VOICES CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS: A COMPARISON OF PRO-BOERS
AND ANTI-IMPERIALISTS, 1899-1902

By

Steven C. Call

A THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College in the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
For the Degree of Masters of Arts

Major: History

Under the Supervision of Professor Pete Maslowski

Lincoln, Nebraska

May, 1991

91-07265  91807142
**Title and Subtitle**

*Voices Crying in the Wilderness: A Comparison of Pro-Boers and Anti-Imperialists, 1899-1902*

**Author(s)**

Steven C. Call, Captain

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)**

AFIT Student Attending: University of Nebraska

AFIT/CI/CIA-91-051

**Sponsoring Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)**

AFIT/CI

Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-6583

**Supplementary Notes**

1. **DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

   Approved for Public Release IAW 190-1
   Distributed Unlimited
   ERNEST A. HAYGOOD, 1st Lt, USAF
   Executive Officer

**Subject Terms**

143

**Security Classification of Report**

18

**Security Classification of This Page**

19

**Security Classification of Abstract**

10

**Number of Pages**

143

**Price Code**
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to:

Mr. and Mrs. Gerald and Marlene Call, my uncle and aunt;

and

Rev. and Mrs. Charles and Pamela McHose, my friends.

Many have helped through the years, but their help might have been expected. No one could have expected the help you four gave so freely and so abundantly. I know that without your care, guidance, and practical assistance I could not have accomplished what I have in my life. Thank you for everything.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROTEST GROUPS</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Groups</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: INSTITUTIONS AND SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segments of Society</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Working Classes</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND MEDIA</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamphlets</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journals</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treason</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Speech</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nature of Citizenship</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism and Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atrocities</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE: IMPACT AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

No scholar works in a vacuum, and the joys of writing include acknowledging assistance rendered along the path of learning. One of the largest groups to which I am indebted is my present and former professors: an inspiring professor is a joy forever. I also thank my fellow graduate students in the History Department: in and out of the classroom you all helped as skeptical, but supportive, sounding boards of my ideas and observations. Thanks also go to the faculty of the United States Air Force Academy History Department for their faith and support.

More specifically, I wish to thank several individuals who have rendered invaluable service. Gretchen Holten, research librarian at Love Library, helped me through the maze of research aids, thereby unleashing an avalanche of valuable information. Two other research librarians, one at the Library of Congress, the other at the British Library, must unfortunately remain anonymous. Their help in directing me to the Pamphlets in American History and the John Burns Collection of British pamphlets will hopefully be rewarded by someone. Had I known how valuable the two collections would be, I would have gotten their names and thanked them properly. The cheerful assistance of Louise Gibbons and Fran Munden at the Trades Union Congress library was not only invaluable, it was pleasant change to the usual
British reticence. I especially want to thank Dr. Pete Maslowski, my advisor, and Dr. Edward L. Homze. Dr. Maslowski's help and guidance went above and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Homze provided many hours of pleasant and stimulating discussion of matters historic and trivial. Finally, I must thank my family. My parents, in-laws, and everyone else, remained my most ardent supporters. Most of all, there was my wife and children. They worked as hard on this project as I did. Their love, patience, and understanding were the crucial elements that sustained me throughout the last year and a half.

In closing, I must point out that the views expressed here are mine alone, and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Air Force.
INTRODUCTION

The Industrial Revolution brought many fundamental changes to Western social and economic patterns during the 19th century, particularly as technological advances strengthened each nation's infrastructure. Such innovations as steam power and telegraphy united societies, while the need for a better educated work force, and cheaply printed books, manuals, and forms raised literacy and generated large bureaucracies to run societies. More ominously, advances in weaponry and logistics allowed larger and more powerful armies that increased the repressive force upon which governments could call. Highly ordered societies and greater military power accelerated the consolidation of national authority in the central government.

Garnering and wielding greater power, though, did not go unchallenged. Political and economic theorists questioned the existing relationship between political power, societies, and their economies. Religious leaders and philosophers questioned not only motives, but consistency in policies and their application. Moralists and humanitarians urged ethical behavior in national and international dealings.

In the midst of social change and challenge two governments pursued policies that embroiled their nations in war. England, expanding and consolidating its imperial hold
on the southern portion of Africa, went to war in 1899 with the two Boer republics: the Transvaal, also known as the South African Republic, and the Orange Free State. America, establishing its own empire in the newly acquired Philippine Islands, also went to war in 1899 against Filipinos seeking independence.¹

A superficial analysis shows several similarities, yet also numerous differences. The wars were contemporary, they were imperial in objective, and both pitted large industrialized powers against small agrarian societies. America, though, fought an unexpected insurrection against an emerging non-Western culture, while England culminated a long effort to subjugate two quasi-independent republics of European origin. Furthermore, the fortunes of war took similar turns that ultimately plagued the consciences of both nations. After an initial conventional phase, in which America and England defeated their enemies' field forces, the Boers and the Filipinos resorted to guerrilla campaigns. In suppressing these, the British and Americans resorted to "methods of barbarism" that shocked even ardent war supporters back home. Finally, in both nations protest movements arose opposing the wars.

In the protest movements, large segments of British and American society vigorously challenged their government’s policy leading to war, as well as the war itself. Britons called anti-war activists pro-Boers, while Americans called them anti-imperialists. Comparing the anti-war activities of British and American society from 1899 to 1902, the actual war years for both countries, yields valuable insight into the interaction of war and society.

The historiography of the two movements also illuminates several interesting comparisons and contrasts. Since the Boer War was only one of several British wars for empire, it has drawn no more, or less, interest than any other region or war in England’s imperial history. On the other hand, the Philippine-American War, and its antecedent the Spanish-American War, were America’s only major wars for empire and have thus drawn relatively more attention. By the same token, the pro-Boer movement has drawn less analysis, and of a different nature, than the anti-imperialists. The difference in analysis presents a significant contrast.

Both the level of reporting, and the conclusions drawn illustrate the treatment of the two groups. Arthur Davey decries the dearth of pro-Boer analysis over the years: the first systematic study, Stephen Koss’ *The Pro-Boers*, did not appear until 1973, and together with Davey’s *The British Pro-Boers* constitutes the extent of book-length scholarship on the subject. Narrow-focused books and articles fared
little better. Numerous excellent articles study various aspects of the movement, such as nationalistic groups or specific organizations, but they show no overall trends. The articles by Claire Hirshfield have admirably illuminated the reactions of such segments of society as women, Africans, and Jews, but have not marked turning points in the scholarship of the field. One significant new perspective over the years comes from emerging South African scholars, such as Davey, telling their side of the events, but they offer no major reappraisals. The only other reinterpretation examined the role of labor. Richard Price illustrates this trend in *An Imperial War and the British Working Class*, contending workers did not support the war. Pro-Boer groups, according to Price, were either too middle-class or too religious in outlook to rally the working class, and, therefore, did not effectively mobilize labor opposition.²

With the anti-imperialists, though, the challenge is not a lack of analyses, but interpretation. Study of the movement maintained a slow, but steady, pace from the 1930's through the 1950's as several articles examined America's single, and quickly regretted, imperial spasm. The early

1960's saw the final break-up of European empires. New social, political, and economic ideas concerning emerging nations brought new interpretations of the economic implications of America's empire, and those who opposed it. Walter LaFeber, William Williams, and others, argued that even the opposition did not really oppose colonialism, they merely argued for indirect, but just as oppressive, economic domination.³

American involvement in Vietnam instigated the largest volume of scholarship to date dealing with the anti-imperialist movement, including all of the major book-length works. Many observers saw parallels between the Vietnam War and the Philippine-American War, and between the two wars' protest movements. Daniel Schirmer, in *Republic or Empire*, carries the connection to the point of appearing polemical, while Richard Welch, writing after Vietnam, attempts to revise some of the reinterpretations. The January/February 1990 *American History Illustrated* article by David Kohler and James Wensyel, portraying the 1899-1902 conflict as an

early Vietnam, demonstrates the continuing tendency to see connections between Vietnam and the Philippines.⁴

Perhaps one explanation for the difference in analysis between the two anti-war movements lies in world events in the 20th century. The post-WWII break-up of European empires generated renewed interest in the social, political and economic implications of imperialism. Britain's relative decline as a world leader, along with America's increased importance in leadership, undoubtedly focused more attention on American affairs, particularly in the area of imperialism. Consequently, although no less important or interesting, the pro-Boer movement attracts less attention than the anti-imperialist movement.

Comparing the two anti-war movements must, therefore, not only consider the body of scholarship, such as it is, but the implications of changing interpretations as well. A fruitful comparison, though, also comes from the writings of the participants, and more importantly, the literature published by the various protest groups. The groups' writings offer a great deal of insight into their nature,

their activities, the issues they raised, and the reaction to their efforts.

Using the sources described above, the first chapter compares the groups and individuals that comprised the two movements and their motives. The second chapter examines the response of significant segments of the two societies to the wars. The third chapter discusses similarities and differences in the methods and activities of the movements to register and increase opposition. Chapter Four compares fundamental issues raised by the movements, and by the reaction to their opposition. Finally, the last chapter contrasts the effectiveness and outcome of protest efforts and draws some conclusions on the two movements.
CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROTEST GROUPS

The greatest similarity between anti-imperialists and pro-Boers is their lack of unity and coordination. The term "groups" often seems euphemistic when dealing with the anti-war efforts, and "movement" must convey the most evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, connotations. Individuals often worked together simply because they disliked each other less than they disliked the government's supporters, while others could not overcome personal animosities even for the cause they so fervently supported. Furthermore, many individuals wholeheartedly sympathized with the cause, but confined their support to individual efforts, and many self-styled non-conformists did nothing to back up their convictions. Similar dynamics kept groups from cooperating or coordinating their efforts.

Political Parties

One area of opposition involved political parties. Both England and America were at the time operating under a two-party government apparatus, so naturally the party not in power in each country used the war as a bludgeon with which to beat the ruling party. A distinct difference existed, however, in the extent to which each anti-war
movement reflected the "loyal opposition." In fact, the political aspect can be compared on two levels.

On one level, the degree to which war opponents came from the party out of power, the pro-Boers were much more political. Very few Tories, the ruling party, broke ranks and opposed the war. One notable exception was Edward Clarke who supported the Stanhope amendment, a condemnation of England's part in bringing about the war. On the other hand, most pro-Boers came from the Liberal Party and included some of the party's most prominent leaders: David Lloyd George, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, John Morley and Leonard Courtney.5

In America, though, the situation was different. The Democratic Party certainly opposed Republican President William McKinley's imperialism, but few prominent Democrats were key anti-imperialists and their contribution was small. Free-thinking Republicans not only swelled the anti-imperialist ranks, they included such prominent figures as former President Benjamin Harrison, Secretary of State John Sherman, and Speaker of the House Thomas Bracket Reed. Moreover, Republicans provided the movement its most dynamic leaders such as Massachusetts' Senator George Hoar, and

5 Koss, Pro-Boers, 32, 43-47; Davey, British Pro-Boers, 178-85.
former Governor, Senator, and Representative George Boutwell.⁶

The other level of political impact concerns party unity at the time. Considerable disparity existed between the two countries in this area. Although the pro-Boer movement was a predominantly liberal crusade, the anti-war cause did not dominate the Liberal Party. In fact, the pro-Boers' nemesis, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, had been a prominent liberal who, in 1881 under William Gladstone's administration, attempted to overturn the 1877 Transvaal annexation. The question of granting Ireland greater self rule had so divided the Liberal Party before the war that its leader, Campbell-Bannerman, and the party's apparatus could not take a strong stand against the war.⁷

In effect, the Party became three mini-parties. The Liberal Imperialists, nicknamed "Lib-Imps," were led by Earl Rosebery and supported the war and imperialism, but saw Home Rule as a diminution of the empire. The more radical faction, led by John Morley, opposed the war and imperialism

---


in any form, but favored Home Rule. Several of them formed the League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism (LLAAM), earning the epithet "Lambs." In the middle were the more moderate liberals, led by Campbell-Bannerman, who supported imperialism as an idealistic civilizing agent, but who saw the war as a violation of idealized imperialism. Most pro-Boers came from the radical faction, and in issues concerning the war Liberal Imperialists usually supported the government. Moderate liberals, balancing between opposing the war and trying to hold the party together, often acted as the swing vote on party issues. To further cloud the picture, the National Reform Union and the National Liberal Federation, both pre-existent liberal organizations from the Gladstone period, gave pro-Boers structures through which to work, but little else.  

The American political scene was quite different. Although individual Democrats varied in the degree to which they opposed imperialism, the Democratic Party was not seriously divided. William Jennings Bryan, hoping for a

---

Davey, British Pro-Boers, 77, 87-88; Koss, Pro-Boers, xxv-xviii, 182-83; M. van Wyk Smith, Drummer Hodge: The Poetry of the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 122-23. For LLAAM membership, objectives, position on various issues, and comments on contemporary state of British political scene see "The First Annual Report of the Work of The League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism" pamphlet, 24 April 1901; for the activities, membership, structure and views of the National Reform Union see "Report of the Annual Meeting of the National Reform Union." 12 March, 1902, both from the John Burns Collection, Trades Union Congress, London, hereafter cited as JBC/TUC.
second Presidential nomination in 1900, effectively eased any strains threatening the unity of the party by espousing, with little concern for consistency or principle, the competing concerns of anti-imperialism, free silver, and trusts, then emphasizing each before its own constituency.\footnote{Baron, "Democrats," 230-32. Paolo E. Coletta argues that Bryan's true primary concern was stopping imperialism, a point to be examined later under the 1900 Presidential election, but the weight of opinion is against him; see Coletta, "Bryan, McKinley, and the Treaty of Paris," Pacific Historical Review 26 (May 1957).}

Likewise, the defections of prominent Republican anti-imperialists never seriously jeopardized Republican unity. Although the party started in revolution against slavery, few abolitionists remained. Former associates of Lincoln, such as Boutwell, Hoar, and Senator Edward Hale, earnestly believed anti-imperialism to be a continuation of the fight for emancipation, but these men were old; their average age was over 70, and Senator Justin Morrill, a staunch ally, died in December 1898. Meanwhile the Republican party evolved as younger men came to Congress in larger numbers. The strongest imperialist in the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge, born in 1850, represented the same state as Senator Hoar: Massachusetts.\footnote{Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22 (September 1935): 218.}

The nearest thing to a political revolt in America was the abortive attempt to organize a third party to run an
anti-imperialist candidate in the 1900 Presidential election. Early efforts culminated in a meeting in New York on 6 January 1900 where New York area anti-imperialists, led by Carl Schurz, chose Edwin Burritt Smith to head their hoped-for party. At the time, Andrew Carnegie offered unlimited financial support. In February, though, Carnegie withdrew his financial support when, according to Richard F. Pettigrew, his financial backers threatened to end efforts to form a steel trust if he continued his anti-imperialist activities. The loss of funding crippled, but did not kill, the third party attempt. Worried by Bryan's vacillating stand on the issue, prominent anti-imperialists, attending the National Liberty Congress in Indianapolis on 15 August 1900, pushed for formation of a third party and endorsement of an alternate candidate. Concerns over splitting the anti-war vote and the inability to find a viable nominee limited their impact on other delegates. The fatal blow, however, had come the week before when Bryan, sensing the dissension among anti-imperialists, delivered a "masterful" acceptance speech at the National Democratic Convention designed to mollify their concerns. The anti-imperialist delegates voted down the third party movement at the Liberty Congress, and it never rose again.11

By far, the greatest activity in both countries was non-political. Running a wide gamut, both movements registered opposition through organizations, agencies, and establishments. Some organizations began with the express purpose of opposing the war, imperialism, or both, while others, such as churches and newspapers, took on the cause as an adjunct to other duties.

**Protest Groups**

To most observers, the groups founded specifically to oppose imperialism and war dominated the anti-imperialist and pro-Boer movements. Although true in a sense, these groups acted as the leading edge of a mass moving behind them. In some respects the two nations spawned dissimilar opposition elements, but there were also significant similarities. On the surface, America's single dominant group, the Anti-Imperialist League, suggested greater unanimity than England where two main groups, the South Africa Conciliation Committee (SACC) and the Stop-The-War Committee (STWC), were merely the largest of many groups. A closer look reveals two facts. First, the Anti-Imperialist League was a national organization in name only, while both major British groups, and several smaller ones, operated on

"Anti-Imperialism," 226; Baron, "Democrats," 231-32; Schirmer, Republic, 199-203.
a truly national scale. Secondly, regardless of scale or scope of operation, dissension and disjointed effort within and between protest organizations plagued both movements.

