Operation Musketeer – The End of Empire
A Study of Organizational Failure in Combined Operations

A Monograph
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## Operation Musketeer - The End of Empire: A Study of Organizational Failure in Combined Operations

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ABSTRACT

OPERATION MUSKETEER - THE END OF EMPIRE: A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURE IN COMBINED OPERATIONS by MAJ Patrick L. Neely, USA, 48 pages.

This monograph studies the failure of Operation MUSKETEER to achieve both its military and political objectives. The study examines an important facet of combined warfare, the conduct of a combined contingency operation.

The monograph utilizes a model for analyzing organizational failure described by I. Iot A. Cohen and John Gooch in their work, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. The central thrust of their methodology is that military failure has multiple causes that are inter-related. By identifying the individual failures a matrix of complex failure can be constructed and an overall pattern identified.

In examining the events that triggered the launching of Operation MUSKETEER in November, 1956, several salient features became evident. The principal architect for the disaster was Britain's Prime Minister Eden. He failed to recognize that Britain's military was not structured to conduct rapid contingency operations. Once he decided on using the military option, he did not insure that the political objective was supported by the military operation. Also, Eden failed to recognize that his nation lacked the capability to conduct military operations in the Mideast without the political consent of at least the United States, which he did not secure. The French shared in the disaster because they assumed the British were prepared to act quickly with military force and the goal was the removal of Nasser. However, as the crisis became prolonged and the Suez Canal became the military objective, the French failed to achieve their goals.

The monograph concludes that military operations must be closely tied to the desired political effect. In combined operations, the potential for misreading the political goals of an ally greatly complicates the military planning process. Also, allied attempts to circumvent the scope of a combined operation when national interests diverge can be potentially fatal to the success of military action. If the United States wishes to retain the freedom of unilateral action in conducting world-wide contingency operations, it must also be willing to pay the military price up front. Otherwise, it will be forced, in a crisis, to enter into hasty alliances which contain a healthy potential to recreate the failure of Operation MUSKETEER.
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Part One: Introduction

At 6:20 A.M., 5 November, 1956, two battalions of paratroopers landed on drop zones at Port Said in Egypt. They were the vanguard of a mighty British and French invasion force of 130 warships, with 80,000 men and 500 combat aircraft. The purpose of the invasion was to seize and safeguard the Suez Canal. Egyptian military resistance was light and amphibious landings began the following morning. However, this short-lived spurt of military success came to a sudden halt at midnight, 6 November, as the two invading governments acceded to a United Nations resolution for a ceasefire and to intense diplomatic pressure by the United States and Soviet Union. By 30 December, 1956, the combined forces had evacuated Egypt in disgrace.

The repercussions of the defeat of the combined British and French diplomatic and military action were massive. In the near-term, the British government of Prime Minister Anthony Eden fell from power on 9 January, 1957, and the French government of Premier Guy Mollett followed soon after in May. President Nasser of Egypt enjoyed a tremendous growth in prestige, both at home and abroad. The relations of the principal North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations were significantly strained, but survived. However, the road to France's eventual withdrawal from the military alliance was clearly begun. In the longer term, French General Andre Beaufre recognized:
The Anglo-French expedition against Egypt, generally know as 'Suez', proved to be the turning-point of the post-war period. Before Suez European prestige was still intact in the eyes of the Third World and the victor nations of 1945 had maintained their solidarity. After Suez both prestige and solidarity had vanished. This was the end of empire, the end of an epoch.\(^{(1)}\)

This is a study of organizational failure, an investigation of how two allies, Great Britain and France, ran aground on the rocky shores of combined operations. Failure was not a foregone conclusion. Diplomatic preparation for a properly coordinated and swiftly mounted military operation could have prevented failure. In terms of combined military power of the two allies should have crushed Egypt. The weight of allied forces promised a swift and total Egyptian defeat. Why that defeat never happened merits investigation.

Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, in their work *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, offer a model for investigating military failure. They suggest some failures are clearly attributable to a simple explanation such as 'overwhelming odds or spectacular incompetence.' Other failures, such as Operation MUSKETEER, lack a convenient singular cause for disaster. As they say, 'These are the occasions when it seems that the outcome of the battle depended at least as much on one side's mishandling of the situation as on the other's skill in exploiting a position of superiority.'\(^{(2)}\)

The key to the Cohen and Gooch model is an acceptance of...
the concept of complex causes for military failure. According to Cohen and Gooch, there are three basic roots to complex failure: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt. (3) Any combination of the three basic kinds of failure constitute aggregate failure. When applied to Operation MUSKETEER, Cohen and Gooch suggest a combination of failure to learn and failure to anticipate was at work. (4)

A failure to learn is simply, "the failure to absorb readily accessible lessons from recent history." (5)

There were two lessons Britain and France should have incorporated into their national strategies by 1956. First was the requirement for obtaining the concurrence of the United States when conducting military operations in a strategically sensitive area. The Suez Canal was and is a vital international waterway. This alone made it of special interest to the U.S. Also, both countries were well aware of the United States attempts to woo Nasser into a pro-Western political policy. Any actions that could upset the U.S. efforts would first have to be cleared first in Washington. Secondly, in dealing with Third World rulers, both Britain and France had a wealth of historical experience from their days of empire. They knew that if military force was to be used, it had to be applied swiftly and in overwhelming strength. There would be no diplomatic subtlety. It was the use of a sledge hammer to kill a mosquito. Finally, the very fact that the British and French governments were sensitive to U.S. reaction should have told them they were no
longer in the first ranks of world powers.

A failure to anticipate is 'the inability to foresee and take appropriate measures to deal with an enemy's move. or likely response to a move of one's own...' (6) In the case of the Suez Crisis, both Britain and France had to be cognizant of Nasser's desire to rid Egypt of the last vestiges of colonialism. The foreign enclave of the Suez Canal Zone was an obvious target of eventual Egyptian political or military action. It was a matter of 'when' and 'how', not 'if.' Also, both countries were well aware of President Eisenhower's strong anti-colonialism stance in general. Military action against a former colony and newly independent state risked the ire of the United States government and should have been anticipated.

