy's fleet, and I shall not be diverted from my efforts by any sinister attempt to render us subordinate to, or an appendage of, the Army.1 Commodore Isaac Chauncey, USN: Letter to Major General Brown, USA on Lake Ontario, 1813

The commodore's words could have been said just as easily today as they were 177 years ago. Interservice rivalry, or servicism, has been present since the United States Constitution differentiated between the services by stating that Congress shall "raise and support" armies and "provide and maintain" the Navy.2 As such, this paper examines whether Congress has provided sufficient means to enhance jointness and reduce interservice rivalry.

Although serious efforts to ensure interservice cooperation began in the 1920's, it was not until the Department of Defense (DoD) was formed in 1947, by combining the War Department and the Department of the Navy, that the United States had a "unified" force.3 Even then, true unification did not exist; instead, because of individual service fears of subjugation by another service, the National Security Act of 1947 subordinated the three autonomous services to DoD and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) as a compromise.4 Since then, there have been numerous efforts to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of DoD.5 One of the more notable attempts at improving jointness was the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, when President Eisenhower stated that "[s]eparate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."6

Since 1958, however, the following incidents have indicated problems in DoD: the abortive Bay of Pigs operation (1961), the loss of the Vietnam War, the SS Mayaguez operation (1975), the failed Iran Hostage Rescue (1980), command and control problems in Beirut (1983), and interoperability problems in Grenada
These operations reduced public confidence in DoD and helped spawn reformers both within and outside the government in the early 1980's. By 1985, two key investigations provided the impetus to reorganize DoD.

The first investigation, the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, published the report "A Quest for Excellence," which reviewed "national security planning and budgeting, military organization and command, acquisition organization and procedures, and government-industry accountability." The second investigation produced a thorough staff report (645 pages and 91 recommendations) for the Senate Armed Services Committee entitled Defense Organization: The Need for Change.

Several themes emerged from these studies. First, the military services usually put their own interests ahead of joint interests. Next, the advice of the JCS was of little value, since it resulted from their consensus vote. Finally, the combatant commanders seemed to have little control over their subordinate commanders, the forces in their area of operations, and the defense budget. These two studies fostered NSDD 219 in April 1986 and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereafter, Goldwater-Nichols); together, they attempted to implement most of the recommendations found in the above reports. Initial indications from Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM are that Goldwater-Nichols and NSDD 219 may have enhanced jointness and reduced servicism significantly. Still, enough recent examples of servicism have occurred to raise doubts about whether these initiatives are sufficient to reduce servicism and improve jointness in peacetime and in the long run.

The first example concerns the Air Force Chief of Staff's relief during Operation DESERT SHIELD for stating, among other things, that the Air Force alone could accomplish the mission if we went to war. A second example is the Air Force's retirement of the SR-71 because it was more of an intelligence asset.
than an Air Force asset and because it was too expensive to operate; this parochial action could have deprived the DESERT SHIELD forces of a flexible source of intelligence.15 A third example is the Navy's promotion of its Maritime Strategy as though it were a separate national military strategy.16 Other examples include the Marines' promotion of themselves over the Army as the nation's most logical contingency force, the Army's creation of light infantry divisions to counter the Marines' capabilities, the Air Force's and the Navy's reluctance to fund airlift and sealift vice warfighting equipment, and the controversy over who provides close air support for the Army--itself or the Air Force. Finally, I found it interesting that in the Military Secretaries' letters in the SecDef's 1990 Annual Report to the President and Congress none of them discussed what his service was doing to further jointness.

Because the above examples made me question whether the 1986 and 1987 legislation went far enough to ensure jointness, I decided to investigate whether Congress should take the more extreme measure of combining the separate military services into one armed force, similar to what Canada had done with its armed forces. As an example, a unification scheme might see each military department losing its autonomy and sharing a common budget and common administration and logistics system. Thus, instead of being separate, autonomous services, the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force could become "branches" of DoD; the SecDef and CJCS could replace the service secretaries and chiefs; some form of joint staff could replace the staffs of the military services; and the service secretaries might become under secretaries of defense for missions, rather than for the function-oriented services.

Elimination of the services as separate entities is a radical step. Therefore, before I can recommend unification, I believe my analysis should, as a minimum, show that Goldwater-Nichols and NSDD 219 did not go far enough to ensure jointness. Naturally, other less drastic ways of increasing jointness
are possible. For example, John Byron's award winning paper, Defense Reorganization, recommended creation of land, sea, and strategic deterrence forces. However, I preferred to explore the possibility of unification, since many of the reformers I reviewed wrote that it was the most radical method of defense reform and because I was interested in learning how the Canadian government unified its armed forces.

My investigation is pertinent since the threat has changed so significantly recently. With the apparent reduction of the Soviet threat and our growing national debt, the military budget may be significantly diminished--prompting calls for more efficiency and joint effectiveness in DoD. Because of the lethality of modern warfare, the need to win battles early is important. In a protracted war, such as World War II or Vietnam, joint problems seemed to work themselves out eventually. Short wars like Grenada and Panama do not allow a break-in period, but both of those conflicts are not the most likely models for future conflicts. Even DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM may not be a likely scenario, since the allies had months to train together before initiating hostilities. Rather than being prepared for only the above scenarios, our forces must be able to fight jointly, without any hint of servicism, immediately upon entering a theater of war/operations. If our forces cannot do that, the consequences could be devastating.

In deciding whether our armed forces should be united, I will answer the question from three perspectives: theoretical, historical--by analyzing the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, and current--by reviewing how well jointness has improved since 1986. In order to analyze the Canadian case study and my proposal, I have developed criteria to measure the relative worth of each course of action (COA). Suitable criteria for COAs are in JCS Publication 0-1: feasibility, suitability, and acceptability.17 Because the JCS definitions are rather general, I expanded them to make them more applicable to my subject.
FEASIBILITY. "Doable. Offers a reasonable expectation of success." Will the legislature permit unification? Can it be completed in a reasonable amount of time, without significantly degrading force effectiveness?

SUITABILITY. "Results in the desired effect." Will unification permit attainment of such goals as reduced costs and interservice rivalry and increased efficiency and jointness? Is the COA more radical than is necessary?

ACCEPTABILITY. "Worth the cost." Do the benefits outweigh the costs? Will the services gain more through unification than if they maintained the status quo? Will the "major players" support unification?

Finally, I will develop my conclusions and implications by synthesizing the results of my analyses from the theoretical, historical, and current perspectives.

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

For whatever reason, possibly because of the size of the battlefield, limited technology, or personal background, military theorists have tended to focus their writings around only a single warfighting medium: ground, sea, or air. Although I found no theory about joint warfighting--the closest was Sir Julian Corbett's recognition that sea action alone cannot decide wars, I can still infer likely theoretical attitudes towards jointness and a unified force from the writings of several well-known military theorists.13 I will also examine organizational theory for clues on how organizations handle parochialism.

Although probably the most quoted military theorist, Clausewitz did not discuss how armies and navies should cooperate to achieve a common objective--probably because he had drawn most of his lessons from Napoleonic land warfare.19 However, he did discuss the need for the three branches--
infantry, cavalry, and artillery—to work together to achieve a common goal.20 Furthermore, as a proponent of the value of mass, the concept of concentrating synchronized land, sea, and air forces in time and space against an objective would have probably appealed to him.21 Even though he might have supported jointness, Clausewitz’s center of gravity concept is useful in understanding why jointness has been difficult to achieve. Specifically, service parochialism may have arisen partly because each of the services focused on different enemy centers of gravity: the Army sought out the enemy’s ground forces, the Navy wanted to destroy the opposing fleet, and the Air Force has focused on bombing the enemy’s industrial centers.22 Other theorists helped reinforce this parochial thinking in the naval and air services.

The first of these parochialists was Alfred Thayer Mahan, a fervent and revered spokesman for the superiority of naval power. Mahan espoused the need for a strong fleet to first establish command of the sea and then to control the sea lines of communication. To him, sea power and the destruction of the enemy’s fleet in a decisive battle were the necessary and sufficient conditions to winning the war. Unlike Corbett, he did not believe wars must be ultimately won on land.23 Guilio Douhet was just as staunch in his belief that air power could alone win wars. Douhet thought the air force must be separate from the ground forces in order to pursue the mission of gaining air superiority, which in turn permitted strategic bombing. Douhet, as have many of his disciples in the U.S. Air Force, believed that strategic bombing was the key to winning any war, since it defeated the will of the people. Douhet was against any other missions, which he called auxiliary missions, since they would detract from the air superiority and strategic bombing missions of an air force; to Douhet, close air support of ground forces was an auxiliary mission.24 In short, Douhet
believed that "... the importance of the Independent Air Force [would] rapidly increase, but the importance of the army and the navy [would] decrease in proportion."25

Up to this point, it appears that at least the Navy and the Air Force came by their parochial thinking understandably. In short, I doubt that Douhet and Mahan would have concurred with any reorganization of the services that might cause loss of their service's autonomy. While the above has focused on the theoretical underpinnings of parochialism, my question deals with whether or not it is necessary to reorganize beyond what which Goldwater-Nichols has already provided in order to improve jointness. Therefore, a brief review of appropriate elements of organizational theory may offer some solutions to service parochialism.

