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THE POLITICS OF NATO SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION 1983-1990:
THE FOLLOW-ON-TO-LANCE MISSILE DECISIONS

Jeffrey Arthur Larsen

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS

JUNE 1991
ABSTRACT

The follow-on to Lance (FOTL) missile was born in 1983 with a consensual decision by NATO, in the face of a worsening strategic situation, to pursue short-range nuclear force (SNF) modernization. The program continued despite increasing popular and political opposition in Europe. It ended with a May 1990 cancellation decision by the American bureaucracy that reflected converging pressures from the international system, from America's allies, and from the domestic arena.

This dissertation asks three questions concerning the FOTL case. Why did NATO decide to upgrade its SNF forces, particularly FOTL? Why did NATO continue to support FOTL's development in the face of increasing public opposition as the decade wore on? Why did the United States cancel FOTL when it did?

The thesis attempts to answer each question through the use of one of three analytical perspectives: systemic theory, alliance politics, or domestic politics. It concludes that during this time of diminishing threat at the systemic level, domestic-level factors within the German and American milieu became more important. While certain perspectives are better at explaining particular aspects or temporal periods of modernization cases, analysts should not focus on one perspective to the exclusion of others. Unexplained "residual" variables fall through the filter of each perspective, calling for further study by other approaches.

The Lance modernization program was a good case for this methodological approach, and provides a model for understanding the politics of future alliance nuclear programs. Using different analytical

perspectives to study discrete periods of a single case proved a sound approach with broader applicability, as the dissertation's last chapter demonstrated in a survey of the ongoing case of the tactical air-to-surface missile.

This approach resulted in better understanding of the details behind what first seemed to be a straightforward story of an alliance weapon system that was cast aside in the post-Cold War international security environment. On the contrary, as this study makes clear, the FOTL case was a complex and interesting example of the intertwined politics of the international system, of alliances, and of bureaucratic and organizational politics at the domestic level.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation owes its foremost debt to Professors Dick Ullman and Aaron Friedberg. Their timely readings of draft chapters, their astute editorial comments and suggestions, and their general counsel during the two years I spent researching and writing this manuscript were invaluable. Dick reviewed my work with exemplary speed and thoroughness, always returning it on the date promised with detailed margin comments and critical editing. His singular dedication to graduate students' needs was largely responsible for my completion of the program in the time allotted. Aaron was gracious in accepting the task of second reader despite being on a sabbatical in Washington, and was responsible for straightening out the dissertation's early structural dilemmas and for pointing me toward the multiple perspectives approach. He filled in when my first advisor, Jim McAdams, left Princeton for California in the middle of this project. Nevertheless, Jim's influence is clearly evident in this work. It was he who first suggested that the follow-on to Lance might serve as a useful case study for examining alliance politics and US-German relations. Finally, George Downs was involved in both ends of this dissertation's life cycle. He taught the graduate research colloquium which critiqued my first attempts at this story, then served as third reader for my final oral defense.

Several graduate colleagues at Princeton commented on the structural and theoretical aspects of this dissertation, especially in the early formative days of the project when their advice was most welcome. Contributors included Arie Kacowicz (who also read and commented on
several chapters), Tom Banchoff, Ian Gambles, Andrew Farkas, Erik Yesson, Andrew Richards, Mike Meese, and Tom Drohan. For moral and administrative support through the years I turned to Mildred Kalmus, the heart of the Politics Department, and to Linda Kaufman, in the Woodrow Wilson School.

I am also grateful for outside help, not only substantive information about my case study but in the form of suggestions on how to write a dissertation and survive the PhD process. Such advice came from many sources, including Jay Lorenzen, John Wahlquist, and Paul Viotti in Colorado; Tom Longstreth, Stan Sloan, David Yost, Catherine Kelleher, Bill Bajusz, and Kerry Kartchner in Washington; and Clay Stewart, Michael Brown, and Frank Klotz in Europe. A special note of thanks goes to Ivo Daalder, who acted as an outside expert, advisor, and third reader for the chapters related to the FOTL case study and NATO nuclear history. In Europe, my travels were greatly eased by the help of Dave Palenchar and Frank Klotz at NATO, Kurt Klingenerberger at SHAPE, Clay and Nancy Stewart in Stuttgart, Tim and Patti Krein in Weisbaden, and Joel and Amy Anderson in Berlin.

This dissertation could not have been written without original interview research, and I gratefully recognize everyone who consented to an interview in Appendix I. Their comments have, of course, remained non-attributed in the text.

My sponsor for this three-year doctoral program was the Department of Political Science at the US Air Force Academy. Thanks to Doug Murray and Paul Viotti for selecting me for this opportunity, and to Joe Burke and Ed Wright for prodding me to accept the challenge. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) handled the administrative and financial
matters during my time at Princeton. Thanks to Doris Reed at AFIT for coordinating travel orders, usually on short-notice, for my research trips.

I received modest additional financial support for my summer research travels. Sponsors included: the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Fund (through the Center of International Studies, Princeton); the Council on Regional Studies, Princeton; the Association of Princeton Graduate Alumni/Mellon Summer Fellowship; the Dean’s Fund for Scholarly Travel (the Graduate School, Princeton); the Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory; the Procter and Gamble Graduate Fund (through the Department of Politics, Princeton); the Bradley University Berlin Seminar; and the Arms Control Division, Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5C), US European Command. I gratefully acknowledge their support and largesse.

My parents and siblings expressed continuing love and long-distance support for this endeavor. Thanks to my brother-in-law Steve for keeping an eye on our house in Colorado Springs during our absence. And thanks also to our neighbors in Grover’s Mill and our church in West Windsor for accepting us with open arms and making us feel at home in New Jersey...and for overlooking my unusual working hours and frequent travels.

There is a saying among military officers that you can’t attend a school in residence without getting either a new baby, a new dog, or a divorce. We were lucky, being blessed with the birth of our fourth child while at Princeton--although her timing could have been better (arriving as she did just prior to General Exams). This was an event which placed even greater demands on our lives, but we couldn’t have asked for a better
reminder of our lovely days in Princeton than Carolyn.

Despite my wife's valiant efforts to act as intermediary, the demands on Daddy's time by mundane household chores and by the extracurricular activities of Heather, Peter, and Andrew kept real life intruding on my academic reverie and allowed for a more balanced, albeit slower and more interrupted, approach to the project you now hold before you. It also made me realize the value of a quiet library carrel in which to escape and get some work done.

Finally, to my wife Cyndy goes the greatest debt and thanks. She willingly sacrificed much, including her own career and her beloved Colorado, to move the whole household to New Jersey for three years and then run the family nearly single-handedly. At the same time she was my constant supporter, editor, and cheerleader. Although the computer has eliminated one traditional role performed by spouses in graduate school--typing the manuscript--she nevertheless read and commented on all the chapters, and her final-year reminders to stop procrastinating and "just do it" kept my priorities straight and my attention focused. This dissertation was truly a team effort--thanks, Cyndy.

* * * * * *

The views expressed or implied in this thesis are my own and do not necessarily represent the position of the Department of Defense or the United States Air Force. Furthermore, despite the help of all those persons listed above, the responsibility for any factual errors or invalid conclusions that remain is mine alone.
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ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>Advanced Cruise Missile</td>
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<td>AFAPS</td>
<td>Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCM</td>
<td>Air Launched Cruise Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLP</td>
<td>Air-Sol a Longue Portee (French long-range ASM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>Air-to-Surface Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASMP</td>
<td>Air-Sol a Moyenne Portee (French medium-range ASM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATACMS</td>
<td>Army Tactical Missile System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSD/AE</td>
<td>Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for AtomicEnergy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNW</td>
<td>Battlefield Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSWS</td>
<td>Corps Support Weapon System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMAO</td>
<td>Department of the Army (Pentagon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAMO/SWN</td>
<td>Army Strategic Weapons Planning/Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Dual Capable Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Defense Planning Committee</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>US European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOTL</td>
<td>Follow-On-To-Lance missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic (East Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Ground-Launched Cruise Missile</td>
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<td>GPO</td>
<td>Government Printing Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLG</td>
<td>NATO High Level Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>InterContinental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range nuclear Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTACMS</td>
<td>Joint Tactical Missile System</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANL</td>
<td>Los Alamos National Laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRINF</td>
<td>Longer-Range INF</td>
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<td>MLRS</td>
<td>Multiple Launch Rocket System</td>
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<td>MRM</td>
<td>Medium-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
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<td>NPG</td>
<td>NATO Nuclear Planning Group</td>
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<td>International Security Policy Division, OSD</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIA</td>
<td>Pershing I-A Missile</td>
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<td>PII</td>
<td>Pershing II Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Secretary of the Air Force (Pentagon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF/AQQS</td>
<td>Air Force Acquisitions Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>NATO Special Consultative Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>NATO Special Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAT</td>
<td>Supersonic Low-Altitude Target (drone missile)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLEP</td>
<td>Service Life Extension Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRAM II</td>
<td>Short-Range Attack Missile, Model II</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRAM-T</td>
<td>Short-Range Attack Missile (Tactical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRINF</td>
<td>Shorter-Range INF Missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Short-range Nuclear Forces (range less than 500 KM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASM</td>
<td>Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USAFE</td>
<td>United States Air Forces Europe Command</td>
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<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>United States Army Europe Command</td>
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<td>United States European Command</td>
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PART I: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On the third of May, 1990, President George Bush announced that he was cancelling a program meant to modernize a NATO land-based nuclear missile. Reporters at the White House were unimpressed. Only one question about the cancellation arose during the 45-minute press conference, and it garnered small headlines in the next day’s New York Times. It was obviously not an issue that excited the public, nor one, apparently, of any great importance.

Yet this weapons program, the follow-on to Lance missile (FOTL), had caused major consternation and rancor within the North Atlantic Alliance less than one year earlier, threatening to turn NATO’s 40th Anniversary summit in May 1989 into a disaster. The Lance modernization issue had been a major agenda item at NATO ministerials and summits for nearly seven years. It had created huge headaches for the West German coalition government. And it had caused a rift to develop between the US and the UK, on one hand, and West Germany and several continental European allies on the other, over the proper role and future strategy of NATO’s theater nuclear forces. It became, as one analyst put it, "the focus of a poisonous struggle between key allies."1 Given this dramatic background, why was there so little concern shown at FOTL’s death knoll?

To the knowledgeable public, the answer might seem obvious: the revolution in Eastern Europe in the fall and winter of 1989 made such weapons unnecessary, and the strategy that called for them outdated. Geo-

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strategic factors, in other words, could explain this domestic political decision made by a US President on behalf of the alliance.

Granted, these changes certainly made the decision easier and more obvious. But is that enough of an explanation? I argue that there were deeper, underlying pressures that caused FOTL's cancellation, factors that were at play even before events in Eastern Europe unfolded in 1989. In order to properly analyze these factors, one must go beyond systemic analysis which looks at the actions of "states" as a function of their position in the international system. One must also delve into alliance and domestic politics to peel off the layers of bureaucratic processes and examine the subtle political pressures that were present. This is true not only of FOTL's cancellation, but of earlier decisions in its short history, as well. The life and death of FOTL is a good example of how US national security decisions are made, and has lessons for future NATO nuclear programs--such as the ongoing tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) debate.

This, then, is the story of the politics behind a seemingly straightforward weapons modernization decision which the North Atlantic Alliance made in 1983 and reversed in 1990, before it was deployed. It is a story that can be told a number of different ways. It is a story that fits into patterns of NATO politics which have been around since the beginning of the alliance, and whose examination can offer clues as to the likely outcome of future modernization programs. In short, it is a good story through which to examine alliance politics and NATO nuclear decision-making, and to attempt to illuminate the changing place of theater nuclear forces, especially short range nuclear forces (SNF), in
alliance strategy and politics. In the dramatically changed strategic environment of the 1990's, the future of nuclear forces stationed in Europe may well be a limited one. The value of this analysis will therefore be to provide insight into the TASM debate against the backdrop of this altered strategic situation.

In an attempt to understand the changing nature and future direction of NATO's theater nuclear force structure, I will focus on the SNF modernization and rationalization programs within NATO since the early alliance studies that led to the Montebello Decision of 1983. This dissertation uses the land-based missile portion of the SNF triad\(^2\) as a case study of how such a weapon can rise and fall in the political environment of the 1980's and 90's.

By approaching the key turning points of the FOTL story from different analytical starting points, each grounded in a different set of assumptions and backed by different supporting theories, an analyst comes up with a much more complete and satisfying explanation of what actually happened in the case under review than can be had through application of a single analytical perspective. For example, by a close examination of the decision to cancel FOTL we can illuminate some of the classic bureaucratic politics at play both in Washington and within the alliance, as well as bring in such systemic variables as the changing nature of the Soviet threat and German reunification. Each of these perspectives forms a separate, but incomplete, explanation for the decision to modernize SNF forces, for the way FOTL was handled, and for its cancellation in the

\(^2\)The NATO triad consists of air-delivered weapons, surface-to-surface missiles, and atomic artillery shells, all of which were scheduled to be modernized by the mid-1990's in accordance with the Montebello Decision.
spring of 1990. I will show that the obvious systemic factors were not the only, nor even the primary, reasons for FOTL's demise; that there were less apparent political aspects to the case--both domestic and international--that could be overlooked without a multi-perspective approach. The changes in Eastern Europe and Germany simply accelerated already established trends that probably would have led to FOTL's cancellation at some point, trends that were little understood. This finding will have consequences for NATO's future SNF plans, which will run up against these same political factors.

Although this thesis focuses on a single case study, it will first be embedded in the historical currents that have affected NATO theater nuclear forces since the 1950's. Nuclear issues have always bedeviled the alliance, and many of the classic earlier analyses of NATO's nuclear dilemmas have continued relevance for my topic in today's world. I refer to many of these themes as I set the foundation for the main body of this thesis. In this work I am attempting to follow in the footsteps of such authors as David Schwartz, Jeffrey Record, Robert Osgood, Gregory Treverton, and Catherine Kelleher, among others, who have written on the history of NATO theater nuclear weapons.3

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS.

My single case study will be broken into three separate episodes which incorporate the major decision points that affected SNF modernization in general and the follow-on to Lance in particular. The story actually began in 1979, with a set of studies on NATO nuclear policy

3Their works are all cited in Chapter Three.
undertaken by the High Level Group. The key events of the early years were the 1983 Montebello Decision by the Nuclear Planning Group and the NATO nuclear weapons requirements study of 1985. The second period, the middle years of the FOTL story, began with the superpower Reykjavik summit in October 1986 and continued through the May 1989 NATO summit. During this time European public opinion began to doubt the wisdom of NATO's nuclear policy, questioned America's long-term commitment to European security, and debated the need for modernized nuclear weapons. In the face of this growing opposition to its SNF plans, however, the alliance agreed to continue its efforts to replace Lance, as seen in its 1989 Comprehensive Concept. The third phase of the story comprises FOTL's last year, from the summer of 1989 until its cancellation in May 1990 (as ratified by the alliance in the July London Declaration).

Each of these periods will be addressed using a different perspective as the analytical framework for analysis. My three explanatory perspectives will be: 1) the systemic, strategic level, looking at the Soviet threat, East-West Cold War relations, and the rationale for the weapons from a structural realist framework; 2) the internal politics of the alliance, including how such modernization decisions are made, by whom, and how consensus is achieved, with a look at the positions of the individual NATO states involved in the FOTL decisions. This will include a focus on the domestic politics and special international sensitivities of (West) Germany, the key polity in the SNF debate and arguably the ally which holds the central deciding role in any
alliance planning; and 3) the domestic politics of Washington, especially the nature of the national security process, decision-making within the executive branch, executive-legislative relations, and the impact of European, and particularly German, politics on American decisions. Each of these perspectives takes a different slant on the follow-on to Lance case, and each uses different key variables to explain the missile's justification, its criticisms, and its eventual cancellation. As Graham Allison wrote in *Essence of Decision*, "My aspiration here is not to write a definitive history but rather to demonstrate the possibility and utility of alternative approaches to events of this sort."5

At the end of my analysis I will attempt to elucidate parallels and lessons from this study of FOTL and apply them to the next round of NATO SNF modernization plans, the tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM). In this way I hope this dissertation will shed some light on current issues, informing the NATO debate over the future of such weapons via a longer view--one achieved by standing back from the day-to-day distractions most policy makers face. As of the spring of 1991, TASM was the only modernization program still scheduled for the NATO theater nuclear force triad. FOTL had been cancelled, as had the upgrade for nuclear artillery, and the INF Treaty eliminated all longer-range missiles, leaving only

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4During the period examined by this dissertation, Germany was, of course, divided into two separate states: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), a member of NATO, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which belonged to the Warsaw Pact. When the reader encounters the name "Germany" in this paper, unless it specifically says in the text that it refers to the newly united Germany in existence since October 1990, he should take it to mean West Germany.

dual-capable aircraft available for SACEUR's use as a nuclear deterrent. (I am intentionally ignoring certain sea-based forces under his control.\textsuperscript{6})

Once FOTL was removed from the public scene, the spotlight was on the sole remaining nuclear modernization program in NATO--the TASM--and it became open to study and criticism.

Will TASM follow the same path as the FOTL? Are there prescriptions that would enable NATO to avoid the same fate as FOTL? Or has the international environment changed so much in recent years that the alliance itself, or the European public, may see no further need for TASM? We will address these questions in the final chapter, in which I will argue that a combination of domestic American and alliance factors, reflecting the dramatic changes to the strategic background in Europe since 1989, will cause the cancellation of TASM and the eventual end of America's theater nuclear role in Europe. First, however, we will lay the groundwork for those answers in the earlier substantive sections of this thesis.

\textbf{THE ARGUMENT AND MY PROPOSITIONS}

This dissertation began as a search for an answer to a simple question: how can one explain the outcome of the most recent case of NATO nuclear modernization? Why did a weapons program, which looked so simple, 

\textsuperscript{6}For example, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) and dual-capable aircraft aboard allied ships in the NATO region and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) aboard American and British submarines which are authorized for nuclear release by SACEUR to use in a European theater conflict. Sea-based forces, by their very nature, have a much lower profile and carry less political baggage than their land-based counterparts. Many critics of SNF modernization, in fact, actually favor sea-based nuclear forces for deterrence or reassurance purposes. We will expand upon this last point in Chapter Three.
and had been agreed to by all members of the alliance, create such political uproar? And how did the follow-on to Lance go from being the top priority weapons program for NATO in 1988 to being deemed unimportant and unnecessary by 1990? The last question is easiest to answer, and can be determined from a systemic level of analysis. For the earlier questions, the answers are harder to find, and require approaching the case from different perspectives.

At the most basic level, this dissertation will describe NATO's plans to modernize its short-range nuclear forces during the eleven year period from 1979 through 1990, embedding this in the framework of the alliance's history vis a vis theater nuclear weapons. Second, it will explain how and why the events unfolded as they did, by examining the politics behind the scenes in each of the major actors, using a detailed look at the follow-on to Lance case as a path to such understanding. Finally, I hope to offer some predictions about the future of NATO theater nuclear forces as a result of this review of past alliance history and recent events, with a special emphasis on the tactical air-to-surface missile program.

My key assumptions and propositions about this case can be summarized from the above discussion in the following list.

1. A first level, systemic explanation for FOTL's rise and fall focuses on the changing nature of the Soviet threat and NATO's response to those changes.

2. Domestic politics, on both sides of the Atlantic, also played a major role in the determination of alliance military policy in the FOTL case.

3. Despite its being an "alliance" decision, the ultimate decisions concerning FOTL's continued development and ultimately, its deployment in Europe, were made as a result of domestic political bargaining in Washington and, to a lesser extent, Bonn.
4. In keeping with bureaucratic politics theory, those ultimate decisions were made by a small group of key actors at the apex of the state bureaucracy.

5. Domestic politics in the other European NATO member states played an equally important role in their decision to support or renounce an alliance consensus decision.

6. While each of the three approaches to explaining such a case of alliance decision-making—systemic explanations, alliance politics, and domestic politics—may seem at first glance to suffice by itself, only a combination of all three approaches adequately explains the case history and outcome.

7. Our examination of the historical record of NATO nuclear decision-making, including the heuristic contributions made by the FOTL case, enables us to identify the perspective that best explains the final segment of proposed NATO SNF modernization, the tactical air-to-surface missile.

THE CASE: THE FOLLOW-ON-TO-LANCE MISSILE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Major foreign policy issues of any kind are firmly embedded in a historical framework. Current policies are most often the product of a long and complex chain of events and decisions. To understand policy problems and the range of potential solutions, one must first understand these events and decisions in some detail. That knowledge can guide today's decisionmakers by showing them the rationale behind different policies at different times, by warning them of the consequences of various policy alternatives, by sensitizing them to the degree of flexibility inherent in the policies and issues they inherit from predecessors, and by revealing mistakes to be avoided and successes to be emulated.7

JUSTIFICATION OF CASE SELECTION.

An issue of continuing relevance to the United States is its expensive and open-ended involvement in security guarantees for Western Europe. This becomes an even greater issue as the "burden" of extended deterrence seems to grow in an era of American budget deficits, diminished

credibility of extended deterrence, Gorbachevian peace proposals, declining threat perceptions in the West, calls for a new security order in Europe, and the resulting increased European indifference, or even hostility, toward continued American presence in Europe.

Within this environment, the work of the North Atlantic Alliance goes on—at least for the time being. One of NATO's many concerns over the years, of course, has been acquiring and maintaining the military weaponry needed to effect flexible response, forward defense, and a credible threat against potential Warsaw Pact aggression. Since the 1950's a major aspect of this strategy has been the substitution of theater nuclear weapons for conventional forces planned for levels agreed to but never reached. Such weapons, regardless of type or range, needed periodic upgrading, modernization, or replacement to remain militarily usable.8

Moves to effect such modernization have met with increasingly stiff opposition in many of the European member states. This is particularly true of land-based nuclear systems. Public and private opposition to nuclear weaponry has been especially heated in Germany. This is important for US and NATO decision makers as they ponder future nuclear changes.

8This requirement stems from the fact that military hardware can wear out. Atomic warheads and their associated launchers suffer from the same mechanical and corrosive effects of aging and weather as do conventional weapons, with the additional consideration that the half-life of the nuclear components forces their removal and refurbishment after a period of years or decades. Improvements in safety and security devices need to be incorporated into the weapons in the field. Improved range and accuracy in new weapons leads military commanders to develop new missions, which require the new weapons. And changing military strategy may force a shift in reliance from one to another type of weapon (for example, the shift from countervalue to counterforce targeting in the late 1970's led to a call for smaller, more accurate warheads and yields).
since Germany is arguably the most important European member of NATO—and, after all, where most of these weapons are based.

This study of the follow-on to Lance shows how present-day cases can add to the debate on alliance policies and strategy, because it brings the key underlying issues right up to the surface. There is no way to avoid facing the crucial questions over the future role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO strategy when talking about new theater nuclear weapons systems that may be deployed in Central Europe in the 1990's. This issue has, as we will see, been scrupulously avoided in the past by the NATO partners in their discussions of SNF modernization and, since the fall of 1989, of the future role of NATO in a new Europe. The adoption of MC 14/3 (flexible response) as the ambivalent and much-beloved official doctrine of the alliance papered over this question for a generation. The debate has now been re-opened for the first time since 1967.

Nuclear weapons have been in Europe almost from the beginning of the alliance. The US deployed its first battlefield nuclear weapon, the 280 millimeter atomic cannon, to the European theater in 1953, followed by two types of surface-to-surface missiles the next year. By the late 1970's there were over 7200 warheads deployed in Western Europe for potential use on well over a dozen different types of delivery systems.9 The Soviet Union lagged behind the US in its deployment of tactical nuclear forces until the 1970's, when a massive expansion program resulted in strategic

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9The 7000 warhead figure has been widely reported. The more precise number of 7200 comes from Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, quoted in M. Leitenberg, "Background Materials in Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Primarily in the European Context)," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1978), p. 16.
and tactical parity and, eventually, theater superiority in numbers and types of TNF weapons deployed in Europe.

From 1977 through 1979 NATO debated the deployment of a new class of land-based nuclear missiles known as long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF). These new missiles were the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II. In December 1979 NATO's foreign and defense ministers met and signed a dual-track agreement, calling for simultaneous pursuit of LRTNF deployment and arms control initiatives to eliminate this category of weapons.

In 1983 these ministers agreed to pursue modernization of NATO's battlefield nuclear forces, as well. These short-range nuclear forces (SNF) included atomic artillery, dual-capable aircraft stationed in Europe, and the Lance missile. After several years of quiet study and preparation, this issue suddenly became a "hot" media item in 1988.

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10 This category's title was subsequently changed, during the Reagan administration, to longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF). This was in response to European concerns about their continent being a mere "theater." LRINF forces, along with shorter-range INF (SRINF, of which NATO had none), were both eliminated by the 1987 INF Treaty. This left only short-range nuclear forces (SNF; those with a range of less than 500 KM) stationed in Europe.

11 The purpose of a follow-on to Lance would be to improve NATO's deterrent posture by threatening to strike at the rear echelons of Warsaw Pact invasion forces, while being stationed further back from the border than current NATO short range missiles. This would give the political leadership more time to decide whether to use such weapons in wartime, thereby raising the nuclear threshold and contributing to crisis stability. Politically, it was expected to alleviate German concerns over nuclear singularity, since its increased range meant it could reach other East European states beyond East Germany. It was also meant to prove continued coupling of the American extended deterrence guarantee to Western Europe. See Chapter Four for details.

12 General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), presented his Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study to the NPG in 1985. This document, which, although not yet declassified, has had many of its
Political maneuvering by the US and Great Britain, on one side, and West Germany and other continental allies on the other, culminated in the May 1989 NATO 40th Anniversary Summit meeting. Here it was agreed to defer any final decision on deployment of these weapons (particularly Lance’s replacement) until 1992. The Heads of State and Government also signed a Comprehensive Concept on Arms Control and Disarmament to guide future NATO policies in this area.

In May 1990 President Bush announced the cancellation of the FOTL program, and the end to the on-going upgrade program for nuclear artillery in Europe. At the same time, he called for earlier negotiations on remaining SNF assets in Central Europe. In both of these instances Bush backed off of the alliance’s 1989 position, claiming that the changing world political environment made such forces less necessary.

RATIONALE

Why have I chosen the follow-on to Lance case for this study? FOTL falls within the class of phenomena known as alliance decision making, specifically those concerned with theater nuclear modernization. As such, it fits logically in the historical flow of earlier cases of alliance nuclear modernization programs. And as in most of those earlier cases, this was an attempt by the United States, in cooperation with its allies, to bolster the old strategy of flexible response through hardware upgrades, rather than via political changes to the alliance or its strategy.

essential points and details leaked to the press in various fora, described the types, purpose, and numbers of tactical nuclear weapons required by SHAPE in the event of a war in Central Europe.
The focus of any study on NATO nuclear policies naturally falls on the United States, as the largest member and biggest contributor to the alliance, and the only member that has given explicit nuclear guarantees to other states. It has been a long-standing American goal to reduce European concerns about this security situation by seeking to enhance the legitimacy of nuclear "coupling" to Europe. Coupling is a term used to describe the close ties and linkage between the countries of Western Europe and those of North America, especially the United States. It implies the extension of a security guarantee from the American side of the Atlantic to cover the European NATO members. This guarantee relies for its ultimate deterrent on nuclear weapons, both those based in the US and those on European soil.

This extended guarantee has led to a dilemma for Europeans, who fear war and the potential devastation of nuclear weapons, but hope to avoid the outbreak of any type of war by linking themselves to the ultimate threat of mutual suicide in nuclear conflict. Trying to overcome this dilemma—a desire to have nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes and to couple the US to Europe, but fear of their use and weariness of having them stationed in their backyard—has been a constant challenge to policy makers since these weapons were first introduced nearly four decades ago.

The FOTL case, and SNF modernization in general, fits nicely into patterns found in the historical record of NATO nuclear decision-making. To show that this is the case, let us compare SNF to the most recent

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preceding modernization program, the INF dual track decision of a decade ago.

Both the INF and SNF cases were examples of a weapons modernization package that was spearheaded by the US, facing increasingly recalcitrant allies despite initial alliance consensus on the need for such weapons. Both cases also took place in international environments that showed striking similarities. For instance, the INF decision was the first NATO modernization plan to be specifically concerned with arms control ramifications. Arms control is, if anything, even more hallowed in the 1990's than it was a decade ago, especially among Europeans. Therefore any SNF deployment agreement must be accompanied by proposals for arms control.

Soviet reaction to both cases was similar, too. In 1979 General Secretary Brezhnev roundly criticized the proposed NATO INF modernization, at the same time announcing unilateral Warsaw Pact troop cuts and tank withdrawals in Eastern Europe, and offering to negotiate cuts in Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. He also began a public relations campaign emphasizing the dangers to detente and improved relations between the two alliances if NATO continued to pursue this path. Soviet reactions to the SNF debate in 1988-89 were nearly identical, as we shall see. Apparently the USSR learned something from the INF decision: that the value of good public relations exceeds the value of strong political or military arguments for new weapons.

Policy makers in the INF case seemed to be cognizant of the negative lessons of earlier NATO nuclear cases, especially the failed attempt to create a Multilateral Force (MLF) in the early 1960's and the neutron bomb
fiasco in 1978.\textsuperscript{14} Policy makers in the late 1980's occasionally made reference to problems with the INF decision (and its implementation), and expressed hope that the US would avoid making the same mistakes again. At the same time, those aspects of the INF decision that were successful--such as consultation among the allies, high-level briefing teams visiting all the NATO capitals, the combination of modernization and arms control issues in one package, and so on--were emulated in 1989 by alliance leaders who obviously learned positive lessons, too. The fact that better consultative institutions were created during the INF debate (among them the NATO High Level Group and the Special Consultative Group) added immeasurably to the successful intra-alliance negotiation process during the SNF debate. In a sense, these institutional creations embodied organizational learning, even though many of the individuals involved in the SNF debate were not part of the earlier INF case.

Finally, one can say that the SNF compromise agreement of 1989 met the same standards as the 1979 INF decision in one more important respect: both appeared to be efforts to "preserve the doctrine of flexible response at all costs, despite a changing strategic environment that called the doctrine into question."

\textsuperscript{15} This point has been noted by several authors examining the INF case, and it was repeatedly emphasized to me during my research on SNF.

\textsuperscript{14}These and other episodes of nuclear modernization in Europe are addressed in Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{15} Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, p. 247.
KEY QUESTIONS

The propositions listed above naturally lead to several important questions that call for further explanation, since they will provide much of the structure that I will use when tying the three perspective chapters together. These questions are derived from the propositions set forth above. They are those issues which I feel are most important to address in order to get a more complete understanding of the FOTL decisions, and to show how we can develop different answers depending on our starting perspective. Each of the questions will be addressed by a different perspective. I will summarize the results in the final chapter.

My key questions are as follows.

1. Why did the Western alliance decide in the early 1980's to upgrade its SNF forces, particularly FOTL?

2. Why did NATO continue to support FOTL's development in the face of increasing public opposition as the decade wore on?

3. Why did the United States choose to cancel FOTL when it did?

One can think of these questions and their relationship to each chapter in terms of a matrix, as shown in Figure 1. My goal will be to complete this chart with answers from each perspective, although I hypothesize that each question can be answered best using the perspective that I have highlighted in the matrix. This will not only give the reader a better explanation of this particular case, but will also give a more complete understanding of the interactive nature of forces at work behind these decisions. In effect, I am creating a focused comparative case study by varying the analytical perspective used for different time periods of the case, so that "each [period of the] case identifies an outcome for the dependent variable and provides a historical explanation
for it that is couched in terms of the independent and intervening variables of theoretical interest.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\hline
\hline
\textbf{PERSPECTIVE} & & & \\
Systemic & * & * & * \\
Alliance Politics & * & * & * \\
Domestic Politics & * & * & * \\
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\end{tabular}
\caption{Matrix of Explanations}
\end{figure}

\textbf{TENTATIVE ANSWERS}

Some tentative answers for each of these questions suggest themselves before we begin the detailed study of this case. First, why did the West decide to upgrade its SNF capabilities? This question points us toward the fall 1983 meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in Montebello, Canada.

From a systemic perspective, the obvious answer is that the West wanted to counter increasing Soviet capabilities in the theater, both conventionally and in tactical nuclear systems. The decision may also have been a concomitant of a change in Western tactics that called for a

more aggressive, nuclear warfighting policy, which required more capable and flexible theater nuclear weapons.

From our second perspective, alliance politics, we see alliance inertia at work. Nobody wanted to raise the issue publicly because to do so would open up the debate over such basic NATO policy fundamentals as flexible response and the role of nuclear weapons in alliance military policy. It was easier to go along with plans for what was, basically, just another hardware improvement. Furthermore, the NATO countries wanted to show cohesion and mutual support for shared alliance goals. Allied commitment to such ends had come into question during the early 1980's as a result of INF deployments. Germany, for its part, still did not feel strong enough to stand up to the US or NATO on this issue, despite growing popular opposition within Germany to such nuclear singularization.

From the perspective of domestic American politics, one can make the case that the US supported SNF upgrades, including FOTL, as one way to atone to the Europeans for mishandling the neutron bomb plan in 1978. There may also have been some technological determinism at play, where the US wanted to deploy FOTL "because we could"—that is, because the US had the capability to build the system, and the weapons laboratory/defense contractor/military user network pushed for the system without considering the political consequences.

Our second question—why did NATO continue to support FOTL in light of increasing popular opposition?—finds its focus on the May 1989 NATO summit meeting in Brussels and the events leading to a FOTL compromise and the Comprehensive Concept. The answers to this question will be similar to those for the first. From a systemic viewpoint, the desire to show
continued resolve and present a strong front to the Warsaw Pact during a time of instability in Eastern Europe was certainly an important factor, as was the goal of negotiating from strength in the various arms control fora beginning in Europe. From the alliance perspective, the alliance as a whole felt it would be unwise to raise troubling questions over the future role or fate of NATO in a period of such uncertainty and change in Europe. Domestic US answers to this question were the same as for question one: to show resolve, stand firm, support the alliance and make up for perceived earlier failures of leadership.

Our third question asked why the President cancelled FOTL when he did. Events had obviously changed dramatically in Europe between the time of the May 1989 summit and the President’s announcement in May a year later. From a systemic perspective, the answers appear simple. Gorbachev and his fresh breeze blowing through Europe had significantly lowered perceptions of a Soviet threat and made the future security problems of Europe seem much less vexatious than earlier. Under these conditions, FOTL no longer seemed necessary; indeed, the whole NATO military strategy of flexible response and forward defense was suddenly put into jeopardy of becoming outdated. At the same time, the West needed to give Gorbachev some assurances that the biggest change, German reunification, would not damage his country’s security situation. Cancelling a weapons system that would have been deployed in West Germany seemed to be one way of making that assurance. Certain top bureaucrats in the US government made sure

17Conventional arms negotiations, called the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, began in Vienna in late 1988. At about the same time some states were quietly calling for SNF talks to start soon, as well, in order to pursue a "Third Zero" in Europe following the successful "Double Zero" incorporated in the December 1987 INF Treaty.
that the German agenda received top priority on this issue within alliance circles and domestic US politics during the 1989-1990 time frame.

From an alliance perspective the cancellation of FOTL and atomic artillery improvements was due to German and Belgian demands not to deploy these new weapons; to public opposition in several countries, but especially Germany, to the continuing burdens of defense; to an associated "nuclear allergy" in some of these same countries; and to alliance fears of the political damage that would be caused by attempting to foist these weapons on to a public that refused to accept the need for them or pay for their procurement and upkeep.

Domestically, America's nuclear decision makers were faced simultaneously with changes in Europe, Congressional opposition to FOTL, budgetary constraints, ambivalence on the part of the US Army towards this weapon, and major decision points concerning the acquisition cycle of the missile. The combination of these pressure vectors made cancellation a pre-ordained decision. However, the justification for this decision was obscured by the style of the Bush presidency, which makes such decisions in a secretive, hierarchical, and politically motivated (some would say felicitous) fashion that is hard to for outsiders to fathom.

PROSPECTUS

Chapter Two begins with a review of the theoretical literature associated with each of my three perspectives. The systemic, rational-actor perspective employs analysis using structural realism and balance of power theories. The alliance politics perspective naturally calls for the use of alliance politics and institutionalist and regime theories, which
are essentially systemic but fit better, for the purposes of my dissertation, in this chapter. One can also apply many of the domestic theories to the intra-alliance political games that go on, and to the domestic politics of West Germany. The domestic politics perspective employs bureaucratic politics theory and organizational process theory. Finally, I discuss the advantages for political analysis of using multiple perspectives in a single case study.

Chapter Three develops the background for the study of SNF issues by re-visiting the history of NATO nuclear forces: their rationale, their modernization over the years, their political meaning. I will concentrate on the numerous key episodes in alliance nuclear history when theater nuclear force structure or policy experienced dramatic and far-reaching change. Those points include the Skybolt episode, the Multilateral Force debate, acceptance of MC 14/3 (flexible response) as alliance strategy, the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group and the High Level Group, the neutron bomb fiasco, and the INF dual-track decision, among others. After reviewing this history, I will develop some themes that run through the history of NATO TNF upgrades and which apply to SNF modernization in the 1980's.

Chapter Four introduces the follow-on to Lance case with a chronological overview of the basic decision points surrounding its development, as well as some technical characteristics of the launcher, warhead, and missile. These basic facts will prove helpful to the reader as he or she proceeds through the following chapters. I also lay out the strategic rationale for the FOTL modernization program, presenting the arguments for and against the new missile that developed in the mid-
Chapter Five begins our study of the follow-on to Lance from the systemic perspective. In this chapter I will sketch the developing relationship between the Soviet Union and NATO force levels in Europe from the mid-1970's through the early 1980's, emphasizing the changing correlation of nuclear forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact, and the NATO response in the Montebello Decision. Montebello's general guidance was translated into specific modernization recommendations in the Supreme Allied Commander's 1985 Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study.

In Chapters Six and Seven we continue our survey of FOTL from different starting points by looking at it from Brussels and Bonn—specifically, from an alliance politics perspective, with a special emphasis on the domestic politics of West Germany. One can analyze this case from a systemic level within the NATO organization by looking at each of the key actors involved in the decisions—-independent nation-states— and their varying policy stands with respect to short-range nuclear modernization. In Chapter Six we review the NATO nuclear decision-making structure to see how alliance consensus is achieved in such matters. We then turn to the internal dynamics of West German politics, including the positions of the major political parties with respect to SNF modernization, the manner in which security decisions are made in the FRG, and special German concerns that impacted on the FOTL decisions: the potential for German reunification, nuclear sensitivities over singularization, Cold War weariness, changing threat perceptions, and so on. These concerns translated into an overall decline in the German security consensus that had been a hallmark of FRG politics since the
creation of the Republic. The disappearing German security consensus had major ramifications for the politics of intra-alliance relations during the FOTL case.

Chapter Seven uses the background developed in Chapter Six to tell the story of FOTL's middle years, from 1986 to 1989. This period was one of testing for the alliance, as it wrestled with the mistrust engendered by the US-Soviet "near-deal" at the Reykjavik summit, the conflicting messages sent out by the INF Treaty, and the rancorous debates within the alliance over the future role of theater nuclear forces in Europe. This period culminated in a "Comprehensive Concept" approved in a compromise deal at the May 1989 summit.

Chapter Eight will examine the final year of FOTL's life cycle from the perspective of domestic US politics. This approach will use a perspective based on bureaucratic and organizational politics theory to explain how America responded to the FOTL modernization plan, its role in the decisions, and how those decisions came about in Washington. Special emphasis will be given to the Bush national security process and to congressional-executive relations.

Finally, in Chapter Nine I summarize these attempts to look at a single case from differing perspectives and develop a history interesting and valuable enough to affect future policy choices concerning NATO nuclear modernization. Our analysis will show that while each of the perspectives goes far toward explaining one part of the life cycle of FOTL, none is sufficiently satisfying by itself. Only by looking at this case from multiple levels of analysis can one confidently say that he understands what happened, and why. However, my analysis will also show
that certain perspectives work better at explaining certain periods of a case than others. Furthermore, I draw some conclusions from trends uncovered in the FOTL case that suggest that the next case of SNF modernization will be decided (or at least can best be explained) by domestic and alliance politics factors, rather than by a systemic approach.

In the final chapter we will look at the sole remaining SNF system on the boards for modernization (the tactical air-to-surface missile) and assess its chances based on the lessons learned from our study of NATO nuclear history as it has culminated in the follow-on to Lance case. I will also draw some conclusions, tentative predictions, and prescriptions for future theater nuclear forces in Europe.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systemic analysis...the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system.¹

This thesis uses three different analytical perspectives to examine short-range nuclear modernization in Europe from 1983 to 1990. I apply these perspectives to different periods of a single case. I have not tried to create new theory; rather, I am using existing theories as tools to better understand recent US and NATO policy decisions. As we shall see, the follow-on to Lance (FOTL) case can be divided neatly into three discrete time periods, each of which lends itself to explanation by one or two of the perspectives. These perspectives become increasingly detailed, refined, and lower-level in their analysis over the life span of the case. This chapter reviews some of the theoretical underpinnings of each perspective.

Each of the perspectives I use is highly regarded for studying cases in international relations; each has its advocates and supporting body of literature. What I hope to do in this dissertation, in addition to elucidating the FOTL story, is show that one need not choose one approach and rigorously stick to it throughout a single case while excluding the others; rather, that one can use all three approaches in attempting to come to grips with what really happened--in this case, what went on behind

the decisions in the Lance modernization case.² By asking questions drawn from each perspective, we should uncover new and interesting information that will help explain the case in toto. As Graham Allison said, "what we see and judge to be important and accept as adequate depends not only on the evidence but also on the 'conceptual lenses' through which we look at the evidence."³ The FOTL story was a complicated set of events. If I try to explain the case through the use of one or more simplifying means, I will be left with an incomplete explanation and leftover "residuals"—details that were unaccounted for in the first analysis. To understand the complete story, I will need to point out which aspects of the case are left unanswered before using the next level perspective to explain those residual details.

So my perspectives can be thought of as screens of increasingly fine mesh. What details fall through the first may be captured by the next. Alternatively, one can visualize this approach as one that uses increasingly stronger conceptual lenses to examine the case. Categorizing our variables into levels of analysis or perspectives constitutes, writes one author, "at least initially simply a matter of theoretical housekeeping" and "organizes into manageable parts the various elements of social reality that bear on the making of foreign policy."⁴

The requirements for a model of international politics, to which our

²I do not claim that these three approaches are the only ones appropriate to this case, but they seem to provide the best "fit" for the empirical data. Nor are these approaches mutually exclusive.


perspectives aspire, are well known. As J. David Singer pointed out three decades ago, a good analytical model must provide us with descriptive, explanatory, and predictive power. In trying to decide in which level of analysis to place one's model and best realize these goals, Singer posits that the systemic level provides a more comprehensive description of international relations, but the domestic level grants us greater detail and depth. The domestic level is superior in its explanatory value, and the two are about equal in predictive forecasting strength.\(^5\) So which one to use? Is one better than another? Not always: "For a staggering variety of reasons the scholar may be more interested in one level than another at any given time and will undoubtedly shift his orientation according to his research needs."\(^6\)

I have labelled my approaches to the follow-on to Lance case study "perspectives" because they are not theories as such; rather, each perspective draws on a number of applicable theories. Again quoting Allison:

> These conceptual models are much more than simple angles of vision or approaches. Each conceptual framework consists of a cluster of assumptions and categories that influence what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer.\(^7\)

One often has no foreknowledge of which particular theory will best fit the existing circumstances; only through trial and error can one find the best post hoc explanatory tool for a historical case. Others have used

\(^5\)Singer, pp. 89-90.

\(^6\)Singer, p. 91.

\(^7\)Allison, p. 245. Emphasis in original.
the same argument to support the use of differentiated theories in a single case study. One student of NATO policy, for instance, used a similar approach when writing recently about conventional forces. He claimed that using several different theories suggests the importance of different determinants of alliance policy, and each offers different hypotheses about what NATO's conventional force posture will be and how and when it will change. These hypotheses are not entirely commensurable, since they often focus on different aspects of alliance policy...As a result, it may be that more than one hypothesis squares with a particular set of circumstances. Nevertheless, there would seem to be enough overlap among these theories that some differentiation of their explanatory power could be achieved by testing them against the history of NATO...force posture.  

This is the approach I seek to take with respect to the history of alliance theater nuclear policy and my specific focus on the follow-on-to-Lance story. Our problem, of course, is limiting the theories to which we will subject this case study. For, as James Kurth put it, "the problem with questions about the making of military policy and...foreign policy is not that there are no answers but that there are too many answers."  

A "CASCADING PERSPECTIVES" APPROACH 

I am uncomfortable relying on a single perspective to explain a complicated case. Each perspective that one could use would capture different clusters of variables that operate at different levels. After analyzing a case with each perspective, however, one would still be at a loss to say which one worked best. So I use all three. 

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This attitude is shared by an increasing number of international relations theorists, and can be seen in the swing away from structural theories of a decade ago to the more complex approaches presented more recently by Putnam, Keohane, Nye, and other members of the institutionalist and neo-statist camps. I fully support this change. There are several reasons why a multiple perspectives approach is a valuable research method. First, such an approach is good for explaining international relations in general. More specifically, it works well in cases of alliance decision-making, especially decisions involving weapons procurement or modernization. Within this category, nuclear weapons create the most interesting and complex cases for analysis. As such, I have chosen the follow-on to Lance episode as a revealing example of such decision-making, and of the value of using cascading perspectives as explanatory tools in such cases.

Are systemic factors simply a backdrop that all actors must keep in mind, while other factors come into play as the key causal variables? During the course of the FOTL case, we witnessed extraordinary changes to the strategic background in Europe, as the Cold War thawed and the earlier consensus on strategic variables disappeared. As this background changed, so too did the intensity of the variables in our other perspectives. As we shall see, the lower-level perspectives grew dramatically in importance as explanatory tools over the course of the seven-year FOTL debate.

We will begin our study of the follow-on to Lance with the most commonly used approach in international relations, the structural or systemic level—what Kenneth Waltz called the third image of analysis. The third image focuses on the position of nation states in the
international system and their search for power in that anarchic environment, and the resultant power balances that develop. This perspective best explains NATO's early decision to pursue FOTL and other SNF modernization programs. We will therefore use a systemic approach as a first cut at the early years of FOTL, and in so doing answer our first key question from Chapter One.

Waltz's so-called second image, or domestic politics approach, enters the "black box" of the state and tries to interpret events from a bureaucratic, organizational, or domestic politics perspective. These approaches are well-known. Two of Allison's models encompass this, as do some works by Morton Halperin and Richard Neustadt. A domestic politics approach focusing on the United States best explains the cancellation of FOTL, and will, I posit in the last chapter, most likely also predict (and eventually explain) the end result of the sole remaining NATO SNF modernization program: the tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM).

I attempt to bridge the gap between these two disparate levels of analysis by coming at FOTL's middle years from the perspective of alliance politics. This approach consists of a combination of the systemic level, on which lie the basic works on alliance politics, and an institutional level, from which we can look inside the government processes of the European NATO allies. We examine most closely West Germany, in order to find out why this crucial partner in the alliance behaved as it did in this case. This is, in essence, the application of both systemic and

10 Allison divides Waltz's single classification of "reductionist," second-image theories into two categories: organizations, and individuals within bureaucracies--his Models II and III.
domestic level theories to a particular regional perspective, rather than a new level of analysis per se.\textsuperscript{11} NATO's periodic renewal of its decision to modernize SNF through the mid-1980's can be understood best from such an alliance politics perspective.

Let us begin our review of these theoretical models that buttress our three perspectives with a look at systemic theory.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{REVIEW OF SYSTEMIC THEORY}

In many ways the simplest, most parsimonious, and at the same time most comprehensive approach to the study of international relations is the systemic perspective. So named because it focuses on the structure of the international system, this approach emphasizes several key concepts in its study of how states operate in an anarchic world.

A system, according to Kenneth Waltz, is a set of interacting units. Systems theories attempt to show "how the structure of a system affects the interacting units and how they in turn affect the structure."\textsuperscript{13} One can think of a system using the metaphor of billiard balls. One does not

\textsuperscript{11}One might call this an interactive approach. It is not particularly clean or uncomplicated, but neither is life. International relations should reflect a commitment to common sense and the realistic application of intellectual tools, re-arranged as necessary, to a problem. The divisions applied in this dissertation are somewhat arbitrary, of course--but so must be any division of theoretical approaches when tackling a new case.

\textsuperscript{12}The reader comfortable with basic IR theory may wish at this point to skip to the historical background in Chapter Three. The purpose of the review that follows is to acquaint those readers unfamiliar with the arguments and basic assumptions of those theories that are included in my three perspectives.

consider what may be going on within the balls; the only important factors are what happens to their relative positions when they hit each other—in other words, how the structure of the system changes due to unit interaction.14

Morton Kaplan made perhaps the most determined effort to develop a systemic approach that stayed at the international level.15 He made a number of simplifying assumptions that kept the reader out of the domestic politics realm and focused on the relationship between the actors. The six systems he studies are well-known. His balance of power and bipolarity models, with their tightly constructed rules and restrictions, will both prove useful in explaining state behavior in the early years of the FOTL case.

Kenneth Waltz, the leading proponent of systems-level approaches, criticizes nearly all of the above authors for providing models or taxonomies rather than systemic theory.16 Despite that criticism, I would nevertheless suggest that all early systems theorists subscribed to one common tenet: the belief that the structure of the international


16Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
system does matter, does affect state behavior, and does explain much of what we see happening in world affairs. If one can simplify that behavior into patterns or trends which one can then use in future cases, one's perceptual and predictive skills will be enhanced.

THE REALIST OUTLOOK

Many systems analysts are motivated by a realist view of the world. One can distinguish classical realism from its modern variant, neo-realism, by their different emphases, yet their basic beliefs are grounded on the same set of assumptions. To a realist, man is basically motivated by fear and envy. He seeks what others have, and he fears losing his own property and life to the hands of others. The world is a nasty, dangerous place, as well as an anarchy in which the players are involved in a zero-sum game—one's loss is another's gain. In this state of nature men naturally seek to protect themselves. This is accomplished by banding together in groups, the representative type today being the nation-state. The key concept in all of this is power—who has it, how to get it, how to protect oneself from others' power. Whether we are

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18 Power is usually defined as the capabilities of actors—economic, military, geo-strategic—and is conceived as both a means and an end. Power is a strength that can be used to influence other actors.
studying individuals in the state of nature, or modern states in the international system, these concepts carry the same connotations. Military power and strength are the key elements of state power, and hence state security. As Waltz points out, states act rationally in determining their policy positions in such a world because they do not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their security unless they set out to provide it for themselves. If security is something the state wants, then this desire, together with the conditions in which all states exist, imposes certain requirements on a foreign policy that pretends to be rational. The requirements are imposed by an automatic sanction: Departure from the rational model imperils the survival of the state.\(^\text{19}\)

In a later work Waltz defined a system and its operating rules as follows:

International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units. International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era... Structures emerge from the coexistence of states... International-political systems, like economic markets, are individualist in nature, spontaneously generated, and unintended... Both systems are formed and maintained on a principle of self-help...\(^\text{20}\)

In such a world states have two basic ways in which to maximize their security: by internal efforts, or through external arrangements with other states. States thus often join together in alliances to balance out a threatening power. In those cases, it could be said that "the balance of power is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen."\(^\text{21}\) The goal of such an arrangement


\(^\text{21}\)Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, p. 209.
are the preservation of security and peace, accomplished through the joint
efforts of utility maximizing individual states. Alliances are the means
to the end of greater security. In Jervis's formulation of a system,
alliances are formed via feedback from the units within a system as they
unite against an actor who threatens the destabilization or domination of
the system.\textsuperscript{22} But since alliances are made up of individual states, each
of which has a different conception of its own best interests, there are
inevitable shifts and changes within an alliance as these states seek to
gain a better position for themselves in light of changing conditions.

One strand of neo-realism holds that in such an anarchic global
system, the most stable structure is bipolarity.\textsuperscript{23} In this sense, the
structural realists have focused on the bipolar international system as it
has existed for the past 45 years: the East-West confrontation between
the two superpowers. Any move made by either side in such a situation
could be justified by the structuralist perspective as necessary or
expedient in terms of the bipolar balance.

The systemic level of analysis is best at describing the framework

\textsuperscript{22}Robert Jervis, "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in
Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, edited by Paul

\textsuperscript{23}For example, Kenneth Waltz explicitly states this preference in
Theories of International Politics, as does Stephen Walt in "Alliance
Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security, Spring
1985, pp. 3-43. John J. Mearsheimer and John Lewis Gaddis also bemoan the
passing of cold war bipolarity in their recent works. See Mearsheimer,
"Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,"
International Security, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56, and "Why We Will Soon Miss
the Cold War", The Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35-50; also Gaddis, "Coping
With Victory," The Atlantic, May 1990, pp. 49-51, The Long Peace:
Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987), and "Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs,
of world politics. As we will see in Chapters Four and Five, it is easy
to justify (or criticize) the follow-on to Lance missile from a systemic
or strategic perspective, using the terminology and outlooks outlined
above. This approach works best for the early years of the FOTL case,
although there are important details that cannot be captured using a
strategic perspective alone. To adequately explain the whole story, one
needs to incorporate alliance and domestic politics approaches, as well.

Life would be much simpler if a traditional structural theory, such
as balance of power, deterrence theory, or alliance politics, was
sufficient to explain what was going on in the alliance. As Stephen Walt
pointed out, the confirmation of structural theories is considerably
easier than that of domestic theories, requiring as it does only an
established correlation between the independent and dependent
variables.\(^{24}\) No further explanations are necessary. From a systemic
perspective, "the reasons why an action was taken are less important than
the fact that it took place."\(^{25}\) In a changing international environment
one would expect to see changes in the structure created by the state
actors for security. If I can identify, through the examination of
historical case studies, a trend for decision-making that correlates with
the changes in the international environment, I could postulate how the
alliance will react to these changes in the next stage of its debate on
SNF modernization. To explain the actions of an individual state,
however, we must turn to lower level theories of foreign policy decision-


\(^{25}\)Duffield, p. 39.
making. For, as Graham Allison pointed out,

Model I [systemic] analysis can be valuable. It does permit a quick, imaginative sorting out of a problem of explanation or analysis. It serves as a productive shorthand, requiring a minimum of information...But it is not itself a full analysis or explanation of an event, and it cannot stand alone.\textsuperscript{26}

Before we look at the domestic perspective, however, we need to consider an intermediate level. Between systemic level explanations and domestic political approaches lies a third level, a perspective that focuses on international institutions and the domestic politics of states more broadly defined. I apply this level to the North Atlantic Alliance and its European members, calling it an alliance politics perspective.

**COMBINING DIFFERENT LEVELS: ALLIANCE POLITICS**

Alliance politics can be approached from any of the three levels of analysis: systemic, as a single body composed of sovereign, utility-maximizing states; domestic, as a set of organizations and institutions making decisions in a bureaucratic melange; or individual, as a collection of bureaucrats and diplomats. One can also view alliance politics as being at the intersection of international structure and domestic variables, where we find the key actor in alliance politics: the state. The state, in this view, is an autonomous actor, but must be Janus-faced, considering simultaneously the concerns of domestic politics and international systemic challenges and opportunities, while at the same time facing constraints from both directions. According to advocates of this institutionalist or neo-statist perspective, such an approach is

\textsuperscript{26}Allison, *Essence of Decision*, pp. 254-5.
necessary because neither the systemic nor the domestic levels of analysis recognize the interaction between the international and state levels.\(^{27}\)

One could also say that alliance politics constitutes a sort of "second image reversed."\(^{28}\) In this formulation we find that international factors can influence domestic politics within a state. This differs from the traditional second image view as put forth by Waltz, where domestic political decisions have an impact on international relations, but not vice-versa. The best example of this occurring in the FOTL case is, of course, how events of the INF dual-track decision and the advent of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union influenced West Germany's domestic political debate vis-a-vis SNF modernization in the late 1980's.

Studying the politics of the NATO alliance forms what I call an "interactive" perspective. This requires the combination of the two


levels--systemic and domestic--into one approach. Alternatively, one could think of this as a regionalized version of the larger thesis: studying Western European politics from both a systemic and domestic politics approach. Let us turn first to the traditional systemic view of alliance politics.

Alliances, Waltz reminds us, "are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common. The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states. Divergence comes when positive interests are at issue." In a bipolar world, alliances are led by the strongest state, which generally makes decisions in response to changing threat perceptions without attempting first to satisfy its own partners.

Most of the works written on alliance theory have to do with alliance creation and dissolution. Few attempt to determine the internal dynamics of alliance politics or the distribution of costs and benefits between allies. Several have alluded to the inherent instability of alliances as a systemic structure, but the long life of NATO would seem to belie that hypothesis. Perhaps NATO's longevity and cohesion were due to its developing an "alliance ideology," a sense of community that transcended the security threat that caused the creation of the alliance as a "latent war community." 

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29Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 166

30The concept of alliance community comes from George F. Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); the idea of a latent war community is found in Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968). See also surveys of alliance theory in Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: , 1973), and Michael D. Ward, "Research Lags in Alliance Politics," Monograph Series in World Affairs (Denver:
Much of the difficulty in developing a common alliance policy position stems from differing perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic. Richard Neustadt pointed this out many years ago, when he described alliance politics as the inter-allied outcomes produced by the interaction of intra-governmental games. Sometimes one actor sees himself in a different game than his ally, and neither may understand the other's viewpoint. As Neustadt put it:

Players on the one side failed to understand the stakes of players on the other. They failed to do so because they misread the interests which the other men pursued. They misread interests because they misunderstood, to some degree, the precise nature of the game in which the others were engaged: its position, or its channels, or its history.\(^{31}\)

In these cases, it takes both domestic and systemic lenses to determine what actually occurred that led to an alliance decision. To comprehend the multiple games while they are going on requires an highly gifted diplomat and analyst—a rare individual, indeed.

Chapter Six and Seven look at the decisions in the middle years of the follow-on to Lance case from this perspective. First, we will examine the dynamics of alliance politics through a systemic lens, focusing on nation states and their positions and roles within the NATO debate on SNF. We will then turn to a more domestic politics approach, looking at the preeminent position held by the Federal Republic of Germany in this issue, and the domestic politics that drove its foreign policy.

The question of how the United States, in its role as leader of the North Atlantic Alliance, actually "leads" is a salient one for my study.

University of Denver, 1982).

That the US must do so is frankly stated by most writers about international politics. Waltz, for instance, reminds his readers that "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can behave as 'ordinary' states because that is not what they are. Their extraordinary positions in the system lead them to undertake tasks that other states have neither the incentive nor the ability to perform." Those tasks include maintenance of the international system, preserving the peace, and dealing with other economic and political problems.

Alliance theory tells us that the United States will play the primary role in the development of NATO nuclear doctrine. This predominant position is greatest when the international system exhibits bipolar tendencies. As international hostilities diminish, therefore, one would expect to see a lessened American ability to dictate its wishes to the alliance nuclear community. Nevertheless, as the largest partner and the owner of most of the nuclear weapons in Central Europe, the US has not forfeited its leading role. This logic is buttressed by collective goods theory.

In collective or public goods theory, security is a collective good. This constitutes a systemic level approach that attempts to explain, via rational choice, the system dynamics at work, and to predict the relative efforts of individual alliance members. A collective good is defined as one which cannot be denied to any other member of the group, and which one cannot get from any other source--in other words, it has the properties of nonexclusivity and nonrivalness. Because of these properties, the theory posits that individual alliance members have no incentive to provide the

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collective good independently; in fact, the good will only be provided by that state which feels the greatest dedication to the value of the good. This generally means the biggest state—the superpower, in a bipolar model. The other states may contribute, but only to a suboptimal level; in the worst case, they may contribute nothing while enjoying the benefits of the security provided by the alliance as a whole, thus becoming "free riders." The largest, most powerful members provide a disproportionate level of the good because they place a higher absolute value on it.  

Given these theoretical underpinnings, it should not be surprising that the United States acts as the presumed "leader" of the alliance, especially in nuclear issues. And so it has done—often to the chagrin of its European allies, who sometimes complain of American non-consultation with its allies, insensitivity to domestic politics in Europe, or just plain steamroller tactics to get its position accepted as alliance doctrine.

One explanation for NATO's reluctance to consider changes to its nuclear strategy is based on regime theory, coupled with concepts of institutional rigidity. According to this view, "national actions and thus overall alliance behavior will come to fall into regular, self-

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reinforcing patterns." Furthermore, such institutions "frequently prove resistant to change, even when they generate outcomes that are widely regarded as undesirable."

Recent work by John Duffield convincingly demonstrates that the NATO alliance does meet the requirements for definition as a regime on several levels: the establishment of broad outlines of NATO policy, the on-going maintenance of that policy, and the implementation of the policy. That it can do so is predicated by the creation of a common set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. These rules and procedures, in particular, buttress organizational process theory and discourage major changes to established policy. The alliance seems committed to the status quo, regardless of external events or possible changes that would be in its best long term interest.

Applying the literature on organizations and institutions to alliance theory helps overcome a major shortcoming in most neo-realist structural theories: they ignore institutions. Obviously this is a

34 Duffield, p. 501. His focus is on changes in the NATO conventional force levels over the years, but his argument works for nuclear doctrine, too.


36 Duffield, p. 502.

37 Requirements for a regime, as put forth by Stephen Krasner in "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," Chapter One of his International Regimes.

serious drawback for students of NATO, since it has become so institutionalized over its lifetime. One cannot explain NATO policy without also considering its institutional manifestations and origins. This we do in Chapters Three and Six.

REVIEW OF DOMESTIC POLITICS THEORIES

Although the Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of reference that focus on the governmental machine—the organizations and political actors involved in the policy process.39

The total system is infinitely complex with everything interacting. One can discuss it intelligently, therefore, only bit by bit.40

Systemic theory alone does not provide us with enough explanatory power to fully understand US or NATO decision-making. The systemic level of analysis is a necessary but insufficient component of a thorough analysis of how states interact. It can set the stage, introduce constraints, and influence policy output, but it cannot determine policy choices. Nor can an alliance perspective answer all the questions surrounding the FOTL case, although it does a more thorough job than systemic level explanations.

To understand where policy comes from we need to turn to the level of national variables, examining especially the character of domestic politics. Here we might find the constraints and imperatives that answer how such decisions are made. While the systemic structure affects the

39Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 5.
atmosphere of international politics, the actual decisions are made by real people, with individual beliefs, acting within organizational frameworks and processes. This equates to Waltz's second image, or internal nation-state attributes. Even though Waltz generally disdains such "reductionist" theories in favor of the systemic approach, he admitted in an early work that they were sometimes necessary. In the international system,

> each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best... The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy.\textsuperscript{41}

J. David Singer supports the use of domestic level theories when necessary, although such an approach does have its drawbacks--most noticeably, the loss of parsimony enjoyed at the systemic level. As he put it,

> this sub-systemic orientation is likely to produce a richer description and more satisfactory (from the empiricist's point of view) explanation of international relations, though its predictive power would appear no greater than the systemic orientation. But the descriptive and explanatory advantages are achieved only at the price of considerable methodological complexity.\textsuperscript{42}

Some analysts differentiate between theories of domestic politics in which the principal variable is structure and theories in which the principal variable is individual choice. Others call these individual levels bureaucratic politics. I intentionally consider both levels of sub-systemic theory in this section on domestic politics as an explanation for the final year of the follow-on to Lance case.

\textsuperscript{41}Waltz, \textit{Man, the State, and War}, p. 238.