This monograph will follow the Cohen and Gooch format for analyzing military misfortune. The five steps are:

1. What was the failure? This examines the available options and how the setting for failure was created.
2. What were the critical tasks than went incomplete or unfulfilled?
3. Layered analysis. A study of each echelon of command and how specific decisions contributed to the ultimate failure.
4. Analytical Matrix. A graphic representation of how complex causes contributed to the aggregate failure.
5. Pathways to misfortune. (~)

Finally, conclusions and implications from Operation MUSKETEER for future U.S. combined operations will be addressed.
In the summer of 1956, the Cold War dominated international diplomacy. The western democratic states, championed by the United States, were holding firm through a policy of containment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its Warsaw Pact allies. The contested ground of political conflict between the two principal power blocks had shifted to the Mediterranean basin and the Arabian Gulf areas, along with ongoing flashpoints such as Taiwan.

In this geo-political battleground, Gamal Abdel Nasser attempted to become the modern Middle East's first great Arab leader. With the diplomatically negotiated withdrawal of Great Britain from Egypt in early 1956, Nasser embarked on a political campaign to establish Egypt as the preeminent regional power. Balking at conditions placed on either British or American military aid, Nasser accepted an arms package from the Soviet Union. The U.S., under the Eisenhower administration, was attempting to increase its diplomatic influence with Arab governments in the region through economic assistance. Nasser's acceptance of Soviet arms, and his reluctance to accept linkage of U.S. financial aid for the Aswan Dam with a diplomatic settlement with Israel caused the U.S. to withdraw the offer of financial assistance for the Aswan Dam. Nasser saw the building of the dam to be a key feature in his drive to modernize Egypt and was infuriated by the U.S. action. In retaliation and as an
alternate means to finance the dam's construction. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956.(8)

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to go into the political details leading up to the Suez Crisis of 1956. Suffice to say that a number of diplomatic miscalculations were made by all parties in analyzing each others' positions. It is well to remember that internationally the 'Iron Curtain' was firmly entrenched in Europe and that the French and British were in the throes of withdrawing from their overseas possessions. France had lost Indochina in 1954-55 and was engaged in suppressing an insurgency in Algeria. Britain had just withdrawn from Egypt and was fighting a guerrilla movement in Cyprus. It also maintained diplomatic and military relationships with Jordan and Libya, with British units based in both countries. Hungary was on the eve of revolting against the Soviet Union. The United States was concerned about the safety of Taiwan from Communist Chinese intervention. Israel was conducting cross border operations into Egypt and Jordan to suppress terrorist raids. In short, there was ample action on the international scene and it was easy for any government to be concerned over incidents that in less troubled times would have been considered of little consequence.(9)

The final point to remember was that even though Great Britain and France were retreating from their empires, politically they still considered themselves nations of the first rank, the equal of the United States and the Soviet
Union. Their decline to the second tier of international players was in progress, but this was by no means clear to all until the conclusion of the Suez Crisis.

Upon receiving news of the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal on the evening of July 26th, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden reacted by stating, 'this is the end. We dan't [sic] put up with any more of this.... Our whole position demands strong action. I want to seize the canal and take charge of it.'(10) The official purpose of seizing the Canal was to safeguard the flow of British commerce, particularly oil. After calling an immediate cabinet meeting, Eden tasked the British military to prepare plans for the military seizure of the canal. Representatives of the French and U.S. government were present at the initial meeting and relayed Eden's initial responses back to their respective governments.

The French administration, under Premier Guy Mollet, was equally hostile to Nasser's actions. They saw the need for Nasser's downfall as part of a wider strategy in support of preserving French rule in Algeria.(11) The canal crisis presented the French an opportunity to recruit an European ally, Great Britain, and a political pretext for military action. However, France lacked sufficient military forces of its own to attack Egypt. Therefore, the French promptly sent a delegation to London on July 29th to begin preliminary discussions for joint military action against Egypt.(12)

Israel welcomed the canal crisis. Israel had been
barred from use of the Suez Canal since it had declared independence in 1948. This exclusion policy had been initiated by King Farouk and continued by Nasser. As desirable as access to the canal was, Israel was more interested in breaking the Egyptian blockade on the port of Elat, first initiated in 1953, and redeveloping maritime trade with Asia. (13)

Israel’s wider strategic aim was to insure no single Arab state on its border gained sufficient military strength to launch an unilateral attack. To maintain this strategic aim, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion desired to destroy the Egyptian Army and Air Force before they could fully assimilate the influx of Soviet arms. Israel had already begun to prepare for a major military campaign against Egypt in April, 1956. It had secured a major arms build-up from France in secret negotiations. The Israelis projected an attack against Egypt in October, 1956.

Before proceeding, it is useful to summarize the strategic aims of the two allied nations and the ‘silent’ partner.

---

**Great Britain:**

**Official Position**
* Punish Egypt for confiscation of “British property”.
* Ensure safe passage of British maritime commerce, most importantly petroleum products through the canal.

**Unofficial Position**
* Remove Nasser as principal player in anti-Western, anti-colonialism movement in Arab world.
* Reestablish physical control over Suez Canal.
France:
Official Position
* Reestablish European control over Suez Canal.
Unofficial Position
* Remove Nasser from power and replace with pro-Western leader.
* Destroy external Arab support for guerrilla movement in Algeria.
* Safeguard continued existence of Israel.
Part Three: The Options

On 26 July, 1956, both the British and French governments had a number of options in responding to Nasser's actions. Only the British options will be examined in detail. The French largely forfeited their choices by throwing their lot in with the British, so they will not be addressed separately. Also, since Israel was not a direct player in Operation MUSKETEER, it will be excluded from analysis in this section.

To begin, it is important to recognize that Great Britain was not compelled to do anything in response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Nasser did not threaten to interrupt the flow of British commerce through the Canal. His action involved administration and revenues only. Therefore, Britain could elect to take a wait-and-see position. Politically, this would allow the situation to defuse over time and would not make out Nasser to be a bigger threat to British interests than he actually was. Also, this course of action was militarily advantageous because, the British armed forces in the Mediterranean were in no position to react. Finally, and most importantly, this would avoid any potential disagreement with the United States over Middle East policy.

The principal disadvantage to the wait-and-see option was that it gave Nasser an easy victory in domestic and international prestige. He would be seen as having taken
great risk with no repercussions. This could cause domestic problems for the Eden administration in the House of Commons.

The second option for Britain was a purely diplomatic response. By moving solely on a diplomatic front, such as the United Nations, Britain could secure valuable allied support and cast the struggle in terms of an international coalition resisting international piracy by Nasser. This option avoided an unilateral military confrontation and more importantly would gain key support from the U.S. Ideally, the Suez Canal could be returned to British control. More likely, an international commission or the United Nations could secure operations of the Canal. In either case, total Egyptian control could be avoided and Nasser’s actions repudiated.