Organizational theory helps explain organizational behavior. A nation's military force is a bureaucratic organization, in that it has a large number of specific functions which reflect its particular purposes.26 The organization's missions are accomplished by assigning specific functions to suborganizations, such as the military departments. By assigning roles and missions the bureaucracy tries to reduce uncertainty.27

To further reduce uncertainty, organizations train their personnel to conduct business in a certain manner. Those people are socialized, or trained, in such a way that they tend to train their subordinates according to the same rules. Because the rules for conducting business and the organizations that formulate those rules tend to become "institutionalized," organizations that are responsible for certain functions tend to develop parochial views about how those functions should be accomplished.28 Thus, the military departments and services are naturally parochial, because they are part of a bureaucracy.
Another way organizations reduce uncertainty is that they tend to resist large change—or innovation. Because organizations value "predictability, stability, and certainty," incremental change is the preferred mode of behavior for organizations. Unification of the forces would be a large, rather than an incremental, change; thus, the services would probably fight unification.

Besides being naturally parochial in its thinking, an organization wants to have autonomy from other organizations; it wants to survive. Only through autonomy can an organization control its surroundings, protect its ownership of certain responsibilities against intrusion by other organizations, and strengthen its case for such needs as influence, missions, or a greater share of the organization's budget. A. H. Maslow has said that survival is man's strongest motivation. The same is true for bureaucracies. Consequently, because "autonomy facilitates survival," an organization would rather be poor in assets but still autonomous, before it would want to be rich in assets but dependent on other organizations. Because any subordination to another service fosters a loss of identity, each service tends to prepare to fight a war as if it would be fighting it on its own. Thus, it would appear that at least the Navy would strongly fight any attempts at unification—as it did in the 1940s, since the Navy is a totally independent force with its own air and ground capabilities.

Besides being an inherent characteristic of bureaucracies, parochialism appears to be facilitated by vague guidance—e.g., our national and military strategies—to organizations. Logically, these strategies should clearly distinguish priorities among means and ends; but, for whatever political reasons, they do not. A fuzzy strategy, however, favors organizational survival, since a clear delineation of priorities could mean that those organizations whose roles have lessened in importance will lose budget dollars. Moreover, the loser in any strategy that favors one organization over another...
may tend to ignore those tasks that are not necessary to its "organizational essence." Those "loser" suborganizations may lose sight of their long-term value. Instead, they may focus on what is needed to preserve their role as a major player, rather than how they can still contribute to the parent organization's interests as a whole. Thus, while we in the services might want specific strategy guidance for planning purposes, we also might not like the answer we would receive. Therefore, vague strategies both foster and mollify parochialism. On the one hand, a fuzzy strategy helps protect an organization's survival and allows it to build a case for its importance to the organization. On the other hand, that same type of strategy may reduce the amount of time an organization focuses on its own roles and needs.

Having discussed why parochialism or interorganizational rivalry is natural in a bureaucracy, it may be useful to review their theoretical effects. Thomas J. Peters, in his book *In Search of Excellence, Lessons from America's Best Run Companies*, notes that "[i]nternal competition . . . permeates the excellent companies. It entails high costs of duplication . . . . Yet the benefits . . . are manifold, especially in terms of commitment . . . [and] innovation . . . ." Competition between different groups can enhance group identification, which can, in turn, help morale and efficiency. One study "found that groups need their own codes, their own words for familiar things, and their own idiosyncratic ways of doing routine procedures." On the other hand, competition can hurt unit cohesion when aspiration levels within a group are not reasonably similar. Even *JCS Publication 0-1* recognizes the existence of interservice rivalry as a phenomenon called sociocentrism, saying that those responsible for "directing large and complex endeavors [e.g., bureaucracies]" must recognize this "tendency to assume the superiority or rightness of one's own group." *JCS Pub 0-1* goes on to explain that while sociocentrism "exists among arms within each [s]ervice, among the [s]ervices [my emphasis], and across
national lines," and cannot be erased, it must be--and can be--"managed."41
That it exists among the arms of each service may give a strong hint that it
would not disappear among the services with unification. For example, it is
generally recognized that competition for dollars and recognition within the Air
Force exists among MAC, TAC, and SAC. Similar competition appears to exist
among the surface, subsurface, and air components of the Navy. In other words,
a reorganization might blur the demarcation lines between the services but not
necessarily erase the parochialism.

Finally, organizational theory tells us that perhaps a better way to
integrate diverse functions in an organization is to organize by mission rather
than by function--or the way DoD is currently organized. A functional structure
provides clarity, is economical, and facilitates learning one's job; however, it
focuses on efforts rather than results.42

In summary, while it seems logical that jointness should be achievable
through unification, unification would probably not eliminate parochialism.
Although the Army and the Marine Corps are dependent on the Navy and the Air
Force to accomplish their missions, the latter two tend to imply that they can
get the job done by themselves--and the primary theorists for both services have
supported that attitude. Organizational theory, meanwhile, suggests that since
the services are, by necessity, bureaucracies, they will continue to fight for
their survival by maintaining their autonomy, will naturally resist change, and
will retain some level of parochial thought. Thus, the choices are to reduce
efficiency through unification--because suborganizational missions may not be
clearly defined--or to work with the given system and try to mollify the natural
parochial tendencies. It would appear that the latter course of action, at
least theoretically, is the better course of action. As James Forrestal said in
1946 about unification: "Good will can make any organization work; conversely, the best organization chart in the world is unsound if the men who have to make it work don't believe in it."43

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Before analyzing whether or not our armed forces should be unified, I will examine the unification of Canadian Forces, which occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s, to determine if that effort can offer any applicable lessons. Although differences exist between the armed forces of the United States and Canada with respect to size, commitments, systems of government, and political culture, the Canadian case study is pertinent for at least three reasons.44 Despite the fact that Yugoslavia, Israel, and Burma have also united, Canada's force was the largest to unite, its original organization was similar to our current structure, and it appears to have been the most publicized unification effort.45 In my review, I will determine why and how the reorganization was accomplished, and then critique its results using my criteria.

In the early 1960s, Canadian forces were under the control of the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ); however, the Army, Navy, and Air Force had three separate headquarters in Ottawa. The NDHQ also contained an administrative headquarters, consisting of mostly civil servants.46 During that period, the following developments prompted concern: emerging technologies, new western alliance strategies, domestic needs, and weapons acquisition difficulties. Most important, it appeared that funds for new equipment would not exist by 1969.47 In response, the liberal Pierre Elliott Trudeau government introduced legislation to first integrate and then unify the three services in order to increase efficiency and economy in its defence department.48

Before integration, each service was organized along functional lines; that is, each service had its own administrative subdivisions such as comptroller general and military personnel. The reorganization of 1964, or Phase I of
Integration, created functional divisions in the NDHQ across the services—with each service providing personnel to man these consolidated divisions. Secondly, a single Chief of the Defence Staff and one Defence Staff replaced the three service chiefs and their staffs. The Chief of the Defence Staff had the complete authority of the men he replaced, and he commanded the entire force. In Phase II of Integration, eleven operational field commands were reduced to six functional commands—3 operational (Mobile, Maritime, and Air Defence) and 3 support (Materiel, Training, and Air Support). Finally, to provide administrative and logistical support to those commands, regardless of the branch of service, a system of 39 Canadian Forces Bases was organized.

By 1966, integration was complete, but the three services were still legally separate. In 1967, however, The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act initiated unification of the Canadian Forces—the formation of "a single-uniform, single-flag, single commander force with one rank structure, and one set of regulations." The Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force were consolidated into the Canadian Forces. The armed forces had already consolidated command and management with integration, but now there was only one force—with one dark green uniform and common ranks. Finally, in order to compete with inflation costs, personnel reductions were ordered.

Unification was essentially complete by 1968.

Unification meant that rather than being in the Army, Navy, or Air Force, personnel and commands were associated with an "environment": land, air, or maritime. With a common rank structure, admirals became generals! As much as possible, common procedures and organization were applied across each environment. Finally, the staff of the National Defence Headquarters was reduced from 12,000 to 8,000.
Despite these innovations, further change in NDHQ was necessary because the Defence Department still had managerial problems. As a result, the 1972 reorganization integrated the military and civilian parts of the headquarters into one organization, thereby consolidating corresponding civilian and military functions. The purpose of the reorganization was to stop the time wasting practice whereby projects and plans would work their way up the military chain for approval, only to have the civilian side reject them—thereby starting the process all over again. Personnel reductions continued; from a 1964 total strength of 120,000, the force dropped to fewer than 80,000 by 1975. Moreover, regiments with long records of service to Canada were retired, since the government thought it would be better to reduce the number of personnel by deleting units from the order of battle, rather than by using a "salami slice" approach.