\textsuperscript{42}Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem," p. 89.
To lay the foundation for our study of domestic politics, it is helpful to turn to organizational and bureaucratic politics models. This helps to define the structure in which we will be examining our cases, identify the key actors and their positions within that structure, and present institutional and organizational constraints upon individual decision-making. Early definitive works on organizational process theory and bureaucratic politics include Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power*, Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision*, and Morton Halperin's *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, which examined the defense and foreign policy making structure in Washington. More recently, Robert Putnam has attempted to combine the domestic level of analysis with systemic theory in his "two-level games" approach. As he puts it,

Unlike state-centric theories, the two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the "national interest" requires. Unlike the "Second-Image" or the "Second-Image Reversed," the two-level approach recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.

**ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS THEORY**

The theory of organizational process rests on a number of assumptions about government behavior, the foremost of which is that government actions and outcomes are the result of the interaction of semi-

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feudal agencies competing within the governmental structure. A state act, according to this outlook, is actually a standard operating procedure performed by a large domestic organization for selfish purposes, legitimized by the veneer of state purpose. These organizations are organized according to issue or functional areas. Government policy toward an issue, rather than being a conscious, rational choice, more often "reflects the independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders."

The underlying assumption of this decision-making model is that a government's structures are important, and that understanding structures can help one understand how and why a certain decision was made. The units of a government structure act according to rules and procedures that channel decisions in ways that help their organization, whether by increasing its size, its budget, or its power in an issue area—defined by Morton Halperin as an organization's "essence." Organizations constantly try to protect their essence and increase their influence without sacrificing their autonomy. Organizations produce options for decision-makers to assess, and create constraints within which leaders must operate. The parameters established by organizations and their procedures serve as the boundaries within which much of "bureaucratic

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politics" by individuals takes place.

Organizational process theory is important not only because of the effect of structural factors in decision-making, but because of the impact of such thinking on iterative procedures. Large organizations are wedded to their own concerns and often fail to consider the larger, state-level issues. Decisions are made slowly through a process of incremental decisions and changes. Organizations change and learn slowly. Francis Rourke coined the law of bureaucratic inertia: "Bureaucracies at rest tend to stay at rest, and bureaucracies in motion tend to stay in motion." New issues are considered within the context of routines and procedures established earlier in the organization's life; policy makers often become prisoners of their own officialdom. This theory does not explain innovation or quick responses to rapidly changing international conditions. Of course, if a government does change its behavior or make a dramatic change of policy, as the US did when it cancelled FOTL in May 1990, that becomes an important incident to examine against the background of organizational inertia. The answer for such innovation is often found in theories of individual action, including bureaucratic politics theory, which looks more closely at the men and women who make up the organizations of government.

The organizational process paradigm can serve as a convenient checklist for analysts as they begin to examine a foreign policy issue,

48 Frances E. Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 49.

alerting them to important factors and considerations that they must not overlook in their studies. It reminds the student of foreign policy that it is vital for him or her to understand how a government is structured and how it works. It can then be combined with other approaches to yield a better understanding of how a state decision was made. As one writer put it, "Such analytical insights are imperative...if the researcher is to have any hope of cutting through the thicket of both problems and overdocumentation that so characterizes the history of national security policies and of international relations since 1940."50

In the follow-on to Lance case, for instance, I found the organizational process model to be extremely helpful in sorting out which agencies were involved in the decisions, why they took the positions they did, and how systemic changes affected those positions. The problem in the FOTL case was not "overdocumentation," but lack of inside information; approaching US domestic politics with the organizational approach in mind helped to focus my research on the proper agencies.51 Nevertheless, once

50Williamson, p. 141.

one has determined which organizations were involved, one still has to talk to people that work there. That is where bureaucratic politics comes into play.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS THEORY

Bureaucratic politics theory views government policies as the outcomes of bargaining among many actors within the system. The focus here is on individuals and "the pulling and hauling that is politics." In this perspective, the "state" is merely an arena for political struggle among individuals for power and influence, particularly among those men at the top of the organizational hierarchy--the political elite, the key decision-makers. In this view it is not the organizations that play the primary role, although they do set the framework and constraining parameters within which individuals must operate, but the individual decision-makers themselves who determine, to the greatest extent, what a state's policy will be. Organizations within the American system, after all, are not independent, as Neustadt told us:

The constitutional convention of 1787 is supposed to have created a government of 'separated powers.' It did nothing of the sort. Rather, it created a government of separated institutions sharing powers.

Individuals sitting at the apex of these organizations must actively


\[53\text{Neustadt, } \textit{Presidential Power}, \text{ p. 33.}\]
compete and cooperate with one another in order to accomplish their organizational tasks, which leads to the interplay we call bureaucratic politics. One could call this a process of creating a dominant coalition of partners within the bureaucracy in order to achieve a particular decision.\textsuperscript{54}

In this thesis I collapse these two approaches—organizational process and bureaucratic politics—into one general domestic perspective that emphasizes simply the "bureaucracy," since I believe the distinction between the two that Allison and others make is forced, artificial, and confusing. In reality, there is no separating the men and the organizations. This, of course, is what makes foreign policy such a fascinating subject for many political analysts. Much has been written about how foreign policy decisions are made, and what the major influences on those outcomes are. It is not an easy topic to clarify. Indeed, some authors have suggested that this mixed system of inputs can actually be used to a decision-maker's advantage, as he allows some pluralistic competition among both organizations and individuals in order to determine alternatives prior to choosing his final position.\textsuperscript{55}

The history of NATO theater nuclear doctrine and strategy is replete with lessons unlearned, or supposed lessons misapplied to new situations. Wrote one author after studying the history of nuclear policies in Europe, one would expect to find progress along a learning curve, implying a higher level of

\textsuperscript{54}Snyder and Diesing, \textit{Conflict Among Nations}, pp. 355-56.

\textsuperscript{55}So argues, for example, Alexander George in "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," \textit{American Political Science Review}, September 1972, pp. 751-785.
understanding than thirty, twenty, or even ten years ago. This was the assumption with which I began. Now, having completed the study, I believe it to be false. What is impressive is the cyclical character of the debates...The past decades have encouraged a rich literature that is barely appreciated by many contemporary students of strategy, especially those close to policy-making circles.56

WHY USE THE UNITED STATES FOR THIS PERSPECTIVE?

We will apply the domestic politics perspective to our examination of the FOTL case in Chapter Eight, which focuses on the internal politics of the United States as the key explanatory variable for FOTL's cancellation. The reasons for emphasizing American policy making are compelling. The United States, as the largest and most powerful leader of the NATO alliance, has led the coalition in its military strategy since the beginning. If an issue is discussed within NATO councils, it must be approved (and often originates) in Washington. Hence it is important to understand what went on in the American capital during the follow-on to Lance case in order to get a complete grasp of this alliance issue.

Alliance theory also supports the study of US domestic decision-making as the key variable in NATO nuclear issues. It suggests that in an uneven power balance the largest member will have the greatest influence on alliance policy. In fact, in extremely stratified systems, such as Kaplan's tight bipolar world (as existed in the early Cold War years), an alliance's decisions should correspond almost exactly with the

superpower's desires.\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, Paul Buteux points out that while smaller allies can sometimes block doctrinal changes in certain cases, the general measures of a country's ability to influence alliance nuclear policy are based on geo-strategic factors. These include the country's size, its involvement in Central Europe, its overall military contribution, and its ties to the nuclear weapons themselves.\textsuperscript{58} In each of these categories the United States holds the dominant position among NATO allies.

**THE VALUE OF MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES**

Some combination of our three images, rather than any one of them, may be required for an accurate understanding of international relations.\textsuperscript{59}

Since it is possible to find historical evidence for virtually any theoretical proposition, the foreign policy analyst must look for ways to check his or her subjectivity. The use of rival theories is one possible solution.\textsuperscript{60}

How does one select which perspective to use? How does one pick an intermediate-level theory to apply to a particular realm of study? John Ikenberry has suggested three means of testing to see which theory works best. One can decide empirically, by gathering material and evidence that


\textsuperscript{59}Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, p. 14.

then points to a particular theory; one can choose aesthetically, by the
application of theoretical standards; or one can select the option
analytically—deciding which level or theory best fits in an ad hoc,
eclectic fashion. We could add a fourth approach: one can opt not to
choose a single theory, applying instead several levels of analysis to a
single case.

This dissertation attempts to combine levels in line with the last
method mentioned above in an intellectually rigorous manner. We are
attempting to understand and explain an ongoing case of weapons
modernization in an alliance, so we start with the parsimony and
simplifying power of the systemic, or third image, level of analysis.
This shows us the constraints and allows us to get a basic understanding
of what occurred, but it is undetermined as an explanatory tool.
Second, we tackle the case from a perspective that allows us to use
aspects of both the systemic and domestic levels from a purely regional
point of view. We then turn to the greater descriptive power of domestic-
level analysis, in order to better explain certain choices that were made.
Finally, we combine the results of these disparate approaches in an
attempt to grasp the full story of this missile debate.

An interesting digression may help show the value of coming at a
story from more than one angle.

THE "RASHOMON" EFFECT

The Rashomon story explores the difficulties of achieving true
justice when trying to recreate the facts of an incident using several

Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy, pp. 8-11.
different eye-witness accounts. The analogy, of course, is to our attempt to uncover the true story of a case by coming at it from different levels of analysis.

In the story, a Japanese samurai warrior is captured and his wife violated before his eyes by a forest bandit. The samurai is then killed. But who really did it? In the trial, each of the participants presents a different version of what happened, reflecting their own viewpoints and their personal agendas. A bystander, listening to the differing accounts, is led to ask: "Why should I trust your eyes any more than those of the other three? Like I told you—people see what they want to see and say what they want to hear." Herein lies the value of multiple perspectives. While the story that develops out of each of the perspectives is believable, and each tends to convert the listener to the essential correctness of its view, there are always other ways to tell the same tale, and other details that may have been left out of the earlier tellings. By looking at a case from three or four different angles you may clutter your life with more information than most people want, but you also can sift through that mass of material and come up with a better (although perhaps no simpler) explanation of what really happened.

FILLING THE HOLE IN THE LITERATURE.

International relations literature is rich with works on all of the above theories, as well as on NATO's nuclear dilemma. What is lacking,

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62 Fay and Michael Kanin, Rashomon (Based on Stories by Ryunosuke Akutagawa). (New York: Random House, 1959). This story became a successful film and Broadway play.

63 Rashomon, Act II, p. 67.
however, is a study that combines these using recent historical cases. Several of the authors mentioned have applied their theories to NATO decisions, but none has yet done the SNF modernization case.

By analyzing the FOTL case in what Harry Eckstein calls a "disciplined-configurative" approach, I can mobilize existing theories into perspectives that explain the case. While the results of my study do not prove or disprove the validity of the theories, they can add to the knowledge base on which such theories are grounded. More importantly, from my point of view, they will also help policy makers better appreciate future cases of nuclear decision making in the European theater. My concerns are descriptive, explanatory, and predictive, rather than theoretical; I am a user rather that a creator of theory.

A study emphasizing decision-making over a period of years faces problems not confronting those who analyze short-term crises. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff point out, "This type of study is often more difficult than the 'crisis' type to cast in the mold of precise decision-making analysis because it involves a harder-to-research cumulative process which takes place in a sprawling bureaucratic labyrinth and a more comprehensive political arena over a longer time period." Many analysts suggest that different theoretical approaches work better at different times--it all depends on the case. Being rigidly theoretical

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from the start could actually be disadvantageous when trying to remain open-minded with respect to analysis results. Snyder and Diesing, for example, examine cases using the traditional, satisficing, and bureaucratic politics models. Their conclusion: sometimes some theories work best, at other times others do better. They recommend, in fact, that the political analyst combine systemic and decision-making theories to better understand the nature of his particular field of interest: in their case, bargaining in crises. What we seem to be facing, as Ikenberry so rightly points out, is an "overabundance of theory;" analyzing discrete periods of a case using different conceptual lenses can help us overcome this surfeit.

One must recognize the difficulties inherent in trying to analyze foreign policy. No single theory is available to look at external factors and domestic concerns simultaneously—something which one must do to adequately explain this field. The theories discussed above all attempt to analyze one level of the problem, going no further than off-hand references to the need for "keeping the other levels in mind."

Putnam's two-level game, combining systemic theory, which sets the parameters of the international environment, with organizational, bureaucratic, and decision-making theories to examine domestic politics, is a more complete approach to the question of US foreign policy and alliance decision-making. As Putnam says:

The most portentous development in the fields of comparative and international relations in recent years is the dawning recognition among practitioners in each field of the need to

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66 Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations.
67 Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy, p. 1.
take into account entanglements between the two. Empirical illustrations of reciprocal influence between domestic and international affairs abound. What we need now are concepts and theories that will help us organize and extend our empirical observations.\textsuperscript{68}

Putnam would agree with Allison's suggestion that "the best analysts of foreign policy manage to weave strands of each of the three conceptual models into their explanations."\textsuperscript{69} That is the goal of this thesis as we now turn to an examination of a recent case of NATO nuclear decision-making.

CONCLUSION

The use of multiple perspectives, whether from the disparate starting points of the international system and US domestic politics, or by applying theories from both arenas to the study of alliance politics, is a frequently overlooked and powerful tool for better descriptive and explanatory purposes in case studies. In a single case study, such as the follow-on to Lance, it becomes even more important to tackle the conceptual unwrapping of what really happened from several different angles. That is what this dissertation will do.

As we begin our story of NATO nuclear modernization in the chapters ahead it is worthwhile to remember what John Kennedy wrote about the problems of uncovering the "true story" behind public policy decision-making. Try as we may to adequately explain the FOTL case,

\textit{The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer--often, indeed, to the decider himself...There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-}

\textsuperscript{68}Putnam, p. 459.

making process—mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.\textsuperscript{70}

Thirty three years ago Professor Klaus Knorr expressed his concerns over NATO’s continued ability to conduct its primary mission. He wrote:

In 1958, it is fair to say, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began to be seriously strained by a profound crisis of confidence... Increasingly the question was put: Can NATO, with its present forces and strategy, still be expected to defend the West against possible aggression and aggressive threats--indeed, to deter military aggression? Is the alliance still able to fulfill its central function?\(^1\)

The central problem of the alliance was already evident in the ninth year of its charter, and has remained relatively unchanged in the three decades since these lines were written. The same questions were heard again and again through the following years, surfacing most recently in the debate over the need for and the prospects of short-range nuclear force (SNF) modernization. The central issue in the 1987-1990 SNF debate concerned the replacement for the aging Lance missile. That program was terminated in May 1990, so the years ahead will see the focus of attention shift to the question of deploying a new tactical air-to-surface missile. Regardless of the technical characteristics of the hardware involved, however, the central questions remained for nearly 40 years:\(^2\) did the alliance have a viable strategy? Could NATO deter the threat from the East? Were the people of Western Europe and North America willing to support the level of military forces necessary to effect such a strategy?

\(^1\)Klaus Knorr, editor, *NATO and American Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 1. As the French say, "the more things change, the more they stay the same."

\(^2\)Although these questions have themselves recently come under consideration as a result of changes in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War.
These recurrent questions have plagued NATO planners and government leaders since the beginning of the alliance, and they remained important concerns behind the scenes of the follow-on to Lance story.

This chapter reviews the history of NATO nuclear planning, doctrine, and force levels from the first introduction of nuclear weapons in the theater in the early 1950's through the INF controversy of the 1980's. This background will lay the basis for an understanding of the Montebello Decision of 1983 and its call for short-range tactical nuclear

This analysis of early NATO doctrine, force structure, the concepts of flexible response and deterrence theory, and the role of TNF weapons, is based on a selective reading of the immense literature available on these topics. Among the most helpful books for reviewing this history have been (see bibliography for complete citation details): David Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy and The Troubled Alliance: Atlantic Relations in the 1980's; Stephen Biddle and Peter Feaver, editors, Battlefield Nuclear Weapons: Issues and Options; Jeffrey Record, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives and NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The Real Issues; Sherri Wasserman, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A Study in Alliance Politics; Jeffrey Boutwell, Paul Doty, and Gregory Treverton, editors, The Nuclear Confrontation in Europe; J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report of the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in the Atlantic Alliance; Uwe Nerlich, "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Is NATO Running Out of Time?"; Catherine Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons; John Steinbruner and Leon Sigal, editors, Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question; Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives; Klaus Knorr, editor, NATO and American Security: Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma; Keith Dunn and Stephen Flanagan, editors, NATO in the 5th Decade; P. Terrence Hopmann and Frank Barnaby, editors, Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe; Leon Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe; John Cartwright and Julian Critchley, Cruise, Pershing, and SS-20; Kenneth Myers, editor, NATO: The Next Thirty Years; Carl Amme, NATO Strategy and Nuclear Defense; Stephen Cimbala, NATO Strategy and Nuclear Escalation; Stanley Sloan, NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain; Catherine Kelleher and Gale Mattix, editors, Evolving European Defense Strategies; David Yost, editor, NATO's Strategic Options: Arms Control and Defense; Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons; and James Golden, Daniel Kaufman, Asa Clark, and David Petraeus, editors, NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, and Prospects.
modernization in Europe, and the resulting controversy over the follow-on to Lance (FOTL) missile. Since the issues and questions surrounding alliance nuclear weapons decisions are cyclical in nature, this review should prove helpful in sorting out the standard questions, justifications, and criticisms as they have appeared in past debates, giving us a better understanding of why governments took the positions they did. This understanding may be transferable to more recent episodes, such as FOTL.

Before beginning our chronological review, however, it may be helpful to look at what it was that nuclear weapons were supposed to do in the first place. We also need to consider the meaning of the term "modernization" in the context of NATO weapons systems, particularly nuclear forces. What does it mean to say that the alliance wants to "modernize" a system? How does the European public see it? Is there a best way to pursue a new system that is deemed necessary?4

After discussing these issues, this chapter turns to the history of NATO nuclear policy, focusing on several discrete incidents where NATO chose to modernize or change its nuclear force structure or doctrine, or its organizational processes for dealing with nuclear issues. Each episode represents an attempt, in most cases based on an American initiative, to address some aspect of NATO's uneasiness over the US nuclear guarantee.5 These cases should prove enlightening to us when we

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4We will return to this question in more depth in Chapter Four when we examine the arguments for and against the follow-on to Lance missile.

5The best history of this period is David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1983), which focuses on six modernization episodes between 1953 and 1979.
turn toward a closer examination of the FOTL program in the chapters that follow, seeing again the recurrent themes that are found running through NATO nuclear history.

Finally, this chapter ends with a look at the legacy of the INF Treaty. What effect did the elimination of several classes of nuclear weapons have on NATO's avowed strategy, on European public opinion towards these weapons, and specifically on the prospective chances for success in future nuclear modernization programs, such as SNF?

NATO THEATER NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

"Besser ein Ende mit Schrecken als ein Schrecken ohne Ende."

A number of strategists and academic analysts turned their attention in the 1950's to the problem of limited war. Were such wars possible in the nuclear age? Was it right to try and limit wars, or was the escalatory tendency to quickly go out of control one of the arguments favoring deterrence? Were nuclear weapons militarily useful in a limited sense, and what did "limited" mean?

The answer, or so it seemed to many of these writers in the late

6"Better a horrible ending than an endless horror." German expression from the 1950's which rationalized the NATO policy of early use of tactical nuclear weapons, even on Western soil, in the event of war in Central Europe. Quoted in Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, editors, Limited Strategic War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1962), p. 19.

7The most important early study on this topic was Project Vista, begun in 1950 at the California Institute of Technology. It examined the feasibility of "bringing the battle back to the battlefield" in a nuclear era, and concluded that it could be done. Schwartz, p. 21; also David C. Elliot, "Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe," International Security, Summer 1986, pp. 163-183.
1950's, was that there were grounds for attempting to keep war limited in geographical scope and destructive power. Furthermore, studies showed that it was at least theoretically possible to design a battlefield use for "discrete," small-yield atomic or nuclear warheads. In some quarters, these weapons were simply seen as bigger artillery, in no way requiring special doctrinal considerations or inspiring political misgivings. Proponents of tactical nuclear weapons also saw them as moral alternatives to an indiscriminate use of large weapons on civilian targets. In essence, they wanted to combine new atomic energy weapons with traditional war fighting methods involving two armies on the field.

The opposing view was that there was a difference between conventional and nuclear explosives, both qualitatively and in terms of sheer destructive power. To these writers, there existed an obvious "firebreak" separating the use of nuclear warheads from a conventional battlefield. Size alone was not the most important distinction; it was

8Among the leading limited war theorists were Robert Osgood, Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, and William Kaufmann.

9Of course, many early TNF weapons were not at all discrete. Some had warheads and ranges, not to mention targets, that made them undeniably "strategic" weapons in all but name. As we shall see, many of the threads woven in today's SNF debate had their beginnings in attempts to correct this tactical/strategic mismatch--efforts that began under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in the early 1970's.


the nature of these weapons that made their use readily acknowledged, and
that placed the world in a much more dangerous, unstable, and
unpredictable conflict arena. For these reasons so-called "tactical"
nuclear weapons were dangerously destabilizing precisely because they were
smaller and therefore more likely to be used in a low-level conflict.
Their escalatory nature, combined with their announced political linkage
role to the United States, made them instruments that put the US at risk
in an uncertain future.

How these questions were answered would determine, in large part,
plans for the peacetime deployment and wartime use of these weapons. That
they would be a part of NATO’s military forces in some form, however, was
never in doubt.

MILITARY RATIONALE

Given these arguments for and against the creation and use of
smaller, tactical nuclear weapons based in the theater, the United States
and NATO chose to emphasize the first position: atomic weapons were
simply the next logical step on the escalatory ladder of firepower,
useable in a manner similar to traditional conventional ordinance. They
would act as a "force multiplier" when applied to conventional operations.
Furthermore, their existence in Europe would provide a direct coupling
link to the American strategic nuclear force, which strengthened
deterrence. From a military perspective the important point was that
these weapons could be considered in nuclear force planning and policy
making. The NATO military staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers

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Europe (SHAPE) could count on a readily available arsenal of atomic firepower for the event of war in Central Europe. This made up for a lot of conventional forces in targeting exercises and war games. It also required NATO and the US to establish procedures for the development, procurement, storage, protection, command and control, and dispersal of these weapons prior to any potential battlefield use.

The declared functions of NATO's nuclear forces eventually became, and remain, threefold: 1) to deter against Soviet first use of theater nuclear weapons; 2) to provide a hedge against possible conventional failure in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack; and 3) to provide an escalatory link (coupling) to the United States' strategic arsenal. To accomplish these goals, from a military point of view, a theater nuclear force must possess the characteristics of survivability, flexibility, sufficient range, and a doctrine for its use in warfighting. These are the hallmarks of a credible theater nuclear deterrent. A secondary, political, function of American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe is to provide America's allies with an opportunity to participate in alliance nuclear planning and deterrence strategy, thereby reducing "whatever need some allies might feel to develop independent nuclear capabilities."

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13 Record, p. 20.

DETERRENCE OR REASSURANCE?

One of the enduring questions surrounding nuclear weapons in NATO concerns their ultimate political purpose. Are theater nuclear forces positioned in Europe to deter the Soviet Union by denying them an easy victory in any aggression against the West, or are they there primarily to reassure the West Europeans that the United States will stand by their side in the event of threats, international crises, or war?

The obvious answer is: both reasons. One cannot make too fine a distinction between the two purposes, for they are intertwined. Coupling the United States to Europe is a condition whereby the integrity of the chain of escalation is complete, from conventional forces in Europe through theater nuclear weapons and finally reaching the American strategic nuclear arsenal. It connotes the joint political, social, and historical links between the two sides of the Atlantic and considers them as one. The problem, of course, is that the US is geographically removed from Europe, and would have different national objectives in time of war which may conflict with those of its European allies. This is one aspect of the nuclear dilemma. As one writer put it, "There is a nagging asymmetry about nuclear protection: it takes more credibility to keep an ally than to deter an adversary."15 After all, America's "secret strategy" could be to de-couple itself from Europe in the event of war. Not that the US is planning to do so, but it is possible—a state may, after all, act differently in time of crisis than its professed strategy

beforehand. Europeans suspect and fear this. Every move made by the alliance, under American leadership, involving nuclear forces or strategy since the end of American nuclear superiority in the 1960's has caused the Europeans to worry about the "spectre of decoupling."\(^{16}\)

As we will see in later sections of this chapter, this question revolves around the NATO doctrine of flexible response, which, with its deliberate ambiguities, tends to marginally satisfy all members of the alliance without clarifying the doctrinal mess. To America, flexible response emphasizes deterrence through denial, by stressing the flexibility of a conventional/nuclear mix of warfighting assets that can be confined to the European continent but would be deliberately escalated to a strategic level if necessary. Nuclear weapons, seen in this light, are useful in direct defense as well as for deterrence. Of course, any use of theater nuclear forces (TNF) by NATO in the event it was losing a conventional war would most likely be on West European territory. This constitutes a real dilemma for the Europeans, who both want and fear these weapons.

West Europeans, who would prefer not to see any war, conventional or nuclear, break out on their soil, emphasize the response side of the flexible response equation. They stress that there exists a "seamless web" of deterrence, stretching from conventional forces through tactical and theater nuclear weapons, eventually reaching America's strategic might. They also emphasize the probability that this linkage will result in a condition of complete loss of control and early massive destruction of the Soviet homeland in the event of any war. This possibility of

\(^{16}\)Ravenal, p. 60.
retaliation—deterrence by punishment—should so frighten the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact that they will be deterred from even beginning a conflict.

Both points of view, therefore, support having tactical nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal, although for significantly different reasons. Such forces support both types of deterrence, one directly and the other indirectly. Neither view substantiates the need for these systems specifically in terms of reassurance, but they are reassuring to NATO nonetheless—especially in light of the linkage argument, which the Europeans stress. For several theoretical reasons, then, in the 1950's there arose a considerable constituency on both sides of the Atlantic that favored theater nuclear weapons. At the same time, pressures from the American budgetary process and nuclear weapons laboratories added to support for TNF.

As we shall see, however, much of the debate that arose in the late 1970's (and that has continued to the present) over the proper role of TNF weapons stems from this doctrinal dilemma. At what point does the alliance make the transition to using tactical nuclear weapons in a defensive role, rather than purely for deterrence? This question has never been clearly answered.

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17Gregory Treverton supports this contention. As he puts it, "TNF stand right at the intersection of these two notions, with Europeans and Americans looking at them through the lenses of different concepts of deterrence...Both these roles for TNF are political, not military." Treverton, "Theatre Nuclear Forces: Military Logic and Political Purpose," in The Nuclear Confrontation in Europe, edited by Jeffrey D. Boutwell, Paul Doty, and Gregory F. Treverton (Beckenham, UK: Croom-Helm Ltd., 1985), p.98.
MODERNIZATION" AND SNF IN EUROPE

The term "modernization" is a more complex concept than one might first suspect, especially in the context of such emotionally charged issues as nuclear weapons. While in the simplest sense to modernize a military weapons system implies the improvement of a component on an existing system, or the replacement of an older system with a newer, perhaps more capable model, there are a number of other definitions apparent in the way this term has been applied over the past few decades with respect to NATO TNF.

Some would argue that the best way to achieve modernization in today's environment is to go about it quietly, with a minimum of public notice or explanation. Calling such moves an "upgrade" or "improvement" of current capabilities, rather than a wholesale replacement of an existing system in the theater, may help the prospects of achieving a successful program. But this implies that without resorting to such techniques, the alliance would not otherwise be able to "sneak it in" past an attentive and opposing public. The alliance chose this option several times in its recent history. Modernization episodes that were undertaken without public fanfare included replacing gravity bombs for dual-capable aircraft, providing improved 155 millimeter and 8 inch artillery shells, modifying target plans through SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Studies, and the quiet research and development program for the tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM).

One alternative to that approach is to make the modernization program as public as possible, perhaps as part of a larger "package" of initiatives that may include arms control possibilities or doctrinal
changes as well as weapons upgrades. This was the path taken by NATO with the INF dual track decision of 1979. It was also the means eventually adopted, albeit not necessarily by choice, for attempting to replace the Lance missile with FOTL.

Was the follow-on to Lance a new system, or simply an improved version of the old missile? In order to ease its deployment, should the US have called it "Lance II" instead of the Lance "follow-on?" Opinion is divided on these questions among the weapons procurement community. The inability to decide which approach was best led, in part, to some of the political and public relations problems that FOTL faced.

NATO NUCLEAR HISTORY: MODERNIZATION EPISODES

In retrospect, the way theater nuclear weapons were introduced in NATO was the single most important failure in NATO force planning.  

If they [TNF] did not exist, it is far from certain that NATO would, today, seek to develop and deploy them.

NATO, after [42] years, is an old unused medicine on the shelf. The bottle is still there and the label remains the same; but, if you ever try it, you find that the contents have long since evaporated or spoiled.

The issue of whether to place nuclear weapons in Europe began immediately after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. At the time, of course, the United States had clear superiority in its atomic arsenal, but had no doctrine for the use of the few warheads it possessed.

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20Ravenal, p. 68.
As the arsenal grew, and as the Soviet Union began to field its own "A-bombs" and "supers" (nuclear, or fusion weapons),\textsuperscript{21} demands grew as well for a plan on which to base American decisions on how and when these weapons could be used in militarily useful ways.

NATO initially had no real strategy for defending Western Europe against the Soviet military threat, beyond a short-sighted adherence to the successful approach used in World War Two: defending while withdrawing, with later reconquest of the Continent following amphibious landings in force, \textit{a la} Normandy 1944. Events in 1949 and 1950, however, increased the apparent likelihood of war. A combination of world events--communist support for the Greek civil war; the Berlin blockade; the Soviet-supported Korean War--woke the West up to the potential threat from the East, and made the early military defense of the Western states seem much more urgent and necessary. A strategy of forward defense seemed to provide the answer.

With the approval of this strategy in 1949 by the NATO Military Committee in Document 14/1, "NATO Strategic Guidance" (usually referred to as MC 14/1), the alliance had a defense plan that was based on traditional counteroffensive doctrine and required no nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{22} As a result of the defensive posture announced in MC 14/1, the alliance in 1952 agreed to the creation of a large standing army in Central Europe. These so-called Lisbon force goals called for 90 divisions within several years, of

\textsuperscript{21}The first Soviet A-bomb was tested in 1949, and an H-bomb was detonated in 1953--just six months after the United States had done so.

which 35-40 would be combat ready and in position in Europe. 23

In October 1953 the United States deployed the first atomic warhead to the European continent. 24 This first shipment amounted to several hundred atomic rounds for the 280 millimeter atomic cannon, followed a year later by Honest John and Corporal ballistic missiles, Matador ground-launched cruise missiles, and Regulus sea-launched cruise missiles. 25 No doctrine existed for using these systems in any particularized manner; they were apparently considered to be just bigger artillery rounds, "more bang for the buck." As Henry Kissinger later admitted, "we had no very precise idea of what to do with them." 26 In Congressional testimony, James Schlesinger admitted that once fissionable materials began to be

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24 The date of the first tactical nuclear warhead delivery to Europe varies according to the source one consults. Most authors place it in October 1953, as does Jeffrey Record, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 8. Others differ: Timothy Ireland, for example, states that "small numbers of tactical nuclear artillery shells began to appear in Europe as early as the spring of 1952" (Ireland, p. 8), while David Schwartz says "these weapons made their first appearance in Europe in 1954." (Schwartz, "A Historical Perspective," in Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question, edited by John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 7.) October 1953 was the date, perhaps not coincidentally, of National Security Council memorandum 162/2 instructing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to base their defense plans in Europe on the massive use of nuclear weapons.


produced in large amounts, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to use all the materials available, regardless of any previous plan or warfare doctrine."27 Uwe Nerlich argued that the US Army deployed tactical nuclear weapons for bureaucratic reasons: the Air Force, especially Strategic Air Command (SAC) had an apparent lock on the strategic nuclear missions, so the Army wanted to grab responsibility for tactical nuclear operations. TNF were deployed as a "technological quick fix that corresponded to domestic incentives." As a result, "there was no concept for how to fit their potential employment into operational planning."28 Historian Ernst May, commenting on this topic, wrote that

Until the mid-1960's, the question of how battlefield nuclear weapons might be used was analyzed only in closely guarded conference rooms. According to General Robert Richardson, then one of SACEUR's Air Force planners, a hard-working high-level group at SHAPE...was unable to come up with any plausible scenarios.29

Nor were the European allied governments even notified of their presence. It was not until December 1954 that the US acknowledged that it had placed these warheads on the Continent.30

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27Leitenberg, p. 12.

28Nerlich, p. 104. As time went on, the alliance saw TNF lending themselves "to a policy of flexible substitution...TNFs became the substitute for either the strategic threat or conventional forces, whichever suited the situation." Ibid.


30Gregory Treverton, "The Strategic Realm," in NATO at Forty, p. 103. Since then the US has been more forthright in acknowledging the presence of nuclear weapons to the host states (except in the case of naval vessels; an international incident developed in the mid-1980's when US warships, in keeping with long-standing policy, refused to confirm or deny the existence of nuclear weapons on board, and were denied port privileges

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In the meantime, it had become obvious that the NATO allies had neither the means nor the will to train, equip, and deploy the standing forces called for by the 1952 Lisbon goals. Adding to this dilemma was the growing stockpile of atomic and nuclear warheads, due in part to the weapons production complex in America getting up to speed and producing tactical warheads at an accelerating rate, and the increasingly sophisticated delivery systems being developed by western technology. Within this situation, however, another possible solution began to emerge: one that relied on Western comparative advantages in tactical nuclear weapons technology and numbers. This was the context in which President Eisenhower called for a major review of American strategy and force structure, which in turn led to the adoption of a policy in the mid-1950's called "the New Look."

**MC 14/2: MASSIVE RETALIATION**

The New Look emphasized the budgetary savings possible if US military strategy was primarily based on nuclear rather than conventional forces. With this approach, one could theoretically substitute the awesome firepower of nuclear weapons for diminished manpower and conventional weapons capabilities, with the same net battlefield effectiveness. Hence the US chose to alter its fundamental strategic policy to one called "Massive Retaliation," wherein America would respond

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in NATO ally Denmark). In 1971 Senator Gaylord Nelson wrote that "in no case, according to US officials, are nuclear weapons present without the local government having been told." Record, *US Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, p. 10.

to Soviet aggression anywhere in the world "instantly" and "massively" against the Soviets "by means and at places of our own choosing."  

American adoption of massive retaliation, combined with several other factors--European inability (some would say unwillingness) to field the necessary conventional forces to make MC 14/1 workable, the ushering in of an era of "nuclear plenty" due to the technical feasibility of tactical nuclear weapons, and the continued presence of a Soviet threat in Eastern Europe--led inexorably to pressures on the current NATO strategy that forced it to change, as well. By late 1954 the alliance had accepted in principle the US strategy of massive retaliation, one which seemed to rectify the disconnect between needs and capabilities in Central Europe while taking advantage of technological advances that seemed to provide a way out of this dilemma. MC 14/2 accepted the increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons by adopting for NATO the US strategy of massive retaliation, while MC-70, adopted the following year, revised the Lisbon force goals downward.  

Conventional forces would form the "shield" (using the analogy offered at the time) fending off any first blow against the West; the "sword" that would strike back in retaliation was initially

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held by the hand of Strategic Air Command, with its long-range nuclear delivery capability.

Massive retaliation brought the nuclear era to the basic army unit, and with it came an onslaught of "tactical" nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield. Studies of limited war and tactical nuclear war were a popular subject in the late 1950's, and the US military bought many of the arguments that suggested that such small-scale conflicts (as opposed to total war) were possible. The integration of nuclear weapons at the lowest levels of existing tactical units became part of the doctrine. "Pentomic" divisions, widely dispersed over a nuclear battlefield, became army policy. Atomic bazookas (named after the popular 1950's television show, "Davy Crockett") were deployed on the backs of jeeps. Atomic artillery shells began piling up in storage sites. Short and medium range surface-to-surface missiles were deployed with field artillery companies. Atomic demolition munitions (ADM's, or "atomic backpacks") were deployed. Air Force B-47 bombers were stationed in Western Europe and North Africa on alert with nuclear weapons aboard.34

European public opinion was relatively benign throughout this period. On the one hand, the public did not know much about weapons deployment decisions made, for the most part, in Washington. Nor did they care; public interest in Europe in the 1950's was centered on the reconstruction of a war-devastated continent, on the economic miracle occurring in West Germany, on the establishment of democratic governments

34For a review of this history, see Leitenberg, pp. 10-22. SAC began rotating bombers into bases in Europe as early as 1948, and initiated airborne nuclear alert, often in European airspace, in 1961. Norman Polmar, Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft, Missiles (Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, Inc., 1979).
in states that had little recent experience in such forms of rule. On the other hand, even if they had known, it is questionable whether there would have been any public outcry over the tactics and strategy chosen by the United States. After all, in the popular view this benevolent power had recently saved Europe from Hitler, and had provided not only economic support since the end of the war but military protection against the newest security threat from the East: the USSR. To question the policies of one's benefactor and protector would have been considered improper.

West Germany, which joined the alliance in 1955, had special reasons for wanting to be involved with nuclear aspects of NATO policy. Binding the FRG closely to US security objectives seemed the only way to pursue reunification without arousing fears about resurgent German nationalism among Germany's neighbors. West Germany also wanted to be seen as an equal partner in the alliance, which required (in its eyes) that it be a nuclear power in some fashion. Finally, Germany wanted some control over how these weapons would be planned or used, since they would most likely fall on German soil in the event of war. This was also a way for the Adenauer government to address its opposition's concerns on this issue.\(^{35}\)

Some early criticism of NATO's over-emphasis on nuclear weapons did arise among non-governmental analysts and certain military leaders. Their concerns focused on issues of credibility and utility of these weapons, and the long-term implications of US extended deterrence in Europe.\(^{36}\) In

\(^{35}\)Schwartz, pp. 44-45.

\(^{36}\)Among those concerned with the increased emphasis on nuclear weapons were the SACEUR, General Louis Norstad, who began to pursue an alternative approach known as the "pause concept," which would place greater emphasis on a conventional "shield;" and General Maxwell Taylor, US Army Chief of Staff, who would later play an important role in the Kennedy
addition, European public concern was awakened by the results of two wargames held in 1954 and 1955 which demonstrated the incredible devastation that would be wrought by even a "limited" nuclear war in Europe.\(^{37}\) Shortly thereafter, America's refusal to support France and the UK in the Suez Crisis shook to the core European confidence in American willingness to support the foreign policy goals of its allies. This doubt carried over into the arena of nuclear deterrence.\(^{38}\) Finally, there was growing widespread disbelief in the credibility of massive retaliation as an effective policy in Europe.

There was one incident in the late 1950's that fully aroused the European public and caused official ire at American presumption. That was the introduction of Thor and Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) to Europe.

administration's decision to move away from this nuclear crutch through its new policy of flexible response. (Schwartz, pp. 57-59; Schwartz, "Historical Perspective," pp. 9-10; and J. Michael Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, RAND Report R-2964FF (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, April 1983), pp. 8-10.) In addition, two young politicians who later became Ministers of Defense in their respective countries made their reputations by arguing against the policy of massive retaliation. They were Helmut Schmidt of the FRG and Denis Healey of Great Britain. (Freedman, p. 285.)

\(^{37}\)Sagebrush was held in Louisiana in 1954, and simulated the detonation of 275 TNF warheads in an area the size of Western Europe. *Carte Blanche*, a 1955 exercise held in Europe, resulted (hypothetically) in over five million immediate West German casualties from the "selective" use of at least 335 tactical nuclear warheads. Ireland, p. 10; Schwartz, p. 42; Leitenberg, pp. 33-34; and Record, *US Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, p. 10.

\(^{38}\)Schwartz, p. 62.
THOR/JUPITER INTRODUCTION.

It is instructive to review this first case of the introduction of American theater missiles to Europe, since the opposition it aroused, the questions it raised, and the concerns that led to the eventual removal of these missiles were all repeated in the decades ahead. Jupiter and Thor were technically considered to be strategic rather than tactical missiles, but they were deployed in the European theater and had great regional political impact.  

The American reasoning behind the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe was as follows. First, missile technology had not progressed to the point where the US could place confidence in its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). Second, there was concern in some circles in the US that the Soviet Union was ahead in the ICBM game, and could, if it "won" this arms race, threaten America's homeland without fear of retaliatory strikes against its own territory. Third, this argument rested on the presumption that deterrence resulted from the threat of assured destruction of the opponent's homeland in the event of war, a concept that was gaining support within the US academic community. Fourth, the best way to threaten the USSR was via those weapons that were

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39 There is a long-running debate over how one differentiates between strategic and tactical weaponry. Is it a matter of warhead yield? Targets? Range? The ability to strike the other superpower's homeland? In all of these categories, however, these two IRBM's fit the criteria for strategic weapons. Jupiter, for example, had a range of some 1500 miles and carried a 5 megaton warhead—which, coupled with its inherent inaccuracy, made it suitable only in a retaliatory, countervalue role against cities. (Data from Leitenberg, p. 111.) For a good introduction to this question, see J. Michael Legge, "Appendix A: Nuclear Weapon Terminology," in Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, pp. 77-80; and Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), especially Chapter 5, "The Special Problems of War in Europe."
available at the time: IRBM's, which, in order to reach the Soviet Union, had to be placed within range—which meant on NATO territory on the periphery of the USSR.

The Killian panel report of February 1955 had recommended the development of an ICBM force as part of the New Look emphasis on nuclear deterrence; in the meantime, it said, IRBM's could provide deterrence, since their development time was quicker than the intercontinental missiles. Each military service proceeded to develop its own IRBM system: the Air Force Thor, the Army Jupiter, and the Navy Polaris. Since the two land-based versions were technologically ahead in the development race, the US foresaw that for the short term it would have to rely on land-based rather than submarine-based missiles. It was therefore necessary to negotiate with European governments to secure basing rights.

Thor missiles went into Great Britain in 1957 under dual-key arrangements. Jupiters followed shortly thereafter into Turkey and, in 1959, into Italy. European public consciousness was raised by this event, and opposition groups began to argue that such a move was destabilizing. Equally important, in the public perception, it made those states which deployed the missiles more liable to blackmail and potential targeting by the Soviet Union. Many of the arguments heard then will

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41Ireland, pp. 11-17; and Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, pp. 176-77. According to SAC's official history, the Thors became operational in 1959 and the Jupiters deployed to Italy in 1960. The Turkish-based missiles never did become fully operational. They were all removed within five years of their respective deployments. Polmar, pp. 208, 219.
sound current to students of the INF debate of the early 1980's and the discussion surrounding FOTL in the late 1980's. European objections centered on concerns over making the host countries targets in the opening round of any war with the Soviet Union. Approving basing rights would also draw the diplomatic displeasure of the Soviets. Indeed, a Soviet public relations offensive was directed at Western Europe during this time period, and may have influenced several states—notably Greece and the Netherlands—not to accept the systems. In addition, concerns were raised within the Western security community over the weapons' technical capability to accomplish their mission, due to the dual problems of vulnerability and inaccuracy. Finally, some Europeans saw this American deployment as a ploy, a means of confining a future war to the European theater, in effect "de-coupling" the US homeland from direct involvement with allied security. This perception, if widely held, could weaken deterrence as much as would actual American de-coupling.42

Washington's plan encountered immediate resistance from its allies:

the American plan provoked strong behind-the-scenes resistance ...on the part of almost all the other allies. So strong were these private responses that...Secretary of State Dulles was compelled to assure the allies that 'there is no desire on the part of the United States to press these missiles in the hands or on the territory of any country that doesn't want them.'43

Nevertheless, the European heads of government eventually agreed to the deployments. The deal—that deployment was conditional pending determination of the military need for such weapons by SACEUR—was a political face-saving move for the governments in power. It worked so

42Ireland, pp. 16-17.

43Schwartz, pp. 65-66, quoting Dulles in a December 1957 speech.
well that they would turn to this approach again in similarly tough
decisions in the future.

West Germany had an additional worry: if it accepted Thor or
Jupiter, all hope of reunification with East Germany would be lost.
Moscow controlled the German unity card. The US was aware of Chancellor
Adenauer's sensitivity on this issue, and IRBM deployments to the FRG were
consequently not seriously considered by American strategists. The
buildup of Soviet INF forces did concern the West German government,
however, and led them to order American Mace cruise missiles for the
Bundeswehr. These seemed less politically troublesome than a land-
based ballistic missile would be, despite a range and warhead size quite
similar to Jupiter's. This may have been because Mace was called a
"tactical" missile in public discourse.

Nevertheless, a domestic debate did erupt in Germany over these
missiles, led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) opposition in the
Bundestag. Polls at the time indicated that 80% of the German population
opposed having atomic missile bases on their soil. In the end, however,
the government won its case. However, a popular anti-nuclear movement had
been born, and Kampf dem Atomtod (Campaign Against Atomic Death) provided

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44Ireland, p. 29.

45Ireland and Leitenberg. However, both Schwartz (p. 71) and Legge
(p. 11) say that the Bundeswehr actually received the Matador-C, while the
longer range Mace remained in US hands. Meanwhile, the West German army
was simultaneously being outfitted with nearly the complete range of air-
delivered and short-range surface-to-surface nuclear missiles, which
caused little public concern. See Christian Tuschhoff, "The MC 70 and the
Introduction of Nuclear Delivery Systems into the German Bundeswehr 1956-
1959," paper presented to the 1990 annual conference of the International
Studies Association, Washington, DC, 10-14 April 1990.

46Leitenberg, p. 125.
an organization for the public recognition and airing of these attitudes. As it turned out, the US canceled Germany's order for the Mace, anyway, substituting for it the shorter-ranged Pershing missile.

Technical obsolescence and a rapidly improving ICBM force led to the 1962 American decision to withdraw its two IRBM systems. This move also caused consternation, this time within those NATO governments that had agreed to accept Jupiter. Turkey and Italy had both deployed American IRBM's in part to enhance their own standing within the alliance, and they saw the removal of those systems as a blow to their prestige. Neither state had any institutionalized manner in which to voice its grievances, however; the decisions were made unilaterally in Washington by the undisputed alliance leader. It would be several years before a forum for such a multi-national debate would be created within NATO.

THE MULTILATERAL FORCE

An idea floated among the NATO capitals during the early 1960's as a means of solving the question of nuclear control in Europe was that of the multilateral force (MLF). Resurrected from an idea unveiled in 1957 by General Louis Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the

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47 Schwartz, pp. 70-73.


49 All Thors were removed by 1963; Jupiters were out by 1965. Polmar, pp. 208, 219.

50 Ireland, pp. 17-19.

51 Norstad's earlier plan called for a mobile MRBM force of up to 700 Polaris missiles, travelling on public roads throughout Western Europe, under SACEUR's control. These would supplement the revised conventional
MLF was a State Department plan presented to the North Atlantic Council in December 1960. The plan called for the deployment of a unit of sea-based MRBM's in European waters with a multi-national crew formed from at least three countries per ship. These weapons could only be fired upon the unanimous consent of all member nations in the crew. In theory, this would mean that all 15 NATO nations would have a direct say in whether or not the missiles would be used. The purpose of MLF was to show alliance solidarity by stressing that an attack on one was an attack on all. It also gave the European allies a greater feeling of involvement in critical decisions affecting the alliance and their own states.

As the idea progressed, it evolved into plans for a sea-based system of 25 surface ships, each equipped with eight surface-to-surface Polaris missiles. Off-shore basing would remove some of the opposition that was expected to arise if the missiles were land-based, as had been seen in the recent Jupiter episode, and would make the risk of piecemeal blackmail of individual NATO nations by the Soviet Union less likely. It attenuated the collateral damage problem in the event of war. It was also presented

force levels called for in MC-70. Norstad apparently envisioned NATO as a "fourth nuclear power." For many reasons, the plan was shelved by the US in 1960, but the MLF alternative was to spring from this concept.

Ireland, pp. 32-33, and Schwartz, pp. 75-79.

52 Ireland, p. 32-39. The best study of the MLF is found in the second half of Steinbruner's The Cybernetic Theory of Decision.

53 A 1960 study conducted by Robert Bowie for the State Department recommended an MRBM-equipped submarine force to be allocated to SACEUR for in-theater use. But the US Navy refused to allow foreign access to American submarine technology. Hence, a surface fleet with Polaris had to suffice. (Ireland, p. 36; Cybernetic Theory, pp. 188-190.) This shows the power of an entrenched organizational entity in affecting the range of policy choices available to other government individuals and organizations.
as an alternative that might satiate other European, especially West German, desires for nuclear weapons and prevent them from following an independent path such as that chosen by France.\textsuperscript{54} In sum,

A fully integrated NATO nuclear force--the MLF--would solve the dilemma of Germany's equal status in nuclear matters, offer an instrument for creating greater alliance cohesion, grant the increasingly strong and self confident European nations meaningful participation in nuclear defense matters without stimulating proliferation, and foster the twin goals of European unity and Atlantic partnership.\textsuperscript{55}

The only parties fully committed to the MLF concept were the West Germans, who liked the idea of having more say in alliance nuclear decisions, and the Bureau of European Affairs in the US State Department. Critics called it a flawed concept, for several reasons. For one thing, the warheads themselves remained under American custody, and could only be released by the US President, through SACEUR (also an American) acting as CINCEUR (Commander-in-Chief, US European Command). In essence, this meant that while the European crewmembers had veto power of the missiles' use, they could not decide to fire them without American approval. Nuclear control would be exercised through "fifteen fingers on the safety catch--or one on the trigger."\textsuperscript{56}

Furthermore, the likelihood of an MLF force actually deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis was extremely low, due to the well-known

\textsuperscript{54}Ireland, pp. 32-39; Schwartz, pp. 82-85. That the West German military entertained thoughts of developing an independent nuclear capability is evident from reading Tuschhoff.

\textsuperscript{55}Summary of Bowie's arguments in Schwartz, pp. 125-126; see also Steinbruner, \textit{Cybernetic Theory}, pp. 264-265.

\textsuperscript{56}Alastair Buchan, quoted in Freedman, p. 329.
tendency of committees to fail to come to resolute decisions. This tendency would be even more pronounced during periods of heightened threats from an overpowering Warsaw Pact.

Negotiations over MLF continued in at NATO headquarters in Paris and in Washington for several years, although France was publicly refusing to support the concept by early 1963. President Johnson had also apparently given up on the program by late 1964. He saw many problems with MLF, especially its lack of support both among the European allies and within the US Congress, and he sensed the futility of trying to coordinate 15 nations' thinking on nuclear decisions. It was a situation much like President Bush would face in the spring of 1990 with respect to the FOTL: "The Europeans did not seem to want it anymore; Congress was unlikely to support an MLF draft treaty; and the whole issue was creating more friction than it was worth." Yet negotiations dragged on for another year, with the State Department denying that the program was in trouble, before all parties admitted its demise. It was not until December 1965 that the allies were informed of the American decision to drop out of the program, meaning, since the US owned the weapons that were

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57 Robert McNamara certainly believed in this truism. Concerning attempts to keep the Nuclear Planning Group membership as small as possible, he later wrote that "there's a very direct inverse relationship between the number of participants and the degree or extent of accomplishment." From Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 57.

58 Schwartz, pp. 105-106. Thereafter, France actively opposed MLF as an "instrument of US hegemony and domination" and a system that suffered from lack of credibility since the US maintained veto power over release of the warheads. (Schwartz, p. 117.)

59 Schwartz, p. 122.
to be used, that it was a dead issue.  

Another attempt to resolve European concerns about the dilemma of nuclear forces on the Continent had failed. This was to be the last attempt to address problems of alliance security through a technical fix—the introduction of long-range systems in Europe—until the INF program was begun in 1977.

Several themes that would be heard again in future NATO modernization episodes first appeared during the MLF debate. For instance, witness McNamara's desire to keep a low profile and not risk political credibility with the Europeans by cancelling the program; rather, he apparently thought, let the Europeans themselves put up enough roadblocks in front of this American initiative so as to make its demise the obvious choice. At the same time, the Germans were disappointed at the end result after giving the program such support. In a comment that would be echoed in the 1989-1990 SNF debate, one West German official summarized the consequences of carrying an initiative so far, only to have it abruptly cancelled: "the United States and Germany climbed up the mountain and then they—we—climbed back down again. In terms of time, money, personnel, and prestige, neither of us can afford that again.""  

THE SKYBOLT AFFAIR

Great Britain had had close ties to the US in nuclear research from the start of the nuclear era, and wanted to maintain the special relationship

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60 Ireland, p. 38.

61 Kelleher, p. 255.

62 Schwartz, p. 135.
it had developed with America in the atomic realm. Accordingly, when the UK decided it needed a new delivery system in the late 1950's to maintain its independent nuclear capability, the US offered to sell it the Polaris submarine and missile package. Britain refused, preferring to opt for the Skybolt air-to-surface missile, then under development in the US for use as a stand-off defense suppression weapon on B-52's. At a summit in March 1960 the US agreed to sell Britain the Skybolt; in return, the UK agreed to provide port facilities for American Polaris submarines at Holy Loch, Scotland. The United States also agreed not to cancel development or production of Skybolt without first consulting the British.

Skybolt was to have been an early version of today's air-launched cruise missile or tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM), with sufficient range to provide a stand-off air capability. It faced major technical problems, however, and was already in trouble when the UK chose it in 1960. Nevertheless, when President Kennedy cancelled the program in November 1962 because of its cost and lack of progress, the British expressed astonishment at such a move. In their eyes, according to the public reports, the US had sold out the UK and left it hanging without a backup system to replace the Skybolt. Even more disturbing to the British was the way in which the system was cancelled: Washington made a unilateral decision without consulting its staunchest ally, one which was

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64Schwartz, p. 97.

65This despite the fact that there were British liaison officers assigned to the program, and that the Defense Department had been briefing British officials on the problems for some time. Schwartz, pp. 97-98.
directly concerned with the outcome.

As a result of the uproar, a previously arranged summit meeting in Bermuda in December 1962 focused almost entirely on repairing the bilateral damage done by the Skybolt affair. At that meeting President Kennedy again offered Polaris submarines to Prime Minister Macmillan as a consolation; this time the British accepted.66

Again we find close parallels to how events transpired in the follow-on to Lance case nearly 30 years later. The Nassau Agreement, and the way in which it was handled--elite decisions that surprised unsuspecting staffs, the desire of an American president to help an allied head of state avert domestic troubles--were part of both the Skybolt and FOTL cases. The similarities between American considerations in 1962 and similar attitudes towards West Germany in 1989 merit the following extended quotation from David Schwartz' account of Skybolt:

Ever the Anglophile, Kennedy was not about to cause permanent damage to Anglo-American relations over insistence on a particular hardware arrangement. He knew and liked Macmillan and fully understood the desperate political situation Macmillan would face should he return from Nassau empty-handed. Macmillan had braved considerable domestic opposition when he struck the original Skybolt agreement with Eisenhower. Without compensation for Skybolt, his return to London would be greeted with derision and might even cause his government to fall...Kennedy was looking for a way to save Macmillan without undermining both basic NATO policy, as defined by the Defense Department, and the MLF favored by the State Department. Macmillan's offer to pledge British Polaris submarines to NATO subject to withdrawal under emergency conditions seemed to provide a basis for compromise. The two readily agreed on this formula and instructed their respective staffs--unprepared for this surprise turn of events--to work out a joint communique to reflect the formula.67

66Schwartz, pp. 100-105, and Neustadt.

67Schwartz, p. 103.
An alternative path toward a political solution began to crystalize. The desire by the European allies to contribute to and take part in the debate surrounding alliance nuclear decisions had been made manifest during the negotiations over MLF and Skybolt. One institutional outcome of this process was the establishment of a new forum for such discussions within the NATO structure: the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

Before turning to the NPG, however, we need to review the development of a new strategy for NATO, which had major repercussions for theater nuclear force levels and planning. This was the doctrine known as flexible response.

**MC 14/3: FLEXIBLE RESPONSE**

NATO's new general strategy for both conventional and nuclear operations was set forth in a document entitled "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area." Better known by its Military Committee number, MC 14/3 enshrined the new policy of flexible response. Approved in 1967, the concept of flexible response had actually been under consideration since the United States adopted it during the Kennedy administration in 1961. Secretary of Defense McNamara and his new colleagues in the Pentagon did not subscribe to theories of limited nuclear war or the value of tactical nuclear weapons which Eisenhower's administration had stressed. While such weapons might still be useful in a deterrent role, recent revised intelligence estimates of the Soviet threat made the feasibility of conventional defense in Europe seem much

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68MC 14/3 was officially dated 16 January 1968, and had three basic elements: 1)forward defense, 2)flexible response, and 3)nuclear deterrence. Leitenberg, p. 19.
more likely. In 1962 McNamara spelled out the details of the new doctrine in considerable detail, first to the allies at the Athens ministerial meeting, and later in a speech at the University of Michigan commencement in Ann Arbor. During the following years the US pushed NATO toward this new concept relentlessly, finally overcoming European reluctance to change NATO strategy yet again—especially to an approach which seemed to favor conventional defense and warfighting over deterrence.

The key idea behind flexible response is that the defending party has a large set of military options from which to choose, and will respond to an aggressive act at the same level. If the attack is conventional, so will be the response. At the same time, the corollary concept of escalation dominance implies that if the defender is losing at the original level, he can and will escalate the pitch or scope of the battle in hopes of denying the attacker victory. By escalating the fight up a "seamless web" of retaliatory options, the defender hopes to send a strong political signal to the attacker that he was facing a resolute opponent who was not going to surrender. Accordingly, a rational attacker would conduct a cost-benefit analysis and decide to stop the aggression, rather than continue on with the prospect of losing at an even higher level. The NATO alliance specifically meant to tell the Warsaw Pact with this strategy that it would escalate up to the level of tactical or even strategic nuclear weapons if necessary. It included an endorsement of first use of nuclear weapons if losing at the conventional level.

Such threats may have made military sense in the situation in which

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69Schwartz, p. 156.

NATO found itself in the mid-1960's. There were, after all, over 7200 American nuclear warheads stationed in Europe, a number far exceeding the estimated Soviet cache or its projected stockpile.\footnote{This number was given by Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford in October 1968. (Leitenberg, p. 16.) It referred only to US warheads based on land in Europe, and did not include SAC warheads or naval systems afloat or undersea in European waters. The US had a total of about 2000 nuclear delivery systems (missiles, artillery tubes, and dual-capable aircraft) in Europe in 1967, according to Legge (p. 86).} The West therefore had "escalation dominance" at the theater nuclear level. This meant that while the Soviet Union might reasonably conclude that a conventional attack on the alliance would succeed at that level, it could not hope to win if NATO escalated the fight to the theater nuclear level—which it now said it would do. Knowing this in advance would deter the USSR from any attack, even with conventional forces.

Flexible response seemed to satisfy both sides of the Atlantic with its simple ambiguity. Both sides stressed that aspect of the new doctrine which each preferred. To the Americans, MC 14/3 meant that a land war in Europe would conceivably be contained to that theater, and not escalate immediately to a strategic exchange between the two superpowers. The US naturally stressed the "flexible" aspect of the doctrine. This meant a call for increased reliance on a stalwart conventional defense capability in Central Europe, so as to raise the threshold beyond which nuclear weapons might be used. It also enhanced the value of tactical nuclear weapons stationed in the theater, that is, on European soil, because that distanced the US homeland from direct involvement in any fight there.

The Europeans, on the other hand, stressed the "response" half of the new equation. They saw the most important contribution of flexible
response to be its link between conventional inadequacies and a strategic nuclear deterrent. They would prefer, to quote Kissinger's later simple analogy, to have a strategic war between the superpowers "fought over their heads." Not that anyone really wanted such a war, of course; but the possibility of any conflict quickly escalating out of control to the strategic level was felt to be the best deterrent against any war breaking out in Europe. Even a conventional war would be devastating and "strategic" for a European.

As Gregory Treverton pointed out,

Flexible response...wrote this dilemma over coupling into doctrinal ambiguity; it could not resolve it. Europeans genuflected in the direction of conventional defense, and Americans accepted the fact that strategic forces would remain the ultimate Alliance deterrent. Theater nuclear forces (TNF) were left as doctrinal bastards, stranded on the fault-line between European and American perspectives.73

The debate over whether to undertake this doctrinal shift lasted five years. Some allied states were unhappy with the American proposal, and were content to keep the earlier doctrine. Great Britain, for instance, had publicly given itself over completely to the idea of massive retaliation.74 For Britain, MC 14/2 made good sense. For a country with a small independent nuclear capability the only conceivable military purpose for those forces is to buttress general alliance war plans, and to serve as a separate decision-making center for countervalue deterrence. Small numbers of inaccurate weapons, such as Britain's Polaris force, are

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72Kissinger, p. 9.

73Treverton, "The Strategic Realm," in NATO at Forty, p. 108.

74Freedman, p. 293. Britain had already made plans for massive cuts in conventional forces as a result of the nuclear emphasis.
only militarily useful as deterrents by posing a threat to the aggressor's home cities. They are not accurate or numerous enough to be valuable in a warfighting, counterforce sense, which greater reliance on TNF in flexible response would seem to imply. In addition, the UK had enjoyed budgetary savings in its shift in emphasis from conventional to nuclear forces, and was reluctant to reverse course and have to re-build that lost conventional capability.75

For France, the American arguments in favor of flexible response were the last straw. In 1966 it announced its withdrawal from the NATO integrated military force, although it would remain in the political alliance. In the future, it said, any decision to use force, particularly atomic force, would be a national French decision rather than an alliance one that reflected American strategic interests. President DeGaulle no longer trusted the United States to act in Europe's best interests in the event of a conflict in Europe.76 Once the American homeland was vulnerable to Soviet attack, so the logic went, the US would be unwilling to risk strategic bombardment over the fate of its allies. As the USSR approached parity with the US in strategic nuclear forces this would be even more true. As a result, the French went their own way, eventually creating their independent nuclear force de frappe (including, besides SLBM's, short-range and medium-range land-based "theater" missiles).77

75Freedman, p. 293.

76Ireland, pp. 22-27, and Freedman, pp. 320-324.

77Although they didn't develop this nuclear capability completely alone; France received technical help from the United States after the mid-1970's, as pointed out recently by Richard H. Ullman, "The Covert French Connection," Foreign Policy, Summer 1989, pp. 3-33.
At the same time, Britain continued to maintain its independent nuclear forces, which were, however, dedicated to NATO use. West Germany also expressed some desire to follow suit.78

West Germany opposed the new concept at first. Defense Minister Strauss expressed doubts about the emerging American doctrine, describing the concept of flexible response as a "conceptual aid for the precalculation of the inconceivable and incalculable nature of the specific."79 The FRG was concerned that increased emphasis on conventional forces meant a diminished willingness to use nuclear weapons, whether tactical or strategic. Eventually, however, the rhetoric emanating from the FRG cooled sufficiently to permit it to accept flexible response. Germany wanted to be a viable member of the family of nations, and recognized that it could only do this as part of an international body. Nevertheless, these basic concerns did not disappear. In fact, they may explain Germany's interest in the MLF as a way to make up for lost confidence in America's nuclear umbrella.80

Curiously, although the Kennedy administration stressed the conventional aspects of the flexible response doctrine and de-emphasized the role of TNF, the number of tactical nuclear warheads stationed in Europe actually doubled during the early 1960's.81 This was an example

78Ireland, pp. 21-22.

79Quoted in Kelleher, p. 165.

80Schwartz, p. 168.

81Record, NATO's Theater Force Modernization Program, p. 17. The number of US tactical nuclear warheads in Europe increased from 2500 to 7200 between 1961 and 1968. (Schwartz, Alliance Security, p. 14.) In addition, officials admitted in 1965 that US warheads were mounted on alert aircraft belonging to nine NATO allies. (Leitenberg, p. 15). The
of a state bureaucracy continuing along a path for reasons of inertia, rather than as part of a grand design.82

The alliance formally adopted flexible response in 1967. The successful conclusion of this five-year period of debate over the doctrine was made possible by two key political events. The first was the departure of France from the integrated military command in 1966. The second was the creation of another forum for the discussion of the integrated political and military strategy that flexible response required: the Special Committee of defense ministers, established in 1965. Its name was changed shortly thereafter to the Nuclear Planning Group.

THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was officially established in 1967 to provide a forum for the exchange of views between allied governments concerning nuclear planning and strategy. Meeting at ministerial level

number of tactical nuclear warheads in Europe appeared so overwhelming, in fact, that in 1966 McNamara imposed an arbitrary ceiling on the maximum number of such warheads that the US would deploy there: 7000. (Legge, p. 86.) A point to remember, however, is that American troops manned only about one-half of the delivery systems for those warheads; the other half were controlled by allied forces under "dual-key" arrangements. (Bracken, p. 139.)

82Although Robert McNamara argues in The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) that the 1961 decision to continue the strategic and tactical nuclear buildups was made on the basis of incomplete information about Soviet capabilities and intentions, and applying worst-case scenarios to that information. (Pp. 57-58.) Catherine Kelleher argues that, to some extent, this paradoxical increase was simply a matter of timing, as programs begun in the 1950's reached production peaks and cutoffs would have been expensive. But the primary reason was the recognition in Washington that theater weapons had taken on a significant political value, especially to the Germans, as indicators of America's nuclear guarantee and its ultimate protection. (Kelleher, "History of Development and Deployment," in Battlefield Nuclear Weapons, pp. 24-25.)
twice a year in an informal setting, it was meant to be an advisory body for the free exchange of information and ideas, reporting directly to the North Atlantic Council. Chaired by the NATO Secretary General, its membership has been kept intentionally small and is made up of the Ministers of Defense from each state. Its administrative support is provided by an NPG Staff Group, composed of NATO international staff members, which receives overall direction from the NPG Permanent Representatives Group that meets regularly in Brussels. 83

The NPG gave America's European allies an input into what had previously been purely American decisions. It was largely the creation of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who wanted to improve consultative arrangements within the alliance but also hoped to keep such interaction tightly constrained. He originally called for a small council limited to the major NATO powers. But when every NATO state except France declared an interest in gaining a seat on the new body, the US conceded that seven states could join. 84 There were four permanent members—the US, Britain, West Germany and Italy—and three other seats rotated among the


84 Norway did not want a seat on the NPG at first, citing its unilateral restrictions on basing nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime. Nor did Iceland, (which has no military), Luxembourg, or Portugal initially choose to join in NPG discussions. After about two years the Norwegians changed their minds and joined as a rotational member. Legge, pp. 14-16, 81.
six remaining states. This arrangement lasted until 1979, when the meetings were opened to all interested allies.\textsuperscript{85} Today, for instance, the NPG regularly has fourteen active participants, with Iceland in attendance as an observer.\textsuperscript{86}

The creation of the NPG was the first major success for attempts at rationalizing theater nuclear policy in Europe.\textsuperscript{87} It allowed the member nations to contribute to the decisions that affected them and their publics. It institutionalized and legitimized major decisions and force level requirements made by the alliance, thus giving a united face to these decisions. This impacted on two important audiences for NATO: the Soviet Union, which could be expected to prefer a divided and rancorous alliance to which it could direct divisive policy initiatives; and the European members' publics, who would be more apt to accept the arguments given for a particular position if the alliance seemed firmly behind it. It would also improve the domestic political position of the incumbent party in each participating country.

As a result of several factors, especially NATO's decision to adopt MC 14/3 and the creation of the NPG, there began a decade of relative public quiet on the TNF issue in Europe. The intense doctrinal debates of

\textsuperscript{85}Freedman, "The Wilderness Years," in Nuclear Confrontation in Europe, p. 51; and Legge, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{86}Only France remains a non-participant. NATO Facts and Figures, p.224.

\textsuperscript{87}Some would disagree with this proposition. Scilla McLean, for instance, says that "to suggest that the NPG has been a political success is to fly in the face of NATO's nuclear history... The Nuclear Planning Group as an institution is unresponsive to public attitudes on nuclear affairs." McLean, p. 231.
the early 1960's subsided in the latter half of the decade. Although policy studies continued behind the scenes, there was little public concern over on-going modernization and rationalization of the European TNF stockpiles until the public debate suddenly erupted in 1977 over a seemingly innocuous weapons modernization program, the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW, or neutron bomb). This crisis ushered in the modern SNF debate of the 1980's, as the allies attempted to placate new public concerns while still accomplishing needed improvements that were identified in the 1970's studies.

RATIONALIZATION EFFORTS

Many of the NPG's early studies centered on trying to establish a set of political guidelines for initial and follow-on use of nuclear weapons. Once these were done, it was hoped, the alliance could turn its attention to the numbers and types of weapons needed to implement the new strategy of flexible response.

NATO has slowly created a set of rules for nuclear release and use. It developed political guidelines for consultation procedures concerning

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88 A partial listing of the reasons why the doctrinal debated faded in the late 1960's would include: France's withdrawal from the NATO integrated military command removed a major barrier to doctrinal compromise within the alliance, which led to MC 14/3 in 1967; the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty gave hope that nuclear lessons were being learned; attention focused on conventional forces; anti-nuclear activists turned their energies to opposing the Vietnam War; Congress increased demands for greater European burden-sharing. All these made participants in the debates unwilling to re-open the issue. As Michael Howard put it, by the end of the 1960's the nuclear issue, while still unresolved, was shelved due to the "sheer exhaustion of the participants." Quoted by Freedman, "The Wilderness Years," pp. 45-46.

89 Legge, p. 28.
nuclear weapons via a series of decisions, the first made by the North Atlantic Council at Athens in 1962, and expanded by the NPG in 1968 and 1969.90 It adopted a set of selective first-use guidelines in November 1969 that was confirmed by the Defense Planning Committee a month later.91 Guidelines for follow-on use were approved in a June 1975 NPG meeting,92 but these were still ambiguous. An improved set of nuclear use rules did not appear until the General Political Guidelines were approved in October 1986.93 NATO Military Committee release procedures have never been spelled out, at least publicly. And the 1962 Guidelines obliged the US to consult with its allies prior to nuclear release only

90Leitenberg, p. 20. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford proposed the development of political guidelines for TNF use in 1968, largely as a result of the NPG's success in early studies of this issue. The guidelines were prepared by Europeans without American involvement: "the first and only time that a major paper on allied nuclear doctrine has been undertaken without US participation from the outset." (Legge, p. 20.) A succinct summary of the release procedures can be found in Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons, prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975).

91Sigal, Alliance Security, p. 114; Leitenberg, p. 29; Legge, p. 21. The 1969 document was entitled "Provisional Political Guidelines For Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO." It played an important role in shifting NATO's emphasis from general nuclear response to an escalatory use of TNF. (Freedman, "The Wilderness Years," p. 53.) This is another example of actual policy lagging behind changes in declaratory policy--in this case, two years after the alliance adopted MC 14/3.

92Legge offers the best "inside view" of these debates. The 1975 agreement resulted from "Phase II" studies that endorsed the earlier first-use report. These guidelines stated that follow-on use should have the same political purpose as initial use: selective employment as a signal to persuade the enemy to cease his aggression. (Legge, p. 27.)

"time and circumstances permitting." As a result, the ability of host countries to prevent launches, should they so desire, even in dual-key arrangements, remains murky.\(^9\)

In 1974 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger embarked on a modernization program for short-range nuclear weapons intended to enhance deterrence by making their use more discriminating, and thus more credible. In his advocacy of a warfighting doctrine and preference for selective nuclear options, he called for improved accuracy, safety, and lower yields in the TNF force. This led to marginal changes in the force structure within the authorized ceiling of 7000 tactical warheads. But the basic doctrine remained the same.\(^9\) At the same time, the NPG authorized two separate study groups to review NATO nuclear capabilities and requirements in the face of increasing Soviet advantages in TNF. The Military Implications Team, under British leadership, and the German-led Political Implications Team were created in 1973 to examine new technologies and their applicability to nuclear forces. The two teams reported to the NPG with recommendations for American nuclear weapons development that supported the direction Schlesinger was already moving.\(^9\) Introducing technologically advanced systems, they reported, "would not call into question the essential substance of MC 14/3, the

\(^9\)Ireland, p. 40


Provisional Guidelines, or the Phase II Report." Of particular interest for this dissertation, one of the upgrades that did occur involved replacing Sergeant and Honest John missiles with the new Lance, beginning in 1972.

In fact, however, no reductions of the TNF stockpile took place as a result of these studies, despite the US Defense Department's desire to reduce and rationalize its nuclear forces in Europe. This was due largely to concern over how such moves would be perceived, politically, within allied governments, which might see any reductions as casting doubt on American commitments to European security. It also reflected the strength of the State Department, which preferred to maintain a large stockpile, within the Washington bureaucracy. As Catherine Kelleher reminded us, "the unchanging size of the stockpile had itself become a political imperative." The content of the American tactical nuclear warheads stockpile did change and contract a bit in the 1970's, but this had little immediate effect on officially expressed numbers. One change that was attempted, but failed, was the introduction of a new generation of reduced-blast warheads, dubbed "neutron bombs."

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97Quoted in Legge, p. 30.


99Leitenberg, p. 39.

100Kelleher, Battlefield Nuclear Weapons, p. 28.

THE NEUTRON BOMB FIASCO

The most politically bungled major weapons project in NATO history.\textsuperscript{102}

In June 1977 the news media reported that the United States was developing a tactical nuclear warhead for use on artillery shells and the Lance missiles stationed in Europe that relied on reduced blast and enhanced neutron flux (short duration radiation) for its killing effect.\textsuperscript{103} Branded the "neutron bomb," the development and deployment of this weapon became extremely controversial in Europe, causing consternation in several governments and increased awareness of, and opposition to, the nuclear role played by NATO strategy among the general public.\textsuperscript{104}

The warhead itself made sense from a military perspective, and was the result of a long chain of studies done by NATO in an attempt to rectify certain fundamental problems in its nuclear stockpile--such as war plans that were based on the presumed use of weapons whose yields were too


\textsuperscript{103}That the issue so suddenly became such a public debate was quite remarkable. Department of Defense and Department of Energy requests to Congress for funding ERW as part of a whole new generation of smaller TNW, in line with Schlesinger's thinking, had been going on for several years. So had testimony by several Secretaries of Defense as to SACEUR's need for these weapons. The original research and development program had been approved by the first Nixon administration in the late 1960's. See Leitenberg, pp. 51-60.

great to be useful in tactical situations. Such planning, it was felt, was unrealistic, thereby hurting deterrence more than it helped. By correcting one of those force problems, by rationalizing the weapon to the doctrine, it was hoped that NATO's strategy would be strengthened, deterrence improved, and the public assuaged.

Proponents of ERW stressed that the perception of greater usability would "strengthen the credibility of the first rung on the ladder of escalation," thereby strengthening the American nuclear guarantee and reducing the risk of war. In addition, a system that caused less collateral damage would mean that the West would not be self-deterred from nuclear escalation, a position it found itself in in the 1970's.¹⁰⁵

Opponents, on the other hand, pointed out that any new weapon fueled the arms race and undermined arms control, and that this new weapon would have several additional negative effects. As one of the new generation of "mini-nukes" it would blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict, would be more usable, and would undermine the American guarantee to Europe by confining war to the European theater. It also had the capability to worry both those who feared that it meant that war was more likely, and those who thought it meant that America was distancing itself from a potential war.

Unfortunately for the alliance the debate took more political and emotional turns. Anti-nuclear and disarmament groups jumped on the issue as an example of the immorality of Western strategy. Some called ERW the ultimate capitalist bomb, one which "destroys people and leaves buildings

¹⁰⁵Senate Report of the Special Committee, p. 6.
intact." The debate touched on the raw nerve endings of a citizenry that was becoming tired of carrying a military and nuclear burden for security. This burden appeared less necessary after a decade of detente with the Soviet Union, which now appeared much less threatening than it had in the 1960's. The debate also raised questions left unanswered in earlier arguments over the flexible response doctrine: what was the ultimate purpose of military forces in Europe—deterrence or reassurance? Warfighting or coupling? ERW seemed to be another US move to insure that any war that broke out on the European continent would be confined there through the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons. As one analyst put it,

The heart of the matter is that the military doctrine that presumably governs NATO's acquisition and employment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) is deliberately so vague that the doctrinal implications of ERWs were not realized until the weapon became the object of public scrutiny. The doctrinal implications are important because they reveal a fundamental difference of interests in TNWs between the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{107}

The neutron bomb crisis also raised questions that would be seen again in both the INF and SNF debates of the next decade. For instance, on whose authority was the decision made for the development and deployment, or cancellation, of such new weapons? Was it the American President or the NATO NPG? What role did the state on whose territory such weapons would be stationed play in those decisions? How much should the US consult with its allies before going ahead with such plans, and to

\textsuperscript{106}Walter Pincus, "Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in ERDA Budget," The Washington Post, 6 June 1977, p. 1. Such sensationalism in opposition to this weapon was also employed by Herbert Scoville in articles for the New York Times that summer, and by many European newspapers, especially in West Germany. Wasserman, Chapters 3 and 4.

\textsuperscript{107}Wasserman, p. 1.
what extent could the allies trust the US to keep its word on agreements? What guarantees did the US Congress require from the allies concerning deployment before it would authorize funding for the development of such weapons?

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the ERW case was the loss of faith in American nuclear leadership on the part of the West German government elite. President Carter had gone to great lengths to garner support for this warhead, pressuring an unwilling German coalition into publicly stating its support for ERW. The Germans had a well-established record of opposition to small-yield nuclear devices, reflecting their fear that such weapons were more likely to be used and would consequently lower the nuclear threshold. The FRG and France also questioned the possible de-coupling effect of such weapons on America’s commitment to Europe. Nevertheless, after several months of intense bilateral and multilateral negotiations, by mid-March 1978 the alliance had agreed to announce its support for a joint production and deployment decision at the upcoming North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting. The deal was to include an agreement to defer deployment of ERW for 24 months to allow time to pursue arms control deals with the Soviets. This first "dual-track" approach--pursuing modernization and arms control initiatives on the same weapon simultaneously--hoped to trade ERW for reductions in the Soviet SS-20 force.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt put himself out on a very long political

108Leitenberg, pp. 55-58. Such concerns had arisen as early as the 1973 North Atlantic Council meeting in Ankara, where the US first presented the concepts of "mini-nukes" and ERW.

109Wasserman, p. 110.
limb for Carter, only to have that limb cut off when Carter suddenly delayed the NAC meeting, followed two weeks later by his unilateral decision to defer production and deployment of ERW warheads after all. This decision was made on the spur of the moment by a President who felt a moral obligation to stop this new type of weapon. Carter did not want to be known as "the ogre in the White House" to future generations who would place the "blame" for the neutron bomb on his historical doorstep.\footnote{Zbigniew Brzezinski, \textit{Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981} (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), pp. 301-309. Confirmed in an interview with a former Carter NSC staff member, Washington, May 1990. Brzezinski called this "the worst Presidential decision of the first fourteen months [of Carter's administration]." (p. 305.) Certainly there is also a deeper, more balanced explanation for Carter's behavior, involving poor communications within the Washington bureaucracy, misperceptions between allies, lack of information, as well as moral ambivalence. Wasserman presents a superb analysis of these factors in her Chapter Six.}

Political considerations for his allies and military arguments for the weapon seem to have had little effect on the final decision. In the end the decision was made by the singularly important man in the White House.\footnote{One senior participant summed up what happened best when he disparagingly said that the President's decision was made "in consultation with himself." Interview in Washington, February 1991.} The neutron bomb episode shows just how crucial the American President is in the making of alliance nuclear policy.

Finally, let us examine a paragraph from the conclusion of a study on ERW:

The neutron bomb controversy is perhaps the most salient example in recent history of a breakdown in Alliance nuclear relations. It was a unique event in Alliance relations because the weapon itself hardly merited the transatlantic row it caused. As such, the consequences of the controversy go beyond the debate over the weapon itself. Its symbolic...
association with fundamental Alliance issues--of strategy, technology, and politics--is indicative of an evolutionary change in the broad strategic context on which Alliance security is based.\textsuperscript{112}

Everything in this quote remains valid, with the exception of one adjective: the neutron bomb episode is no longer "unique." The evolutionary change referred to above will be seen in the strikingly similar way in which the FOTL modernization program proceeded a decade later.

THE INF DUAL-TRACK DECISION

One year after the neutron bomb was abruptly cancelled the alliance faced yet another modernization package for theater nuclear systems.\textsuperscript{113}

As a result of the same studies that had led to the enhanced radiation warhead, the NPG recommended the improvement of NATO's longer range nuclear missiles.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112}Wasserman, p. 133.


\textsuperscript{114}In April 1979 the High Level Group (HLG) [described in next section] submitted its report to the NPG supporting an "evolutionary upward adjustment" in long-range TNF for the alliance. The NPG directed the HLG to come up with a specific deployment package, which it furnished...
The dual track decision was so called because of the two parallel approaches the alliance simultaneously took in pursuit of greater security. On the one hand it announced the modernization of its TNF forces through the introduction of two new weapons systems: a medium-range ballistic missile called the Pershing II, and a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). While several countries agreed to take the GLCM (specifically the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy), the Pershing would be stationed only in West Germany. The latter weapon was particularly valuable from a military standpoint, as it had the effective range, speed, and accuracy to strike hard targets deep within the Soviet homeland—including Moscow. This was the first weapon introduced to the European theater with this capability since the Jupiters were removed in September. The NPG combined the two reports from HLG and the Special Group [also in next section] into one Integrated Decision Document. The NPG then made its final decision in December 1979. Schwartz, pp. 227, 232.

Pershing II was a land-based, mobile, two-stage ballistic missile with a single, highly accurate MARVed (maneuverable re-entry vehicle) W-85 warhead. The W-85 has a yield range of 5-50 kilotons. CEP was expected to be between 60 and 135 feet at a range of 1300 to 1800 kilometers. During the early stages of Pershing II development, it was believed that it would be a short-range successor to the Pershing IA, striking rear-echelon fixed targets with an earth-penetrating W-86 warhead. These plans were shelved, however, when the longer range version was adopted in 1977. Data from William M. Arkin, Thomas B. Cochran, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook. Volume I: US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 292-297.

GLCM was a modification of the Navy's Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile. The W-84 warhead used on the GLCM was a variable yield weapon in the 10 to 50 kiloton range. When fired from the GLCM mobile launch platform, it had a CEP (circle error probable) of approximately 90 feet at a range of up to 2500 kilometers. Data from William M. Arkin, Thomas B. Cochran, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook. Volume I: US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 179-183.
1965. It held at risk those assets felt to be most dear to the Soviets--their government and military leadership at home. The missiles also fulfilled traditional strategic desires of the Germans, who preferred to directly threaten the Soviets with the risk that any aggression against the West would immediately escalate to the destruction of the Soviet homeland. This, they felt, best enhanced deterrence. The operational upshot of this logic: the longer the range of the missiles, the better.

The rationale for this modernization was primarily military in nature. For one thing, as a result of a build-up that began in the late 1960's the Warsaw Pact had achieved theater superiority in numbers and technological quality over the West in these systems. The USSR had also reached parity with the US in strategic weapons. This led to a possibility of Soviet dominance at the middle rungs of the escalatory ladder, which would negate the whole concept of flexible response as a link to America's strategic arsenal. That was one reason why Chancellor Schmidt called for a re-examination of the alliance's nuclear

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118Of course, this capability also meant that Pershing II became a special object of the anti-nuclear protest in Germany, in part because it drew the greatest wrath from Soviet propaganda. This made INF deployment in the early 1980's questionable. Gregory Treverton, "Managing NATO's Nuclear Business: The Lessons of INF," in Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe, p. 21.

119This emphasis on maximum ranges has been a long-held tenet of the German defense establishment, and was repeated forcefully to me in interviews with German officers at the Ministry of Defense, Bonn, and at SHAPE headquarters, Belgium, August 1989 and June 1990.

force structure in a May 1977 NATO speech, repeated even more forcefully in a presentation at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London that fall.\textsuperscript{121} His comments reflected traditional European concern with the loss of coupling implied by improving Soviet nuclear delivery capabilities, and acted as a catalyst in alliance activity searching for ways to rectify those problems. In 1979 Henry Kissinger also unleashed a scathing criticism of NATO reliance on America's increasingly incredible nuclear guarantee in a speech that buttressed Schmidt's concerns.\textsuperscript{122}

Furthermore, there were military concerns about the usability of short-range forces and their coincident lack of deterrent value. According to this argument,

As long as the Alliance envisages the possibility of having to resort to nuclear fire on its own soil, continued reliance on battlefield weapons whose destructiveness makes them palpably unusable can serve only to degrade deterrence and encourage Soviet force planners.\textsuperscript{123}

From a political, public relations perspective, the alliance also wanted to match the symbolic superiority of the Soviet Union's newest theater weapon, the SS-20.\textsuperscript{124} If the alliance could not stand up as a


\textsuperscript{122}Kissinger's speech is reprinted in "The Future of NATO," in NATO: The Next Thirty Years, pp. 3-20.

\textsuperscript{123}Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{124}The SS-20 was a long-range (1500 km), re-loadable, mobile missile with three MIRV (multiple independently targettable re-entry vehicles) warheads that was far superior to anything then in the NATO arsenal. While actual numbers of missiles did not, \textit{per se}, obviate the flexible response doctrine, the SS-20 was deployed in sufficient numbers to awaken Western public concern about its meaning. NATO felt obliged to couch its justification for the Pershing II and GLCM in terms that the public could
united body against this newest Soviet technological threat, it might lose credibility in both its populace's and its opponent's eyes. This concern was amplified by the recent ERW debacle, which helped convince Carter that INF was necessary for another reason: "Having been perceived as flinching once, the Administration felt it could not be seen to be irresolute again."125 The alliance as a whole felt the same way. As one analyst put it shortly after the decision was made,

The political consequences for NATO of a European refusal to carry out the decision...are likely to be catastrophic...Implementation of the Program has thus become, and is increasingly seen to be, the acid test of Alliance political cohesion, and for this reason alone the Program should be carried out according to schedule.126

Put another way, the military benefits of these missiles were less important than the fundamental issue of political perception. What was at stake was "the alliance's capacity to act multilaterally on virtually any major nuclear defense issue."127 As David Schwartz put it,

the time had come to send a strong message both to the Kremlin and to European capitals that the United States had the resolve, strength, and sense of purpose to lead the alliance to maintain parity with the Warsaw Pact across the spectrum of the military balance.128

West Germany agreed to the dual track decision only under a set of conditions. These were: 1) the principle of non-singularity (that is, other continental European allies had to accept deployments alongside the readily understand—as a counter to the SS-20.


126Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program, pp.3-4.

127Uwe Nerlich, "Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running out of Options?", in NATO: The Next Thirty Years, p. 64.

128Schwartz, pp. 219-220.
1) American control and operation of the weapons (no dual-key arrangements); and 3) preference for Pershing II over GLCM, in hopes that it would be better received by the public if presented as a modernization of the Pershing IA, rather than a new system. The conservative parties, then in opposition, more fully supported the modernization side of the dual track, citing Soviet INF build-ups, whereas the governing SPD/FDP coalition emphasized prospects for arms control success via this initiative.

The other side of the dual track coin was the novel approach of opening arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on the very class of weapons which the US was about to deploy. This reflected the deeply felt need by many in the alliance to pursue détente and better relations politically, as well as preparing a robust defense capability militarily. As such it was in keeping with the Harmel Report of 1967 which accompanied the shift to MC 14/3. Said one analyst:

As the difficult process of relaxing political tensions between East and West came to hinge on specific arms-control negotiations...arms control became a high-priority political issue on the agenda for the West. However much the United States valued arms-control negotiations, European political elites valued them even more.

The US opened bilateral talks with the Soviets in 1980 over INF. After meeting for about two years without progress, a new approach was

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129 Senate Report of the Special Committee, p. 86.

130 The Harmel Report called on the alliance to pursue better political relationships within Europe at the same time it maintained a solid defensive capability. NATO's twin tasks were security and the pursuit of détente. See "The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)," reprinted in NATO Facts and Figures, pp. 402-404.

131 Schwartz, p. 201.
fielded. As the Reagan administration came into office, it offered an initial opening gambit to the Soviets called the "zero option": no deployment of Western missiles if the Soviets agreed to eliminate all of their SS-20’s. In the meantime, missile research and development, site selection and preparation, and political maneuvering to secure domestic support for the deployment continued within the affected allied governments.

One unexpected consequence of the dual-track decision was the huge public outcry over deployment plans. Anti-nuclear sentiment, which had been awakened by the neutron bomb case, came fully alive in the early 1980’s. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators marched through European capitals demanding an end to the arms race and the cancellation of at least the first track of NATO’s plan, putting intense pressure on the generally conservative coalition governments in power in the various allied states. This was intensified by the extreme positions of many leftist parties which had, once out of government in the aftermath of the early 1980’s electoral swing towards conservatism throughout Europe, moved toward their activist core and began condemning the new missiles which their parties had recently voted for while in office.

The first American GLCM was deployed to RAF Greenham Common, England, in the fall of 1983. The Soviet Union immediately walked out of the Geneva INF talks in protest. But the expected crack in the Western alliance did not occur. The deployments of both missiles continued

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without serious incident, the public outcry gradually died down in the face of Soviet intransigence and Western solidarity behind the plan, and in 1985 the USSR returned to the bargaining table. Two years later President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev signed a treaty that realized the "zero option" and eliminated this category of long-range INF missiles.

THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP

One important aspect of the INF dual track decision was the institutional structure created by NATO to deal with this two-sided approach. The two newly created bodies were the High Level Group (HLG) and the Special Group (SG). Both played vital roles in the development of alliance policy during the INF debates and deployments. The HLG became the centerpiece of alliance nuclear strategy making in October 1977, when it was created to study NATO's nuclear requirements and the appropriate military and political responses to the Soviet TNF buildup in Eastern Europe. NATO and the Pentagon wanted "a group of individuals who had access to key political figures in their own countries and who had operational responsibility for defense planning within their governments. The High Level Group fitted the bill."

The High Level Group consists of senior defense ministry personnel

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133 The Special Group was re-named the Special Consultative Group (SCG) in December 1979. Schwartz, p. 240.

134 Senate Report of the Special Committee, pp. 50-51, and Schwartz, p. 217. The HLG was created to handle Task Force 10, which dealt with nuclear aspects of the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP), launched in May 1977 to pursue (primarily) conventional force improvements. In practice, as Legge points out, the HLG quickly became divorced from the work of the other LTDP groups. (Legge, p. 34.)
from each member state and is chaired by the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (OSD/ISP). It acts as a nuclear think tank, doing preparatory work and studies for the Nuclear Planning Group. Its activities are kept behind the scenes and out of the public eye.

The SCG (originally the SG) was formed in April 1979 to study arms control options for theater nuclear weapons, but became moribund after the INF Treaty was signed in December 1987. However, the SCG has recently been revived and given new life in its original role, this time as part of the upcoming SNF negotiations. The Special Consultative Group was originally chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (PM), and later by the Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs (EUR). Its purpose was primarily political:

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135 HLG Chairmen have been David McGiffert, 1977-81; Richard Perle, 1981-87; Frank Gaffney, 1987; Ronald Lehman, 1987-89; and Stephen Hadley, 1989-present. Originally the chairman was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), but this changed when ISP took over NATO responsibilities as a result of internal DOD restructuring in the early 1980's.

136 Special Consultative Group chairmen prior to 1985 were Leslie Gelb, Lawrence Eagleburger, Reginald Bartholemew, and Richard Burt. The reason why the chairmanship of the SCG switched from Political-Military Affairs (PM) to the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs (EUR) reflects bureaucratic gamesmanship at work in Washington. Richard Burt, who began the Reagan administration as Assistant Secretary of State for PM, moved to EUR and wanted to keep the SCG job when he did so. After Burt became Ambassador to West Germany in 1985 the new EUR head, Rozanne Ridgeway, held the SCG job until it became dormant in late 1987. When the SCG was reinvigorated in early 1990 to prepare for the upcoming SNF negotiations there was an interesting bureaucratic battle within the State Department over which bureau would chair the meetings. Both PM and EUR had historical justification for their positions; EUR based its claim on a regional basis, while PM chose the functional argument, since it has statutory responsibility for arms control matters. In the end it was decided to have co-chairmen: Richard Seitz from EUR, and Richard Clark from PM. After the first several meetings in late 1990, it appeared that PM was gradually assuming the dominant position in this turf war. From
establish and coordinate mutually agreed policy for the alliance position vis-à-vis INF arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Since these were bilateral talks, only the US was sitting down with the USSR in Geneva. The SCG made sure that nothing was done, however, without thorough consultation with all the allied partners and complete coordination within the American interagency process. The SCG officially reported to both the NPG and the North Atlantic Council.  

Both bodies served the innate European desire for ever more consultation with Washington, especially over nuclear matters. They proved resilient and successful in this respect, as seen by their incorporation into the permanent NATO decision-making structure. They also provided fora for continued American leadership of the alliance in matters pertaining to nuclear weapons, in two ways: first, the US chairmanship of both committees, and second, because matters were often worked out through the interagency process in Washington first, then briefed to the allies in Brussels for their concurrence and approval.

The HLG's success in its first major effort, the INF dual-track decision, was significant not only because it marked the first time that the alliance had used doctrine to determine a weapons systems selection, 


137McLean, p. 206.

138This was the approach taken in preparing for the INF dual track, as Schwartz describes in such detail (pp. 223-240). Strobe Talbott points out, for instance, that "in the fall [of 1979] the US National Security Council staff and the State Department took the reports of the HLG and SCG and in effect stapled them together. The result became known as the Integrated Decision Document." (Talbott, p. 38.) This was essentially the approach taken again in discussions over FOTL and the Comprehensive Concept prior to the May 1989 NATO summit.
but because it was also the first occasion in which all the allies reached agreement on the types and numbers of a new weapon before deployment. Almost all other NATO nuclear weaponry was inherited from American decisions made before MC 14/3 had been adopted.\textsuperscript{139}

As part of the December 1979 INF decision, NATO ministers agreed to keep the HLG as a forum in which to study the size and composition of the rest of the TNF stockpile, as well as to oversee INF deployment and the withdrawal of 1000 older TNF warheads from Europe.\textsuperscript{140}

**THE LEGACY OF THE INF TREATY**

In December 1987 President Reagan and Soviet President Gorbachev signed an historic agreement in Washington banning the entire category of INF and SRINF weapons.\textsuperscript{141}

From a strategic perspective, however, there was one big problem with the treaty and its implications. The INF treaty codified the

\textsuperscript{139}Legge, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{140}Legge, pp. 37-38.

\textsuperscript{141}Intermediate-Range (INF) missiles were those with ranges from 1000 to 5500 kilometers, and included the Soviet SS-20, SS-4, SSC-X-4, and SS-5, and the US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). Shorter-range INF (SRINF) weapons, those with ranges between 500 and 1000 kilometers, included only Soviet systems: the SS-12 and SS-23. See US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty," in Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987. The United States pressured West Germany into including its only MRBM, the Pershing IA, in the zero agreement (under a separate unilateral decision made later), even though the FRG was not a party to the treaty. A good review of the INF Treaty and its impact on American national security is found in Patrick J. Garrity, "The INF Treaty: Past, Present, and Future," CNSS Papers, No. 4, Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, February 1988.
permanent nature of the missing link in the escalatory chain once deemed critical to NATO's policy of flexible response. The missiles, many argued, had not been deployed as simply a response to the Soviet SS-20's; they were necessary regardless of Soviet INF strength. By eliminating the one missile which could strike the USSR from Western Europe the alliance had surrendered an important element of its deterrent strategy. The "seamless web" was no longer seamless. Questions about the credibility of the remaining links coupling America to its European allies were bound to arise in the aftermath.

**EFFECT ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION**

*For every European who sees nuclear weapons as a surrogate for American links to Europe and wants them removed, many others see a connection and want to maintain it.*

The signing of the INF Treaty had a profound effect on several sectors of the European public. For one group, it validated the alliance strategy of negotiating through strength. Only by showing its willingness to carry out the INF deployments as a cohesive body could NATO convince the Soviets of its uncompromising stance on security for the West. Furthermore, the Pershing II put Soviet territory, and particularly Moscow, within range of NATO land-based missiles for the first time in decades. This sudden theater vulnerability, according to this argument, prompted the Soviets to return to the negotiating table and accept large asymmetrical cuts in its INF forces in order to rid Europe of the Pershing II threat.

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For the peace activists, the INF Treaty had an ambivalent effect. On the one hand, it achieved what they had been advocating, sometimes stridently, for nearly a decade. On the other hand, it took the wind out of the sails of the peace movement. NATO essentially co-opted the peace platform as its own in dealing a zero-zero solution with the USSR. This was not totally unexpected. As one analyst pointed out, the issues facing NATO were not new, but neither were they unsolvable:

the issues have always been divisive, and they remain so today. No consensus has ever existed in Europe on the place of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Instead there has been public and parliamentary acquiescence by silence, punctuated by occasional outcries. Publics for the most part have left the debate up to experts in government who argue over technicalities in muffled tones and arcane language inaccessible to most laymen. Once public controversy has broken out—as it has from time to time in every NATO country except France—it has aroused intense moral anxiety that bureaucrats and strategists cannot address, much less allay. Yet past episodes of public controversy have been followed by the restoration of popular acquiescence.\textsuperscript{143}

West European governments were also mixed in their response to the treaty. They were publicly pleased at the outcome, since NATO had been calling for INF negotiations since 1979. The removal of several thousand nuclear warheads from Central Europe was certainly a public relations plus, and everyone breathed a bit easier over the lowered possibility of an accident or incident short of war involving these weapons. Nevertheless, safety had never been a primary concern in deploying such warheads and missiles in the first place. They were there to bolster military and political deterrence as essential middle links in the seamless web linking European conventional forces to America's strategic might. Some European government leaders recognized that that mission was

\textsuperscript{143}Sigal, in \textit{Alliance Security}, p. 135.
now, once again, open to question. According to this argument, the mission had not changed, the gap still existed, and the elimination of these forces put the alliance right back to where it was in the late 1970's—when NATO had first decided it needed INF forces, and began the long chain of events that had now come full circle.\textsuperscript{144}

Finally, the general consensus among Western public opinion was that the INF Treaty was a good thing. In the public's eye, it lessened the chances of war; it proved that Gorbachev was more than a short-term phenomena, and that he was serious in his vision of a better Europe and could be trusted; it lessened the involvement of the United States in Europe's destiny; it decreased the defense burden borne by the states on the Central Front; and it overcame a nasty public controversy over these weapons that had erupted between domestic groups in the early 1980's. One could also argue that the Treaty served to de-couple the US from Europe to some extent, thereby damaging deterrence and lowering the nuclear threshold, but these were not public positions. It also set the tone for future NATO weapons modernization programs. In the future, the public was less likely to be swayed by arguments on the basis of military need; after all, hadn't the alliance so argued for INF, only to negotiate them away at the first opportunity? In any case, the "need" for such weapons seemed to be disappearing, in light of Gorbachev's policies and the changing face of Eastern Europe, which was now perceived by much of the West as a rapidly

\textsuperscript{144}This argument carried to its limits would suspect all arms control negotiations in general, since they make the West vulnerable to Soviet manipulation. So argued Richard Perle in 1984 Congressional testimony; see also Lynn E. Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Spring 1988, pp. 720-734.
declining threat.\textsuperscript{145} This attitude would have severe consequences for the NATO SNF modernization program, agreed to in 1983 and coming to fruition, in terms of decision points, in the late 1980's.

**EFFECT ON NATO THEATER NUCLEAR PLANNING AND TARGETING**

Helga Haftendorn wrote that since the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles were deployed primarily for political reasons, their removal had little effect on alliance military strategy per MC 14/3.\textsuperscript{146} Nevertheless, the loss of Pershing II and GLCM's made SACEUR's job more difficult. Until being told otherwise, he still had to cover all of the targets on the NATO target list in Eastern and Central Europe in the event of war. This included short-range targets, such as battlefield deployments and rear area mobilization and missile sites, as well as second-echelon or follow-on forces: primarily fixed positions such as rail junctions, airfields, vital bridges and other communications links, and command centers in Eastern Europe and the Western Soviet Union. In the event of war, SACEUR had to be ready to provide a full range of strike capabilities to cover a spectrum of war options ranging from local battlefield use to general nuclear release.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{145}Especially in West Germany, which held the key to FOTL modernization plans. Some of the force structure problems that derive from this were presented by Jeffrey Record and David D. Rivkin, Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1988, pp. 735-754.

\textsuperscript{146}Haftendorn, "Role of Nuclear Weapons in Allied Strategy," in NATO in the 5th Decade, pp. 115-134.

\textsuperscript{147}In the early 1980's William Kaufmann suggested that there were 1610 such vital targets in Eastern Europe that NATO would have to plan to strike. Kaufmann, "Nuclear Deterrence in Central Europe," in Alliance Security, pp. 40-41. The complete SHAPE target list was in the range of 18,500 targets, "of which 10% are considered 'priority' targets." Senate
While the official targeting process is highly classified, several facets of that process are self-evident.

The alliance has had nuclear targeting plans drawn up for many years by the Nuclear Activities Branch (now the Nuclear Concepts and Nuclear Policy Sections, Special Weapons Branch, Policy Division) at SHAPE. NATO provides guidance to the military planners through a document originally called "Concepts for the Role of Theater Nuclear Strike Forces in ACE," and later called the annual "Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study."\[148\]

There are two basic categories of scenarios within which SACEUR could envision using tactical nuclear warheads. The first is selective use, perhaps for sending a political signal or for some battlefield purpose; the second is a General Strike Plan that allows for deliberate escalation and could be undertaken in conjunction with strategic forces implementing the SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan--America's grand

Report of the Special Committee, p. 43.

\[148\] Leitenberg; and interviews at SHAPE, August 1989 and June 1990. During his 1990 visit the author saw a draft version of the newest edition of this document, its name proposed as "Nuclear Contributions to Deterrence 1990" (or NC-90). It was considerably different in tone from the previous NWRS written in 1988; the new approach was vaguer in employment details and stressed the political purposes for these weapons and their use. It also focused on selective release, whereas past NWRS's were primarily concerned with nuclear warfighting under conditions of General Nuclear Release. It was assumed that if you could work out the details for the "big" war, the selective use options would also be available. Stockpile levels were determined politically, rather than by what the alliance actually needed. One allied officer at SHAPE told me that "earlier studies were a game to justify limits that had already been set politically." Of course, the details of NC-90 remain classified, but one can assume that, given the candor with which the officers involved in writing it expressed their discomfort with earlier studies, the emphasis had shifted considerably. The new document emphasizes how NATO's residual TNF forces still made a significant contribution to deterrence in Europe.
design for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union). Selective use options range from a single "shot across the bow" for the purpose of sending a political signal, to more widespread battlefield use.\textsuperscript{149}

Targets are scheduled according to their priority for SHAPE, and fall into either the Priority Strike Program (PSP) or the Tactical Strike Program. The PSP includes targets that are on the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Critical Installations List.\textsuperscript{150} Any employment plan would require prior consultation and release approval by the US President, and would most likely take the form of pre-planned "packages" consisting of specified numbers and yields of weapons for a particular area or target type.\textsuperscript{151} Both long and short-range theater nuclear weapons can be included in a package.

One option mentioned earlier, striking deep into Warsaw Pact territory, has received much attention in recent years as a possible NATO doctrine. Known as Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA), it involves deep strikes into the enemy's rear areas with nuclear or advanced technology conventional weapons in order to disrupt his ability to bring forces and equipment to bear on the forward edge of the battle area. Such a plan was possible because of the relatively narrow front on which the Warsaw Pact

\textsuperscript{149}Record, \textit{US Nuclear Weapons in Europe}, pp. 32-33.


could attack in Central Europe, and the resultant bunching up of forces behind the front lines as these follow-on forces waited for their turn to be called into battle.\footnote{Interviews in Europe and Washington, summer 1990.}

The INF missiles, as well as the proposed modernized SNF forces, were perfect for the FOFA mission. GLCM was mobile, survivable, and accurate, with a discrete nuclear warhead that could be quite small (by historical standards), thanks to its high accuracy. The Pershing II, due to its speed and range, was more of a theater weapon in the old MRBM tradition, although it, too, could be programmed to hit shorter-range targets. Leon Sigal points out that whereas the GLCM, a subsonic, air-breathing weapon, was an acceptable second-strike system, the Pershing II was a destabilizing first-strike weapon, capable of rapidly taking out deep targets and threatening the Soviet homeland.\footnote{Sigal, "No-First-Use and NATO's Nuclear Posture," in Alliance Security, p. 109.} Yet both systems had similar capabilities.

Losing these two weapons systems meant that SACEUR had to scramble to find ways of re-covering one-third of the long list of priority targets he was expected to hit. There were several possible ways to do this. First, SHAPE could shorten the target list. Second, NATO could place greater reliance on dual-capable aircraft to accomplish the nuclear role, although this bumped up against finite airframe resources that also had critical conventional missions. Third, the alliance could develop and produce new long-range weapons to meet SACEUR’s needs and cover the targets left exposed by the loss of INF assets. Finally, NATO could
attempt to create a new synergy, using existing and upcoming weapons systems, with a refined target list, in an attempt to achieve the FOFA mission and still provide the corps commanders with all the nuclear firepower they needed in the event of war. This was the path chosen by SHAPE.\textsuperscript{154} It placed a heavy burden on the new generation of SNF forces just beginning to come into the field, or on their way in the development cycle: the follow-on to Lance, the tactical air-to-surface missile, and modernized rocket-assisted artillery fired atomic projectiles (AFAPs).

IMPACT ON SNF MODERNIZATION

As pointed out above, in the afterglow of the successful INF Treaty European public opinion was less likely to approve of any new nuclear weapons plans for the theater. But military officials in the key states saw a need for such new weapons, given the ongoing tasks of the alliance, the unchanged doctrine enshrined in MC 14/3, the loss of capability after the INF Treaty, and the continuing numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces. This disparity between public and official attitudes (and, in some cases, differences within the governments, as well) naturally led to conflict and disagreement over the proper ends and means of NATO strategy in the 1990’s. At the center of this controversy, not surprisingly, was a new nuclear weapon system waiting for approval to be deployed in the theater. FOTL, and, in its shadow, TASM, were about to be rudely thrust into the limelight as the villains in the next act of the ongoing alliance drama concerning the need for and role of nuclear forces.

\textsuperscript{154}Based on interviews at SHAPE headquarters, Belgium, August 1989 and June 1990.
RECURRENT THEMES IN ALLIANCE NUCLEAR HISTORY

For two decades...the stockpile of US nuclear weapons in Europe has resembled fish flopping on a dock: they are still alive, but somehow out of their element.\textsuperscript{155}

Even in a cursory review of alliance theater nuclear history such as this one, there are a number of obvious themes that run through the story. We can expect that trends which have developed over a period of nearly four decades will continue to play a role in SNF modernization efforts in the 1980's and beyond, and such is indeed the case.

Among the major thematic cords linking NATO nuclear issues are the following:

1. The distinction between deterrence and reassurance as key purposes of nuclear forces.

As we saw above, this distinction lies at the heart of alliance debates over nuclear modernization and force employment policy changes. Whenever the United States has appeared to be placing more emphasis on the former, whether with talk of limiting a nuclear war to Europe, or making such weapons more useable for warfighting, the European allies have strenuously objected. They have, generally speaking, shown a marked preference for the political value of these weapons, seeing them as a link that couples the US to European security at the first infraction of the peace. Put another way, "the bottom line of alliance nuclear relations is not NATO's military doctrine but Europe's confidence in America's will."\textsuperscript{156}


\textsuperscript{156}Wasserman, p. 134.
The nuclear dilemma in Europe is rooted in geography. The missiles which are supposed to protect Western Europe are located in Europe, as is the major threat to the West, yet the country providing that deterrent is 3000 miles away. The basic problem of American extended deterrence is the possibility of NATO being "self-deterred," either out of fear of nuclear devastation on its own territory or from American unwillingness to risk its homeland for Europe. This has disturbed the delicate compromise enshrined in MC 14/3 between the American wish for theater options and the European desire for tight linkage and quick escalation to US strategic forces. The ambivalence was tolerable only as long as the US emphasized assured destruction of an enemy in the event of war—a condition no longer credible in an era of nuclear parity.157 Perhaps the continued reliance on flexible response doctrine and nuclear deterrence is due to the alliance (and the Warsaw Pact, for that matter) adopting a form of "existential deterrence." As a recent conference report explained it, the possibility of irrational (or at least involuntary) behavior provides the foundation of existential deterrence. Given this, the mere presence of nuclear weapons in Europe contributes deterrent value—whether rational plans for the weapons' use exist or not. This clearly contributes to war prevention...The contribution of existential deterrence, while real, is not a formal element of Alliance policy.158

2. The concern among European members that the United States does not consult with them prior to making nuclear decisions that affect the

157Haftendorn, in NATO's 5th Decade, p. 116.

alliance as a whole.

The desire of the European allies to be a part of alliance nuclear policy making is a constant thread that weaves its way through the history of the past forty years. Their anger over America's failure to consult them concerning such decisions is a natural outgrowth of this desire. Several of the episodes which we examined above demonstrated this problem, and several of the institutional changes created within the alliance are reflections of the attempt to change this situation.

The most obvious cases of American disregard for European concerns or inputs into the decision-making process were: the cancellation of the Skybolt missile program, and the after-the-fact notification of the British; the way in which the neutron bomb was handled, particularly President Carter's abrupt decision to defer any production and deployment of ERW despite the political costs this would create for his allies; the Reagan administration's "zero option" on INF negotiations, which, after the surprising acceptance by the Soviets, led to a "zero-zero" INF Treaty and the loss of those nuclear delivery assets deemed most valuable by the Europeans; and, finally, the "near deal" which Reagan and Gorbachev came close to signing at the October 1986 Reykjavik summit, without any European allies present during the negotiations.

During the FOTL case the Europeans were once again concerned with American consultation procedures. Aware of these concerns, and of its past record, the US seemingly tried to do better this time. It attempted to maintain alliance cohesiveness throughout the modernization process, as is evidenced by statements supporting the Montebello program in every ministerial communique published since 1986. Nevertheless, as we shall
see in the chapters to come, there were still some problems in the way the program was managed in terms of intra-allied consultation at every step, especially in the May 1990 decision to cancel FOTL and AFAPs modernization.

3. The attempt by NATO to overcome deep political divisions over the purpose and value of theater nuclear weapons with technological "fixes" rather than via new doctrine.

Supplying a technological "answer" to what is inherently a political problem has never satisfied the basic nuclear dilemma. This was attempted in several instances, notably the introduction of IRBM's into the theater in the late 1950's, the attempt to create a multi-national MRBM force in the 1960's, and the deployment of INF forces in the early 1980's. All three were supported as much by political as by military rationale, yet none accomplished the difficult task of solving the simultaneous military and political needs that the alliance faced.

SNF modernization in the late 1980's was supposed to solve a military problem--SACEUR's targetting and FOFA requirements--while also serving a political purpose, at least in the minds of certain Europeans and advocates of the "seamless web" of deterrence: proving American stoutheartedness through renewed linkage between the conventional forces in the theater and nuclear weapons that began the escalatory chain leading to US strategic forces. As with earlier attempts to solve nuclear dilemmas through hardware upgrades, this proved to be exceedingly difficult to do. The lesson, perhaps, is that "the political implications of deploying new nuclear weapons in Europe should be an integral part of
the decision-making process."\textsuperscript{159}

4. The increasing willingness of the alliance to consider public opinion in its efforts at force modernization and rationalization.

This was most evident in the 1979 dual-track decision, which attempted to "sell" the INF modernization package to the public by attaching an arms control element to it—something which the alliance had never felt it was necessary to do in earlier nuclear modernization episodes.\textsuperscript{160} Since an arms control deal seemed like it, too, would offer security improvements to the alliance, due to the disparity between the long-range theater nuclear forces between the two blocks, and the associated unequal cuts required of the Soviets to reach parity, the alliance appeared to have placed itself in a "no-lose" situation with this decision. Only after later re-examination of theater nuclear strategy revealed the loss of coupling and the break in the seamless web of deterrence was the zero option seen to be dangerous, especially to European strategists. To the average citizen, however, the outcome seemed to be greater security through smaller numbers of weapons on the continent.

On the other hand, there are those who argue that the alliance needs a strong leader, someone who can make the hard decisions when necessary and provide guidance on nuclear issues. The natural leader in NATO is the

\textsuperscript{159}Wasserman, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{160}Although, as we have seen, the first attempt to do so occurred a year earlier, in the proposed 1978 NATO plan to produce ERW but delay its deployment pending Soviet arms control concessions. The lesson seemed obvious to some: "the dual track notion of parallel modernization and arms control has set a powerful precedent for future nuclear initiatives in NATO." Wasserman, p. 137.
United States. From this point of view, the US should not put too much emphasis on public opinion, from whatever quarter. Sherri Wasserman, for one, came to this conclusion in her study of the neutron bomb episode: "Modernization of nuclear weapons in Europe cannot be managed by a pluralist approach to decision making."\footnote{Wasserman, p. 136.} A major part of the political mess surrounding ERW stemmed from Washington’s failure to exert strong, continuous, decisive leadership.

5. Europeans have often had ulterior motives when accepting new nuclear systems on their soil.

Early cases examined in this chapter clearly show that European support for deployment, as far as it went, was often motivated more by a desire to acquire the most modern and capable systems with which to defend themselves, or to enhance their prestige within NATO, rather than by any real enthusiasm for American missiles based in Europe.\footnote{Ireland, p 40.} The alliance’s unwillingness or inability to accommodate that desire, either through collective nuclear force arrangements (such as MLF) or via independent national nuclear forces (such as Britain and France) has allowed this strain to continue, and is reflected in the problems that have affected the most recent SNF modernization proposals.

6. The lack of a credible nuclear warfighting doctrine by NATO military forces; their unpreparedness for such operations and their unwillingness to face the hard questions these weapons pose.

The US Army has never had a serious plan to employ nuclear weapons in Europe, despite the fact that it maintained over 7000 warheads in Army
storage facilities for several decades. As one critic put it,

Army tactical nuclear doctrine, as it exists today, avoids the
tough issues...In essence, the US Army does not have what can
appropriately be called an authoritative nuclear warfighting
document for tactical nuclear weapons and forces. In the
current framework there is not likely to be one. Instead of
addressing warfighting issues, the current guidelines are
basically concerned with conditions which enable a decision to
be reached on whether or not to employ nuclear weapons. The
military aspects of the problems are hidden by overriding
procedural and political factors.\textsuperscript{163}

This last issue points out two problems: first, the lack of a credible
military strategy for the use of TNF and SNF forces degrades their
deterrent value in an opponent's eyes; second, it shows the dangerous
trends towards "more of the same" and the inertia that goes along with
bureaucratic processes and arms production. The situation has not
appreciably changed since the late 1960's, despite attempts to correct
this problem undertaken in the 1970's (INF) and 1980's (SNF). As early as
two decades ago, theater nuclear weapons

allowed NATO to maintain the fiction of a flexible response
capability despite manifest conventional weaknesses. That the
theater nuclear posture was supported by no viable employment
document, that the conventional forces it presumably supported
were neither trained nor equipped to operate in an intense
nuclear environment, and that the use of these weapons and
their Soviet counterparts would almost certainly leave much of
NATO territory in ruins was well known by both American and
European planners. Yet the facts were ignored by general
consensus: Europe refusing to entertain the notion of a purely
local nuclear conflict and the United States fearing that
attempts to redress deficiencies in TNW's would demolish
arguments for a strong conventional option.\textsuperscript{164}

7. The desire by the United States and other allies to prevent West
Germany from obtaining its own nuclear capability.

\textsuperscript{163}John P. Rose, \textit{The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-}

\textsuperscript{164}Wasserman, p. 13.
This theme was obvious in the MLF plan. The State Department's worries over Germany's nuclear desires contributed to its organizational support for the MLF concept, despite bureaucratic opposition from several quarters, including the Pentagon and most other European states. This also explained why State preferred MLF to General Norstad's mobile MRBM proposal, which would have aggravated US-Soviet and US-French relations over the question of a German finger on the trigger. MLF was designed to appease these supposed German desires for such weaponry, as well as their concerns over France's burgeoning independent nuclear forces.\textsuperscript{165}

The question of German interest in acquiring an independent nuclear capability reappeared during the hectic 1989-1990 period, when issues of SNF modernization were enveloped by the pace of German reunification.

8. \textit{The incompatibility of weapons and doctrine.}

This final theme is almost too obvious to mention, for it underlies all that has been said in this history. NATO's nuclear forces have never matched the doctrinal prescriptions for their use. As Jeffrey Record pointed out nearly two decades ago, the reasons for this problem are clear: NATO has a surfeit of weapons, with extravagant yields, too-short ranges, and unnecessary vulnerability, all of which lead to temptations for unauthorized early use of TNF.\textsuperscript{166} Nevertheless, as he correctly pointed out, "the deployment's psychological value within NATO far outweighs whatever military contribution the weapons may make to overall deterrence of aggression."\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{165}\textit{Schwartz}, pp. 82-85.

\textsuperscript{166}\textit{Record, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe}, pp. 50-54.

\textsuperscript{167}\textit{Record, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe}, p. 68.
In terms of political reassurance, short-range battlefield nuclear weapons have usually caused more problems than they have solved. To be effectively reassuring, American forces must be credible, stabilizing, and appear to contribute to responsible force planning. The neutron bomb presents the best case for this argument, and a good case for how this policy has not been applied to NATO force planning; as we shall see, FOTL provides another. Regardless of military value, a weapon must pass strict political guidelines before it can be successfully deployed on the European continent.

CONCLUSION

The history of NATO's intimate involvement with nuclear weapons deployed in the European theater is replete with themes and lessons that have carried over into the most recent case of nuclear modernization: the follow-on to Lance missile story. In the chapters that follow we shall conduct a detailed examination of the events surrounding the key FOTL decisions from three different perspectives: international systemic, European alliance, and American domestic. We will ground the case in the history of what has gone before, as sketched out briefly in this chapter, and try to discern how well the allies have learned the "lessons" of past NATO modernization efforts, or at least whether they have learned to recognize the inescapable themes that affect the politics of allied interaction with respect to nuclear weapons. Finally, we shall attempt to assess the future of nuclear weapons in a rapidly changing Europe.

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168 Biddle and Feaver, pp. 6-7.
PART II: THE FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE MISSILE DECISIONS
CHAPTER FOUR: INTRODUCTION TO FOTL AND MODERNIZATION ARGUMENTS

The follow-on to Lance (FOTL) missile modernization decision was not a unique decision, nor was it taken in isolation. It was part of a much larger "package" of force rationalization changes that NATO deemed necessary for the continued maintenance of its flexible response doctrine in the decades to come. These included intermediate-range (INF) deployments, short-range (SNF) modernization, stockpile reductions, arms control initiatives with the Warsaw Pact, and the development of general political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons should conventional deterrence fail.

In Part Two of this dissertation we will examine the follow-on to Lance decisions in detail as they developed over the course of 11 years, from early studies of NATO's theater nuclear force structure begun in 1979 until the cancellation of FOTL in the summer of 1990. The present chapter starts with an overview of the life cycle of the follow-on to Lance in order to have an understanding of the "big picture" before delving into the political details of the story. We then lay out the major arguments offered for and against SNF modernization in Europe. Some of these arguments have a long pedigree; others developed only later in the decade of the '80s as a result of changes in Eastern Europe, the legacy of the INF Treaty, and a declining Soviet threat.

THE FOLLOW-ON-TO-LANCE MISSILE: A PRIMER

The Lance surface-to-surface missile (SSM), built by the Vought Company, began development in 1962 with missile production beginning in
1970. Initial operational capability (IOC) and deployment to Europe were achieved in 1972. Eventually 6 allied nations received Lance and its associated dual-capable mission: the US, Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The Lance had an expected service life of ten years.\(^1\) Thanks to several service life extensions, however, as of 1990 there were 88 Lance launchers and approximately 690 missiles still stationed in Europe.\(^2\)

The purpose of Lance was to serve as a short-range corps support weapon that could reach rear areas of the enemy’s front lines. A dual-capable system, it had a range of 120 km (72 miles) and in the nuclear mode carried a W-70 warhead capable of either 1 or 100 kilotons of explosive power. It was independently mobile, making it somewhat survivable, but it was cumbersome and slow to operate, set up, and fire. Each tracked erector-launcher carried two extra missiles that took between 15 minutes and three hours for the eight-man crew to reload.\(^3\)

Recognizing these drawbacks, in the late 1970's the US Army and NATO began considering a replacement for Lance called the Corps Support Weapon System (CSWS), but this did not meet SACEUR's mission requirements in terms of range or accuracy. They then began looking at technology that

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\(^2\)McCausland, chapter 4, p. 4.

\(^3\)McCausland; Campbell; and William Arkin, Thomas Cochran, and Milton Hoenig, *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: US Forces and Capabilities* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1984). The Lance had a crew of 8, but 72 men were counted against each launcher for the purposes of the European troop strength ceiling.
could strike deep behind enemy lines, in accordance with emerging doctrinal thought on the concepts of Airland Battle and Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA). This included "assault breaker" technology and concepts, which the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was examining; the Air Force's conventional stand-off weapon system; and, in the early 1980's, the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS), which eventually became the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). These concepts were loosely joined in the mid-1980's during the pursuit of a Lance follow-on and other programs.4

In 1977 NATO established the High Level Group (HLG) as an adjunct body to serve as a nuclear advisory body for the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The HLG immediately began studying NATO's nuclear posture and requirements. In 1980 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) began a separate Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS) at SHAPE headquarters. The two study programs were linked at the October 1983 NPG meeting at Montebello, Canada, where the ministers called for rationalization of the SNF force structure through unilateral cuts and modernization of the remaining systems. In addition, they asked SACEUR to complete his NWRS with specific weapons types and numbers within the political guidelines set at Montebello. General Rogers completed his

study and presented his plan to the NPG in March 1985.

The Rogers modernization proposals, which will be examined more closely in the next chapter, included four major weapons upgrade programs as well as a host of smaller operational improvements. One of the new systems called for was a follow-on for Lance, which had by this point already exceeded its expected service life. Additionally, the HLG studies had pointed out numerous technical and operational deficiencies with the Lance.

Despite the formally announced need for a follow-on to Lance, the US Army was slow to respond to SACEUR's request. The Army feared losing control of what had traditionally been an Army weapon; with its increased range, FOTL was likely to fall under the theater commander's control as a deep strike weapon. The Army corps commanders preferred to have FOTL available for their immediate tactical use. Nevertheless, with SACEUR's continued pressure, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally prevailed on the Army to begin looking at FOTL options. The Phase II study request came out of the Army acquisition office in August 1986, and a Statement of Need for a Lance follow-on was finally presented in November 1987.

The follow-on-to-Lance was expected to be a nuclear-only weapon. This, it was hoped, would prevent FOTL from being "captured" in

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conventional arms control negotiations. Besides, the Army had discovered that the older Lance had proven too valuable in its nuclear role to be used for conventional purposes anyway. Several alternative missiles were considered for the program, but it was generally assumed that whatever was chosen would be a "generic" missile--a variant of one already in existence. Starting from scratch to build a new system would take too long, given the time constraints of Lance's service life.

The Pentagon first requested funding for a follow-on-to-Lance program in the FY 1989 defense budget. Only $15 million the first year, this category request was projected to rise to $33 million in FY90 and $130 million in FY91. Congress approved half of the FY89 and FY90 amounts, and the program was cancelled before a final decision was made for FY91. The total program was expected to cost approximately $1.2 billion and produce up to 1000 missiles and warheads over eight to ten years.

DOD gave the go-ahead for the FOTL and TASM development programs in August of 1988. In December of that year the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) was selected as the launch platform for the FOTL. Also

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7Tertrais, para. 5.2.2.


9Chen, SASC Hearings, p. 415.

10Chen, SASC Hearings, p. 415. The MLRS is built by LTV Aerospace and Defense Company. Army Missile Command awarded LTV with a production contract in September 1983. MLRS is a tracked mobile system capable of firing 12 227mm rockets carrying conventional submunitions or scatterable mines to a distance of 30 km. It can also accommodate two ATACMs long-range conventional missiles, capable of delivering cluster bomblets to a range exceeding that of Lance (beyond 115 km). DOD hoped to procure up to 1000 MLRS platforms for US and allied use by the year 2000 (602 for the US
in December the Army Missile Command issued a request to 31 contractors for a FOTL missile. According to one Army source, corporate response was favorable: 56 companies expressed interest in the FOTL program at a pre-contract meeting held at Redstone Arsenal in October 1989. The choice of a missile candidate was expected by the end of 1989, with full-scale development to begin in 1990, production in 1993, and IOC (Initial Operational Capability) in 1995. As we shall see, however, these dates were never met. The Phase 3 development decision was postponed several times before the program was finally cancelled.

The Army chose a competitive approach to the FOTL program in order to have a broader range of solutions to choose from because, as one senior

Army), and as many as 2237 ATACMs missiles. (McCausland, p. 22; and ATACMS," p. 9.) According to one report, 750 MLRS launchers would be deployed in Europe: 400 US, 200 German, and 50-100 British. (Dan Plesch, "NATO's Follow-on to Lance: The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)," BASIC Report 89-1, February 1989.) For more on MLRS see Manfred Kemmerich, "The MLRS--Phases II and III: New Dimensions in Conventional Defence," NATO's Sixteen Nations, April/May 1988, pp. 71-75; "Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)," Jane's Weapon Systems 1988-89 (Coulsdon, UK: Jane's Information Group, 1988), pp. 133-134; and Eric Allen, editor, "MLRS--Transatlantic Success Story," NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special Edition 1990. Plans called for putting two FOTL missiles on a MLRS launch platform, but the exact mix of conventional and nuclear systems to be fielded had not been determined. As we shall see in later chapters, the issue of missile selection created considerable debate within Congress and the Pentagon in late 1989, as questions of distinguishability for arms control purposes arose.

Interviews at the Pentagon, May 1990.

Tertrais, para. 5.2.1. The planned schedule was as follows: release the draft request for proposal to industry the 3rd quarter of FY89; release the final request for proposal the 1st quarter of FY90, after review by the DOD strategic Systems Committee; begin full-scale development of FOTL in the 3rd quarter of FY90; and, in FY91, conduct the FOTL preliminary design review, build the prototype, and complete the critical design review. FOTL production was to begin in the 2nd quarter of FY93. Details from Chen, SASC Hearings, 14 June 1989, pp. 415-416.
officer said, "no current system meets the requirements."\textsuperscript{13} The leading candidate for becoming the FOTL missile in the early stages of the search was the Army Tactical Missile (ATACMS), which was being developed to fit on the MLRS and could have accepted a nuclear warhead fairly easily. However, Congress placed a restriction against Army research into nuclear ATACMs on the FY 1984 defense budget which was never completely lifted.\textsuperscript{14} In addition, ATACMS could not meet the increased range requirement after the INF Treaty, when NATO's military leaders changed the FOTL's desired range from 250 to 450 km. Accordingly, the Pentagon gave up the fight for a nuclear ATACMS in 1988, as seen in the FY89 military budget request for funds for a new missile for the FOTL.\textsuperscript{15} Nevertheless, LTV presented one of the three bids received for the FOTL before it was cancelled, based on a nuclear version of the ATACMS it was developing.\textsuperscript{16}

A second candidate missile was the Pershing IB. Research into a single stage successor to the aging Pershing IA had been going on since the mid-1970's at Martin Marietta. They added a second stage to their proposed Pershing II in 1978, calling it the Pershing IIXR (for extended range), and won the contract for the INF missile, which adopted the PII designation. The re-named Pershing IB (or, if one prefers, a single stage

\textsuperscript{13}Chen, SASC Hearings, p. 415.