The third option was the military option. The principal advantage was that it would restore the Suez Canal to direct British control, thus safeguarding a vital lifeline. Also, it had the potential for toppling Nasser from power or at the very least it would visibly punish him for his temerity in challenging the British Empire. The disadvantages were numerous. As already mentioned, military operations required time to carry out. In that time period, Nasser could either blockade the canal or do nothing to jeopardize shipping, which in fact is what he did. By not threatening access or operations of the canal, Nasser deliberately attempted to avoid making himself vulnerable to a British military response. Therefore, a threat to the canal would have to be
created, so long as the canal was the publicly stated strategic aim.

Any British military option would have to originate out of theater, which would preclude any immediate response. The British forces in the Mediterranean area were configured for show-of-force and internal security missions. The British navy had only one carrier task force in the sea. The army had 12 infantry battalions conducting counter-insurgency operations on Cyprus. The only other ground forces in theater were the 10th Armoured Division in Libya, which was only one brigade in strength, and the 11th Hussars Regiment based in Jordan. The Royal Air Force had no first line units in the area. There were two bomber squadrons in Libya, but no modern fighter aircraft aside from the Royal Navy's aircraft on the carrier HMS Eagle. The ground and air units based in Libya and Jordan would be prohibited from directly attacking another Arab country. (14) Finally, there was a lack of suitably developed British controlled ports or airbases from which to stage a major operation into Egypt.

In the political arena, British allies were opposed to direct military intervention in Egypt. With the exception of France, Western European governments favored a diplomatic resolution. Only the French, with their war in Algeria, were supportive of the military option. The United States was certain to oppose a military solution with uncertain consequences for Britain.
In summary, Britain's options were to do nothing, conduct diplomatic actions, or initiate military action. The first option would concede some political gain for Nasser, but avoiding military action and securing support amongst its allies. Alternately, a vigorous diplomatic campaign could be waged to discredit Nasser and control of the Canal placed in non-Egyptian hands. Finally, military action to physically restore the Canal to British sovereignty could be conducted. Diplomatically, the last course of action was the most risky and posed the greatest physical threat to the Suez Canal itself. The first two options carried no military penalties for failure and only limited domestic political risks. Most importantly, the non-military options held the greatest promise for U.S. support, an essential in Cold War politics. Finally, an unfavorable outcome for the military option threatened to forfeit much more than just the loss of political face. A military failure would drop Great Britain from the first tier of world powers and potentially create an irreparable diplomatic rift with the United States. Faced with these choices, Eden chose the military option.
Part Four: Planning for Failure

Operation MUSKETEER was a failure. It did not achieve the politically stated goal of securing the Suez Canal. There are multiple reasons for this notable lack of success. Securing the Suez Canal did not achieve Prime Minister Eden's stated goal of safeguarding British shipping through the Canal. Instead, the Egyptians sunk blockships in the Canal, which prevented commercial shipping from using the passage for five months. Secondly, the operation failed because Eden's true goal was to depose Nasser, which was not accomplished. However, Eden never impressed this task on the military, therefore the military operation never addressed this issue as a primary mission. Finally, Operation MUSKETEER failed because it took too long to initiate. Any military option had to be executed quickly to avoid diplomatic efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union designed to prevent a military conflict.

On the evening of the 26th of July, Eden tasked the British Chiefs of Staff to develop a military plan to seize the Suez Canal (See Figure 1). No mention was made of the desirability of removing Nasser from power or destruction of the Egyptian armed forces. As acting chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, First Sea Lord Louis Mountbatten responded to Eden's instructions by stating, 'The Chiefs of Staff of course will do whatever you wish.'(15)
FIGURE 1

The Suez Campaign – Distance and Sailing Times

Preliminary analysis by the Joint Planning Staff revealed only two options for conducting amphibious landings (See Figure 2). The first choice was Alexandria. It was the major port for Egypt and the country's second largest city, with ample dock facilities for off-loading follow-on forces and had unrestricted access to the interior. The drawbacks were that it was a major urban area, requiring significant forces just to secure the city, and it was 150 miles from the Suez Canal. Also, between Alexandria and the canal zone was the heavily populated Nile River Delta region. The Delta was sure to become a hotbed of guerrilla resistance if a lengthy military presence was required.

The alternative was Port Said (See Figure 3). In its favor was its smaller size and its location at the northern end of the Suez Canal. However, it had only one-third the port capacity of Alexandria and was located on an island which could be easily isolated by destroying three bridges. Movement south along the canal was limited to one 27-mile long causeway.

In the end, the Joint Planning Staff settled on Alexandria because of its superior port facilities (See Figure 4). Although not part of the military planning considerations, the Alexandria site also provided the best opportunity to bring the Egyptian Army to decisive battle. Any route from Alexandria to the Suez Canal would approach Cairo from the north. This would force the Egyptian armed forces to fight or capitulate. This in turn offered the
FIGURE 2
The Exits from Port Said

FIGURE 3
(From Sellers, p. 35)
prospect of deposing Nasser.

The force package needed to secure Alexandria and maintain the Suez Canal was calculated to be three divisions. One division was to come from United Kingdom Middle East Land Forces, the remainder from strategic reserves in Britain. Time would be needed to call up reserves for the divisions deploying from Britain and to assemble the necessary shipping. (16)

The enemy was well known, the British just having completed their withdrawal from Egypt on the 18th of June, 1953. The planners primary concern was the upgrading and enlargement of the Egyptian Air Force with first line Soviet equipment. Properly used, the enemy could strike at the staging areas for the invasion force or attack the ground forces on the beachhead. The Egyptian Air Force was impressive in numbers, 520 aircraft of all types, but its operational readiness was considerably less than what the numbers suggested.

Of least concern was the Egyptian Navy. Two of the navy's four destroyers were in England for overall, and remained there for the duration of the crisis. British naval and air forces were considered sufficient to quickly neutralize the Egyptian Navy. (17)

The most formidable opponent to the invasion plan was the Egyptian Army. The regular forces numbered 100,000. This force was organized into 18 brigades: 10 infantry brigades, 3 armored brigades, 1 medium machinegun brigade.
1 coastal defense brigade, and 3 anti-aircraft brigades. (18)
At the time of the invasion, 4 infantry divisions, and 1
armored division were in existence.