With the exception of the formation of the Air Command in 1975 and some regroupings of the functional commands, the organization has remained essentially the same since 1972. However, the government has slowly retreated from its initial firm stance on having a one force/one uniform/one rank structure. At first, the government strongly believed that one uniform was needed to ensure loyalty to the force as a whole rather than to a particular service. Gradually, however, it relented on allowing environmental identity, naval rank nomenclature and rank insignia, and unit identification badges. Although the terms began to be used as early as 1975, the government did not sanction the use of the terms Army, Navy, and Air Force until 1984. By 1984, with the election of the conservative Mulroney government, traditional service uniforms could again be worn. Having discussed how and why the Canadians unified their armed forces, I will now analyze how well it was done using the criteria of feasibility, suitability, and acceptability.
FEASIBILITY. In hindsight, it would appear that unification offered a reasonable expectation of success. Its goals were to reduce overhead costs so that more modern equipment could be bought, improve decision making and management at the top, minimize Canada's British military tradition by developing a distinctive Canadian military ethos, develop forces that were more flexible and efficient, and ensure that servicemen had more diverse and satisfying careers. However, in succeeding paragraphs, I will show that achieving the unification's infrastructure was easier than attaining its goals.

Unification was politically feasible; the Canadian government simply decreed that unification must happen as quickly as possible, with little or no debate, to meet the economic goals rapidly. The aim was to get the organizational structure in place and then tie up any loose ends later. However, it seems that in the rush to achieve quick savings, the government did not attempt to account for any possible friction. For example, it appears that the government did not make its plans flexible enough to account for not only decreases in the defence budget and in the number of personnel authorized, but also increases in the types and numbers of tasks given to the forces by the government. As a result, although unification was executed on schedule, some long-term economic goals, which will be discussed in more detail below, were not met.

SUITABILITY. Given the government's goals, unification seemed, at the time, to be the best way to achieve the desired effects. For example, Defence Minister Hellyer believed unification could produce savings that would allow the government to devote 25% of its military budget to buying more modern equipment. Using Hellyer's "formula-funding" approach, the percent of the budget allocated for capital spending was set to increase to 18% in 1967, 20% in 1970, and 25% in 1975. While the 1965 equipment "want list" was obtained from the initial savings gained from the unification process, the long-term budget goals were not achieved; by 1975 defence expenditures were only about 9% of the
overall expenditures. The problem was with Hellyer's percentage-of-the-budget-for-defence approach. The government seemed to have developed this approach without regard for inflation and equipment cost increases. As a result, capital expenditures were forced to decline because equipment and personnel costs rose—despite personnel reductions of 20,000 over a five-year period.

According to R. B. Byers in his paper, *Canadian Security and Defence: the Legacy and the Challenges*, the problem was the Canadian government's procurement policy. First, the Trudeau government did not link acquisition with defence. Instead, acquisition was linked to "regional development and industrial benefits" rather than to maintaining a warfighting capability that matched the country's commitments. Second, that same government would not commit to long-term real growth in the defence sector; the result was equipment that was purchased ad hoc to help the force survive and maintain operational effectiveness from year to year.

The next goal, improving decision making, was achieved. Time was no longer wasted in the more than 200 coordinating committees. For example, after the United Nations asked for Canadian help with the Indo-Pakistani border dispute problem, decisions were made in one 37-minute meeting and troops were dispatched in 72 hours. With a single Chief of the Defence Staff, decision times were theoretically cut by two-thirds. On the other hand, some critics felt that with fewer sources of input, decisions may not have been as qualitatively good as they were with the input of three service chiefs. With only one force it also seemed logical that, with proper officer development and training, decisions to buy new equipment would be based on the needs of the armed forces as a whole, rather than on the needs of the individual services, since loyalty should be to the nation ahead of the individual services. In my research, I found nothing to rebut that concept.
In streamlining the decision process, however, it became obvious that not only were the commanders of the field commands not being used as advisers to National Defence Headquarters, but also many actions bypassed the commanders before being sent to NDHQ—in much the same way that U.S. Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands were not involved enough in DoD decision making before the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Probably because of this lack of interaction, the NDHQ was not responsive to the needs in the field. Consequently, some of the leadership in the Canadian Forces would have preferred using a joint chiefs of staff-type organization to ensure that environmental interests were looked after.

Other steps that were taken to improve economy and efficiency were: consolidating 11 basic training camps into 2; lowering the number of specialized training schools from 91 to 30; reducing trade specialty qualifications (MOSs) from 346 to 89; cutting three intelligence services and three recruiting services to one each; turning four war plans books into one coordinated defence plan; publishing one version of the Queen’s Regulations; merging three construction engineering branches into one; reducing headquarters personnel by 30%; and closing 18 bases. On the other hand, after 15 years the Defence Headquarters had been cut by only by 5 percent. Furthermore, although the Canadian forces have one headquarters, unification is, essentially, in name only, since all air assets are under Air Command. Consequently, conflicts arise between Maritime Command’s use of “their” helicopters or Mobile Command’s use of the 10th Air Group for CAS training. The Maritime and Mobile commands have operational control, but Air Command controls flying hours for training, maintenance schedules, and safety considerations.

While decision making and efficiency appear to have improved, combining the military and the civilian sections of the NDHQ has caused some discontent; the military has charged that the Defence Department has become too "civilianized."
With the integration of the civilian and the military sides of the Defence Headquarters in 1972, the civilians had a far greater say in what the military thought were purely military matters. More civilian involvement was only natural, however, since senior civilian officials tend to stay in the job for many years, while officers have tried to avoid NDHQ duty. A counter to the charge of too much civilian influence is that the 1972 reorganization provided the military with more influence in higher level, previously all-civilian, committees.

While the Canadian military understood the need for civilian control, it also believed the military ought to be in charge of military organizations, rather than share the leadership role with civilians. Their cause for concern was that the civilians appeared to focus more on sovereignty issues than on warfighting. Furthermore, because the civilians continued to determine strategy, the officer corps appeared to be unprepared to offer strategic advice. Consequently, "military professionalism was equated [only] with operational professionalism." In addition, the civilians appeared to be imposing a civilian ethos and bureaucratic form of leadership on the military, to the point where the military was often perceived as a job rather than a vocation. Greater emphasis was needed on filling key positions with military personnel and on ensuring that the military understood and practiced its values. Finally, some feel that the ethos of the Canadian military could also be improved if the commitment-credibility gap were closed and defence priorities were more clearly defined.

The next goal of ensuring that servicemen had more diverse and satisfying careers meant, on the one hand, that there would still be brigades, wings, and squadrons, with the right people trained to do their jobs: "An infantry soldier [would] not be asked to do the job of a sailor in a fighting ship; a sailor [would] not be asked to fight in an infantry platoon; and a fighter pilot
[would] not be required to drive a tank.84 On the other hand, personnel with common trade skills--e.g., medics, helicopter mechanics, drivers, etc.--would not be restricted to one environment. In addition, the differences in personnel policies and promotion opportunities in the same trades, but in different services, would disappear.85 The results of this last effort are discussed under the criterion of acceptability.

ACCEPTABILITY. The government stated that unification would not mean "abandonment of tradition of pride in the unit and other ingredients of esprit de corps."86 By establishing a common identity, it was hoped that the services would develop a greater loyalty to the total force and Canada's overall objectives and ensure cross representation by all the services on different staffs.87 Most senior officers supported integration, since they had no problems with the concept of enhancing civilian control, improving decision making, and producing savings to obtain new equipment.88 Most opposition focused on unification. On the civilian side, the Canadian Parliament was the scene of "lengthy and acrimonious hearings and debates" about unification.89 On the military side, one retired Canadian naval officer wrote that "Admiral of the Fleet Lord Louis Mountbatten, . . . said it was madness to unify below command level, and on no account should men and women lose their identity."90 In response to unification, the Canadian Navy retired some senior officers to preempt a Canadian version of the United States' 1949 "revolt of the Admirals" after our "unification" in 1947.91 Some of those Canadian officers who opposed the unification plan blamed US Secretary of Defense McNamara, since Minister of Defence Hellyer became enthusiastic about unification after a visit with McNamara. They theorized that McNamara hoped Canada would pilot a possible US Forces unification.92 In short, it appears that unification was an exceptionally controversial issue.
The most emotional issue, however, was the perceived loss of individual identity with a service through uniforms, unique rank designation, and insignia. Initially, the government believed the uniform issue would fade away as recruits replaced veterans. As mentioned earlier, the importance of morale won out, and the traditional service uniform has been restored, but not before it caused a lot of anxiety in the services.93