The first Anti-Imperialist League formed in Boston on 19 November 1898, while negotiators in Paris sought an end to the Spanish-American War. A group of independent-minded intellectuals, economists, and former abolitionists, mostly Republicans, and collectively known as Mugwumps, feared the events in Paris indicated McKinley's intention to retain the captured Spanish colonies. Translating anxiety into action, this group started, and later dominated, the League. The Boston chapter quickly attracted such diverse figures as industrialist Andrew Carnegie, labor leader Samuel Gompers, John Sherman, former Secretary of State to McKinley, and former Democratic President Grover Cleveland, all of whom served among its 18 initial Vice-Presidents. Leagues sprang up in major cities across the United States, most notably New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.¹²

Two conferences in 1899, one in Boston and one in New York, coordinated the activities of the regional leagues.

under the auspices of a national organization, known as the American Anti-Imperialist League, with its headquarters in Chicago. In a gesture of solidarity, the original league in Boston changed its name to the New England Anti-Imperialist League, and amended its constitution stipulating a subordinate relationship to the national office. Its activities remained the same, however, and it continued to dominate the direction of the movement. Moreover, because the Boston chapter's constitution placed so much authority in the hands of its executive committee, the original founders sitting on the committee dominated the local league, and thereby the national structure. One indication of this is that although each local chapter continued its own uncoordinated activities, such as publishing pamphlets and holding public meetings, the writings and speeches of the men from Boston dominated their efforts. Far from ensuring close control, the duties, distance, and workload overwhelmed these men. They worked hard and donated vast sums, but they were volunteers with no staff, and they had personal careers to maintain. Moreover, no single leader among the small group emerged to set priorities.\footnote{Maria C. Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," The Philippine Social Science Review 3 (August 1930): 16-23.}

Another factor exacerbating the lack of structure was the dual nature of membership. The most prominent anti-imperialists formed or joined a regional chapter, but a
major portion of activity transpired through personal correspondence with other anti-imperialists around the country. A person might be a member of the Philadelphia chapter and attend their meetings, but through letter writing he or she might feel closer ties to like-minded members in other locations. This tended to break down allegiance to group consensus, while building intellectual independence.

Two obscure groups also opposed American policy in the Philippines, though not nearly to the extent of the Anti-Imperialist League. One, the Philippine Information Society, published at least two series of pamphlets, and possibly a third, but no book or article on the subject refers to its existence. A single page leaflet published by the group states that the purpose of its first series of pamphlets, The Story of the Filipinos, was to, "treat of the relations of the United States with the Filipinos from May, 1898, to the present [July 1901]," and claimed worldwide demand for its work. An announcement for the second series, Facts About the Filipinos, announced its intention to use official documents to place authoritative information on the Philippines before the American public. The group's officers were, with one exception, from the Boston area and included Charles Francis Adams, grandson of John Adams, as a Vice-Chairman. Adams disagreed with many prominent leaders
of the Anti-Imperialist League, so the Society may have started as a rival to the League.¹⁴

Morrison I. Swift, a socialist and sharp critic of the Anti-Imperialist League, started the other group, the Filipino Liberation Society. The society circulated an "Emancipation Proclamation to the Filipinos" stating that the illegal acts of a government do not bind the individuals of that nation, and called for all "sovereign citizens" of the U.S. to repudiate the national crime committed against the Filipinos by signing the proclamation. The Filipino Liberation Society achieved only passing notice until Swift, following the lead of Edward Atkinson, sent some of the group's pamphlets to American soldiers in the Philippines. In the uproar that followed, the Anti-Imperialist League denied any affiliation with Swift or the society he represented, thus precluding any chance of cooperative effort.¹⁵

Unlike the American phenomenon, the British movement generated several organizations, two of major, national importance. One of the primary groups, the Stop-The-War Committee, formed on 11 January 1900 after Silas K. Hocking,


a former Methodist minister, issued a Christmas eve appeal to all who opposed the war and wanted it stopped. The appeal did not mention political causes or considerations, but specifically demanded unilateral action by Britain to halt the fighting. The committee's name and agenda upheld the spirit of this early sentiment. Later appeals called on the Boer Republics to stop fighting, but the original theme, peace at any price, remained throughout the war.16

One of the STWC's early and most visible figures was W.T. Stead. A prominent, and controversial, newspaper publisher, Stead began the English media's move to "modern" journalism: the use of large exclamatory headlines and an exciting, often inflammatory, writing style. Stead contributed this style to many pamphlets the group published that, along with its anti-war stance and oft quoted slogan, "Stop the war and stop it now!" gave the group a partially unwarranted reputation for religious fanaticism and rabid arguments. Many who opposed the war shunned the STWC, some because they disagreed with the group's stand, others, such as public figures, because they feared the reputation that went with it. The committee grew nonetheless; it attracted members from all walks of life, established a network of

16 Koss, Pro-Boers, xxiv-xxv, 67-81.

The South Africa Conciliation Committee, conceived by Leonard Courtney and a group of moderate-minded Liberals on 15 January 1900, four days after the inception of the STWC, was a direct response to the more radical group. Again, these terms are relative, for many Liberals, such as Rosebery, considered Courtney and other members of the SACC reactionary radicals. The committee set the tone for future activities in its manifesto, released to the press on the 15th. Attributing the outbreak of war to mutual misunderstanding, it called for peaceful negotiations not only to end the war, but to reconcile (hence the group's name) the British and Dutch people of South Africa. In emphasizing reconciliation, the SACC saw itself as heir to the heritage of Edmund Burke, the 18th century British statesman who urged reconciliation with the rebellious Americans. Significantly, the manifesto called for peaceful co-existence with the two Republics, indicating an opposition to annexation that Courtney shared with many of the group's founders. A pamphlet outlining its aims and methods reiterated the goals of peace and reconciliation laid out in its manifesto, and called on members to solicit
supporters, address village meetings and workmen's clubs, and start committees in their towns. The group quickly grew as members from across the political and social spectrum, reluctant to join the STWC or agreeing more with the SACC message, joined, brought other supporters, and started local branches. Subordinate chapters supplemented the work of the parent organization by conducting meetings and publishing their own pamphlets.\textsuperscript{18}

Other groups, smaller and less prominent, complemented, and at times competed with, the STWC and the SACC. Two groups already mentioned, the League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, and the National Reform Union, were primarily political organizations, but they too drew non-political members. They also published pamphlets and held regular meetings, providing platforms from which to issue public statements. In fact, Campbell-Bannerman delivered his famous "Methods of Barbarism" speech, giving the pro-Boer movement a new direction, unity, and vitality, at a meeting of the National Reform Union. Although the Union consisted of nearly one hundred member Liberal clubs and published numerous pamphlets, it divided its attention between the situation in South Africa and other Liberal

concerns, such as Irish Home Rule and domestic issues. The LLAAM organized on 14 February 1900 under the leadership of R.C. Lehmann, editor of The Daily News. Its goal was convincing the fragmented Liberal Party that grassroots Liberals backed the anti-war position. The League saw itself upholding the Gladstone variety of liberalism and, therefore, published a series of pamphlets, "The Gladstone Series," containing excerpts from his Midlothian speeches. In 1901 the LLAAM changed its name to The Gladstone League.19

The Transvaal Committee, begun before the war on 12 June 1899 by a small group of Liberal Party extremists known as the Liberal Forwards, continued its work after war erupted. Under the leadership of George Russell and the guiding influence of C.P. Scott, M.P. and editor of the Manchester Guardian, the group outgrew its Liberal Party roots. It organized meetings, published pamphlets, provided speakers for other groups, and distributed other groups' literature. Its platform blamed the war on bad-faith negotiating by England with the Boers, but Russell went so far as stating that the Tory Party engineered the whole crisis to maintain popular support. Russell also charged

that the Uitlanders, the Boer name for English prospectors and speculators in the Transvaal whose plight helped precipitate the war, had more rights in the Transvaal than many people had in England.20

The Transvaal Committee interacted with two other groups. The Manchester Transvaal Committee, at the instigation of Scott, grew directly out of the work of the Transvaal Committee on 5 September 1899, and conducted the work of the parent group throughout Northern England. Its composition, goals, and activities were much the same as the Transvaal Committee's, but it stipulated it was pro-peace, not pro-Boer, and it published its own series of pamphlets. To further emphasize its pacifist stance, in November 1899 it changed its name to the Manchester Transvaal Peace Committee. The Bermondsey Labor League held joint meetings with the Transvaal Committee, but few accounts of its activities remain. A Labor League appeal to workers reflected the same concerns of the Transvaal Committee, and the charges made by George Russell, so the two groups were in close harmony.21

20 The Transvaal Committee pamphlet, "Report of Six Months' Work," 1 February 1900, JBC/TUC; Davey, British Pro-Boers, 72-75; Koss, Pro-Boers, xxiv, 6-8.

21 The Transvaal Committee pamphlet, "Six Months' Work," 5, JBC/TUC; Davey, British Pro-Boers, 75-77; Bermondsey Labor League pamphlet, "Arbitration, Not War: An Appeal to the Working Men and Women of London," September 1899, JBC/TUC. For the continuity between the Transvaal Committee and the Manchester Transvaal Committee see Manchester Transvaal Committee pamphlet no.5, "The
Finally, British chapters of the international peace movement joined the pro-Boer movement, but with little notice or impact. The International Arbitration and Peace Association, the London Peace Society, and the International Arbitration League opposed the war through meetings and writings, but apparently only the Arbitration League published its own pamphlets. There are only two Arbitration League pamphlets in the John Burns Collection of pro-Boer pamphlets held in the Trades Union Congress Library in London. They list a diversified group of officers, charge that arbitration failed because of financial interests, and warned of the dangers of martial law.  

On the surface anti-imperialists seemed more united, while pro-Boers seemed more chaotic, but neither found harmony. The American movement generated only one national protest group and two obscure regional ones, while the pro-Boers fragmented into two major and several minor national groups, and several regional or special interest protest groups. Surprisingly, the anti-imperialists' single national organization developed less group loyalty among its members.

Franchise: What was Asked, and What the Boers Offered," 28 September 1899; and, Manchester Transvaal Peace Committee pamphlet no.11, "The Reasons For the War and Why They Are Bad Reasons," n.d.; both JBC/TUC.

Davey, British Pro-Boers, 88-90; International Arbitration League pamphlet, "Now Tell Us All About the War, and What They Killed Each Other For," n.d.; International Arbitration League pamphlet, "Martial Law: What it has Done for South Africa, What it is Doing for the Empire," n.d.; both JBC/TUC.
members than the various pro-Boer groups. Still, internal
dissension and uncoordinated efforts paralyzed both
movements. The primary reason for the lack of cohesion was
the diverse motivations of the groups and their leaders.

Analysts of both movements attempt to attach a single
motivation to the entire movement, but the diverse nature of
both movements frustrates their efforts. Maria Lanzar
points to the Anti-Imperialist League's constitution barring
non-American citizens and its repeated emphasis on America's
democratic institutions, and claims the anti-imperialists'
primary concern was American welfare, not Filipino welfare.
Undoubtedly, many anti-imperialists' arguments, for example
Carnegie's genuinely benevolent intentions, sounded
unconcerned about the plight of Filipinos. Others, such as
Senator G.G. Vest, in claiming Filipinos were unfit to be
American citizens, were decidedly racist. Lanzar's
argument, though, ignores the diverse nature of the anti-
imperialist sentiment, and the unmistakably sincere morality
of many protesters. The Anti-Imperialist League's "Address
to the People of the United States," published on the day it
was founded, states that a government derives its just
powers from the consent of the governed, and the Filipinos
obviously denied their consent. Although anti-imperialist
added other arguments, such a basic stance had no more self-
benefit than the comfort of doing the right thing.23

William A. Williams' charge that the anti-imperialists urged economic imperialism also ignores the movement's diverse motivation. Granted, many saw economic domination as preferable to the political form, while others actually saw economic imperialism as desirable. In fact many anti-imperialists supported the annexation of Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Other anti-imperialists, though, specifically railed against both economic and cultural domination of other people.24

Writing on the pro-Boer movement, Richard Price claims the STWC's motivation was radical christianity, and that the SACC's motivations were strictly middle class concerns; both alienated the working classes. Both of these views neglect the diversity of motivation among British protesters. Yes,


24 Williams, Tragedy, 37-40; Williams, Contours, 367-68; for opposition to economic imperialism see Morrison I. Swift, "Anti-Imperialism," 1899, Pamphlets Vol. 2, LL/UNL; for opposition to cultural domination see Mark Twain, "To the Person Sitting In Darkness," The North American Review 172 (February 1901): 161-76.
many STWC arguments emphasized religious concerns, such as the pamphlet that summarizes, in banner headlines, why Stead opposes the war: "Afraid of God!" Many other STWC pamphlets, however, presented cogent, even-handed, non-religious arguments for ending the war. By the same token, the SACC arguments often stressed conciliation for the good of the empire and business, but they also stressed internal social reforms and they targeted workers' clubs and unions as fertile ground for members and support.25

The root problem causing diversity of motivation for both groups was a lack of clear consensus on the nature of the problem. Both groups faced two major issues: the war and imperialism. Each nation had a long history of pacifist sentiment, and every war elicited some anti-war sentiment. England and America, however, were both at the peak of militant nationalistic sentiments, know as "jingoism," and pseudo-anthropological theories that claimed war toughened and invigorated societies.

Although both movements faced imperialist issues, they were different. America did not possess an empire so the question facing the anti-imperialists was whether or not

America needed or could afford an empire, and if not, why not? England, on the other hand, already held an empire, so pro-Boers faced two questions: did they need more holdings, and what kind of empire did they want? Like pacifism, contemporary attitudes complicated the imperialism questions. Social Darwinism gave a scientific veneer to racism by claiming societies grappled in a death struggle where naturally strong cultures dominated weaker ones, and no one wanted their society to be the dominated culture.

How individual pro-Boers and anti-imperialists, each a product of their culture and times, answered these questions and other ever-present tangential issues such as social reform, labor issues, and militarism, dictated his or her motivation. Such multi-faceted problems confronting each group inevitably led to multiple motivations in each protester, and in ever-varying orders of priority. Some anti-imperialists, such as Edward Atkinson, stressed the evils of all wars, while others, such as Andrew Carnegie, not only supported the war with Spain but saw it as a humanitarian crusade to free Cuba, and America's finest hour. Atkinson, Carnegie, and Gompers all agreed on the need for foreign trade, but Atkinson argued for emphasis on European and Canadian markets, and along with Carnegie, disagreed with Gompers on union issues. Socialists, like Swift, agreed with Gompers and other labor leaders on the plight of workers, but felt foreign trade helped perpetuate
capitalist exploitation. Rev. Robert Brisbee agreed with the socialists on the evils of economic exploitation, but for religious, not political, reasons.26

The situation was the same in England. Both W.T. Stead and J.W. Rowntree wanted the war stopped, but Stead, an idealistic imperialist, saw it as a heinous departure from the civilizing mission he envisioned for the British Empire, while Rowntree, a Quaker, rejected war in any form. Furthermore, just before the war Stead advocated a big navy, and continued harping about England's vulnerability to attack. Many radical Liberals, led by William Harcourt, opposed imperialism in any form, and saw the Boer War as a brutal example of its evils.27

The divergent motivations led inevitably to dissension in both movements. Among the pro-Boers the two main groups crystallized into two camps: the STWC drew anti-war advocates with its Stop-The-War emphasis, and the SACC


rallied all other opponents. The fundamentally different approaches made Stead sharply critical of the SACC and its leaders for being too timid to demand an end to the war, and the SACC, for its part, resented Stead's attacks and refused all STWC efforts to cooperate. Individual supporters of each group often ridiculed or lampooned rival pro-Boers in the press.\textsuperscript{28}

In America, the one channel for opposition forced non-conformists to work too closely together. Each held rigid attitudes on mutually exclusive issues, and the result was even more dissension in the ranks. Two leading Democratic figures, party leader Bryan and former President Grover Cleveland, could have together rallied formidable political support for the cause. Instead they loathed each other because of their different views on the Free Silver issue and would not work together. The Anti-Imperialist League publicly disavowed Atkinson and Swift when their tactics became too controversial. Charles Francis Adams broke from the movement when he sensed anti-imperialists were doing more harm than good, and publicly criticized his former associates for continuing the struggle.\textsuperscript{29}

\vspace*{1cm}

\textsuperscript{28} Price, \textit{Imperial War}, 23-25; Davey, \textit{British Pro-Boers}, 85-87.

\textsuperscript{29} For Cleveland and Adams see Beisner, \textit{Twelve}, 116-20, 122; for Atkinson and Swift see Schirmer, \textit{Republic}, 152-54, and Welch, \textit{Response}, 54-55.
Such dissension naturally led to lack of cooperation, duplicated effort, and crossed purposes that undoubtedly detracted from each movements' effectiveness. The greatest failure, though, was the effect dissension had on the two movements in their roles as catalyst for change. Both England and America were democratic governments and, therefore, subject to the will of the people. Recognizing early that they could not convince the constituted governments to make the desired changes, both movements took their case to the people. When they did, however, they presented the public with a barrage of mixed, conflicting, and at times, hysterical signals.