The Egyptian Army was initially deployed to defend its
borders with Israel. As the crisis persisted, alterations to
troop deployments were made. Eastern Command, defending the
Sinai, deployed 2 infantry divisions and two separate
battalion task forces. A second command, the Suez Canal
Zone, was organized and allocated 2 infantry divisions, an
armored brigade, and one independent infantry brigade. (19)
The remainder of the army was deployed to defend the
Mediterranean coastline, with the sole armored division of
two brigades in strategic reserve north of Cairo.

The joint planning staff assessed that the strength of
the Egyptian Army was in its armored brigades. Officer and
non-commissioned officer leadership was considered weak and
incapable of conducting mobile operations. The key for
military victory for the allies was to destroy the Egyptian
Air Force, quickly establish a lodgement area, buildup
forces, and then move south to force a mobile battle on the
Egyptians, where superior Western tactics and leadership
would prevail over the enemy's armor. The Suez Canal could
then be seized and secured.

The staff's conclusions were presented in a cabinet
meeting on 27 July. Both the political and military leaders
wanted to strike while domestic and international political
support was favorable. While the military chiefs recognized
the need for swift action, they wished to avoid a military disaster. The unanimous opinion by the Chiefs of the Staff was that it would take a minimum of 6 to 8 weeks to muster the necessary military strength to carry out the mission. Political pressure to conduct immediate military action was only defeated by a combined threat by the chiefs, Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templar, Fleet Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, and Air Marshall Sir Dermot Boyle to resign if pressed on the point. They pointed out that no amphibious shipping was available and the airborne forces in Cyprus lacked parachutes, had not conducted recent jump training, and had no air transports readily available to conduct a forced entry mission. After these revelations, the cabinet accepted the staff's recommendation. However as time went on, the political leadership lost sight of need for haste.

The military situation was significantly altered the following day when the French government committed itself to supporting any military operations conducted by the British. This was not necessarily an advantage for the British military planners. The British had sufficient forces, after mobilization, to conduct the operation unilaterally. They did not need the added complication of dealing with an ally with which the British had no formal military relations since World War II, outside of NATO. Also, it greatly expanded the command and control coordination problems which will be addressed in more detail later.
The French needed an ally for military operations against Nasser. France lacked the military capability to take on Egypt. With nearly 400,000 troops committed to Algeria, the French Army had reached its limits of deployable strength. It was for that reason and because Egypt had traditionally been in the British sphere of influence(21) that the French political leaders had decided to accept British leadership in the military operations.

Despite French political enthusiasm, allied cooperation got off to a shaky start. The French military commanders were not enthralled to be placed entirely under British command.(22) On 31 July, a French military delegation was flown to London to begin preliminary discussions with their British military counterparts. The first full planning meeting did not take place until 10 August in London.

The meeting was held in the wartime planning complex in the basement of the British Air Ministry. The British were represented by Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Stockwell, Land Force Commander, Vice Admiral D. Robin Durnford-Slater, Naval Task Force Commander, and Air Marshall Denis Barnett, Air Task Force Commander (See Figure 5). The French planning committee was chaired by General Andre Beaufre, Deputy Land Force Commander, Rear Admiral P. Lancelot, Deputy Naval Task Force Commander, and Brigadier General R. Brohon, Deputy Air Force Commander. Notably absent from the meeting were General Sir Charles Keightley, Allied Commander-in-Chief and Vice Admiral Pierre Barjot, Deputy Allied Commander-in-
Chain of Command for an Operation against Egypt in 1956

Chief.(23)

One aspect of the chosen command structure that was to plague coordination was the wide dispersal of the various component commanders. No forward combined headquarters was deployed into the theater of operations until after the initial plan was completed. A forward command post would have been more conducive for coordination and personal consultation. Also, many of the major commanders retained operational commands which required much supervision in the preparation of the actual invasion.(24) The nominal combined commander-in-chief (CINC) was General Charles Keightley whose normal duties were as CINC United Kingdom Middle East Land Forces, headquartered in Episkopi, Cyprus. During the first planning sessions he seems to have deferred principal responsibility to General Stockwell in London. The deputy CINC for the combined force, Admiral Barjot, and Rear Admiral Lancelot were headquartered at the French naval base at Toulon. Barjot generally stayed in France and only commented once on the operational plan. He did not supervise French planning with the British and he left the bulk of French military coordination to General Beaufre. General Beaufre was more junior in rank and had to commute from his operational headquarters in Algeria. This tended to dilute his impact on the planning until all the commanders assembled in Cyprus, just before the invasion. The combined naval component commander, British Admiral Sir Guy Grantham remained at his headquarters at Valetta, Malta.
Although it was very early in the planning process, differences in the two ally's mission analysis were becoming apparent. At the first meeting, Stockwell presented Operation HAMILCAR to the combined staff. Beaufre was displeased to discover that the British had been conducting unilateral planning for nearly two weeks. He was also disappointed that the British plan was only a concept plan. The good news, from Beaufre's standpoint, was that the British concept plan had been rejected by Eden, hence clearing the plate for a fresh start. (25) The meeting adjourned after presentation of the plan to allow the French delegation to do their own assessment.

In general, the British high command was not in favor of any major military operation that had the potential for high risk. (26) Stockwell promulgated the following planning principles for the combined staff:

1. We could neither afford to lose nor risk a setback.
2. The destruction of the Egyptian Air Force was a prerequisite for the protection of sea convoys and the landings.
3. There must be a quick link-up between the seaborne and airborne forces.
4. The follow-up forces must disembark rapidly to destroy the Egyptian Army.
5. We must be ready by 15 September (it was then 3 Aug)
6. We would not enter Cairo.

Stockwell recognized that time was not on their side, but the lack of available resources required the lengthy process of activating reserves to correct the shortfalls. Beyond the question of resources, the British military questioned the basic strategic mission of seizing and
defending the Suez Canal. Any attack on the canal was sure
to result in Egyptian blockage of the canal with sunken
ships. This could take weeks to clear for commercial use and
create the condition the British government wished to avoid.
In the meantime, the British/French force would be in a
hostile country, subject to conventional and guerrilla
attack. (27) Also, how long would the force have to remain in
place? The British military seemed to be hedging their bets
and hoping a diplomatic solution would solve the crisis.