\textsuperscript{14}This interpretation was confirmed by Susan Crawford, General Counsel, US Army, in "Memorandum for Director, Nuclear and Chemical Directorate, Subject: Phase II Nuclear Study for Lance Follow-On," 30 May 1986.


\textsuperscript{16}Interviews in Washington, February 1991.
Pershing II) was put on hold for several years until offered as a FOTL candidate by Martin Marietta.  

Other possibilities for FOTL included a nuclear surface-to-surface version of the Patriot air defense missile; an improved Lance (the T-22 Lance II had been under development by Vought since 1979); a new Boeing system possibly based on their BRAVE-3000 missile (Boeing also placed a bid for FOTL with DOD in 1990); and the French Hades SSM scheduled to enter the French nuclear inventory in 1992.

A Phase 2 warhead feasibility study had begun in October 1986 for a second system called for by the Montebello plan, the tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM). Eventually the two warhead programs were folded into one, since the FOTL program began late and could be brought up to speed by "piggy backing" off the work already done for TASM. The warheads thus became a joint FOTL/TASM warhead, designed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and named the W-91. The Phase 2 warhead feasibility study was completed in June 1989 and presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council; they then approved the beginning of the Phase 2A study.  

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18DMS Report, p. 7.

19Tertrais, para. 5.4.2; interviews in Washington, January and February 1991; and BASIC Report 90.2.

20Interviews at Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM, August 1990; Chen, SASC Hearing, 14 June 1989, p. 416. The Nuclear Weapons Council is a small, powerful committee that sits at the interface between the Departments of Energy and Defense. It makes the final decisions on nuclear weapons research, development, and procurement plans, based on inputs from all concerned agencies. For a good introduction to this process, see William M. Arkin, Thomas B. Cochran, Milton M. Hoenig, and Robert S. Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook. Volume II: US Nuclear Warhead.
The plan was to convert either the W-85 Pershing II warhead, removed from the PII missiles when they were destroyed in accordance with the INF Treaty, or the W-80, already in use on air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, for this purpose. Either would have a smaller yield with greater variability than the old W-70 on Lance; the new warhead was expected to be in the 10 to 40 kiloton range.²¹

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**Figure 2: US Nuclear Warhead Production Phases**²²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concept Study</td>
<td>1 Yr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility Study</td>
<td>2 Yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Engineering</td>
<td>4-6 Yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Engineering</td>
<td>5 Yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Production</td>
<td>8-25 Yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity Production &amp; Stockpile</td>
<td>1-4 Yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement/Disposal</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

By 1989, then, the FOTL program appeared to be progressing well. The launch platform and warhead had been selected, and bids were expected to be let out to contractors for the missile in the fall, with a selection

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²¹Tertrais, para. 5.2.4., and interviews at Los Alamos, August 1990. The W-85 warhead for the Pershing II had a yield of 5-50 kilotons. Developed by Los Alamos, it was a variant of the B-61 Mod 4 nuclear bomb. The W-80 was also a LANL product derived from the B-61. Desired yields for the new warhead were 80-100 kilotons for the TASM, and 5-7 kilotons for the Army’s FOTL. *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I*, p. 297.

and development go-ahead expected in 1990. Such was not to be, however.

In January 1989 SACEUR presented his newest nuclear requirements study to NATO, in which he called for continued development of the Montebello SNF program, including FOTL. But events in Eastern Europe, and the corresponding changes in the former consensus within the alliance, led many in NATO to reconsider the entire concept and question the need for a new nuclear surface-to-surface missile in Central Europe. West Germany was the catalyst for this new debate. The FRG began to campaign for an early decision on FOTL, preferably its cancellation, and managed to raise the issue to major crisis proportions prior to the May 1989 NATO summit. A compromise reached there allowed the alliance to put off a formal deployment decision until 1992. In the meantime, the United States would continue research and development on the new system.

European hesitancy over FOTL had important repercussions in Washington, as bureaucratic infighting intensified over whether the US should continue to fund a weapon that appeared increasingly unlikely to be deployed by its allies in Europe. The dissolution of the Iron Curtain and resulting decline in the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact at the end of 1989 only added to such concerns, especially within the US Congress. The Phase 3 engineering development start-up date was delayed several times: first from July 1989 to October, then December, then March 1990, and finally indefinitely.

In early spring 1990 the National Security Council convened a new inter-agency body called the European Strategy Steering Group to consider the impact of recent changes in Europe on NATO and US commitments to
European security. One of the first decisions made was that FOTL had no chance of ever being deployed, had been overcome by events, and should, therefore, be cancelled for political reasons. This decision was finalized by the end of March. On May 3rd President Bush announced that the follow-on-to-Lance missile program was being terminated. This was confirmed and approved by the NPG at its May meeting, and by the NATO Heads of State in their London Declaration of July 1990.

**THE MODERNIZATION QUESTION: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE**

One can divide the arguments favoring and opposing the modernization of NATO's TNF assets into two general categories: early, "traditional" arguments that were put forward in the 1970's and re-affirmed by the alliance through the 1980's, and those that developed as a result of the INF Treaty and changes in the political environment of Eastern Europe in the late 1980's. Alternatively, one can divide the arguments into the broad categories of military/strategic versus political. Traditional arguments in favor of TNF rest largely on military rationales, with some political arguments buttressing the strategic issues. More recent arguments, on the other hand, have stressed the political liabilities of

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such weapons, regardless of their supposed military purpose or value.

As Hans Binnendijk has pointed out, these arguments are largely subjective judgements based on five general criteria: the nature of extended deterrence; the types of targets to be covered; the size of the conventional threat; the requirement for diversity in force structure; and the capabilities of the weapons under consideration. Despite the approval of the "General Political Guidelines for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons in the Defence of NATO" by the NPG in October 1986, there remained considerable debate even within official NATO circles over what these criteria meant for the minimum necessary nuclear deterrent in Europe. Several different groups could be identified, according to their views on the value and use of nuclear weapons. Among those that advocated continued reliance on tactical nuclear forces for deterrence were: those that believed in "existential deterrence"; those that supported a continuation of flexible response; and those that saw TNF as tools of a warfighting strategy. At the same time, some within the alliance saw more dangers in such weapons than they were worth and called for radical cuts in the TNF stockpile. These groups included: those who preferred robust conventional defenses; strategic defense advocates; and a segment of the concerned public outside the mainstream of NATO policy making that called for nuclear disarmament.

While the focus of this study is the now-defunct follow-on to Lance,

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27 Binnendijk, p. 144.

many of these arguments have broader applicability to other TNF forces. As such, they are relevant for the future question of TASM deployment in Europe.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SNF MODERNIZATION

Regardless of whether we can ever get conventional-force parity, I believe nuclear weapons have an indispensable peacekeeping value irrespective of the conventional balance.29

--General John Galvin, SACEUR, 1989

Proponents of short-range nuclear modernization emphasize the military value of these weapons for deterrence and, if necessary, for battlefield use. Nuclear weapons are meant to counter overwhelming Soviet advantages in conventional forces in the Central European theater. They also help compensate for geographical dissimilarities which allow the Soviet Union to more easily bring to bear conventional forces in the theater.

The value of nuclear weapons has been a long-held tenet of alliance orthodoxy. In a 1988 RAND paper, Arnold Kanter summarized those beliefs as follows:

* Nuclear weapons perform important functions for which conventional weapons of equal military capability and effectiveness cannot substitute.

* Nuclear weapons based in the theater perform important functions for which nuclear weapons of equal military capability and effectiveness based elsewhere (either in the United States or at sea) cannot substitute.

* US nuclear weapons perform important functions for which nuclear weapons of other NATO allies (i.e., France and the

having equal military capability and effectiveness cannot substitute.\textsuperscript{30}

A British study of the SNF modernization program recognized the deeply ingrained feelings associated with such attitudes:

Initial dependence on nuclear weapon development has been built progressively deeper into [NATO's] evolving practices and structures. NATO's nuclear weapons are now said to play a bewildering range of different roles: military, political, psychological, economic, symbolic. This has come about by a process of historical overlay, in which function has been added to function without the replacement of those that were there before. The result is that for many commentators Theatre Nuclear Forces are seen to be integral to the continued political unity of the Alliance itself. 'Denuclearization' would be tantamount to dissolution.\textsuperscript{31}

Proponents argue that there is no guarantee that arms control will successfully limit conventional forces in Europe, nor that there is, in the foreseeable future, any alternative to nuclear weapons as key deterrent elements. NATO must, therefore, continue to upgrade and modernize its forces as necessary to guarantee a viable nuclear delivery capability, including land-based missiles, in the 1990's and beyond. Nor would conventional parity brought about by arms agreements eliminate the need for such weapons. As General John Galvin, the current SACEUR, has said, "A parity of conventional forces has never meant peace in Europe."\textsuperscript{32}

Nuclear weapons pose a deterrent against enemy first use of similar

\textsuperscript{30}Arnold Kanter, \textit{Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control}, RAND Note N-2896-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, December 1988), p. vi. Emphasis in original. Kanter's views are particularly important to consider, since he became the senior arms control specialist in the Bush National Security Council just a few months after writing this RAND paper.


\textsuperscript{32}Kramer, p. 78.
weapons. Proponents believe that they can also substitute for conventional inadequacies in the theater. NATO's strategy has since 1967 relied on the explicit threat of nuclear escalation if it was losing a conventional conflict. Consequently,

to the extent that NATO continues to rely on the strategy of flexible response, it must depend on a mix of theater nuclear forces that, in combination, cover the Warsaw Pact target base (including targets in the Soviet Union), can survive Soviet preemptive attacks in adequate numbers, and can successfully penetrate and reach their targets. These forces will need to be modernized as they obsolesce and as Soviet capabilities to counter them improve.33

In this regard, certain types of weapon systems are better able to meet a NATO commander's requirements than others, and a mix of several different types is considered better than reliance on fewer. Surface-to-surface missiles, such as Lance and FOTL, offer the virtues of good survivability (since they are mobile, small, and easy to hide) and high penetrativity (a characteristic of all ballistic missiles), as well as relieving some of the burden on dual-capable aircraft which can then be used in conventional roles. Atomic artillery tubes offer the advantages of survivability (due to their large numbers and low individual target value), quick response, and presumably lower escalatory pressures if used. Aircraft offer greater range and provide the flexibility of a manned system that can be recalled or re-targeted once launched.

It was obvious as early as the 1970's that NATO's tactical nuclear forces faced serious problems. As one analyst dramatically put it, "Tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe...are technically and

33Kanter, p. 2.
operationally incapable of performing their mission of deterrence." \(^{34}\) Western TNF had limited range, a condition exacerbated by their stationing locations—close to the forward edge of the battlefield (FEBA), in the case of artillery and SSMs—and, for aircraft, by the small number of vulnerable allied airbases. The Lance missile, in addition, was old and outdated; it suffered from metal fatigue, corrosion from liquid fuel, launcher breakdowns, and degraded system reliability. \(^{35}\) Its electronics, guidance system, and safety devices were all of 1960's vintage. It had entered its second service life extension program (SLEP), and would be outmoded ("militarily unreliable") after 1995. \(^{36}\) As Secretary of Defense Carlucci said, "The fact is the electronics in the current Lance system will not last past 1995 and it will cost more to upgrade the electronics than to replace the system." \(^{37}\) Added General Galvin: "Trying to extend its life beyond that time would be prohibitively expensive and technologically infeasible." \(^{38}\)

Similarly, nuclear artillery (which shoot "artillery fired atomic projectiles," or AFAPs) were outdated and required new munitions. In addition to the questionable utility of using weapons of such short range

\(^{34}\) Andrew Goldman, "NATO Needs a New Missile," Orbis, Fall 1988, p. 541.

\(^{35}\) Tertrais, para. 5.1.2; McCausland, p. 21.

\(^{36}\) Kelleher, p. 606; also "Statement on Nuclear Force Modernization by Lawrence W. Woodruff," House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Research and Development, 1 March 1988. SLEP is a "minimum fix" intended to extend a weapon's operational life once deployed.


in the vicinity of one's own troops, warhead safety and security were key concerns with AFAPs. In the process of continued testing and study of the tactical nuclear stockpile in Europe (including an occasional underground explosive test of a randomly selected warhead) it was discovered that several warheads, including the "modernized" W-79 AFAPS, were unstable and likely to suffer from radioactive leakage in the event of an accident, improper handling, or seizure by terrorists. This led to Defense Department concerns and motivated, to a large degree, pressures for further modernization of nuclear artillery.

In a news conference in 1983 former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who oversaw the biggest increase in the TNF stockpile in Europe during the 1960's, admitted that "Most of them are junk, just plain junk. They're old, they're unreliable, there's no way they can be used efficiently, and they can be removed entirely." Since developing modern weapons systems requires such a long lead time (ten years is the normal figure used for the period from conception

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40 Reported by Fred Hiatt, "McNamara Suggests Eliminating A-Arms from NATO Defense," Washington Post, 15 September 1983, p. 15. To put it another way, a senior Defense Department official pointed out that "a Sony Walkman has better electronics than the newest stand-off missiles we're using in the Gulf War, so think how old and poor the original Lance system is." From interview in Washington, February 1991.
to fielding a new weapon), it was necessary to begin the modernization cycle for NATO's SNF forces in the mid-1980's in order to have these new weapons in place by the mid-1990's. That meant that the necessary political work to develop alliance support and consensus had to begin even earlier.

Proponents claimed that a new land-based missile could enhance stability. With its increased range, such a weapon system could be located farther back from the battlefield than is the Lance and still strike deeper into second echelon forces. This would theoretically raise the nuclear threshold by increasing the time allowed decision-makers to decide whether to use SNF. It would also make these weapons more valuable if actually needed in a war scenario, since they could employ cross-corps and second echelon targeting. Better accuracy and quicker response time also enhanced the military capabilities of these weapons, giving them greater survivability and better targeting value in a FOFA mission. In addition, a FOTL would require fewer operators than the Lance, freeing up valuable troops for conventional roles.

FOTL would have been, in short, more survivable, flexible, mobile, penetrable, and effective than the system it would have replaced, all of which would, so the argument went, have enhanced NATO's nuclear deterrent. Maintaining a land-based theater deterrent force was necessary because there were inherent problems relying on sea-based or air-based systems. For one thing, these alternative systems were not visible enough—if nuclear weapons are largely political in purpose, then you must display

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them to your own publics and to the enemy in order to convey your willingness to use them. The credibility of American coupling to Europe relies to some extent on this visible, physical linkage in the escalatory chain. Land-based systems enhance the US commitment in the allies' eyes, if for no other reason than the simple fact that in time of crisis they are less likely to fly or sail away than are other types of weapons. The Europeans can count on America "staying the course" by virtue of US military and nuclear forces on the ground in Europe.

Conversely, a NATO relying solely on America's strategic forces for theater deterrence would suffer from all the negative aspects of the same arguments: the credibility of American use would be considerably weakened; jumping from conventional conflict to strategic weapons without an intervening theater nuclear rung would be a dangerous escalatory move; and the yields on strategic weapons are generally too high to be credibly useful in a tactical environment. These factors in combination would serve to undermine European belief in coupling to the US if such reassurance were to come from strategic weapons alone.

Basing TNF in Europe also demonstrates nuclear burden- and risk-sharing by the allies, and presents to a potential aggressor a united defensive alliance.

The threat of nuclear escalation, say SNF supporters, is a key aspect to the doctrine of flexible response. This shows the political value of nuclear weapons, an importance which some claim exceeds their military purpose. Whether one presents this threat as one of deliberate escalation, or simply of threatening to "lose control" of the
situation, nuclear weapons serve political as well as military functions for NATO strategists. Such escalatory linkages reaffirm the coupling of European security to American strategic interests and enhance the credibility of the ultimate guarantor of Europe stability: American strategic weapons.

In addition, proponents argued that the alliance needed to carry out its 1983 Montebello decision in order to prove solidarity and political resolve. Without SNF deployment, questions would undoubtedly have arisen over Germany's commitment to alliance risk-sharing. There were also concerns within the FRG government coalition of American willingness to maintain a military presence in Germany if nuclear weapons were not deployed there. \(^4^3\)

A rationale that grew in importance following the 1987 INF Treaty was that of theater target coverage. As discussed in the last chapter, the elimination of several categories of long-range INF missiles in this Treaty "uncovered" many targets in Eastern Europe and the Western Soviet Union for which SACEUR had responsibility in wartime. SNF modernization, if it fielded weapons that reached the maximum range (500 KM) authorized under the treaty, would alleviate some of the discrepancies between targeting plans and weapons capabilities. The FOTL, as the only remaining land-based SSM, was particularly important in hitting those targets that required quick response, great accuracy, and guaranteed penetration.

Finally, with the INF Treaty as a precedent, some argue that NATO must show its willingness to actually carry out such modernization in

\(^{4^2}\)Kanter, p. 15.

\(^{4^3}\)Interview in Bonn, August 1989.
order to achieve greater success at the arms control table, should it
decide to go there. There was an explicit "dual-track" linkage
involved in any nuclear competition with the Soviets, according to this
approach.

Arguments that were not heard, or that were dealt with summarily by
proponents of modernization, included the issues of arms control
(distinguishability and verifiability concerns could have been easily
overcome, proponents claimed, via technical means) and the political and
public relations consequences of a modernization decision (the allies
always balk at new systems, but the political furor soon passes, so it was
not an issue worth grave concern).

The discussion now shifts to those arguments posed by opponents to
SNF modernization in Europe.

ARGUMENTS OPPOSING SNF MODERNIZATION

We have a great deal to fear in Europe and worldwide, but we
certainly need not fear negotiations or a Soviet Union that is
willing to negotiate. Whoever seeks disarmament must negotiate
on disarmament.

-- Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 1989

The objective in coalition warfare is to unite allies and
divide enemies. BNW [battlefield nuclear weapons] has the
potential to accomplish precisely the reverse, as was
demonstrated...in the Lance modernization controversy.

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44 "Issue Preview," p. 3.

45 German Information Center, "Speech by Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the German Bundestag, Bonn, April 27,

46 Leon V. Sigal, "The Case for Eliminating Battlefield Nuclear
There are several types of critics who oppose NATO SNF modernization plans. The first are those who reject the initial premises of NATO reliance on nuclear escalation as flawed policy. The second accept earlier military or political rationales for deterrence, but disapprove of the turn taken by NATO policies since MC-14/3 was adopted in 1967. The third group believes that the INF and SNF decisions of 1979 and 1983, if not the entire security arrangement for Western Europe, need to be reconsidered in light of recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.\(^47\)

Opponents of tactical nuclear modernization generally stress political, rather than military, reasons for their opposition. They argued that NATO had "under-responded" to Gorbachev's initiatives, and that development of a new nuclear missile would have been an inappropriate response to this new opportunity in East-West relations. The alliance was wedded to "old thinking," in this view, and had not accepted the vision of a peaceful European future that had been offered by the Soviets. In this new Europe there would be no need for nuclear weapons or forward defense, once conventional arms reductions had taken place.\(^48\) The apparent disappearance of the Soviet threat experienced since 1989 has added considerable weight to this argument, especially among West Europeans. Said one such study,

> The historic question being asked of NATO at this time is whether or not it can shake itself free from the inherited traditions of the past so as to be able to seize the chance which now exists to achieve in the future what has always been its fundamental goal: the secure defence of its territories at

\(^47\) Ramsbotham, p. 33.

\(^48\) "Issue Preview," p. 3.
minimum force levels and without the risk of immolation should deterrence fail.49

According to this line of reasoning, the West should either eliminate tactical nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursue a "third zero" in short-range nuclear forces, especially SSM's, within some future arms control forum. This would achieve greater stability and security in Europe, not least through asymmetric cuts in Soviet forces.

In any case, opponents claimed, the follow-on-to-Lance and tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) were actually new missiles, rather than modernization of existing systems; the alliance thereby came dangerously close to violating the INF Treaty with weapons of greater range and new missions. This would have been a serious breach of the new spirit of good-neighbourly relations between the two blocs, with grave implications for other arms control arenas. The INF Treaty also raised public expectations vis à vis arms control. It underscored the central role of Germany in alliance decisions, especially those nuclear, by pointing out that Germany got none of the benefits from the Treaty, but bore many of the negatives—in particular, the concerns over "singularization" of the FRG as a nuclear battleground.50

If deployed, FOTL would have been extremely difficult to verify under any arms control regime, due to the indistinguishability between nuclear and conventional models of the army's launcher. This would have been especially true if FOTL was deployed, as planned, on the Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), which is primarily a conventional

49Ramsbotham, p. 43.

50Kanter, p. 20.
Nor was FOTL necessary, said opponents; even without it, NATO would still have atomic artillery, SLCM's, and dual-capable aircraft in-theater. Those who believed in existential or minimum deterrence saw these remaining systems as sufficient to maintain the peace.\(^{51}\) In addition, according to this logic, one could still count on American strategic forces and the British and French independent nuclear forces to buttress SNF.

Furthermore, pushing for a decision on FOTL deployment could have fractured the alliance politically. An argument often heard in 1989 was that a modernization decision was neither militarily nor politically necessary at that time, and could therefore be deferred indefinitely (at least until the mid-1990's). The greatest danger lay in such a decision's effect on the autumn 1990 West German elections.\(^{52}\) Many analysts, including some who actually supported SNF modernization for military reasons, suggested that the political damage from an early decision on FOTL would have outweighed any conceivable military benefit; therefore, the alliance was right not to deploy FOTL.

Nor was there much public support in Europe for NATO's continued reliance on nuclear forces. Anti-nuclear feelings continued to grow in

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\(^{51}\)This argument lost considerable weight after the 1990 London Declaration which halted AFAPs modernization and cancelled FOTL.

\(^{52}\)"Issue Preview," pp. 4-5. This view was held most strongly by West German politicians in 1988 and 1989. They feared the consequences of a final modernization decision before the 1990 elections. In that case, voter disenchantment with the ruling CDU/CSU/FDP coalition could have led to an SPD victory. As it turned out, of course, German reunification totally overshadowed NATO nuclear plans in this election, and the incumbent coalition was returned to office overwhelmingly.
Germany throughout the period of the debate over SNF modernization. This was due, in large part, to the declining threat perceived in Germany. Poll data has consistently shown, for example, that the West German public no longer fears the Warsaw Pact. A 1988 poll indicated that 75% of the German public saw no military threat from the East;\(^5\) by January 1989 that figure had risen to 88%.\(^5\) More important for SNF’s future, the same poll showed that 55% of West Germans thought NATO should unilaterally renounce the use of nuclear weapons, while fully 79% were in favor of the complete denuclearization of Europe.\(^5\) Furthermore, a May 1989 poll showed that 89% of the German public opposed new American short-range missiles,\(^5\) up from 68% the year before.\(^5\)

By 1989 the US Congress was expressing unwillingness to fund a weapon that appeared to be facing such political troubles. They were concerned about "throwing money away" on a system that was conceivably going to be cancelled at some future date; therefore, they wanted a firm advance commitment on FOTL from the concerned allies that were expected to deploy it.

From a military perspective, opponents argue that short-range


\(^5\)Allensbach Institute poll conducted June 1988 by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, quoted in Binnendijk, p. 149.

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nuclear weapons actually risk escalation of conventional war into nuclear warfighting, fail to enhance stability or deterrence, and divert attention from the conventional (im)balance and conventional force needs.\textsuperscript{58} As Leon Sigal has written,

Whatever purposes BNW [battlefield nuclear weapons] purportedly serve as deterrents come at a disproportionate cost to peacetime reassurance, crisis stability, and wartime control...BNW do not hold at risk much that the Soviets value. Indeed, their threat is largely self-defeating.\textsuperscript{59}

The danger of accidental or unauthorized use of such weapons is enhanced by their large numbers and dispersal throughout the theater, something which advocates of TNF believe is good for survivability of the nuclear force. From the opponents' viewpoint, however,

The problem of wartime control is only compounded by the multiplicity of military organizations and national forces with physical possession of nuclear weapons, the diversity of their interests, the complexity of the chains of command governing their use or non-use, and the incompatibility among various communications networks--both within and among national forces.\textsuperscript{60}

On the other hand, these weapons are also faulted for their lack of credibility. George Will posed the key question in this regard: "Could an alliance that is paralyzed and sundered by the prospect of modernizing those weapons ever agree to use them?"\textsuperscript{61} This concern was particularly

\textsuperscript{58}Williams, in \textit{The Future of Deterrence}.

\textsuperscript{59}Sigal, pp. 15-16.

\textsuperscript{60}Sigal, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{61}George Will, "They're Back: The Germans as a Problem," \textit{Associated Press}, May 1989. This is a position also held by the SPD, who see no military scenario wherein short-range weapons could be used, no scenario wherein political approval for such use would be forthcoming, and where the probable unintended response to their deployment would be a new arms race in the field of anti-tactical ballistic missile technology. From interviews in Bonn, August 1989.

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apt given NATO’s inferiority in this category of weapons and the consequent break in this rung on the ladder of nuclear escalation.

Some opponents of modernization conceded the possibility of military value for SNF weapons, at least in the near term. But if FOTL was really necessary, they said, we could avoid most of the political difficulties and much of the expense by simply sponsoring a second service life extension program to extend Lance’s life expectancy into the next century. If a land-based SSM was not essential to theater deterrence, however, it made more sense to invest NATO’s energies and finances in the TASM program. An air-delivered SNF missile would be cheaper, easier to deploy, less likely to arouse public ire, and would provide better long-range target coverage than an SSM.62

Finally, NATO’s reluctance to use tactical nuclear weapons, even in command post wargames, weakens their deterrent value and increases the incredibility of allied response to a Soviet attack. Since this is so, there is little reason to continue the facade of theater nuclear deterrence through the procurement of an expensive new generation of SSM’s that would wreak political havoc within the alliance.63

From the point of view of an opponent of SNF modernization, then, these weapons were, to put it bluntly, neither effective instruments of military power nor worth the political trouble caused by their deployment.64

With the arguments for and against the modernization now in hand,

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63 Sigal, p. 19; and interviews in Brussels, August 1989.
64 "Issue Preview," p. 6.
the next chapter shall address the changing strategic situation in Europe during the 1970's and early 1980's. The shifting correlation of nuclear forces on the continent was largely responsible for the consensus that developed within NATO as to the necessity of nuclear modernization.
CHAPTER FIVE: "THE EARLY YEARS"--A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE

This chapter focuses on the broader alliance nuclear studies which began in the late 1970's: short-range nuclear force (SNF) modernization and, in particular, the decision to develop a follow-on to the Lance surface to surface missile. It lays the strategic background for this decision by reviewing the changing correlation of nuclear forces in Europe in the late 1970's and early 1980's. It examines FOTL's origins in the High Level Group studies begun in 1977, the Montebello Decision of 1983, and SACEUR's 1985 Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study, as well as early American weapons proposals to meet perceived SNF needs. It concludes that one can best explain the early years of this weapons system's life cycle through a systemic perspective, with the aid of alliance politics to capture the leftover "residuals" that are not encompassed in a purely strategic explanation.

The systemic explanation best answers the first of the three key questions put forth in Chapter One: Why did the West decide in the early 1980's to upgrade its SNF forces, particularly FOTL? In the late 1970's and early 1980's there existed a strategic consensus within the NATO alliance that Soviet theater nuclear force improvements posed a fundamental threat to the West that required a military response. This belief, based on a systematic and realistic look at the potential adversary in a bipolar world through a systemic perspective, led to the decision to modernize NATO's short-range nuclear forces. That modernization program included an upgraded missile to replace the Lance.
THE STRATEGIC SETTING: CONTESTATION AND COLD WAR

In response to the massive build-up of American theater nuclear forces in Europe in the 1960’s, the Soviet Union began a campaign to match the levels of NATO TNF. This effort began to bear fruit in the 1970’s, and led to a situation wherein the Warsaw pact had achieved numerical superiority in theater nuclear forces by the early 1980’s. At the same time, the Warsaw Pact (WTO) did not reduce the size of its ground army; rather, it continued the modernization and improvement of its conventional forces in Eastern Europe at a steady pace. In the face of America’s 1966 decision to stop procurement at an arbitrarily defined level of 7000 warheads, coupled with unilateral NATO TNF withdrawals announced in 1979 and 1983, this Soviet build-up led to a drastic shift in the correlation of nuclear forces arrayed on the European continent over little more than a decade.¹

It was this shift, obvious to NATO planners by the late 1970’s, which was partly responsible for the Long-Term Development Program and the series of High Level Group studies on NATO’s nuclear future that began

¹Phillip Karber and A. Grant Whitley suggest that the Warsaw Pact force improvements came in three successive waves. The first, beginning in the late 1960’s, attempted to counter NATO technological superiority by massive quantitative increases in deployed systems; the second, in the 1970’s, focused on improving the combined arms doctrine by which the WTO would wage a conflict; and the third, which carried on into the mid-80’s, was a new threat to NATO: a solid qualitative effort to close the technological gap, and to do so in quantity. These authors, among others, argue that the Soviets succeeded in their goal. Karber and Whitley, "The Operational Realm," in NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, and Prospects (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), edited by James R. Golden, Daniel J. Kaufman, Asa A. Clark IV, and David H. Petreaus, pp. 138-139. For the best discussion on why these changes in the theater military balance matter, see Gregory Treverton, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe," in Nuclear Weapons and European Security, edited by Robert Nurick (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), pp. 38-71.
immediately after the HLG's creation in 1977.

Soviet surface-to-surface missiles were first introduced in the 1950's. The FROG (its NATO designation) was a short-range rocket acting as a form of advanced divisional artillery. In addition, Soviet forces in Eastern Europe fielded the SCUD and the SS-12 SCALEBOARD as short-range battlefield support missiles. The latter missile was replaced beginning in 1977 by a more accurate version of similar range--the SS-22--and the SCUD was phased out in the early 1980's by the SS-23.2 US Army intelligence first confirmed the presence of Soviet nuclear capable artillery, a field in which NATO had previously had complete dominance, in Europe in 1977.3 In addition, in the early 1980's the USSR began replacing its FROG-7's with mobile SS-21's in its forward-deployed divisions.4 For intermediate ranges, the Warsaw Pact had the SS-4 and SS-5 mobile medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which were undergoing replacement in the late 1970's and early 80's by the SS-20.5


4The SS-21 had a range of 120 km. Soviet Military Power 1984, p. 57.

The number of Soviet LRINF launchers remained stable at about 600 between 1978 and 1987, yet the number of warheads increased from 600 to 1450, due to the triple-warhead, reloadable SS-20 coming into service and replacing some older systems. Total SNF launchers, including the shorter-range SSM's and artillery tubes, increased from 2000 to over 7000 between 1980 and 1987. The USSR was obviously building up its missile forces with modernized, more capable systems that offered greater range and more warheads. This led to a situation where, according to the Joint Chiefs and the Defense Intelligence Agency, "NATO has declined from a 4:1 superiority in land based short range nuclear forces in 1975, and a slight 3:1 superiority in 1980 to a slight numerical inferiority in 1986, and a major qualitative inferiority."^6

At the same time, the WTO's dual-capable aircraft fleet was upgraded with five new types of fighters in the five years between 1978 and 1983, as well as the Backfire bomber.^9 Dr Philip Karber testified before Congress that the Soviet Union modernized and increased the number of its

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^7Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 1988, p. 109. By contrast, NATO SNF resources increased from 2000 to 4000 during the same period.


nuclear delivery capable aircraft by 163% during the 1980's.\textsuperscript{10}

Figure 3: TNF Missile Launcher Comparison in Central Europe\textsuperscript{11}

A North Atlantic Assembly report in 1984 pointed out that while NATO would unilaterally withdraw 2400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe between 1980 and 1988, the Soviet Union would deploy about the same number.


of new ones in Eastern Europe. In addition, the historic quantitative edge which the alliance held over the Pact in nuclear artillery had reversed by the early 1980's, thanks to Soviet modernization efforts. In addition to the quantitative increases in Soviet theater nuclear capabilities witnessed in the decade following 1975, one must also consider the operational and planning aspects of the two alliances. The Warsaw Pact seemed to have an advantage in these areas, too. Soviet forces appeared to be better controlled, trained in a more comprehensive and realistic manner, and organized to take advantage of the combined arms concept for the integration of conventional, chemical, and nuclear warfare. Soviet military writings also suggested adherence to a warfighting doctrine that encompassed and directed all military efforts. All of this stood in stark contrast to what some analysts considered a feeble force management situation in NATO.

This shift in the theater balance of power did not go unremarked. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented already in 1981 that the Soviet build-up had "turned the TNF balance in Europe to the Warsaw Pact's favor." In Congressional testimony in 1984, Senator Sam Nunn questioned top Pentagon nuclear planners whether this changed strategic situation had obviated the NATO doctrine of flexible response. In debate

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12Cartwright and Critchley, p. 42.


over funding for SNF improvements required by the Montebello decision, Nunn asked his witnesses some tough questions:

Haven't we reached the point where they have come pretty close to deterring our first use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack? Our doctrine for years was that we were better off escalating even though both suffer in nuclear war. It seems to me they come close to deterring our first use. You are talking about a nasty game of chicken without any advantage for escalation on our part.  

This question was also being asked in research centers and at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and the answers were not good for the West. The Western alliance's superiority in tactical and theater nuclear weapons in 1967 lent credence to the flexible response doctrine, with its requirement for deliberate escalation to nuclear war if necessary. The alliance had, at that time, "escalation dominance" over the Soviets. By the late 1970's, however, the strategic situation had changed dramatically in favor of the other side. NATO had by now lost its last level of clear superiority over the Warsaw Pact: theater nuclear weapons. The West was inferior to, or at best equal to, the Pact in both conventional and nuclear levels. It now no longer made sense to escalate from one level of

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16Or, as James A. Thomson put it, NATO TNF superiority put the "burden of escalation" on the Soviets' shoulders. Changes in that correlation of forces had, by the early 1980s, shifted the burden back to the West. "The SS-20 is but a part of a Soviet effort that has reshaped Soviet TNF dramatically. The appearance of nuclear artillery, a new family of nuclear ground attack aircraft, and a new family of theatre ballistic missiles--the SS-20/-21/-22 and -23--has brought new qualitative dimensions to the force. ...Because NATO did not respond to these changes, the burden of escalation has shifted away from the Soviet Union and towards NATO." Thomson, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Planning for NATO's Nuclear Deterrent in the 1980's and 1990's," Survival (?), approx. 1983.
military inferiority to the next level of inferiority, at a higher level of destructiveness.

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**Figure 4: Changing Correlation of Forces in Europe**

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Even if one assumed that the Warsaw Pact was not actually planning to use its forces for deliberate offensive war, the mere existence of Soviet superiority at all levels seemed to negate any plausible Western response to intimidation. As David Yost put it,

The most effective form of "perceptions management" to erode confidence in US military protection would be "reality management"—i.e., changing force balances to make the implementation of US nuclear guarantees appear incredible and suicidal. By building up great conventional force superiority, the Soviets force NATO to depend on nuclear escalatory threats; but those threats are in turn checkmated by the West's own vulnerability to nuclear retaliation and by Soviet superiority in counterforce capabilities and active defenses (BMD and air defenses).17

In a similar vein, while questioning the wisdom of continued funding

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for SNF modernization in 1989 Paul Nitze was led to ask,

Why should exploitation of this particular [escalatory] rung be desirable or necessary? The Soviet Union has a great superiority in such weapons today, estimated by some to be at 6 or even 18 to 1...Any exchange between us at the level of short-range missiles would therefore be one-sidedly destructive for us and our allies, primarily the Germans... An implied threat by us to expand a non-nuclear conflict with weapons almost all of which cannot reach Soviet territory and in which the Soviet side has an overwhelming advantage in numbers, range, and opportunities for modernization, is unpersuasive on its face and can have little or no additional deterrent value.18

At the same time, for some people this situation suggested the need for an active force posture response rather than resignation and inaction. This line of reasoning drove many of the arguments supporting the need for NATO TNF rationalization and modernization at both the INF and SNF levels. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy, replied to Senator Nunn's 1984 question that

Work is being done...both internally in the US government and in extensive cooperation with the allies, to try to improve measureably the survivability of our theater nuclear forces and our ability to ensure that we can communicate with them and operate them effectively. Those capabilities underpin such value as those forces have...To the extent particularly that you are concerned about the credibility of the deterrent, it really is much, much worse if we do nothing to ensure that such forces as we do have today--hopefully modernized forces in the future, but even the forces we have today--hold a credible deterrent to the Soviets such that...as they make that initial calculus of go/no go, they continue to feel they are better off not going [to war].19

STRATEGIC CONSENSUS

The strategic situation by the beginning of the 1980's was bleak,

18Paul Nitze, Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 June 1989, pp. 432-3.

from a Western viewpoint. On that there was consensus. All three legs of NATO's triad—strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional—had now been compromised by Soviet force improvements. How to correct this vulnerability was a more difficult problem for the alliance, although until at least the early 1980's there also remained a consensus among the western allies that this was a situation that should be actively corrected. NATO had internal agreement on the nature of the Soviet threat and on a desire to maintain its "enduring dilemmas" of nuclear deterrence as a cohesive body. These underlying strategic concerns drove much of the rationale for theater nuclear modernization in Europe.

But there were other factors at work, as well. As one highly placed source said, the 1983 Montebello decision really comprised two stories: on the one hand, the military and strategic needs that justified future modernization and rationalization of the nuclear stockpile; on the other, the pressure of alliance politics which led to unilateral warhead cuts as a public relations effort. The latter tactic was a means of ensuring continued allied support for both a) the upcoming INF deployments, scheduled to begin in the fall of 1983 amid widespread public opposition, and b) necessary future SNF modernization plans.

In the late 1970's and early 1980's there seemed to be a consensus among the Western allies over the nature of the strategic threat in Europe. It was these strategic/military factors that drove the political decisions which NATO made concerning SNF. As we shall see in the chapters...

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ahead, by the time of FOTL's cancellation in 1990, the strategic background had changed dramatically. The resultant loss of allied consensus on strategic threats and military needs led analysts to recognize the value of "lower level" perspectives, such as alliance or domestic politics, as the primary means of explaining what really happened with respect to FOTL. By 1990 it was no longer military needs determining political decisions, but the reverse: political factors that determined the outcome of long-standing military plans.

THE EARLY FOTL STORY. MID-1970's TO 1986

As seen in Chapter Three, the origins of NATO's decision to modernize SNF go back to the early 1970's. The purpose of short-range nuclear weapons was generally expressed in three categories: battlefield use, to counter the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional arms; theater deterrent use, to counter WTO tactical nuclear weapons; and as part of the "seamless web" of deterrence, coupling the United States to Europe and reflecting NATO's policy of deliberate escalation in the event of war. In this latter viewpoint, tactical weapons comprised an essential lower rung on the escalatory ladder between theater conventional forces and strategic nuclear systems in North America.22

By the late 1970's doubts over the efficacy of such tactical weapons, and, in some cases, even of the underlying rationale behind them, had grown to serious proportions. Additionally, many of the warheads and delivery systems themselves had become outdated or were facing the end of

22 For a short overview of these arguments, see Pat Towell, "Germans' Stance on Missiles Puts Bush in Tight Spot," Defense and Foreign Policy, 6 May 1989, pp. 1050-1054.
their service lives. It was becoming increasingly apparent that NATO was facing the prospect of re-assessing its doctrine and strategy to reflect new strategic conditions: parity with the WTO and loss of escalation dominance.

Concerns over the survivability and safety of these types of weapons had led the American Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, as early as 1974 to propose a modernization program that included introduction of so-called "mini-nukes"—smaller yield, higher accuracy warheads that would enhance the military usefulness of nuclear forces in a warfighting scenario. Political controversy arose in Europe over these concepts during 1973-1974, but quickly dissipated.23 The creation of the High Level Group in 1977 to study the nuclear aspects of the Long-Term Defense Program,24 and the neutron bomb fiasco of 1978, both set the stage for the beginning of serious attention paid to shorter-range systems during the decade of the 1980's.25


24At the June 1977 NPG meeting the Netherlands pushed for a study of the quantity and quality of theater nuclear forces needed in Europe, which became Task Force 10 of the LTDP. The Dutch were especially concerned over short-range nuclear weapons. The HLG was established at the October NPG meeting to tackle this issue. See Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

25It is interesting to note that Task Force 10, the study of NATO's nuclear force modernization needs, was added to the conventional LTDP at the last minute as "sugarcoating on the bitter pill formed by the other nine;" "a cosmetic addition" meant to assuage European concerns over the seeming emphasis by the Carter administration on expensive conventional projects. Within a very short time, of course, the emphasis was completely reversed as the alliance approved, and promptly forgot, the conventional improvements and turned its attention to the nuclear aspects.
In 1983 the NATO members came together in Canada to consider how to meet these various threats to their tactical nuclear systems and, by inference, the NATO strategy of flexible response. This meeting formed a significant touchstone of legitimacy for much of the rhetoric surrounding the NATO modernization program over the ensuing seven years. Montebello had been preceded, however, by several years of alliance studies concerning the threat, the use of nuclear weapons, the need for such weapons and the size of the resulting stockpile.

NATO NUCLEAR STUDIES, 1979-1985

In July 1979 the Dutch government again proposed that NATO study the future role and shape of its nuclear forces. The Netherlands suggested that such a study would conclude that the alliance should shift its emphasis away from shorter-range, battlefield weapons, particularly artillery, in favor of longer-range theater forces. The HLG, as part of its original mandate received in October 1977, had already been tasked with developing a plan for the introduction of INF missiles. Once it had completed its review of INF-driven force structure changes, the Dutch felt, the HLG would be able to turn its attention to this new, broader study of overall alliance nuclear strategy. The mandate for this so-

As early as February 1978, in fact, the alliance agreed that the HLG should focus its attention exclusively on LRINF, rather than on TNF more broadly. Robert Komer and Walter Slocombe, quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Missile Deployments in Europe," Science, 27 January 1984, p. 372; and Daalder.

Theater nuclear forces were the main topic of discussion at the January 1979 Guadeloupe Conference, when the heads of the five major NATO states met and discussed several "gray area" issues, including TNF. Cartwright and Critchley, p. 59.
called "shift study" was accepted by NATO as part of its December 1979 dual-track decision.\textsuperscript{27}

The shift study initially appeared likely to have a short life. One reason for its initial success in getting on the NATO agenda was that it was seen as a way to enhance the prospects of Dutch approval to INF deployment. When, however, the Netherlands in December 1979 deferred a decision on such deployment, Washington accordingly notified the Hague that it no longer supported the shift study. Instead, in January 1980 the HLG began a review of all defensive nuclear forces in Europe: Nike-Hercules air defense missiles and atomic demolition munitions (ADMs). The conclusions of this study, presented to the NPG that November, were consistent with the shift study's desired outcome in their call for the phased elimination of both weapon systems.\textsuperscript{28}

The Reagan administration had little use for such a study, either. Shortly after coming to power in January 1981, the administration's new Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and chairman of the HLG, Richard Perle, called for a "work program" to examine the nature of the Soviet threat and NATO's nuclear requirements. This was approved by the North Atlantic Council in its May 1981 Rome meeting. This move effectively blocked any re-assessment of NATO's disproportionate reliance on SNF, at least temporarily.\textsuperscript{29} The work program's reports,

\textsuperscript{27}Daalder, "The Debate about Nuclear Forces, 1980-1989," draft chapter in The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, p. 402-3 (page numbers for Daalder hereafter will refer to this draft version of his manuscript).

\textsuperscript{28}Daalder, p. 404.

\textsuperscript{29}Daalder, p. 405; and Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp. 48-50.
presented by the HLG in October 1981, served to re-validate the INF dual-track decision and the need for INF modernization. However, they also pointed out that there were problems with those nuclear weapons of shorter range that required more study. Accordingly, in its communique the NPG called for what was, essentially, a return to the shift study: there was need for "continuing the High Level Group work examining the precise nature, scope, and basis of adjustments which would be required by long-range theater nuclear force deployments as well as possible implications of these deployments for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole."30

The 1979 INF dual-track decision included a unilateral nuclear stockpile reduction of 1000 warheads. Most of the warheads removed were for the older Honest John rockets.31 Their removal was completed in 1980.32 In addition, the United States promised to retire all nuclear Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles once replaced by conventional Patriots, and to remove ADMs without replacement once they reached the end


31Cartwright and Critchley, p. 50. These missiles were only fielded by Greece and Turkey by this point, according to J. Michael Legge, "Appendix C: Growth of the NATO Theater Nuclear Stockpile," Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, April 1983), p. 85.

of their stockpile life. The alliance also stated that INF deployments would result in a one-for-one replacement of nuclear warheads; the effective reduction resulting from the 1979 decision was thus 1572 warheads.

In 1979 NATO got a new Supreme Allied Commander: US Army General Bernard Rogers. One of his first acts was to call for an overall review of SHAPE's nuclear strategy and requirements. This study, which would be conducted by military officers at SHAPE headquarters in Belgium, began in 1980 and was given a target completion date of spring 1985. That way, Rogers explained, there would be no pressure to prepare a rushed or flawed product.

The Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS), as this review was known, is accomplished at irregular intervals by all American commanders of unified and specified commands as part of their input into the annual Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). An annex to the JPAM establishes the military requirements for nuclear weapons, and as such forms the basis for the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum signed by the President. In the past, a NWRS was generally regarded as

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34One source lists the withdrawn weapons as follows: 1000 Honest John warheads based in Greece and Turkey, 100 US Pershing 1A warheads, 200 Nike-Hercules warheads, possibly 100 warheads for the obsolete Sergeant, the remainder old artillery shells. Tertrais, para. 4.1.


SACEUR's "wish list" of weapons that he wanted in order to defend his region of the world, and was unconstrained by political factors. It was often constructed simply by counting the number of dual-capable delivery platforms in the theater and multiplying that number by some arbitrary number of warheads. This led to artificially large numbers of warheads required.

This particular study (NWRS-85), however, was the first to explicitly consider political factors and constraints in determining not what was desired, but what was needed within the politically set guidelines for the defense of NATO and the nuclear stockpile size. Rogers developed new guidelines in 1983 that called for a more realistic assessment of the threat facing each corps commander in Central Europe, and then determining the number of warheads needed for adequate deterrence and defense based on that threat. This new criteria implied that the total numbers of warheads could be reduced if emphasis was given to longer-range weapons that could reach targets in neighboring corps sectors. As General Rogers later said, there was no reason for the large TNF stockpile that he inherited in Europe "except a love of big numbers."

One way in which Rogers took political considerations into account was what he called "the test for gas theory." He sent SHAPE teams to

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every applicable country, in most cases more than once, to try out his ideas on the allies and see if they made sense or not.\textsuperscript{40} In this manner he was able to get immediate feedback to ideas at the working staff levels. The final study was more likely to be accepted because SHAPE built a consensus into the report as it was being done. The importance of this cannot be underestimated in alliance politics; a former HLG participant says that most NATO "studies" are actually an attempt at building line-by-line consensus on a policy paper among the allies in a series of meetings.\textsuperscript{41}

At the same time SACEUR was conducting his NWRS study, the High Level Group was continuing its review of the NATO theater nuclear stockpile. From 1981 until 1983 the HLG examined NATO nuclear policy in light of the impending INF deployments, scheduled to begin, barring an arms control agreement with the Soviets, in the fall of 1983. One consideration throughout the course of the study was that reducing the size of the NATO nuclear stockpile would have clear political benefits at a time when public opposition to new INF deployments was mounting.\textsuperscript{42} In essence, Perle and his cohorts on the HLG were looking for a "pot sweetener" to show the European publics that NATO was trying to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons, thereby ameliorating public concern over the INF deployments.

America's primary concern in its approach to the shift study was

\textsuperscript{40}Interview with General Rogers, February 1991.

\textsuperscript{41}Interview in Washington, May 1990.

that NATO's TNF posture be more conducive to a warfighting strategy. This meant that SNF forces, which would play a major role in a battlefield scenario, had to be modernized rather than eliminated or bargained away in arms control negotiations. For different reasons, other European states also opposed the Dutch presupposition implied in the term "shift," at least initially; by 1983, however, most of those reasons had evaporated. Public opposition to INF and nuclear weapons in general was increasingly difficult to ignore for the governments in power. Accordingly, the Europeans eventually came to block the American desire to emphasize increased numbers of modernized SNF assets, calling instead for smaller numbers of modernized weapons, further unilateral stockpile reductions, and confining TNF to selective nuclear options of a political, rather than military, nature. This meant that fewer numbers would suffice.\(^4\)

While most of the allies agreed that cuts could be made in the SNF force levels, there was some debate over how many and which weapons to eliminate. The Netherlands, supported by some other European states, advocated cutting up to half of the total nuclear arsenal--a move that could be done without risk, they said, if the alliance shifted to greater emphasis on longer-range weapons.\(^5\) The United States opposed such large cuts. Their emphasis on warfighting led US officials to prefer increased numbers of improved battlefield nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.\(^6\) As late as July 1983, according to one report, there was

\(^4\text{Daalder, p. 412.}\)

\(^5\text{Priscilla Paintain, "NATO Reaches Agreement on Cutbacks in Nuclear Warheads," Washington Post, 7 October 1983, p. 20.}\)

\(^6\text{Daalder, pp. 408-409.}\)
still considerable disagreement in the HLG between Perle, on one side, and the Germans, Dutch, and Belgians on the other, over the size of the proposed Montebello cuts. In the end, of course, a compromise level was reached that all sides could live with. But this was a political compromise; the military side of NATO was carrying out its own study at SHAPE and was brought in to the decision-making loop only after the bottom line figures were determined within the HLG.

Some differences also existed between the political and military sides of NATO during the time of these studies. General Rogers, for example, testified before the Senate in early 1983 that it would be wrong if the alliance was "just politically pulling from the air a number without consulting those of us in uniform who bear the responsibility for defense." He continued, "I say that, having seen some indications that there are those within the HLG who would like to just say, all right, let us automatically remove X number, without referring to the SACEUR." SHAPE officials told a special committee of the North Atlantic Assembly that TNF reductions presented a "high risk" to NATO in light of the massive and unmatched Soviet build-up in regional nuclear capabilities. After all, according to this logic, after the Montebello reductions the alliance would have reduced its SNF warheads by 2400, while the WTO had

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45Kurt Kister, "Throwing Doubt on the Outdated Concept," München Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25 October 1983, p. 10, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Western Europe. According to this article, the final Montebello cuts and residual stockpile levels were closer to the original American than to the European proposals.

increased its stockpile size by roughly the same number. General Rogers complained frequently during his tenure as SACEUR that the military leadership was never consulted during the political process of determining INF, SRINF, and SNF force levels and unilateral cuts.

One reason for the delay in getting SACEUR's NWRS to the NPG may have been due to disagreements between General Rogers and the HLG chairman, Richard Perle. According to high-ranking assistants to both men during this period, the two frequently disagreed. Some of this was due to bureaucratic gamesmanship; for example, the nuclear policy people in OSD had wanted to get rid of nuclear Nike-Hercules for some time, and found in Richard Perle a boss who would make that decision. In 1981 Perle persuaded Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to announce the American decision to unilaterally withdraw them, without first consulting with SACEUR. This move infuriated Rogers. On another occasion General Rogers barged in on a private session between Perle and Weinberger during the March 1983 Portugal NPG meeting and accused the Assistant Secretary of going behind his back on the SNF modernization/reduction issue. According to one source, the two men did not even speak to each other thereafter for several months; it was up to Perle's deputy to act as a go-between when it was necessary to exchange information or get answers to questions.

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48Cartwright and Critchley, Cruise, Pershing, and SS-20, p. 47.

49See, for example, his interview in Army, September 1987, "Vital Deterrence in Peril; Gen. Rogers: Time to Say 'Time Out,'" pp. 20-38.

50Interview in Brussels, July 1990.

51Interviews in Washington, January 1991, and Brussels, July 1990. General Rogers did not bring this episode up when asked if personalities or individuals affected the speed or efficiency of the NWRS process, but others I interviewed made this point emphatically.
After the Portugal incident, in fact, Rogers temporarily cut off all military support from SHAPE for the ongoing HLG studies. The first time the two men spoke again was in a classified phone call in August 1983 where Perle called Rogers to see if the 4600 level was acceptable for the final Montebello decision.\textsuperscript{52}

In the meantime, the United States showed its commitment to both long and short-range nuclear theater systems by continuing its ongoing research and development programs into several new weapons systems and modernized versions of already deployed forces. As early as the mid-1970's DOD had proposed a modernization plan for some 3000 new artillery shells, including fission and enhanced radiation (ERW) varieties, for the 155- and 203-mm (8-inch) guns.\textsuperscript{53} This desire for new warheads was reflected in several consecutive annual budget requests from DOD, each of which stressed a different delivery system for the ERW warheads than had the previous year's request, and each of which was denied by Congress. In a move which prompted the neutron bomb controversy, the Carter administration received Congress' permission in 1977 to order production of 340 enhanced radiation warheads for the Lance missile (the W-70 Mod 4 warhead) and a new ERW version of the 8-inch artillery shell (W-79). Both of these were convertible warheads: standard fission warheads that could be converted into enhanced-radiation/reduced blast shells through the

\textsuperscript{52}Interview in Brussels, July 1990.

\textsuperscript{53}Cartwright and Critchley, p. 49. This request was denied by the US Congress in 1973, for reasons of cost, concern over the usability of atomic artillery, and opposition to increasing the theater nuclear stockpile expressed by Senator Stuart Symington, new chairman of the Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. Leitenberg, pp. 54-55.
insertion of a tritium plug in the nose.\textsuperscript{54} After all the ERW controversy, Carter ordered the components to be built but not assembled, and stored in the US.\textsuperscript{55}

Just before leaving office, Carter cancelled a program scheduled to produce 1000 new 155 millimeter ERW shells (the W-82 warhead), even though several NATO allies were buying the new American self-propelled 155mm howitzer that could only fire the new convertible shells.\textsuperscript{56}

The Reagan administration continued the ERW programs begun by Carter, as well as ordering the production of fully assembled 8" and Lance ERW warheads in 1981 for storage in America and quick deployment to Europe in time of crisis. It also continued modernization of the B-61 Mod 3 & 4 gravity bomb.\textsuperscript{57} The administration requested funds for the cancelled 155-mm warheads in January 1982, and resurrected another Carter cancellation, the Pershing IB MRBM, for possible use as a fall-back weapon in case the Pershing II was not deployed, and perhaps as a replacement for

\textsuperscript{54}Daaldorfer, p. 409, and Wayne Biddle, "New Army Shells Could Double as Neutron Bombs," \textit{New York Times}, 14 December 1984, p. 24. According to this report, the new artillery rounds could accept either a tritium plug, making them ERW warheads with the standard range of 15 km, or a rocket assist motor that would increase its range to 30 km.

\textsuperscript{55}Tertrais, para. 9.2.2. The production run for the 8-inch shell lasted from 1978 to 1986.

\textsuperscript{56}This argument was still being used to justify funding for the W-82 in 1984. See Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Part 7, "Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces," \textit{Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985} (Washington: GPO, 1984), p. 3634. Tertrais points out that production engineering for this warhead was deferred in 1980, and Congress deleted funding for the program in 1982 and 1983. General Rogers began lobbying Congress to restore 155 funding in 1982, and limited production approval was granted in June 1984 for a level not to exceed 925 total modern AFAPS. Tertrais, para. 9.2.2.

the FRG's Pershing IA missiles. The US Congress disapproved production funding for the new 155-mm shells in 1983, but in 1984 authorized the production of a maximum of 925 non-ERW shells for the 155-mm and 8" howitzers, at a cost not to exceed $1.1 billion. At that point, 325 ERW rounds for the 8" gun had already been built.

In addition, the US pursued a missile system known at various times in its research cycle as the corps support weapons system (CSWS), "assault breaker," the joint tactical missile system (JTACMS), and the army tactical missile system (ATACMS), as well as the launch platform for this missile, the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). As Chapter 4 explained, in 1985 Congress barred the Pentagon from pursuing a nuclear version of the ATACMS, which was, at the time, the leading candidate for the FOTL. The Senate believed that conventional weapons would be "more militarily effective and politically acceptable than the shorter-range artillery shell," declaring that "the utility of short-range nuclear battlefield weapons as a deterrent to war in the NATO area is diminishing.

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58 Daalder, p. 410.


60 James, p. 21; "Defense Authorization: 'Deep Strike' Weapons," Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1984 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1985), p. 45; and interviews in the Pentagon, May 1990. JTACMS was planned as a deep strike missile that would deliver a conventional 1000 pound warhead up to 200 miles behind the front lines, attacking mobile ground targets that would be identified by the Joint Services Tactical Airborne Radar System (JSTARS). The package had been under consideration since the early 1980's. JSTARS and ATACMS were first operationally used in the Gulf War of January-February 1991. (Sean Naylor, "Ground Assault Termed Textbook Perfect," Air Force Times, 11 March 1991, p. 6.) For more references on these programs, see Chapter 4.
and that conventional defensive systems should receive additional emphasis." This act slowed the FOTL development process considerably, as it forced the Army and potential contractors to come up with a new plan for the missile that was less cost-effective than simply adapting the ATACMS.

Throughout this time period the US Congress continued its pattern of increased vigilance over defense projects and took to heart its legislative oversight responsibilities, particularly in the area of nuclear weapons and arms control issues. This was accomplished through regular committee hearings, special hearings and resolutions, and by requesting detailed reports and actions from the Pentagon.

THE MONTEBELLO DECISION, OCTOBER 1983

Recognizing that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective, Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements.

In October 1983 NATO's Defense Ministers met near Quebec, Canada, for the semi-annual meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group. At this


62Relevant committees include: Senate Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign Relations; and House Armed Services, Appropriations and Foreign Affairs.


meeting, NATO decided to eliminate large numbers of outmoded nuclear warheads in Europe, including some entire categories of weapons—for example, atomic demolition munitions. This unilateral stockpile reduction of 1400 warheads was widely reported at the time. What was less well known, however, was the other side of the Montebello coin: the planned modernization of those remaining assets deemed vital to maintaining a cogent deterrent ability. It was, as Secretary of Defense Cheney later explained, "a process of realigning the armory available to the Western alliance, taking out some obsolete systems and replacing them with some more up-to-date systems."\(^{65}\) Essentially the NPG approved the HLG’s plan to reduce the nuclear stockpile size while modernizing the remaining weapons, and it identified a range of possible options for implementing the new policy in the future.

At Montebello the NATO leaders also reaffirmed their decision to go ahead with delivery of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) under the auspices of the 1979 dual-track INF decision. SACEUR was tasked to plan necessary additional modernization measures affecting NATO’s nuclear forces and to report back to the Alliance leadership.

In terms of cuts, the Allies pledged to withdraw 1400 nuclear warheads from Europe in addition to the 1000 already withdrawn as part of the 1979 INF package, leaving a remaining arsenal of 4600 warheads.\(^{66}\) This number, which remained classified for many years despite leakage to the press, was the focus of considerable internal debate over what the


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lower numerical limit of the NATO stockpile should be, and followed the High Level Group review on rationalization of threats, stockpiles and targets. In order to get SACEUR acquiescence to this reduction, a number of concessions were granted to the military. For example, the communique announcing the decision stressed that "detailed implementation of this decision as to the precise composition of the stockpile is a matter for the responsible military authorities to determine and a program to effect this will be worked out and implemented over the next five to six years." Furthermore, although SACEUR had basically developed his position with respect to the size and composition of the nuclear stockpile by the time of the NPG meeting, he was granted the authority to take another year and a half to finalize his plans and report back to the NPG. He was thus allowed to keep the 1985 deadline originally set when he began the NWRS process in 1980. Most important, the reductions would only take place within the framework of SNF modernization efforts which SACEUR deemed necessary for the defense of Central Europe.

General Rogers was unhappy with the Montebello process, the way the HLG ignored military advice, and the final number they arrived at. In his

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67 Hutchinson, p. 9; and interviews at the State Department, January 1991. An early example of the 4600 warhead floor being leaked was in Charles Corddry, "NATO Planning to Eliminate Nuclear Anti-Aircraft Missiles," Baltimore Sun, 10 November 1983, p. 14.


69General Rogers had the initial draft of the NWRS ready by July 1983, but it took almost two more years to coordinate the document among all the NATO allies and the subordinate commands before it achieved consensus approval. SACEUR was in no hurry: "he wants it right once and for all." According to testimony of Brigadier General Randall Peat in Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces," op. cit., 1 May 1984, p. 3669.
view, the proposed cuts were illogical and lacked any strategic rationale. He recommended that the ministers wait to announce a number until his SHAPE study was completed in 1985, but they were unwilling to wait. HLG Chairman Richard Perle felt that the political consensus which had been achieved in that body over the need to reduce TNF to the 4600 level far outweighed any minor military impact. This consensus reflected the belief that NATO had far more tactical nuclear forces than it needed; there was "lots of rubbish" in the stockpile which could be cleared away. Such a move would also help some allied governments' domestic political positions.

Despite his reservations, SACEUR was given a specific number by the NPG representing his allowable warhead ceiling. This figure was politically derived. He was told to find the best "fit" for his remaining nuclear forces within that stockpile ceiling. As Richard Perle said, the general could suggest changes to the arsenal in his detailed recommendations to NATO, but he was nonetheless "under an injunction to find 1400 weapons" that he could do without. Rogers accepted that number under three conditions: full deployment of INF; continued modernization of SNF assets (artillery); and the development of FOTL and TASM.

Although SACEUR was unhappy with the results and the process of the decision, the reductions called for at Montebello were completed ahead of
schedule. General Rogers unveiled his reduction plan at the Luxembourg NPG meeting in May 1985, and was given until December 1988 to accomplish the withdrawal.\textsuperscript{74} By 1986 the withdrawal of all 1400 warheads was complete. These included atomic demolition mines, Honest John and Pershing IA warheads, and Nike-Hercules warheads, plus some reduction in older artillery shells.\textsuperscript{75} In addition, NATO had to retire another 572 warheads to match the new INF deployments.\textsuperscript{76} NATO's future nuclear stockpile, in other words, had diminished by some 3000 older tactical warheads via two decisions made less than three years apart.

General Rogers also put in a tempting offer for the politicians to consider. He suggested that the overall stockpile size could be reduced even further if he got his complete "wish list" of SNF modernization. One source stated that the NWRS-85 listed up to 2710 warheads that could be

\textsuperscript{74}Rogers interview in \textit{Army}, September 1987, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Stanley Sloan, "NATO Nuclear Strategy, Forces and Arms Control," CRS Issue Brief} (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 9 November 1990), p. 3. Note that many of these warheads were those which the US had promised to remove anyway in 1979 as a unilateral codicil to the INF dual-track decision. Also see Jesse James, "Tactical Nuclear Modernization--the NATO Decision that Won't Go Away," \textit{Arms Control Today}, December 1988, pp. 18-19. According to Daalder, the specific reductions actually added up to more than 1400 warheads: 372 ADMs, 686 Nike-Hercules, 198 Honest Johns, and 156 W-33 8-inch artillery rounds. (Daalder, p. 419.) These numbers are close to those suggested in \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 1986}, pp. 43-45. One report suggested that many of these warheads were so unsafe that even before the NWRS was presented to NATO "they already have been dismantled and are in crates and depots waiting to be returned to the US." Melissa Healy, "NATO Tallies its Obsolete Nukes," \textit{Defense Week}, 14 Jan 1985, p.13.