What clear message could their audience discern? In the U.S. some anti-imperialists opposed imperialism in any form, but others favored some island colonies. Some opposed war, but others favored idealistic crusades. Many anti-imperialists hearkened to conservative ideals, yet some promised radically new economic and social orders at home and abroad. Were Americans supposed to oppose the war or imperialism? The arguments were often confusing and contradictory. In England the dilemma was the same. Some pro-Boers said empire was bad, but others urged an idealistic empire. According to some, war was always bad or avoidable through arbitration, but others claimed the war in South Africa left England defenseless and vulnerable to a
hostile Europe. Britons too received a confusing and contradictory message of what pro-Boers opposed.

The pro-Boers and the anti-imperialists worked hard and believed in their cause, but their lack of clear direction left the masses confused. Significantly, both movements only found clear direction late in the wars, when Boer and Filipino guerrilla campaigns prompted harsh suppression measures. Once the movements established an obvious and unmistakable purpose, their audience could more easily discern the message, weigh its merits, and decide on the issue. Unfortunately, the clear direction came too late. The wars were all but over, and the years of anti-war cacophony had inured the population to much of what the dissidents said. When the newly united and cooperating movements presented their new arguments, they found the populations had "tuned out" much of their message.
CHAPTER TWO: INSTITUTIONS AND SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY

Once any pressure group, such as an anti-war movement, fails to sway the "powers that be" in a democratic society, its primary task becomes taking the argument to the people. A movement encounters society at two principle levels: the community's infrastructure; and the people themselves. The infrastructure consists of a society's institutions such as newspapers, churches, and colleges, that have collective opinions and agendas, and that help shape the opinions and attitudes of the public at large. The people in a society consists of several segments, and although it is often difficult to judge the reaction of an entire nation, the reaction of certain segments might be more apparent. How the English and American institutions and social segments reacted to the pro-Boer and the anti-imperialist debate illustrates both the extent and the limitations of opposition in each country.

Institutions

If a group of individuals sought to influence public opinion, their impact might be proportional to their size. If, however, that group of individuals is the management of a newspaper, or the leadership of a church or college, their potential impact exceeds their mere numbers. The leadership
of such establishments can dictate corporate policy, or the official stand on particular issues. Likewise, individuals within these institutions exert influence out of proportion to their efforts. Society turns to these elements of social infrastructure for information and guidance on issues facing the community, and the institutions' response is often more influential than information or arguments from politicians or partisan opposition groups. Institutional policies were, therefore, crucial to the reaction of society to the issues raised by the anti-imperialists and pro-Boers.

Newspapers

The reaction of the newspapers in both countries followed the same pattern: major newspapers supported the government and chided the protesters, while some lesser, or provincial newspapers gave the movements active and vocal support. Newspapers occasionally switched positions, or reacted to specific issues or events as they saw fit at the time, but for the most part the lines remained static.

In England both sides recognized the prodigious influence newspapers exerted on public opinion. Two prominent pro-Boers, Stead and C.P. Scott, were newspaper editors, while Alfred Milner, British high commissioner in South Africa and chief villain in the pro-Boers' eyes, was Stead's understudy before entering politics. The Times of
London lent its considerable influence to the government, but since it was a recognized Tory paper, its stand was no surprise. The *Westminster Gazette* and the *Daily Chronicle*, both of London, were, however, prominent liberal newspapers. Their alignment with the Liberal Imperialist faction and attacks on pro-Boers accentuated the splits within the political opposition and thus damaged the movement's cause. The most prominent pro-Boer paper throughout the war was Scott's *Manchester Guardian*. The *Guardian's* support was significant, but it was not a London-based daily. Realizing the importance of a voice in the capital, pro-Boer David Lloyd George, with the financial backing of George Cadbury, a Quaker and head of Cadbury chocolates, bought the *Daily News* in 1901. Another pro-Boer newspaper, the *Morning Leader*, had little impact in its columns, but it published a series of pamphlets.  

On the American side the situation was similar. America did not have one single all-important urban center, such as England had in London, but New York, the nation's largest city and a world center of finance and commerce, and Washington, D.C., the nation's capitol, were the two

---

premiere centers of gravity. So when the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* threw their considerable weight behind the government, the influence on public opinion was immense. Other papers, both Republican and Democrat, across the country backed imperialism with frequent editorial attacks on the anti-imperialist movement. The *Chicago Tribune*, for example, conducted a questionable poll of mid-west university professors that suggested overwhelming, though probably exaggerated, support for the administration. In a class by themselves were the so-called "yellow journalism" papers, such as Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World* and William Randolph Hearst's *New York Journal*. Not surprisingly, they were early backers of imperialism.\(^3\)

The newspapers supporting the anti-imperialists were, like those in England, less prominent or farther removed from major urban centers. The leading opposition paper was

---

\(^3\) Harrington lists some of the larger newspapers that supported, or opposed, imperialism, "Anti-Imperialist Movement," 214; Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism*, 76; for an anti-imperialist's view on the irresponsibility of the "jingo" press in shaping public opinion see E.L. Godkin, "Diplomacy and the Newspaper," *The North American Review* 160 (May 1895): 570-79. The *Chicago Tribune* poll quoted in Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," *Review* 3 (August 1930): 32-33, suggests strong support for McKinley's policies among academics, though far more professors spoke out against imperialism than defended it. Welch, *Response*, 119, note no.8, cites a congressional petition against imperialism containing the signatures of thirty-six professors from the University of Chicago, while the *Tribune* poll claims only five of twenty professors there opposed the administration. The petition is undated, but it seems unlikely attitudes could change that dramatically within the span of the war.
the Springfield Republican, followed by the Boston Evening Transcript and the New York Evening Post. E.L. Godkin, a New York Mugwump and editor of the Evening Post, also edited The Nation, a weekly journal with considerable influence despite its small circulation. The anti-imperialists, like the pro-Boers, also gained the support of an apostate newspaper. As late as February 1899 Hearst's Journal supported imperialism and attacked anti-imperialists, but during the 1900 Presidential campaign, due possibly to political ambition, Hearst rallied behind Bryan, and the Journal began attacking imperialism. Bryan rewarded Hearst with the presidency of the National Association of Democratic Clubs. The switch may have done more harm than good since such a blatant political move by a controversial figure like Hearst gave Republicans an opportunity to question publicly anti-imperialist motives and sincerity.

Churches

Churches act as a society's moral conscience. Often people will look to a church for guidance on the morality of

---

an issue whether or not they subscribe to its full doctrine. The response of churches in England and America to the wars followed similar paths. Most church hierarchies supported, or at least accepted, the administrations' policies. Vociferous, but modest, opposition came from individual clergymen, small denominations, and sects.

Britain differed from the U.S. in one significant way: the Church of England, being the official state church, would almost by definition support the government's war effort. Fredrick Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury and head of the Church of England, though, pressed his role of loyal supporter to the Queen beyond his role as society's moral arbiter. A month before the war broke out he rebuffed two attempts to enlist his aid in arranging international arbitration. To one attempt, from the editor of the New York World offering to arrange America's good offices, Temple observed that he did not represent the public's opinion, but Englishmen felt the responsibility to protect the oppressed Uitlanders. To the International Arbitration and Peace Association he replied that if he allowed the oppression of the Uitlanders to continue he would share the crime. Some Anglican priests opposed the war, the Bishops of London and Hereford, the Dean of Durham, and Canon E.L.
Hicks for example, but most fell in line with the sentiments of Fredrick Temple.\(^3\)

The Methodist Church split on the issue of the war, but lacking a national office to issue official church policy, the response was more individualistic. The most authoritative voice, Hugh Price Hughes, president of the Western Methodist Conference and editor of the *Methodist Weekly*, changed from pre-war attacks on British encroachment in South Africa to outspoken support for the war. Furthermore, *The Methodist Times* defended the government. On the other hand, Silas Hocking, founder of the Stop-The-War Committee, was a former Methodist minister, and popular reaction to Hughes' stand led to a coup at *The Methodist Weekly*, and Samuel Keeble, a pro-Boer, replaced him as editor. In a manifesto opposing the war, signed by 5,214 ministers and sent to the Prime Minister, 1,870 of the signatories were some form of Methodist.\(^4\)


Among most of Britain's other churches the story is the same. Hocking claimed the Baptists ignored the pro-Boer movement, yet 1,000 signed the manifesto mentioned above, and John Clifford, president of the Baptist Union, was a staunch pro-Boer. In Scotland, the Presbyterian Church predominantly supported the government. The only church that registered almost universal opposition to the war were the Quakers. The Boer War helped spark and sustain a revival of pacifism within the Society of Friends, and gave their message influence far beyond their numbers. One prominent Quaker, John Bellows, gained notoriety for supporting the war, but the Quakers disavowed his views.35

In the United States the response was much the same. No denomination officially endorsed the war or imperialism, but as organized bodies of opinion most priests, ministers, and church journals supported the administration. Although dissent arose in all branches of faith, Richard Welch suggests a rough connection between high levels of Calvinist doctrine and strong support for the government. Approval from Presbyterians and Congregationalists, with deep Calvinist traditions, was substantial, while backing from Unitarians, Universalists, and Quakers, with little Calvinist doctrine, was weaker. One issue distinguished

American considerations from British: the prospect of missionary work compelled sustained approval for imperialism in many religious circles. Episcopalians and Methodists felt evangelism would help negate the evils of the war.\textsuperscript{36}

Catholics were in a difficult position. The Filipinos were predominantly Catholic, so there was little hope for new converts. Reactionary groups in America, however, accused the church of weak loyalty, in part due to its large number of recent, and unpopular, immigrant members, but also due to the age-old issue of loyalty to Rome. Sensitive to charges of disloyalty, Catholics also saw advantages in strengthening Filipino Catholicism with American priests, incidentally increasing the number of high level positions, so most Catholics backed the administration.\textsuperscript{37}

Some American religious leaders opposed the war, or imperialism, or both, but they never formed a coalition. Many joined the Anti-Imperialist League, others spoke out individually. Three main themes dominated their protests. Some were avowed pacifists and opposed the war, others railed against the hypocrisy of wagging war to win converts, especially when they were already Christians. Third, many feared the abandonment of democratic traditions that they felt stemmed from America’s religious heritage as much as

\begin{itemize}
\item[36] Welch, \textit{Response}, 89, 94–98, see especially 94 for impact of Calvinist tradition.
\item[37] Ibid, 89–94.
\end{itemize}
from its political heritage. One final note, the campaign against "sins of the flesh" incidental with the war - alcohol, brothels, venereal diseases, and the government "endorsing" the Sultan of Sulu's polygamy and slavery - was separate from the anti-imperialist movement. Most attacks of this sort came from journals that supported the government's policies.  

Colleges

Like churches, colleges act as a social conscience, but more in terms of an intellectual guidepost. Whether college educated or not, people often look to the academic community for advice on the wisdom of a particular policy. Professors, furthermore, are often as independent of thought and deed as the clergy. Recognizing this, American colleges and professors far out-paced their English colleagues in opposing imperialism. College presidents and faculties across America presented widespread dissent. In England the response was much like the churches' response: colleges avoided official stands on the war, while the vast majority

---

of rank and file professors supported the administration despite a vocal minority.

Uncharacteristically, most professors gave the government silent support, while others spoke out for, or against, official policy. The nearly ubiquitous professorial acquiescence contrasted starkly with the debate they raised during international tensions in 1876, and later during the First World War. On the other hand, J.A. Cramb, an historian at King's College London, spoke in Mahanian terms of Britain at the crossroads of empire and destiny. Not all were as extreme in their support, but many agreed with Cramb. Another aspect of support was the mob violence of English college students plaguing pro-Boer meetings. A small number of professors joined pro-Boer committees or otherwise spoke out against the war. J.S. Haldane, an Oxford physiologist, gave an example of appealing to society's intellectual conscience. At the height of the concentration camp controversy Haldane, sensing that mere death tolls hid the true magnitude of the tragedy, wrote a letter to the *Westminster Gazette* poignantly comparing camp death rates with statistical norms for South Africa.39

Although the American academic community widely opposed imperialism, its opposition fragmented into impotence.

Reflecting the same individuality shown in the movement as a whole, fewer than half joined the Anti-Imperialist League, and no scholastic bloc formed. Furthermore, many confined their dissent to private correspondences. Some of the brightest stars in the academic pantheon wrote articles, gave speeches, and signed petitions, but it caught little public notice. David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford and a vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League, wrote several articles; Northwestern forced president Henry Wade Rogers' resignation over his outspoken views; and from Yale, William Graham Sumner's "The Conquest of the United States by Spain" became a popular pamphlet. Despite their efforts, the most widely recognized academic connected to the Philippine debate was Cornell president Jacob Gould Schurman, McKinley's Philippine Commission chairman. Such a position signalled to many that Schurman was an imperialist, but he refuted the charge. Anti-imperialists' criticism of Schurman for supporting McKinley, despite his writings and speeches attacking expansion, accentuates the public confusion over the movement's message.\(^\text{40}\)

Segments of Society

As recognizable bodies, anti-imperialists and pro-Boers were highly individualistic, which badly dissipated their strength. No major political party became synonymous with either movement, and the constituted protest groups could not collectively define their cause or their aims. Furthermore, the movement failed to persuade the people who in turn shape the attitudes of the major opinion-influencing institutions. The few newspapers, ministers, and - in England - professors, who rejected administration policy stood like so many Davids facing the Goliath of imperialism and war. Even among American professors, individualism negated strength in numbers. Basically, both movements were composed of individual members, each products of his or her society. As individuals, they acted as leavening agents among society, fomenting sympathetic attitudes, and thus inspiring the society to rise up and demand change of their leaders. What were their societies like?

A comprehensive study of British and American societies is too broad a subject to analyze in this study, but some general observations help explain the task facing the opposition movements. Both England and America, at the turn of the century, rode the crest of a wave of economic good times and nationalist fervor. Although not booming, the
economies contrasted favorably to the recessions of earlier in the 1890's, and many people were satisfied and appreciative. Intense nationalism, or jingoism, also affected people's attitudes. Many factors and events such as Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee of 1897, and the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, popular on both sides of the Atlantic, intensified and directed national feelings. Strong economies and jingoism inspired many segments of the two societies to back the war and imperialism, but other segments had reasons to feel differently from the population as a whole. Their reaction to dissent reveals other facets of the protest movements.\(^{41}\)

**Minorities**

Descendants of what many called the Anglo-Saxon race dominated English and American government at the turn of the century, yet both nations encompassed many other groups that did not count themselves among the Anglo-Saxons. Using this thought as a guide, minorities include both ethnic groups

and citizens who felt allegiance to some other nation. The former includes Blacks, for example, while the latter includes immigrants, citizens of subject nations, and colonists. On the surface, minorities of both nations divided on support for the war, but the subsurface dynamics were more complex, especially for England.

In America the most significant minority was the Black community, only recently emancipated. Two repugnant, yet mutually exclusive, options confronted Blacks. First, an obvious consanguinity figuratively linked Filipinos and Blacks. Soldiers calling Filipinos "niggers" made this more apparent. The thought of Black Americans killing Filipinos rebelling against American rule, another form of slavery to many, was abhorrent. On the other hand, many white extremists questioned the Black community's commitment to American society, making many Blacks anxious to avoid appearing disloyal by dissenting. On the extremes of these views, some saw little honor for Blacks dying in a war that would extend the domination of their former masters, while others welcomed the chance to prove their loyalty standing shoulder to shoulder with other Americans.  

Black newspapers and ministers divided over the war, but more newspapers opposed the war than favored it, while

---

the reverse was true of ministers. Many newspapers doubted American benevolent rule in the Philippines when they could not overcome racial prejudice at home. Ministers hoped for missionary and economic gains for Blacks through expansion. Black leaders called for a Black Anti-Imperialist League, and, distrusting Democrats as an alternative to Republicans, worked toward a third political party, the Afro-American Party, but both attempts failed. Black soldiers in the Philippines suffered anxiety over the race issue, and endured Army segregation, but they served with near universal valor and distinction. Despite Filipino appeals to Blacks to defect, only nine joined the insurgents. Unfortunately, the nine, led by David Fagan, gained undue notoriety. 43

The other minority group in America was the large number of recent immigrants. The nation's recruitment policy removed the onerous Civil War era draft burden from this group, so no draft riots occurred. Many immigrants, however, coming from European nations ruled by kings, sought to escape such a system in America. Although their numbers were small, some immigrants pointed to the evils of empire back in the "old country," and urged America to forsake empire and remain true to its republican heritage. Chief among these was Carl Schurz, from Germany, one of the

43 Welch, Response, 107-16; numerous editorials from various newspapers reprinted in Foner and Winchester, Reader Vol. I, 166-75, 181.
leading figures in the anti-imperialist movement. Surprisingly, it appears America's oriental community did not speak out against the threat of expansion into the Far East. 