The most insightful of the French commanders, General
Beaufre, realized that quick military action was necessary to
avoid diplomatic resistance. He also recognized that only
Nasser's removal would assist France's strategic goals in
Algeria and the Middle East. However, the rest of the French
high command seemed to concentrate more on tactical matters
and Beaufre's concerns fell on deaf ears. (28)

Despite prolonged and somewhat tentative planning,
the British and French staffs reached preliminary agreement
on Operation MUSKETEER (See Figure 6) at the second combined
staff meeting on 14 August. In outline the operation
consisted of four phases:

Phase I: Air Battle to destroy Egyptian AF (3 days)
Phase II: Amphibious/Airborne Assault (1 day)
Phase III: Main Landing & Buildup (6-7 days)
Phase IV: Advance on Cairo

The plan addressed several major problems. Due to
political constraints, attacking Egypt from neighboring Arab
FIGURE 6

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Eastern Mediterranean – MUSKETEER Outline Plans
countries was prohibited. The majority of forces must therefore come from the sea. The difficulty was that both British and French amphibious capability had steadily eroded since 1945, creating a severe shortage. (29) To add to the shipping woes, the nearest friendly ports to the proposed invasion site were in Cyprus, 250 miles north of Egypt. Unfortunately the ports in Cyprus were underdeveloped and totally inadequate to meet the total invasion support requirements. That left Malta, which was 950 miles away. While having excellent harbor facilities, Malta was limited in staging areas to accommodate combat units and had no tactical training areas. In the end, a combination of sites in Cyprus, Malta, Algeria, and Britain were used to stage the sea lift.

In naval combat capability, the British and French navies provided ample support. Eventually the combined naval task force had five aircraft carriers, two helicopter carriers, one battleship, three cruisers, and ten destroyers. (30)

The air situation presented some difficulties. The short range of contemporary jet aircraft meant that Allied land based fighters in Cyprus could not reach Egypt. The French would later secretly base three fighter squadrons in Israel but the bulk of air defense and close air support would have to be supplied by naval air. Fortunately, the allies were able to muster three British and two French aircraft carriers with a total of 88 jet fighters and 52
propellar driven ground attack aircraft. (31) For the bombing campaign, the British had a formidable force of 108 jet bombers split between bases in Cyprus and Malta. (32) The remaining concern was providing sufficient airlift for the airborne forces. The British and French each held sufficient transports to drop one battalion each. Airborne operations would have to be conducted in waves.

The French provided the bulk of the allied airborne forces. The 10th French Parachute Division, based in Algeria, provided the largest airborne punch. The British contributed the 16th Parachute Brigade. At first glance, these two formations appeared very formidable. In actuality, neither was ready for major airborne operations. Both units had been committed to anti-guerrilla operations and had not conducted large scale air drops in months. Many of the authorized heavy weapons and air transportable vehicles did not exist. One battalion of the 16th Parachute Brigade was in reserve status in Britain and had to be called up. (33)

The situation with ground forces was equally bleak. The French 7th Armored Division had also been dispersed for fighting Algerian guerillas. Tank crews had been converted to infantry and had to be retrained in mobile operations. Key pieces of equipment, such as gun sights for the AMX-13 tanks, were missing due to supply mishaps and were hastily requisitioned. (34)

The British Army's situation was even more depressing.
The two tank regiments designated for MUSKETEER were dispersed to support reservist training. Neither units were fully equipped or manned. British higher level formation headquarters were in equal disarray. An armored brigade headquarters had to be created from scratch. The 3rd Infantry Division, in strategic reserve, was only at cadre strength. Also, the overlapping jurisdictions of British territorial and operational headquarters created confusion with mobilizing units who often received contradictory orders from several agencies. (35)

The state of both the British and French armed forces was a product of limited post-World War II budgets and the attempt to retain their traditional colonial empires. Both countries used conscription to provide large numbers of soldiers, particularly for the armies. However, insufficient funds were available to also maintain equipment and organizations suitable for contingency operations. Amphibious vessels and air transports were either in short supply or laid up in mothballs. Everything was geared for internal, counterinsurgency type missions. Strategic missions were tasked to reserve forces which were not suitably equipped or rapidly deployable. Both countries were now paying the price for their military policies.

Working through these and other difficulties, the allies managed to assemble an impressive force (36):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Forces</th>
<th>French Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45,000 men</td>
<td>34,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000 vehicles</td>
<td>9,000 vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 aircraft</td>
<td>200 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 warships</td>
<td>30 warships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 15 August, Prime Minister Eden gave his approval to MUSKETEER and the various commanders returned to their respective commands to begin necessary preparations. Once again Eden made no comment concerning Nasser's retention of power. Stockwell remained in London to supervise preparations. Beaufre returned to Paris and briefed General Ely, the French Chief of Staff, and Admiral Barjot. Barjot continued his lack of involvement with either Stockwell or Keightley to ensure the British plan met French strategic requirements. That responsibility continued to rest on Beaufre's shoulders. After receiving approval from the French military high command, Beaufre returned to London to finish the details on the operations plan. By August 18th the plan was completed with the target date for the amphibious landing fixed as 15 September. (37)

At this point, both governments expected early military action and Alexandria was still the invasion site. The United States had been intentionally uninformed of the military preparations being conducted. Both Eden and Mollett continued to maintain the facade of seeking a purely diplomatic resolution to the crisis.

The combined staff reconvened on 25 August in London. Admiral Barjot surprised all parties by suggesting switching to Port Said as the invasion site. This is the only incident
in which Barjot actively sought to influence MUSKETEER and it did nothing to address French national interests. Beaufre had been briefed to the proposed change only the night before. Beaufre was annoyed that Barjot's last minute contribution was based solely on tactical considerations and did not address any strategic issues. Keightley and Stockwell were taken aback by Barjot's proposal, coming only 12 days from the scheduled landing date. After some debate, the British promised to study the Port Said recommendation as an option, should one become necessary. Alexandria was confirmed as the landing site, with the landing date slipped two days. The detailed time table was (38):

31 Aug - British reservists called up.
2 Sep - British government decision to launch MUSKETEER.
3 Sep - British convoys leave England.
5 Sep - Naval forces concentrate off Malta.
8 Sep - 10th French Aiborne Division deploys to Cyprus.
10 Sep - Final decision date for D-Day.
10 Sep - Air superiority campaign begins.
11 Sep - French convoys leave Algeria.
15 Sep - Amphibious landing at Alexandria.

Due to transit schedules and tidal conditions, the latest date the MUSKETEER landing could be delayed to was October 6th.

As preparations continued, the British units earmarked for MUSKETEER were failing to meet the invasion timetable agreed to at the 25 August conference. On September 2nd, the operation was pushed back 8 days, with the landing changed to September 25th. (39)

To further complicate matters, a debate raged in the
top levels of the British high command. Mountbatten had continued to press for abandonment of military action. As the details for MUSKETEER became clear, he expressed great concern over the choice of Alexandria as the invasion site. Mountbatten stressed the probability for high civilian casualties and serious resistance by the Egyptians. His arguments swayed the opinions of several key Cabinet ministers. On the 7th of September, in two separate meetings, Mountbatten convinced Eden to at least modify MUSKETEER and move the invasion site to the less populated Port Said. (40) Also, the date for the landing was delayed until 1 October.