Unification had increased career opportunities for personnel. However, some commanders did not find the emergence of a "fourth service" worth the cost. When the three services existed, support relationships were clear and designed for operational requirements. With time, the support service (medical, dental, postal, finance, etc.) has become larger, more important, and more independent—to the point where the combat/support ratio appears to be too low.94 The support services had service identity problems and had lost sight of the goal of providing support to the operational forces. There were problems with personnel who were not trained to serve in multiple environments and with those who would prefer to be stationed at static bases rather than go to sea or to field operational units.95

Finally, some civilians and military believed the structure of the forces was more reflective of peacetime rather than wartime requirements. Ends and means now appear mismatched, since, in the drive to be economical, the size of the force has become too small to meet Canada's commitments. Another characteristic of the peacetime structure was that the rank structure was top-heavy. Finally, mobilization was a problem. Because common training was done at the training base while environmental training was done by the unit, the need for short specialty courses to prepare service personnel for war during mass mobilization could not be met by a common training base.96
Before proceeding, a short review of the findings seems appropriate. Just as navy and air force theorists espoused autonomy, my investigation of organizational theory indicated that bureaucratic organizations believe that to survive they must remain autonomous. This autonomy causes those organizations to fight for missions that would make them invaluable to the overall organization. Thus, it would appear that, theoretically, as long as organizations are autonomous—and the nature of a bureaucracy demands the use of suborganizations to conduct business efficiently, they will continue to be parochial in their interests. On the other hand, while the Canadian unification outwardly seemed both feasible and suitable for achieving the stated goals, it has been unable to meet most of the desired long term fiscal goals. Savings have not been achieved such that 25% of the budget can be devoted to capital expenditures. Moreover, the reduction of the force size to help achieve those savings has made it more difficult to meet commitments. Except for recognizing the economies achieved by integrating the functional services in the National Defence Headquarters and by consolidating the support services, the acceptability of unification was low to those in the military; the single exception might be those in the support services, since they now have more flexibility in their careers. However, since they have stayed the course this long, it appears that the Canadian civilian leadership has no intention of reversing its decision to unify the armed forces.

The reason this was only a partially successful unification is that the architects ignored for too long the antipathy towards the one uniform/one rank idea and that their main purpose was to save money for modernization, rather than improve the overall defensive posture of Canada. Furthermore, the one uniform issue seemed to overshadow many of the true accomplishments associated with Canada's unification of forces. To take away only a few lessons from Canada's experience, they would be that defence should not be treated as a
business, that defence structure should be changed only if the change improves the nation's warfighting capabilities, that the needs of the individual are very important, and that appropriate consolidations can enhance efficiency. Thus, based on theory and the Canadian example, unification of the services would, up to this point, not seem to support the goals of reducing parochialism and increasing jointness or of improving the defence economy.

CURRENT ANALYSIS

The purpose of this next section is to analyze, using the previously identified criteria, my concept of unifying the services. In December 1988, former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown and James Schlesinger published a report called "Making Defense Reform Work." The purpose of the year-long investigation was to determine how well defense reform legislation had been implemented since 1986. An updated version of the report was published in a book with the same name by defense analysts James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. Blechman. Many of my observations on how well reform is working are based on that book.

The changes brought about by Goldwater-Nichols and NSDD 219 appear to be both wide and deep. It is difficult to analyze the effects of the reforms in isolation, since some reforms may indirectly affect more than one area of concern. Since space will not permit a complete analysis of all major areas of reform, I will focus on those JCS reforms that I believe have the most potential to affect jointness, either positively or negatively. My reason for looking principally at the JCS is because "... JCS reform is indispensable for overcoming the parochial service dominance that has so critically hampered sound strategy making and resource allocation ...".97

As far as jointness problems are concerned, the 1985 staff report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," identified "the predominance of the power and influence of the four Services in
decision-making [as] the most critical [my emphasis] organizational problem of DoD.98 Service interests have predominated DoD decision making for several reasons. First, function has predominated over mission needs; therefore, service programs and capabilities have not been properly integrated into the forces necessary to accomplish DoD's missions.99 Since the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, the authority of the CINC's of the Unified and Specified Commands has been weak. In conducting military operations, unified commanders found that their authority and capacity to carry out missions were mismatched, and the division of responsibility and accountability between themselves and the services was not clear.100

Second, the services' veto power dominated actions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The result was that the JCS was more like a corporation, reaching decisions by consensus to protect their parochial interests; as a result, advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense was watered down.101

Third, the service component commands of the unified commands were not only strong and independent, but also more responsive to their service chiefs than to the CINC's of the unified commands.102 By law and in concept, the purpose of the services has been to provide administrative and logistical support to the unified commands in the way of equipment and trained personnel. Many people, however, lost the distinction that the Army, Navy, and Air Force were the armed services while the joint commands were the armed forces.103 In addition, the services attempted to dominate as many of the commands as possible. For example, the Marines and Army wrangled over who would command The Rapid Deployment Force (now USCENTCOM), while the Navy and Air Force both tried to dominate SPACECOM.104

Other problems with the military departments and services identified in the staff report included: confusion over the roles of the Service Secretaries, duplication of effort between the staffs of the Service Secretaries and those of
the services, and the inexperience of political appointees in the military departments and services. While I will not discuss these last three problems, since they do not appear to induce parochialism or affect jointness, I will discuss a fourth: the assignment of service roles and missions.105

Finally, because the services dominated the PPBS process, the CJCS needed his own staff and greater authority, and the CINCs needed to be heard more in force planning, programming, and budgeting.106 Second, in the planning, programming, and budgeting process there was a mismatch between ends and means, because the ends were unclear. Because the national strategy was not clearly defined, military leaders were forwarding parochial force structure and strategy proposals that exceeded the budget; civilian leaders, meanwhile, were not willing to provide priorities or make hard decisions.107 Finally, the Joint Staff was weak. Good officers avoided joint duty, there was little joint training or repeat joint tours, and the Joint Staff officers were "captives of their service".108

Whether the preceding problems have been overcome sufficiently to warrant elimination of the autonomous services will be analyzed using the previously developed criteria.

FEASIBILITY. On the surface, it would appear that just about any reorganization which reduces the size of an organization is physically possible. Eliminating the military departments and services and transferring some of those assets to assist the Joint Staff is such a reorganization. However, whether it is feasible in spirit to eliminate parochialism as long as the services exist is another matter. According to General(R) Bruce Palmer,

Although the services technically are confined to administrative and logistic matters, in reality it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to divorce them completely from so-called operational matters . . . . How does one separate organization, training, weapons, and equipment from the operations they are designed to carry out?109
If the separate services did not perform those administrative and logistical functions, who would? The CINCs and their staffs have more than full-time jobs just planning and preparing for war. A new, unified organization that does nothing more than admin-log functions, but has no affiliation with any one of the services is a possibility; after all, the Canadians have instituted such a system. In other words, there could be, for example, one training, one personnel, and one logistical system. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is moving in that direction with its consolidations of warehouses and inventories for the services. Whether it is feasible to do this on a grander scale—the size of the U.S. military is more than twenty times the size of the Canadian military—is only conjecture, since I do not have the projected cost figures for such a system. Logically, however, it would appear that while the startup costs to convert the many systems to a common system would be significant, it would also seem likely that the long-term savings would outweigh the short-term expenses. On the other hand, the sheer magnitude of the organization might create more bureaucratic problems than the current system causes parochial problems.

As far as political feasibility is concerned, there are pros and cons. On the pro-unification side, despite the fact that Goldwater-Nichols brought significant change, and was opposed by President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Secretary of the Navy Lehman, the bill was overwhelmingly passed by both houses of Congress. Congress sometimes uses “petty, self-serving ‘divide and conquer’ politics,” but, in the case of Goldwater-Nichols, partisan politics were overcome for the nation’s sake. Thus, if Congress sees that its reforms have not been emplaced, it may resort to unification if the services are unable or unwilling to make the changes. For example, in speeches in
March–April 1990, Senator Sam Nunn threatened that if the services and administration could not fill in what he saw as "blanks" in the threat, strategy, dollars, force structure, and programs, then Congress would do it for them.113

On the "con" side, Congress has normally been an obstacle to initiatives that centralize executive authority. For example, during the 1944–47 unification controversy, Congress consistently fought any measures to centralize authority in the DoD.114 While Congress did not necessarily fear the formation of a "Prussian General Staff System," it did want to keep the executive branch from becoming too powerful.115 Basically, Congress prefers "organizational pluralism." Individuals in Congress like to be associated with certain services, to groups in those services, and to particular senior officers in those services, since these ties sometimes help increase military spending in their districts and provide personal perquisites. The feelings are mutual, since the latter groups need Congressional support for their projects.116 Finally, Congress has a record of refusing to approve any attempts to eliminate the separate military departments.117

The strong Congressional constituencies of the services can best be illustrated by the 1952 law requiring that the size of the Marine Corps not drop below a certain level.118 However, laws can be repealed. For example, a 1983 law forbidding the consolidation of transportation assets was repealed in order to create TRANSCOM in 1987.119 Nevertheless, the Marine Corps has not had any serious challenges to its existence since the law was enacted, both because of the law and because of the Corps' congressional constituency.120 Thus, it would appear that while unification is physically and politically feasible, the constituencies of the services probably make it unlikely.
o SUITABILITY. Intuitively, unification would seem to be a likely way to reduce servicism. However, it may also be an overkill solution. Therefore, the way I will determine if total unification is unsuitable is to see if the current reforms are sufficient to help ensure jointness.