England did not have a Black community but it did have its "Irish Question." The Irish had a natural affinity for the Boers, and long-standing animosity for the British, so opposition in Ireland quickly developed. Irish newspapers and, to a greater extent, Irish politicians deplored the bullying of the Transvaal, and gloried in British setbacks. Irish dissent added fuel to the simmering Home Rule controversy as M.P.'s opposed to Home Rule observed how quickly Ireland proved disloyal. The Irish, often characterized by England as a nation of hooligans, trumpeted every occasion of riots breaking up English pro-Boer meetings. On the other hand, Irish units serving in South Africa fought with such distinction that after the war England granted, out of gratitude, concessions that decades of rebellion and agitation could not win. The war also engendered in Ireland a new sense of co-equality within the empire, and a new attitude of "unionism." 

44 Beisner, Twelve, 18-19.
Besides the Irish, England had two other subject nationalities within the United Kingdom: the Scots and the Welsh. Generally speaking, support and opposition in both countries roughly reflected that of England itself. Pro-Boer meetings in Scotland elicited greater mob violence than in England. Crowds burned in effigy Gavin Clark, M.P. for Caithness and one of the most outspoken pro-Boers, and voters turned him out of office in the 1900 elections with only 673 votes. Only one SACC chapter operated in Scotland, and the SACC list of names and addresses lists relatively few Scots or Welsh members. Henry Pelling uses statistical methodology and the Welsh election results of 1895 and 1900 to support his claim that Wales was heavily pro-Boer, but he neglects two points. First, as Kenneth Morgan points out, the 1895 Liberal setback was an aberration, whereas the 1900 results represented more of a return to normalcy than a rejection of the war. More importantly, though, Rosebery would be the first to point out that being a Liberal in 1900 did not mean opposing the war. Two prominent pro-Boers came from Wales, David Lloyd George and Bryn Roberts, and most Welsh language newspapers opposed the war. Lloyd George and Roberts, though, were in the minority of Welsh politicians, and the papers, recognizing most Welshmen supported the
government on the war, turned to other issues on the eve of the 1900 election.46

Another concern unique to England was the question of colonials. This was truly a two-edged sword that cut both ways. While most colonies, notably Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, rallied to the colors in a new and critical way, the Cape Colony degenerated into revolution and civil war. Most of Britain's colonies experienced the wave of patriotic fervor seen elsewhere, and they responded quickly and positively to the Queen's predicament. According to Munro, the colonies' offers of troops for the war surprised London, but after the initial military defeats, the help proved to be a godsend, and a new day dawned for the empire.47

Opposition existed in these countries, but it remained small. An Anti-War League formed in Australia, and according to a letter written by its president, a Professor Wood, the group circulated petitions and met with counter opposition of some sort. Pro-Boers in Canada registered vocal dissent, but the extent of their activities and


47 Donovan Williams, "Newspapers as Public Opinion In the South African War Years: A Note In A Western Canadian Setting," Historia 2 (September 1975): 146-50; Munro, "The Empire," 197.
organization is unclear. In New Zealand J. Grattan Grey, a journalist and an employee of the New Zealand Parliament, criticized New Zealand's support of the war. The New Zealand Premier inquired into the propriety of a government employee making such statements, and someone removed "seditious" newspapers from Grey's personal mail. Grey responded with pamphlets taking his case to the people and creating a minor furor, for though most people disagreed with his views, they supported his right to air them.48

The Cape Colony was a completely different situation, and America had nothing to compare with it. The history of the Cape paralleled that of the two Boer Republics. In fact, the Boers were Dutch descendants who fled the Cape and its eastern neighbor, the Natal, to escape British rule. Large numbers of British colonists settled in the Cape over the years, but it remained a heterogeneous community dominated internally by the Dutch. The war fractured the Cape community. Some Dutch sympathized with their Boer kinsmen, some English resented London's role in the whole affair, yet other English and Dutch yearned to prove their loyalty. Regardless of political views, everyone in the Cape suffered from the war, especially when the British Army

48 [Professor Wood], ["The Anti-War League"], n.d., a leaflet printed by someone other than Professor Wood quoting Wood's letter, found in JBC/TUC; [no author], "The Shame of Canada," March 1900; J. Grattan Grey, "Freedom of Thought and Speech in New Zealand, no. 1," 2 April 1900; J. Grattan Grey, "Freedom of Thought and Speech in New Zealand, no. 2," 30 April 1900, 20-21; all JBC/TUC.
declared martial law. Furthermore, although all Cape Colonists were British citizens, the Home Island treated them, particularly the Dutch, as traitors.

The situation deteriorated further when the Boers invaded the Cape. Many Cape Colonists, primarily Dutch, joined the Boers in arms. If caught, the British publicly executed Cape Colonists as traitors, often without trial. Violations of basic civil rights under martial law shocked many Britons, who questioned its constitutionality. Cape officials, including S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner, visited England where Britons treated 'hem as enemies and mobbed them in the streets. Pro-Boers argued against such treatment and warned these actions would forever divide the community, but their warnings fell on deaf ears.⁴⁹

**Social and Working Classes**

Many perce in America and England agreed with Alfred Thayer Mahan that imperialism ensured economic prosperity at home, while socialists and labor leaders claimed it hurt

---

workers' interests. Furthermore, both wars spawned charges that capitalists instigated the wars to serve their interests. The economics of imperialism is too broad a topic for this study, but the question of how workers and lower social classes responded to the war is pertinent. Generally speaking, attitudes revolved around questions of whether imperialism meant high employment from greater trade, or unfair competition from foreign labor.

America had less history of rigid social stratification than England, therefore, the debate centered more around workers and labor issues. Recent studies of this issue bog down over whether or not anti-imperialists pushed economic imperialism, but most labor unions clearly opposed annexing the Philippines for varying reasons. Some labor leaders, such as Samuel Gompers, feared competition from cheap Filipino labor, but not the increased employment of expanding markets. Others such as Eugene Debs, felt imperialism kept capitalism alive by externalizing excess profits and products. Gompers opposed imperialism, but not economic expansion, while Debs opposed economic expansion, but seeing imperialism as part of capitalism, did not oppose imperialism specifically. As in other areas, the workers received mixed and conflicting signals, so patriotism and
current good economic conditions shaped most workers' attitudes.  

In England class divisions add another element to the discussion. Richard Price and Arthur Davey address these two aspects of the issue, workers and class, respectively. Price shows that workers did not readily support the war and contends that, if properly led, they offered a formidable block of opposition. Davey illustrates the recently acquired importance of the middle class, and the relative disunity of the working class. Price contends the SACC ignored workers, while Davey claims they aimed at the middle class because that was where the power lay.

Both miss some important points. First, if workers did not fall prey to the jingo passions of the day, neither were they docile followers waiting for a Pied Piper to lead them. The second point stems from the first. Rising literacy meant more people could read the printed arguments circulating widely around them. Many pro-Boer papers aimed their arguments at the working class, as did many pamphlets. In fact, the vast majority of STWC pamphlets stress workers' issues, and not, as often charged, religious invectives.

---


51 Davey, British Pro-Boers, 121-26; Price, Imperial War, 150-52, 233-35, 241-42.
Furthermore, the notion that workers could not grasp the well reasoned arguments of most SACC pamphlets seems patronizing. Like their American counterparts, conflicting information deluged British workers. No single argument encompassed all opposition, and no single alternative offered meaningful change. In such a state, other issues likely held sway.\footnote{Examples of SACC and STWC pamphlets arguing issues of interest to workers are too numerous to list, but common themes were, "rich man's war, poor man's fight," distraction of interest from social reform at home, and the incompatibility of banker/speculator schemes with the plight of the workers.}

The anti-imperialist and pro-Boer movements, as social phenomena present some serious problems. The political parties and opposition groups reflected the diverse and pluralistic societies that spawned them, and were, therefore, fragmented in their motivations and goals. The opposition groups, particularly, never overcame their fragmentation, so their arguments remained disjointed and often contradictory. Significantly, neither movement was completely an anti-war or anti-imperialist movement. Elements of opposition existed in segments of each society, but, with few exceptions, the opposition was small. More important, even among the exceptions, the dissent was fragmented and ineffective.

Would the opposition groups have succeeded had they subdued their differences for the good of the cause? The
question is impossible to answer, especially since protest
groups thrive on allegiance to principles, and compromising
principles usually carries negative connotations. Their
disjointed movements certainly hurt their effectiveness, and
both movements ultimately failed in all their main goals.
In the final analysis, each movement failed, in the same
way, to do what any pressure group in a democracy must do:
convince its society that its proposed alternative is the
best choice.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND MEDIA

The anti-imperialist and pro-Boer movements were movements of the people. Private citizens dominated the opposition groups, but many who sympathized with the movements' goals never formally joined an opposition group. The fact that they did not join, though, does not mean they did not speak out in some manner. How, then, did these movements of the people voice their protest? Both movements used many methods and media to spread the word, and both tried, at some point, virtually every method used by the other. English and American groups and individuals published pamphlets, wrote articles, stories, poems, and letters lodging their protest or presenting their argument to fellow citizens, officials and, representatives. The means of disseminating their message tells as much about the movements as the composition of the various groups.

Pamphlets

The most prominent media used by both movements was the pamphlet. Since even sympathetic newspapers left authors at the mercy of editors, space, and deadlines, dissidents adopted a forum they controlled. The pamphlet campaigns in England and America shared a surprising number of aspects, but not all. The pro-Boers were more systematic in
publishing pamphlets on a regular basis, and with more groups publishing, they put out more pamphlets than the anti-imperialists. Yet the Philippine Information Society conducted the most thorough and comprehensive public education effort of any group.53

The target audience for both movements was the person on the street, and although pamphlets often listed a price, financial reports list small revenues from sales despite the thousands of pamphlets distributed. Group members most likely handed out pamphlets on street corners and requested the recipient to read it and pass it on to someone else. Most English pamphlets were short for quick and easy reading. The STWC, Morning Leader, Transvaal Committee, and Manchester Transvaal Committee pamphlets usually numbered two or three pages. Although SACC pamphlets were sometimes this short, they commonly contained twelve or more pages. American pamphlets were often longer, with Atkinson's "The

53 For analysis of the pro-Boer pamphlet campaign see Galbraith, "Pamphlets"; no systematic analysis of the anti-imperialist pamphlet campaign exists, though Lanzar, "Anti-Imperialist League," Review 4 (October 1933): 264-69, gives useful details, and Foner and Winchester, Reader Vol. 1 contains some edited pamphlets and editorial comments. All the pro-Boer pamphlets mentioned in this section are located in the John Burns Collection of the Trades Union Congress in London. The nearly 1600 photocopied pages held by the author represent one third of the collection. All anti-imperialist pamphlets mentioned are, unless cited otherwise, found in the four volume bound pamphlet collection titled Pamphlets on Imperialism, and the single volume bound pamphlet collection titled Facts About the Filipinos held in Love Library, University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Anti-Imperialist" series, and the Philippine Information Society's work frequently running longer than fifty pages.

Many, but not all groups published, or financed pamphlets, although determining publication responsibility is often impossible. Many pamphlets did not identify the publisher, some did not identify the author, and few gave a publication date. Often unusual clues help assign origin. For example, one pamphlet from an otherwise unheard of group lists the same address as every STWC pamphlet, and an anonymously published pamphlet bears the same slogan and printing house marks as SACC pamphlets. Groups published most pamphlets, and series were popular. The SACC published a numbered series of at least ninety-six pamphlets, and the STWC's series numbered at least forty-eight. The Anti-Imperialist League published at least twelve pamphlets in its Liberty Tracts series, and at least twelve Anti-Imperialist Broadsides. Most series did not follow a particular theme other than the group's agenda, but once again, the Philippine Information Society's The Story of the Filipinos and Facts About the Filipinos are two noteworthy exceptions.54

Individuals also published pamphlets. The two most notable were Atkinson in America, and Stead in England. Although publishing a pamphlet was costly, philanthropists

54 Numerous pamphlets reprinted in Foner and Winchester, Reader Vol. 1, 287-307.
sometimes helped defray costs. One pamphlet, "Labor Leaders and the War," so impressed George Cadbury that he paid to have three million copies printed and distributed. Most times, though, individuals paid the expenses themselves. In Stead's and Atkinson's cases, both men had money and means of assistance, but most people did not. Individuals with little money, therefore, could not protest widely through pamphlets on their own.\footnote{Davey, \textit{British Pro-Boers}, 125.}

Pamphlets drew their contents from several different sources. Many were original pieces written by prominent dissidents, or by an anonymous author under the name of the group or an alias. Three pro-Boer pamphlets omit the publisher, and use the pen-names "X," "Y," and "Z" respectively. Another popular source was excerpts from newspapers. Both movements carried pertinent articles from opposition newspapers, but excerpts from loyalist papers were also popular as effective pieces from unimpeachable sources pointing out government inconsistency. Speeches were in the same category. Leading pro-Boers' and anti-imperialists' utterances at meetings or in the legislatures were popular, but if a leading government figure or outspoken government supporter said something useful to the cause it circulated widely. Observations of average people on the scene in either the Philippines or South Africa, either before or during the war, furthered efforts to
overcome popular misconceptions. Finally, soldiers' accounts were common sources, especially during the atrocities controversies.\footnote{6}

The pro-Boer pamphlets followed two approaches, one of which anti-imperialists shared. One approach of British pamphlets was straight to the point and sometimes shrill. STWC pamphlets dominated this category. Although not always guilty, as charged, of religious fanaticism, they did use banner headlines and a lot of exclamation points. They also frequently used cartoons that at times were grotesque. More often, though, they used temperate, well-reasoned arguments to make their point. In this they shared the other, more popular and widespread, approach. The detailed, elaborate, argument was the hallmark of the SACC, and all the anti-imperialist groups used it as well. In the controversy over Atkinson sending pamphlets to the Philippines many newspapers echo one sentiment: something so dull was not going to drive anyone to mutiny.\footnote{7}

Similar themes dominated both pamphlet campaigns. During the first half of the wars, when both movements hoped for success, common themes stressed under-handed politics, deals with capitalists, the true nature of Boers and Filipinos, and a return to traditional virtues. Apparent

\footnote{6} Lanzar, "Anti-Imperialist League," \textit{Review} 4 \textit{(October 1933)}: 269.

\footnote{7} \textit{The Nation} editorial, 11 May 1899, reprinted in Foner and Winchester, \textit{Reader Vol. 1}, 387-88.
military success and losses in the elections of 1900 dashed both movements' hopes, and a period of reduced activity followed. Military success proved illusory as both Boers and Filipinos turned to guerrilla warfare, which in turn prompted British and American troops to resort to harsh measures. The "methods of barbarism" sparked a revival in both movements, and pamphlets reflected this as they detailed the unfolding story of atrocities.

Were the pamphlet campaigns effective? Reports from each group point with pride to large numbers of pamphlets distributed, and no doubt they had some impact. Galbraith raises a point that is pertinent to both movements, "A pamphlet issued is not necessarily a pamphlet read, and a pamphlet read is not necessarily a pamphlet accepted." The crucial point is pamphlets let small groups, and even some individuals, reach the people in a medium where they controlled the content and the extent of circulation.58

Meetings

Meetings were popular forums in England and America. Pro-Boers and anti-imperialists not only took their message directly to the people and drummed up support, the events gave them a real sense that they did something positive for the cause. Both movements held public meetings in rented

58 Galbraith, Pamphlet, 112.
halls, spoke at clubs and labor organizations, and led outdoor rallies; they also held private meetings to keep up morale. The reaction to meetings, though, was decidedly different in the two countries.