The strategic implication of changing the invasion site seemed to escape the British leadership. By focusing on Port Said, there would be little opportunity to force a decisive engagement on the Egyptian Army. The British General Staff was blind to the significance of the change as Eden’s intent to remove Nasser had not been communicated in any official directives. The campaign was about to be lost before it had even begun.

News of the momentous change of invasion sites was slowly disseminated. Beaufre did not receive word of the change until 10 September, in Paris. He was so infuriated at the last minute change of plan that he considered resigning (41) He fully realized that Port Said was a strategic deadend. Flying on to London, Beaufre conferred with Stockwell on the modifications to MUSKETEER, now rechristened
MUSKETEER REVISE (See Figure 7).

The other major change contained in MUSKETEER REVISE Plan A (See Figure 8), was the introduction of an "aero-psychological" phase after air superiority had been established. This was an aerial bombardment, recommended by the Chief of the British Air Staff, designed to destroy Egyptian morale to such an extent that resistance would collapse and the country would be paralyzed. The total amount of time allocated for this phase was 8-10 days. (42) The amphibious landing would wait for the effects of the bombardment. Beaufre's reaction was, "Indubitably we were now in cloud cuckoo-land." (43)

Beaufre convinced the combined staff that an alternate plan should be developed if the Egyptians should suddenly collapse. His real purpose was to speed up the tempo of the operation, as he had total contempt for the "aero-psychological" phase and feared any further delays to the landing. The combined staff agreed and developed MUSKETEER REVISE Plan B (See Figure 9). (44) The key difference was the prepositioning of the 10th French Airborne Division in Cyprus with the British 16th Parachute Brigade instead of waiting in Algeria to be called forward. This would permit the immediate use of all allied airborne forces from Cyprus should circumstances allow.

The impact of MUSKETEER REVISE on the ability to quickly build up forces at Port Said concerned the commanders. With only one-third the port capacity of Alexandria, Port Said
FIGURE 7

(From Sellers, p. 30)
The Suez Campaign – MUSKETEER Revise Plan A
FIGURE 9

(From Sellers, p. 34)
would double the time needed to place the bulk of the amphibious force ashore with the use of all possible expedients. Therefore, the initial drive south along the banks of the Suez would have to be accomplished with only two battalions of tanks. While not happy with the logistic constraints, the ground commanders remained confident of tactical success. (45)

Immediately on the heels of MUSKETEER REVISE came further delays. Various diplomatic maneuvers by the United Nations and U.S. were creating more postponements. In order to maintain harmony with the U.S. and the fiction that the Canal was the issue, the British and French governments continued to go through the appearances of seeking a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Throughout the month of August, the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA) held sessions in London to ostensibly hammer out a new canal convention. Talks dragged on until 7 September, when Australian Prime Minister Menzies took the SCUA proposal to Cairo and failed to reach agreement with Nasser. (46)

The British and French governments immediately switched diplomatic channels to the United Nations. Their intent was to exhaust all diplomatic means as quickly as possible to allow the 'legitimate' use of military force. (47) Going to the UN entailed still further delays for the invasion. Consequently, on 19 September, the landing date was moved back to 8 October. (48) Then, the operation was postponed indefinitely on 1 October, as the UN Security Council was not
scheduled to begin debate until 5 October. Eden refused to launch the military invasion without exhausting the diplomatic channels to avoid the appearance of precipitating a war with Egypt. However, it was a war with Egypt that Eden wanted.

Confidence in British resolve at the highest levels was questioned by the French. Seeking out an alternative to acting with its seemingly reluctant ally, France began to feel out Israel's position in early August. As diplomacy dragged on, the French continued talks with the Israeli government in September. (49) Eden was first informed of the talks in mid-October and responded favorably to possible Israeli involvement.

The whole issue of Israeli participation came to a head on October 22, at Sevres, near Paris. In total secrecy, delegations from Britain, France, and Israel discussed joint action against Egypt. A specific agreement was reached. The concept of Israel first attacking Egypt, then the British and French governments demanding a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities was tacitly agreed to. This would pose Israel as the aggressor, but allow the British and French to carry out their invasion of Egypt under the guise of reestablishing peace and safeguarding the Suez Canal. (50)

The French provided additional guarantees to Israel in the form of military assistance. Three squadrons of French fighter aircraft were moved to bases in Israel. (51) Also, French warships would provide protection against Egyptian
naval intervention and shore bombardment support for Israeli forces in the Gaza area.

The failure of the British government to keep its military commanders abreast of diplomatic developments directly impacted on the MUSKETEER REVISE time schedule. The combined staff was not notified of the inclusion of the Israelis. The lack of a truly unified planning effort exacerbated the problem. Beaufre was informed of the initial secret talks by Admiral Barjot on 10 October, with further instructions on 12 October. Members of Beaufre's staff attended meetings with the Israeli delegation in mid-October. Beaufre was disturbed that the Israeli military goals did not support French objectives. Specifically, the Israelis only intended to destroy Egyptian forces in the Sinai and guerrilla bases along the border and in the Gaza Strip. They did not intend to advance as far as the Suez Canal nor depose Nasser.

The British military commanders remained completely in the dark about the negotiations with Israel by either their own government or the French. In fact, speculation ran toward British intervention against Israel should it attack Jordan. Assuming that there would be no political decision in the short term, Stockwell and his staff proceeded without haste. In fact, Stockwell and his staff had just about written off MUSKETEER due to the constant delays.

Stockwell finished the final operation order on 24 October. The following day, Eden briefed his Cabinet on the
Sevres agreement and got approval to initiate MUSKETEER REVISE (Plan B) if Israel and Egypt refused to accept a ceasefire should hostilities develop. Oddly enough, no one informed Stockwell or Keightley of this decision. (54)

Stockwell began to get wind of Israeli involvement after meeting with Beaufre on 26 October in Malta. Beaufre pressed Stockwell to shorten the movement times for the convoys to less than the 10 days, 4 days loading and 6 days enroute, allowed for in Plan B. Stockwell promised to do what he could to chop 2 or 3 days from the schedule to hasten everything along. (55)

Although not entirely sure of the reason behind Beaufre's sense of urgency, Stockwell took precautionary measures to move up the British timetable. Using an amphibious training exercise as a cover, Stockwell and British Admiral Grantham moved the British ground forces to sea for swift movement to Egypt, should the political green light be given. (56)

On 29 October, the Israelis began Operation KADESH. Success for their operation was predicated on surprise, swiftness of execution and piecemeal destruction of the dispersed Egyptian forces in the Sinai.