\textsuperscript{76}These were made up of 335 gravity bombs, 193 Pershing IA warheads, and 44 W-33 AFAPS. (Daalder, footnote 58, p. 480.) The gravity bombs were largely old B-28 and B-43 models being replaced by more modern B-61’s on a "less than one-for-one basis." \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 1987}, p. 12.
removed over a seven year period. According to Rogers, he showed the ministers how they could reduce the stockpile to 3800 warheads with full implementation of the Montebello plan, and even lower with further modernization steps.

SACEUR's SNF modernization plan contained four major components. First, SACEUR wanted new, longer range AFAPS for 155-mm and 8" howitzers, which would replace older rounds on a less than one-for-one basis. Second, he called for a longer range modernization or replacement for the Lance surface-to-surface missile. Third, dual-capable aircraft (DCA) required new nuclear gravity bombs, as well as other improvements to improve their safety and security and that of their weapons, and fourth, NATO wanted to develop and deploy a new tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) for its DCA.

In addition to these new systems, the ministers at Montebello also identified a number of operational improvements that they hoped to see in all new SNF systems. These included enhanced security, increased range, and greater survivability. New AFAPs introduced in the early 1980's already had many of these characteristics, such as improved electronic permissive action links (PALs) and on-board disabling mechanisms to preclude unauthorized access or use. FOTL and TASM were expected to have

77 Healy, p. 13. The offer, although not the number, was confirmed in an interview with General Rogers, February 1991.

78 Interview with Rogers, February 1991.

these features, as well. Finally, new procedures to ensure the reliability of the personnel assigned to nuclear missions were instituted, as were improvements to the warhead storage facilities.\textsuperscript{80}

While not exactly the "shift" that some elements of NATO's membership had hoped for in 1979, the Montebello Decision nevertheless represented a milestone in alliance nuclear policy and a \textit{de facto} shift from shorter- to longer-range TNF. Montebello was yet another in a long line of political compromises between those who favored a pure deterrent role for nuclear weapons, and those who saw them as useful in a military warfighting role. It also represented a compromise between political and strategic considerations--strategic in the sense that the remaining SNF weapons required modernization and increased range; political because reducing the size of the overall stockpile would garner considerable positive press and help ensure the continued deployment of both INF and, eventually, modernized SNF forces.\textsuperscript{81}

OPERATIONALIZING THE MONTEBELLO DECISION: 1983-86

SACEUR was tasked with developing a plan for implementing both sides of the Montebello Decision--reductions and modernization. His resulting ten-year plan, outlined above, was unveiled at the March 1985 NATO Defense Ministers' meeting in Luxembourg.\textsuperscript{82} The NPG agreed to "consider SACEUR's recommendations in detail and to continue close consultations on the

\textsuperscript{80}McCausland, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{81}Daalder, pp. 416-7; also interviews in Washington, January 1991.

\textsuperscript{82}Charles, p. 8.
implementation of his improvement proposals." But it did not immediately approve SACEUR's grand plan.

For the most part, the three years following the Montebello decision were a quiet time for the alliance. The United States continued to conduct feasibility studies on new SNF systems, in accordance with NATO support for "national" programs, but only at a minimal level. The Defense Department awaited SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study, then began to consider alternative options to meet those needs. To do so, DOD tried to keep all options open with continued low-level funding from Congress, which only grudgingly went along, in most cases. In addition, DOD was hesitant to do anything new with tactical nuclear weapons until after INF deployments were complete. The consensus on the proper INF/SNF mix within the alliance was very fragile.

But public concern with nuclear weapons and associated policy seemed to evaporate once the Soviets walked out of the INF talks and the first GLCMs and Pershing II's were deployed on European soil. Arms control did not play a major part in these considerations, largely because the Soviet Union did not return to the INF negotiating table until late 1985, and the resumption of those talks temporarily deflected interest from the possibility of SNF limitations. In addition, chief American negotiator Paul Nitze queried his German counterparts in 1985 as to their interest in pursuing a "third zero" for SNF missiles once the INF talks resumed. The

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German answer: no; it would just overburden the INF negotiations. The High Level Group continued studying NATO nuclear policy and force levels in accordance with an extended mandate granted it by the NPG in April 1984. And the Lance missile was given a new lease on life courtesy of a service life extension program (SLEP) in 1986, which was meant to extend Lance’s service life until at least 1995. This allowed the alliance some time to begin looking for an acceptable follow-on to the Lance, a process which had not yet begun.

The Defense Department was able to use the Montebello decision and subsequent NWRS as ammunition in its perennial fight with Congress over funding for new weapons programs. Specifically, in 1984 DOD was able to get approval for a circumscribed production of new 155-mm artillery shells, as mentioned above. Primary emphasis during this period was on AFAPS modernization, with little interest or concern over the other legs of the SNF modernization program. This was reflected in the public record. At the same time, however, development of the JTACMS, originally a conventional long-range interdiction missile, continued. Although there had been some earlier interest within the Army development staff for a nuclear version of ATACMS (the Army’s version of the joint missile), by

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87 See Chapter 4.
1984 such interest had disappeared to the extent that Congress was able to pass the Kennedy-Nunn amendment prohibiting the Army from researching a nuclear version of the ATACMS. It was not until late 1986 that DOD began to reconsider the need for a longer-range air and ground launched missile, thus initiating the feasibility studies for the FOTL and TASM.

The US Army was noticeably quiet about a follow-on-to-Lance program during the first several years after the SACEUR requirement was announced in 1985. The Army apparently felt that it would lose control of a weapon that was specifically designed with a range (250 km) and accuracy that would allow it to be targeted across corps boundaries. Such a weapon, it was felt, would no longer be a corps commander's weapon, but would be controlled by the theater commander--in this case, SACEUR--working in a multi-national role. This went against the grain of the Army's traditional desire to maintain complete control of all forces at the corps level. So the Army (especially the field artillery branch) opposed FOTL--perhaps the first time they had opposed an artillery system because it was too accurate and had too great a range. In particular, the head of the Department of the Army's nuclear weapons acquisition branch, an artillery general, was dead-set against a FOTL. His expertise in deep battle (FOFA) concepts gave him a considerable air of legitimacy in inter-agency discussions of this type. As a result he managed to block any serious

88Daalder, p. 421; and Susan Crawford, General Counsel, US Army, Memorandum for Director, Nuclear and Chemical Directorate, Subject: Phase II Nuclear Study for Lance Follow-On," 30 May 1986. There was little negative reaction from the Army to this restriction at first. Later, however, when the Army was pressured into seriously looking for FOTL options, it found itself stymied by the Kennedy-Nunn Amendment. This was interpreted by DOD lawyers as precluding even feasibility studies into a nuclear ATACMS.
feasibility studies or consideration of such a new missile for several years. SACEUR, meanwhile, was concerned with European sensitivities on the issue of range, and he was trying to get his own national military element to meet his needs as Commander in Chief (CINC) of the European theater. SHAPE requirements in the nuclear realm, after all, are met by US European Command, of which SACEUR is CINC. The individual military services are then supposed to develop programs to meet the CINC’s requirements. In the case of FOTL, it finally took direct and forceful pressure from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to get the Army moving. Their FOTL Mission Need Statement finally came out in November 1987.89

Opposition to FOTL from the US Army, the ultimate end user, had two major negative impacts on the program. First, by refusing to begin feasibility studies immediately after the CINC requirement was presented, the Army delayed the program by at least two years. This delay had a cascading effect. It foreclosed later options on certain systems that might have been better choices, but were not available in the time remaining before the end of Lance’s service life; it meant that ATACMS had been ruled off-limits as a choice by the Kennedy-Nunn Amendment before Phase I studies even began, whereas Army opposition to this law might have changed Congress’ mind; and it meant that the critical early decision points in FOTL’s development cycle arose at the same time as the strategic consensus in Europe was breaking down.

89Based on interviews in Washington, December 1990 and January and February 1991. General Rogers admits that during the time he was SACEUR, he believed the most likely candidate for FOTL was a nuclear ATACMS fired from MLRS.
Second, it meant that the Army in the late 1980's had a major acquisition project underway which was based on felicitous presumptions for its use. The Army neither wanted the system nor had thought through the political rationale behind it. As a former senior official in Army nuclear planning said, the US Army never incorporated the flexible response doctrine into its thinking. The Army's attitude never changed with the nuclear era; it still maintained a "corps mentality" that saw tactical nuclear warheads as just bigger bullets. As an example of this, the Army's choice of launcher--the MLRS--was based on purely military criteria: the large number of these dual-capable launchers enhanced FOTL's survivability, according to this view. They never considered that these weapons were primarily political, or that putting FOTL on a conventional platform doomed it politically in European eyes.

The head of the joint DOD-DOE atomic weapons committee, reflecting on NATO's nuclear assets compared to the Soviet TNF build-up, told a Senate committee hearing as early as 1984 that "we are...years behind in this modernization program and we have got to face up to it. I believe the opportunity to face up to it is provided now by the Montebello decision in which the allies have endorsed the modernization in just these categories...that are technologically more survivable and more capable." He went on to describe the TNF projects underway within DOD

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92 Dr Richard Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, "Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces," 1 May 1984, p. 3640.

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in 1984: the 8-inch shell, Pershing II, GLCM, and the B-61 bomb; they were also hoping to go back to work on the 155-mm shell after having the program cut off the previous year.93

Other projects taking place within NATO suggested by NWRS-85, in addition to the major modernization plans, included: correcting the maldeployment of nuclear systems in Europe (for instance, too many warheads in Northern and Central Europe to the detriment of defensive plans for the South94); improving the command and control of NATO TNF; increasing the survivability of TNF, including construction of bomb storage vaults directly beneath hardened aircraft shelters and the certification of all central front artillery tubes as nuclear capable; better safety and security measures for warheads; and increased all-weather capabilities and penetrability of dual-capable aircraft.95

The Nuclear Planning Group approved the General Political Guidelines for follow-on nuclear use in October 1986. These attempted to dovetail the planned future nuclear force structure with the NATO strategy of flexible response. These guidelines shifted the modernization emphasis from battlefield nuclear weapons toward deep strike weapons, and categorically stated (largely at West Germany's insistence), that replacing lost long-range forces with battlefield weapons was unacceptable.96 In addition, the alliance accepted an arms control

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93Wagner, SASC Hearings, p. 3668.
94Interview with General Rogers, January 1991.
95Daalder, p. 415.
framework outlined at the June 1987 Reykjavik North Atlantic Council meeting: no discussion of short-range nuclear forces until after the successful conclusion of INF, chemical, and conventional talks.97

A different meeting had taken place in Iceland nine months earlier, however, which dramatically shifted European thinking about the permanence of America’s nuclear presence on the continent. The October 1986 Reykjavik superpower summit led to the second phase of the SNF modernization debate—-a phase dominated less by strategic concerns than by intra-alliance politics.

CONCLUSION

The decision to modernize NATO’s short-range nuclear forces agreed to at Montebello in 1983 and re-affirmed annually since began as a relatively straight-forward strategic plan. There existed a consensus in the early 1980’s among the Western allies on several points: that there was a growing threat from an adversary which was modernizing its TNF capabilities at a prodigious rate; that NATO required a continued nuclear capability to meet that threat; that the Western TNF forces were falling dangerously behind relative to the Warsaw Pact; and that, given these strategic presumptions, there existed a need for rationalization and modernization of the NATO nuclear stockpile. Not that this process could not also result in some politically fortuitous reductions in the overall

97 “Bush, Kohl Stick to Guns,” Associated Press, 4 May 1989. This position, one element of the proposed comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, was first publicly stated in the communique following the June 1987 meeting. “Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik (11-12 June 1987),” NATO Communiques 1987 (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1987).
level of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, but the driving consideration was one of strategic necessity.

We now turn to the second part of our story on SNF modernization in the 1980's. The "mid-life crisis" of the follow-on-to-Lance occurred in the next couple of years, from 1986 to 1989. It was during this period that FOTL was the center of alliance concerns, and it is primarily with the perspective of alliance politics that we shall attempt to examine what happened during that time.
Deep down, although [FOTL deployment] is not a question of peace or war, it is about the great symbolic political importance of a technical military decision in a period of change in the East-West conflict.¹

Allied consensus on the nature of the Soviet threat and the necessary Western response was largely responsible for the decision to modernize and rationalize the theater nuclear stockpile. As the last chapter showed, this decision subsequently drove much of the alliance's political-military agenda in the mid-1980's. Even as the decisions were being made, however, the consensus was breaking down. The event which symbolized this change was the 1986 Reykjavik Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, a meeting of potentially great consequence for NATO policy but from which European views were excluded. After Reykjavik, and the INF Treaty which followed a year later, the allies were no longer in complete accord over the requirements of modernization as laid out in the Montebello Decision and follow-up Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS-85). In some states, in fact, there were increasing questions over the very nature of alliance membership and its concomitant reliance on nuclear weapons. The state in which these questions were being asked most fervently, and at the highest levels, was the Federal Republic of Germany—the very state in which most of the SNF deployments were scheduled to take place.

Several key events occurred between late 1986 and early 1989 which

created an atmosphere of crisis for the alliance as it approached its 40th anniversary. The crisis centered on a debate over the necessity of replacing the Lance missile, as stipulated by the earlier NATO agreements. On one side of this issue were the United States and Great Britain, which wanted to modernize SNF to show allied resolve and to compensate for theater capabilities lost as a result of the INF Treaty. On the other side stood the Germans and the Belgians, who saw a declining Soviet threat, a new spirit of European detente, and evidence of American de-coupling from Europe as reasons for NOT modernizing short-range systems that threatened only those people they theoretically protected.

To understand the events and political maneuverings of the middle years of the FOTL story, one is better served by setting aside the simpler but less descriptive perspective of systemic analysis and picking up the more finely woven and more contextual filter of alliance politics. This chapter will do that in attempting to answer the second of the key questions from Chapter One: Why did NATO continue to call for FOTL's development in the face of increasing opposition as the decade wore on? A perspective emphasizing alliance politics best answers that question. Certain aspects of the story, as we shall see, still fall through the mesh of an alliance politics approach; these can be explained by adopting a domestic perspective that looks at bureaucratic politics in Bonn and Washington.

Chapter Two described the alliance politics perspective as a combination of the systemic and domestic levels of analysis applied on an inter-governmental basis. It is an interactive perspective that attempts to close the gap between the two theoretical approaches commonly used.
One way to approach the issue of alliance dynamics is to study the institutions that exist within an alliance and that channel the policy process. The critical questions for the analyst of NATO theater nuclear force modernization in the 1980's pertained to how the major players in the political game handled themselves, and each other. For West European nuclear policy, an approach emphasizing institutions requires us to examine the numerous organizations and groups that help create consensual nuclear policy in the international fora of NATO, as well as the internal institutions that come into play within each of the major member states. For the purposes of the SNF modernization case, we shall focus on the primary ally of interest: the Federal Republic of Germany.

Chapter Six will first review how nuclear decisions are made in the North Atlantic Alliance. Following this, it will analyze more intensively the role of the Federal Republic of Germany, the central figure in the story of FOTL's mid-life crisis. We will see how defense decisions are taken in the FRG government, what Bonn's traditional security consensus entailed, including the outlook of each of the political parties, and how and why that consensus disappeared in the 1980's. This review is important because it sheds light on the inherent tension between NATO decisions and the domestic debate going on in Germany, which in turn affected the decision-making process of the alliance. Chapter Seven will then examine the effect that this declining security consensus had on Germany's position vis-a-vis FOTL as we review the chronology of the theater nuclear forces issue from late 1986 through the summer of 1989.
HOW NUCLEAR WEAPONS DECISIONS ARE MADE IN NATO

The NATO alliance has developed an intricate set of interlaced organizations in which its common policy is worked out by the sixteen member nations. It is important to remember that all NATO decisions are made by consensus, not by majority. This allows the alliance to claim that it does not make decisions per se, but only facilitates the coordination of national policies in a coherent whole through the institutional fora of the voluntary association known as NATO. In this manner all NATO decisions can be assumed to reflect the national will of the participating states, as expressed through their government leaders and permanent representatives to NATO. While this argument can be criticized for its lack of realism, it nevertheless forms a starting point for our discussion.²

The politics of decision-making in NATO are affected in three ways by its formal structure and the presence of American forces in Europe. First, it turns decisions into tests of loyalty and cohesion for the member states. Once a decision is taken, it is nearly impossible to adjust it in light of changing international or domestic circumstances. Second, decision-making deadlines within the organizational parameters of the alliance force decisions that some member governments would prefer to delay. Examples are easy to identify: the neutron bomb in 1977-78, the INF deployments of 1983, and the FOTL modernization go-ahead of 1989. Third, alliance decisions sometimes become disconnected from national

²For an expanded version of these assumptions and a critique of them from a parliamentary oversight point of view, see Oliver Ramsbotham, Modernizing NATO's Nuclear Weapons: 'No Decisions Have Been Made' (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1989), Chapters 8 and 9.
politics. This occurs because leaders often prefer to deal with the technical details of more "glamorous" defense issues than with domestic concerns. Since national security questions often turn on technical fixes to problems, they appear easy to accomplish; but in doing so a politician may forget the political implications that will have to be dealt with later.  

Trying to sort out the details of who made a particular decision in a bureaucracy is maddening. One can study the organizational charts and trace the lines of authority, but that is seldom enough to give one a complete understanding of the processes involved:

whereas on the one hand bureaucracies tend to proliferate into the increasingly baroque formal structures described in official handbooks, on the other influence within those structures tends to be concentrated in fluidly evolving and elusive informal associations. The problem here is that the former, which can be thoroughly outlined, would probably do little more than bewilder the reader if sketched out in full, whereas the inner workings of the latter, which is what we would really like to understand, is by its nature obscure.

This is further complicated in an international alliance where the policy positions brought to the bargaining table represent an amalgam of all the disparate elements that are part of the security community of each member state. Furthermore, the alliance itself has a large bureaucracy, made up of military and civilian staffs, permanent and otherwise, who are not always working toward the same purpose.

On the other hand, with respect to the NATO alliance one can simplify this generality somewhat. The United States is the predominant

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4Ramsbotham, p. 111.
power in NATO and all of its decision-making fora; as such, its positions are given greater weight in negotiations than any other member. This is especially true in the arena of nuclear weapons. There are three independent nuclear states with forces in Western Europe: the United States, Great Britain, and France (which, however, does not dedicate its military forces to NATO). In addition, six others have accepted a nuclear delivery mission under dual-key arrangements with the US, and are therefore intimately involved with many of the planning and operational details concerning these weapons: Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. But the history of NATO nuclear decision-making is essentially a part of the larger story of America’s nuclear weapons.\(^5\)

Most nuclear programs originate and are developed within the American nuclear weapons complex. Accordingly, when an alliance decision is made concerning nuclear weapons, it is understood that the US will shoulder the responsibility of pursuing the technical aspects of that decision. There are no alliance votes to see who gets to build the next nuclear warhead or missile, no debates over cooperative production agreements, no complaints about nuclear burden-sharing. In the nuclear

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\(^5\)In this section I concentrate on the decision-making process of the alliance in its most general political aspects. I do not discuss the intricacies of nuclear release procedures, targeting plans, warhead safety and surety considerations, stockpile security, or the myriad other technical aspects that one could consider when writing about NATO nuclear policy. For good discussions of these fields, see Daniel Charles, *Nuclear Planning in NATO: Pitfalls of First Use* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1987), and Catherine M. Kelleher, "NATO Nuclear Operations," in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987).
business, the United States has the monopoly on this product. And it accepts this responsibility, not necessarily because it feels any altruistic obligation to act as the alliance leader, but for the benefits such unilateral actions provide in terms of influence over allied nuclear policy making—an area in which the European member states DO wish to have influence. Admittedly, in the past the US has at times acted in an arrogant and condescending manner towards its non-nuclear allies, but it also finds itself in the double bind of being expected to lead and being susceptible to criticism for the way in which it does so.

Alliances generally have a leader: the member who is the strongest, the largest, or that provides the collective good that others need. The United States is the obvious leader in the North Atlantic Alliance for all of these reasons, particularly in the realm of nuclear deterrence. It can lead either by command or by collegiality. In the SNF modernization case the Reagan administration tried to lead by the former method, but the Bush team seemed to shift to the latter approach as the

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6Ramsbotham, pp. 112-114; interviews in Brussels, August 1989 and June 1990, and Washington, May and December 1990. I do not consider the British nuclear forces in this discussion for several reasons. Britain's submarine- and air-delivered weapons are national forces, dedicated to strategic deterrence of a threat against the UK. They are not NATO weapons in the same sense as the American warheads stationed in Europe, although the UK has placed their systems under SACEUR's control in peacetime. Britain has never developed a tactical nuclear weapon for multilateral alliance use; that role belongs to the United States.


8A typical comment from the Reagan administration: "The allies expect and want leadership from the United States in the area of nuclear forces. We must demonstrate to the alliance and to the Soviet Union that we will take the steps necessary to provide for our security." Ronald F. Lehamn II, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear
European political situation changed and West Germany began to play a more assertive role.

David Schwartz suggests two leadership methods which the US has alternatively used in dealing with nuclear issues. The first is to let the allies drive the political agenda, responding only to their voiced or perceived fears, doubts, and desires with policies designed to alleviate those needs. The biggest problem with this approach is that consensus among alliance members is nearly impossible to achieve, so there is seldom clear guidance upon which the US can act.  

The second leadership approach is for the United States to clarify its perception of what the alliance's defense needs are, and then to ask the other allies for alternatives to or criticisms of those perceptions. This method is attractive in two ways: it allows the largest member of the alliance to take a true leadership role, and it puts the burden of coming up with better ideas on the shoulders of the European members. On the other hand, it can lead to charges of "leadership by fiat." Moreover, the US itself may find it hard to develop a consistent, consensus position on NATO nuclear policies. As Schwartz says, "If different US agencies pursue differing, and incompatible, policy goals, confusion, suspicion, and tension may result on the other side of the Atlantic."  

Looking at the two most recent NATO modernization programs shows

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10Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, p. 10.

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these contending leadership styles at work. The INF case, for instance, falls in the first category defined above. The US was, to a large extent, responding to an alliance request for new nuclear weapons to restore coupling between Europe and the United States, a concern voiced first and most eloquently by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. In addition to military arguments for INF deployment, states on both sides of the Atlantic were also anxious to restore confidence in the United States after the neutron bomb debacle of 1978. Delivery of a new class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons seemed to fit the requirement to bolster NATO's will, credibility, and capability to match Warsaw Pact improvements, and to show Moscow that it did not have veto power over Western policy decisions.

The FOTL case, on the other hand, seemed to fall into the second category of leadership styles. The United States took the lead in this case, suggesting the need for such modernization, developing the new weapons, and lobbying the other states for support in a deployment decision. Nevertheless, the US then tolerated the 1988-89 debate on alternatives put forth by West Germany. Perhaps American policy makers were thinking back to the acrimony that followed what seemed to be, at the time, an innocuous decision on INF, and were hoping to forestall any recurrence. This would seem to indicate learning on the part of these decision makers. Cancelling the program in 1990 added credence to this argument. On the other hand, one saw many of the same political arguments

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used in 1979 dusted off and re-used in the late 1980's to justify the FOTL deployment.

In terms of consultations within the alliance, the nuclear decision-making processes are often accused of being "rubber stamps" that merely place the allied seal of approval on what is essentially American policy. As one European critic wrote, "decisions about what are seen to be American nuclear weapons are regarded as effectively American decisions. The formalities of 'consultation' are tolerated as a relatively painless way of expediting American policy." There is certainly some basis to this complaint. After all, while the US may understand the virtues of consultations in principle, it is nevertheless "not an easy task for Americans, who during the last half century have a history of making their own superpower decisions without seeking much foreign advice." At the same time, Washington certainly recognizes that there is much to be gained by observing the niceties of political discourse within a pluralistic political body such as NATO, in which the European member states attach great value to such discussions. While the US could bully its way through the North Atlantic Council (NAC) process if it wanted to, the long-term costs in future cooperation and support from the allies make this approach a last-ditch effort only to be used in the case of watershed issues.

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12 Ramsbotham, p. 146.


Consultations generally take place in behind-the-scenes bilateral discussions, discrete queries at the Permanent Representatives' weekly luncheon, or within the more closely held High Level Group meetings. Nevertheless, in all of these the US is likely to present the initiative on nuclear plans, and the details of the initiative will have been worked out first in the intra-agency process in Washington. As one former chairman of the High Level Group put it,

Frankly, I think, while we continue within the alliance to discuss exactly what characteristics would be desirable for that system to have, in the end the allies will be looking to see what we think are the most viable candidates and what kind of programs we would recommend... So you see, in the end we have to decide for ourselves, the executive branch and legislative branch working together, what we think is the appropriate American program or role. But it will be done with bilateral consultations with key allies and in the multilateral context as well.¹⁵

As will be shown in Chapter Seven's analysis of the Bush administration's national security process, in any large bureaucracy there is an inevitable tendency toward small group decision-making to the exclusion of many members of the larger organization. This is undoubtedly true of international organizations, as well. Indeed, one of the more severe criticisms of NATO by certain Europeans is that just such a shift has taken place in the realm of nuclear weapons decisions. Recommendations reaching the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), let alone the higher NATO bodies, are already so narrowed and finalized by lower-level staff work that the "decision" has effectively been made. The problem with this, according to this critique, is two-fold: first, the High Level Group, which makes the inputs on nuclear questions to the NPG, is chaired

by an American, considers staff work from the American nuclear weapons community, and listens to military advice from an American SACEUR; second, none of these participants (nor any from the European ministries that sit on these councils) is an elected official that is accountable to his national parliament. How, then, can the outcomes of such a system be considered "decisions," arrived at by consensual agreement of the member states, and representative of the will of the people they supposedly serve? In fact, the critics argue,

'decisions' will be formulated piecemeal from within the organization, and the role of those who are nominally in charge will in effect be little more than to endorse them publically, and then to protect them from the threat of subsequent political opposition... The Atlantic Alliance has become a law unto itself, perpetuating the disastrous modernization process through its system of secret incremental decision-making against the express wishes of the NATO electorates, and accountable to none of them for it.

Despite these reservations, it will be instructive to examine the myriad institutions that have been set up in the North Atlantic Alliance that have some influence on nuclear decisions, if only because it is here that the participating members make their inputs into planning and operations surrounding nuclear weapons in Europe.

NATO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

At the apex of NATO decision-making is the North Atlantic

\[\text{\footnotesize 16}A \text{ full presentation of these arguments can be found in Ramsbotham, Chapter 9.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 17}Ramsbotham, pp. 150-151 and 158.\]
It meets weekly at the level of Permanent Representatives (ambassador rank) of the national missions to NATO headquarters in Brussels, and is chaired by NATO's Secretary General. The NAC is the source of all delegated authority within the alliance. More importantly, major decisions are taken and publicly affirmed by the sixteen Foreign Ministers at the semi-annual NAC meetings. Occasionally the Heads of State and Government will meet in summit; this is also considered a NAC meeting.

Officially equal in status to the NAC is the political forum for military issues, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). It also meets regularly at working levels and twice a year with the national Defense Ministers (except France, whose military forces are not fully integrated into the NATO command). The DPC was created after France withdrew from the integrated military structure in 1966, which necessitated a forum separate from the NAC for defense discussions in which France was no longer included. Its concern is the determination of defense priorities and broad force planning issues. The DPC has an international staff, including an office for nuclear plans,\textsuperscript{19} that works for the Secretary General. The Council and DPC have set up over 22 standing committees (and


\textsuperscript{19}The Director of Nuclear Planning for the NATO International Staff is an American. He also chairs the NPC Staff Group.
over 350 total subcommittees) to assist them in preparing studies and position papers.

Figure 5: NATO's Formal Nuclear Decision-Making Structure

Also reporting to the DPC is the Nuclear Planning Group, the DPC's "nuclear think tank." The NPG meets monthly in the NPG Permanent Representatives Group, more often at a lower level NPG Staff Group, and semi-annually at the Defense Minister level to confirm policy studies and direct NATO nuclear policy. All members except France participate in the NPG; Iceland, which has no military forces, sends an observer.

\[20\] Chart from Ramsbotham, p. 120.
The main supporting body for the NPG is the High Level Group.21 Created in 1977, the HLG has become a permanent and increasingly important body for multilateral consultations within the alliance, usurping to some degree the very purpose of the NPG. The HLG does the preparatory work for NPG meetings; it is here that the most wide-ranging and uninhibited discussions over NATO nuclear policy and force planning take place. The HLG is chaired by a US Assistant Secretary of Defense and staffed by working level officials from national foreign and defense ministries, and meets irregularly on an as-needed basis (usually every few months). At any one time the HLG has numerous committees and study groups working for it, but its activities are highly secretive and noticeably lacking in organizational rigidity.

The Military Committee also reports to the DPC and is the highest military authority in the alliance. Its purpose is to recommend to the civilian NATO leadership those military measures it considers necessary for the common defense of the NATO area. Made up of the national chiefs of staff (excluding France, which sends a military mission, and Iceland, which may send a civilian observer), it also has an international staff and three subordinate regional commands, each with a large military staff at its respective headquarters: Allied Command Europe (ACE, with headquarters at SHAPE, near Mons, Belgium, commanded by SACEUR), Allied Command Atlantic, and Channel Command. The command of most interest in this thesis is SHAPE, with its focus on planning and preparing for land and air war in Central Europe. SHAPE headquarters contains the major

21We discussed the origins and workings of the Nuclear Planning Group and the High Level Group in Chapter Three.
nuclear weapons planning sections within its Special Weapons Branch: nuclear operations, nuclear policy, and nuclear concepts. The NATO International Military Staff also has a nuclear policy branch.

A smaller committee of importance to nuclear arms control is the Special Consultative Group. Created in 1977 to determine consensus allied inputs to the bilateral superpower arms control negotiations, it reports directly to the NAC.

In addition to the formal NATO bodies there are a number of non-governmental organizations which contribute to the consultative and information functions of the alliance. The North Atlantic Assembly, for example, is an unofficial auxiliary group in which parliamentarians from the sixteen member states can meet and discuss alliance concerns. Based in Brussels, the Assembly also creates special committees to conduct studies of interest to NATO.

The Atlantic Treaty Association is made up of private, voluntary societies in all of the NATO nations. Their purpose is proactive: to educate their respective publics about the alliance and its importance. It takes an advocate's view of NATO, but the wide influence of its membership certainly influences the NATO process.22

The West European Union, the European Community, the EUROGROUP and the Independent European Programme Group also play a role in the formulation of NATO policy through the intermingling of common members, meeting in different situations without the sometimes overbearing presence of the USA to contend with. Furthermore, the full participation of France

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22Kennedy, pp. 42-3. The Atlantic Council of the United States is the US branch of this organization.
in these other groups adds a broader element not found in formal NATO organizations. Policies worked out by consensus among the European national governments in these fora invariably find their way back into NATO discussions.

Most working level decisions, including pre-conflict operational war plans and force deployments, are made at the lower levels of the alliance bureaucracy, and are merely approved by the formal bodies described above. The HLG, SHAPE's nuclear divisions, and the US nuclear weapons sub-government accomplish most of the real work. "Decisions" are actually long-running programs that eventually reach the upper levels of the bureaucracy and require public blessing before being put in gear. Bilateral Programs of Cooperation are then signed between the United States and the host country for the stationing of nuclear warheads and the procedures for mating those warheads with the national launchers in time of conflict.\(^2\)\(^3\)

Two trends of recent years are noteworthy within this process. First, there has been a move to create new NATO consultative institutions that rely on and enhance national expertise over NATO-centralized staffs. This was evident in the creation of the High Level Group, for instance. Second, while this change enhanced American nuclear influence through the HLG, there has been an opposing trend: major nuclear decisions are now made only after lengthy and laborious multilateral consultations among all involved NATO members. This had not often happened in the early years of the alliance, and may reflect growing American sensitivity to European

\(^{23}\)Kelleher, p. 464; McLean, p. 218; and Ramsbotham, Chapter 10.
In general, Germany contributes to the intra-defense dialogue in three ways: via membership in the organized alliance structures outlined above; through various arms control negotiating fora; and in normal diplomatic channels with its allies. Given Germany's central geographic and political role in alliance plans, it is natural that it would want to have inputs into these decisions, despite being a non-nuclear power. Its influence is increased by the fact that once a nuclear decision is taken, it remains up to the national government to insure that it is implemented.

NATO-wide consultative groups are not executive bodies. Their business is diplomacy, technical deliberation, sharing of information and viewpoint. As the United States has the dominant nuclear role in NATO it is not surprising that the United States dominates the consultative process. But once the High Level Group, the Nuclear Planning Group, or the Defense Planning Committee itself reaches a decision on nuclear matters, it is for the country or countries concerned to execute its part of the decision.25

As we shall see below, the FRG adapted to all the institutional changes that occurred within NATO over the past decades and has maintained an important tie to every alliance organization. In this way she can assuage her feelings of self-worth, show the German public that their interests are being taken into consideration in NATO planning, and have a genuine, if still peripheral, impact on America's plans for the tactical nuclear warheads stationed on German soil. As Catherine Kelleher pointed out, the creation of the NPG in the 1960's provided Germany with the opportunity to broaden its diplomatic maneuverability and domestic flexibility. It took nuclear issues off the public agenda (at least

24McLean, pp. 214-5.

25McLean, p. 221.
temporarily), allowed the FRG to make national perspectives known, and improved the transmission of information between the FRG and the United States.\textsuperscript{28} Those goals have not changed, and the success of the NPG inspired Germany to participate actively in every new forum that has arisen since.

\textbf{WEST GERMANY AND ITS CHANGING RELATIONSHIP VIS-A-VIS THE ALLIANCE}

Germany is the most important European member of the North Atlantic Alliance. As such, it played a major role in the debate over implementation of the Montebello Decision in the middle and late 1980's. German opposition was particularly strong against the replacement or modernization of the Lance missile. This opposition led to a near-crisis in the alliance as it approached its 40th anniversary in 1989, a problem which was temporarily settled through the expediency of a "comprehensive concept" on arms control but only "solved" as a result of international changes in Eastern Europe and the FOTL program's subsequent cancellation.

Whether the follow-on to Lance missile would have been developed and deployed in Europe without the dramatic changes which occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 is hard to say. Certainly Germany was at best ambivalent, and at times seemed openly opposed to such a deployment. The reasons for this unhappiness with a consensus decision agreed to in 1983 and re-affirmed at every NATO meeting since can be understood through a closer look at this key member of the alliance.

THE NUCLEAR AND ARMS CONTROL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN THE FRG

"Nuclear decision-making" in the Federal Republic of Germany is somewhat of a misnomer. Since the FRG has no nuclear weapons of its own, it is undoubtedly more appropriate to describe their decision-making structure as simply defense policy making, or arms control policy making. Nevertheless, as the front-line state in the superpower confrontation, the Germans have an abiding interest in the policies that affect their future and security, including nuclear issues. These policies are made, for the most part, in Washington and Brussels; Bonn can only hope to influence these decisions via bilateral or multilateral ties to those decision-making centers. It does this through membership in such groups as the Nuclear Planning Group and the High Level Group. Much of its policy making, however, is reactive, taking its lead from American and NATO initiatives.

At the same time, until recently the Bundeswehr also maintained a nuclear capability with its 72 Pershing IA missiles, and the Luftwaffe still has a nuclear delivery mission with its Tornado aircraft. Although the warheads for these weapons are stored and controlled by the US and releasable to the Germans only under dual-key arrangements, they nevertheless give the German military and political leadership a desire, and a right, to be part of the decisions surrounding these weapons and their intended use.

The German military is deeply integrated into the NATO structure, and the German defense and foreign affairs offices have close ties to the major organizations within NATO and SHAPE. In addition, there are close bilateral ties with various foreign militaries, in particular the French,
Danes, and Americans.

The federal administrative process is widely penetrated by outside forces. These include international organizations and influences, bilateral ties with allies, and domestic groups such as the churches, labor unions, business lobbies, and innumerable other organizations and interest groups. The FRG has been called a "semi-sovereign state" due to its permeability and the cautious approach to policy change that results from this outside penetration.2

There is no central coordinating body for German government decision-making, as there is in the United States (the National Security Council). As a result, the emphasis on lower-level consensus building is much greater. This also reflects the constitutionally guaranteed right of ministerial independence, which is held dear to the politicians who work in this decentralized, cabinet style of government. One study compared the German administrative system to a large matrix, with horizontal

connections and communications as important as vertical lines of authority.28

While there is a Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat), it is primarily a forum for final government approval of policy papers that have already been staffed and signed off by the applicable ministries. The Council, which falls under the administrative control of the Chancellor's Office, meets a few times per year, and has none of the power or prestige of its American counterpart, the NSC.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The locus of decision-making for security policy within the Federal government is firmly lodged in the executive branch, specifically the Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt). By historical tradition, bureaucratic arrangement, and constitutional law, the Foreign Minister is the foremost spokesman on international relations, including security and defense policy, for the FRG. He is assisted in his efforts by a staff of career civil servants that is organized along traditional German hierarchical lines. A small number of bureaucrats run the day-to-day operations of diplomacy, arms control, coordination of policies with the other relevant departments of government, and relations with allies and various international fora. The current Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has held the position since 1974, and apparently takes an active personal role in the establishment of German arms control and security policy.29


Two intermediate-level offices in the Foreign Ministry have primary responsibility for arms control and security policy: Division 2 and 2A. (See Figure 2.) The Commissioner for Arms Control directs Division 2A, and holds ambassador rank as a reflection of the importance of arms control to the FRG government.\textsuperscript{30} There are about 20 civil servants in each division. They get much of their expertise from outside research conducted by institutes such as the Research Institute of the Foundation for Science and Policy (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), a government-supported research center located in Ebenhausen, near München, and from the German Society for Foreign Policy (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) in Bonn.\textsuperscript{31}

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. The Defense Ministry (Verteidigungsministerium) has a constitutional right to make inputs into the security policymaking process through the concurrence principle. While it takes the lead in setting the broad outlines of defense policy, it must coordinate its plans with the Foreign Ministry for approval. The Defense Minister is assisted by a civilian planning staff and the armed forces staff. The Inspector General is the highest ranking German officer; he is the equivalent of the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sits on all important government committees that oversee security policy. His armed forces staff (Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, or FûS) is responsible for the creation and implementation of defense plans. The staff is made up primarily of military officers, and is divided into seven departments, the

\textsuperscript{30}Blechman and Fisher, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{31}For a description of these organizations, see Blechman and Fisher, pp. 32 and 43-46.
most important of which is FuS III, responsible for formulating military policy. Within FuS III are three divisions of particular importance: political military planning, NATO affairs, and arms control. These sections interact closely with the Foreign Office's Divisions 2 and 2A, as well as with international staffs at NATO and SHAPE. It is here that the background work is done for the German representatives to the High Level Group.32

Figure 6: German Defense Decision-Making Structure33

CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE. The third center of security policy making in


the FRG is the Chancellor's Office (Bundeskanzleramt). The Chancellor's Office plays a "central but by no means dominant" role in security policy. It does not equate to the centralized and powerful apparatus that is found in the White House bureaucracy. Rather, the chancellor attempts to influence the ministries through government guidance papers and periodic state of the nation addresses. Responsibility for foreign affairs, defense, and arms control issues lies in Division 2 of the chancellor's office. Until recently the head of Division 2 was Horst Teltschik, one of Helmut Kohl's closest political advisors. The Chancellor's Office's task is to coordinate interdepartmental policy and ensure compliance with these general policy guidelines by the various ministries. It does not act as a decision-maker per se.

The Cabinet and the Federal Security Council both fall under the administrative control of the Chancellor's Office; both are essentially ineffectual. The Cabinet could serve as a forum for the discussion, clarification, and determination of difficult policy issues. In fact, however, it, like the Security Council, meets only occasionally to "rubber-stamp" policy decisions that have already been made elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Contentious issues are not expected to rise to this level in a parliamentary system of government.

BUNDESTAG. The national parliament (Bundestag and federal Bundesrat) has little input into policy making in Germany, particularly in

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34Van Oudenaren, p. 23, and Blechman and Fisher, pp. 36-7. Teltschik has been called "Kohl's Kissinger," and attempted to increase the power and importance of the Kanzleramt in these functional areas.

35Blechman and Fisher, p. 36.

36Mayntz and Scharpf; Dogan; Blechman and Fisher, p. 37.
the field of security issues. This reflects the historical weakness of German parliamentary bodies, the strength of the bureaucracy, and the nature of the system set up by the Basic Law. The Bundestag can act as a forum for public debate on important issues; its committees serve to convey party experts' views to the government; and the parties act as transmission belts for public opinion to the ruling elite. In terms of actual law-making and policy determination, however, the Bundestag is unimportant.

TRADITIONAL GERMAN SECURITY CONSENSUS

A security consensus encompassing all major political parties has existed in West Germany since the early days of the Republic. This consensus accepted the facts that a reborn Germany faced in the late 1950's: its exposed, central position between the two superpowers; its restrictions, both self-imposed and as a result of international law, on the development weapons of mass destruction; its reliance for security on the good will and coincidence of interests between Bonn and the United States of America and other West European states; its determination to keep those security guarantees tightly bound through a complex set of coalitions and multi-national agreements. These restrictions, many of which were codified in the FRG's Basic Law, meant that it has forfeited

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37Blechman and Fisher, p. 40.

38The standard reference for an understanding of the early years of Germany's nuclear dilemma remains Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons.

some aspects of its national sovereignty in return for protection under the security umbrella of others.40

West Germany has generally deferred to the United States position in NATO planning, especially regarding nuclear operations. The consensus position, led by moderate pro-NATO leaders of both major parties such as Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, has held that the FRG must in no way antagonize or upset the Americans, in order not to put at risk the coupling of German and American interests so vital to the concept of extended deterrence. With this attitude, decisions concerning security policy have been made by a small group of elites firmly integrated in a wider alliance community.41 As Jeffrey Boutwell recently wrote,

For most of the 1960s and 1970s, the major parties in the FRG sustained a broad-based consensus on the twin pillars of deterrence and detente as the basic tenets of West German security policy. Dating at least from the Grand Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD in 1966, if not from the SPD's decision to support NATO (i.e., the Bad Godesberg program of 1959), this security consensus encompassed the moderates and left liberals in the SPD, the centrist FDP, and the dominant moderate conservative wing of the CDU....only the more doctrinaire socialist members of the SPD and right-wing conservatives in the CDU/CSU found themselves at odds with majority West German support for the twin goals of military security within NATO and detente with the East bloc.42

There are several basic principles on which the West German security

40For example, all FRG military units fall under direct command of the NATO Allied Forces Central Command in wartime. Although the AFCENT commander is a German general, he nevertheless represents the multilateral military coalition and takes orders from the NATO commander, rather than from his national leaders.


consensus has rested for the last 30-plus years. Some of these became more apparent and were made explicit following the 1979 INF dual-track decision. These include: the principle of non-singularity—that is, for the purposes of risk-sharing other continental European allies are expected to bear comparable weapon deployment burdens as the FRG (Germany must not be singularly exposed to a greater threat than its partners); the requirement that the United States must take responsibility for introducing new nuclear weapon systems; the expectation that the US will, if necessary, be willing to field and man such new systems alone, without dual-control by the Germans; the principle that such new systems will be endorsed in as broad an alliance framework as possible, preferably by the North Atlantic Council; and the requirement that new weapons must be tied to some sort of arms control proposal (such as the 1979 dual-track plan). These principles are now considered minimal necessities for German involvement in any arms modernization or introduction under alliance guises, and were evident in the intra-allied debates during the FOTL case.

While the security consensus extended across the political spectrum within West Germany, there were nonetheless several variants evident within the major political parties. These differences became evident and important during the debate over FOTL and SNF in the late 1980's. Let us

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look at each party in turn.

DIVISIONS WITHIN THE WEST GERMAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU) and CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION (CSU).
The CDU (and its Bavarian partner party, the CSU) has traditionally been
the party of close ties to NATO and the US, supporting the alliance
strategy of flexible response and accepting the need for nuclear weapons
in a deterrent strategy that included the prospect of deliberate
escalation. It is the most conservative and anti-communist of the major
parties in Germany. The two factions have been united in their common
perception of the Soviet threat and the realization that security depends
on the US nuclear guarantee. The party can be broadly divided into two
groups: the Atlanticists, primarily CDU moderates including Helmut Kohl,
Manfred Wörner, and Volker Rühe, who view the bipolar world as a given,
generally support all policies that are compatible with maintaining close
ties to America, and were, in the past, willing to sacrifice arms control
to the military needs of deterrence; and the Gaullists, made up mostly of
CSU and some conservative CDU members, who have been skeptical of the
durability of the American security guarantee and would prefer to see
stronger European self-defense efforts. The latter faction includes Alfred
Dregger and, formerly, the late Franz-Josef Strauss. A third, less
powerful group has also been identified within the CDU/CSU: a collection

\[4^{4}\]Blechman and Fisher, p. 12; Van Oudenaren, pp. 54-61; Boutwell, pp.
163-165; and Dembinsky, et al, pp.11-13. In the aftermath of the recent
revolution in European political arrangements, this discussion must
include a caveat that such differentiation may no longer be as true as it
was in the four decades leading up to 1989. All positions are in flux, as
we shall see in the chapters ahead.

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of Länder officials and Bundestag back-benchers led by CDU General Secretary Heiner Geissler, who support arms control efforts and generally fall into line with the Genscher/FDP camp.45

FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (FDP). The FDP, the party of the middle class, is a centrist party that wields political importance far outweighing its modest electoral strength. Its third party role is the making and breaking of coalition governments in the FRG. Led by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, it supports German membership in NATO and accepts the need for nuclear weapons, but only for purposes of minimal deterrence. It is the party that tempers the larger coalition member's platform once in office. Its role in the governing coalition since 1982 has been to question the CDU's Atlanticist vision of a proper German response to US and NATO policy initiatives. The FDP "attempts to strike a balance between automatic acquiescence to American views and defiant independence or unilateralism."46 As we will see below, the FDP opposed the modernization of SNF forces and was among the first to take Gorbachev and his proposals at face value. This, in turn, caused considerable anger among the FRG's allies, as well as within the CDU coalition itself. Genscher's pivotal role as Foreign Minister meant that he could advocate his personal views as official policy and block multilateral plans with which he disagreed. It also led to internal bickering and disputes within the government over security policy--something never before seen in Germany with respect to security issues.


46 Blechman and Fisher, p. 15; see also Van Oudenaren, pp. 79-84.
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SPD). The left wing Social Democrats moved further left after leaving government in 1982; they appeared for several years to be pursuing a pure socialist and pacifist agenda once freed of the constraints of official duties. The party of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt used to support the security consensus, but now offers radical solutions to the current debates over NATO membership and nuclear upgrades.

Since 1987 the SPD has modified and reassessed some of its most extreme positions, restructured itself, and got new leadership, all of which restored some of its lost popularity.47 If not for the collapse of the communist regime in the GDR and Kohl's windfall political benefit from that event, the SPD would have been a contender for the chancellory in the 1990 elections. Polls indicated that it had surpassed the CDU in national popularity prior to the Berlin Wall opening in November 1989. Its security policies, however, remain far to the left of the CDU/CSU or FDP positions.

The SPD can be divided into two camps: the moderate faction, led by Schmidt, Hans Apel, and Richard Löwenthal, argues for a centrist course, in line with NATO policy (including reliance on nuclear weapons) and is close to the FDP position. It has lost considerable strength within the party over the past decade. The new power center is in the left wing, led by Brandt, Egon Bahr, Karsten Voigt and Oscar Lafontaine. This group is further split into the "old guard" and the younger, more doctrinaire wing. The former still prefers to retain ties to NATO, but both groups are

highly critical of American and alliance policies, especially nuclear policy. They want to see more weight placed on arms control and disarmament, the eventual elimination of reliance on foreign powers for defense, and the complete removal of nuclear weapons from German soil.48

THE GREENS. The Green Party arose from the peace movements of the early 1980's to enter the Bundestag in 1983 as an "anti-party" of environmentalism and disarmament.49 During their tenure in government, the Greens added an extreme voice to the security debate. While generally ignored in the policy making process, their existence did affect the SPD to some extent; the Social Democrats found themselves having to accommodate certain Green positions in order not to lose dissatisfied voters to this upstart party. Some of the Greens' early platform planks can be seen, for example, in the SPD "Security 2000" program with its calls for nuclear zero-options and the removal of all foreign troops.

GROUPINGS BY POLICY ORIENTATION. The CDU/CSU, the Chancellor's Office, and the Ministry of Defense make up one of three main groups that can be identified in the SNF modernization case. It has become a minority group since the collapse of the security consensus within the FRG since the early 1980's, but it is, nevertheless, a significant minority, holding as it does the reins of power in the current Bonn government. It is pro-American, solidly behind the NATO alliance and its policies, generally distrustful of the Soviet Union and its calls for new thinking, and

48Blechman and Fisher, pp. 13-14; Van Oudenaren, pp. 62-79; and "European Security 2000--A Comprehensive Concept for European Security from a Social-Democratic Point of View," Presseservice der SPD, Bonn, 6 July 1989, especially the section on reductions envisioned for Phase III.

49In the most recent elections of December 1990, however, the Greens were unable to pass the 5% hurdle for representation in the parliament.
motivated to maintain the strategy of flexible response, including reliance on modernized theater nuclear weapons. This group would like to see new weapons compensate the alliance for capabilities lost as a result of the INF Treaty.  

Centered around Genscher and the Foreign Ministry, including some CDU arms control advocates, is the second group in the FOTL story. This group advocates a more politically oriented approach to security, with less reliance on military forces and nuclear weapons. It wishes to maintain German ties to NATO, and realizes that some nuclear forces are necessary for deterrence, but it is not willing to modernize forces such as SNF if doing so would risk improving relations with the USSR or jeopardize future arms control efforts. Detente is healthier for Central Europe than is continued over-reliance on the United States for security, they believe. To insure the long-term security of Germany, this group advocates a stronger European defense pillar, more multilateral arms cuts by the two sides, and a decreased American presence in Europe (especially in Germany). They prefer to see the process of disarmament that began with the INF Treaty-- "an historic opportunity to make significant headway on the road to demilitarization of the East-West conflict" --continue into the SNF realm.  

Our third grouping in the SNF modernization story is made up of the SPD, with some other nationalist and anti-military elements. Its outlook is often echoed in the statements of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

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51 Asmus, pp. 36-40; and Dembinsky, *et al.*, p. 15.
The third group has a long-term vision of a dramatically changed Europe, one that will face the future without the large standing armies, the nuclear weapons, or the unnatural division of a continent in Central Europe. It essentially follows the platform of the left wing of the Social Democratic Party in its outlook and beliefs. The SPD's official party line on security policy moved far to the left in the early 1980's. The stated goals of the SPD platform include: increased emphasis on arms control; developing a structural inability to attack ("defensive defense" concepts); creation of weapon-free zones; replacement of the flexible response doctrine with a new Gesamtkonzept; and the concept of "common security" within Europe.52 There is no room in such an outlook for the introduction or modernization of nuclear weapons in Europe.53

While each party has its own particular approach to the issues of arms control, defense policy, and nuclear weapons, the remainder of this chapter will concentrate on those parties that had an impact on the SNF modernization episode of the late 1980's. These were the three parties in the current governing coalition: the CDU, CSU, and FDP, making up the first two of our groups above. As we shall see, their differences of opinion on the right course of action marked the breakdown of the traditional security consensus in Germany, and led to considerable confusion and consternation on the part of the FRG's allies during this episode.

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52 Weiler, p. 516; also see "European Security 2000," op. cit.
53 Asmus, pp. 40-47.
THE DISAPPEARING CONSENSUS--CHANGES IN THE 1980'S

Except for France and Britain, the European states don't have nuclear weapons, and are rapidly losing interest in them and the supposed role of such devices in the scheme of things... the tolerance of Germans for much of what is done on their terrain in the name of deterrence and readiness is fading fast.54

The traditional West German security consensus began to unravel in the 1980's. This was the result of many factors, both international and domestic. It had a major impact on alliance nuclear decisions--not only those that were already made, but the process by which such decisions would be made in the future. As one American expert on Germany put it:

It is true, of course, that logic and rationality have never been strong points of nuclear deterrence theory...For a country such a West Germany, however, irrationality and incalculability cut both ways. No other country is at such grave risk from the possible use of nuclear weapons in an East-West conflict, yet no major power is so highly dependent on the actions and decisions of others. Since 1949, this has been the crux of the German nuclear dilemma. Although this dilemma has been managed successfully for forty years, events in recent years have conspired to cast doubt on whether the Germans will be content to play the deterrence game by the old rules.55

There are a number of factors that analysts have pointed to as explanatory variables for the break-down of the West German security consensus in the 1980's. One often mentioned is the "securitization" of the public debate on policy issues--greater public and parliamentary interest and involvement in security and defense issues that formerly were handled by the security decision-making elite.56 This does not mean that

55Boutwell, p. 218.
56Blechman and Fisher, p. 8.
security policy in Germany has been democratized, as some writers were reporting after the public outcry over INF deployments in the early 1980's; rather, it is simply a matter of security issues having greater salience in policy debates than before: "Public acceptability has become a more important criterion of arms control decisionmaking." As another analyst put it, "For the foreseeable future, opposition will remain 'built into' the system."58

Another factor is a revival of German nationalism, with an agenda for specific "German interests" that may conflict with or even supercede alliance and American desires. Greater assertiveness in German foreign policy is part of a larger trend towards normalcy and a restoration of sovereignty originally forfeited by the Germans in return for the Cold War security guarantees. Josef Joffe calls this "structural revisionism," an attempt by Germany to change the international system to its own preferences, thereby overcoming the costs of "militarized bipolarity" from which it no longer believes it benefits. One example of this new attitude was seen in the SNF debate:

Regardless of party, Bonn will resist the intrusion of new nuclear weapons (the very hallmark of its unique dependence) while working hard to shape a disarmament milieu that makes them unnecessary. That implies the "Germanization" of East-West relations in Europe--the attempt to structure the future of security diplomacy around specifically German needs.59

Other causal factors for the declining consensus on security policy within West Germany can be noted: the massive public demonstrations

57Bleichman and Fisher, p. 8.

58Van Oudenaren, p. x.

against NATO's nuclear policy in the early 1980's, which reflected and enhanced the general anti-nuclear feelings within the populace; the rise of the Green Party, which built on those feelings; a swing to the left by the SPD; increased public questioning of American and NATO policies; and uncertainty over the future of Germany's security as a result of the INF Treaty.60

Many of these factors represent a generational shift in the membership of the attentive public and, to a lesser extent, in the government leadership, to the post-war "successor generation" that has been so much anticipated. This new cohort has a different set of attitudes and beliefs than its parents, with a generally more benign view of the Soviet threat and a correspondingly smaller need for American military support, with all that that entails.61 The depth of anti-nuclear feeling in the country as a whole will make any future decisions on nuclear modernization extremely difficult for whatever coalition is governing.62


Increasing German assertiveness in international affairs has been an oft-repeated theme over the last decade. The reasons for this new active approach in pursuit of German interests include "the country's political rehabilitation, its ability to use its relative economic well-being to further its security goals, a retraction of American power, and new opportunities provided by Soviet flexibility."63

The INF arms control decisions also had a negative impact on the German security consensus. Said one analyst, "The Euromissile conflict led to the collapse of a security consensus that had been a hallmark of West German politics since the early 1960's."64 In essence, both actions--INF deployments and their later removal--served to frighten segments of German society into believing that the US was planning to limit a war to the European theater.65 Chapter Three of this dissertation looked at the legacy of the INF Treaty in some detail; here we begin to see its direct impact on policy making and security considerations by a major European ally.

Other factors are stressed by Ronald Asmus in his recent RAND study for the disappearance of the traditional consensus. For one thing, loose

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63Boutwell, p. 11.

64Asmus, p. 4

65This discussion is found in many commentaries on the nuclear dilemma in Europe; see, for example, Anne-Marie LeGloannec, "West German Security: Less of a Consensus?" in Kelleher and Mattox, Evolving European Defense Policies, pp. 169-184.
talk by some high-ranking Americans in the early 1980's on the possibility of limiting a nuclear war to the European theater, supported by a massive Soviet propaganda campaign, created a war scare in Europe. These worries were further enhanced by the Reagan administration's justification for the strategic defense initiative, with its implicit criticism of the morality of nuclear deterrence (the morality of which, of course, the Germans have always stressed in their reading of the meaning of flexible response). Add to this the shock of the Chernobyl accident and scandals in the civilian atomic energy program in the FRG, and you find a potent mixture that has created in the West German public a growing alienation from all things nuclear, including especially the possibility of nuclear warfighting in Europe.66

Subtle changes in elite attitudes have also played a part. For instance, there has developed a noticeable antipathy between Washington and the Social Democratic Party in Germany as the SPD has swung further away from traditional NATO security policy. This shift was hard to see at first, because Helmut Schmidt, a pro-NATO moderate, was still the chancellor and acting party leader. But Schmidt, as we have seen, now belongs to a minority within his party, although this was not evident to most Americans until after the SPD left government in 1982.67 In addition, strains between Washington and Bonn were due to American mishandling of earlier episodes of nuclear modernization, such as the neutron bomb. This resulted from a combination of a lack of understanding of German domestic considerations, and just plain bungling. But one could

66Asmus, pp. 6-7.
67Asmus, p. 7.
also point to the discordant notes coming out of Europe as a reason for the growing trans-Atlantic rift. After all, a multitude of varied approaches to deterrence theory and competing views on the proper German role in all of this are evident in this chapter; certainly this cacophony coming out of Germany confused and angered some of its allies who were used to dealing with a dispassionate, supportive, and consensual FRG.\textsuperscript{68}

Perhaps the single most important incident which sparked concern by disparate groups within the FRG over the sustainability of America's security guarantee was the Reykjavik summit of October 1986. Many writers point to the December 1987 INF Treaty as the key to the SNF modernization debate of the late 1980's, and they are correct in emphasizing the treaty's importance. But the Reykjavik meeting set the stage for the treaty; the basic outline of the eventual agreement was hammered out in Iceland without any European participation or input. This sudden reminder of their vulnerability to superpower deals made many Europeans sit up and take stock of the alliance's nuclear policies and what an INF Treaty would mean for the future of extended deterrence in Europe. The NATO allies "were shocked that a US president had entertained in a single weekend the notion of dismantling the Western nuclear deterrent."\textsuperscript{68} "What Reagan seemed prepared to do would have vitiated NATO's doctrine of Flexible Response."\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{68}See also Jed C. Snyder, "Germany Between the Superpowers," \textit{The World and I}, February 1989, pp. 132-137.

\textsuperscript{68}Boutwell, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{68}Robert Hunter, "Will the United States Remain a European Power?" \textit{Survival}, May/June 1988, p. 211.
Concerns about being "singularized" have been emphasized by several prominent West German politicians and academicians. A minor debate occurred in the press in early 1988 over the true meaning of singularization, with American ambassador to the FRG Richard Burt weighing in with the observation that singularization was a myth: all West European states faced the same threat of Soviet nuclear attack. Volker Rühle publicly responded to this issue by admitting that while Burt was right in one respect, there was more to the concept than simple physical vulnerability. According to Rühle,

'It is not a case of the Federal Republic being singularized in terms of the threat facing it...Rather, it is a question of the political and psychological effects that the structure of the Alliance's SNF left after the elimination of INF will have on the German public's acceptance of the strategy of deterrence.'

Lothar Rühl was less blunt but no less adamant in calling for a reassessment of the Montebello Decision in light of the INF Treaty. This new look should have one basic consequence: less reliance on, and smaller numbers of, battlefield nuclear weapons. Karl Kaiser attempted to clarify the argument in a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee during hearings on ratification of the INF Treaty. Kaiser

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agreed that the concept was a myth, but "the fact remains that most of the remaining weapons of shorter range are either on German soil or are likely to hit German territory." He also warned the US not to slip into the easy role of criticizing German thinking, since that would only further antagonize an already anti-nuclear German public and undermine the fragile legitimacy of the remaining minimal nuclear deterrent in Europe.

Alfred Dregger brought the issue of singularity back to one of the fundamental questions debated in the alliance since its earliest days: the true meaning and purpose of nuclear weapons. Writing of NATO plans to increase the numbers of SNF launchers to compensate for the loss of INF capabilities, Dregger emphasized that if that occurred, Germany would be exposed to an entirely avoidable special nuclear threat in addition to the unavoidable special conventional threat to which our country is already subjected due to its geographic position on the border between the two blocs. We Germans reject this. Densely populated as it is, West Germany can be destroyed but not defended by nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can be justified only as weapons of deterrence... 

This reflects the German view of the proper first use policy for nuclear weapons--as demonstrative devices only, which, as we have seen, is much different than the American perception of what first use entails.

Foreign Minister Genscher was able to capitalize on these German fears in

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several speeches in 1988 and 1989 wherein he opposed FOTL modernization and called for early arms control negotiations on land-based SNF instead.

On top of everything else that had hurt the security consensus in Germany since the early 1980's, in 1988 the United States released a report on the future of US security policy entitled *Discriminate Deterrence*. This semi-official report attempted to look at America's military needs and security interests for the long-term. The conclusions of most interest to the Europeans were that Europe was no longer going to be considered the single most important region for US interests, and that nuclear weapons stationed there should be militarily useful so as to prevent any theater conflict from automatically spreading to the strategic level. While this had obviously always been an unstated goal (or at least an option) within NATO's flexible response doctrine, admitting this in a public document was unheard of. It undercut the European understanding of deterrence and flexible response. When, in response, the US administration pointed out that the authors of the study were not actually in the government, many Germans came to the conclusion that this was just one more example of fuzzy thinking on the part of the Americans with respect to the role of extended deterrence:

With their traditional yearning for logical consistency, a tradition not shared or even understood by many Americans, the Germans found it difficult to conceive that US officials might remain firmly committed to extended deterrence even as they took actions or wrote papers that appeared to depart from that

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As a result, calls arose from the right as well as the left of the German political spectrum to reduce the alliance's dependence on nuclear weapons, particularly those of the shortest range which would be the most militarily useful in a limited conflict.

Finally, into this debate came Mikhail Gorbachev, offering a new European security order based on benign, good-neighbourly relations. The West Germans in particular were fascinated with "Gorby." He came to power in the Soviet Union in March 1985, and within a year was making heretofore unthinkable offers to the West for a changed and less confrontational new world. The Germans took him at his word--much to the chagrin of several of their allies, including the British and Americans, who preferred to build an updated security structure that met existing Soviet capabilities, rather than promised future cuts. Gorbachev offered a new European detente by making a successful effort to appear less threatening to the West. What his true motives were are uncertain--whether his moves were made out of economic necessity and upcoming requirements for restructuring of the Soviet military, or for nobler aims--but it did not matter to much of the West European public. For some, the new approach confirmed their belief that the Soviet Union was no longer, nor perhaps ever had been, a threat; that the USSR was merely a defensive power reacting to NATO military moves. This was a position held by many on the left wing of

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the SPD, and seen as well in aspects of Genscher's more centrist approach. They did not want to see the alliance pursue new policies that might antagonize the Soviets.79

EFFECT OF THE DECLINING SECURITY CONSENSUS ON SNF MODERNIZATION

Once the INF Treaty cuts were accomplished, the Germans foresaw that the only remaining nuclear weapons assigned to NATO would be those of the shortest range, including aircraft, artillery, and Lance missiles. Of these, the majority would be based in West Germany, and could only reach targets in the two Germanies. At the same time, the US appeared to be calling for increased emphasis on a warfighting strategy, including the modernization of these SNF weapons in accordance with the Montebello decision. All of this was too much for some German commentators, including one former supporter of ties to the US and NATO, who pointed out that under the circumstances, "The shorter the range, the deader the Germans."80 This damning phrase became a rallying cry for opponents of SNF modernization and the debate over FOTL which began at about this time.