Public meetings, speeches, and rallies were the most important for both groups. In England virtually all groups held public meetings to some degree. Most annual reports detail meetings and speaking engagements conducted by the groups; the LLAAM, for example, reports forty meetings in the last three months of 1901. Meetings, though, drew sharp reactions from the public. Patriotic crowds violently broke up a meeting held at Exeter Hall in London on 2 March 1900, the night after the city celebrated the relief of Ladysmith. Elements opposed to pro-Boer protests either organized or incited the riot by announcing the meeting in London papers on 2 March, and suggesting "loyal" citizens continue their celebration of 1 March by disrupting the meeting. Riotous crowds broke up numerous meetings in this manner. Lloyd George, injured at one such meeting, only escaped the mob disguised in a police uniform. Some pro-Boers responded to these attacks by holding "private" public meetings, where attendees needed a ticket to get in. Loyalist papers then printed counterfeit tickets. Others pro-Boers reacted to the violence by hiring "stewards" to help keep order at meetings, but who also stifled expression of opinions contrary to the pro-Boer line. Damage caused by violence at
meetings made hall owners reluctant to rent their buildings to pro-Boer groups, further hampering their efforts.59

Meetings were also popular with the American movement. In fact, the Anti-Imperialist League began at such a meeting. Individuals opposed to imperialism held a meeting in Boston on 15 June 1898 at a strategically chosen site: Faneuil Hall, the historic location of many early Revolution era independence meetings. The League again chose Faneuil Hall for another public meeting, this time on a date chosen for its significance: 22 February 1899, George Washington's birthday. In fact, anti-imperialists held public meetings in several cities on that day. Another chapter, the Central Anti-Imperialist League, began at a public meeting held in Chicago's Central Music Hall on 30 April 1899. In stark contrast to the experiences at British public meetings, the meeting in Chicago was the only occasion of an attempt to disrupt an anti-imperialist meeting, and even this one was peaceful. A group of "loyalists" shouted "traitor" and "treason" at the speakers as they talked, but when officials asked the group to leave, they left quietly. Newspapers and public figures across the country condemned such meetings but few disrupted them.60

59 Koss, Pro-Boers, xxviii-xxix, 105-26, 218, 251-56; LLAAM pamphlet, "Second Annual Report," 9-11, JBC/TUC.

60 Anti-Imperialist League pamphlet, "Speeches at the Meeting in Faneuil Hall, Boston, June 15, 1898," and Central Anti-Imperialist League, Liberty Tract no. 1, reprinted in Foner and Winchester, Reader Vol. 1, 275-84, 287-97,
Both movements held private meetings to conduct group business, or to inspire the faithful. The Anti-Imperialist League conventions, described in Chapter One, are examples. The various Leagues across America also held periodic meetings, as did sympathetic, but independent, clubs like the Massachusetts Reform Club. The same occurred in England. Every group held periodic meetings where they conducted group business and issued reports. The press called one episode of political infighting between factions of the Liberal Party the "war of the knife and fork" because the verbal exchanges occurred during a series of group dinner meetings. Each group consisted of local chapters or clubs, and they too held meetings.⁶¹

Although popular and numerous, meetings had one important limitation. Since the audience chose to attend, the undecided faction who might benefit from the arguments could chose not to attend. Violence at English meetings exacerbated this tendency as many average citizens avoided the trouble spots. Admission by ticket only worsened the "preaching to the converted" tendency of these meetings. Still, newspapers frequently summarized the speeches at such meetings, further circulating the movements' message. Few other forms of protest gained such press coverage.


⁶¹ Blodgett, "Boston Mugwump," 620; Price, Imperial War, 36-37.
Unlike newspapers, which only reported or editorialized on events, albeit favorably or unfavorably, journals offered a venue to air complete, coherent arguments in the form of articles. Advocates of both movements wrote numerous articles for publication in the popular journals of the day. The anti-imperialists and the pro-Boers each "owned" a journal of sorts. Godkin edited The Nation, and Stead edited Review of Reviews. Although influential, both had small circulations and suffered from close identification with their editors' respective causes. Other more popular and neutral journals ran numerous articles written by prominent dissidents as part of a forum for debate. The Arena, The Independent, the Literary Digest, and The North American Review all published several anti-imperialist articles. The Contemporary Review, and the Fortnightly Review published pro-Boer articles, and The American Monthly Review of Reviews published articles from both movements.62

Other journals joined the debate, but these were the most prominent. Although not a panacea, articles placed in respected journals presented the movements' arguments to

62 Beisner, Twelve, 55; Koss, Pro-Boers, 17-18, 47-48, 68. Stead started a second journal when the war began, War Against War in South Africa, but it made no attempt at impartiality or balanced presentation of issues, therefore, I have not considered it in this category; see Davey, British Pro-Boers, 83-86.
readers who might not otherwise hear or listen to them. Authors still confronted editors concerned with reputation and circulation, but placing arguments in such journals immediately boosted their credibility. Thus despite the limitations, these restrictions actually helped the cause.

**Literature**

Not all who sympathized with the anti-imperialists or pro-Boers joined the movements, but they followed the dictates of their conscience in other ways. Many writers and poets fall into this category. Both movements listed writers and poets among their members, but far more, ranging from the famous to the anonymous, registered their protest through art. Some of the works were good, many were not, but more important, they effectively presented the views or concerns of individual members of the two societies. Seeing how works like "The Charge of the Light Brigade" glorified and promoted war, artists strove for the story, satire, or poem that would do for peace what Tennyson did for war.⁶³

---

Probably the most famous writer to speak out was Mark Twain. His satire, "To the Person Sitting in Darkness," was arguably the most effective work of the period. Though an American, and writing primarily about the Philippines, the piece blistered imperialism generally, and England and America specifically. Two major themes predominate in his piece: the self-righteous and sanctimonious imperialist attitude that dissimilar cultures need to be brought "up" to Western standards, and America's fall from republican grace. In an example of the first, Twain's main motif portrays the civilization effort as a profitable business that must be properly run to be effectively exploited:

"Extending the Blessings of Civilization to our Brother who Sits in Darkness has been a good trade and has paid well, on the whole; and there is money in it yet, if carefully worked..."

Twain's second theme depicts a deeper cruelty in America abandoning the ideal of liberty - at home and abroad America was the example of liberty:

"...we have stabbed an ally in the back and slapped the face of a guest; we have bought a Shadow from an enemy that hadn't it to sell; we have robbed a trusting friend of his land and his liberty; we have invited our clean young men to shoulder a discredited musket and do bandit's work under a flag which bandits have been accustomed to fear, not to follow..."
The piece brought praise and howls of protest from both sides of the Atlantic, and many quickly branded Twain a traitor.64

Another international effort from a famous poet yielded a British poem that back-fired. Rudyard Kipling, an ardent imperialist and supporter of the Boer War, wrote a poem, "The White Man's Burden," and dedicated it to America as encouragement to carry on in the Philippines. The effect fell short of Kipling's intended mark in two ways. First, it enjoined America to take up the burden of enlightening the benighted with lines like, "Go bind your sons to exile," and, "the savage wars of peace." Such sentiments hardly inspired American imperialists who relished only the benefits, not the arduous duties, of empire. Second, and more important, the anti-imperialists had a field day with such blatant jingoistic and ethnocentric sentiments: they turned out at least eight parodies. One anonymous version that appeared in the New York World asked simply:

We've taken up the white man's burden
Of ebony and brown
Now will you kindly tell us Rudyard,
How we may put it down?65


Among strictly American efforts, William Vaughn Moody combined effective themes with true artistic quality in, "An Ode in Time of Hesitation." Inspired by the Boston memorial to Robert Gould Shaw and the 54th Massachusetts Regiment, and glorifying America's noble heritage, critics still consider the ode a classic in the genre. Another Moody poem, "On a Soldier Fallen in the Philippines," broached the delicate subject of supporting America's soldiers while decrying the war they fight.66

Other works tackled various themes. George Ade tackled America's darker motives behind imperialism in his, Stories of "Benevolent Assimilation," Peter Finley Dunne's humor stressed American jingo passions and ignorance in his "Mr. Dooley" series. Raymond L. Bridgman's polemic, Loyal Traitors, attacks the hypocrisy of America suppressing liberty-seeking rebellion. Anti-imperialists who supported the movement's main activities also turned out effective literature, particularly Ernest Crosby, but the extent and variety of work done by people not usually considered part of the movement was impressive and significant.67


67 Several works by Ernest Crosby, George Ade's Stories of "Benevolent Assimilation," and extracts from Raymond L. Bridgman's Loyal Traitors are reprinted in Foner, Reader, Vol. II, xxiv-xxix, 57-78, 119-80, 395-409, respectively.
On the pro-Boer side, several prominent authors opposed the war but did not actively agitate with the various groups. G.K. Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc, Thomas Hardy and W.B. Yeats all supported the movement through their writing. Hardy, known primarily as a novelist, wrote "Drummer Hodge," a poem that poignantly alludes to the tragedy of death and eternal rest in a distant and alien land. Yeats, a devout Irish nationalist, defined his goal as tapping the passions aroused in Ireland by the war into a hatred for the values and way of life that led to the war. Although some famous authors, Silas Hocking for instance, joined protest groups and registered dissent in more "traditional" ways, other prominent writers, obviously sympathizing with the movement, contributed with their pens.68

Less famous authors added prolifically to the flood, stressing many of the various pro-Boer themes. T.W.H. Crosland parodied his compatriot, Kipling, and added to the plethora of "White Man's Burdens," adapting it to conditions in South Africa. Harold Begbie et al., adopted the style of Lewis Carroll, and the pen-name "Caroline Lewis," to lampoon Chamberlain and the questionable diplomacy that precipitated the war. Their "Clara in Blunderland" borrowed from Alice in Wonderland, but sounds like something out of "The Jabber Wacky." Alice M. Buckton challenged the jingoistic image

---

68 Davey, British Pro-Boers, 142, 156-60; Smith, Drummer Hodge, 85, 146-47.
Britons held of Boers through a book-length epic poem, *The Burden of Engela: A Ballad Epic*, portraying the war's impact on one Boer family. E.G. Harman considered his pacifist theme in "War," written 1902, timeless enough to include the sonnet in a 1920 collection of his World War I poems.69

Just because poets and writers did not join protest groups or actively support "traditional" forms of protest does not mean they were not pro-Boers or anti-imperialists, quite the contrary. Traditional studies of these two movements focus on the "movers and shakers," the people who ran the groups, made speeches, or agitated in the streets. Such an approach neglects the opposition of a large number of dissidents, and suggests that those who did not join groups did not support the movement. A large group of people who opposed America's or England's policy through non-traditional protests contributed immeasurably to the cause. They faced the same problems that article writers faced getting their works published, but often an argument in an article might be too controversial, where the same argument in a poem might be acceptable as art. Such was the case with Moody's "An Ode in Time of Hesitation." Once published, a poem or story often exposed its reader to ideas

---

69 Smith, *Drummer Hodge*, 132, 150-51, 246-49.
in a more subtle, powerful, or evocative way than even the best reasoned and forceful article, speech, or pamphlet.\textsuperscript{70}

Letters

Poems and stories opened avenues of protest to people who chose not to pursue "traditional" forms of opposition, but few non-traditional opponents could write publishable stories or verse. Many people of both countries registered their complaint through letters. The groups and leading figures of both movements also sent letters: the pamphlets of each abound with references to such activity. A variation on the usual theme is Atkinson's "Anti-Imperialist Chain," a chain letter petitioning support and requesting the recipient duplicate the letter and send it to ten friends. For many, though, letters represented the only way they could, or would, support their cause.\textsuperscript{71}

Accurately determining the extent of this opposition form is impossible. Pamphlets, newspapers, and journals published letters of support or protest from famous and influential people, but space prohibited printing all letters, so they undoubtedly left out some. Private collections hold all surviving correspondences, but were all

\textsuperscript{70} Foner, \textit{Reader, Vol. II}, xviii.

letters saved by the recipient? Possibly so, but probably not. Still, average people sent letters to leading figures, groups, and institutions. The Anti-Imperialist Reader, Vol. 1 reprints numerous letters, especially to editors of prominent newspapers. Occasionally pro-Boer pamphlets reprinted letters from average citizens speaking out on various aspects of the war.72

An interesting use of letters from average people employed by both movements was letters from people on the scene or soldiers in the field to their families back home. Anti-imperialists and pro-Boers used these as authoritative descriptions of the Filipinos and Boers, or of atrocities committed by American and British soldiers. Although not always intended by their author as dissent, they served as examples of claims made by the two movements.73

Enough allusions to letter writing exist to support the conclusion that such activity was widespread. A report from The Transvaal Committee claimed, "An immense correspondence ...letters are constantly received from sympathisers [sic]." Schirmer's description of grass-roots agitation to bring the


73 Foner and Winchester, Reader, Vol. 1, Chapter 8; SACC pamphlets 10, 11, 20, 38, and STWC pamphlets 31, 32, 33, JBC/TUC, are all examples.
volunteer soldiers home from the Philippines leads to the tantalizing assumption that it entailed numerous protest letters from family members. Although beyond the scope of this survey, this neglected area deserves more investigation and could lead to further insight on the extent of pro-Boer and anti-imperialist sympathies.74

The methods used by the two movements had various strengths and weaknesses. Some means were more amenable to groups, such as pamphlets and meetings, while others, such as writing, lent themselves more to individuals. Writing, though, took different forms. Writing articles, stories, or poetry suitable for publication excluded many people, but nearly everyone who sympathized with the movements could write letters. The various avenues of dissent also reached different audiences. People who avoided meetings might read an article or story in a popular journal and change their views.

As stated in Chapter One, pro-Boers and anti-imperialists were movements of the people, and as protest movements in democratic societies they needed to take their message to voters. The methods used in England and America gave nearly every dissenter the chance to lodge his or her complaint. As a whole, the methods also allowed both

movements to place their arguments before a wide cross-section of each nation's society. Such easy access to so many dissenters, however, also allowed badly fragmented movements to put forth many, and often contradictory, arguments further confusing, rather than convincing, their audiences. If the pro-Boers and anti-imperialists failed, they did not fail from inability to get their respective messages to the people.
Any protest movement is bound to raise issues, and the pro-Boer and anti-imperialist movements were no exception. The fact that a segment of a population is unhappy with the way the country or society is acting implies an issue of contention. If the issues involve firmly held beliefs, the disharmony generated over the issue in question will be even greater. England and America were both at the height of intense patriotic waves, and involved in remote wars against weak nations. The combination of patriotism and war quickly gained overtones of defending national honor against all comers. The pro-Boers and anti-imperialists, though, also saw the institutions they defended as questions of national honor.

The two factions in each society, administration supporters and dissenters, developed firmly held notions and the fight over the fundamental issues raised was intense and acrimonious. Similar issues affected both England and America, but some took on characteristics or intensities different enough to make them barely recognizable between the two countries. The two societies approached some issues in the same way, yet others they treated quite differently. The nature and intensity of the issues, and how they handled those issues say a great deal about the anti-imperialists, the pro-Boers, and their respective societies.
Treason

Treason is one of the most fundamental issues facing any group protesting its nation's war effort. Both the anti-imperialists and the pro-Boers faced the accusation that their agitation was treasonous. In both cases the treason charge brought along a second related charge: their protest encouraged the enemy to fight, hoping to gain a favorable peace if dissension ended the war. The movements responded with yet another related issue: true patriotism, or the duty of a citizen who sees the nation headed toward disaster.

At the Chicago Liberty meeting of 30 April 1899 people in the crowd shouted "traitor" and "treason" in response to the speeches delivered. The account does not specify when the spectators began shouting, or to what statement they responded, but nothing in the speeches advocated the violent overthrow of the government. On 10 July 1899 the Chicago Daily Tribune charged a crowd at another anti-imperialist meeting, held on 9 July, with treason because they applauded a picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, Filipino rebel leader, but remained silent when someone brought in a picture of General Elwell Otis, the American field commander.75

Critics hurled such serious charges as treason frequently, but rarely examined them for legal authenticity. The Public, in a 13 May 1899 editorial, questioned the validity of such charges, and found they lacked credibility. The editor pointed out that anti-imperialists were not making war on the government, and since the Spanish-American War had ended, and no other state of war existed, they could not be aiding national enemies. The Public suggested the better charge might be sedition, but since 19 April 1775 Americans recognized sedition was really an attempt to muzzle free speech. Frederick Gookin echoed the thoughts of The Public and added that the framers of the Constitution specifically wanted to prevent charges of treason stemming from political debate. Most newspapers reflected the opinion that such meetings, as well as printing and distributing pamphlets, exhibited disloyalty, and some people wanted them stopped and the perpetrators prosecuted. Some papers, however, recognizing the right and duty of dissent, dismissed the protesters as misinformed.76

The government did not actually try anyone for treason, though they did threaten Edward Atkinson. The court of public opinion, on the other hand, continued the debate, but

throughout the conflict it was no more than a war of words. Advocates on either side hurled bitter invectives, but nothing else; it remained a peaceful controversy.