Reports of the Israeli attack began to flow into the combined headquarters on Cyprus. The allied staffs met at 1700 hours on 30 October to determine a course of action. After 6 weeks of planning there were still many loose ends to MUSKETEER REVISE. During further conferences on the 31
October and 1 November, much debate centered on date of the landings. The French pressed for early action, landing no later than 6 November. They further recommended that the airborne drops occur on 3 or 4 November. After more discussion, 6 November was agreed to for the landings, but the airborne operations were to go in no earlier than 5 November. (57)

Since MUSKETEER REVISE Plan A had been dropped, a new contingency plan for early Egyptian collapse had to be cobbled together. Plan OMLETTE, later SIMPLEX, called for three simultaneous air assaults on key facilities in Port Said (see Figure 10). The British 16th Para Brigade would make a battalion sized drop of Gamil Airfield to the west of Port Said. French parachutists, also in battalion strength, would make two landings. One drop would be to south of the city and capture the two key bridges over the Junction Canal. The other drop would be on the east side of the Canal to secure to town of Port Fuad. Further operations envisioned an additional airdrop on D+1 at El Qantara, and Ismailia on D+3. (58) By 2 November the combined staff was in a total uproar.

No political guidance was forthcoming from London. Paris kept badgering Barjot to get MUSKETEER started. Stockwell refused Beaufre's plea to order OMLETTE unless he could be assured there would be no Egyptian resistance. Intelligence reports indicated that enemy forces were moving into the invasion area. (59) These were actually forces
OMELETTE
Proposed 31 Oct.
Agreed 2 Nov.

AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
FROM MALTA AND ALGIERS
4 DAYS

FROM CYPRUS
BY SEA-2 DAYS

| 18 (-) |
| 1 REP  |

The Canal Zone – OMELETTE Plan
FIGURE 10
(From Sellers, p. 39)
retreating from the advancing Israelis. British reconnaissance aircraft continued to track the success of the Israeli offensive. The Egyptian forces in the Sinai appeared to be in total collapse. The British government had still not given Stockwell the authority to launch MUSKETEER REVISE. When Stockwell refused to move up the timetable from 6 November, Barjot instructed Beaufre to draft a plan that could be implemented with the immediately available forces. (60)

Beaufre took the OMLETTE plan and grafted on the amphibious landing with the reduced forces readily available. The three airborne drops would occur on 5 November, the landings on the 6th.

On morning of 3 November Barjot, Beaufre, Stockwell, and Keightley met to go over Beaufre’s proposed plan. The plan was christened TELESCOPE (see Figure 11). The British accepted the plan, but still refused to implement it. Eden was still querying Keightley on how much longer the attack could be delayed. After Keightley stressed that any further postponement would have a serious impact on the invasion, Eden relented and authorized the invasion on 11:00 P.M. London time. (61) But it was too late. Time had run out for MUSKETEER.

When British/French military action finally began it unveiled the diplomatic duplicity of both governments and damned them to the world. In retrospect, there had been a window of opportunity for military action. Until the end of
The Canal Zone – TELESCOPE Plan

FIGURE 11
(From Sellers, p. 42)
September, there was sufficient ambiguity in the international diplomatic arena and enough domestic support in both Britain and France to favor Operation MUSKETEER. The longer both governments played in the various diplomatic forums, this support eroded for two reasons. First, the expectation was created that the diplomatic efforts reflected a serious attempt at a peaceful solution to the Suez Crisis and military action had been ruled out. Secondly, as long as shipping through the Canal was unimpeded, there was no clear reason to employ military forces.
Part Five: Analyzing the Failure

As Cohen and Gooch offer in their analytical model we now come to the analysis of the layers of command and control and outlining the pathways to failure (62). In researching Operation MUSKETEER, three levels of command stand out, with the first level consisting of two parts (see Figure 12). The three command levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. At the highest level is the British and French national command authorities. Specifically, we are talking about Prime Minister Eden, Premier Molett, their Cabinets, and military Chiefs of Staff. Collectively, they established the strategic and operational mission for the combined forces and allocated the resources.

There is much to criticize on the political selection of the military option. Here the blame must rest squarely on Eden’s shoulders. He failed to comprehend Britain’s evolving decline as a major world power, consequently the military option held the greatest strategic risk. Furthermore he chose a British military machine that was not prepared for the type of operation it was being called on to perform. British forces were resourced to hold on to an empire, not restore one.

Having selected the riskiest option, Eden compounded his error. Rather than recognizing that only Nasser’s downfall would satisfy his political aim, he indulged in political sleight-of-hand with the United States to mask his true
MATRIX OF FAILURE

Critical Task Command Level

1. High Command

1.1 Marginal Failure: Forces in poor state of readiness, lack of sea and air lift assets

1.2 Critical Failure: Used principals of colonial intervention

1.3 Critical Failure: Political strategic intent not communicated to military planners

1.4 Critical Failure: Did not secure international or domestic support. Did not launch military opn at earliest possible date

2. Operational Command

2.1 Marginal Failure: Troops not trained for conventional opns, lacked equipment and suitable bases

2.2 Marginal Failure: No formal combined doctrine existed outside of NATO, adapted WWII Experience

2.3 Marginal Failure: Planning process hampered by geographic separation

2.4 Critical Failure: Did not insure opni plan met political goal. Secret French negotiations created confusion between Br. and Fr. commanders

3. Tactical Command

3.1 Adequate once equipment provided

3.2 Adequate within scope of plan

3.3 Adequate within national chains-of-command

3.4 Critical Failure: Tactical success does not secure political goal, international diplomatic pressure halts operation

Arrows indicate primary pathways to failure.

FIGURE 12
intent. Eden's identification of the Suez Canal as the goal and subsequent failure to add his intent to overthrow Nasser lies at the heart of the problem. By never communicating the need to depose Nasser, Eden left the British Chiefs of Staff Committee in the dark. By lying to the United States, he invited a strong backlash when the truth was revealed.