One area where the most significant reforms have been made since 1986 is in the role of the CJCS. Before then, the JCS only provided lowest common denominator consensus opinions. To protect their own parochial interests, the Services engaged in "logrolling", a practice that began in the McNamara days to help each other protect individual service programs from the SecDef's knife.121 Now, the CJCS is the principal military adviser to the NCA and the NSC. Theoretically, the CJCS should take into account the opinions of the service chiefs and the CINCs, but it is not a requirement. When asked by the NCA or the NSC, the service chiefs can present their own opinions, as can the CINCs. However, the onus of being the bottom-line adviser rests with the CJCS.122 Consequently, since he has no turf to protect, the CJCS should be able to provide advice based on national, rather than parochial, interests.

Before Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman had few specific duties. Now he has all the duties the JCS had prior to 1986, plus more additional duties; his responsibilities have changed from implicit to explicit.123 First, he is responsible for developing joint doctrine. Next, although he is not in the chain of command of the CINCs, commands from the NCA are routed through him to the CINCs, so that he, rather than the service chiefs, can prioritize the CINCs' requirements. Third, as the overseer of CINC activities, he can incorporate the views of the CINCs in his advice to the NCA and advise the SecDef on the CINC's priorities.124 He also accomplishes his oversight duties by reviewing the CINCs' Integrated Priority Lists (IPL) and by writing comments on the adequacy of each of the service Program Objective Memoranda (POM) with respect to the CINCs' needs.125 He reviews the contingency plans of the CINCs to ensure they
have the resources they need to accomplish those plans. Thus, since he has the job of assessing military requirements, he can be an additional honest broker for PPBS and defense acquisition. He must prepare a joint military net assessment; therefore, the differences in the capabilities of our forces and our allies can be compared to those of the enemy through a joint rather than a service lens. In addition, he must develop alternate budgets more in line with the true, rather than the fiscally constrained, strategic requirements and the CINC's needs. Finally, he must make biennial reviews of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and triennial reviews of the service roles and missions, and recommend any appropriate changes to the SecDef. In short, after Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman became the focus of all jointness.

In addition to the increased power of the CJCS, the creation of the position of Vice CJCS, as recommended by the Packard Commission, has helped jointness in several ways. Senior to the service chiefs and the CINC, the VCJCS can step in for the chairman in his absence, such as the VCJCS--General Robert T, Herres (USAF)--did during the Stark incident. His job is to not only assist the CJCS in reviewing war plans and linking resources with the national military strategy, but also to act as an additional spokesman for the CINC's needs. As the CJCS's representative in the PPBS process, he attends Defense Resources Board meetings, is vice chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and is chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). By playing a role in all three committees, the VCJCS helps provide continuity and a joint point of view in every stage of PPBS and in developing military requirements. His chairmanship of the JROC focuses attention on jointness, since the JROC is supposed to: "(1) examine potential joint military requirements and candidate systems to meet requirements, (2) identify, evaluate, and select candidates for
joint development and acquisition programs, (3) resolve cross-service requirements and management issues, and (4) resolve service and interoperability issues."\textsuperscript{131}

To assist the Vice Chairman in his duties, an internal reorganization of the Joint Staff in February 1987 created the J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability) and J-8 (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment). These two staffs help ensure jointness is a large part of force planning decisions. For example, besides reviewing operations plans, the J-7 has been instrumental in ensuring that military requirements documents consider joint needs, joint doctrine is written and coordinated with the services, joint warfare simulation is established, and that readiness tests for the unified commands are instituted.\textsuperscript{132} The J-8 is the focal point for the CINCs, Joint Staff, Services, and OSD for PPBS; essentially, it is a Joint Program Analysis and Evaluation Division (PA&E). Some of its more important duties include providing program and budget analyses to the CJCS so that he can advise the NCA, speak for the CINCs, and testify before Congress; and monitoring weapons systems acquisition.\textsuperscript{133} Even if they were not performing to full capacity yet, these two directorates still provide the infrastructure for joint progress.\textsuperscript{134}

Other improvements have enhanced the power and efficiency of the entire Joint Staff and have tended to increase its power vis-a-vis the service staffs. The first change was that prior to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the Joint Staff worked for the JCS. Obviously, each of the services could greatly influence the staff actions of the Joint Staff. Now the Joint Staff works only for the Chairman, and its size has been expanded from a ceiling of 400 to 1627 to give him what he needs to carry out his duties.\textsuperscript{135} This arrangement is far different from the situation that caused General David Jones to complain that the only people he could tell what to do were his personal secretary, assistant, and aide.\textsuperscript{136}
Next, according to Blackwell and Blechman's book, Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols has improved the quality of personnel assigned to the Joint Staff. As a result of working for the CJCS and because of the quality of the officers assigned, the Joint Staff's output has increased in quality and in stature. Previously, the services did not assign high caliber personnel to the Joint Staff; in some cases, serving on the Joint Staff was detrimental to an officer's career since the promotion authorities--the services--often felt it was less important than parent service duty. Now the services are taking "purple suit" assignments seriously. Some indicators of the significant change in attitude towards Joint Staff Officers (JSOs) are that: they must fill at least one half of the Joint Duty positions and all 1000 critical Joint Duty positions, promotion rates for JSOs must be comparable to service staff rates, specific requirements for joint education have been established, and a JSO career specialty has been established. Consequently, the services are assigning "fast-trackers" to joint billets, since such an assignment is a prerequisite for flag/general officer rank. In fact, all three- and four-star joint performance records are reviewed by the CJCS. Finally, joint assignment tour lengths must meet a minimum time requirement to ensure some level of expertise is gained in the position.

The above changes in the Joint Staff have improved not only the quality of the individuals, but also the staff's efficiency. Specifically, the staff action process has been streamlined, by reducing the requirements for the Joint Staff to coordinate with the services or even obtain their agreement on staff actions. Consequently, the number of JCS staff actions is decreasing, while those for the CJCS and Joint Staff are increasing. One result of all these changes is that where resource allocation issues had once been addressed only by
the service staffs and OSD, now the CJCS has a staff to assist him in the PPBS process and in other operational areas that is of higher quality, more independent, and more influential.142

Having discussed how the CJCS, the VCJCS, and the Joint Staff now have the power to enhance jointness significantly, I now want to review how Goldwater-Nichols enhanced the power and authority of the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands with respect to the Service Chiefs. As long as the CINCs do not hesitate to use the power given to them, they could "become potentially the most powerful U.S. military leaders ever deployed since Eisenhower in Europe and Nimitz and MacArthur in the Pacific."143 By law, the CINCs--who must be JSO-qualified--are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for mission accomplishment in their area of responsibility and for the "preparedness of their command".144

At the same time, they have also been given the authority to accomplish those missions. This authority extends over their subordinate commanders from all services to include: determining the command's chain of command; directing training, and organizing and employing forces; picking his subordinate commanders and his staff, relieving subordinates, and holding courts-martials for subordinates. By law, the subordinate commanders are not supposed to be able to make "end runs" to their services chiefs.145 Goldwater-Nichols has even given each of the CINCs the authority to have a separate, in-theater, readiness budget to ensure their operational needs are met; this budget would cover, for example, joint exercises. Except for SOCOM, which was given its own MFP, the other unified commands have stated that they do not want a separate budget, since they want to focus on operational matters and because the size of their staffs is inadequate to take on that mission; however, if a contingency fund were established, most would want it managed at the JCS level.146 Nevertheless,
the fact that they have the option to have their own budget is significant, in that it demonstrates one more aspect of their increased power to accomplish their mission without service interference.