Loyalists in England also branded pro-Boers as traitors for their public speeches and pamphlets, but the debate quickly turned violent. Mobs attacked and broke up private meetings and public rallies, beat speakers, and ransacked prominent pro-Boers' homes. As in America, no one stood trial for treason, but the court of public opinion not only tried and convicted the pro-Boers, it meted out punishment. In the House of Commons debates on the violence the ruling conservatives, side-stepping the question of what constituted treasonous behavior, felt the dissidents got what they asked for by contravening heightened public sensitivities.\(^7\)

The slow response to halt or prevent such violence indicated unofficial government sanction of violence. On the local level, police either refused or resisted efforts to arrange for protection at meetings, and summons for help once violence broke out. When police arrived they often made no arrests despite the injuries and damage caused by the rioters. On the national level the ruling party resisted demands from pro-Boer parliamentarians that they order the police to protect meetings. Inquiries from

\(^7\) Koss, *Pro-Boers*, 108-11.
liberal M.P.'s received evasive answers and assurances that everything that could be done was being done.\textsuperscript{78}

The crux of the treason charge in both countries was not simply the lack of support for national policies, but that anti-imperialists and pro-Boers gave aid and comfort to the enemy. The charge took two forms. First, during pre-war legislative debate representatives in Congress and Parliament argued against what became official policy. Government supporters claimed this precipitated the wars by instilling in the Filipinos and Boers the notion that America and England would not fight. Second, after war broke out public elements debated the merits of the war policy. Loyalists claimed such public dissension encouraged continued resistance in the enemy.

In America John Barrett, former U.S. Minister to Siam, publicly charged that an anti-imperialism speech in the Senate by George Hoar contributed to Aguinaldo's decision to rebel. The Philadelphia \textit{Press} augmented Barrett's accusation by claiming Andrew Carnegie paid the $4000 cable fee to wire the speech to the Philippines. The Philadelphia Evening \textit{Telegraph} even urged the government to "make treason odious" within the Senate by restricting such speeches. Several papers responded that the speech had nothing to do with Aguinaldo's decision. Other papers made a far more important point: in a democracy important issues facing the

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid, 105-15.
nation demand full debate among appointed representatives without fear of later recriminations. Charging a U.S. Senator with aiding the enemy by questioning policy within the halls of Congress struck at the very heart of representative government.  

British parliamentary dissenters faced similar charges within Parliament and from outside critics. When Wilfrid Lawson commented that fellow M.P.'s would not physically attack him in the House of Commons for voicing his views, a critical M.P. called out, "We ought to do so." On the eve of war Edward Nicholls told a Conservatives' meeting that if war came it would be due to M.P.'s misleading the Boers with their calls for a peaceful settlement of grievances. A STWC pamphlet quoted a London Times editorial advocating a law to force pro-Boer M.P.'s to vote in Parliament according to the wishes of their constituents, and not their conscience. Unionist pamphleteers took up the theme in numerous pamphlets and claimed radical M.P.'s "egged on the Boers to resist."  

79 "Did Senator Hoar Cause the Philippine Rebellion?" The Literary Digest, 27 July 1900, reprinted in Foner and Winchester, Reader, Vol. 1, 413-16.  

The other half of the aid and comfort issue questioned the right of society to debate the merits of government actions. Critics of anti-imperialists and pro-Boers charged that public debate implied weak national resolve encouraging the enemy to continue fighting after it was obvious they could not win, hoping for a collapse of American or British will to fight.

The Filipinos drew hope from the activities of anti-imperialists, and that hope unfortunately led to prolonged and increased attacks on American soldiers. Hoping to aid Bryan's prospects for victory in the 1900 Presidential election, for example, the insurgents stepped up their attacks during the three months prior to the election. Increased casualties would give the anti-imperialists ammunition to use against McKinley, and heighten the war's unpopularity with the public. As in the charge against Senator Hoar, the anti-imperialists responded throughout the war by emphasizing the duty of public debate on important national issues.81

The pro-Boers also faced charges that they encouraged the Boers to fight on in forlorn hope that dissent in England would change military reality in South Africa. The loyalist pamphlets did not directly label pro-Boers traitors

81 John Barrett letter to Public Opinion, 29 June 1899; Juan Cailles letter to Colonel Pablo Estilla; "People Indignant," Springfield Republican editorial, 22 September 1899; all reprinted in Foner and Winchester, Reader, Vol. 1, 410-11, 360, and 409-10 respectively.
until the 1900 "khaki election" campaign, but the widespread election slogan, "A vote for the Liberals is a vote for Kruger," referring to Transvaal President Paul Kruger, implied that pro-Boers worked more for the Boers than they did for their constituents. In fact, the lines between pre-war and post-war aid blurred when the loyalist pamphlets published pro-Boer letters found when the British occupied Pretoria and Bloemfontein. The pamphlets twisted the letters, written before the war, in such a way as to suggest pro-Boers still corresponded with Boer leaders and offered help.  

Pro-Boers responded by connecting the pre-war and wartime criticism and the need for free debate. If they could not speak out before the war without bringing it on, and they could not speak out during the war without encouraging the enemy, when, pro-Boers asked, were they to voice their reservations? Raising their original objections after the war would only bring recriminations and disrupt the post-war healing process. In essence, the pro-Boers said, critics told them not to raise objections.  

Never truly able to acquit themselves of treason charges in the public's eye, the two movements went over to the offensive and asked the fateful question, "What is true patriotism?" Should a loyal, patriotic citizen who sees

---

83 Ibid, 117.
danger ahead not call it out even if it goes against the crowd? Both movements saw themselves as clear-sighted leaders, even Jeremias, and wrapped themselves in the mantle of seers of a sacred cause. The religious imagery is no accident since both movements reserved their most righteous (not necessarily religious) sounding phrases for portraying themselves as martyred heroes.  

For the anti-imperialist cause one letter represents the thoughts of many. Caroline Pemberton, a socialist, listed herself among the real traitors, for she paid taxes and supported the system that conducted the war. All citizens, she charged, were the true traitors and would soon suffer God's wrath. In an English example, the STWC began a list of attacks on pro-Boers with a quote invoking the spirit of Edmund Burke. In the passage Burke claimed that those who uphold the ideals of liberty are "the only true Englishmen," while all those who depart from the ideals are "wholly fallen from their original rank and value."  

The twin images of any war protest movement, the one of traitor that loyalists apply to the movement, and the one of

---

84 In one of the rare episodes of cooperation between the two movements, W.A. Croffut used a contemporary English pro-Boer poem to defend both anti-imperialists and pro-Boers as true patriots of their respective societies, letter to the editor, Springfield Republican, 9 September 1899, reprinted in Foner and Winchester, Reader, Vol. 1, 407.

true patriot that the protesters assume for themselves, seem natural labels that become part of any such dissent. The third image, giving aid and comfort to the enemy through public dissent, seems endemic, although not exclusively, to democracies at war. The fact that England and America experienced all three of these, therefore, is not surprising. For a free society to weigh the momentous decisions of going to war, and waging war, it must openly debate conflicting views. Debate, though, gives the appearance of indecisiveness to potential enemies. It also leads to self-awareness of, and sensitivity to, dissension at home. During the 20th century several nations dismissed both England and America as too divided by internal debate to go to war, only to end up fighting one or both nations. Does public dissension encourage potential enemies to strike or bluff? Loyalists in England and America thought so and blamed the dissidents. The pro-Boers and anti-imperialists, rather than focusing on disproving such charges, claimed that the disadvantages of eliminating such debate threatened a greater calamity than war itself.

Free Speech

The question of free speech became a major issue in both countries as a result of the protest movements. Most of the debates on treason, aiding the enemy, and the true
duty of a patriot centered around the right of a citizen in a free society to speak his or her mind. What pro-Boers and anti-imperialists said or wrote prompted the accusations against them. On the other hand, how firmly people clung to the right, the necessity, of free speech determined how quickly they hurled the epithet of traitor. Much of this chapter has, thus far, examined generalities of the free speech controversy. Rather than repeat much of it, therefore, the focus here will be on specific events in the controversy, such as censorship and imprisoning critics.

One of the most notorious episodes in the entire anti-imperialist campaign involved Edward Atkinson and his pamphlets. Hearing that soldiers were not getting telegrams considered too inflammatory, Atkinson decided to test the freedom of one American citizen to communicate with any other American citizen through the mail. Atkinson informed the Army of his intentions and asked for a mailing list. When he got no reply, he sent some of his pamphlets to high-placed American officials in the Philippines. The government reacted at the cabinet level: the Postmaster General ordered the pamphlets confiscated from the mail, and the Attorney General publicly claimed he could charge Atkinson with treason. At that point it became a cause celebre as newspapers debated the appropriate response.86

86 Virtually every major work dealing with the anti-imperialists describes this episode, the best is Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism, 206-08; Atkinson, "Prospectus," The Anti-
The response was mixed. Many newspapers called for harsh measures, not just against Atkinson, but the whole conspiracy of which he was only a part. The Anti-Imperialist League, fearing too much controversy, distanced itself from Atkinson as much as possible without repudiating his deeds publicly. Many people, though, rushing to his defense, raised significant points. City and State pointed out that while suppressing harmless statistics and health information that might actually benefit the troops, the administration's actions back-fired by creating a tremendous demand for Atkinson's pamphlets at home. The Nation emphasized the importance of free debate, and observed that unlike past and present conquerors, American Presidents must submit to quadrennial reviews of confidence. More unlike other conquerors, Presidents also must submit to the votes of their soldiers, and therefore soldiers need access to free speech. To those who believed dangerous times justify extreme measures, The Nation a week later addressed a Civil War veteran's letter to the editor of the Boston Advertiser recalling that during the 1864 Presidential election Union troops voted, and front-line soldiers received any paper requested.87

87 Survey of newspaper reactions in Public Opinion, 11 May 1899; City and State editorial, 11 May 1899; The Nation editorial, 11 May 1899; The Nation editorial, 18 May 1899; all reprinted in Foner and Winchester, Reader, Vol. 1, 393-95, 386-87, 389-91, 396-97 respectively.
The greatest threat to free speech in England was the violence directed at those who spoke out against the war and government policies. Pro-Boers quickly pointed out the hypocrisy of fighting the war to secure rights in the Transvaal for Britons while denying rights to Britons in England. Other questions, though, arose concerning a British subject's right to voice dissenting opinions. Although the government did not officially try to stop speeches or pamphlets, some dissidents faced libel charges. The Daily News, for example, sued W.T. Stead for libel after his attacks on its leaders.\textsuperscript{88}

More ominous, though, was the charge of criminal libel, leveled against Albert Cartwright, for upon conviction, he received twelve months in prison. The government charged that Cartwright, editor of the South African News, published a letter written by a British officer claiming Gen. Horatio Kitchener issued orders before one engagement to ignore any white flags and take no prisoners. The circumstances of the case gave it a highly controversial and political air. The letter, reprinted from the London Times, had appeared in several other English, Irish, and Cape Colony newspapers. Pro-Boers in England asked, at the time the letter first appeared, for refutation from both the Prime Minister and the Commander in Chief of the Army. Neither commented on

\textsuperscript{88} Koss, Pro-Boers, xxvii; Davey, British Pro-Boers, 87.
Moreover, after printing the letter, Cartwright printed Kitchener's immediate denial.\textsuperscript{89}

When the case turned into an apparent trial of anti-war opposition, the pro-Boers reacted vigorously. The \textit{South African News} was the leading English pro-Boer paper in the Cape Colony, and though other Cape editors had faced libel charges, no other paper in England or the Cape was prosecuted for printing the letter. The Cape Colony Attorney General, James Rose-Innes, personally prosecuted the case, and cross-examined Cartwright on the opposition stance of his paper, and the charge that Cartwright had received pro-Boer pamphlets from England. Leonard Courtney, Liberal M.P., attested to subscribing to the paper for two years. More important, though, a committee formed to lobby on Cartwright's behalf both during and after his prison term, and the SACC published two pamphlets dealing with the case exclusively. The pamphlets stressed the case's irregularities, its violation of English laws giving increased latitude to the press, and its danger to the institutions of free speech, free press, and democracy.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{89} Davey, \textit{British Pro-Boers}, 111-12; SACC pamphlet 74, "The Imprisonment of Mr. Cartwright," 3-4, 7, JBC/TUC.

\textsuperscript{90} Davey, \textit{British Pro-Boers}, 174-75; SACC pamphlets 74, "The Imprisonment of Mr. Cartwright," and 96, "The True Facts of the Cartwright Case," both JBC/TUC. Davey claims the only reason for the case's notoriety was that English pro-Boers rose to the defense of a prominent Briton, but he does not mention the claim that Cartwright alone went to jail for reprinting a letter from the respectable, and loyal, \textit{Times}. 
Both nations shared the controversy of censorship in the war zone. From the beginning this raised questions about the ability to debate adequately the conduct of the war, but censorship on the war front became a critical issue when rumors of military problems filtered back to the home front.

Anti-Imperialists saw censorship of news coming out of the war zone, and efforts to control information going to the Philippines, as related issues. The government's reaction to Atkinson's test of free speech confirmed to many anti-imperialists that the loss of traditional American freedoms they warned of had already begun. Concerning the censorship of information from the Philippines, though, they were just as outspoken. On 17 July 1899 the newspaper correspondents in the Philippines sent, by way of the uncensored Hong Kong cable, a protest stating that, due to the Army altering their despatches, the American people had an incorrect impression of the military situation in the Philippines. In fact, they claimed that since the military sent home only the information that looked good, even the generals on the scene did not believe what they were telling Americans.91

The reaction of the papers at home was mixed. Some editors recognized the importance of protecting secrecy, and thereby soldiers' lives, but others felt Americans were smart enough to hear the truth and make up their own minds. Frederick Gookin, raising a more crucial point, stated that within limits, the Army should protect some information, but the importance of free speech to a democracy, even during war, was so great it transcended military considerations. In short, divulging information to the enemy was a necessary risk to ensure an informed electorate. On 9 September 1899 censorship in the Philippines ended, although the military never officially announced it, and the press did not learn about it for some time. Anti-imperialists applauded its removal as a victory for the right of free speech.92

In England the debate over the larger issue of martial law overshadowed the controversy of censorship that followed in its wake. Numerous pamphlets argued against martial law but few dealt specifically with censorship in the Cape. Still, the issue rankled the pro-Boers. Two aspects drew particular fire. First, before the conflict became a guerrilla war military and government leaders assured the nation all was going well. After it degenerated into

seemingly unending conflict Robert Reid, M.P., speaking to his constituents, railed against the lack of independent information on the war. Rosy reports of military success accompanied more losses, delays in bringing troops home, and reports of continued Boer strength. Later, Emily Hobhouse's report after her first visit confirmed suspicions that Britons were not getting the full story. She told shocking and pathetic stories of the plight of women and children in concentration camps about which few knew much, if anything. Worse, on her return to the Cape authorities stopped her in port and sent her back to England. Many suspected the Army deported her to avoid more embarrassing news getting out.93

To pro-Boers and anti-imperialists free speech was a sacred right, and a duty. When they spoke out against their governments' policies, critics called them traitors, and questioned or interfered with their right to dissent. Recognizing the threat to a basic tenet of democracy, they assumed the role of true patriots and spoke out louder. Their arguments came full circle when each movement saw its origional charges coming true. The anti-imperialists had claimed the nation's drive for empire threatened fundamental traditions of liberty, and now the government abridged free speech in America. Pro-Boers had charged that the

93 Koss, Pro-Boers, 235-36; Davey, British Pro-Boers, 60; SACC pamphlets 87, "A Law Lord on the Imprisonment and Deportation of Miss Emily Hobhouse," n.d., and 91, "A Great Lawyer on the Liberty of the Subject," n.d., both JBC/TUC.
government was using the Uitlanders' petition for rights as a pretext for war, and now the government leaders denied those rights to Britons, showing their true lack of concern for rights. The issue of free speech, aside from the basic question of continuing the wars, became a central issue for the two movements. At times it even seemed to overshadow the original questions.

The Nature of Citizenship

The basic nature of citizenship occupied both groups, though for different reasons. For the pro-Boers it was a question of what martial law meant to the rights of British citizens during war. For anti-imperialists the question was whether or not a republic could have subjects. Like the issue of free speech, the debate over the nature of citizenship in both countries asked questions that struck at the very heart of basic liberties, and added yet another facet to both protest movements.

For England, the debate over martial law was more than a reaction to arbitrary military despotism. For some time the basic relationship between the home country and some colonies, the "white" colonies of Australia, Canada, the Cape Colony, and New Zealand, had grown closer. The residents of the colonies enjoyed full British citizenship, and they received wide latitude in running their own
affairs. Many ties, though, linked the Cape Colony and the Boer Republics, badly dividing Cape sympathies. The military authorities declared martial law in parts of the colony when the Boers invaded, and then extended it as Cape Dutch rebelled in support of the Boers. Seeing the close pre-war relationship with the Cape, the close legal ties, and the similarities between citizens in the Cape and England, many people in England asked, "Are we next?" If the military could declare martial law in the Cape without an act of Parliament, what prevented it from doing the same in England?\textsuperscript{94}

Pro-Boers debated the legality, efficacy, and excesses of martial law in a wide array of pamphlets. Some dealt with issues such as execution or deportation of British subjects, and the animosity martial law engenders among Cape citizens. For example, Olive Schreiner, a Cape resident and author, warned that every Cape resident killed by England weakened Cape ties to the Queen. England might win peace for a time, but the graves would speak louder than the men in them, and the martyrs' descendants would become the aristocracy of a new nation.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{94} For descriptions of the colonial relationship with England before the war see Munro, "The Empire," and Donovan Williams, "Newspapers," 146-50.