Even within the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition one could find serious disputes over the meaning of the Montebello Decision in light of the changing world situation, and what form the planned SNF modernization should take. For the FDP and the arms control wing of the CDU, a delay in making any firm decision was preferable to immediate deployment, and would

79LeGloannec, p. 176.

80This phrase has been attributed to both Alfred Dregger and Volker Rühe. In either case, its significance is that it was spoken by a conservative and erstwhile staunch supporter of alliance policy, including nuclear deterrence.
lessen the chances of eventually fielding new weapons like FOTL. Genscher became more and more vocal in opposing the idea of FOTL modernization during this time. Gaullists in the CDU argued that short-range systems were unnecessary for deterrence, made the West Germans bear an undue share of the risk burden, and would extract too great a political price in terms of public opposition to new nuclear weapons. Only the CDU's Atlanticists favored carrying out the Montebello plans, largely because of Bonn's earlier commitment to do so and in order to keep the FRG tied to the US and maintain some influence over nuclear planning in NATO.81 Manfred Wörner was the most supportive proponent of modernization, whereas Kohl tried to play the middle ground and ended up waffling between positions. Overall, though, the CDU/CSU supported carrying out the Montebello Decision. As one commentator put it, the coalition wants to avoid arousing doubts about Bonn's alliance credentials. The CDU-CSU may no longer pursue policies prepackaged in Brussels, but its security policy is still built around NATO, and unlike the SPD it has few leaders who actively seek a way out of the nuclear era.82

The SPD and the Greens, of course, preferred unilateral nuclear disarmament anyway, so they hoped to see this issue resolved in favor of no deployment.

Given the situation described above, it was little wonder that West Germany called out for help and guidance from its allies as regards the future policy of the alliance. This concern took the form of a 1986 request that NATO develop a "comprehensive concept for arms control and

81Clemens, p. 68; and Boutwell, pp. 184-185.

82Clemens, p. 73.
disarmament." The FRG was apparently looking for a re-affirmation or replacement of the 1967 Harmel Report that had accompanied the switch to the flexible response strategy. As we shall see below, the Gesamtkonzept played a major role in the FOTL story. The German request was heeded by NATO and was formally recognized in the communique following the June 1987 North Atlantic Council meeting in Reykjavik.

By 1989, Chancellor Kohl was facing serious political difficulties. These problems focused on a minor military upgrade (FOTL) that in earlier years would have passed relatively unnoticed by the public. With the disappearance of the former security consensus, however,

Kohl is finding...that a once-solid foundation of support in Germany for prudent approaches to defense spending and force modernization has withered to a fringe element of the political elite and public...[this] suggests a generalized shift in attitudes that may transcend historically rooted ideological boundaries. Within such a fragile and fickle political environment, any West German leader will be reluctant to exercise leadership.83

CONCLUSION

With this overview of the complex political situation in West Germany during the latter half of the 1980's, we can turn to a more detailed look at the chronology of the middle period of the follow-on-to-Lance episode. From 1986 through 1989 the alliance attempted to carry out the modernization mandate approved by the Nuclear Planning Group at Montebello in 1983 and Luxembourg in 1985. Several important milestones came up during this time frame, requiring decisions that would determine the deployment schedule of FOTL in the next decade. These decisions were

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83Snyder, p. 137.
not made, however; alliance squabbling, German political maneuvering, and US Congressional hesitancy precluded their resolution. The strategic considerations that had so influenced the earlier NPG and SHAPE studies and the Montebello Decision had by now disappeared, along with the German security consensus, leaving the fate of FOTL in the lap of alliance politics.
This chapter concentrates on the detailed twists and turns of intra-alliance politics from the end of the strategic consensus on the Montebello Decision, which had disappeared by late 1986, through the May 1989 summit compromise. These middle years of follow-on to Lance were rocky ones for the North Atlantic Alliance. West Germany's assertiveness in international affairs, combined with its growing fear of nuclear singularity in Europe, clashed with traditional NATO beliefs and procedures concerning nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty and the way in which it was negotiated brought to the fore US-German differences over the question of nuclear risk-sharing. Soviet disarmament offers touched basic European hopes for a less militarized continent and magnified the differences between these and American views. Domestic politics in the FRG dominated Chancellor Kohl's agenda in the international realm, as did, to a lesser extent, national elections in the US and Great Britain. All of these factors made the two and one-half years following the Reykjavik summit a veritable roller-coaster of consensus building, compromise, estrangement and diplomatic turn-arounds regarding the twin issues of SNF modernization and arms control negotiations. In the end, NATO reached a compromise agreement at its May 1989 summit that papered over these differences via a "Comprehensive Concept." Whether this would have lasted long enough to deploy FOTL is unknown, of course, since all the maneuvering and preparatory work leading up to that event were overturned by the revolutionary events of late 1989 and 1990.
THE SHOCK OF REYKJAVIK AND INF NEGOTIATIONS.

The seminal event of the middle years of the POTL story was the October 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev. Reagan and Gorbachev came close to agreeing to the global elimination of all strategic and theater nuclear missiles at this meeting, and they did settle on a tentative "zero option" solution in Europe for the INF negotiations already underway. The US did this without consulting a single European ally. The Europeans were dumbfounded. "Confusion, irritation, and shock were the watchwords in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit."¹ For a society that had long relied on the US to provide nuclear assurances of peace through deterrence, such dealings were inconceivable. The Germans were particularly upset, and they became more so once they began to perceive American pressure on them to give up their Pershing I missiles in return for a "double zero" INF solution that they did not want in the first place.²

Shortly thereafter, at Gleneagles, Scotland, the Nuclear Planning Group approved the "General Political Guidelines for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons in the Defense of NATO" (GPG's). These new guidelines attempted to dovetail the emerging nuclear force structure with the NATO strategy of flexible response. Specifically, they tried to incorporate all the NPG studies of the 1970's into one document that included initial and, for the first time, follow-on use principles for TNF. The GPG's also


incorporated INF and sea-based missiles into SHAPE targeting plans. They updated and replaced a number of NATO operational policies, including the 1969 Provisional Political Guidelines for initial use and the 1970 General Release guidelines. And they attempted to articulate a better counterforce nuclear doctrine. In that sense they were the NATO equivalent and follow-up to earlier American doctrinal shifts that moved the US toward a warfighting strategy: Carter’s Presidential Directive 59 in 1980, and the 1981 Reagan National Security Decision Directive 13.³

The GPG’s attempted to accommodate two divergent views of the value of such weapons: the American outlook that saw tactical nuclear weapons as potential warfighting instruments, whose deterrent value was enhanced by improved military capabilities; and the European view that saw their value only as pure deterrements, in which case longer ranges were better because they threatened targets of higher value—especially the USSR.⁴ The GPG’s shifted the modernization emphasis from battlefield nuclear weapons toward deep strike weapons, largely at the urging of West Germany.⁵ In this way they formally recognized for the first time a NATO commitment to the German position: to carry nuclear escalation to the Soviet homeland in


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the event of conflict.6

The basic bargain outlined by the US and USSR at Reykjavik in 1986 included the banning of all long-range INF missiles (LRINF) from Europe, in accordance with Reagan's 1981 "zero-option" offer—the West would reverse its deployment of Pershings and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets withdrew their SS-20's from Europe. Helmut Kohl had written a letter to President Reagan in September 1986 asking that the US press the Soviets for future negotiations on missiles in the 150 to 1000 kilometer range after an INF Treaty was signed.7 At the Reykjavik summit, however, the US delegation confined the possibility of follow-on negotiations to those missiles with ranges of 500 to 1000 km. NATO subsequently followed the American lead and publicly supported talks on shorter-range INF (SRINF) forces but not short-range (SNF) forces, as Bonn had demanded.8

Chancellor Kohl visited Washington a week after the Reykjavik summit to discuss the American position first-hand with Reagan. Kohl told the president that NATO should not consider partial zeros; if INF missiles


were to be eliminated, then the alliance should also discuss short-range systems that could only be detonated on German soil. The issue of German singularity had arisen.

Kohl was not alone in his opinion. Many Europeans (and some American military officers) saw the outcome of the chain of events set in motion by the Reykjavik understanding as the worst of all possible worlds. The elimination of the middle rung of NATO nuclear escalatory capabilities, the one theater rung which seemed to most concern the Soviets, would leave the alliance in worse shape than before the dual track decision of 1979: facing Soviet conventional and SNF superiority in Central Europe. Josef Joffe pointed out the continuity in German concerns that was shown by Kohl's trip, which echoed Helmut Schmidt's fears a decade earlier with respect to INF: Kohl was reasserting Western Europe's classic anxiety, what amounts to the basic law of European defense: Stabilizing any one level of the deterrence structure through arms control magnifies imbalances on the next level below, diminishing West European

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9Boutwell, p. 177; Post, 22 Oct 1986; and Robert McCartney, "Kohl Wants Wider Accord on Missiles," Post, 16 May 1987, p. 18. Volker Rühe acted as Kohl's point man on this issue, traveling to every major ally's capital to express Germany's worries over the possible elimination of LRINF. We saw examples of his presentations in Chapter Six.


11Boutwell, p. 176, and interviews in Bonn, Brussels, and Washington, 1989-1990. The lament heard most often from NATO officials when discussing the origins of the SNF debate was that "we negotiated away the wrong systems first." See Figure 4 in Chapter Five.
And, like Schmidt in 1977, Kohl exhorted Reagan not to shift the balance of risk to the Europeans in such a manner.

In February 1987 Gorbachev upped the ante by suggesting that limitations on shorter-range theater missiles (SRINF) be linked to those on INF. In April US Secretary of State George Shultz travelled to Moscow to meet with Gorbachev. He returned with the Soviet Union's latest concession: "double zero"—the elimination from Europe of both LRINF and SRINF missiles with a range greater than 500 kilometers. The US had responded in March with an intrusive verification proposal for the earlier Soviet proposal of lower ceilings on SRINF, as an alternative to "double-zero," which the US also accepted in principle. The Soviet Union accepted a global double zero formula in July in order to ease its

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13 Daniel Charles, "NATO Looks for Arms Control Loopholes," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1987, p. 9. Shultz stopped off in Brussels on his way home to brief the allies on the latest proposal. In the press conference that followed, he went out of his way to emphasize that arms control success required parallel nuclear modernization. Richard Perle, who was with Shultz on this trip, thought that this was the ideal time to force the allies into publicly accepting future SNF deployments on their soil, using the carrot of major reductions in nuclear weapons ("Genscher was desperate for the double zero," according to one source) and the stick of probable domestic opposition if they delayed such a decision. Perle believed he had convinced Shultz to agree with this stance on the flight from Moscow to Bonn, but once there "the State Department weenies" talked the Secretary out of forcing such a commitment on the allies. From interviews in Washington, May 1990.

14 The earlier offer called for zero INF in Europe, but up to 100 missiles authorized globally. The Soviets said they would put their's in Asia; the US responded by planning to place its launchers in Alaska.
verification requirements.\textsuperscript{15}

It was during this time that German elite opinion became heated. Leading German Atlanticists railed against the proposed INF plan, saying it would lead to the de-nuclearization of Europe and de-coupling from America. Some critics called the INF accord "the European Munich."\textsuperscript{16} The far right wing of the CDU/CSU was particularly upset over the proposals of Reykjavik. Warning of a possible superpower "sell-out" of German interests, the right criticized the US leadership for its unilateral manner of negotiating with the Soviets and for the results of those talks. The German view of the political use of nuclear weapons required, as we have seen, that they be used early in a conflict to strike the Soviet homeland. With this position finally accepted by the other NATO states in the recently approved General Political Guidelines, the West Germans were now aghast that the only weapons capable of accomplishing this mission were going to be signed away.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15}Boutwell, p. 179; and Daalder, "Debate."


\textsuperscript{17}On the other hand, the GPG's obviously did not solve all of the alliance's problems. The WINTEX/SIMEX command post exercises, a biannual event, were conducted in the NATO command bunker in Ahrtal, FRG, in March 1989 and were the first to employ the new guidelines. In the course of the war games, the Warsaw Pact did not cease hostilities after the initial "nuclear warning shot" (actually 17 warheads in all, of which one was delivered against a target in the Soviet Union and three landed on East Germany), so the alliance prepared to launch a package of militarily significant strikes (25 more warheads, several of which were targeted on West German and Turkish soil) as a second warning. Both the German and Turkish delegations protested this scenario, but the US refused to change its plans. The German contingent became so flustered when faced with actually using tactical nuclear weapons in a follow-on mode, as stipulated by the agreed GPG's, that they called Chancellor Kohl for advice on how to respond. His orders: "Stop this idiocy." The Germans basically stopped
The French and British were just as upset, and joined with Kohl in urging Reagan to reject the double zero. Rühe and Alfred Dregger continued their rounds of NATO capitals to drum up support for their opposition to the American position. This diplomatic approach ended, however, when British Prime Minister Thatcher stunned Kohl and French Premier Jacques Chirac by suddenly switching sides at the May NPG meeting in Norway, throwing her support behind Reagan and the double zero concept. She had an election scheduled for June, and did not want to be on the wrong side of an unpopular nuclear issue.18

Thatcher and Secretary of State Shultz thereafter characterized the 500-kilometer threshold as a "firebreak" below which NATO would never go in further arms control cuts. This placed them in direct opposition to the German SNF proposal, which specifically called for reductions down to the shortest battlefield ranges. Kohl was incensed, vowing to Mitterand that "never again would he allow himself to be outflanked on a nuclear

the exercise by stalling for the final three days, claiming that the US and Britain were unsympathetic to West German concerns and over-eager to begin using TNF, even in a training scenario. See Tony Catterall, "War Game 'Idiocy' Fires Kohl Resolve," The Observer, 30 Apr 1989; "'Der Iwan kommt--und feste druff: Wie die Amerikaner den großen Atomschlag in Europa übten," Der Spiegel, 1 Mai 1989, pp. 23-27; an English translation of the Spiegel article, "Ivan Comes--Let Us Beat Him: How the Americans Practice for the Big Nuclear Strike in Europe," unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency message from FBIS, Vienna, 051005Z May 89; "NATO Chiefs at Odds on War Targets," Washington Times, 24 May 1989, p. 10; and Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, pp. 92-93.

18Newhouse, p. 103; Charles, "Loopholes," p. 11. The British defection was most embarrassing for the German government, since it came directly on the heels of Rühe's last visit to London. They were "stunned" and felt "betrayed," according to Joseph Fitchett, "Europe Sees Lesson in INF Diplomacy," International Herald Tribune, 5 Feb 1988, p. 1.
issue by the Americans and the British.19 Another conservative Bundestag minister complained that "Britain wanted a 'firewall' that would keep all the missiles falling only on Germany."20

As the double zero idea gained strength and public support, the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition found itself in a dilemma. While it recognized the strategic dangers of agreeing to such a formula, since that would make the two Germanies singularly exposed to the remaining SNF forces, the CDU also recognized that to stand in the way of this agreement would brand it as the "missile party" in the public's eye--with uncertain but predictably negative results for the CDU coalition in the next elections.21 Kohl found that he was isolated abroad and under increasing pressure at home.

A double zero deal would also create problems for the 720-km range Pershing IA's owned by the Luftwaffe. Although the INF negotiations were bilateral, Gorbachev demanded that the German missiles be included in any agreement. The US at first refused, supporting the West German claim that the PIA's should be considered third-party weapons, like the French and British missiles.22 When it had urged the Germans to upgrade their Pershings in the late 1970's, the US had promised that weapons under

19Newhouse, p. 103. "Firebreak" was a singularly poor choice of words to describe the Anglo-American position. To the Germans, "firebreak" (Brandmauer) seemed to imply a cleared zone laid out around their country, exaggerating its nuclear singularity. See also Elizabeth Pond, "Consensus is Forming on Nuclear Missiles," International Herald Tribune, 20 Apr 1988, p. 15.


21Asmus, p. 10.

Programs of Cooperation with allies would never be included in an arms control deal. But the US then announced that it was leaving the decision up to the national governments concerned while still opposing their inclusion in the INF talks. This left Kohl alone facing the full effects of a public opinion that was overwhelmingly in favor of the arms control cuts promised by the INF negotiations.

WEST GERMANY ACCEPTS DOUBLE ZERO

By summer the German coalition realized that it could not hold out any longer against the popularity of double zero. Accordingly, in June 1987 Kohl reversed the government's position and came out in favor of an INF double zero solution. His one stipulation—that the West German Pershing I's be excluded from the negotiations—also proved to be an untenable position, from which he further retreated in August. Domestic and international pressures forced the Kohl government not only to cave in on double zero, but to give up their Pershing I's to preclude blocking the INF Treaty between the superpowers. The government linked its acceptance to demands for a "third zero" to consider battlefield weapons in the INF talks, as well. In addition, the FRG began to balk at carrying out the second half of the Montebello Decision. As early as April West Germany had told Washington that a double zero agreement would make it politically difficult to support SNF modernization, and it rejected an


24In August 1987 Kohl announced that the Pershings would be unilaterally dismantled "following the final elimination of all Soviet and American INF systems." Boutwell, p. 180; Asmus, p. 10; and "Germany, US Remove Last Obstacles to INF Agreement," Arms Control Today, September 1987, p. 30.
earlier Pentagon proposal to replace Lance with an increased number of longer-range missiles to compensate for INF.\textsuperscript{25}

The reasons for Kohl's turnaround on double zero were driven to a great extent by domestic political factors. On the one hand, he could not afford infighting within the CDU coalition on an issue that obviously had broad public support. The CDU/CSU had done poorly in Land elections in late May, with Genscher's FDP gaining ground at their expense. Second, by the summer of 1987 both Britain and France opposed the German suggestion that the alliance negotiate to lower but equal ceilings on shorter-range INF missiles, such as the FRG's Pershing I's, instead of seeking a second zero-option. Finally, Kohl was wary of jeopardizing the first state visit by East German Prime Minister Honecker scheduled for later that fall.\textsuperscript{26}

If the FRG could not get alliance support for negotiations on SNF, at least it could try to slow the modernization of those weapons. In 1986 the alliance created a High Level Task Force to formulate conventional arms control positions and consider a German request to delay making any formal commitment to SNF modernization until a "comprehensive concept on arms control and disarmament" relating arms control and military needs had

\textsuperscript{25}Robert McCartney, "West Germany May Renege on Battlefield Missile Plan," \textit{Post}, 12 Jul 1987, p. 1; and Daalder, "Debate," p. 453. This was a DOD proposal to replace Germany's Pershing IA's with PIB's, a position strongly supported by Defense Minister Wörner and his ministry staff.

been developed. In the German view, there was "no hurry" in making a decision on FOTL. Many in the FRG believed that NATO could afford to decrease its nuclear stockpile substantially. The FRG's insistence on calling for this study also reflected a need to develop (or try and restore) an intra-governmental consensus on the SNF issue. On the other hand, cynics thought the Comprehensive Concept was meant as "a broad NATO concept to lend what would amount to political cover for a West German decision to accept a new short-range missile."

The comprehensive concept review program was first formulated at the June 1987 North Atlantic Council meeting. At the same meeting the foreign ministers outlined an arms control framework meant to address European concerns over the de-nuclearization of the continent: bilateral negotiations on short-range nuclear forces would begin "in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons." This formula also served as a compromise between the German delegation, which wanted post-INF negotiations on SNF to begin as soon as any others, and her major allied partners, who preferred to see future arms control negotiations in

27 Oliver Ramsbotham, Modernizing NATO's Nuclear Weapons: 'No Decisions Have Been Made' (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 135; and interview in Washington, April 1991. France also agreed to participate in this broad review of NATO arms control strategy, thereby adding political legitimacy to the process.


29 James Markham, "In NATO, Brand New Missile Debate," NYT, 25 Jan 89.


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sequential terms with discussions on SNF given a very low priority.\textsuperscript{31}

**COMPENSATORY MEASURES DEBATED**

Everyone agrees that if we accept the zero solution, we need compensatory measures.\textsuperscript{32}

In April 1987 the High Level Group met in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to discuss ways of compensating for lost theater nuclear capabilities after an INF agreement. For public relations reasons, the term "compensating" was forbidden; instead, the HLG studied possibilities for "readjustment" and "rebuilding" after INF.\textsuperscript{33} NATO's defense ministers, meeting in May in Stavanger, Norway, in joint session of the NPG and the Defense Planning Committee, supported this study by recommending the modernization of both nuclear and conventional systems.\textsuperscript{34} SACEUR told the group that the elimination of long-range missiles would hamper his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. His assessment was buttressed by a similar report from the Military Committee. Both advocated steps to

\textsuperscript{31}Daalder, "Debate," p. 452.

\textsuperscript{32}A European official at NATO headquarters, quoted in Charles, "Loopholes," p. 7. Of course, I could have quoted the opposite view: "When one hears such language in NATO as: 'compensate' for the treaty, or take 'compensatory' measures, the thought must surely cross his mind that if NATO needs to compensate for this treaty, maybe it should not have been agreed in the first place." General Bernard Rogers, "NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance," prepared statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee, NATO Defense and the INF Treaty, Hearings, Part 2 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 1 February 1988, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{33}Ramsbotham, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{34}Michael R. Lucas, The Western Alliance after INF: Redefining US Policy Toward Europe and the Soviet Union (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 33.
fill in the gaps opened by lost INF missiles. The FRG participated despite its earlier refusal to consider such compensatory offers by the Pentagon.

When the defense ministers met in Monterey, California, for the November NPG meeting, the INF Treaty signing was only weeks away. The US position was that it was not going to sign anything until it was sure that its nuclear deterrent mission in Europe could be successfully fulfilled without the Pershing II or GLCM. As Defense Secretary Carlucci later told a Congressional committee,

Before entering into our agreement with the Soviets we made sure that from the standpoint of the military implications of the INF Treaty, NATO's resulting force structure would be fully capable of supporting deterrence--provided that we vigorously pursue the necessary modernization, and make use of the gains in capability achieved over the last few years.

Several possibilities for new longer-range TNF weapons were considered in Monterey. These would either fall beneath the range restrictions of the INF Treaty (500 km) or would be systems not addressed by the treaty language, such as air- and sea-based missiles. As the communique put it,

We remain concerned about the offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact arrayed against us. We are therefore determined, consistent with the framework of the Montebello Decision and with our arms control obligations, to continue to implement those measures required to maintain the effectiveness,


responsiveness, and survivability of our nuclear forces. Among the programs and systems considered: assigning sea-launched cruise missiles or more sea-launched ballistic missiles to SACEUR (in addition to the 400 SLBM warheads he already had available in case of general nuclear release); increasing the number of dual-capable aircraft in Europe, including the deployment of additional F/FB-111 aircraft to Great Britain; or the deployment of some B-52 bombers with air-launched cruise missiles to the UK. These projects were to be in addition to the SNF modernization plans already outlined in the Montebello Decision and 1985 Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study. Although NATO tried assiduously to avoid the impression of looking for compensatory systems, in actuality it was trying to flesh out weapons in the gray areas not covered by the INF Treaty. One analyst called it "a prelude to an arms race legitimated by arms control discussions."

Also at this meeting a number of European defense ministers apparently suggested that they would prefer an all-new FOTL, perhaps a Lance II, rather than the US Army’s leading candidate, a nuclear army tactical missile system (ATACMS) on the dual-capable multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) launcher. The ministers were concerned about the arms control ramifications of relying on the same system for both the

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39Lucas, p. 34; also R. Jeffrey Smith, "NATO Evaluates its Nuclear Strength After Medium-Range Arms are Gone," Post, 3 Nov 1987, p. 27.
conventional and nuclear missions. US HLG members and military officers from SHAPE responded that this was not possible; the program was too far along to change now. Critics of the decision-making process in NATO point to this as yet another example of the tight constraints which military interests place on political decision-making in the alliance.⁴⁰

Some public opposition to NATO's compensatory efforts arose, although for the most part these meetings and the topics of discussion were buried beneath the flood of publicity surrounding the upcoming INF Treaty. However, one American observer pointed out that while the arms control specialist had good reason to celebrate the INF Treaty signing, at the same time "the nuclear addicts fret about how they will clean up what they perceive as the mess after the INF party."⁴¹

Throughout 1987 France and Britain had gone forward with plans to modernize their independent nuclear forces. Britain decided to pursue a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) and to cooperate more closely with France in the future on nuclear matters.⁴² Efforts to modernize FOTL were underway in the United States, where some people saw FOTL as a symbol representing allied nuclear determination in the post-INF world. In September Congress lifted the restriction on feasibility studies for a nuclear warhead for the army tactical missile system (ATACMS) that it had

⁴⁰Ramsbotham, p. 135; story reported in The Independent, 5 Nov 1987.

⁴¹Arkin, "Happy Birthday," p. 5; also see critical editorial by Ian Davidson in The Financial Times, "Europe Pines for the Good Old Days," 10 Nov 1987, p. 27.

⁴²Daalder, p. 454. The UK did not officially announce its plans to replace the aging WE-177 gravity bombs with a TASM until May 1988.
put in place in 1984 with the Kennedy-Nunn Amendment. Senator Edward Kennedy specified that the Army could only develop a nuclear ATACMS if, after the conventional version was fielded, it became clear that a nuclear version was necessary "to preserve an adequate theater nuclear capability in Europe in the aftermath of the INF Treaty." Conservative senators and General John Galvin, the new SACEUR, argued for the continued funding of a successor to Lance in accordance with the Montebello Decision. To SHAPE and US military planners FOTL became crucial, especially in its role as a FOFA strike weapon; these officials became more impatient and demanding in trying to get firm decisions from the allies and Congress for development and eventual deployment. The American executive branch and SHAPE seemed to be developing a consensus on what weapon they wanted as the Lance replacement and what characteristics it should have: a nuclear

\[\text{[Footnotes]}\]

43For details about ATACMS and the Congressional restriction see Chapter Four. Also John Cushman, "Pentagon Seeks Atomic Warhead for New Missile," \textit{NYT}, 15 Mar 1987, p. 8; Colin Norman, "NATO Ponders its Nuclear Options," \textit{Science}, 11 Dec 1987, p. 1499. In a bit of bureaucratic sniping, Kennedy told the Army that his earlier amendment had never been meant to restrict paper studies of a nuclear version of ATACMS, although it had been so interpreted by Army lawyers and Kennedy had for two years blocked Army efforts to begin work on a nuclear version. \textit{Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1987} (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), p.242.


ATACMS carried on the dual-capable MLRS.\textsuperscript{46}

At the same time, however, Congress was growing alarmed over political developments in the FRG. The Germans appeared unwilling to sign a letter of intent to deploy FOTL, and Congress noted how uncooperative Kohl had been in the Pershing IA affair earlier in the year. Accordingly, Congress said that it would not appropriate money for FOTL research and development unless and until the European allies agreed to accept and deploy the new missile.\textsuperscript{47}

On December 7th, 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty at a Washington summit meeting. An entire category of nuclear ballistic missiles—those with ranges from 500 to 5500 kilometers—was eliminated, and the lowest rung on NATO’s nuclear escalatory ladder stood exposed. The public spotlight was already swinging around from INF to the remaining short-range systems on that rung, and on NATO’s plans for modernizing them. But the manner in which intra-allied relations had been handled during 1987 did not bode well for the security consensus necessary to carry out those plans.


THE DEVELOPING ALLIANCE CRISIS: 1988

The ice has become thinner than many think.

-- Volker Rühe

The new year began with a flurry of activity, as alliance members tried to establish their positions on the two tracks of SNF arms control and modernization and conducted numerous visits, bilateral talks, and multilateral meetings in attempting to build support for their respective sides. Later in the year, however, the issue had settled down considerably, with the United States distracted from international affairs by its own national elections in November, by the fact that the Reagan administration was a "lame duck" government, and by the belief that the SNF issue had seemingly been deferred via compromise wording at the spring NATO summit.

By early 1988 the North Atlantic alliance found itself divided into two camps. On one side stood the Americans, the British, and the French, who supported SNF modernization, opposed entering into SNF arms control negotiations until the conventional, chemical, and strategic nuclear imbalances had been met, and wanted to stop what appeared to be increasing momentum toward the progressive denuclearization of Europe. They agreed with recently retired SACEUR Bernard Rogers when he said that "We must not sacrifice the long-term credibility of our deterrent on the altar of short-term political expediency." On the other side were the West Germans, with some support from the Belgians (and, later in the year, most

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of the other continental European states), who preferred early negotiations on SNF aimed at a level lower ceiling if not zero (such talks to begin at the same time as, or before, the other arms control fora started). They wanted to put off modernization efforts indefinitely.\textsuperscript{50}

The alliance had temporarily set aside questions of timing on SNF at its spring 1987 ministerials in the interests of alliance unity over INF. But Great Britain had made it clear then that it expected full implementation of the Montebello Decision in return for its support of INF double zero. At the Monterey NPG meeting in November it was assumed that a decision to proceed with modernization would be made in the spring of 1988.\textsuperscript{51} But this possibility appeared more and more unlikely as the winter wore on. What was needed was a formula that would allow on-going SNF development, especially for the FOTL, while simultaneously minimizing any negative impact on future arms control efforts and satisfying German demands for early SNF negotiations and a Gesamtkonzept.\textsuperscript{52}

The West Germans were obviously dragging their feet with respect to FOTL modernization, no doubt in part to show displeasure with the alliance’s refusal to meet German requests for early SNF negotiations. The Christian Democratic Party was beginning to lean toward the leftist political positions on nuclear weapons espoused by the Social Democrats in


\textsuperscript{52}Kelleher, \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 1990}, p. 608.
response to public opposition to such modernization. Volker Rühe continued to lead the CDU campaign, which now called for a re-examination of the Montebello Decision. The Germans were trying to sell their allies on a package for updating Montebello in terms of the changed international political situation, particularly the INF Treaty; basically, they called for "further arms limitations and a restructuring of the arsenal." Karsten Voigt testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February that all parties in the Bundestag favored a review of the Montebello Decision. Moreover, "none of the parties...apparently support deployment of new short-range missiles." Fears within the FRG of German singularization and American de-coupling were becoming palpable. As Elizabeth Pond so aptly summarized the situation,

Unfortunately, then, at the same time that SNF became a negative symbol for the West Germans, SNF modernization became the latest test of West German loyalty to the alliance for the US, France, and especially Britain.

German fears were being addressed in a Soviet propaganda drive that shifted its emphasis away from INF and toward SNF in 1988. Taking

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53 James Markham, "Bonn Angst on Missiles," NYT, 10 Feb 1988, p. 10.

54 The package called for linkage between arms control and modernization, reductions in total numbers, moving away from weapons of the shortest ranges, and maintenance of the nuclear threat to an aggressor. (Volker Rühe, "The Treaty Which Could Leave West Germany at Greater Risk," The Independent, 10 Dec 1987.) This proposal was also the FRG's preferred package for the Gesamtkonzept. (Clemens, pp. 68-9.) The key points of this package were outlined by Hans-Dietrich Genscher in "Making Our World More Peaceful," an address to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, 4 February 1988, reprinted in Statements and Speeches (New York: German Information Center), 5 Feb 1988.


56 Elizabeth Pond, "NATO Members Declare Unanimity on Keeping Nuclear Arms Up to Snuff," CSM, 28 Apr 1988, p. 11.
advantage of the rapidly increasing popularity of Secretary Gorbachev in Western Europe, the USSR began to criticize NATO efforts to modernize its SNF forces as compensatory moves that violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the INF Treaty and threatened to damage improved Soviet-European relations. Soviet and East German leaders called for a "triple zero" ban on all short-range ballistic missiles and singled out Lance modernization plans for specific criticism.\(^57\) For example, in January 1988 the text of a letter from East German leader Erich Honecker to Kohl was released by the GDR press. Honecker suggested that the two Germanies freeze the modernization of all nuclear weapons remaining in the two states after the INF Treaty, and hinted at the eventual removal of those weapons.\(^58\) Leaders of all major parties in Bonn endorsed the proposal. During Honecker's January visit to Paris, however, the French government rejected any deal that called for SNF negotiations prior to modernization.\(^59\) Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also came to Bonn in January and urged the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons, warning that nuclear modernization would "scuttle all that has been achieved in arms control so far."\(^60\) Some American arms control advocates


\(^{60}\)Quoted in "Western Europe Facing a New Challenge," \textit{Strategic Survey 1988-1989} (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 81; see also Eric H. Thoemmes, "NATO Strategy and the INF Treaty," \textit{Global Affairs}, Winter 1988, pp. 58-59; and James Markham, "Arms and Allies: NATO A-Arsenal Cuts Disputed," \textit{NYT}, 21 Jan 1988, p. 3. The timing of this visit, says Thoemmes, was not accidental; it was meant to drive a
began to suggest that this would be a propitious opportunity for the West to capture the overwhelming Warsaw Pact superiority in SNF forces via a third zero, which for various reasons the Soviets might consider.61

In early February the alliance considered the issue of modernization in the unofficial but influential International Defense Studies (Wehrkunde) conference in München, West Germany. In his speech, Helmut Kohl made no mention of FOTL modernization requirements, pointing instead to the General Political Guidelines as proof that the alliance had shifted its focus from short-range to longer range weapons. He also emphasized the German desire to begin SNF negotiations at an early date.62 US Defense Secretary Carlucci spoke for most of the other NATO members in his response, in which he opposed SNF negotiations and urged NATO to "carry out the agreed program to modernize these systems," especially FOTL, TASM, and dual-capable aircraft. He also provided the biggest shock at the conference by implying that the failure to modernize SNF (which would effectively result in the eventual de-nuclearization of NATO through obsolescence) or the active pursuit of further arms control limitations by the Germans might lead to the withdrawal of US troops from the

wedged into the Western alliance by wooing Germany towards de-

nuclearization and possible neutralism.


continent. If we somehow get to triple-zero, then it is incumbent on me and officials of the United States to look at whether we could keep forces here," he said. This only antagonized the Germans in attendance, however, since he was calling into question the American conventional force guarantee just when Europeans needed some renewed demonstration of US steadfastness in the aftermath of INF.

The US Congress was busy holding hearings in January and February on whether to ratify the INF Treaty, as well as considering the fiscal year 1989 DOD budget request. The request included $15 million for early developmental studies to determine the best missile and warhead for the follow-on to Lance. There were at least five missiles being considered for FOTL, including the most popular candidate, a nuclear ATACMS. Congress eventually approved half the requested amount, citing allied


64Patricia Clough, "US Warns of Troop Pull-Out if Short-Range Missiles are Scrapped," The Independent, 8 Feb 1988, p. 10.

65Hunter, p. 213. Kohl said that "Any reduction in the US troop presence would give the wrong signal to the other side and be a mistake of historic proportions." Hamburg DPA in FBIS-West Europe, 8 Feb 1988, p. 1.

hesitancy to deploy FOTL as justification for the slow-down: "allied uncertainties about the timing and composition of NATO's nuclear modernization programs permit a reduction in the pace of the follow-on LANCE efforts." Moreover, the Senate suggested that "the executive branch should obtain cost-sharing agreements with the allies for codevelopment and deployment of the follow-on LANCE." Senator Dan Quayle argued that the administration should force a showdown with the allies to secure early commitment to deploy specific weapons. Other Senators, however, including Majority Leader Robert Byrd, worried that that would be premature and show insensitivity to European public opinion. Senator Sam Nunn, meanwhile, called on the European members of NATO to decide just what short-range nuclear weapons they needed and would accept.

Kohl flew to Washington later in February to seek support from Reagan for the comprehensive concept. The Chancellor was able to convince the administration that no German government, of any political persuasion, would survive an alliance decision to proceed with FOTL deployment given current conditions. A compromise was worked out between the two leaders in which testing and development of a FOTL would continue, but no alliance decision would be taken on deployment. In addition, the US seemed sympathetic to Kohl's domestic political plight and assured him that it


69Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 27 February 1988, p. 531.

70Michael Mecham, "US Outlines Modernization Plans; Allies Told Nothing is 'Concrete,'" AW&ST, 14 Mar 1988, p. 60.
would work towards the goal of a comprehensive concept. Kohl received specific assurances that Washington would not ask Bonn for an immediate commitment. In return, Kohl hinted that if the comprehensive concept included a plan for negotiated SNF reductions his government could support FOTL modernization. This compromise cleared the way for the March NATO summit.

THE SPRING ROUND OF NATO MEETINGS

In March the NATO Heads of State and Government came together in Brussels for their first summit meeting since 1982. Their purpose was to show allied solidarity and support for the INF Treaty, and to consider what to do about replacing Lance. Most commentators considered the summit a resounding success. Yet West Germany, anxious about a possible deployment battle over FOTL, enlisted the aid of French President Francois Mitterand and prevented the summit from making a decision on FOTL. The resulting "non-decision" led to a watered-down communique focused on conventional forces that allowed the alliance to sidestep the SNF issue once again. This lack of squabbling over SNF was meant to show alliance solidarity before the superpower summit in Moscow in May. The final communique wording did cause a bit of trouble until Mrs. Thatcher came up

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71James, p. 22; Lucas, p. 35; and David Fouquet, "Washington Summit Downplays US, German Differences on SNF," The NATO Report, 22 Feb 1988, p. 2.


74James, p. 22.
with the winning, albeit muddled, formula: forces would be kept "effective and up to date where necessary," and they would be necessary "for the foreseeable future." As one correspondent put it, "In the interest of unity, the wording in the final communique on this subject is vague enough for everyone to be satisfied." Kohl claimed that the communique wording was a vague commitment which mandated no immediate action; it meant that FOTL was now delayed, "a subject for the first third of the 1990's"—a date conveniently beyond the projected 1990 West German elections.

Despite the conciliatory wording of the communique, Prime Minister Thatcher stood adamantly opposed to SNF negotiations and unmoved by Kohl's political difficulties. She even repeated Britain's insistence on creating a "firebreak" for modernization programs in order to protect the alliance. The day after the summit ended Thatcher was telling Parliament that a decision on modernization would have to be made "in short order," perhaps as soon as at the April NPG meeting. Nor was the United States relenting in its commitment to eventual implementation of

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76"Disagreements at NATO," Financial Times, 4 Mar 1988, p. 16.

77Clemens, p. 70.


long-range compensatory programs for INF. This was made clear in Secretary of Defense Carlucci's report to Congress entitled "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990's," in which he re-asserted that American policy called for conventional and nuclear modernization that was neither linked to nor subject to results of arms control. The Carlucci plan received favorable bipartisan support from Congress and was referred to by both parties during the autumn electoral campaign.\textsuperscript{81}

At the April 1988 NPG meeting the ministers endorsed a step-by-step approach to restructuring NATO's missile force following INF withdrawals. This idea allowed separate decisions to be made in the future for each weapon type, rather than an all-or-nothing vote on the entire SNF modernization package. It was based on an HLG study presented at this meeting which had examined the consequences of LRINF and SRINF removal, and the options available to NATO in response.\textsuperscript{82} However, because the March summit had specifically announced that no decisions on modernization would be made until the completion of a comprehensive statement, the NPG took no steps to implement the plan. The group did re-affirm its commitment to the Montebello Decision and authorized "national efforts" to prepare for meeting modernization requirements. This endorsement was meant to give the US administration leverage over an increasingly hesitant Congress for FOTL funding.\textsuperscript{83} The NPG also called for another HLG review of the role of SNF in NATO's deterrent strategy. The purpose of this

\textsuperscript{81}Carlucci, "Report;" Lucas, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{82}Daalder, "Debate," p. 457.

study was to rationalize further modernization efforts, thereby improving
the chances of obtaining a consensus to do so.\(^8^4\)

This newest HLG review focused on the follow-on to Lance program.
Whereas until now the US and SHAPE had assumed that a nuclear version of
the Army tactical missile system would satisfy the FOTL requirement
(assuming that Congress would eventually lift the restriction on a nuclear
version), SACEUR was forced to re-examine his range requirements for a
land-based missile after the elimination of INF forces. ATACMS with a
nuclear warhead had a projected range of 250 km, which had been long
enough for the NWRS-85 mission. Now, however, the range requirement was
increased to about 450 km.\(^8^5\) This would better serve SACEUR's targeting
problems after INF, allow cross-corps targeting flexibility, and
concurrently meet long-standing German desires for a longer-range system
that would land on territory other than Germany. Unfortunately for NATO
planners, it meant that ATACMS was no longer in the picture. The US Army
began scrambling to find an alternative that could be ready in time for

\(^{8^4}\)Robert Joseph, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1990-1991,

\(^{8^5}\)This range number was kept classified until after the program's
cancellation, primarily in an attempt to prevent opposition groups from
pointing to this as an example of circumvention of the spirit of the INF
Treaty. (Interviews at USEUCOM, August 1989, SHAPE, August 1989 and June
1990, and Washington, May and December 1990 and January 1991.) SACEUR had
called for a 450 km missile well before this, but it was not officially
confirmed, nor did the HLG or NPG change the mission requirement for
acquisition purposes until the October 1988 NPG meeting. ("NATO Chief
Backs Missile Upgrade," Financial Times, 19 Jan 1988.) In Congressional
testimony, General Galvin said that "surface to surface [missiles] would
be limited to 500 kilometers, and I would like to get as close to that as
I can." "NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance," Senate Armed Services
Committee Hearings, Part 2, NATO Defense and the INF Treaty, 1 February
1988, p. 179.
initial deployment in 1995.

The way in which the disagreements were papered over at the spring NATO meetings showed the lack of urgency among the allies on the need to create a coordinated policy approach for this divisive issue. A glance at the electoral calendar for the upcoming years in the US and the FRG would have shown that the alliance had a small "window of opportunity" in which to make and announce hard decisions on SNF without them having a disastrous impact on a government's electoral chances. That window would open in January 1989 and close in about May of the same year, 18 months prior to the expected German elections.86

THE OUTLINES OF A COMPROMISE EMERGE

The High Level Group met in Seattle in September 1988 to consider options for modernization in accordance with the mandate given them by the Nuclear Planning Group in April.87 Although not yet ready to make specific proposals, the HLG did present its initial findings to the NPG in their October meeting in the Netherlands. While the defense ministers agreed that "for the foreseeable future, NATO requires diversified, survivable and operationally flexible nuclear forces in Europe across the entire spectrum of ranges, including SNF,"88 the US and UK were still unable to convince their allies to formally endorse the first steps of a

86Asmus, p. 19.


modernization program. The onus of blocking a consensus this time fell on Belgium. The Belgian Defense Minister, Guy Coeme, announced at the beginning of the session that he could not endorse a High Level Group report supporting SNF modernization. He agreed with the Germans that any upgrade decisions should only take place in accordance with a comprehensive concept that included future arms control strategy as well as nuclear requirements. Belgium was only persuaded to sign on to the final communique when everyone agreed that the wording in no way committed any state to deployment prior to the completion of the comprehensive concept.

After the meeting Coeme told reporters that Belgium supported SNF modernization, and only questioned the timing of a go-ahead decision. But he also expressed some concern with the NATO decision-making process. For example, in his view a "step-by-step" approach actually meant that "You stick your finger in it and soon, first your arm and then your entire body is taken. In fact, you never know at which point a decision is made."

Late in 1988 the Reagan administration began pushing hard to get a firm FRG commitment to FOTL deployment. West Germany appeared to be

86 Daalder, "Debate," p. 459; William Tuohy, "NATO Ministers Reaffirm Goal to Modernize A-Arms," Los Angeles Times, 29 Oct 1988, p. 4. Belgian opposition came as a surprise, given their previous record of support for NATO nuclear policies; it was likely a consequence of a new center-left coalition government that had recently assumed power in Brussels.

90 McCausland, Chapter 5, p. 3; "NATO Keeps on Course on Updating," International Herald Tribune, 29 Oct 1988, p. 2.


moving toward a compromise position that would break the alliance impasse on SNF forces. The Kohl government had conducted an intra-governmental study, chaired by Horst Teltschik, Kohl's senior foreign policy and national security advisor, which laid out the basis for a compromise that looked, as it would turn out, very much like the final agreement reached in the May 1989 NATO summit. His blueprint for the future of strategy, arms control, and military requirements formed the basis for consultations within the Federal Security Council. It had four major provisions: 1) a unilateral reduction of 1100 weapons in the NATO nuclear stockpile, to a level of 2900; 2) early negotiations with the USSR on SNF missiles to lower and equal levels; 3) ruling out the possibility of a nuclear "third zero" for SNF missiles; and 4) modernization of Lance under those conditions.93 The paper clearly represented a compromise between the pro-modernization Defense Ministry and the arms control-oriented Foreign Ministry.

With this paper in hand, Kohl flew to Washington in November. There he told the President that his government was prepared to reach a decision on the SNF issue by spring 1989, at the NATO 40th anniversary summit. Kohl had reversed his earlier desire to delay such a decision, and now preferred to have the issue settled and the controversy over with before

the 1990 general election. The compromise would include approval for FOTL deployment in Germany (with a new 450 KM range missile) and TASM deployment aboard Luftwaffe aircraft. In return, Kohl wanted assurances that NATO would agree to deep reductions or elimination of nuclear artillery, and to SNF arms control negotiations. Kohl was so sure of being able to keep this agreement that he told Thatcher and Mitterand of his decision to deploy FOTL at their European Community meeting in Rhodes, Greece in December. What he apparently forgot, however, was that his political fortunes rested on a coalition of forces at home, with whom he had not cleared this agreement before going to Washington. Satisfying the allies was not necessarily the most important goal of everyone in Bonn, as Kohl (and the rest of NATO) was soon to find out.

While Kohl’s agreement did appear path-breaking by its explicit endorsement of FOTL deployment, it also made such deployment contingent on the implementation of the Gesamptkonzept and progress in arms control. Even if the Germans accepted this deal in the spring of 1989, in other words, they still had a way out when deployments began in the mid-1990’s. Nevertheless, the FRG now appeared to be bound more tightly

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96Jim Hoagland, "NATO’s Next Missile?" Post, 29 Dec 1988, p. 23.

97Clemens, p. 73.

98Clemens, p. 73.
than before to FOTL deployment, a view held by many who saw the issue in political terms:

the argument developing over the FOTL is really about political intentions, not military capabilities. Getting West Germany to agree to accept a new Lance now is a political device to reaffirm Bonn's allegiance to NATO.99

The emergence of an apparent consensus on SNF had a last-minute impact on the latest Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS-88), which the SHAPE staff was finalizing for delivery to NATO's High Level Group in January 1989. The study endorsed the HLG's plan to extend FOTL's range beyond 250 km and supported the idea of linking SNF modernization commitments with reductions in the overall nuclear stockpile. Specifically, NWRS-88 stated that NATO could reduce its warhead levels by another 1000 artillery shells and bombs, a cut similar in size to the West German proposal, leaving some 3000 warheads in Europe.100 This would only be possible, however, if the remaining shells were modernized, according to SACEUR.101 As for FOTL, the Pentagon planned to produce a total of about 1000 new missiles; subtracting those used for training, testing, and spares, one could presume that about 700 would be deployed in Europe. That meshed with General Galvin's comment that he wanted to

99Jim Hoagland, "NATO's Next Missile?" Post, 29 Dec 1988, p. 23.

100The details of NWRS-88 remain classified, of course, but many have been leaked to the press. See Charles Corddy, "NATO Weighs New Nuclear Weapons Cuts," Baltimore Sun, 17 Feb 1989, p. 1; Michael Gordon, "NATO Looks to Newer, Fewer Arms," NYT, 19 Apr 1989, p. 8; Kelleher, SIPRI Yearbook 1990, p. 614; and Daalder, "Debate," pp. 460-461. The general conclusions of the study were confirmed by Robert Joseph in his testimony before the House, 14 June 1989.


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replace the 690 Lance missiles with a "comparable" number of follow-on's.\textsuperscript{102} The remaining stockpile was likely to comprise 900 AFAPS and 1400 bombs for dual-capable aircraft, with 900 of the latter scheduled to be replaced by TASM in the mid-1990's.\textsuperscript{103}

The US Army had initiated development programs for both FOTL and TASM in August 1988, and decided on the capability and deployment requirements for these systems in December 1988.\textsuperscript{104} A six-month series of test firings for ATACMS was scheduled to begin in January.\textsuperscript{105} And a competitive Request for Proposal was scheduled to be released in March 1989 for the missile itself.\textsuperscript{106} Everything seemed to be falling into

\textsuperscript{102}William Casey, "NATO Commander Galvin is Convinced Allies Need to Update Nuclear Missiles," \textit{WSJ}, 19 Apr 1989, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{103}Daalder, "Debate," p. 462; "Galvin: Mobility and Interdiction to Gain Importance after CFE," \textit{Aerospace Daily}, 20 Oct 1989, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{104}Michael Gordon, "Pentagon Working on a New Missile for West Germany," \textit{NYT}, 17 Feb 1989, p. 1; Joseph testimony, 14 June 1989. Exact specifications for the FOTL missile had not yet been released, nor had the contractors been selected. Nevertheless, in line with the recent NATO HLG and SHAPE NWRS studies DOD officially rejected earlier plans to use ATACMS for the follow-on-to-Lance because of its limited range. There were now five leading candidates for the FOTL missile: an updated Lance, a modified Patriot, the French Hades, a modified Pershing, or an all-new design. The Army chose MLRS for the FOTL launcher, and the Air Force selected SRAM-T for TASM; both would use a modified version of the W-85 warhead off the Pershing II missile. See Chapter Four for details; also SIPRI Yearbook 1989, p. 9; General John Galvin, answers to questions for the record, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, \textit{Department of Defense Appropriations for 1990}, Hearings, Part 2 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1989); and interviews in Washington, May 1990, January and February 1991.

\textsuperscript{105}"SNF Modernisation Plan Centre of Talks," \textit{Jane's NATO Report}, 17 Jan 1989, p. 3.

place for final NATO endorsement of the Montebello modernization package in early 1989, with deployments to take place on schedule in the next decade. But it was not to be. NATO's emerging consensus on a plan to modernize the follow-on to Lance was suddenly dealt a severe blow from an unexpected direction. In an address to the United Nations on December 7th Mikhail Gorbachev announced major unilateral cuts in Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe. The ball was back in NATO's court.

PRE-SUMMIT MANEUVERING, 1989

There is never a good time to make hard decisions, but the current combination of obstacles looks unusually bad.

--Arnold Kanter, December 1988¹⁰⁷

In December 1988, just four days after Kohl had told his colleagues at the EC conference of his decision to approve FOTL deployment in the spring, President Gorbachev made his dramatic speech at the United Nations, wherein he scored a public relations coup by announcing large unilateral Soviet force reductions in Europe.¹⁰⁸ Observers immediately recognized the effect this newest Soviet move would have on NATO modernization plans, especially given latent opposition to SNF upgrades in the West German public and the US Congress. The fiscal year 1990 defense budget request was due to the Congress in January, with a substantial increase in requested funding for the follow-on to Lance missile program, now entering its second year. The likelihood of its passage was


diminished even more by Gorbachev's announcement. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze capitalized on Gorbachev's success in January by extending the unilateral cuts to short-range nuclear weapons deployed in Eastern Europe.

Helmut Kohl also felt the pressure from Gorbachev's speech, and was forced to reassess his earlier decision. The West German cabinet issued a declaration in January 1989 seeking to clarify, but delay, its position on SNF, but it was noticeably vague—no doubt reflecting the ambiguity within the coalition itself. A week later Defense Minister Rupert Scholz was widely criticized for his statement to the press that the modernization of SNF systems was "inescapable." This line of thinking was rapidly becoming unacceptable within the German government, and even Chancellor Kohl publicly rebuked Scholz for speaking prematurely.

In February 1989 Kohl reversed the position he had recently stated to Reagan, Thatcher, and Mitterand, and called on the alliance to postpone its modernization decision until 1991 or 1992. In an interview, Kohl reminded his readers that Lance would remain in place until 1995, so no


decisions were necessary at this time. Furthermore, he said, "It doesn't interest me at all if others see this as a sort of litmus test. I have to represent German interests and I am a reliable partner." 112

This move surprised many analysts, and probably reflected a political decision on Kohl's part to try and shift toward public opinion following the CDU's losses in the West Berlin elections on 29 January. With Länder elections just weeks away, Kohl was forced to minimize his future political risks and align himself with the mood of the electorate. 113 After all, as The Economist put it, "The weathervane now shows West Germans to be captivated by Moscow's Gorbacharm and bored about military security." 114 His change of heart may also have been a reaction to the negative public outcry that occurred that same week when the press reported that Germany was developing a short-range missile designed to circumvent the INF Treaty restrictions and possibly carry a nuclear warhead. Kohl responded by immediately cancelling the program in an effort to defuse the issue. 115


114"Worried About West Germany," The Economist, 18 Feb 1989, pp. 16-17.

115Studies on the KOLAS rocket had been commissioned by the FRG government in 1985 as a successor to its Pershing IA missiles. The system was conceived as a delivery vehicle for advanced conventional submunitions.
German rhetoric was becoming strident. Speeches by Genscher now "demanded" rather than requested that NATO begin arms control negotiations without delay. In chastising both superpowers, Genscher moved the level of the debate a notch higher than it had previously been and showed the ever-increasing assertiveness of the West German political elite.\textsuperscript{116}

The new administration of President George Bush had taken office in late January without fully comprehending the intensity of European antipathy to theater nuclear modernization plans. It had not yet worked out its basic concepts and strategies for foreign and security policy, and it was distracted by the public row over the nomination of John Tower to be Defense Secretary. Generally speaking, the military leadership, both in the Pentagon and at SHAPE, favored FOTL modernization, as did the National Security Council and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Congress was less enthusiastic, especially given European hesitancy. The State Department was somewhere in between, hoping to work out a compromise in the triangle that was also affected by allied pressures.\textsuperscript{117}

The Bush team began by pushing for early commitment to FOTL deployment—a policy no doubt reflecting Vice President Quayle's stance in the Senate Armed Services Committee budget hearings the previous spring. But they quickly backed off once they realized how sensitive an issue this was.

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\textsuperscript{117}Dembinsky, pp. 20-21.
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was in Europe. The week after taking over his new post, Secretary of State James Baker went on his inaugural fact-finding tour of the major NATO capitals. He visited eighteen countries in five days, and came back to Washington convinced that FOTL was the number one foreign policy concern of the alliance and hence for the new administration. This point was driven home in Bonn, where Baker met with Genscher and Kohl just days after the Chancellor had reversed his stance on SNF. The Germans reportedly told the American that "the momentum which now has been achieved in the disarmament process in Europe, in particular by the unilateral steps taken by Gorbachev, should not be stopped by a false signal (to modernize the Lance) that could be interpreted as rearmament instead of disarmament."" In March the US position softened enough that it could agree to give in a little to German demands. It tried to do so in three ways. First, SACEUR's report, "The Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study 1991-98" (NWRS-88), had projected large cuts in nuclear artillery and bombs over the next decade if NATO were to deploy new, better weapons--particularly FOTL. This projection was developed into a US offer to Bonn that suggested


120Michael Gordon, "NATO Looks to Newer, Fewer Arms," NYT, 19 Apr 1989. These cuts could reduce the tactical nuclear inventory by up to one-quarter, according to SACEUR, once modernization began to yield "greater precision and greater efficiency." Russell Watson, "Bush's First Foreign Crisis," Newsweek, 8 May 1989, p. 17.
unilateral cuts in allied nuclear artillery by 50% if the Soviets would follow suit, and conditional on NATO deploying both FOTL and TASM; in addition, NATO would consider additional cuts in nuclear forces if there was concrete progress in the CFE talks in Vienna. This offer was forwarded to NATO as a working paper in early May.

Second, at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Brussels in April the US and Great Britain agreed not to press Bonn for an early decision on Lance modernization. A week before the NPG meeting the Belgians had reiterated their demands from the previous fall for early SNF negotiations with the Soviets. Prime Minister Wilfried Martens called upon NATO to postpone any FOTL decision that would increase the range of SNF missiles in Europe. In effect, the US gave in to German and Belgian demands to delay a decision until after the December 1990 elections, despite NATO hopes to have such a commitment by the May 1989 summit.

The language of the communique stressed the "step-by-step approach, under which decisions will be made when necessary," and expressed support

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for continued national efforts toward the Montebello requirements.\textsuperscript{124} Defense ministers went out of their in explaining to the press that this was not a meeting for making decisions, but for briefings on HLG studies and NWRS-88.\textsuperscript{125}

Third, the Bush administration began to look for its own arms control initiatives in order to reclaim the alliance leadership role and counter Gorbachev's "peace offensive." Two officials were specifically tasked with sounding out independent experts for new ideas: Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Robert Blackwill, Director of European and Soviet Affairs in the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{126}

The reasoning behind this American change of heart was convoluted. At one time the Pentagon had hoped to get the Comprehensive Concept on Arms Control out of the way first, before an allied agreement on modernization, thereby avoiding what they saw was a dangerous possibility that was not in NATO's best interests: a repeat of the 1979 dual-track decision which linked arms control and weapons modernization. By the spring of 1989, however, there were divisions developing within the interagency process in Washington over the best way to tackle this problem. On the one side were those who wanted to tie the two parts together and "save" Chancellor Kohl from domestic political trouble; on


\textsuperscript{125}For example, see Richard Cheney's remarks in "Transcript of an On-the-Record Press Conference at the Conclusion of NATO's NPG Meeting, April 20, 1989, Brussels."

the other side were those who saw FOTL deployment as another "litmus test" of alliance loyalty, especially for the Germans. In addition, some observers were beginning to realize that American obstinancy on this issue was at least partly responsible for the impasse.\textsuperscript{127} Josef Joffe recognized this newest example of interdependence: "The Americans can't modernize Lance without the Germans, and the Germans can't negotiate without the Americans."\textsuperscript{128} The White House eventually came to see this as an issue that the US needed to "win"--it had, in effect, become a litmus test for America, a measure of US power, resolve, and continued leadership of the alliance.\textsuperscript{129}

**INCREASING GERMAN ASSERTIVENESS**

Just as the alliance began to think the issue had been settled pending the May summit, however, the West Germans made another sudden shift in their political demands that undermined the compromise of the NPG meeting. On the night of April 20th, as the NPG was adjourning in Brussels, Alfred Dregger and Hans-Dietrich Genscher met in a private session in Bonn in which they agreed to a five-point plan to resolve the SNF debate in the FRG's best interests. Their initiative would demand speedy negotiations on SNF within the framework of a Gesamtkonzept, defer any decision on FOTL deployment until 1992, and dissociate West Germany

\textsuperscript{127}For example, see David Lynch, "US Writing New 'Lance' Pitch to Win European Blessing," Defense Week, 27 Mar 1989, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{129}Interviews in Washington, May 1990.
from any such future decision—FOTL would become strictly a national American decision. At the same time, their plan reiterated West Germany's recognition that there was no alternative to deterrence and its opposition to a third zero for SNF. The group also agreed to leak the paper to the press and to have the government formally present these positions to the Bush administration.130

The Chancellor was not involved in the discussions or the final agreed paper. With the conservative right and the moderate left wings in Bonn now standing shoulder to shoulder on the issue of SNF negotiations as part of any modernization package, it was Genscher, not Kohl, who was making German foreign policy.131 His stock rose further in a speech by FRG President Richard von Weizsäcker later that spring that, while not mentioning the SNF controversy by name, clearly alluded to it and came down squarely in the Genscher camp: "We are not a great power, but we are not a plaything for others, either...it would be inappropriate to conceal out interests, or we would not be a predictable and reliable partner."132

Kohl had no choice but to call President Bush the next day. In addition, Kohl shuffled his cabinet, replacing the pro-modernization Scholz with Gerhard Stoltenberg as Defense Minister, and he reversed his


earlier positions on several defense issues, including a planned increase in the length of service for conscriptees. All of these were moves in the direction of public opinion.

Bush suggested a meeting before publicly announcing the five points, so on 24 April Genscher and Stoltenberg flew to Washington to present their proposal for opening negotiations on SNF with the Soviets. In meetings with Cheney and Baker at the State Department the Germans laid their fait accompli on the table. The discussions were heated and ended without resolution; the Germans flew home that evening. This visit, coming the day after Cheney's concessions in Brussels, surprised and infuriated many American leaders. The Secretary of Defense was particularly exasperated by this diplomatic style of hard-ball, and minced no words in talking to the press afterwords. "We must not fall into this dangerous trap," said Cheney. Secretary Baker was furious with the envoys for having come at all. "What we have here is grandstanding by a panic-stricken Government," said another US official. "This is no way to do business." Nor was this the normal German approach to

133Asmus, p. 29; McCausland, Chapter 5, p. 4; "Kohl Announces Major Changes in Cabinet," The Week in Germany, 14 Apr 1989, p. 1.


135"A Nasty Spat Among Friends," Time, 8 May 1989, p. 42.

136Thomas Friedman, quoting an unidentified American official in "US Rejects Appeal by Bonn for Battlefield-Arms Talks," NYT, 25 Apr 1989, p. 1; also Asmus, pp. 29-30. In my discussions with State Department officials in June 1989 I perceived a strong sense of frustration over this incident. According to one senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, State had sent emissaries to Kohl during the spring to discuss the SNF impasse, but he had been too busy to see them; then Secretary Cheney announced the agreement to delay the decision; and suddenly the Germans presented their
managing intra-alliance affairs—usually handled in a quiet, behind-the-scenes way. Some officials suspected that Genscher’s trip was taken, at least in part, for domestic purposes: "he knew this would enhance his domestic image as a proud German standing up to the English-speaking nuclear powers." Indeed, he undoubtedly expected his overture to be rejected by Washington, but he decided it was worth the trip.\textsuperscript{137} What we may have seen here was a case of "the historical chickens coming home to roost"—that is, a role reversal of Carter’s sudden turnaround with respect to the neutron bomb in 1978 and Reagan’s INF double-zero deal with the Soviets in 1987. "The Germans have long memories," noted several Washington bureaucrats, especially when it came to the way they were treated in earlier nuclear cases.\textsuperscript{138}

THE SEARCH FOR ALLIED CONSENSUS

\textit{Five weeks of one of the nastiest little crises NATO ever had.}

--Catherine Kelleher\textsuperscript{139}

Chancellor Kohl presented the five point plan in a speech to the Bundestag on April 27. Most West German politicians and opinion makers lined up behind the proposal as a reasonable compromise that took German fait accompli: they wanted early negotiations with the Soviets after all, and they sent two emissaries to Washington to "inform" the US. State’s response: "What the hell are the Germans doing?" From conversations at the State Department, June 1989. See also Don Oberdorfer and Ann Devroy, "Bush Rejects Demand by Bonn on Missiles," \textit{Post} 6 May 1989, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{138}Interviews in Washington, June 1989.

\textsuperscript{139}Kelleher, ISA presentation, 11 April 1990.