The CINCs also have increased power with respect to the budget. Since 1981, the opportunities for the CINCs to provide input into the PPBS process has increased eleven-fold.147 "All necessary PPBS procedures and organizational changes are either in place or well on the way to being developed."148 In addition, each of the services has adjusted its POM-building process to accommodate the needs of the CINCs. First, each POM has an annex, which displays every IPL item and comments on how well the proposed budget will meet the CINC's needs. CINC staffs and the staffs of the service components trade POM information more thoroughly and earlier in the cycle. In fact, the CINCs' headquarters and the OSD are linked by the PPBS electronic distribution system (PEDS) so that the CINCs and services receive program and budget information simultaneously. Finally, any specified program and budget concerns identified by the CINCs are tracked by the services throughout budget execution.149

The above has outlined, in part, what Goldwater-Nichols and NSDD 219 have or were supposed to accomplish. It seems that these reforms were more than suitable for solving interservice rivalry. However, shortfalls exist in any new system, especially in one with such revolutionary changes. Senator Barry Goldwater called Goldwater-Nichols the "most far reaching reorganization of the United Stated defense establishment in almost 30 years."150 Representative Les Aspin said it "was probably the greatest . . . change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress."151 Nevertheless, my research found mixed reviews on reform results. In some cases, a reviewer might say the power of the Joint Staff has improved tremendously, while another might provide numerous caveats on areas that are still controlled by the services.
For example, the CINC does not have absolute control over the forces assigned or temporarily within his command. Goldwater-Nichols states that "the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified commands to perform missions assigned to those commands." Still, CINCCENT has no forces assigned to him; instead they are designated for his use in case of military operations. Until Operation DESERT SHIELD began, the majority of CINCCENT's designated army forces were under Forces Command, an army specified command. Similarly, the majority of the CONUS-based Tactical Air Command is assigned to the unified European Command; however, those tactical air forces are "managed" by TAC, a single-service force. Although regular joint exercises can be conducted, by maintaining these single-service "pools" of forces, the services limit the CINC's readiness, since it is difficult for him to form a team where all the players are familiar with each other. Because General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (CINCCENT) had months to train the majority of the forces that arrived in his theater, we will never know what the results would have been if the forces had to fight as soon as they arrived.

The law also stated that "forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant command shall be assigned to, and under the command of, the commander of that command." In this regard, the Navy appears to be the service still most resistant to unification. In SOUTHCOM, almost four years after the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, NAVSOUTH commanded the SEAL teams rather than release them to SOCSOUTH's control. During a 1988 crisis in Panama, the USS Okinawa remained under the operational command of CINCLANT as it transited the canal; this may have presented operational difficulties for CINCSOUTH if he had needed the marines on board. Finally, despite the
tension-filled atmosphere of Korea, Okinawa-based Marines training near the
Korean DMZ remain under the command of Seventh Fleet rather than CINC, Combined
Forces Command, a sub-unified commander.159

The above two problems might be resolved in the next UCP revision, which is
a responsibility of CJCS. Hopefully, all forces would then be assigned to a
unified commander, who has the complete operational authority and responsibility
to train those units to fight a war jointly. The services, meanwhile, would
still have the important role of equipping and providing trained personnel for
those forces.

Another possible problem has to do with how quickly and forcefully the key
players implement the reforms. Admiral(R) William J. Crowe, CJCS from October
1985 to October 1989, thought it would take three to five years for the changes
to have a noticeable impact.160 For example, participation in the PPBS process
by the CJCS, Joint Staff, and the CINCs is new to them. Consequently, they are
probably still developing any needed procedures, expertise, and
infrastructure.161 Another important adjustment has been in the changed role of
the CJCS. Specifically, the strength of the CJCS seems to lie as much in his
personality as it does in statutory authority. In other words, the CJCS has the
authority to improve jointness, but it is up to him as to how he uses that
authority. Chairman Crowe focused on his role as a spokesperson for the
individual CINCs; consequently, he did not develop positions that were
independent of the CINCs' influence to give the NCA, the Joint Staff, and the
Defense Resources Board integrated advice. A possible reason for this is that
while the CJCS is supposed to be the overseer of the CINCs, the latter still
have other channels they can pursue to achieve their interests. They can go
through their component commands or directly to the services, and they can
appeal directly to the SecDef to get what they want.162 Besides a good
relationship with the CINCs, Crowe also wanted to cooperate with the services,
since, until the Joint Staff developed the requisite expertise, he depended on the services for information. It seems, then, that unless the President, SecDef and the CJCS have a strong relationship, the CJCS's power may be reduced if he tries to establish a constituency with the CINCs and the services rather than with just the NCA. Naturally, this is conflict is always possible since, although the CJCS is responsible only to the NCA, he does have an explicit responsibility to execute the reforms that promote jointness and an implicit one to preserve the traditions and values of the services.

Much of the above criticism was based on Admiral Crowe's reaction to Goldwater-Nichols and NSDD 219. From my own impressions, the current CJCS, Colin Powell seems to understand that his constituency is the NCA. A recent example of his power was when the services accused General Powell of presenting a "Base Force" Plan without adequate input from them. The plan creates minimum force sizes and responsibilities for each Service; consequently, each service had lobbied for a greater share of the budget. Apparently, the strength of the SecDef's and the CJCS's personalities and the increased importance of the chairman's position cut the squabbling short. As I said above, strong personalities can make a difference.

A similar problem in relationships occurs between the CINCs and their service component staffs. First, to get what his command needs, a CINC might develop a cooperative rather than a directive relationship with the service component commands—even though Goldwater-Nichols specifies that the latter work for the CINC. As currently organized, each CINC's staff spends its time planning and participating in military operations. Any resource data they receive is from the staffs of the service component commanders, who are still responsive to their parent service. As a result, the CINCs could tend to focus more on the individual needs of their service component commands as opposed to the overall, integrated needs of the unified command.
As a way to solve the above problem, some reformers have recommended funding by mission--using Under Secretaries of Defense as the officials responsible for each mission--rather than by service. The conflict associated with current funding procedures is that the services fund for the long term, while the unified and specified commanders are more concerned with short-term readiness. Priorities for theaters tend to change more quickly than do the products of force planning, programming, and budgeting. In any case, the current reforms do not account for the necessity to strike a balance between modernization and readiness.  

As positive as the picture for improvement of the joint staff looks, some wrinkles still need to be smoothed out. Some critics of the system believe that because high performers will be put into joint positions, ticket punching will occur. Required time in a joint staff position is only two years. While this short time allows those on the fast track to move on to assignments enroute to a flag/general officer promotion and to bring a larger number of more capable officers to the Joint Staff, it also may bring officers who are inexperienced in joint matters and who lack the analytical tools and the depth of knowledge needed to analyze actions and present integrated recommendations; as a result, these officers may become overly dependent on the service staffs.  

Hopefully, though, as time passes and more officers think jointly, the Joint Staff and the CINC staffs should become less dependent on the service and service component staffs for information. Closer cooperation with the OSD staffs may also help reduce this dependence. Another solution is to make long-term service on the joint staff, even without battalion or brigade-level command, a way to achieve flag/general officer rank. While this might seem like a Prussian General Staff, enough evidence exists to indicate that, as Robert W. Komer has written, the “political risk of creating a military elite that could facilitate a military takeover is grossly exaggerated in a society like ours and
has little historical validity."\textsuperscript{171} In fact, R.K. Betts has said that Congress's "fear of a man on horseback is more a rationale for maintaining legislative clout than for protecting the nation."\textsuperscript{172} Finally, while the emphasis on producing professional joint staff officers appears to be on target, the legislation fails to address developing a thorough grounding in, or even an appreciation of, jointness in all officers early in their careers.

Other problems arise outside the services, rather than from within. In the feasibility section, I discussed the influence of Congress and how its "divide and conquer" tactics with the services leads to parochial infighting. Much of the inefficiency in PPBS is a result of Congressional committees providing detailed program management of programs rather than management oversight.\textsuperscript{173} This micromanagement sometimes leads to contradictory or inconsistent direction. It also leads to overlapping responsibilities in the Armed Services, Budget, and Appropriations committees in both houses, causing repetitious appearances by service members to testify before these committees to justify their expenditures.\textsuperscript{174} The services have little incentive to review their budgets themselves, since the money gained from any cancellation cannot be used elsewhere.\textsuperscript{175} Recommended solutions have included a clearer division of responsibilities among the committees and a biennial defense budget.\textsuperscript{176}

Many of the reformers consider the biennial budget a cure-all for defense budget ills. Congress now focuses only on defense input—the services' individual programs. When the biennial budget becomes a reality in the '92-'93 budget, it should allow Congress to focus in the first year on authorization and appropriation phases, and in the second year on the joint warfighting output of the Defense Department as a whole (force structure, military strategy, armed forces preparedness, and acquisition system effectiveness).\textsuperscript{177}
ACCEPTABILITY. It seems to me that the theoretical benefits of unification might be: decreased interservice rivalry, more focus on the mission than the function, enforced jointness, and a more economical system of defense because of reduced duplication. The purpose of this section is to determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs and how acceptable unification of forces might be to various groups.