Martial law's constitutionality presented a more fundamental question. In the House of Lords Lord Coleridge spoke of its illegality and its violation of the noble, ancient traditions of Magna Carta and Common Law. The most cogent attack, though, came from Frederic Harrison who argued that although several nations in Europe included contingencies for a "state of siege" in their law codex, English law had no such provisions. He felt if England needed such a thing, Parliament should enact the necessary changes, and in such form that only Parliament could implement it. His main point, though, was the danger of allowing martial law at all. Any such law, even if controlled by the people's representatives, placed too much power in the hands of those who govern by fickle voter popularity. Prudent leaders might fall to despots who temporarily gained a majority at the voting booth, and thus wield authority to do away with centuries-old institutions and traditions.96

America, too, faced a constitutional dilemma. From the beginning many anti-imperialists felt that imperialism threatened many cherished American traditions. Endangered traditions included avoiding foreign entanglements, a small military structure, and others, but one tradition seemed

particularly threatened: liberty for all people. The anti-imperialists who argued the tradition of liberty fell into two categories, but both agreed on one thing: a republic could not have subjects.

One group recognized the hypocrisy of the nation that began at Concord and Lexington shooting down independence-minded rebels in Manila. Frederic Gookin went so far as to paraphrase the Declaration of Independence on the subject, "the people of the Philippines Islands are and of right ought to be free and independent." Many of like mind with Gookin feared that such hypocrisy would result in American republicanism ending up like Rome, with Americans, as well as Filipinos, ruled by "Satraps and military officers."97

The other group considered the Philippines either too distant or too different to become a co-equal state in the Union. Christopher Lasch places most anti-imperialists in this category, and quotes several prominent dissenters to indicate that these attitudes stemmed from racist views as strong as the ethnocentric imperialists. To be sure, many anti-imperialists fit this characterization. Sen. George Vest of Missouri opposed the notion of Filipinos gaining American citizenship with public statements that shock modern sensibilities. Yet others, such as Felix Adler,

argued the differences of the Filipinos in a positive light, claiming that forcing American citizenship on them would harm their culture. Both Vest and Adler agreed, though, that the Constitution and the traditions of American democracy could not allow the republic to govern without the consent of all the governed. In short, a republic could not have subjects.98

The anti-imperialists and pro-Boers saw threats to their countries' traditions of basic human freedom and their governments' constitutional establishment. The anti-imperialists saw this threat from the beginning as one of the dangers of imperialism, but their concerns stemmed from abstract notions. The pro-Boers' concern did not appear until the implementation of martial law, and although they all saw a real and concrete threat, some attacked only the human tragedy of its implementation. Along with the issue of free speech this gave the two movements two fundamental rights to defend, and therefore further split their already fractured arguments. Although it seems two endangered fundamental rights would rally the populace twice as fast as one, such was not the case. Few people saw either issue as an immediate danger to themselves or their world. Lord

Hobhouse, uncle of Emily Hobhouse and a high-placed critic of martial law, observed, "...how very long a time it takes to inform large multitudes as to the value of an abstract principle not yet violated in their own person."

Racism and Anti-Semitism

When contemporary notions of social-Darwinism combined with intense nationalism to create an aggressive mood of cultural superiority in the dominant cultures of both England and America, racist attitudes followed in the two countries. The situation in America, discussed briefly in Chapter Three, took on predictable forms. In England, though, the racial situation was surprisingly complex. Ironically, America claimed to offer the benefits of civilization to the Filipinos, and England claimed it was defending the rights of an oppressed majority within the South African Republic. Many critics in America, but few in England, recognized the racial ironies in these claims.

The response of the Black community in America, and their supposed affinity for the Filipinos gave the racism issue a sense of immediacy. Many anti-imperialists, but definitely not all, recognized the hollow ring in the government's justification for suppressing an independence

movement. Claiming to offer the Filipinos the benefits of an advanced culture, imperialists seemed to overlook the fact that they still had not "benevolently assimilated" Blacks in America. Anti-imperialism was strong in the South because Southerners equated Filipinos with Blacks. Southern politicians, though, had Northern imperialists, who needed Southern support, over a barrel. Proclaiming the Filipinos unfit for self-rule left Northern imperialists open to the South's claim that Blacks were just as unfit for a role in running the country. Northern imperialists, therefore, gained Southern political support for imperialism in exchange for a freer hand in race control policies for the South. Furthermore, many opposition figures did not offer much of an alternative. The Democrats as a whole had close ties with the South, and, therefore, Southern race control policies, conservative mob violence, and previous resistance to Reconstruction. Moreover, many saw racist overtones in Bryan's Populist policies.100

Many other anti-imperialists attacked imperialism's racist hypocrisies. Senator Hoar saw the rise in Black lynchings in the South as a product of both the war's dehumanization of Filipinos and Northern reluctance to speak out against Southern treatment of Blacks. The Springfield

---

100 Lasch, "Inequality," 320; Welch, Response 70; Richmond Planet editorial, 11 November 1899, reprinted in Foner and Winchester, Reader, Vol. 1, 165-66. See also the cartoon of "Dr. Jekyll" Bryan hugging a Filipino, while "Mr. Hyde" Bryan attacks a Southern Black, Welch, Response, 69.
Republican echoed Hoar's sentiments, adding that the use of violence in the Philippines meant long-term problems for American Blacks. Mark Twain's blistering attacks stemmed in part from his view that America needed to civilize its own culture before it turned to other areas. Another writer, Raymond Bridgman, connected racism in America with future Filipino prospects in one of the most graphic ant-war pieces. His polemic Loyal Traitors depicts three Americans who fight with the Filipinos as "soldiers of conscience." In a jungle skirmish American soldiers wound and capture one of the three, Douglass - the son of a freed slave. His fellow Americans torment, and finally kill Douglass. Significantly, Douglass' tormenters mistreat him not because he fought with the Filipinos, but because he is Black.101

The racial aspects of the Boer War are more complex. The predominant modern view of the war imagines hardy, devout, pastoral Boers fighting a noble, desperate war for survival against insatiable British imperial aggressors. The issue of race adds a new dimension to that view. One reason the Boers resisted British rule was Britain had outlawed slavery within the Empire, and the Boers practiced virtual slavery with the native population. Furthermore, English democratic reforms threatened to abolish the Boers' system of race control that evolved into the modern system.

of apartheid. The debate surrounding this issue created surprising role reversals for the main characters involved.102

The plight of Blacks in South Africa led to a lively debate that placed imperialists in the unaccustomed role of liberal reformers and pro-Boers scrambling to show the current government unfit as racial advocates. Hugh Hughes, prominent Methodist minister and subject of repeated pro-Boer deprecations, attacked slavery in the Republics and called for its abolition. Furthermore, the Imperial South African Association, an administration supporter, listed legal protection for Blacks as an essential element of any future settlement. The pro-Boers responded with pamphlets charging the government and its supporters with hypocrisy and listing the abuses of natives elsewhere in the Empire. The real intentions for Blacks in South Africa, several pamphlets stated, was cheap labor. Quoting Cape Colony and Rhodesian mine owners, pro-Boers claimed a capitalist cabal planned to end liberal Boer labor laws and force natives to work longer hours at a fraction of their former pay.103

102 For a concise description of the Boer's historic resistance to British racial policy see Pakenham, The Boer War, xiii-xiv.

Although not as open an issue as racism, anti-semitism bears investigation, particularly in light of events forty years later. Anti-semitism did not play much of a role in the Philippine-American War, but it was a prominent part of the Boer War. Worse, pro-Boers were the guilty party. The frequency and nonchalance of opposition charges that the war was the work of "dirty Jews," or that British soldiers were the cat's paw of "Jewish financiers," hint at widespread tolerance of anti-semitism within English society. The war supporters, unlike their defense of the natives, did not defend the nobility of the Jewish community, but instead assured Britons they were not "the Jew's instrument."

Pro-Boers, aiming at the England's baser attitudes to create public opposition, made anti-semitic stereotypes synonymous with the private interests supposedly pushing for war. One STWC pamphlet depicted a rich financier reviewing British troops marching off to war under the headline, "Morituri Te Salutant!" (We who are about to die salute you!) The text described the financier as a "Jewish jackal." Another shows a Jewish caricature exploding the world, with the fragments labeled stocks, bonds, pounds, and gold. Other pamphlets were more subtle. If the target audience was more middle class, phrases like "cosmopolitan
capitalists" replaced direct epithets, but the context unmistakably implied these capitalists were mostly Jewish.\(^{104}\)

The issues of racism and anti-semitism were particularly ugly by-products of two wars brought about in part by popular attitudes of cultural superiority. The presence of racist attitudes among the two opposition movements, although not universal, was obvious. Some of the anti-imperialists who argued for Filipino independence sounded condescending, or wanted to avoid another race problem in American society. Many pro-Boers sunk to a surprising depth in using anti-semitism as a weapon of opposition. Even the humanitarian concerns of Emily Hobhouse betrayed a racial bias: she inspected only white concentration camps, and chided British officers for letting natives hold positions of authority where, seeing white women humiliated, they grew impertinent. Adding new issues, and the differing attitudes toward those issues, fragmented the arguments of the two opposition movements still further.\(^{105}\)


\(^{105}\) SACC pamphlet no. 86, "Appeal of Miss Hobhouse to Mr. Brodrick," 15 October 1901, JBC/TUC; Koss, *Pro-Boers*, 206.
Atrocities

Late in the course of the wars, when each movement felt the cause was lost and dedication waned, reports of atrocities filtered out from the war front. The issue rejuvenated both movements, and for the first time, their opposition appeared united. The issue focused on two aspects shared by each movement: treatment of enemy soldiers and inhumanity to non-combatants. Although it was the most volatile issue of each movement, atrocities engendered more controversy in England than in America. When Hobhouse reported the conditions in the concentration camps the pro-Boer movement suddenly gained a grassroots response that far out-paced American response.

The limiting factor in America was the availability of information. With the Philippines half a world away and no American community close by, information came by way of news and letters. Even after the military lifted censorship news was hard to obtain. Due to costs, few correspondents stayed in Manila, and America had no unimpeachable private citizens bringing back shocking stories to jolt public complacency. Thus the first reports of killing wounded soldiers and the secretive torture known as the "water cure" came from soldiers' letters home. Initial efforts to investigate reports based on these letters found a weakness that would plague anti-imperialists throughout the war: the soldiers
spoke only in confidence. Later, when reliable reports came to light, including summary executions and herding civilians into concentration camps, anti-imperialists found new life and reacted vigorously.\textsuperscript{106}

The newspapers castigating the excesses of Generals Franklin Bell and Jacob Smith included not only such anti-imperialist stalwarts as the Springfield Republican and New York Evening Post, but several normally loyal papers as well. Many pointed out the hypocrisy of adopting the very measures used by General "Butcher" Weyler in Cuba that had so infuriated Americans, and had partially precipitated the Spanish-American War. Interestingly, some papers even compared American excesses, and those of Weyler, with General Kitchener in South Africa. B.O. Flower, editor of the Arena, took exception to apologists in general, who claimed Filipinos were even more ruthless, and specifically Gen. Smith's defense that his actions conformed with the laws of civilized warfare. Flower felt America should remain unfettered by the conduct of an enemy, and either abide by its own standards of civility or avoid war.\textsuperscript{107}

The Anti-Imperialist League formed a committee to gather information, secure testimony from witnesses, and aid


\textsuperscript{107} Welch, Response, 137-41; B.O. Flower, "Some Dead Sea Fruit of our War of Subjugation," The Arena 27 (June 1902): 651-53.
the Senate Investigating Committee charged with examining the issue. Old faithfuls who had fallen away, such as Charles Francis Adams, rejoined the fight. People who had argued over differing, and sometimes contradictory, reasons to oppose the war now united behind this one effort. That effort, however, ran into serious resistance. The Senate committee, headed by staunch imperialist Henry Cabot Lodge, held closed meetings, called for little of the information and few of the witnesses gathered by anti-imperialists, and refused to allow the anti-imperialists to participate in the hearings. The most active member of the anti-imperialist committee, Herbert Welsh, earned public embarrassment and a nervous breakdown for his efforts.108

Judging by the increased donations and expenditures of the Anti-Imperialist League, the controversy breathed new life into a movement that had sagged badly in 1901. The distribution of pamphlets and letters, however, fell sharply in 1902. Perhaps the expense of the investigation committee accounts for this drop. More likely, though, it resulted from the preoccupation of the anti-imperialists with proving the charges instead of using the issue to drum up support among the people. Some increased support came from a shocked population, but no outpouring of relief occurred as

in England for the South African victims. Many offended citizens sent letters and donations, but the difference in scale is obvious. The Senate closed its investigation in June 1902, and a month later the war ended. Between Lodge's desires to protect the administration and the Army's reputation, and the difficulty in finding witnesses who remembered details and would testify, the Senate committee added nothing new, and the issue died.109

The atrocity controversy in England started early and followed two distinct phases. The first phase was the debate over treatment of enemy soldiers and farm burnings. With the proximity of the Cape Colony to the Boer Republics, a steady stream of information came, both from people returning to England with eyewitness accounts, and from soldiers' letters. In the second phase, the controversy of the Boer women and children in concentration camps, little information circulated, even within the military, until the Hobhouse's report. The first stage elicited merely charges and counter charges, but the second stage united and invigorated the fractious and moribund movement in a way that shocked the complacent Conservative administration.

Early in the war pro-Boers sought to ennoble the Boer soldier in the eyes of the British. Since loyalists were circulating accounts of Boer atrocities, killing wounded or

captured British soldiers and ignoring white flags, pro-Boers countered with stories of British excesses. One example, previously mentioned, was the letter published by Albert Cartwright claiming General Kitchener forbade taking prisoners. In another account, a British chaplain confronted a Boer general, and asked why the Boers changed their policy of allowing the British to tend their wounded and bury their dead. The general explained that they ended the previous practice because the British did not reciprocate such considerations and instead fired on Boer doctors.110

The first hints of war against the Boer population were the accounts of extensive farm burning. In an examination of official reasons given by the Army for burning particular farms, one author claimed only 77 cases out of 634 conformed to internationally recognized rules of war. Fighting in the Boer Army was one popular justification for burning a soldier's farm. The author asked if such an excuse would have justified Wellington's troops in 1814 burning the homes of Napoleon's soldiers. In another account, pro-Boers claimed the Army burned the farms of Boers who were prisoners of war.111

110 STWC leaflet 3, "The Men We Are Fighting and How We Are Fighting Them," n.d., JBC/TUC.

Moved by stories of farm burnings, Emily Hobhouse started the South African Women and Children Distress Fund. Her visit to South Africa to distribute aid in the beginning of 1901 uncovered a morass of death, disease, and military mismanagement that shocked her, and soon the nation. The situation in the camps required the report of an outside observer, for it seemed the Army had no idea the situation was so desperate. Hobhouse saw cases of Army incompetence and obstinacy, but she also told of camp directors overwhelmed with inmates and short supplies, but receiving more women and children daily. An indication that the military and the government were out of touch with the magnitude of the problem appeared in a pamphlet presenting two articles, side by side, written within days of each other. One was an account of Secretary of State for War St. John Brodrick's assurances to Parliament quoting Kitchener that all in the camps were comfortable and content. The other article was an appeal to Americans from the Transvaal Military Governor's wife requesting relief aid for the camps and describing conditions like those in Hobhouse's report.¹¹²

The response to the situation in the camps was immediate. Within days of meeting with Hobhouse, Campbell-Bannerman lashed out with his "methods of barbarism" speech. The leader of the Liberal Party occupied the center position

¹¹² Davey, British Pro-Boers, 58-60, 172-74; Koss, Pro-Boers, 198-207; SACC pamphlet 72, "A Contrast," n.d., JBC/TUC.
in a tug-of-war between the Liberal Imperialists, supporting the war, and the radical faction who did not. Previously, therefore, he held the factions together by avoiding a stand on the war. The prevailing outrage over the camps, though, allowed opposition without splitting the party. Others spoke out as well, including some new names. Field Marshall Neville Chamberlain denied that such measures are necessary in warfare. J.S. Haldane, a doctor and Oxford don, put the staggering death rate in a statistical perspective that shocked many people. The issue of the camps finally moved the churches in England to oppose the war policy. One measure of the popular sentiment toward the situation was the immediate flood of aid that poured into the Cape from ordinary citizens in England.113

The issue of atrocities, for both movements, came when support was drifting away. The controversy gave each movement a boost, cemented fractured allegiances, and gave the chaotic movements unity of purpose. These benefits are, however, relative. The anti-imperialists enjoyed a new lease on life, but only in relation to the year before. American society, although appalled, as a whole did not experience outrage to the extent English society did, and so did not respond to the extent England responded. The lack

---

of an admission from the Senate committee or guilty verdicts from courts martial do not explain this fully, for no such admissions resulted from England's atrocities either.