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concerns into consideration. They claimed that they were not trying to
get a third zero, but rather were attempting to begin negotiations on
lower levels of SNF forces in accordance with the Reykjavik NAC communique
of June 1987. Kohl emphasized strategic rationales for his pursuit of
arms control, justifying it by pointing to the large Soviet superiority in
SNF forces and the disproportionate cuts that the Warsaw Pact would have
to take to reach equal levels. At the same time, he admitted that
domestic political concerns played a role in his party's shift toward more
popular policy stances. The speech was generally viewed as a triumph for
Foreign Minister Genscher and his policies.\textsuperscript{140} This was made even more
evident by the tremendous cross-party applause given Genscher's speech
which followed. Here he sounded his theme that the world was witnessing
a fundamental change that required far-sighted leadership:

\begin{quote}
This is a historic opportunity. We must not let it slip by, nor idly look on from afar, but must seek to exercise creative influence. This is our responsibility!...the Federal Republic is rendering an indispensable contribution to the security of all the allies. And this entitles us to have a big say in the decision-making process, including alliance decisions on matters of defense, arms control and disarmament.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

It was hard to miss his point, and the ministers loved it. West Germany
should be "the driving force of detente," he said, and the United States


should show understanding for this responsibility.\textsuperscript{142}

Washington, on the other hand, accused the West Germans of reneging on an understanding reached at the April NPG meeting. From the American point of view, the FRG had pocketed the allies' concession at Brussels and now was demanding more—in essence, the denuclearization of NATO forces in Germany. Overreaction set in on both sides. Catherine Kelleher described the situation as follows:

Five weeks followed of public and private recriminations and attacks, numerous visits and personal and telephone consultations that resulted in stalemate, frozen silences in NATO forums and intense back-channel negotiation and bargaining...The heated debate about intentions and options in Bonn, Washington, London and even an officially silent Paris reached the heights of the most intense INF negotiation sessions.\textsuperscript{143}

American Congressmen blamed the FRG for threatening the denuclearization of Europe and the success of Soviet hegemonic aims; the Germans responded by ridiculing the concept of a dangerous and threatening Soviet Union, pointing instead to the dangers of nuclear weapons on their territory.\textsuperscript{144} Prime Minister Thatcher warned that the Germans were "playing with fire, not only with the American troops but with ours, if they think we'll keep them there indefinitely without the protection they require."\textsuperscript{145} Some American columnists began fanning the flames of anti-German concern. George Will, for instance, quoted Goethe in his warning:

\begin{footnotes}
\item[142]"Coalition Partners Disagree on Missiles," \textit{The Week in Germany}, 5 May 1989, p. 1.
\item[144]Newhouse, pp. 107-108.
\item[145]Craig Whitney, "NATO Crisis: London Frets Over the Alliance..." \textit{NYT}, 29 Apr 1989, p. 3.
\end{footnotes}
"the Germans make everything difficult, both for themselves and for everyone else." And a US official was quoted as saying that "this has become the contemporary German political style. Kohl says everything is fine until he panics at the last minute, and Genscher is devious." The political battle lines between the two sides were becoming firmer as the May summit approached. The allies appeared to be playing a game of "diplomatic chicken," waiting to see which side would back down first.

The other allies were generally quiet, sitting on the sidelines watching the two leading members of the alliance go at each other's throats. France tried to straddle the fence by rejecting a third zero on SNF but displaying sympathy for West Germany's position and her preference for delaying a decision until 1992. Great Britain remained obstinately opposed to any compromise on the issue of no SNF negotiations, period. And the FRG claimed that many of the smaller continental states


148 This phrase attributed to Hans Binnendijk in Jonathan Randal, "Thatcher, Opposing Kohl, Seeks to Block New Arms Talks with Soviets," Post, 27 Apr 1989, p. 27.

149 James Markham, "Mitterand Straddles the NATO Missile Dispute," NYT, 18 May 1989, p. 1. France could not very well support the German position unreservedly, since it was in the process of modernizing its own SNF forces: replacing the Pluton with the Hades missile, and developing a longer-range TASM. According to one source, since at least late 1988 France had chosen a policy of trying to accompany West Germany's moves, partly as a continuation of recent Franco-German cooperation, and partly as a check to ensure that the Germans did not go too far in their new assertiveness and renewed Ostpolitik. Strategic Survey 1988-1989, p. 83. For excellent short overviews of the policy positions of the European states regarding SNF, see Dembinsky, et al, pp. 23-40, and McCausland, chapter 5.
supported its position, namely Italy, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Belgium.\textsuperscript{150} In short, only the US, UK, and the Netherlands still supported FOTL modernization in accordance with the original Montebello Decision.\textsuperscript{151}

During May the US began to shift its thinking toward a compromise with the Germans. Both Bush and Kohl were uncomfortable in their respective positions. For instance:

> By aligning himself with Genscher and trying to keep in step with his critics, [Kohl] had acquired the look of someone who would do anything to stay in power. He was losing favor within his own party and its political base--the large bloc of voters who are alarmed by any serious rift with the Americans...A leader who can be blown this way and that by the political winds is rarely seen as much of a leader.\textsuperscript{152}

Bush was not in such domestic trouble over this issue, but he had left himself little room to maneuver by his adamant refusal to negotiate on SNF. He also recognized that Kohl was in dire political straits, and that to push too hard on this issue might cost the US its best possible friend in the German chancellory. Other allied governments and senior Congressmen were suggesting that he soften the American position enough to at least talk to the Germans. Early thoughts on what would eventually

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\textsuperscript{150}James Markham, "Western Officials are Now Hopeful on a NATO Accord," \textit{NYT}, 2 May 1989, p. 1; David Fouquet and Nick Cook, "NATO Forced to Rethink Nuclear Battlefield," \textit{Jane's Defence Weekly}, 4 Feb 1989, p. 178. Nevertheless, there were also hints of nervousness among these states that the Germans might go too far, thereby jeopardizing European Community cohesion or even trans-Atlantic ties. \textit{Strategic Survey 1988-1989}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{151}Kelleher, \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 1990}, p. 609; Robert McCartney, "Missile Rift Highlights NAO Split," \textit{Post}, 26 Apr 1989, p. 1. The other allies were either trying to remain neutral, or had no great interest in, or at least no public opinions on, the issue.

\textsuperscript{152}Newhouse, p. 108.
become the summit compromise began to be heard in Washington from such
disparate sources as Ambassador Paul Nitze, Senators Sam Nunn and William
Cohen, and the Canadian and Dutch governments. The idea was to link the
prospect for talks about SNF reductions (but not their elimination), along
with a delayed modernization decision, to success at the CFE talks in
Vienna. At the same time, Congress was putting verbal pressure on the
Germans to come around to the alliance point of view. During debates over
the FY90 budget in May several Senators suggested tying American troop
strength levels in Europe to German willingness to deploy modernized
SNF. Congress was now effectively telling the FRG, in quite blunt
terms, "no nukes, no troops."

On May 1st the US submitted a working document to NATO that bore the
seeds of eventual compromise, as we saw above. The German response to
this offer was positive. On a visit to Bonn two weeks later, however,
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stoked the fires of German anti-
nuclear feeling by suggesting that the USSR would back out of the INF

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155 Smyser, p. 78. Secretary of Defense Cheney also said that it would be almost impossible to keep 326,000 US troops in a de-nuclearized Europe, a point with which General Galvin, the SACEUR, agreed. Michael Kramer, "Keep the Powder Dry," Time, 29 May 89, p. 79.

Treaty if NATO modernized its Lances. Specifically, the Soviets threatened to halt destruction of their SS-23 missiles, which technically fell at or below the range limits of the treaty but had been included, or to build a new missile comparable to FOTL.\textsuperscript{157} American officials reacted coolly to this newest effort to "stir up another faction of angst-ridden Germans," as one put it, which would be an obvious violation of the INF Treaty.\textsuperscript{158}

Secretary Baker flew to Moscow in early May to confer with Soviet leaders about conventional arms control matters. He returned from high-level talks in Moscow convinced that the Soviets were serious about conventional arms control.\textsuperscript{159} Also in mid-May the West Germans began sending signals that they were willing to compromise on SNF at the NATO summit. In addition, Defense Minister Stoltenberg met Secretary Cheney for talks on this issue in Washington on May 18th.\textsuperscript{160} Sensing a way out of the SNF impasse, and frustrated by the cautious results of his much-


\textsuperscript{159}Newhouse, p. 108. The Soviets told Baker that they were willing to make the deep cuts in armored forces and manpower along the Warsaw Pact-NATO border that the West had long demanded, if in return NATO agreed to include strike aircraft, helicopters, and personnel in the negotiations. As soon as Baker's plane left Moscow, Gorbachev publicly announced a unilateral cut of 500 of the 10,000 tactical nuclear warheads the WTO had stationed in Eastern Europe. Thomas Friedman, "Gorbachev Hands a Surprised Baker an Arms Proposal," \textit{NYT} 12 May 1989, p. 1; and interviews in Washington, April 1991.

touted strategic review that called for little more than moving "beyond containment," President Bush ordered DOD to prepare a new conventional arms proposal based on the new Soviet offers that would include some US cuts, as well. This would, it was hoped, prove America's serious intent, particularly in those areas of greatest interest to the Soviets: manpower and aircraft.\(^\text{161}\)

Once he received it, the President and his closest advisors went to the President's summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine, for a weekend retreat beginning 19 May. Attending were the President, Secretary of State Baker, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs William Crowe, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, NSC Deputy Robert Gates, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, and, as a house guest, French President Mitterand.\(^\text{162}\)

The results of this gathering represented a major shift in Bush administration thinking concerning the evolving European situation. For the first few months of his administration, the Bush team had taken a conservative line, reflected in the unofficial motto for foreign policy: "status quo plus." Now, in the spring of 1989, the key figures at the top of America's executive branch finally seemed to accept that change in Europe was inevitable, and they resolved to get out in front and lead it, where possible. Among their hopes were a desire to "lock in" Gorbachev's arms control offers while he was still in power—to seize this opportunity.


to move the policy ball down the field.\textsuperscript{163} This evolving approach could be seen in Bush's set of five major foreign policy speeches made in April and May,\textsuperscript{184} in this meeting and its results at the May NATO summit, and in Secretary Baker's agreement with Gorbachev in Moscow. May 1989 was, therefore, an important turning point in the Bush administration's approach to proactive foreign policies.

This small group of influential figures meeting on the Maine coast came up with a plan to break the deadlock between the US and Britain, on the one hand, and West Germany and its allied supporters, on the other. With respect to arms control, the new idea called for delaying SNF talks until a CFE agreement was reached and conventional reductions had begun; delaying implementation of any SNF agreement until after all conventional reductions were completed; setting a timetable for completion of CFE talks within 6-12 months; and ruling out a third zero for SNF.\textsuperscript{165} This package

\textsuperscript{163}Newhouse, pp. 108, 113. According to this report, it was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral William Crowe, who pushed the "locking in" concept at the Kennebunkport meeting. This idea appeared two weeks later in one of the President's foreign policy speeches, at the Coast Guard Academy, where he promised that the US would "seize every--and I mean every--opportunity to build a better, more stable relationship with the Soviet Union." This speech was considerably more optimistic and upbeat than the first two of this series had been. This was meant to send a positive message to the Soviets, who had just put their promised conventional arms control proposals on the table at the Vienna CFE talks. George Bush, "Security Strategy for the 1990's," \textit{Current Policy}, No. 1178 (Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, US State Department, May 1989); George Seib, "Bush's Initiatives on Arms Cuts, Political Change in Europe Lead Some to Call Trip a 'Victory Tour,'" \textit{WSJ}, 2 Jun 1989.

\textsuperscript{184}See "Beyond Containment: Excerpts from the Speeches of President George Bush on Europe and East-West Relations, April 17-May 31 1989," United States Information Agency, July 1989. Transcripts of each speech were published by the State Department in \textit{Current Policy}.

apparently mollified the continental members of the alliance as to America's good intentions, allowing the US to get most of its desired positions accepted with respect to SNF, in particular NATO endorsement of continued American research and development for FOTL. It was also a public relations coup for the President, giving his administration a much-needed boost and direction, and restoring American leadership of the alliance after a period of drift.\footnote{It did not, however, totally satisfy the main actors in the SNF drama; the UK thought the offer went too far and gave up too much, while West Germany felt it still had too many restrictions.} It did not, however, totally satisfy the main actors in the SNF drama; the UK thought the offer went too far and gave up too much, while West Germany felt it still had too many restrictions.\footnote{National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft was briefing Congress on the outline of the Bush plan by 24 May, and NSC Deputy Robert Gates and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger flew to brief the European allies the week prior to the summit. The US even sent Gorbachev a letter the day before the NATO announcement, explaining the alliance position.\footnote{Accepts Principle of Missile Talks," \textit{Post}, 20 May 1989, p. 1; and David Hoffman, "Bush Gains Support of Mitterand on Arms," \textit{Post}, 21 May 1989, p. 11.}\footnote{Conversations with State Department personnel in June 1989 confirmed the story of the secretive Kennebunkport weekend.\footnote{\textit{Debate}," p. 467; Serge Schmemann, "Bonn Says Plan by US is Lacking," \textit{NYT}, 22 May 1989; Schmemann, "Bonn Sees Wide Gulf in Missile Dispute," \textit{NYT}, 23 May 1989, p. 3.}\footnote{Harry Anderson, "Bush's New Look for the NATO Alliance," \textit{Newsweek}, 12 Jun 1989, p. 35; and Church, pp. 30-31. Despite all this hurried "consultation" (or notification) with America's allies, many staff members in the State and Defense Departments who were supposedly directly involved in SNF planning were surprised by the compromise. Even the Bureau of European Affairs at State and the Theater Nuclear Planning Office in the Pentagon were in the dark about the decisions taken at Kennebunkport until they were announced at the summit—a classic example of executive}}
The British, however, stayed with their extreme position. "Mrs. Thatcher is severely out of touch with what is going on," said one British Foreign Office official. "Because she got so far out on a limb, she made it easy for Bush to find the middle way--to end by brokering differences between her and the Germans," added an American diplomat. As we shall see, this was just what the US administration needed to reassert their leadership role in determining alliance policy at the upcoming summit.

A series of high-level meetings between US and West German officials occurred in the final two weeks leading up to the summit. NATO's leaders hoped thereby to forestall an acrimonious 40th Anniversary for the alliance. The May summit was supposed to focus on conventional arms control and the comprehensive concept, but the "SNF sideshow" was threatening to take the spotlight. As of May 19th the US had accepted the principle of eventual SNF negotiations, under certain stringent conditions. The FRG, however, could not accept one condition, in particular--that talks be delayed until success at the CFE table. Nor would the US or UK budge on FRG insistence that SNF talks begin without delay. While all of the elements in the eventual compromise at the summit had already been discussed publicly and in these talks, the new twist on the American approach was the US initiative in cutting decision-making over the heads of the bureaucracy. This shows the secretive nature of closely held decisions made at the very top of the hierarchy typical of the Bush administration--on which, more in Chapter Eight. From interviews in Washington, June 1989 and March 1990.

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Both quotes in Newhouse, p. 110.

conventional arms in several new categories: manpower, aircraft, and helicopters, as well as establishing a target date for concluding a CFE agreement in 6-12 months.\textsuperscript{171} By establishing a timetable with a short-term deadline for completion of CFE talks, the alliance removed a major stumbling block to a compromise agreement linking SNF negotiations to conventional reductions: German fears that such a linkage would drag out the start of SNF talks for years. This was not an unrealistic concern; one merely had to look at the MBFR process for validation of such worries.

These final details, presented just days before the summit, gave the Germans an acceptable basis for compromise that meshed with their earlier demands. Still, there was no resolution to the problem prior to the gathering in Brussels on 29 May. The key remaining differences concerned the timing for the opening of SNF negotiations and the final disposition of Lance and FOTL in any such talks.

THE NATO SUMMIT, MAY 1989

For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the prevention of war. This is a strategy of deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces that will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary.\textsuperscript{172}

The Heads of State and Government of all sixteen NATO nations met in Brussels on 29 May for two days of talks and decisions. It is traditional


at such gatherings that all papers are staffed, coordinated, and agreed well in advance so that the leaders merely have to sign the final product for the cameras. In this case, however, it was not until the morning of the last day of the summit before the wording on the Comprehensive Concept and the Declaration of Heads of State and Government could be worked out.

A working group of senior foreign ministry officials had been formed on the morning of May 29th to try to bang out the documents; by six o'clock that evening, however, they realized they were stalled, so the Foreign Ministers were called in. In an all-night session, chaired by Dutch Minister van den Broek, the allies brokered words and nuances tying SNF and CFE into a single package. The key participants were Baker, Genscher, British Foreign Secretary Howe, and van den Broek, who orchestrated deals with the other ministers in fluent English and German. The Americans had basically accepted the German position prior to the summit; it was the British who held out the longest as pro-modernization hardliners, fearing that any talks on SNF would lead to their complete elimination. Eventually, after seven hours of negotiations that focused on only three paragraphs of the 17-page draft document, wording was achieved that allowed all sides to claim victory. The Americans and

173 Robert McCartney, "US-Bonn Accord Laid to One Word," Post, 31 May 1989, p. 18; George Church, "'Here We Go, On the Offensive,'" Time, 12 Jun 1989, p. 31; also "NATO Summit: SNF Debate Resolved, Bush CFE Plan," Jane's NATO and Europe Today, 31 May 1989, p. 2; "NATO Summit," Atlantic News, 1 Jun 1989, p. 1; and interviews in Brussels, August 1989, and Washington, June 1989, March and December 1990. According to one State Department source who was with Baker at the summit, this was exactly the kind of situation that the Secretary of State loves: using his "Texas lawyer" skills to broker an agreement between two disparate sides—in this case, the British hard-liners versus the Germans and Genscher. At the same time, the Dutch have (rightfully) taken credit for much of the compromise that was worked out during this marathon session.
British got German agreement to "partial" reductions and a commitment to make a decision on modernization in 1992; the Germans got the US and UK to agree to negotiate on SNF once conventional reductions had been achieved, and to keep their earlier promise to delay a modernization decision.

In essence, the final statement of the Heads of State and Government looked much like the German five-point proposal put forward in April, which was itself close to the position that Volker Rühe had been advocating nearly a year and a half earlier. Said one analyst familiar with these events, "the Germans got everything they wanted out of this meeting." Echoed another: "Bonn's position was adopted almost verbatim by the alliance in May 1989. Genscher thus rightly declared victory."

The summit compromise embodied five major aspects:

* NATO would continue to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe;

* the US would continue to develop FOTL, but no decision would be made on deployment until 1992;

* the US would not enter into SNF talks with the USSR until an agreement on CFE was signed and was being implemented;

* any SNF negotiations would be limited to equal and verifiable reductions--NOT elimination (no "third zero");

* Warsaw Pact SNF systems in Eastern Europe should be unilaterally reduced to match NATO levels before SNF negotiations began.176


The compromise worked out at the summit called for SNF negotiations to begin as soon as a CFE agreement was completed. This seemed to satisfy the West German concerns over nuclear singularity, and at the same time met US and British concerns over Warsaw Pact conventional superiority. According to the agreed mandate, SNF talks would begin as soon as a CFE Treaty was accomplished, but SNF cuts would not be made until conventional reductions were complete, nor until the WTO first cut its theater nuclear forces. In the words of the Comprehensive Concept,

Once implementation of such an agreement [on conventional forces] is underway, the United States, in consultation with the Allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels...[T]he Allies concerned proceed on the understanding that negotiated reductions leading to a level below the existing level of their SNF missiles will not be carried out until the results of these negotiations have been implemented. Reductions of Warsaw Pact SNF systems should be carried out before that date.\(^7\)

With reference to the question of modernization, the second half of the summit compromise concerned West Germany's intransigence when it came to FOTL development. The FRG consented to wording in the Comprehensive Concept reflecting agreement with NATO on the purpose and indispensability of nuclear weapons:

there is...a level of forces, both nuclear and conventional, below which the credibility of deterrence cannot be


\(^7\)"NATO Comprehensive Concept," para. 48. Emphasis in original. Underlining the word "partial" was apparently a US demand, and reflected a compromise by the West German delegation at the NATO Summit. This was the first time an official NATO document had stressed one word or phrase by underlining it--a technique not normally used in diplomatic papers. From interviews in Washington, June 1989.
maintained. In particular, the Allies have always recognized that the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe would critically undermine deterrence strategy and impair the security of the alliance.\textsuperscript{178}

At the same time, the other Allies granted Germany some breathing space on this issue: "The question concerning the introduction and deployment of a follow-on system for the Lance will be dealt with in 1992 in the light of overall security developments."\textsuperscript{179}

Initial reviews on the summit's success and the Bush initiatives were almost unanimously favorable.\textsuperscript{180} Even the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact praised the NATO conventional initiatives, saying the Bush plan converged with their proposals and should make an early CFE agreement possible.\textsuperscript{181}

POST-SUMMIT SECOND-GUESSING: THE DEBATE RETURNS

Within days, however, the second-guessing began. Some commentators remarked that the May "decision" was in fact a way to postpone the real decision, to continue "kicking the can down the road" and see what happened. One German critic of the CDU coalition put it more bluntly: "The Bonn parties' attempts to limit the damage caused by the INF treaty by way of

\textsuperscript{178} NATO Comprehensive Concept, para. 32.

\textsuperscript{179}"NATO Comprehensive Concept," para. 49.


supporting NATO in its nuclear 'modernization' and 'compensation' plans imply an evasion of the Federal Republic's strategic dilemma, for which a military solution does not exist." Press reports referred to the possibility of a de facto third zero as a result of delays, technological problems, or Congressional inaction.

Some American writers were critical of the Bush administration's handling of the affair. A few conservatives worried that Bush had abandoned traditional US security principles under pressure for political success at the summit. On a broader plane, one analyst saw disturbing lessons for alliance politics in the SNF story:

Lance was--is--dead, but it nonetheless became the focus of a poisonous struggle between key allies, in which the American and British side forgot that the political cohesion of the alliance far exceeds the importance of any single weapon, even one that has a future.

The President was charged with lack of vision in papering over larger issues with a political compromise that merely deferred hard decisions. Moreover, went this argument, the summit compromise itself was based on a dubious prediction: that the complex CFE process could be untangled and reach a satisfactory conclusion within a year.

\[182\]
Peters, p. 37.

\[183\]Kelleher, SIPRI Yearbook 1990, p. 611.

\[184\]Newhouse, p. 102. This was a widely held belief among officials familiar with the SNF struggle and alliance strategy on both sides of the Atlantic. With the exception of a few hold-outs in academic redouts and government offices, for the most part in Defense Ministries, the people with whom I spoke in the summer of 1989 recognized that the follow-on-to-Lance was a dead issue, not worth the political trouble it would cost. Interviews in Bonn, Stuttgart, Berlin, Brussels, and Washington, June-August 1989.

\[185\]One example of this criticism was Burt Solomon, "The NATO Summit in Brussels...Gave Bush's Image a Pick-Me-Up," National Journal, 17 Jun 1989, p. 1592.
On the other hand, President Bush did patch up US-German relations with a successful visit to the Federal Republic after the May summit. In one memorable line that caused reverberations around Europe, particularly in Britain, Bush averred that the two states were "partners in leadership."

As one commentator put it, "Thanks, ironically, to the row set off by Genscher [over SNF], Kohl was now Washington's special partner." In press conferences immediately after the summit, differences arose as to the exact meaning of some of the documents' phrasing. West Germany interpreted the acknowledgment that NATO would need nuclear weapons "for the foreseeable future" as implying that, given certain changes in Europe, SNF may be eventually ruled out completely. Indeed, Kohl confirmed this in a major policy statement released June 1st: "given the current momentum of overall East-West developments, 'as far as can be foreseen' can only mean a relatively limited period of time." One German government official was quoted as saying, "The foreseeable future is until 1992," implying that German acceptance of a modernization decision then is unlikely. Genscher stretched the ambiguity of the summit documents to its limit, however, by taking credit at home for transforming the Allied

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186 "Excerpts from President's Address," NYT, 1 Jun 1989, p. 5.

187 Newhouse, p. 118.


position from one of "modernization without negotiation" to "negotiations without modernization." 101

This interpretation aroused considerable consternation on the part of the United States and Great Britain. President Bush, in a major speech in Mainz following the summit, reminded the Germans that in terms of SNF reductions, "Partial is partial. To try to interpret it some other way misses the boat." 102 And Prime Minister Thatcher was equally blunt: "Wiggle as some people might, that is what they've signed up to." 103

The May compromise settled nothing. It merely deferred both aspects of the SNF issue--arms control and modernization--to a later date. The American administration clearly hoped that Congress would continue to fund the research and development process for follow-on to Lance until such decisions were made, even though it was by no means obvious that the European allies would ever agree to deploy the new missile. 104 But Capitol Hill was becoming increasingly restive over the size and cost of overseas defense burdens, as well as tight domestic budgets and public concern over jobs lost to foreign trade. These pressures all marked the defense budget for renewed attention, especially at a time when the threat to Europe seemed to be declining and the Europeans were unwilling to share


103 George Church, "'Here We Go, On the Offensive,'" Time, 12 Jun 1989, p. 33.

104 Sloan, CRS Issue Brief, p. 7.
the burdens and the risks of modernized deterrence.\textsuperscript{105}

The way in which the summit compromise was handled aroused European feelings that once again America was making major decisions for Europe without consulting the Europeans.\textsuperscript{106} It was easy, under these circumstances, to think back to earlier cases of American unilateral decisions that were not so well-received in Europe: cancellation of Skybolt in the 1960's, non-deployment of the neutron bomb in 1978, the Reyjkavik Summit concessions in 1986. These concerns would be exacerbated by the FOTL cancellation decision a year later.

Writing in May 1989, just prior to the summit, a German analyst pointed to an increasingly important aspect of the FOTL story: the domestic situation in America. The Bush administration, he noted, sees itself confronted with the delicate task of having to assert its authority within the alliance without at the same time alienating Bonn. Meanwhile, the US Congress has adopted a wait-and-see attitude. For the present, the political battle is fought primarily between the Bush administration and the West Germans. But a dispute between Capitol Hill and the White House is brewing and likely to break out before long over the issue.\textsuperscript{107}

This analysis was prescient. We, too, will now shift our focus to the domestic political situation in the United States, and its effect on the final year of the follow-on to Lance story. Chapter Eight will examine


\textsuperscript{106}Interviews with government officials, military officers, and academics in Bonn, Brussels, SHAPE, and London, August 1989 and June-July 1990. According to one source at NATO, President Bush followed the procedure set up under Reagan of letting the Allies know of his tentative speaking plans 24 to 48 hours in advance, either via cable traffic or by sending one of his top advisors out to brief people face to face.

\textsuperscript{107}Dembinsky, p. 23.
the Bush administration's national security decision-making apparatus and the FOTL cancellation decision.

CONCLUSION

There were several major factors at work within alliance politics that we have identified in this chapter. Interestingly, from many different angles all were converging on the follow-on-to-Lance program in 1989. These pressures were also all pointed toward one most likely solution: the cancellation of FOTL modernization. This conclusion was not yet evident in May of 1989, but it would become clear within the year that followed. For the time being, growing public disaffection with the new short-range nuclear programs and diverging domestic trends within both the FRG and Washington were overcome by a commitment to alliance solidarity, whose expression was made manifest in the Comprehensive Concept.

The first major factor in this stage of the story was the result of several events that disturbed the fragile consensus on which long-range alliance plans had been agreed to at Montebello in 1983. West Germany's disappearing security consensus, rising assertiveness, fear of becoming militarily singularized in Europe, and growing antipathy to all things nuclear arose, in part, from the way in which its interests were ignored at the 1986 Reykjavik summit, in America's handling of the 1987 INF Treaty, and in the bitter recriminations hurled at the FRG by its allies during the SNF debate of 1988-89. Concerns over de-coupling from America, the traditional worry in the FRG, were pushed aside by political leaders of all persuasions in order to appear responsive to these other, more widely held popular attitudes. In addition, the FOTL case broadened appreciably from
being a simple military issue into a political and diplomatic debate wrapped up in much larger concerns: the future of nuclear deterrence and allied risk-sharing, the role of Germany in a new Europe, and the proper Western response to Gorbachev. The central figure leading this move toward a wider view of the issues was West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Officials at NATO headquarters realized the magnitude of this shift by spring 1989. The FOTL issue was actually "a coded debate about how to handle far deeper challenges in Europe." Mining much of the frustration felt by alliance members could be traced to their differing reactions to the Gorbachev phenomenon. While some Western states, notably the US and Great Britain, held doubts and suspicions about the "new" USSR, and therefore wished to "keep NATO's powder dry," others, especially West Germany, eagerly embraced the Gorbachev proposals and saw peace breaking out in a common European house. It was in the FRG that this effect was greatest:

Here, Mr Gorbachev's allure seemed to contribute to a range of other complex trends—a growing disquiet, both on the Left and the Right, over the concentration of NATO troops in West Germany, a sense that Germany had a special role to play between East and West, resentment over what were perceived as vestiges of occupation, a chafing at the taboos and bonds of the Nazi past. Differing assessments by the US and West Germany of the proper response to Gorbachev's initiatives also reflected powerful economic, political, and military incentives to see the world one's own way. The US, Britain, and France, in this view, foresaw serious consequences for the status quo—and their own influence and power in the new arrangement—if

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Europe was de-nuclearized and became an "all-European house." West Germany, on the other hand, had much to gain from a new European detente: renewed cultural, political, and economic ties to Eastern Europe, greater freedom of movement in international affairs, diminished security burdens, and, potentially, the chance for reunification with East Germany. Each of these provided motivation to accept the Soviet initiatives. Together, as Germany’s partners nervously recognized, they might prove to be a stronger lure than the old-fashioned tie to a Western security structure.

In Washington in early 1989 the Bush administration saw itself locked in a battle with Gorbachev for the allegiance of West European public opinion. Furthermore, there was a strong underlying belief that the Kohl government was the only possible German government which would act in America’s interests. The net effect of these attitudes was to "put Bonn in the driver’s seat" with respect to US policy toward Europe and the SNF debate. For all of its early rhetoric, however, the US eventually came to support the FRG policies almost completely. German leaders were quick to recognize this happy state of affairs and equally quick to exploit it, using their new-found freedom of maneuver and foreign policy assertiveness to carve out their own policy stance. As one analyst put it, "with Bonn setting NATO’s agenda, the Administration had little choice but to agree to Germany’s demands on short-range nuclear forces."200

The two and one-half years covered in this chapter were a fascinating period for alliance politics. Domestic politics also played a role, both in Bonn and in Washington, but the broad strokes of the story are best explained using the alliance perspective. In Chapter Eight we shall

continue the saga of the follow-on-to-Lance missile as it encounters unexpected challenges prior to being unceremoniously cancelled. Europe, and the world, changed dramatically in the autumn of 1989. The systemic background that had been so stable in the early 1980's began to break apart with the new thinking coming out of Moscow. This systemic level change allowed the lower-level perspectives--alliance and domestic politics--to emerge as the dominant explanatory elements of events surrounding the death of FOTL. As we shall see, these perspectives will serve us in understanding why the FOTL program survived the challenges of 1989 only to disappear a year later.
Managers of the follow-on to Lance program began its final year optimistically, coming off the May 1989 summit compromise with plans to continue development of the missile while delaying official decisions on its eventual deployment until 1992. All members of the alliance hoped that this would silence the issue for the time being.

Within months, however, dramatic changes in the strategic situation in Eastern Europe were unfolding. With German reunification suddenly appearing likely, the alliance was forced to reassess its strategies and its purpose. The role of short-range nuclear forces was among those categories under reconsideration. West Germans had raised concerns in the past about targeting such weapons on East Germany; the utility of weapons that now could only hit the eastern part of a united Germany, or at most the emerging democracies of the former Warsaw Pact, was even more questionable.

At the same time, Congressional budgetary concerns had an impact on the SNF story, especially with respect to what seemed to be an increasingly anachronistic missile—-one which no ally had agreed to field, yet whose funding request quadrupled in the fiscal year 1991 defense budget.

So FOTL was faced with a set of independent pressures, all of which were converging on the key decision-makers in the White House in the winter and spring of 1990. Faced with this ominous set of factors—Congressional concern, budgetary pressures, public ambivalence, European allied opposition, and a declining strategic rationale—the logical choice
was to cancel the program. This President Bush did in May 1990. How he reached that point, however, is an interesting and little understood story that can shed some light on the American national security decision-making process.

This chapter tells the story of the final year of the follow-on to Lance. With a background of the disintegration of any consensus on security matters within the Atlantic alliance, the case best be understood as the result of bureaucratic and organizational processes, as well as alliance politics. Accordingly, we shall use domestic politics as our third perspective in an effort to adequately describe and explain what happened to FOTL from the summer of 1989 until its cancellation in May 1990 and its epitaph in the London Declaration two months later.

Analysis focusing on the international system is a necessary but not sufficient perspective from which to explain how and why particular policy choices are made by a government. It sets the broad background against which security policy is measured and arrayed. Alliance politics can explain the interaction among states in arriving at certain decisions, and is valuable for understanding the milieu of international politics in which security policy is made. However, all security choices are made by national governments comprised of individuals. To understand these choices, then, one must focus on the individuals and the organizations that make up the state structures. That is the function of the domestic politics perspective.

Why did the United States government decide to cancel FOTL when it did? To answer the third key question from Chapter One, we will enter the “black box” of the state using a framework of bureaucratic politics and explain the interaction among states in arriving at certain decisions, and is valuable for understanding the milieu of international politics in which security policy is made. However, all security choices are made by national governments comprised of individuals. To understand these choices, then, one must focus on the individuals and the organizations that make up the state structures. That is the function of the domestic politics perspective.

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organizational process theory. This question can be answered by delving into the national security processes of the American government, as well as by examining the numerous pressures that built up against the decision-making leadership of the US. Studying internal nation-state attributes may lack the parsimony found in systemic level explanations, but this perspective gains in richness of detail and an understanding of how decisions are actually arrived at.

Nevertheless, states and policy makers face a two-level game when making foreign policy. They must try to simultaneously satisfy both international and domestic imperatives. No explanation of a decision or event can be fully satisfactory if it does not examine both aspects of the process. In attempting to understand the decisions that led to FOTL’s cancellation, we shall heed this advice and consider both domestic and alliance politics, while keeping in mind the systemic level changes occurring in the background.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

-- National Security Act of 19471

Decisions concerning American foreign policy are made at the highest levels of the state, by numerous actors who face both domestic and international constraints and pressures, acting in a melange of

organizational and institutional arrangements. Many writers concerned with American foreign policy decision-making have described this confused situation in terms of bureaucratic politics.\(^2\) While some see inefficiencies in such a pluralistic system, others have condoned such an approach to foreign policy decision-making, advocating that such multiple inputs improve the process and make for better policy outputs.\(^3\)

One solution to the dilemma of multiple inputs to a "state" decision is to try to coordinate the inputs, achieve consensual decisions, and oversee the implementation of such policies through a central office at the top of the national executive branch. The agency that has been established for that purpose in the United States, and which has been used for political-military decisions by every President since Eisenhower, is the National Security Council.\(^4\)

The National Security Council accomplishes its primary function as the central decision-making nexus in the United States foreign policy


\(^3\)For example, see Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

\(^4\)In the realm of nuclear weapons decision-making there are other mechanisms that try to coordinate and control this amorphous process. These include the State Department Bureaus of Politico-Military and European Affairs, The Department of Energy Military Applications Division, the Department of Defense Office of International Security Policy and Joint Staff, the Nuclear Weapons Council and its Standing Committee, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee, Presidential proclamations, specified command CINC inputs, and so on. But the focus of all this activity is, theoretically, the NSC, with the President at its peak.
bureaucracy. The manner in which it does so, however, changes according to the issue at hand and according to the personal whim of the President, who sets its organizational structure and establishes the rules of the game. Furthermore, the ultimate decisions are often made not by the President alone, nor, at the other extreme, by collective bargaining among bureaucratic agencies, but by a small, elite group of top administration officials who meet within the vaguely defined boundaries of the national security process. This group, whether known as the inner circle, the "closet cabinet," the President's fishing buddies, or a "policy community," wields tremendous power in American foreign policy decision-making.

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6 The concept of a "policy community" has been posed as an alternative to traditional bureaucratic politics in the study of security policy. In this view, the attitudes and beliefs of a small number of key people matter more than organizational interests in explaining doctrinal shifts and policy outcomes. From unpublished dissertation by Kimberley Zisk, PhD candidate, Stanford University, presented at the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August 1990.

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Political-military issues are generally tackled via an inter-agency process within Washington, involving primarily the State Department, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, and the White House staff, with inputs from field commands (e.g., US European Command) when appropriate. The State Department often puts forth the original "straw man" proposal that opens up the debate at the lower action officer levels. The Defense Department tries to maintain influence at this early stage by placing some of its officers into the more influential divisions at State—especially Politico-Military Affairs, Policy Planning, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The chain of interagency discussions then proceeds up from action officers to the level of assistant secretaries from each relevant department, to under secretaries, and finally to department heads at the NSC level. At other times issues may reach the President more directly, as when a small group of people are concerned with a specific issue, and have access to the President, or when the President directs that an issue of special interest to him be handled by the NSC. In most cases, however, policy coordination committees thrash out US policy in an interagency setting of bureaucratic politics.

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7Since the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of 1986, the JCS Chairman has had the authority to present his own opinions directly to the President as his senior military advisor. This has led to some situations where there are two different policy outlooks coming out of the Pentagon: the Secretary's, and the Chairman's. According to interviews with members of both staffs in 1990, each claims to be the more politically astute of the two.

8Interviews in the State Department, June 1989, March and May 1990.

9Interviews in Washington, March and December 1990.
THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

In the Bush administration, foreign policy—or, at least, the most important foreign policy—is run by a very small group of people at the top of the State Department and on the staff of the National Security Council. These people live in a constant state of overload.10

The primary structural components of the national security process in the Bush Administration are carry-overs from the Reagan years: the National Security Planning Group and several Policy Coordination Committees and subcommittees, chaired by Assistant Secretaries or higher. Other groups are created as the need arises on an ad hoc basis, and usually include only the top people.11

But the NSC process under Bush is not tied to a formal, structured model of how to get things done; it also uses informal channels for information transfer and decision-making, as it has under most Presidents. Bush's personality lends itself to such informality. He believes in cabinet government, granting his departmental secretaries considerable independence within their policy realm. He has no regular meetings scheduled outside of the NSC itself, as did earlier Presidents (for example, Kennedy's "Executive Committee," Johnson's Tuesday lunches, and Carter's Friday breakfasts).12 His senior staff, however, seems to find


12Interviews in Washington, May 1990. For a discussion of the informal meetings of earlier Presidents, see James Thompson, "How Could Vietnam Happen?" The Atlantic, April 1968, and Karl Indefurth and Loch Johnson, Decisions of the Highest Order. LBJ's lunches, for example, were attended by the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the National Security Advisor, and dealt primarily with issues concerning the Vietnam War. Thompson characterized these as representative of "the closed
such meetings helpful for interagency coordination at the highest levels, one example being the Baker-Cheney-Scowcroft weekly Wednesday breakfasts. Cheney meets with the President three or four times every week, at NSC meetings and other times. Baker, who is widely held to be the key policy maker in the Bush administration, meets at least as often with the President. Scowcroft, who sees Bush daily, is quiet and unassuming, the role-model, according to some analyses, of an efficient and circumspect NSA—although his personal power and influence with the President seemed to grow during the course of the Bush administration.

The Bush NSC system has been compared to the late Nixon-Kissinger model, during Nixon's second term: a strong Secretary of State, a President deeply involved in foreign affairs, and a moderately weak NSC.


There remains considerable disagreement in Washington circles as to the role Cheney plays and his influence with the President. Some argue that while Baker has grabbed all the publicity, Cheney and General Colin Powell still wield considerable power behind the scenes. From interviews in Washington and Europe, May and June 1990. This possibility was undoubtedly enhanced by the successful Gulf War operation in early 1991.

More disparagingly, it could also be said that such a model keeps the bureaucracy busy, running in all directions, while the real decisions are made by a few key people in the top levels of the hierarchy. The Bush NSC has also returned to the Nixon practice of controlling all important inter-agency committees from the White House.  

The Bush administration is known to be much more hierarchical than it was under Reagan, in the sense that there are very few key people at the top of each participating agency who make the decisions and control the vertical and lateral flow of information within the bureaucracy. Relations within the top bureaucratic levels under the Bush administration rely heavily on individualistic leadership styles and personal relationships with one's fellows. This is a management style favored by Bush in the White House, by Cheney in the Pentagon, and by Baker at State, an approach that is buttressed by Scowcroft's minimalist "staff director" view of his role in the NSC process.

Such reliance on inter-personal relationships in the Bush administration works well because the top leaders have been together in government offices before. As Director of the CIA during the Ford administration, Bush worked closely with Scowcroft, who was then, as now,  

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16Kissinger, in Charlton, p. 102. This was generally confirmed in many of the interviews I conducted in Washington, especially with those on the lower rungs of the bureaucratic ladder, 1989-1991.

the National Security Advisor. At the same time, Cheney was White House Chief of Staff, and Baker was Ford's 1976 campaign manager. In addition, they all held important offices during the Reagan years.\(^8\) Their common government experience in the detente era of the mid-70's may also go far in explaining their initial mainstream approach to foreign policy making in 1989, even as four decades of European history began unravelling before their eyes.\(^9\)

Another example of the importance of personal relationships in accomplishing bureaucratic tasks, and the extent to which organizations will go to try and achieve their goals, is seen in the existence of the US Army's "nuclear mafia." Before the SNF issue became so volatile, many of the routine bureaucratic staff processes and lower-level decisions were handled by a group of Army colonels that were well-placed throughout the key offices involved in theater nuclear matters in and out of Washington. There are Army colonels on the Army nuclear planning staff, of course, as well as on the JCS staff, the offices of OSD/ISP, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, all in the Pentagon; in the State Department's offices of Politico-Military Affairs and European Regional-Military Analysis; in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's regional assessment branch; in the NSC Arms Control and Strategy Division; as special assistants to the ambassadors-at-large for arms control issues; in the Department of Energy's Military Applications Division; on exchange to

\(^8\)Scowcroft served on several presidential study groups, Baker was White House Chief of Staff before becoming Secretary of the Treasury, and Cheney was a (actually "the") Congressman from Wyoming.

the national laboratories in their Nuclear Weapons Technology divisions; acting as Program Managers for Army nuclear systems at contractors' factories; and, once retired, at research centers doing "outside studies" on nuclear issues for DOD. These officers all know each other, interact regularly, and rotate from one of these jobs to another every few years. They all have backgrounds in Army tactical nuclear affairs, usually the field artillery; all are bright and generally open-minded about issues. But they also wear the green uniform.20

It is interesting how an organization can so thoroughly infiltrate other agencies with "its" people. Whether or not this is by design, or simply coincidental, is hard to confirm—but easy to guess.21

In addition to the formal NSC, which meets occasionally at the principals' level22 and is chaired by Scowcroft, there are a number of smaller fora that provide for inter-agency discussion and faster decision-making by fewer key officials. The Deputies Group is comprised of Under Secretaries of the departments involved in a particular issue, and is

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20This group is unofficially known, both to itself and by others, as the "nuclear mafia." One example of the close working relationship between these officers occurred during the winter of 1989/90, when they gathered for a meeting in Washington for a briefing by one of their colleagues on the State Department's position on the follow-on to Lance program. (Interviews in Washington, December 1990 and January 1991.) If one were to look for it, no doubt one could find similar webs of single service officers in other areas, such as senior Air Force personnel in acquisitions and policy programs for strategic nuclear weapons.

21On the other hand, such finesse by the Army has not always worked at higher levels of the bureaucracy, even within the Pentagon: from 1985 through 1988, for instance, a crucial period for the beginning of the FOTL program, there was no Army general assigned to any office in the JCS that handled nuclear issues. (That is, the Chairman, Assistant to the Chairman, J-5 or J-8 Divisions.) Interviews in Washington, January 1991.

chaired by Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates. Policy Coordination Committees (PCC's) are chaired by Assistant Secretaries of departments or NSC division chiefs (for example, in the FOTL case, by Robert Blackwill, head of European and Soviet Affairs, or Arnold Kanter, director of Arms Control and Strategy). At the lowest inter-agency level there are PCC Working Groups. These are big and unwieldy, in which consensus is hard to achieve and from which leaks to the press regularly spring.

For sensitive issues, or when new thinking is needed, the NSC will usually move to a higher-level group or bring in outside experts for informal consultations. The formal NSC structure is not used for delicate questions; these are handled by a much smaller group of influential people in positions of authority.

In the spring of 1990 events in Europe were changing so fast that a new forum was created to try and keep up with the daily pace and develop some policy positions for the United States. The "European Strategy Steering Group" (ESSG) was created in February 1990 at the Deputies level, chaired by Gates, to deal with the new European political environment. One of its charter goals was to imbed the FOTL controversy in an overall policy for European security and the future of NATO. The ESSG met at the White House, with the NSC European and Soviet Affairs Division tasked as

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23 It is interesting that two of the key personnel involved with SNF decisions under Bush--Robert Blackwill and Robert Gates--were not on the NSC staff during the Reagan years, but were on the NSC under Carter--and undoubtedly carried over memories of the way the neutron bomb was handled to the FOTL case. Interviews in Washington, March and May 1990.

24 Interviews in Washington, December 1990. For a list of the key individuals in the upper levels of these groups vis-a-vis nuclear policy, see Appendix 4.
the staff agency for paperwork and agenda preparation. The group proved to be so successful that it has been institutionalized as a permanent forum for discussions on European issues within the Bush NSC system.25

On paper, then, the White House staff is in a position to control the bureaucratic process through its gatekeeper role in committees and paper routing. In practice, the small group of close Presidential advisors makes policy with very little interaction with the bureaucratic staffs. The Secretaries of State and Defense use their departments as reservoirs of information and analysis, counting on a small number of trusted lieutenants to control the flow of information to the top.26 The Bush model appears to be even more "regal" in its approach to national security decisions than its predecessor, although the press and public have yet to attack it on those terms as they did Reagan. As one Washington official put it, "Bush has reached the point that most Presidents do eventually--they get fed up with the bureaucratic process,

25Interviews in Washington, December 1990 and January 1991. The ESSG was actually composed of several smaller staff-level groups, chaired by senior appointees: the Gates group, the (Reginald) Barthelemew group, the (Condoleezza) Rice group, the (Philip) Zelikow group, the JCS group. Only the higher-level principals knew what all the groups were and what they were studying. There was little pretense or organization; the groups were encouraged to have wide-ranging and unconstrained discussions. One participant described the process as "semi-anarchical," and "frustrating but fun." According to this individual, "the amazing thing was that it worked! It wasn't pretty, but it was effective." Interviews in Washington, January 1991.

26One source at State described Baker's approach this way. After receiving inputs from the lower bureaus, he uses the "7th Floor staff" (counselor, policy planning, and political affairs bureaus) as a personal staff. The resulting policy is not necessarily bad, according to this source, but it does leave the other bureaus, especially the regional desks, out of the loop and feeling a bit "used." Interviews at the State Department, March 1990. Another example of Baker's tight control over his department was seen in Joseph Fitchett, "Baker Order Gives Ambassadors Less Say," International Herald Tribune, 28 Jun 1990, p. 5.
and make the big decisions by themselves. But he's reached that point earlier than most."

The recent case of NATO short-range nuclear modernization vividly displays this preference for small circle decision-making by America's ruling elites. The United States has always had the lead in alliance nuclear policy, and has also been the state to develop the weapons systems for NATO deployment. In the past, there have been occasional charges by the European allies that the US has been arrogant in its decision-making style, but these complaints have usually foundered on the shoals of superpower reality: if the US was going to research, develop, and fund such weapons, it was only natural that it also have the biggest input into the politics that went along with them. FOTL's final year, leading up to and including its cancellation in May 1990, includes several key decision points where the NSC process showed a propensity for management of the alliance, and of the American bureaucracy, by high-level decree. It thus can serve as a useful case for examining how and at what stages the elite leadership intervened in the decision-making process.

"ENDGAME"--FOTL'S LAST YEAR

The NATO summit meeting of May 1989 postponed the ultimate decisions on both the modernization of and the potential arms control negotiating approach for the follow-on to Lance missile. As noted in the previous

27Interview in Washington, May 1990. A likely reason why Bush became disenchanted with the bureaucracy so quickly is the obvious fact that he has spent much of his life working in Washington's inner circles. For a good example of how the Bush administration conducts important foreign policy cases, see "The Moscow Connection: The Inside Story of Secret Diplomacy Between the Superpowers," Newsweek, 17 Sep 1990, pp. 24-26.
chapter, there was immediate obfuscation of the true meaning of the Comprehensive Concept and the compromise wording that came out of the summit. West German commentators were pointing to the ambiguity and explaining that that meant negotiations would lead to a situation wherein modernization would no longer be necessary. The US and Great Britain, on the other hand, officially expected that the full range of SNF programs put in motion by the Montebello Decision of 1983 would be implemented. In fact, sweeping changes in the international political system would occur over the following twelve months that would serve to make the May summit seem a relic of a distant past--and with it, FOTL modernization plans.

The position of the key players in the FOTL game in early summer 1989 could be summarized as follows:

-- West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opposed modernization of FOTL and sought early negotiations with the Soviet Union to parity in SNF at lower levels.

-- German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was not opposed to modernization, but saw it as a "political hot potato" which he preferred to postpone until after the 1990 elections;

-- the United States sought early commitment to FOTL and TASM deployment so as to persuade Congress to continue funding these programs;

-- the UK opposed abandoning the Montebello Decision, and saw early SNF negotiations as the first step on a slippery slope to European denuclearization;

-- France also opposed arms control because of its potential impact on its Hades SNF missile program, but empathized with Germany’s concerns;

-- most of the remaining continental European members, with the exception of the Netherlands, sided with Herr Genscher and arms control.

President Bush’s compromise solution at the May summit postponed dealing with these differences rather than melding them into an alliance consensus. The Gesamtkonzept "effectively papered over the cracks of a
deep difference between the FRG and its allies over the needs of Flexible Response and the relative risks borne by Alliance members."

Obviously events in Eastern Europe during the fall and winter of 1989-90 changed the situation dramatically for NATO. Short-range nuclear modernization no longer seemed so important; rather, such a move now seemed, to many observers, to be unnecessary, wasteful, and provocative toward the former Warsaw Pact states. Congress began to pressure the administration to cancel FOTL for budgetary reasons. These attitudes meshed with the already existing German phobia about nuclear weapons deployed on their soil, and led to a situation by early 1990 in which FOTL's deployment was unthinkable. Its cancellation, therefore, came as no real surprise to anyone, but the manner in which it was cancelled revealed the Bush national security style and caused some hard feelings within the alliance and in the American bureaucracy.

RENEWED EUROPEAN DOUBTS AND SOVIET PRESSURES

The SNF modernization issue was but one of a four-part set of important issues that were in the limelight in 1989. NATO's nuclear future centered around: 1) compensation requirements for targeting and flexibility needed to replace capabilities lost because of the INF Treaty;

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29Some useful caveats for the remainder of this chapter, as suggested by a former NSC staff member, may be in order here: 1) we are still too close in time to these events to get at the complete truth; 2) all the documentation about the decisions is still classified; 3) there is no guarantee that the papers, even if we could see them, would reflect the reality of what really happened. From interview in Washington, January 1991.
2) the fate of nuclear artillery in Europe; 3) the modernization of Lance; and 4) the future of nuclear arms control. Most of the attention fell on the last two issues. Within the alliance there were basically three factions addressing these questions: the "Cold Warriors," who saw the imminent collapse of the Soviet empire and viewed it as an opportunity for the West to push even harder for ultimate victory; the "Genscherists," who saw a new era emerging with the changes in Eastern Europe wrought by Gorbachev and wished to pursue arms control efforts during this golden window of opportunity; and the majority of people who fell in the "Status Quo" camp, preferring to see things stay much as they had been for the previous successful four decades, with detente a possibility as long as the West maintained its strength to match residual Soviet capabilities.

These categories were represented in the United States as well. All three were heard from in the debate--noticeably toned-down though it was, compared to the spring of 1989--on the role and future of theater nuclear forces that resumed following the May NATO summit.

The Soviet Union continued to pressure the Western alliance toward early negotiations on SNF. At the opening of Round Two at the Vienna

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31Risse-Kappen, pp. 10-11.

32For instance, American conservatives saw these Soviet threats as proof that the Soviets could not be trusted and had not changed their spots: "This blatant extortion...should remind us of the speed with which Soviet policies can be reversed and targets of opportunity aligned in Soviet sights." Richard Perle, "Soviet Nuclear Blackmail," NYT, 17 May 1989, p. 27. Also see William Van Cleave, "NATO Nuclear Deterrence: Short-Range Modernization and the NATO Summit," Hoover Institution Working Paper in International Relations (and testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 June 1989), August 1989.
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks in May, for instance, the Warsaw Pact nations pressed for superpower talks on nuclear arms in their opening position papers. East Germany warned that failure to hold discussions on SNF "could have negative effects" on the Vienna conventional negotiations. The Soviets followed this with an announcement of unilateral cuts in their tactical nuclear stockpile in Eastern Europe. They proposed removing 500 warheads—a somewhat token gesture, given their total stockpile of 10,000 tactical warheads, but a political signal of some public relations value, nonetheless. They also began threatening to renege on the INF Treaty if the alliance went ahead with Lance modernization. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviets would be "forced to react" if NATO continued to reject calls for SNF negotiations and deployed FOTL.

During Gorbachev's triumphant tour of West Germany in June he made several references to the "common European house" and "shared European values." He also signed a major document on Soviet-German relations and a number of cultural and economic agreements, all of which enhanced the FRG's position as Gorbachev's strongest supporter in the West. Also in June the GDR suggested a step-by-step elimination of all tactical nuclear

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missiles from Europe, and the Soviet Union proposed consultations on preparations for such talks.\textsuperscript{37}

In a major address to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France, on 6 July, Gorbachev again called for early negotiations on SNF. He promised "further unilateral cuts in our tactical nuclear missiles in Europe without delay" if NATO agreed to enter negotiations. The United States rejected this call. President Bush said, "I see no reason to stand here and try to change a collective decision taken by NATO."\textsuperscript{38}

Polls taken in West Germany in mid-1989 showed that the combination of Soviet propaganda, Western decisions, and German government positions had had an impact on the public: only 24% of the German populace perceived the USSR as a threat.\textsuperscript{39} Hans-Jochen Vogel, head of the Social Democratic Party, congratulated Genscher on his support for the third zero in arms control, a position firmly in line with SPD thinking. He also stated that there would be no modernization of Lance in 1992, whoever was in power in Bonn. "I don't think it is possible to station new weapons on the territory of a country which does not want them," Vogel stressed.\textsuperscript{40}

Other commentators began arguing that the logic that once imbued theater nuclear weapons with a deterrent function no longer held. As the strategic situation changed, NATO no longer could count on short-range

\textsuperscript{37}"Short-Range and Battlefield Nuclear Weapons," draft report, DSC 89, para. 161.


\textsuperscript{40}David Marsh and David Goodhart, "SPD Chief Sees no Chance of a Sharper Edge for Lance," \textit{Financial Times}, 27 Jun 1989, p. 3.
tactical nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression, to counterbalance conventional force asymmetries, or to link Europe to the US strategic guarantee. These functions either no longer seemed necessary or could be accomplished using other means.  

TECHNICAL DECISIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES

The Department of Defense asked for funding authority of $33 million in fiscal year 1990 for FOTL research. Although House subcommittees deleted funds for FOTL and TASM in the FY 1990 budget hearings, the whole committee restored it after the May NATO compromise and a personal appeal by General Galvin in late June. Congressman Ronald Dellums, chairman

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of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Research and Development, sponsored an amendment to the FY90 DOD Authorization Bill that would have cut funding for FOTL in half and cut all money for TASM, but the amendment was soundly defeated in a vote on the House floor during the summer.\textsuperscript{45}

The money allocated to FOTL for FY90 was scheduled to "support the initiation and award of the full and open competitive Full Scale Engineering Development contract." This would cover $13.8 million in various government costs and $19 million in payments to contractors.\textsuperscript{46}

Congress muddied the waters of the FOTL development and acquisition program with two arms control provisions that it attached to the budget authorization. First, the House of Representatives ordered DOD to report back to Congress on the verifiability of FOTL in any potential arms control regime. Second, the final appropriations bill ordered the Army to insure that a nuclear missile on MLRS could be distinguished from non-nuclear weapons for the sake of arms control verifiability. As the bill's wording stated:

The secretary of Defense shall conduct the follow-on to Lance (FOTL) development program in a manner that preserves the option of providing functionally related observable differences that would distinguish between nuclear FOTL missiles on their launchers and other non-nuclear surface-to-

\textsuperscript{45}Dellums' proposal to restrict FOTL funding to preliminary research only was defeated 329-96. He also tried to delete the entire amount for SRAM-T; this was also overwhelmingly defeated. \textit{1989 CO Almanac}, p. 450; "Panel Slashes SDI, Stealth Budgets; Midgetman, Lance Missiles Boosted," \textit{Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph}, 1 Jul 1989, p. 1.

surface missiles on their launchers.\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense was required to prepare a report on the operational and arms control implications of such a requirement for functionally related observable differences with his FY91 budget request, due to Congress in January 1990. The effect of these new requirements was to delay the FOTL program yet again. The Army began trying to find a way to keep FOTL on the MLRS while still meeting the Congressional arms control standards. The German government also asked DOD about the issue of distinguishability for FOTL in the fall.\textsuperscript{48}

The preliminary Request for Proposal (RFP) for a FOTL missile was issued to industry in July, with expectations that the final RFP would be released in December. In that case, full-scale engineering contracts could be issued in June 1990.\textsuperscript{49} Defense contractors were understandably nervous about sinking money into a program that could be given away at the negotiating table; they wanted no part of a weapon that was seen as a


\textsuperscript{48}Interviews in Washington, May and December 1990, and Los Alamos, August 1990. As it turned out, one of the possible solutions was to have a FOTL missile too long for the normal MLRS launcher box, so that it would noticeably stick out of the back of the vehicle. This idea pleased Martin-Marietta, whose single-stage Pershing candidate did just that--it was longer than the ATACMS missile, so it stuck out of the box. What had previously been a liability for this candidate suddenly became a selling point.

\textsuperscript{49}"Tactical Nuclear Modernization," working paper from unnamed government office. The original DOD plan had been to issue the draft RFP in the third quarter of FY89, or about April 1989, and the final RFP that October, the first quarter of FY90, after the Defense Strategic Systems Committee had reviewed the project and early bids.
political bargaining chip for arms control. On the other hand, this was conceivably the last Army ballistic missile project for years to come, and it would provide a $1.2 billion multi-year contract for the company that won the bid.

The Army tried to assuage these fears with a paper it released in May 1989 which explained the need and rationale for a FOTL as well as a description of the proposed weapon. It stressed the Montebello Decision and the "pre-existing need" for such a corps commander's support weapon. The paper also explained that after preliminary investigations, the Army was convinced that only a new missile would fit the bill--ATACMS was no longer a candidate. This was a relief to some companies, who now had a competitive chance at the contract (since LTV made both the MLRS and ATACMS, it had earlier appeared to have had the "inside track" for FOTL). As a result, several companies responded to the draft RFP. Martin-Marietta, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, and LTV Aerospace and Defense all indicated interest in competing for the FOTL contract.50

The Phase Two warhead feasibility studies were completed in June and presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council; its approval gave the go-ahead

to commence the Phase 2-A design definition and cost study. While the missile had not been selected, the choice of the MLRS launcher bound the missile to certain parameters that allowed the national laboratories to begin preliminary studies into the warhead. Meantime, Congress also mandated that DOE consider recycling the warheads being removed from the Pershing II and GLCM missiles scrapped under the INF Treaty, for possible use on either or both of the new short-range missiles. In fact, money for a new warhead was restricted from use until the Nuclear Weapons Council reported to the Secretary of Energy on whether it could use the W-84 or W-85 warhead, or a combination of both.

As progress continued towards warhead selection for these two SNF missiles, Los Alamos National Laboratory began to consider the possibility of using a common warhead for both TASM and FOTL. This would result in cost savings and reduce the impact on the DOE production complex, already under resource constraints and facing severe problems of its own. The range and yield requirements, warhead size and weight, safety and security considerations, and development schedules were similar enough that "it is likely that both systems can share a common design with minor

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modifications." Equally important for the Air Force, the fact that the FOTL warhead program was already well underway meant that going with a joint warhead would save considerable time for the SRAM-T, since it could "piggy-back" on the work already done for FOTL.55

The Los Alamos and Sandia Labs were selected to develop a dual-role warhead for FOTL and SRAM-T at the end of the Phase II study in June. LANL would handle the physics package, and Sandia would be responsible for mating that with the electronics. The actual hardware production would be accomplished in the DOE weapons complex around the country.56

In the third category of SNF weapons, Congress also approved full funding for the production of nuclear 155-mm artillery shells. It also lifted the restrictions on the number of shells allowed and the maximum total cost of the project, two barriers which had held up the development and deployment of these new AFAPS for several years.57

In 1988 Congress had directed the Defense Department to aggressively pursue the possibility of co-production of a Lance follow-on. Responding to questions for the record on this requirement in early 1989, SACEUR pointed out that since the FOTL missile had not been selected, the


55The Phase 2 request for FOTL preceeded the Phase 2 for SRAM-T by almost a full year (November 1987 versus December 1988). In addition, LANL saw this as a way to keep their contract for at least one warhead alive, since they could see that FOTL was in political trouble. Interviews in Los Alamos, August 1990.


possibility of co-development had not yet been raised with the allies. The allies deploying it would, however, buy both FOTL and the modified MLRS launchers from the US. Seven allied nations were involved in the co-development and deployment of conventional MLRS, and two more were considering buying it.\textsuperscript{58}

DOD planned to seek $117 million in budget authority for FOTL in fiscal year 1991, a significant increase from the previous year. This was in line with the program entering full-scale engineering development. Plans for the next fiscal year included the preliminary design review, building the prototype, and the critical design review, as well as continued analysis of logistics and production needs. Production was not scheduled to begin until 1991, so procurement monies would first be allocated in the FY92 budget. Nevertheless, "A contract award in fiscal year 1990 is essential to meet the initial operational capability," said an Army general in acquisitions.\textsuperscript{59}

Despite Congress' willingness to go along with funding for FOTL in 1989, there were still concerns about the need for such a system, especially given European hesitancy to eventually deploy it. This concern was enhanced by statements from the German leadership to the press following the May summit compromise. Senator Sam Nunn, for instance, asked one of his committee's witnesses in June whether DOD had an alternate plan for FOTL in case international and congressional pressures became too much to stick to the preferred schedule. Given the fact that


\textsuperscript{59}Chen, SASC Hearings, 14 June 1989, p. 416.
FOTL development costs would exceed $300 million between 1989 and 1992, when NATO was supposed to re-address the issue, the Senator had some misgivings:

Senator Nunn: Have you got a fallback, slowdown position on the Lance Follow-on? Can you keep the program alive, but slow it down, save some money until NATO makes a decision on deployment? I will tell you why...I am not hearing from anyone--no one--that Follow-on to Lance is ever going to be deployed...

Mr. Joseph: Senator, I am unaware of any fallback position that would provide for a slowdown.

Senator Nunn: Well, you better come up with a fallback position, unless you want it to be dreamed up in the Congress. I may not be in favor of it myself, but I think that we are not going to put up $300-some million while everybody in Germany says it is never going to be deployed.

Mr. Joseph: [Deleted].

By December Nunn had given up on FOTL. In a televised interview he stated that while a nuclear presence in Europe was still necessary, the US should reconsider its modernization plans. He was convinced that FOTL would never be deployed in Europe, so the alliance needed to focus on air-delivered missiles as the next generation of deterrent forces. Congressional pressures on the administration mounted exponentially once this influential Senator cast his lot with FOTL's opponents.

THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ALLIANCE REACTION

In September 1989 the Hungarians opened their border with Austria, providing a conduit for the safe flight of thousands of East Germans into the West. This marked the beginning of the end for the communist-controlled regimes of most of Eastern Europe. By November the Berlin Wall

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60SASC Hearings, 14 June 1989, pp. 414-415.

was breached for the first time in 26 years, Erich Honecker, the man who had built it and ruled the GDR for decades, was ousted, and within four months the East German citizens voted into office a conservative pro-unification government. With the strategic background rapidly changing, the North Atlantic Alliance and the US weapons acquisition process went about their business, while also trying to decide what to do to respond to the developing situation in Eastern Europe.