The first area I will examine is service roles and missions. Some might say that unification would allow each of the services' roles and missions to be complementary, so that roles and missions would not overlap.178 For example, if only the Air Force provided close air support (CAS), then the Army should have to give up its attack helicopters. While it appears that financial savings might accrue, such a policy would also remove much of the flexibility in the warfighting systems. In fact, that is one of the arguments against making the F-16 a dual-capable aircraft; in an effort to save money by eliminating the A-10, the Air Force may be trying to promote a plane that may be too fast for CAS or may be diverted to support an air mission rather than a ground support mission.

Closely associated with the need for flexibility is the idea of reversibility. Our government might view an in-place unification as too much of a sunk cost to revert back to separate services. There may also be a possibility that, since only the Marine Corps' size is protected by law and the services could lose their constituencies after they lost their autonomy, any of the services could shrink to a dangerously low level—depending on the mood of the country and the current national strategy. However, given our rapidly changing world, I believe we should have the right mix of trained, flexible, and ready forces to fight in any medium.
While speaking of trained and ready forces, this brings up the fact that unification will take time to implement. Canada took more than a decade, without debate, to reach the organization it felt best met its needs. The turmoil involved in such a significant reorganization, especially in the administrative, training, and logistical areas could have a significant effect on our armed forces' warfighting capability. In our current role as the "911" of the world, the United States may not have the breathing room to decrease its capabilities during a possibly difficult transformation period resulting from the usual bureaucratic inertia associated with change.

Some might say the flexibility discussed earlier needs to be better balanced with the costs associated with service duplication or triplication of effort. Edward Luttwak has attacked the services' "not invented here" syndrome, saying it causes duplicative research and economy of scale losses through a smaller number of buys, which results in higher unit costs.179 A smaller defense budget in the future may naturally force more consolidation of effort; however, it may also heighten interservice rivalry as the services vie for the various roles and missions. The possible costs of eliminating controlled duplication are that the Defense Department's bargaining power with contractors will be reduced, the defense industrial base will narrow, and a loss of effectiveness could result because of lost synergism between the different service's weapons platforms.180 For example, during the 1940s and 1950s, rivalry offered more choices in at least doctrine and equipment than if there had been a "monolithic military establishment."181 In sum, instead of duplication, rivalry may produce complementary weapons systems and capabilities that augment the overall effect and strength of the forces by adding depth, redundancy, and robustness.182

Although I discussed the civilian leadership's role in the feasibility section, I will mention Congress again--but this time from the aspect of why they might resist unifying the forces. As stated earlier, the separation of
forces allows the Congress to enhance their own power, and, as General(R) Bruce Palmer wrote, "... most members of Congress sincerely [believe] that the nation's security is enhanced, if not safeguarded, by having competing groups share in the shaping of our national security policy." I would also speculate that the NCA would resist unification even more than President Reagan, SecDef Weinberger and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman resisted Goldwater-Nichols. Goldwater-Nichols was enthusiastically passed by Congress over the NCA's resistance; without Congressional support, however, unification could not occur. My belief is that the Congress would want to fix those areas not reformed under Goldwater-Nichols through supplemental legislation and closer oversight, rather than through the more radical step of unification.

As far as acceptability to the individual services is concerned, the Army, as it did in 1947, might be the only service to come close to advocating unification, since it is heavily dependent on the other two services for a deployment capability. The Navy and the Marine Corps, on the other hand, have consistently fought any attempts to further centralize DoD. While the Air Force supported unification in 1947, it also thought it would dominate the Defense Department. Although the Air Force has some dependence on the other two services--in the form of sealift for sustainment and Army firepower for SEAD, it would still not like to surrender its independence for which it fought so hard in 1947. As shown here and in the feasibility section, these autonomous departments could probably develop a convincing case against unification.

The people in those services, if they are like Canadian servicemen and women, would probably be against unification, based upon what it would do to their morale. As Arthur Hadley noted, "Service differences are vital for morale." Similarly, SecDef Brown wrote that: "The morale and esprit in the military have largely come from service identifications." While the men and
women in the service would probably do what they were told, the loss of identity with a particular service could have an effect on their morale. The importance of morale to mission accomplishment was illustrated by Napoleon when he said: "In war the moral[e] is to the material as three to one".190

The last group I want to examine concerns those individuals and associations who had called for military reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From my research, I was impressed by how many of the reformers' complaints were addressed in the 1986 legislation. While I could not find specific reformers' opinions about unification, the impression one writer gave me was that the reformers were, for the most part, satisfied with the reforms made in 1986; they felt the reforms were not perfect—but, then, they did not expect them to be. For the most part, the reformers seemed to prefer to have the military reform from within, rather than have reforms imposed by outside forces.191

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Before I began my research, I did not realize the depth of the changes brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and NSDD 219. In fact, I believed that the only way to begin to eliminate service parochialism would be to eliminate the services. My investigation has shown I was wrong; specifically, my overall conclusion is that the reforms initiated in 1986 and 1987 provide a strong enough basis for significantly enhancing jointness in the armed forces. Second, unification of the armed forces, while probably feasible, is neither suitable, nor acceptable. To further reinforce those conclusions, theory and the Canadian experience have shown unification of the United States Armed Forces is neither the best nor a wise solution to service parochialism. Finally, my research has shown that as important as those pieces of legislation were, further improvements are needed—but not any as radical as unification.
At least two good reasons have been cited by others for not disestablishing the four services. First, having separate services provides significant benefits. Former SecDef Brown cited several such benefits.

Any organization as large as the [DoD] must be divided into major operational units, with appropriate authority delegated to them. . . . Each service has definable functions, and the land, sea, and air environments differ sufficiently to call for differing skills, experience, and sometimes even equipment. . . . Recruiting, training, and personnel functions up to a certain level are clearly best carried out in such a structure. Attempts to substitute for service identification some general professional military identification that would go with the activities of particular unified or specified commands, are unlikely to work as well.192

Second, as stated in Defense Organization: The Need for Change, there are probably "numerous and less drastic actions that can be taken . . . for more effective integration of Service capabilities and for more useful joint military preparation and planning."193

In addition to my overall conclusion, a number of other conclusions are worth mentioning. The first is that the right people--the CJCS, VCJCS, CINCs, and Joint Staff--have been given the necessary statutory authority to increase jointness and decrease servicism; the key, then, to making the system work seems to be strong, aggressive leadership by those people. Hopefully, the Cheney-Powell-Schwarzkopf combination will be typical of our future leadership. Their leadership and professionalism emphasize the point that the quality of the people in charge will make the difference. To decrease their reliance on service staffs, the CJCS and the CINCs must demand and develop officers for their staffs who understand jointness. In the case of the Joint Staff, longer tours of duty may be needed; however, officers should be recognized for long, successful tours on the Joint Staff. The same high quality staffs need to be developed for the CINCs. Until enough officers understand jointness and the problems of parochialism, the CINCs may need to supplement their staffs from the service component staffs.
The CINCs must also use their full statutory authority in their commands—and have the complete backing of the NCA and the CJCS. They must be more concerned about accomplishing the mission than achieving a consensus with their subordinate commanders, and they must ensure that their subordinate commanders understand their loyalty priorities. They must demand that they not only have a tight leash on all the forces assigned to them under the UCP, but also have all the forces they will need when they go to war—not an easy task given the proposed reduced size of the armed forces. In short, the CINCs must follow the General Maxwell Thurmond maxim of: “When in charge, take charge.” However, the NCA must also ensure that the CJCS and the CINCs are each the best combination of warfighter and politician available.

A second conclusion is that while it does provide a solid foundation, the 1986 legislation cannot ensure success. Regardless of the way the boxes are drawn on the organizational chart, parochialism will not disappear in a bureaucracy. As long as one service must depend on another for support, the supported service will often question the reliability of the supporting service. Moreover, the decreasing budget will ensure that there will be a continuing fight for roles and missions, which will promote interservice rivalry; however, as I have shown, controlled peacetime rivalry is not all bad.

Despite these obstacles to jointness, I must again go back to strong leadership as the solution, rather than another reorganization. Officers must understand that anything less than total support for jointness will not be tolerated. Hopefully, more reliefs similar to General Dugan’s will not be necessary; however, such actions send the right message: “Be joint or be gone.” The right senior leadership will also ensure early, continuous joint training for all officers, rather than for just mid-career or “fast-trackers”; with the passage of time and solid training, jointness will be the path to success more than loyalty to one’s own service.
A third conclusion is that we can learn from the Canadian Forces unification. The first point is that the needs of the individual were very important. Consequently, the Canadian Forces have changed from a totally unified organization to one that recognizes the individual services. The second point is that savings and efficiency can accrue to those organizations that wisely and selectively consolidate like functions within the organization. Finally, the defense department should only be reorganized if the new structure enhances warfighting.