Other issues arose from the debates within the two countries, such as the reasons for the start of the war, domestic social reform, and threats from militarism, but the issues point out a trend. Issues of free speech, the duty and nature of citizenship within the state, and racism, were fundamental questions of basic human rights and freedoms. But they were abstract notions. The issue of atrocities was more a question of societal morals and values, but also it was a concrete issue. Graphic descriptions of infant death rates caused English mothers to gaze at their babies and wonder. Stories of American soldiers shooting unarmed civilians made American parents wonder if their boy was acting so ignobly.

The nature of major issues fosters understanding of the response to the movements. As long as pro-Boers and anti-imperialists argued abstract notions of rights and tradition, their arguments invited chaos and contradictions. A person's views on rights are often like the joke about art: "I can't define it, but I know what I like." What one person likes about rights might be what another person dislikes. Such was the case in England and America. Each dissident argued violated rights and traditions from his or her standpoint of likes and dislikes. The ultimate decision
makers, the voters, listened to the cacophony nodding their heads emphatically one minute, and shaking them just as emphatically the next. In the early days of the wars, nothing arose of a concrete nature strong enough to dissuade the movements from their emphasis on abstract notions. This does not mean they were wrong to emphasize rights and traditions; the problem was that few in either movement could agree which rights were most vital or most threatened. When a concrete issue, atrocities, came along, nearly all dissidents found they could overlook differences in abstract notions to unite on a real and present danger. They also found they could more effectively win popular support with a concrete issue.

What then accounts for the difference in English and American responses? Several factors, such as distance, or little information, may explain it. The manner of exposure may have played a part also: American stories of excesses trickled out, while Hobhouse's report burst over the nation like a star shell in a night sky. How the movements handled the issue made a difference too: anti-imperialists focused on Senate efforts to prove the validity of atrocity charges, while pro-Boers immediately took the story to the streets. Another difference, however, exists. The British committed atrocities against Whites of European stock, so no racial barriers inhibited full and strong empathy among Britons. Americans, though, committed atrocities against people whom
many Americans regarded as Blacks. American racists could still oppose inhumanity to Filipinos: ante bellum Southern ministers defended slavery root and branch, but preached the sinfulness of abusing slaves. In England there was no ethnic check to a person's outpouring of pathos, so it could more easily overcome other checks such as pride, patriotism, or indifference. Not all Americans were racists, but for many, racial overtones made overcoming other factors that much harder, and for some, impossible.
CHAPTER FIVE: IMPACT AND CONCLUSIONS

What was the impact of pro-Bc :s and anti-imperialists on English and American society? The introduction outlined each movement's task as convincing either its government or its society that the movement's alternative was preferable to the current policy. Each movement failed to convince its national leaders, so attention then turned to convincing the voters. In the English and American systems of government, voters, if convinced, effect changes in national elections where legislative and administrative representatives are chosen. Each nation's voters got the chance to force such changes, but assessing each movement's impact through voter reaction is problematical.

Coincidentally, both nations held nation-wide major elections within weeks of each other, providing the two causes the most systematic effectiveness test they would get. In England on 2 October 1900 Parliament stood for a major election, known as the "Khaki election." On 6 November America held its quadrennial Presidential election. In both cases many presumed the voters would pass judgment on the war. English conservatives, with the fortunes of war momentarily going in their favor, called for elections. Liberals charged the Tories timed the election to benefit from patriotic fervor. The moniker "khaki," from the color of the new British uniforms, reflects this prevalent belief.
In the American election William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate, declared imperialism the "paramount issue." In both cases, the actual value of the election results as a barometer of popular support for the two movements is questionable.\textsuperscript{114}

One immediate problem in linking the elections to anti-imperialist or pro-Boer sentiment is timing. Both elections occurred before the controversy over atrocities hit the two countries. At that stage, the tangled arguments of the badly fragmented movements meant few Americans or Britons understood what the dissidents really advocated. On the eve of the American election, for example, former President and anti-imperialist Grover Cleveland received numerous requests from people asking for help figuring out what the issues were. Secondly, despite some significant setbacks, the war appeared to the populations to be going well. England particularly benefited from this. The relief of Mafeking and Ladysmith were only a few months old, and Alfred Milner, high commissioner in the Cape, confessed that, had England voted six weeks later, the results might have been different. Even America, though, was less war-weary in 1900.

\textsuperscript{114} Each major study of the two movements analyzes the corresponding election in great detail. For the Khaki election Koss, \textit{Pro-Boers}, Chapter 7, and Price, \textit{Imperial War}, Chapter 3, provide the most systematic studies. For the American election both Beisner, \textit{Twelve}, Chapter 6, and Tompkins, \textit{Anti-Imperialism}, Chapter 14, are good, but an important perspective appears in Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 A Mandate On Imperialism?" \textit{The Mississippi Valley Historical Review} 24 (June 1937): 43-52.
than it would be later. So the elections may not reflect peak pro-Boer or anti-imperialist sympathies.  

The more important aspect of how to interpret the polls is whether they represent a mandate on any issue. In England the divisions in the Liberal Party made a national anti-war voting block impossible. Unionists could, and did, urge a campaign against pro-Boer candidates. A nation-wide accusation that a vote for the Liberals helped the Boers might hurt Liberal Imperialists, but Conservatives would replace them. The pro-Boers could not use such tactics. An appeal to register anti-war sentiment by voting for the Liberal Party might help Liberal Imperialists get elected. Moreover, to many the Liberal Party was too divided to implement a viable alternate plan dealing with the problems in South Africa. Divisions within the Party, therefore, forced endorsing individual candidates, but this promoted regionalism. Such regionalism invited decisions based more on local conditions and individual records, the very thing national campaigns attempt to overcome. Close examinations of the election returns on a regional level indicate, if anything, the importance of local concerns.  

---

116 Davey, *British Pro-Boers*, 56, 127; Koss, *Pro-Boers*, 164-66; Price, *Imperial War*, cites a survey of certain local issues and the number of districts where each issue dominated, see 97, note 2, and 103; Morgan, "Wales, A Reply," gives a regional break-down of many districts and shows in some areas regional issues dominated, but in areas
In America the problem was not a split opposition party but split issues. Bryan forged a shaky coalition of Free Silverites, Democrats, Populists, and anti-imperialists. The many parties in this coalition eyed each other with thinly veiled suspicion and often contempt. Many anti-imperialists regarded Bryan as an opportunistic opponent of imperialism, a view stemming from his support for the Treaty of Paris giving America the Philippines. Worse, though, was Bryan's reputation among many as an irresponsible politician and his advocacy of Free Silver. The silver issue was his main plank in the unsuccessful 1896 campaign, and many suspected it was still his first love. His insistence on a silver plank in the 1900 Democratic platform bolstered this view, as did his campaign speeches emphasizing Free Silver despite proclaiming imperialism the paramount issue. 117

Thus anti-imperialists, divided in their motivations and concerns, distrusted Bryan for a variety of reasons. Purists distrusted his flip-flopping on imperialism, Blacks distrusted his ties to Southern Democrats, but most damaging were the many who disagreed with his widely unpopular silver stand. Few were willing to compromise these concerns for the sake of the anti-imperialist cause. Some sacrificed for the cause and endorsed Bryan, such as Carl Schurz, who

of traditional Liberal support, Liberals who won fell on both sides of the war issue, see especially 373-76.

referred to it as a "horrible duty." The words of a Nebraska editor, though, sum up sentiments of many, "It is a choice between evils, and I am going to shut my eyes, hold my nose, vote, go home and disinfect myself."118

The problem in both elections was voting dictated by many concerns other than pro-Boer or anti-imperialist issues. Observers describe the voter turnout in both elections as surprisingly light, and some sought ways to indicate that their vote did not represent their views on the war. Anti-imperialists suggested a manifesto to McKinley stating that they voted against Bryan and silver, not for imperialism. The British working class turned to cynicism toward the whole notion of empire.119

If the voting returns for the two elections in the fall of 1900 do not reflect the strength of anti-imperialist or pro-Boer sympathy within the American and British society, is there anything else that does reflect that strength? The direct answer is no, nothing in either country clearly or unequivocally reflects the strength of anti-war attitudes. Various authors point to diverse elements and draw conclusions, but these elements merely hint at different aspects. Divining voter attitudes requires drawing some important distinctions. What shapes or changes a person's

118 Ibid, 45-49, Schurz quote, 45, editor quote, 47.
119 Ibid, 45-47; Price, Imperial War, 238-40.
attitude toward a particular issue, and how does a person manifest his or her opposition toward that issue?

Several things shape or change a person's opinion on an event once it occurs. A person forms an opinion based on personal background and initial assessment of evidence presented from various sources, but that assessment is subject to change. People select some information sources, such as churches and newspapers, and since such sources often take a particular stand based on the opinions of their staff, anyone who turns to that source is going to hear the same theme repeated. People also gain information from unsolicited sources that are presented to them, like pamphlets, or sources that present both sides of an issue, as do many journals. Thus information challenging an initial opinion might unexpectedly confronted the reader. But this process works both sides of an issue. Initial acquiescence might evolve, under challenge, to opposition, but reassurances from apologists might also mollify initially suspicious opinions.

Once a person adopts an opposition stance, how does he or she manifest that opposition? This is the key question, for upon it hangs the whole issue of judging pro-Boer and anti-imperialist effectiveness in their task of convincing their societies to adopt their alternatives. As with dissension on any issue, strength of feelings range from mild annoyance to intense agitation, with myriad variations
in between. Patriotism, reluctance to speak out, or more importantly, opinions on competing issues, could easily overcome mild annoyance. Intense agitation would obviously brook no faint or half-hearted measures. But what of the many levels of opinion between the extremes. Here the divided arguments and the distracted election issues become critical. The weaker one's feelings of annoyance with current policy, in relation to feelings on other issues, the less likely one will translate that feeling of annoyance into active opposition. Furthermore, the less clearly one's vote will represent a blow in the name of opposition, the less likely one will strike that blow. In the case of the two 1900 elections, contradictory arguments on abstract principles presented by the two movements weakened the potential strength of voters' opposition, and other issues weakened the association of opposition votes to war policy.

Various clues support the theory that sympathy for the two movements varied widely, and that other concerns negated action on that sympathy. Price tells of an English relative who remained ambivalent toward the war until it affected his neighbor; only then did the relative express long-harbored opposition to the war. Bailey quotes a New York Herald poll wherein 45% favored, and 46% opposed imperialism. Annual reports of groups in both movements show contributions as low as 25 cents in America, and 1 shilling in England, while other contributions ranged in the thousands of dollars and
pounds. None of this proves the extent of sympathy for the two movements, but it does support the conclusion that, contrary to popular supposition, support among voters was greater than the votes against the ruling parties in the 1900 elections indicate.120

Conclusions

When America found itself in a war to suppress Filipino rebels fighting for independence, groups of concerned individuals banded together to oppose the administration's policy. Some opposed imperialism in thought and deed, others only imperialism in the Philippines. Some opposed acceptance of benighted heathens, others the crushing of a noble and uncorrupted race. Likewise, when England entered the Boer War, groups formed to oppose further imperialism, while others, only the practice of imperfect imperialism. Some opposed war in general, while others opposed sending the Army all the way to South Africa when the real threat was in France. Most dissidents were avid and sincere as only dissidents can be, and they evoked some measure of grass roots support.

Both groups, however, were badly divided and their strong feelings made the divisions wider and cooperation harder. Throughout most of the wars both movements stressed perceived threats to important, but abstract, concepts. The divisions, and the abstract nature of the issues raised, detracted from the strength and coherence of their arguments, and blunted their impact on society. Still, they made some impact on both societies, and that impact, although hard to measure with accuracy, was larger than often believed.

Would greater unity have helped their effectiveness? That, too, is hard to determine accurately. When a concrete issue arose for both groups, the issue of atrocities, each group experienced a relative increase in sympathy for their cause. Neither country's reaction yielded measurable, widespread, political opposition to the wars themselves, just greater pathos and outrage at military immorality. Had the issue arisen earlier, arguments of military necessity or crusades for military reform might have deflected the impetus. Too little study of grassroots reaction, and too many variables prevent accurate assessment.

One thing is true of both movements. When the central authorities of England and America committed their respective societies to a course of action, movements arose to challenge that commitment. Each movement raised fundamental questions concerning the authority of the state,
the rights of citizens within the state, the right of the state to commit its citizens, and the right of citizens to oppose that commitment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Published Government Documents


Books


Foner, Philip S. and Richard C. Winchester, ed. The Anti-Imperialist Reader: From the Mexican War to the


Articles


Pamphlets

JOHN BURNS COLLECTION

Trades Union Congress, London


Byles, W. P. What We are Fighting For. London: Bradford South African Conciliation Committee, n.d.


Martial Law. What it has Done for South Africa.
What it is Doing for the Empire. London: International
Arbitration League, n.d.

Grey, J. Gratten. Freedom of Thought and Speech in New
Zealand Nos. 1&2. Wellington, New Zealand: J. Gratten
Grey, 1900.

Kitchin, G.W. Overcome Evil With Good. London: South African
Conciliation Committee, 1900.

League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism. The
Financiers and the War. London: League of Liberals
Against Aggression and Militarism, n.d.

———. The First Annual Report of the Work of the League
of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism. London:
League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 1901.

———. Gladstone Series Nos. 1-4. London: League of
Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, n.d.

———. League of Liberals Against Aggression and
Militarism Pamphlets Nos. 2&3. London: League of
Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, n.d.

———. Now tell us all about the war, And what they
killed each other for. London: League of Liberals
Against Aggression and Militarism, n.d.

———. The Second Annual Report of the Work of the League
of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism. London:
League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 1902.


Manchester Transvaal Committee. Manchester Transvaal Committee Leaflets Nos. 1,2,4-15. Manchester: Manchester Transvaal Committee, n.d.


Morning Leader. Why we are at War. London: Morning Leader, n.d.


- **List of Names and Addresses**. London: South African Conciliation Committee, 1900.
- **Mr. Courtney's Speech**. London: South African Conciliation Committee, n.d.


- **Leaflet No. 3**. London: Stop-The-War Committee, n.d.


- **Sir William Harcourt on the Objects of the War**. London: The Transvaal Committee, n.d.


PAMPHLETS IN AMERICAN HISTORY


________. Imperialism. n.p., n.d.


PAMPHLETS ON IMPERIALISM

Love Library, University of Nebraska - Lincoln


________. Address to the People of the United States. Boston, Mass.: Anti-Imperialist League, 1898.

Protest Against the Philippine Policy. Boston,
Mass.: Anti-Imperialist League, 1899.

Atkinson, Edward. The Anti-Imperialist Nos. 2-5. Brookline,
Mass.: Edward Atkinson, 1899.

______. The Anti-Imperialist No. 6. Brookline, Mass.:
Edward Atkinson, 1900.

______. The Anti-Imperialist Chain. Brookline, Mass:
Edward Atkinson, 1899.

Boutwell, George. Imperialists or Republicans?

______. Isolation and Imperialism. Washington, D.C.: Anti-
Imperialist League, 1898.

Brooks, Francis A. An Arraignment of President McKinley's

______. An Examination of the Scheme for Engrafting the
Colonial System of Government upon the United States.
Boston, Mass.: George H. Ellis, 1900.

______. Objections to the President's Proposed Subjugation
of the Filipinos. Boston, Mass.: Alfred Mudge & Son,
1899.

______. The Unlawful and Unjustifiable Conquest of the
Filipinos. Boston, Mass.: Press of George H Ellis,
1901.

Bryan, W. J. Imperialism: Extracts from Speeches,
Interviews, and Articles. n.p., n.d.


Hoar, George F. *The Opinion of Massachusetts on "Imperialism"*. Boston, Mass.: Anti-Imperialist Committee of Correspondence, 1898.


Simmons, H. M. *History of Our Philippine Relations*. Minneapolis, Minn.: Minneapolis Anti-Imperialist League, 1899.


---

**Secondary Sources**

**Books**


Articles

Bailey, Thomas A. "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 24 (June 1937): 43-52.


______. "Liberal Women's Organizations and the War Against the Boers, 1899-1902." *Albion* 14 (#1, 1982): 27-49.