The French political leadership is to be criticized on two points. First it assumed the British intended swift military action before having any clear knowledge of the operational plan. Secondly, by agreeing to the subordination of all French forces, it tied itself to the British military aim and pace of operations. In its haste to secure an ally in deposing Nasser, the French did not bother to first find out if that was the British intent. Finally, France already had a significant overseas military commitment in Algeria. Like its ally, France could hold on to its possessions, but lacked the military power to unilaterally confront new enemies. This was their folly.

Rather late in the crisis, the French searched for an alternative and fell on the Israeli option. However, they neglected to inform their British ally until it was clear some jolt was needed to prod Eden into action. Failing to earlier confide in the British created curious actions at the operational level. When French subordinate military commanders knew about Israeli participation, but their British seniors did not, the command climate cannot be characterized as either efficient or effective.
The second part of the first level of leadership was the British military high command. Here there was clear recognition of the national unpreparedness to conduct the required military operations. However, a lack of consensus on the Chiefs of Staff Committee combined with Lord Mountbatten's opposition to the military option, contributed to fragmented advice to Eden and an absence of urgency in prosecuting the military option. When Mountbatten did finally make a point, switching from Alexandria to Port Said for the landings, he neutralized whatever potential for success MUSKETEER may have had.

The French high command was crippled by the politically agreed to subordination to the British. Admiral Barjot's sole contribution to MUSKETEER seems to have been providing support for the Port Said invasion site. As the senior French military commander, he mired himself in tactical details and failed to grasp the strategic implications of the constantly evolving operations plans.

At the operational level, on the combined staff, the participants suffered from the vagueness of the political leadership and the separate ends each government was pursuing. Keightley and Stockwell diligently pursued the Suez operation, unaware of Eden's true aim, but well aware of the risks. Beaufre had the clearest sense of the strategic goal of MUSKETEER. However, he suffered by being subordinate to an unresponsive Barjot and uninformed British commanders. He recognized the need for speed and the removal of Nasser.
but was unsuccessful in convincing his superiors. Beaufre was reduced to producing contingency plans in the hope the situation would allow early military action.

At the tactical level, great success was realized. But success at this level could not save MUSKETEER from its fundamental flaws. Even had the Suez Canal been secured, the bulk of the Egyptian Army would have been intact and Nasser would still have been in power.

In the end it was time which killed MUSKETEER. Any military option had to be executed swiftly to avoid international repercussions. Through military unpreparedness and political intrigues, time worked against the invasion force. As Clausewitz observed,

Like everything else in life, a military operation takes time. . . . Both belligerents need time: the question is only which of the two can expect to derive special advantages from it in light of his own situation. If the position on each side is carefully considered, the answer will be obvious: it is the weaker side . . . Time, then is less likely to bring favor to the victor than to the vanquished.(63)
Part Six: Implications for the United States

In the closing decade of the twentieth century, there are ample lessons to be learned from an operation little known or studied in U.S. military circles. The circumstances that surrounded the British and French involvement in the Middle East in 1956 seem to provide parallels with our own experience in Operation DESERT STORM in 1991.

The advantage the U.S. enjoyed was that it had had two recent rehearsals to build on, Operations URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE. The lessons from these military excursions greatly contributed to success in Kuwait.

The French and British were not so fortunate. Their experiences in the post-World War II era had not prepared them for dealing with the United States as a potential enemy. They had assumed the U.S. would remain neutral at worst. Both nations also assumed they could treat former colonies without risking international sanctions. The philosophy of empire still permeated the halls of government in London and Paris.

The lessons for the U.S. begin at the national command level. Clausewitz recognized the impact of political guidance on military actions.

Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse. (64)
Identification of clear military missions which support political goals is crucial. The assigned military missions must be clearly capable of providing the politically desired result. In its final form, Operation MUSKETEER could not achieve the politically desired objective.

If an alliance is established, communications between the allied leadership must be candid and in total agreement concerning the military goals. A lack of consensus at the political level can ultimately undo any positive results of military action.

When the combined chain-of-command is established national sensibilities and desired unilateral flexibility must be balanced. Multi-national command structures are politically attractive in peacetime. In a crisis, should there be a divergence of interests amongst the allies, the command structure could choke any unilateral action.

Finally, there must be a realization that the limits of military action in a crisis are predetermined by political and fiscal policies. Both Britain and France had stretched their available military resources in the maintenance of empires and had ignored readiness in their strategic reserves. Low intensity conflicts (LIC) has consumed the bulk of their energies. When faced with the Suez crisis, both found the military cupboards bare. The British had placed the strategic reaction mission in the reserves which were found to be ill-prepared to mount a time sensitive operation. The French had to pry regular forces out of
counterinsurgency operations and hastily retrain them for the Suez operation.

As the U.S. conducts the build-down of forces in the 1990's the same problems confront us. There is an ultimate limit to what can be done with the regular armed forces. Place too much in LIC force structure and the heavy forces may be inadequate for the next crisis. Neglecting LIC requirements allows the little wars to erode our diplomatic efforts for regional stability.

Ultimately each nation must decide whether it is willing to pay the price to maintain itself as a world power. In 1956 Great Britain and France found the stakes too high and they had to retreat. In the 1990's, will the U.S. be willing to pay the price up front or wait until it meets its Suez Crisis?
Endnotes

4. Ibid. p. 27.
6. Ibid. p. 27.
7. Ibid. p. 46.

18. Ibid, p. 24
20. Love, p. 370
22. Beaufre, p. 27.
29. Total Allied amphibious lift available in August 1956, consisted of 2 LSTs, 2 LCTs, and 16 LCAs all British and based in Malta. The French had disbanded their amphibious units and mothballed the vessels. Beaufre p. 40 and Barker p. 26.
32. Ibid. p. 218.
34. Ibid, p. 41.
35. Barker p. 46.
36. Ibid, p. 36.
38. Sellers, p. 32.
42. Beaufre, p. 56.
43. Ibid, p. 57.
44. Ibid, p. 56.
See also Neff, pp. 320-321.
46. Neff, p. 305.
47. Sellers, p. 37. See also, Love, p. 458.
50. Ibid, pp. 340-346. Three copies of the Sevres agreement were produced, one to each party. The papers were never to become part of official archives. Eden apparently destroyed his copy, while French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion retained their copies in their private papers. None of the copies have been made public. See also Love, pp. 464-465.
52. Beaufre, p. 71.
55. Love, p. 471.
57. Beaufre, p. 88.
58. Sellers, p. 41.
59. Beaufre, p. 89.
60. Ibid, p. 90.
62. Cohen and Gooch, pp. 52-54.
64. Ibid, p. 608.
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