Another conclusion is that the "problem with the services" may not be with the services at all. In other words, no reorganization of DoD would fix certain problems. I am talking about the influence of and interference by Congress, and about the lack of clear, budget-constrained strategy guidance from the White House. The former increases the possibility for servicism since influential Congressmen can play the services against each other, micro-manage the defense programs, and do not allow the services to make program tradeoffs within their budget. The latter fosters the attitude that, without definitive guidance, every service must push for more roles and missions and more impressive equipment, so that its worth goes up and it survives in the budget wars. As a result, because the NCA is not providing priorities, Congress has stepped in to do the prioritizing for us. If the missions of the armed forces were funded instead of the services, the budget battles would be among the Assistant Secretaries of Defense in charge of those missions instead of the services. Thus, with the CINCs having more authority with respect to the services, and with funding going to integrated missions instead of service programs, the services would have less need to fight among themselves. Naturally, proper balance between readiness and modernization will still need to be maintained.
My final conclusion is that just because I think another reorganization is not necessary does not mean that Congress will not impose another—especially if we do not implement the 1986 legislation as quickly as possible. Congress has already shown they are quite willing to make radical changes in the Defense Department, regardless of any dissent by the NCA. Consequently, I believe the services need to form their own watchdog organizations to monitor implementation progress, since reform from within is preferable to outside reforms.

Having reached some conclusions about unification and jointness, certain implications naturally follow. First, the training system must look at beginning adequate jointness preparation as early as precommissioning training, and implementing a system of continuing education. Moreover, all officers should receive a heavier dose of joint training at every school gate throughout their careers. Second, the idea of a general staff should not be dismissed off-handily. Third, DoD must take the lead on ensuring reforms are implemented or initiated and reporting to Congress without awaiting further investigations or reviews. We must seize the initiative, or Congress may take it from us. Fourth, the policy on handling those officers who favor servicism over jointness should be clearly stated. On the other hand, a system must be in place to ensure that service component commanders in the unified commands are protected from any parent service retribution because they acted "too jointly." Fifth, we should continue to look at ways in which support services can be consolidated and economized, much like the Canadians have done with their "fourth service" and as we have done with the Defense Logistics Agency. Sixth, if the new UCP does not have the services assigning all their units to one of the Unified or Specified Commands, then Congress needs to get involved. Seventh, as much as possible, given the natural desire for ambiguity in the world of politics, the military must demand a clearer strategy from the NCA; however, this will not be easy, since clearer strategies may mean more clearly defined winners and losers.
among the services for a piece of the budget pie. Finally, Congress should reform the way it interacts with DoD. As Senator Goldwater said about the Goldwater-Nichols Act,

Un fortunately, that bill did nothing to change one of the major problem areas in the defense budgeting process: the Congress. Every year, the Congress adds literally billions of dollars to the cost of defense by our own inefficiency, inconsistency, micromanagement and misappropriation of defense funds to promote selfish, parochial interests. It would be the ultimate act of hypocrisy if, after reorganizing the Pentagon, we in Congress did not clean up our own house.194

The bottom line from this entire analysis is that the military's leaders now have the statutory authority they need to make a quantum improvement in jointness. All they need do now is exercise the requisite leadership it will take to implement those laws.


10. Gruetzner, 141. Hendrickson, 100. Two other key investigations were completed in 1985 by the Heritage Foundation and Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies.


12. Snider, 89. In addition, the purpose of the 1987 DoD Appropriations Act, which created the supporting unified commands of USTRANSCOM and USSOCOM, was to improve the nation's joint strategic lift assets and special operations capabilities.


21. Ibid, 204-209.


27. Ibid, 43-44.


30. Posen, 45.


32. Clark, 252-253.

33. Posen, 54.

34. Korb, 173-175.

35. Posen, 53.

36. Clark, 269.


39. Ibid, 44.

40. Ibid, 43-44.

42. Defense Organization, 614.

43. Heinl, 84.


47. Art, 139 Task Force, 27. Armed Forces Journal, 38-39. F. R. Sharp, "Canadian Armed Forces Unification. Part I," Royal Air Force Quarterly 8 (Autumn 1968): 197-198. Specifically, Canadian Defence Minister Paul Hellyer charged that: (1) defence costs were rising, personnel costs seemed too high, and triplication of effort among the services was prevalent; (2) the percentage of the defence budget used to buy weapons systems had dropped nearly 30% over the last ten years; 3) unified functional commands did not exist; (4) the use of over 200 coordination committees made decision making slow and complicated; and (5) the three services could not communicate with each other on the radio. The choices were to decrease the number of military commitments, increase the budget, or reduce the costs of personnel, operations, and maintenance.

Art, 139. R. B. Byers, "Canadian Security and Defence: the Legacy and the Challenges," Adelphi Papers 214 (Winter 1986) (London: Janes Publishing Co., Ltd.), 46-47. As a result, the Glassco Commission was appointed in 1961 to look at the government for waste and duplication of effort, and to find ways for the government to be more efficient and economical—especially with respect to defence. Although the commission outlined several hundred shortcomings in the Department of National Defence in its 1963 report, it only mentioned unification as a solution in passing, since it assumed that the three services would continue to exist.


49. Art, 140, 142. Task Force, 28-29. Sharp, 200. Integration also established a centrally controlled reserve organization, consolidated all engineering construction branches, and integrated all fixed communication sites into the Canadian Forces Communication System.

50. Sharp, 199. Task Force, 29-30. Armed Forces Journal, 39: "This was the most difficult stage of the program. Byers, 47: Today the commands are: Maritime Command, Mobile Command, Air Command, Communications Command, Canadian Forces Europe, Canadian Forces Training System.

51. Task Force, 30, 41-42. Sharp, 200. Assigned to one of the major field commands, the base commander was in charge of four departments for his area: operations, technical services, comptroller, and administration; and he was expected to provide support to units from other commands. The bases were organized using the Canadian Air Force model.


57. Art, 144. These problems included coordinating planning and budgeting, providing unified direction, accounting and controlling weapons and equipment acquisition, eliminating duplication of effort, bettering relations with other government agencies involved in Defence Department decisions, and implementing the Glassco Commission's recommendations (see note above). The Management Review Group (MRG) investigated the above problems in 1971.

58. Byers, 47. Task Force, 31-32. Art, 145, 147. If an Assistant Deputy Minister was a civilian, then a military person became the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister—and vice versa. The military Chief of the Defence Staff and the civilian Deputy Minister became coequals, sharing responsibility and were equally accountable to the civilian Minister of National Defence.

59. Byers, 84.

60. Hal Lawrence, "Unification or Resignation," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 108 (July 1982): 34. LTC David Graham, Canadian Liaison Officer to Combined Arms Command reviewed a draft of my paper on 13 March 1991 and gave me the information concerning why the number of regiments were reduced.


63. Kellet, 56-57.


65. Byers, 10-12, 32.

66. *Armed Forces Journal*, 42.

67. Byers, 87.

68. Ibid, 32-33.

69. Ibid, 34-36.

70. *Armed Forces Journal*, 42.

71. Sharp, Part I, 199.
75. Armed Forces Journal, 42. Task Force, 58.
76. Task Force, 58.
77. Ibid, 43.
79. Art, 148.
83. Byers, 45.
85. Ibid, 8-9.
86. Ibid, 9.
87. Ibid, 7.
88. Byers, 46.
89. Ibid.
90. Lawrence, 35.
92. Armed Forces Journal, 42.
93. Review Group, 43-45. Lawrence, 35.
94. Byers, 48.
97. Art, 226.
99. Ibid.


103. Kruzel, 176.

104. Ibid., 177.


112. Kruzel, 172.


117. Korb, 179.


124. Ibid, 158.

125. Ibid, 16.


129. Ibid, 59, 171.


131. Ibid, 165.

132. Ibid, 111, 166.


134. Ibid, 249.


136. Kruzel, 190.


142. Ibid, 161.

143. Kruzel, 193.


146. Blackwell, 139, 169.

147. Ibid, 168-169.


149. Ibid, 170-171.

150. Kruzel, 171.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid, 116-117.

153. Snider, 93.


155. Ibid, 113.

156. Ibid, 116.

157. Author interview with high ranking USSOUTHCOM official on AOSF trip, 21-25 October 1990. I cannot give the individual's name because of the CGSC non-attribution policy.


159. Ibid, 117.

160. Ibid, 172.

161. Ibid, 171-172.

162. Ibid, 125-129, 141-142.


164. Ibid, 146.

165. Ibid, 268.

166. *Inside the Pentagon*, 1+.


168. Hendrickson, 105. Art, 244-246, 251-252.


171. Art, 226.


174. Hendrickson, 30, 103.

175. Ibid, 33, 104.


177. Hendrickson, 102-103.


179. Buckley, 4-5.

180. Hendrickson, 42.

181. Ibid, 54.


183. Palmer, 4.

184. Kruzel, 172.


186. Korb, 173.


190. Heinl, 196.

191. Hendrickson, 54, 98.


193. Ibid.

194. Kruzel, 198.
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