Various alternative strategies and weapons mixes began to appear in the press as options for the future NATO. These generally assumed a radically reduced Soviet threat and continued political opposition to certain types of nuclear armaments in Western Europe, which meant that NATO could get by with a smaller, leaner force—and, for fiscal reasons, would have to. A commonly heard projection was a NATO theater nuclear force of 500-1000 warheads, preferably composed of a variety of weapons types, but most likely relying heavily on air-delivered bombs and missiles.62

In October 1989 the NATO defense ministers met for the first time since the summit to discuss the changes in Eastern Europe and their implications for NATO. Meeting in Portugal, the Nuclear Planning Group intentionally avoided the SNF modernization issue in its discussions, preferring to leave it quiet and not question the uneasy compromise achieved in May. Instead, it ordered the High Level Group to begin a series of concept studies on the alternatives available to cover SACEUR's mission requirements in light of a probable CFE agreement. The HLG, under

62See, for example, Hans Binnendijk, "Rethinking the NATO Deterrent in a World of Uncertain Threat," International Herald Tribune, 6 Oct 1989.
the chairmanship of US Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Hadley, was
told to report back to the NPG in 1991 with its findings. Six different
studies would be conducted, including an analysis of the role of NATO
nuclear weapons in an alliance of the future. The most likely options
for future theater nuclear weapons were FOTL, SRAM-T, a British TASM (or
perhaps a joint Anglo-French version), or sea-launched cruise missiles.

In addition, Secretary Cheney briefed his counterparts on the NPG on
the status of the FOTL, TASM, and AFAPS development programs; all of them
were "on track," according to Cheney.

In November a delegation of West German officials, including
Genscher, came to Washington to discuss East-West issues with President
Bush and Secretary of State Baker. Upon arrival, reporters asked the
Their reply was undiplomatically blunt: "The question of nuclear
modernization makes us laugh. I don't think there is any possibility of

63David White, "Bonn and US at Odds Over NATO Study," Financial Times,

64Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Debate Over the Modernization of NATO's Short-Range Nuclear Missiles," SIPRI Yearbook 1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 612. Kelleher included nuclear ATACMS on her list, claiming that it was still the leading candidate for FOTL. Actually, however, the US Army, in conjunction with SHAPE, had already discarded this idea due to range limitations--ATACMS could not reach the 450-495 KM range that SACEUR now wanted to compensate for lost INF weapons. See Chapter Seven.

it being implemented." Later a senior German official, speaking of the emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact, was said to have asked a top Bush administration official, "What do we need these missiles for—to bomb Lech Walesa?" Many analysts point to this blunt assessment of FOTL's chances in Germany as the turning point for the program's support in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill. These comments, on top of the momentous changes occurring in Eastern Europe, seemed to have finally forced many American officials to accept the fact that despite arguments as to its military benefits, the follow-on to Lance was politically dead in the water. Within a month even sources in the Pentagon were coming forth with suggestions that perhaps the military ought to shift its emphasis from the increasingly problematic FOTL to the more acceptable SRAM-T program.

In December the Joint Chiefs met with the Chairman to consider the release for proposal on the FOTL. Everyone approved it, and it was assumed the Secretary would send the letter supporting its Phase 3 development to the Nuclear Weapons Council. By January, however, General


67 Although not attributed to him in the press, this quote apparently came directly from Genscher. So writes Kelleher in SIPRI Yearbook 1990, as does Senator Bingaman in Congressional Record, 22 Mar 1990, p. S2973.

68 Henry Kissinger had so stated a week before the West German visit. In a speech to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, Kissinger said that "Modernization of nuclear weapons in Germany is out of the question." NYT, 16 Nov 1989; reprinted in "And You Can Quote Me on That...," Arms Control Today, December 1989/January 1990, p. 27.

Powell had changed his mind. With a sensitivity to broader political considerations honed by his tenure as the National Security Advisor, and against the advice of his own service and the SACEUR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs no longer supported FOTL.\textsuperscript{70}

**THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR FOTL**

In January 1990 the administration presented its FY 1991 budget proposal to Congress. The immediate reaction to the FOTL request—$112 million—was shock and disbelief on the part of many Congressmen. Secretary Cheney was hard-pressed to justify the spending increase from the previous year. Although the amount was actually less than what had been forecast for this program a year earlier, in light of the substantial changes in the world situation and alliance politics it appeared to be a "pie-in-the-sky" amount that did not reflect reality.\textsuperscript{71} Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, declared the Bush defense budget "dead on arrival," and Senator Sam Nunn, in the first of his series of speeches on the Senate floor during the spring term, criticized the administration and the Pentagon for sending the Congress a budget full of "defense blanks." As Nunn put it, "the Bush administration's 1991 defense budget proposal is based on a 1988 threat and a 1988 strategy...They have not adjusted the underlying assumptions about threat and strategy...if the Department of Defense wants to remain relevant to

\textsuperscript{70}Interviews in the Pentagon, December 1990 and January 1991.

this process, they must begin filling in these big blanks in the defense budget."

In response, the Secretary of Defense and the top military leadership emphasized that FOTL was an alliance decision that should not be tampered with unilaterally. Nor, they insisted, had the West German government officially asked the US to stop work on the program. General Galvin continued to promote the need for follow-on-to-Lance in public statements and Congressional testimony. He now called FOTL, as the only land-based missile in NATO’s future, "the most important type of ordnance on the battlefield today." He emphasized that it was the mix of different delivery systems that gave deterrence its credibility, and it would be foolish to risk this in a chaotic future. The Army also stressed that TASM could not accomplish the same mission as FOTL, primarily because of concerns about guaranteed penetrability of aircraft. Nor did the Army


73 So argued Richard Cheney before the House Appropriations Committee, Hearings, Part 1, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1991, p. 94; so also did Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmett before the Senate Appropriations Committee a month later. ("FOTL Funding Opposed By Rudman, Bumpers in Senate Hearing," Aerospace Daily, 28 Feb 1990, p. 366; "Senate Panel Says FOTL Funding Likely to be Zero," Defense Daily, 28 Feb 1990, p. 314.) As late as the end of March, even when he was admitting that many previously untouchable Pentagon systems would have to be cut in the revised budget, Cheney was still adamant (at least officially) that FOTL was necessary because alliance policy called for it. "More Systems to be Cut in Future--Cheney," Defense Daily, 23 Mar 1990, p. 462.


75 See, for example, answers to questions for the record, House Appropriations Committee, Hearings, Part 1, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1991, p. 911. An interesting organizational
leadership wish to publicly speculate on alternative systems to replace the FOTL if it were not deployed. On the other hand, not everyone in the Army was particularly enamored with this weapon in the first place, as we have seen. And since opposition to FOTL was coming close to "fouling the nest" for ATACMS, which the Army did want, some in the senior Army leadership would have been happy to sacrifice FOTL. This forced SACEUR to fly over to Washington from Belgium and beat the drum for FOTL in front of Congress, since the Army was threatening to give it away.76

Alternatives were being considered within the bureaucracy. The press began reporting several possibilities to replace FOTL, some of which emanated from unnamed Pentagon sources. One option would stockpile unassembled FOTLs in crates in the UK and Italy, ready for quick deployment in time of crisis.77 More realistic alternatives included relying solely on TASM instead of a land-based missile, or eliminating all tactical nuclear missiles through arms control.78 In February the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Donald Atwood, split from the Army's no-comment position and admitted that SRAM-T was being considered as a replacement for the FOTL should it be rejected in Congress.79

The debate over FOTL's budget increase raised the issue to an

justification came up, as well: air assets are not organic to the Army, and it wanted its own system under the control of an Army commander in the field.


78Ibid.


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embarrassingly high pitch for the Bush administration. While SACEUR and the Pentagon still clung to their policy of continuing national efforts towards fulfilling the Montebello Decision, the tide was beginning to turn against them. The list of officials publicly coming out against FOTL grew longer every day.  

According to one well-placed source in the Pentagon, the event that finally convinced Cheney that FOTL had no chance occurred at the February Wehrkunde conference in München. An exchange occurred there between left-wing German politicians and some US Senators, during which the American legislators told their hosts (and, peripherally, the Secretary of Defense) "if you don't want it, we aren't going to fund it." This blunt warning, plus the on-going budgetary storm at home, made it clear to the Secretary

For instance, three former JCS Chairmen—David Jones, Thomas Vessey, and William Crowe, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that FOTL was not politically justifiable. ("Production of Follow-on to Lance Unwise Right Now, Say Former JCS Chiefs," Inside the Pentagon, 9 Feb 1990, p. 7.) Stanley Sloan, in his paper "NATO Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control," (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2 Jan 1990), argued that the situation in Eastern Europe made early decisions on what nuclear forces it wanted to keep in Europe essential for NATO. The chief FRG delegate to the CFE talks, Rüdiger Hartmann, said that by January 1990 most officials in Germany had written off the replacement of Lance as politically impossible. And Senator John McCain warned that "there is absolutely no support for modernizing of a weapon that's going to strike Leipzig, or Prague, or Budapest...there is no sense in engaging in a political contest with the West Germans over land-based missiles. We can do nothing but lose." (Adams and Baker, Defense News, 5 Feb 1990, p. 53; and David Bond, "NATO Commander Presses Congress for Lance Missile Replacement," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 Feb 1990, p. 33.) Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens announced in February that his country now felt that NATO should not modernize FOTL. "NATO Reaffirms Stance to Delay Decision on FOTL until 1992," Defense Daily, 27 Feb 1990, p. 311. Senator Warren Rudman joined Senator Dale Bumpers in opposing FOTL, as well. "Why would anybody expect the Germans to agree to this type of missile?" Rudman asked. "Senate Panel says FOTL Funding Likely to be Zeroed," Defense Daily, 28 Feb 1990, p. 314.
that FOTL would not survive the Congressional debate that year.\(^8^1\)

Still, the Army carried on its acquisition plans for FOTL, apparently blind to political pressures building against it. There was a minor debate between the Army and SACEUR over accuracy requirements for FOTL in the first part of the year. SACEUR wanted a more accurate system than the Army thought necessary. This was an argument similar to the earlier debate over range requirements—if the missile was too accurate, the Army felt, it would be more useful in a semi-strategic role by the theater commander, rather than staying in the corps commander's control.\(^8^2\) The issue was decided in SACEUR's favor by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee, which then sent along the FOTL plans to the Pentagon's strategic systems review committee before reaching the Defense Acquisition Board—the final step before contract bids could be let in the form of an RFP.\(^8^3\) This hurdle was passed on March 12.\(^8^4\)

The warhead selection process had determined that the W-84 warhead from the Pershing II and the W-85 off the GLCM were both too heavy to use for the FOTL, and too heavy and bulky for TASM. DOE was able to develop a common warhead for both systems, however, that used existing and modified designs from the B-61, W-85, W-88 and W-89 warheads, but without

\(^8^1\)Interviews in Washington, May and December 1990.


\(^8^3\)Ibid.

\(^8^4\)"Lance Moribund?" AWST, 23 Apr 1990.
using existing hardware.\textsuperscript{85}

According to sources close to the top of the Pentagon hierarchy, however, all of these bureaucratic moves in FOTL acquisition were wasted effort after about the first of the year, when General Powell made up his mind that FOTL was a dead issue. The real question for the JCS Chairman was which cancellation option to recommend to the Secretary and the NSC. The driving issues for Powell's conversion were Congressional opposition and the changes in Europe, rather than any particular concerns over German unease, which some staff members in the NSC stressed. In the Chairman's words, "why tie a loser like FOTL around the issues of NATO in the 21st century like an albatross?"\textsuperscript{86}

In March 1990 the Pentagon released a new confidential military threat assessment which suggested that NATO could now effectively defend itself and Western Europe without the use of nuclear weapons, due to increased warning time and unilateral Soviet military cuts.\textsuperscript{87} This dealt a severe blow to the military's rationale for continued spending on FOTL development. Several other studies that came out about this time argued for FOTL's demise, as well. A bipartisan report opposing FOTL was released in March 1990 which suggested that NATO could now effectively defend itself and Western Europe without the use of nuclear weapons, due to increased warning time and unilateral Soviet military cuts.\textsuperscript{87} This dealt a severe blow to the military's rationale for continued spending on FOTL development. Several other studies that came out about this time argued for FOTL's demise, as well. A bipartisan report opposing FOTL was

\textsuperscript{85}John Tuck, Undersecretary of Energy for Defense Programs, testimony before Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee, reprinted in National Resources Defense Council memo, 1 May 1990, p. 3. According to Tuck, the SRAM-T could not even get off the ground with either of the two warheads due to the weight and size mismatch. The W-89 warhead was designed for the SRAM-II missile, the W-88 for the MIRVed Trident D-5 SLBM warhead.

\textsuperscript{86}Interview in Washington, January 1991.

\textsuperscript{87}Many of the details of the report were given to the press by Les Aspin after a House Armed Services Committee received it. Michael Gordon, "US Shift Seen on Defense of Europe," \textit{NYT}, 14 Mar 90; Richard Sia, "Nuclear Arms' Use No Longer Needed, Military Chiefs Say," \textit{Baltimore Sun}, 14 Mar 1990, p. 4.
published by the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. Signed by a
prestigious group of defense specialists, it argued against NATO’s
overreliance on early use of theater nuclear weapons in the face of
dramatic changes in Europe and West German opposition to the program. The
money budgeted for FOTL could be better used elsewhere, they argued.88
Another crucial argument against FOTL was Sam Nunn’s set of four
strategic policy speeches on the Senate floor, in which he argued that
NATO’s old strategy had been overcome by events. Nunn’s leadership role
in the Senate, particularly in terms of defense issues, made these
speeches a crucial marker for future Congressional support of the
alliance’s FOTL program. But such support was not forthcoming. Nunn
stated:

In a post-CFE situation of conventional parity...NATO’s
reliance on the threat of an early first use of short-range
nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack is no longer
credible. I do not believe there is a role in a new military
strategy for land-based nuclear weapons whose range is so
limited that they could only detonate on the soil of our
allies or the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe.
Ground-based nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery in Europe
should be phased out...however, a requirement will [still]
exist to deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons in Europe...I
suggest that NATO emphasize tactical air-delivered nuclear
bombs and missiles, including what is known as TASM.89

On March 30th Senator Dale Bumpers introduced a bill entitled

88"Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance," FPI
Policy Study Groups (Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute,
Nitze School of Advanced International Relations, 1 April 1990). Also R.
Jeffrey Smith, "US Weighs Changes in Plans to Produce Short-Range Nuclear

89Sam Nunn, "A New Military Strategy," speech on the Senate floor
(third in his series), Congressional Record, 19 April 1990, p. S4451. For
more on Nunn’s special role in the Senate, see Donna Cassata, "Nunn Wields
Quiet Control Over Defense," Philadelphia Inquirer, 8 Jul 1990, p. 4C.
"Prohibition on Obligation for Funds for the Follow-on to Lance Missile Program," which would immediately halt FOTL research and save the government $112 million that year alone in money which was being spent, as he put it, on "a missile that will almost certainly never be deployed." He argued that the money would be better spent on TASM. There was no objection from the Senate to the presentation of this bill. The tide had more than turned against FOTL; it was rushing in and threatening to wash away anyone who stood in its path—that is, anyone who still argued for a Lance follow-on.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE FOTL ISSUE

Policy in this town is never made in accordance with the wiring diagrams; it's done by small groups.

While pressures were building from nearly every quarter—Congressional, alliance, academic—to cancel the follow-on to Lance, the NSC was discussing that very issue behind closed doors. Recognizing that the budget was going to force FOTL back in the public eye again, the NSC decided to get in front of this issue and try to lead rather than just react to outside pressures. As described above, the NSC developed a


91 Interview with participant of the NSC process, Washington, January 1991. Another source told me that all the Bush formal structures are "Potemkin Villages"—sham fronts for the public. When the hard decisions have to be made, the administration "goes off line."

92 Interviews in Washington, December 1990. The NSC thereby hoped to have an affirmative policy in place relative to FOTL before Congress began marking up the FY91 defense authorization bill in late spring.
new organizational forum specifically to address the questions surrounding
the changing European security situation in a more coherent intra-agency
fashion. The European Strategy Steering Group (ESSG) was established in
February to imbed the FOTL program within the larger context of the
changing European political environment and the creation of appropriate
American policy responses to those changes. The only public reference to
this small elite decision-making cabal was in a New York Times article
that referred to new ideas "under discussion by a small circle of top
officials."³³

There was little discussion over FOTL's fate within the ESSG. By
February 1990 it was already obvious to everyone concerned that the
follow-on to Lance was doomed and had to go. Options for FOTL which were
discussed in the ESSG included: 1) outright cancellation; 2) cancellation
linked to Soviet withdrawals, either TNF or conventional; 3) placing it in
SNF negotiations as a bargaining chip; or 4) continuing its development
for as long as possible. Of these, only the first was a real option:
cancellation with no strings attached.³⁴ But FOTL was only one of
several issues under study by the NSC, which did not want to isolate the
follow-on to Lance but preferred to integrate it into a package of
proposals for European security. DOD was tasked with preparing a paper on
the FOTL which was the centerpiece for discussions on the issue and was
incorporated into the NSC paper for the President.

³³Michael Gordon, "Bush Plans to Cut Short-Range Arms in Germany,"
NYT, 19 Apr 1990, p. 12. See details on the ESSG earlier in this chapter.

³⁴Interviews in Washington, January 1991. Interestingly, no one
apparently raised the possibility of producing FOTL and storing it in the
US, an option that was used for ERW warheads in the aftermath of the
neutron bomb fiasco.
According to one member of the group, no "decision" per se even had to be made over whether to cancel FOTL; its demise was taken for granted, with the only remaining question being when to make the formal announcement. The actual recommendation to scrub the FOTL program came from the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was in keeping with the principles of cabinet government and ministerial responsibility which the Bush administration advocated. The recommendation went through NSC channels to the President, who approved it in late March.

FOTL'S CANCELLATION. MAY 1990

The follow-on-to-Lance was in fact already dead. The president only performed the last rites. What a difference a year makes.

In March the follow-on to Lance program was scheduled to go into Phase Three of the DOE research and development process: full-scale engineering development. This date had already been delayed at least


96 There may not have even been a formal decision paper associated with this, since the consensus was so broad in favor of cancellation. One source suggested that the "NSC channels" that were used actually consisted of Cheney, Baker, and Scowcroft agreeing to cancel the program at one of their breakfast get-togethers, then letting the President know. Interviews in Washington, December 1990 and January 1991.


three times. At this point bids would have to be let out to contractors
developing the missile system and associated hardware. Due to world
events and funding questions, however, the senior leaders in the Defense
Department were hesitant to move on to this next phase, despite SACEUR and
Army desires to have it.100 Late in March the Army Missile Command was
notified by the Pentagon that it should again "delay" its request for
proposal to solicit contractor bids on the follow-on to Lance missile,
even though the Defense Acquisition Board had given the project its final
go-ahead just days prior.101

Officially, this was merely a "temporary delay" in the program. Pentagon spokesmen emphasized that no final decisions had been made, and
any such decisions would be made in the NATO context, rather than
unilaterally. The reasons for delaying the RFP included concerns about
the nature of the contract, the precise technical design of the missile,
and the need to re-examine the contract in light of a new design study
mandated by Congress.102

These were obviously excuses to cover the real reason for the delay:
its pending cancellation. Administration officials admitted that "the
United States' earlier position has been superseded by political

100Michael Gordon, "Bush Plans to Cut Short-Range Arms in Germany,"
NYT, 19 Apr 1990, p. 12; Barbara Starr, "Pentagon 'Halts' FOTL Go-Ahead,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 Apr 1990, p. 673; "FOTL RFP Delayed but Program
Remains," Defense Daily, 20 Apr 1990, p. 139; and interview in Washington,
May 1990.

101Barbara Starr, "Pentagon 'Halts' FOTL Go-Ahead," Jane's Defence
Weekly, 14 Apr 1990, p. 473; "Lance Moribund?" AWAST, 23 Apr 1990;
interviews in the Pentagon, May 1990.

102"FOTL RFP Delayed But Program Remains," Defense Daily, 20 Apr 1990,
p. 119; "Army Stops Work on Lance, NATO May Ban," Army Times, 30 Apr 1990,
p. 29.
developments in Europe and at home.\textsuperscript{103} OSD/ISP responded to these official leaks by looking at all upcoming NATO meetings for a good place to make the announcement.\textsuperscript{104}

Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Wörner in early April calling for a rapid review of NATO nuclear policy so as to avoid a replay of the SNF debate of the previous year. NATO officials publicy downplayed such concerns, however, stating that the alliance would stick to its compromise from May 1989.\textsuperscript{105} Nevertheless, rumors began floating around Washington and European capitals that the Bush administration was considering a major shift in alliance strategy, perhaps by unilaterally removing American nuclear shells from Central Europe, or by offering Lance missiles (and non-deployment of FOTL) in SNF arms control negotiations.\textsuperscript{106} Either of these moves, it was felt, would give the President the lead in new initiatives in Europe.

By April 1990 even the last American hold-out for FOTL, General Galvin, recognized the futility of swimming upstream against overwhelming public opposition to such weapons. In an interview in the Washington Post

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Gordon, \textit{NYT}, 19 Apr 1990, p. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{104} A Pentagon source later told me that "this seemed to be the most appropriate time to cancel it," even though no lower-level staff offices had yet been notified that cancellation was imminent. The people in the tactical nuclear business in DOD were certain that the FOTL cancellation would be announced in a joint alliance forum; they were quite surprised by the President's unilateral and abrupt delivery of the news when he did. Interviews in Washington, May 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Theresa Hitchens, "NATO Officials Raise Doubts Over German Nuclear Ban," \textit{Defense News}, 16 Apr 1990, p. 21.
\end{itemize}
the SACEUR admitted that deployment was becoming unlikely.  

In mid-April President Bush began a round of meetings with the heads of the most important NATO nations. He met Prime Minister Thatcher on Bermuda for a day of talks in which she agreed to the general concept of cancelling the follow-on to Lance program as part of a larger review of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO. She also recognized that SNF missiles and artillery would have to be removed, eventually, from a unified Germany. A week later Bush received French President Mitterand in Key Largo, Florida, for discussions that included the same topic. Both British and French officials stressed that they did not want to see Germany become a nuclear-free zone, not only for military reasons but because they wanted to keep the German special nuclear relationship with the US intact. Otherwise, these neighbors feared, a new Germany might be tempted to one day pursue its own nuclear weapons capability.

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107 Post, 18 Apr 1990.

108 Michael Gordon, "Bush Plans to Cut Short-Range Arms in Germany," NYT 19 Apr 1990, p. 12. According to this source, Thatcher had finally come to accept that deploying new land-based SNF missiles in Germany was politically impossible. Her discussions with the President centered on how and when the US would announce its unilateral cancellation of FOTL. Also "Nuclear Missiles (West Germany)," House of Commons Debates, Volume 171, 26 April 1990, p. 620; The Times (London), 15 Apr 1990; R.W. Apple, "Arms and Germany," NYT, 29 Apr 1990.

109 Marc Fisher, "Nuclear Arms Debate Looms for United Germany," Post, 20 Apr 1990, p. 21; "No Nukes, Please, They're German," The Economist, 28 Apr 1990, pp. 52-3. Bush also asked the French president whether he might consider allowing US aircraft with SRAM-T nuclear missiles to be based in France, should a reunited Germany chose to be denuclearized; Mitterand was reportedly unexcited about the offer.

In late April the High Level Group, meeting in Brussels in preparation for the spring NPG meeting, approved a recommendation to replace the planned follow-on to Lance and all nuclear artillery shells situated in Central Europe with the tactical air-to-surface missile, which would be based throughout Western Europe. The TASM would be less visible, both physically and politically, than either FOTL or modernized 155-mm AFAPS. This seemed to match projects underway on NATO airfields around Europe—the construction of new munitions storage facilities beneath hardened aircraft shelters, capable of holding two B-61 gravity bombs or one SRAM-T missile per airplane. Some 389 of these new "WS3" storage vaults were scheduled to be completed in seven NATO states by late 1991.

On May 3, 1990, to nobody's great surprise, President Bush announced the cancellation of the FOTL program. He also added an extra twist: the end to nuclear artillery modernization in Europe. He expressed

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113 There was some initial confusion in the Pentagon over the precise details of the President's announcement, especially since no official paperwork (a Presidential Decision Document (PDD) or Memorandum (PDM)) accompanied the statement. Questions arose over whether all 155 mm modernization was cancelled, or just the program for warheads in Europe. When the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy asked the NSC for clarification in the form of a PDM, he was told that such a
America's willingness to put Lance missiles on the negotiating table with the Soviets earlier than previously agreed--as soon as a conventional forces agreement (CFE) was signed. In addition, he called for a NATO summit to meet in mid-summer to discuss how to react to the changes occurring in Eastern and Central Europe. As the President said, thanks to developments in Europe the previous six months there now was "less need for nuclear systems of the shortest range." Therefore,

in response to these new conditions, I've decided to terminate the follow-on-to-Lance program, and cancel any further modernization of US nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe. The NATO summit should agree on broad objectives for future negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the current short-range nuclear missile forces in Europe, which should begin shortly after a CFE treaty has been signed.115

One report pointed out that the President's announcement "was in many ways an exercise in political realism, providing just enough of the appearance of concessions to address complaints in the Atlantic alliance without

document was unnecessary; the President's message at the press conference was clear enough. This reflected the informal bureaucratic style of the Bush administration and its NSC process. The issue was clarified later that summer by DOD lawyers who determined that the President had cancelled AFAPS modernization programs world-wide. Cheney then formally cancelled the W-82 warhead program which was scheduled to begin production in 1991. Interviews in Washington, December 1990.


giving up much in real military terms." An administration official admitted that "Only in the remotest sense is this a military discussion. It is basically a political question about anchoring a unified Germany to Western Europe." At the same time, Secretary of State Baker was briefing America's NATO allies in Brussels on the US decisions. Indeed, one reason for the timing of the President's press conference in Washington was to ensure that Baker briefed the allies after the President had taken the spotlight for the announcement. At the Foreign Ministers' meeting, NATO agreed to Bush's call for a summit to discuss changes that NATO would have to consider. The ministers also endorsed FOTL's cancellation, supported early SNF negotiations, and agreed to several aspects of Germany's impending unification, including the stationing of Soviet forces in the eastern part of Germany for several years—a concession considered necessary to allay Soviet fears that might otherwise prevent her from consenting to German unity.


118 The administration had planned for Bush to make the announcement at his commencement speech the next day in Oklahoma, but they got the dates of Baker's European conference mixed up—if they waited until Oklahoma to make the announcement, the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Brussels would have to be delayed. Interviews in Washington, May 1990, and Brussels, June 1990. Also Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush is Readying an Arms Initiative," NYT, 2 May 1990. The President's speech at Oklahoma State University is reprinted in "NATO and the US Commitment to Europe," Current Policy No. 1276 (Washington: US Department of State, May 1990).

True to this administration's style, the decision to cancel FOTL was made by a select group of individuals at the very top of the bureaucratic hierarchy. No low-level "experts" received any feedback on their inputs into the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{120} The noticeable lack of press interest in the President's announcement that day (the follow-up questions during the press conference focused nearly entirely on events in Latin American drug wars and internal Soviet politics) reflected both the esoteric nature of the subject, and the fact that FOTL's demise had been anticipated for some time.

JCS Chairman Colin Powell stated that the issue now belonged in the High Level Group's lap, as they continued their studies on the future of nuclear weapons in Europe and NATO strategy. He also indicated that SACEUR would be developing a new Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study to reflect the loss of FOTL and modernized AFAPS, as well as probable conventional force reductions stemming from the CFE talks. General Galvin admitted that "some water has gone over the dam" since the last NWRS was completed, just 18 months earlier. Both generals stressed that it was now more imperative than ever that the alliance continue to pursue the modernization program for air-delivered nuclear weapons, such as TASM.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{120}For example, OSD/ISP, which develops nuclear policy for the US military, was not even included in the decision loop. In fact, even a senior member of Baker's staff at the State Department admitted that, while he knew the cancellation was coming, it was still unclear to him how the administration got from its position on 1 April to its final position on 3 May. The details were discussed only within a "high-level, closed, insulated group." Interviews in Washington, May 1990.

\textsuperscript{121}R. Jeffrey Smith, "Nuclear Reductions in Europe Ahead," \textit{Post}, 4 May 1990, p. 35.
America's NATO partners were generally happy about the decision to cancel the FOTL program. For the Germans and their continental supporters, it meant success for their policy positions and the end to an uncomfortable period of debate within the alliance over the need for and future of such weapons, which appeared to be heading for yet another "litmus test" of loyalty and willingness to share the burden of risk on their part when the deployment decision would have to be made in 1992. For the British, who had pushed for such a system, it merely reflected political realities--the alliance would never have been able to actually deploy FOTL in Germany, anyway, especially given the major changes in Eastern Europe the previous six months.

Some European members of international staffs were disturbed, however, by the US administration making such a unilateral decision without first consulting them. Bush, they said, could have talked with his key allies first; he could have delayed the announcement one week until the NPG meeting in Calgary, where the alliance could have put a united face on the decision and spread the political rewards equally; he could have given SHAPE and NATO a "heads-up" that such a decision was imminent. The US did none of these. Only the general allied agreement with the essence of the decision overcame this feeling that once again America was making major decisions for Europe without consulting the

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122See, for example, Hans-Dietrich Genscher's reaction in "Policy Statement to the Bundestag on the May 3 Conference of NATO Foreign Ministers and the May 5 'Two plus Four' Talks," Statements and Speeches, 14 May 1990.
Europeans. Nor was everyone in the US particularly pleased with the way the decision was made. Some pointed to this as one more example of how closely held such decisions were in Bush's Washington.

That these attitudes were prevalent adds credence to the argument that key decisions in this case were made by a small handful of elite decision-makers. Although Bush had spoken with Kohl, Thatcher, and Mitterand on the subject of cancelling FOTL, their bureaucratic staffs were as in the dark as were the experts in State and the Pentagon.

NATO STRATEGY STUDIES

FOTL's cancellation was considered a first step toward what the NATO alliance described as a major re-examination of its military strategy, including nuclear policy, in light of recent changes in Europe. The concepts that had been percolating to the surface for several months began to coalesce into a new consensus on what NATO would need for deterrence in coming years: a smaller, leaner force, relying more heavily on air-delivered nuclear weapons and less on battlefield missiles and artillery.

At the Calgary NPG meeting in May, NATO's defense ministers agreed that the alliance would keep its basic strategies intact, but would consider changing its force levels and weapons requirements in light of

123 Interviews with government officials, military officers, and academics in Bonn, Brussels, Mons (SHAPE HQ), and London, June-July 1990; also David White, "UK Urges NATO to Keep Some US Missiles," Financial Times, 10 May 1990, p. 10.

124 Interviews at the Pentagon and State Department, May 1990. One staff member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had worked on the political aspects of FOTL deployment for years told me he was "surprised" by the announcement--no one had let his office, which supposedly handled tactical nuclear issues for the Chairman of the JCS, in on plans to make such a decision.
the changes occurring in Eastern Europe. They told the High Level Group to continue its studies of future NATO strategy, as ordered in their fall 1989 NPG meeting, and tasked SACEUR to re-examine NWRS-88. Finally, the allies were in consensus agreement that NATO, including Germany, should not be denuclearized, and that continued work on a TASM was necessary. As the communique put it,

125 The High Level Group studies, already underway, became part of the underlying basis of the strategic review called for by President Bush in his May 3rd press conference and officially sanctioned by NATO ministerials and the London Summit during the late spring and summer of 1990. The study, entitled "Roles, Missions, and Desired Characteristics of Alliance Nuclear Systems," had been instigated by the Nuclear Planning Group in October 1989. It consisted of at least six discussion papers, each examining a different aspect of the issues surrounding nuclear weapons policy. Each study was carried out by a different allied country or set of countries; the SHAPE international staff also wrote one paper. For instance, the US prepared the study on changes in Eastern Europe, which it delivered to the HLG for circulation and discussion during their meeting in the summer of 1990. The lead agency tasked with writing this report was the Theater Nuclear Forces branch, OSD/ISP; they had substantial inter-agency coordination on this project with the State Department, NSC, JCS, and probably the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency. West Germany and Italy were jointly tasked with developing a study on the public relations aspects of announcing NATO's new nuclear policies. This was the final study to be completed, and was presented to the HLG in its meeting in Brussels in late January 1991. The final synthesis of these studies was scheduled to be presented to the NPG and Defense Planning Committee at their May 1991 joint ministerial in Brussels. Interviews in Washington, December 1990, January and April 1991.

126 The new NWRS was due to the NPG in spring 1991. Compared to earlier versions, the '91 version was vaguer, emphasizing fewer numbers of warheads and targets, existential deterrence, and direct targeting of the Soviet Union, in accordance with concepts agreed to in the General Political Guidelines of 1986 and the London Declaration of 1990. Interviews at SHAPE and Los Alamos, June-August 1990.

While the principal elements of NATO's nuclear policy remain valid, we will continue to adapt it and will reassess the future qualitative and quantitative requirements for NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces. In this context, and also bearing in mind the continuing need for widespread Alliance participation, we noted that sub-strategic nuclear systems offering both flexibility and longer range will assume relatively greater importance.\(^{128}\)

All governments seemed to be in agreement that TASM should remain out of the spotlight. Other than the oblique reference to it in the passage above, no defense minister wished to discuss the TASM program with reporters after the meeting. "TASM is not a word we want to talk about right now," said one senior US official at the NPG meeting.\(^{129}\) Given the general agreement that NATO should not be denuclearized, and remembering the uproar that ensued in 1989 when the US tried to push an early deployment decision on its allies for FOTL, most military and political leaders within NATO wanted to keep the TASM program as quiet as possible for as long as possible. Nobody wanted a repeat of the FOTL mess, and everyone recognized that its cancellation might now turn the public spotlight on the sole remaining SNF program: SRAM-T.\(^{130}\)

In early June the Soviet Union took another unilateral disarmament step by announcing that it would withdraw 1500 tactical nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe. While some commentators, including Secretary Baker, pointed out that the USSR was making political virtue out of a military necessity, since its forces were going to be asked to leave those states anyway, the announcement had some public relations effect and increased

\(^{128}\)NPG Final Communique, 10 May 1990, para. 6.


\(^{130}\)Interviews in Washington, May, July and December 1990, and Europe June and July 1990.
pressures on NATO and Washington to make some dramatic gesture at the London summit.¹³¹

The summer of 1990 was marked by a series of international gatherings wherein NATO considered its response options to the Soviet moves in Eastern Europe. By the time they were through, they had developed a new strategic outlook that forecast the end of flexible response, discounted the importance of nuclear weapons, and established new ground rules for conventional force structuring. Their efforts also formally buried the follow-on to Lance program. While the details were left to various working groups to thrash out, the broad outline of the new look was presented at these meetings.

In late May the Defense Planning Committee met in what was essentially a continuation of their meeting as the NPG two weeks earlier. The defense ministers were more upbeat in their considerations of conventional force changes, announcing that they were "determined to make the most of the opportunities created by these developments and in adapting to the new conditions in Europe," and that the time had come "to reap the benefits of the greatly improved climate in East/West relations."¹³² The DPC called for a review of NATO military strategy and the means of implementing that strategy. This portended big changes at the upcoming meetings.

In early June the foreign ministers met as the North Atlantic


Council in Turnberry, Scotland. Their final communique was even more startling, offering "the hand of friendship and cooperation" to the Soviet Union "as Europe enters a new era." They echoed the DPC commitments to a changed security structure to reflect the new realities, but remained cautious about the continued need for nuclear weapons as a link between Europe and North America. They also focused on pending German unification and ways to insure that the Soviet Union would allow Germany to remain a full member of NATO without feeling threatened by the changed circumstances. Many of the final agreements concerning residual Soviet military rights in eastern Germany, and the conditions for German reunification and membership in NATO were first publicly announced here.\(^{133}\)

The United States became surprisingly open-minded in the weeks leading up to the July London summit. It jettisoned several of its traditional security positions and took the lead in pushing the Western alliance to accept an agenda scripted in Washington. As the date of the summit approached, many of the American positions were included in a letter that Bush sent to the allied capitals for advance consideration. NATO clearly wanted the London Summit and resulting declaration to be a path-breaking moment for the alliance, establishing the course for allied security and political arrangements for the years ahead.\(^{134}\)

\(^{133}\)See "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry, United Kingdom, 7-8 June 1990: Message from Turnberry and Final Communiqué," NATO Press Service, 8 June 1990.

THE LONDON DECLARATION: "WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT"


In fact, however, while the alliance did make some changes to established policies in the London Declaration, the overall effect was more of a minor shift than a major transformation. The key elements of flexible response relying on potential nuclear retaliation were still in place, if only temporarily; the US would still maintain conventional and nuclear forces on the continent; Germany would still be a full, contributing member. Still, the details made interesting reading. With respect to nuclear forces and policy, the Heads of State and Government declared that they were adopting a new strategy that would make "nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort." This shifted the alliance from an "early use" policy to a "no early first use" stance; NATO was not willing
to go to a "no-first use" strategy, which would have negated the value of US in-theater nuclear forces. Second, the declaration confirmed that NATO was prepared to eliminate all nuclear artillery, under two conditions: once SNF arms control negotiations had begun, and in return for reciprocal action by the Soviets. The allies preferred bilateral, unverified artillery reductions to an arms control agreement that might affect conventional artillery missions, and which would be unverifiable anyway. Third, the alliance confirmed President Bush's earlier announcement that it was willing to enter into SNF negotiations as soon as a CFE Treaty was completed.\(^\text{136}\)

The most important aspect of the round of announcements and meetings between May and July 1990 was the way in which the deeply held commitment to short-range nuclear forces, including the planned follow-on to Lance, evaporated almost overnight. FOTL was dead; the London summit wrote its epitath. The only remaining SNF project in development for the 1990's was the tactical air-to-surface missile, which was already facing many of the same pressures and problems that had plagued FOTL. We will turn to TASM's case story in the final chapter.

**ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION**

Why was FOTL cancelled and the announcement thereof made in such a manner? On the one hand, there were pressures to keep the program alive: a desire not to appear to be "caving in" on SNF, which could appear to put NATO on "the slippery slope to total denuclearization," concerns not to

offend a key ally (the UK) by cancelling a program it regarded as necessary, and the belief that delaying a decision on FOTL for as long as possible served to protect the TASM program by keeping it out of the public spotlight. On the other hand, a number of pressures coalesced in the spring of 1990 that forced this decision: the budget cycle, pressures from Congress, studies by the Pentagon and outside agencies showing a declining threat and concomitant decreased need for such systems, Nunn's speeches in the Senate, ambivalence by the Army over acquiring a new nuclear missile, concerns by the administration not to offend a different ally by hanging on to the program too long. In addition, the programmatic decision to cancel FOTL sent a strong signal to Moscow, buttressing the forthcoming announcement that the alliance was shifting its nuclear policy to a "last resort" emphasis. The cancellation of FOTL set the stage for the spring round of ministerials and the London summit, responded to Soviet charges that the US was not responding in kind to unilateral Warsaw Pact cuts, and helped ease Soviet concerns over a unified Germany.

One analyst likened the FOTL cancellation story to an Agatha Christie mystery novel. It was as if the detective was faced with an over-abundance of suspects in a murder case, all of whom had motive and opportunity to kill the victim (program). Any one of them could have done it; and as it turned out, all of them did. Similarly, each of the pressures facing the President could have been the proximal cause of the decision to cancel FOTL. More likely, however, is the probability that the combination of these pressures created an overwhelmingly simple

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solution to this problem.\textsuperscript{138}

From the Pentagon's point of view, there were also a number of constraints forcing DOD's hand on FOTL by late 1989 and early 1990: uncertain military requirements as the threat in Europe receded; uncertain funding by Congress; bureaucratic infighting within the Army over its future nuclear role (if any); the pressures of the arms control process moving forward; a declining resource base for defense spending; allied concerns over the weapon; and the Bush administration's political style--flying all over the world and juggling several diplomatic balls at once (the future of Europe, arms control, German unification). It all became too difficult for the Defense Department to keep up with, and not worth the political effort it would take to fight for this system any longer. The senior military leadership was more aware of these fiscal and political issues than was the lower-level "nuclear mafia" of Army colonels in the acquisition staffs who maintained a more parochial, military needs oriented outlook.\textsuperscript{139}

In addition, the European allies had been telling the US for some time that FOTL development was an American "national decision," so Bush took that as a given and made a unilateral decision to cancel it--hence the lack of apparent formal allied consultation prior to the announcement. One must remember, however, that Bush did hold two summit meetings in the spring of 1990 prior to FOTL's cancellation, with Thatcher and Mitterand, and he was on the telephone regularly with many other Western leaders who were interested in the decision. Furthermore, his moves were quite

\textsuperscript{138}Thanks to Aaron Friedberg for this analogy.

\textsuperscript{139}From interviews in Washington, January and February 1991.
clearly tailored to, and coordinated with, Chancellor Kohl’s needs. Just as in the May 1989 compromise, the US was unwilling to sacrifice Kohl’s political future for a weapon program of limited value.\textsuperscript{140}

Washington’s obvious tilt toward Germany was due to several factors involving personalities in leadership positions, as well as to geo-strategic considerations. President Bush had a close working and personal relationship with Chancellor Kohl, and Robert Blackwill, Director of European and Soviet Affairs for the NSC, had a strong personal interest in enhancing US-German relations. The personal views of these two men helped push American interests closer to those of the FRG, and would not be sidetracked by divisive weapons systems like FOTL and allies, such as Great Britain, who supported those programs against German desires.\textsuperscript{141}

The timing of the cancellation announcement gave the Nuclear Planning Group, which had already reached a consensual position that FOTL was undeployable and therefore a dead issue, the opportunity to endorse the President’s decision at its meeting a week later.\textsuperscript{142} The reason for the delay from late March until early May was ascribed by one participant to inertia and the press of other events: “it’s easier to make a policy

\textsuperscript{140}Interviews in Washington, May 1989, May and December 1990, and February 1991. One member of the HLG said that FOTL “wasn’t worth risking the alliance, or the Kohl government, for;” this attitude pervaded the NSC system in the United States.

\textsuperscript{141}The extent to which Blackwill was successful in his behind-the-scenes role as a pro-German voice high in the American bureaucracy became evident after he left the NSC in fall 1990. The German government awarded him a medal for distinguished service upon his departure. From interviews in Washington, January 1991.

\textsuperscript{142}Interview at NATO, June 1990.
than to make an announcement about it."\textsuperscript{143}

Finally, the pressure of other activities and demands kept the NSC from devoting proper attention to FOTL and SNF and their changing roles as a result of events in Eastern Europe. One NSC staff member admitted to me that they were just too busy earlier in the year to deal with FOTL, which was not a pressing issue at the time (perhaps because it had no suspense date for a decision). It only became an issue again when it came back on the table as a result of nearing its Phase 3 development point in March and as the new fiscal year budget was entering Congressional debate.\textsuperscript{144}

EVALUATION OF THE NSC PROCESS IN THE FOTL CANCELLATION

One obvious lesson of the various ways in which the NSC has been organized over the years, including the Bush system and structures, is that many policy matters are decided at informal gatherings of the key actors in the NSC membership. Such decisions are not made by the appropriate agencies or departments, they are not made by the National Security Council staff, nor by the Cabinet, nor via executive-legislative consultation. In the FOTL case it was clear that the final decision on a strategy for handling the Alliance at the May 1989 NATO Summit, as we have seen, was made during a weekend "retreat" at the Bush estate in Kennebunkport, Maine—a weekend attended by Bush and a handful of his key advisors. Interviews conducted at the State Department, DOD, and the NSC

\textsuperscript{143}Interview in Washington, January 1991.

\textsuperscript{144}Interviews in Washington, May and December 1990. This reflects much of the writing on bureaucratic politics which describes why certain issues are considered. See especially Halperin, \textit{Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy}, Chapter 6, "Initiative and Rules."
shortly after this event confirmed that many key officials in these departments were not aware of what was afoot until the decision was announced in Brussels.\textsuperscript{145}

The same sort of behind-the-scenes drama occurred in the spring of 1990, as the President considered his options with respect to the follow-on to Lance modernization program. Due to the rapid and dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, there was no longer any support for the development or deployment of this new weapon from any quarter. Yet the President did not announce its cancellation until May 3rd. While many bureaucrats in Washington and Europe were not surprised by the President's decision, they were, for the most part, surprised at his timing, and very few were involved in the actual decision to cancel FOTL.\textsuperscript{146} The President relied on his "inner group" of top officials, all at or above the Assistant Secretary level, and all nominally involved in the NSC process, to make this decision. The larger bureaucracy had no feedback from its inputs to

\textsuperscript{145}Interviews, Washington, June 1989, and Bonn and Brussels, August 1989. According to several views, Bush was dissatisfied with the cautious alternatives suggested by the military and the NSC. He wanted to take a bold step that would re-establish his leadership of the alliance through some dramatic break-through at the summit. See also Crabb and Mulcahy, p. 194.

\textsuperscript{146}"The President likes surprises," was how one senior staff member described it. "He likes to make the big splash in the news, and he hates leaks"--so he keeps his cards held tightly to his vest until he plays them. Another example of a staff being cut out of the loop showed itself at the US Mission to NATO the week prior to the July 1990 London Summit. As the key political body representing US interests to the alliance, one would think that the US Mission would not only be making policy suggestions to Washington, but would also be involved in the decision-making process of determining American policy in Europe. One would be wrong to think so. Nobody I talked with at NATO that week knew what the President was going to offer up at the summit; they were awaiting his announcements so they could then scramble to develop an appropriate response to whatever new tasking he had created for them.
these higher levels, nor were they consulted during the deliberations.147

That this is so should perhaps not be too surprising. We have already noted that the most important decisions facing a government rise to the generalists at the top of the hierarchy, and are not settled by the experts within the bureaucracy; it is also true that most Presidents prefer to place trust in their personal aides rather than their professional staff, regardless of those aides' intended, "official" positions within the organizational charts. As Roger Hilsman describes it, the policy making arena is a series of concentric rings, each of which contains a smaller set of decision makers involved with the process.148 Quite often good decisions made at lower levels of the bureaucracy reflect the fact that trust and confidence have flowed down to those levels from the President. When such trust is not forthcoming, which happens especially in crucial foreign policy decisions, the decision level

\[\text{Based on interviews in Washington, May 1990, and in Bonn and Brussels, June 1990. One JCS staff officer who worked directly on SNF issues for the Chairman admitted to me that he was surprised by the cancellation announcement; not only were his office's recommendations ignored, but they had no inkling of the impending announcement and had made no contingency plans in case of FOTL's cancellation. This leadership style–where staff inputs go up the chain, but no feedback ever comes back to the individuals–has caused considerable demoralization in the State Department, and to a lesser degree in DOD. Staff members never know if their work is being considered or junked, or even if they are ahead of or behind the leader's pace. Worse, they are sometimes intentionally led astray, as when the senior leadership publicly and privately stuck to the NATO position on SNF right up until May of 1990, when the administration suddenly reversed itself. As one senior American official in Europe said, "It must be frustrating for dedicated young staffers to be told to pick up the ball and run with it, only to find out later you were told to run in the wrong direction." From interviews in Washington, March and May 1990, and Bonn, Brussels, and Mons, June-July 1990.}\]

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naturally moves into a tighter, smaller circle of decision makers.

A large bureaucracy obviously does not always lead to Weber's "ideal type" of system, with the information and data necessary for such decisions flowing to the top of the pyramid. Often it seems as though "bureaucratic politics" really means who is in a particular seat, what his personality is like, or who has the most energy and desire to pick up the ball and run with it on an issue. These factors are just as important in determining who will have the greatest impact on a national security decision as are all of the traditional rules of bureaucratic in-fighting.\textsuperscript{149} For example, the fact that several highly placed officials in the Bush administration wanted to improve US-German relations drove many of the US policy decisions from 1989 through 1990. This also meant that certain programmatic aspects of the larger alliance relationship, such as FOTL and its place in the Montebello Decision, were deemed expendable.

On the other hand, the purpose of a bureaucratic organization is to provide information and options to the leadership for their decision, then to implement the decision regardless of its relation to the original bureaucratic inputs. A bureaucracy is not supposed to be a collective decision-making apparatus; it would, therefore, be wrong to criticize the American system when the executive leadership does not follow the proposals of lower level staffs or interagency working groups. Such inputs from the NSC process are simply suggestions, options for the leaders to consider. Decisions can be made at such high levels much more

\textsuperscript{149}Morton Halperin recognized this years ago. See \textit{Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy}, especially Part II, "Decisions."
quickly, and are less likely to be inadvertently leaked to the press. It is, in the final analysis, still their job to use good judgement and make the decisions that will rest on their shoulders.

CONCLUSION

The National Security Council has been used by different presidents in different ways. At some times, it has been virtually nonexistent as a meaningful entity for deliberation over important decisions. Instead, presidents have relied more on informal groups and individual consultation with trusted aides. At other times, the NSC has provided the site for vital debate and discussion, albeit in either expanded or contracted form (as with Kennedy’s "ExComm" and Johnson’s "Tuesday lunch group.").

The case we examined in this chapter—the cancellation of FOTL in 1990—reflects this latter type of decision-making: small groups of elites meeting informally to make decisions outside of the formal NSC organization. This process is best explained by the bureaucratic and organizational politics theories, which are incorporated in the domestic politics perspective. The domestic politics approach is the best way to understand the rationale behind the decision to cancel the follow-on to Lance missile program in the spring of 1990, as well as how that decision was made. Admittedly, the decision was driven to a large extent by a dramatic decline in the strategic threat, stemming from systemic changes; the pressures of alliance politics were certainly another major factor in the decision-makers’ analyses of the situation. But one cannot fully understand the rich details of the behind-the-scenes activities that went on in the final year of FOTL without an appreciation for the

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150Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 196.
organizational struggles, the budgetary concerns, the questions of timing, and the inter-agency discussions that occurred—in short, domestic politics at work in the Bush administration.
PART III: ANALYSIS AND THE FUTURE OF SNF MODERNIZATION
The story of the follow-on to Lance missile ended with its cancellation by President Bush in May of 1990. It was a story that began with a consensus among the NATO allies that the worsening strategic situation required a response that included modernized short-range nuclear forces. It progressed through increasing popular and political opposition, especially in the European allied states. And it ended with a decision made within the American bureaucracy that reflected a number of converging pressures on the President from the international system, from America’s allies, and from his own domestic arena.

What lessons can we draw from this story? What themes run through the three time periods of the case, and across the three perspectives we used to understand what happened? I believe that the FOTL case can serve as a model for understanding the politics of future theater nuclear programs. The problems FOTL encountered will be repeated and perhaps magnified in the changed strategic environment of the 1990’s. More importantly from an academic standpoint, the approach used in this thesis—applying multiple perspectives to better understand different time periods of a single case—can be applied in other cases, and points in a particular direction that has ramifications for the best way to predict what will occur in connection with the next case of SNF modernization: the tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM).

This final chapter is divided into two discrete parts. The first will analyze some of the themes that have run through the preceding chapters, as well as some supposed "lessons" which other writers have
attributed to the INF and FOTL modernization efforts. It will then turn to the bigger issue within this dissertation: the applicability of different perspectives to a single case. I will review how well my approach worked, and examine some of the residual aspects of the story that could not be explained using the primary perspective for each section. In the second half of the chapter I will turn to the TASM story. After a brief look at TASM's history, technical details, and ongoing problems, I apply the framework from this study on FOTL in an attempt to predict TASM's likely outcome. At a minimum we should be able to discern which perspective will best serve an analyst trying to explain the TASM story, regardless of the program's success or failure.

ANALYSIS OF THE FOTL CASE

In Chapter Three I identified a number of thematic cords that wove their way through the history of early NATO nuclear issues and debates. We can now return to those themes to see if they were still applicable in the FOTL case.

The distinction between deterrence and reassurance as key purposes of nuclear forces. This question certainly lay behind the scenes in much of the SNF controversy during the late 1980's. One of the biggest difficulties for the alliance, in fact, was reconciling the deterrent purposes of modernized SNF with the declining desire on the part of European publics to have these weapons stationed in their countries. Nuclear weapons no longer seemed reassuring. After the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, many saw such weapons as presenting more of a barrier to the dismantling of the the Cold War security
architecture in Europe than as a deterrent to Warsaw Pact forces.

European concern over lack of prior consultation by the United States regarding nuclear decisions. This issue had supposedly been addressed through the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group and the High Level Group as multinational fora for the discussion of views on nuclear issues. In fact, the US still controlled both of these bodies. Substantial lip service was given to the consensus-building arrangements of the alliance, but as the FOTL program progressed in its developmental process the major decisions were still made unilaterally by the US, acting in response to alliance pressures and domestic political considerations. Obvious examples included the technical restrictions on a nuclear ATACMS missile imposed by Congress, and President Bush's cancellation of the FOTL and AFAPS modernization programs.

NATO's attempt to overcome political divisions between the allies with technical "fixes" rather than with revised doctrine. This was seen in the changing range requirements put forth by SACEUR as the Soviet threat declined; the same weapons could still be used, he argued, but for different purposes and with different targets. Eventually, of course, the changes in Europe became so great that NATO had to respond with doctrinal shifts. In 1990 it ordered a strategy review and announced some major changes to long-standing policies. Nevertheless, the TASM program still appears to be an attempt to placate both sides of the old flexible response dichotomy: those who want robust, militarily effective TNF forces stationed in Europe, and those who prefer a trip-wire approach that relies on existential deterrence.

Increasing consideration of public opinion in formulating force
modernization and rationalization policies. Public opinion played a central and obvious role in the FOTL story. Much of what we have here termed "alliance politics" could be construed, in fact, as attempts to placate or direct European public concerns. Public opinion had the greatest effect on domestic German politics. Chancellor Kohl found himself caught between public antipathy toward SNF modernization, a mood captured and used against him by his coalition partner, Foreign Minister Genscher, and by traditional Atlanticist desires to maintain close ties to NATO and the US. The latter consideration meant abiding by agreements and commitments made concerning nuclear force modernization.

Lack of a credible nuclear warfighting doctrine by US and NATO forces, and the incompatibility of weapons and doctrine. The unreality of actually using follow-on-to-Lance in a military situation made many of the top leaders in the US Army ambivalent or even opposed to taking on a new theater nuclear role. In their view, FOTL was simply an increased burden and a fiscal drain on the organization, with little military rationale. Arguments as to its excellent military capabilities (cross-corps targeting, flexibility, and so on) were undermined by debates between the Pentagon and SHAPE over range and accuracy requirements.

The desire of the US and European allies to prevent Germany from obtaining its own nuclear capability. This theme has not diminished; on the contrary, it may be even more important to certain of Germany's neighbors in the aftermath of German reunification. While still a generally unspoken concern, this issue has emerged in the arguments for TASM development and deployment on German airfields as a way of both assuring and deterring those Germans who may want to develop a national
nuclear capability.

The themes we presented in Chapter Three did have relevance and applicability to the FOTL case, as we expected. At this point we shall turn to a more thorough examination of the case in order to determine whether the methodological approach proposed in Chapter Two was equally successful.

THE FOTL STORY: A CONVERGENCE OF PRESSURES ON THE UNITED STATES IN 1990

*The political environment seems to have constraints that override NATO political guidelines.*

President Bush found himself assailed by an increasingly demanding set of pressure variables in 1990. These pressures originated from each of our three time periods for the FOTL story and in each of the three perspectives. Together these demands forced the President's hand in the FOTL case; rather than try and deal with the often conflicting demands of all of these pressures, it was easier to just cancel the program. Some would say the President gave in to political pressure on what should have been a strategic decision; others claim that he was merely recognizing "political realities" in cancelling a program for which support was rapidly evaporating. These pressures can be grouped by perspective and time period in the categories that follow.

1. SACEUR Requirements (systemic). The initial decision to pursue the SNF modernization program mandated by the Montebello Decision was a strategic determination based on the threat, SACEUR's target set, and existing and forecast NATO and Soviet weapons balances. These early

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*Interview with American diplomat at SHAPE, Belgium, August 1989.*

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demands included a required IOC (Initial Operational Capability) for the follow-on-to-Lance of 1995. By the late 1980's the pressure to meet this deadline was mounting from SACEUR and his staff at SHAPE.

2. German Demands (alliance). Also by the latter part of the decade certain European allies began to have second thoughts about developing a new nuclear weapon for Central Europe. West Germany was particularly concerned over its long-term defense burden, given growing anti-nuclear popular opinion, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's opposition to NATO nuclear plans, and, beginning in the summer of 1989, the possibility of improved relations with East Germany. German domestic politics drove much of its changeable foreign policy agenda during these years, as the SPD tried to capitalize on anti-nuclear fears, the FDP under Genscher used German nationalism and pro-Gorbachev sentiments, and the CDU under Kohl waffled between traditional Atlanticist commitments and catering to public opinion. These domestic factors translated into pressures on the alliance and the US, as evidenced in German demands for a Comprehensive Concept on Arms Control and Disarmament, adopted by NATO at its May 1989 summit, and the compromise agreement to defer a final decision on FOTL until 1992. Allied pressures for the elimination of FOTL and nuclear artillery reappeared in early 1990 following a six-month dormancy after the May '89 summit, coming primarily from the FRG, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

3. Acquisition Timing (domestic). SACEUR's requirements for the IOC and technical characteristics of the weapon drove the domestic US acquisition cycle. The Army and Department of Energy were developing plans for a missile, launcher, and warhead package that would meet the
range, yield, accuracy, safety and survivability demands of the theater
CINC (commander-in-chief), while still being ready by 1995. This required
steep funding increases for the program in the 1989-1990 time frame, as
the program entered full-scale development. It also meant that hard
decisions had to be made, sometimes on short notice, on technical aspects
and whether to proceed with the next phase of the program. Such was the
case in early 1990 regarding the FOTL missile as it neared its Phase 3
full-scale development point.

4. Congressional Restrictions (domestic). The US Congress entered
the fray during this time by adding new requirements to the weapon
acquisition planners regarding arms control (the distinguishability
arguments, and restrictions on a nuclear ATACMS) and questioning the
original strategic justification for such a weapon. In addition, the
American economy was in a slump, and Congress found itself short of funds
for popular domestic programs. Given the realities of electoral politics,
money for a new weapon that appeared unlikely to be deployable once built
was money unavailable for other programs that would directly benefit the
voting public. Congress pressured the administration to get allied
agreement to FOTL deployment before it would authorize full production
funding; this, in turn, antagonized the European allies who preferred to
keep the program quiet and out of public sight. This became a vicious
cycle, as negative feedback from Europe increased Congressional hesitancy.
The final straw came when Sam Nunn, leading defense expert in the Senate,
announced his opposition to FOTL in the spring of 1990.

5. Inter-agency Differences (domestic). Not all organizations
within the US bureaucracy agreed on the need for FOTL or on its technical
specifics. The Army, as we have seen, was ambivalent about its nuclear role and appeared reluctant to spend money on a tactical system that was politically unusable, and that would be controlled by the multi-national theater commander. In addition, FOTL was not adequately discussed in interagency fora until the last year or so, when the only question remaining was how and when to cancel it. Changing rationales and differing testimony from different bodies within DOD and the State Department hurt FOTL's support in Congress. It looked like the administration did not even know why it needed this weapon, or what its purpose was. Congress proved unwilling to fund such a system without a clear statement of US military need coupled with allied support.

6. International System Changes (systemic). The background issue which drove many of the above pressures was the changing strategic situation in Central Europe. International systemic changes evident by late 1989 included the Gorbachev political and arms control initiatives and the resulting disappearing threat to NATO. While systemic effects did not directly pressure the President to act on FOTL, their indirect influence was felt in several ways, most notably in public pressure on the US for a positive response to the new Soviet thinking.

7. Public Demands for Response to Gorbachev (domestic and alliance). Public demand grew throughout the winter of 1989-90 for some positive responses by the West to the Gorbachev initiatives. In particular people looked to Washington, as the leader of the NATO alliance, for some example of firm, decisive leadership that would grasp this opportunity in international relations and make the most of it. This theme was common in speeches by German political elites, who feared that
inaction or undue caution by the US would allow this unique window of opportunity to close without having locked in the changes as permanent.

These pressure vectors all converged on the National Security process in the United States in late 1989 and early 1990, making FOTL's cancellation not only politically expedient, but also predictable. As Chapter Eight pointed out, the President's decision to cancel the FOTL program, announced in May 1990, was the logical outcome of these various pressures, with domestic political factors being the proximate cause of the decision.

"LESSONS LEARNED" FROM INF AND FOTL

Behind these pressures lay several supposed "lessons" from earlier weapons modernization programs, notably the INF missile upgrades and the INF Treaty. For some in the alliance, the INF Treaty signified that those remaining TNF weapons--the SNF forces undergoing modernization as a result of Montebello--assumed even greater importance. They would now act as the sole remaining nuclear coupling device between European security and American strategic guarantees, and might also compensate for lost INF weapons in covering East European targets.

For others, however, notably the West Germans, the INF Treaty had an entirely different lesson and meaning. The limited range and warfighting characteristics of the remaining battlefield forces, the willingness of the alliance (under US leadership) to negotiate away those missiles that best fulfilled the classic long-range deterrent function, and the imbalance between the WTO and NATO in SNF forces, all meant that arms control reductions became more important than modernization as a political
goal. This difference in perspective between the lessons gleaned from INF by the US and West Germany explains much of the vague language apparent in NATO communiques between 1987 and 1989. The alliance was wrestling with its future in a changing world with its two leading members holding two opposing outlooks on what was necessary. Ambiguity was the predictable alternative to unachievable compromise in this situation.

The dual-track decision of 1979 had been based on the Harmel Report, which called on the alliance to pursue both military preparations and arms control efforts to improve East-West relations. Ironically, the lasting effect of the INF missile controversy and the INF Treaty was the breakdown of the left-right political consensus within the alliance that had agreed to the Harmel Report in 1968. We saw evidence of this in the discussion in Chapter Six on the disappearance of the West German domestic security consensus.

Some attempts were made by American analysts to develop lessons from INF or FOTL that could be applicable to future nuclear modernization programs. Among the supposed "lessons" one should remember if new nuclear weapons are deemed imperative are:

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--shorten the time between decision and deployment, to prevent becoming hostage to public opposition;

--try to look ahead to the state of European domestic politics in the key allies at the time of deployment, rather than just when the decision is made;

--recognize that these are preeminently political decisions, which heads of state must get a handle on early in their terms of office, before the issues disappear into the technical milieu of bureaucracies;

--a military rationale must be clearly articulated before undertaking a decision on new weapons;

--a requirement should be articulated not against a specific weapon, but against the general Soviet threat;

--do not offer a "zero solution" if the weapon is strategically needed;

--modernization efforts should not begin without a long-term public diplomacy strategy to insure support for the process;

--future modernization efforts should not be tied to an arms control process that could derail the military effort.  

Obviously few of these lessons from the INF experience were applied in the follow-on-to-Lance modernization case. The long delay (12 years) between the decision and proposed deployment, the lack of a well-defined military rationale that the public could understand, the inability to foresee changes in the international political environment that swept across Europe in 1989 and 1990, the attempt to force European governments to make early commitments to FOTL deployment despite the tension this 


*Most of the persons I interviewed in Washington disagreed with this last lesson. They do not believe it will be possible to have any future modernization program that is not tied to an arms control agenda in some way, because the public now wants and expects such a connection. Interviews in Washington, May 1990.*
caused in the INF case—all were examples of ways in which the alliance (and the United States, as its leader in nuclear issues) failed to properly apply these lessons.

In the summer of 1990 a group of military officers and consultants gathered in Washington to consider specific lessons from FOTL that might be useful in the SRAM-T modernization effort. These echoed many of those listed above. One of the most important lessons from a domestic perspective was the need to present a solid front to the public; that is, to resolve organizational differences of opinion “in-house,” rather than letting such arguments reach the media. The inter-agency process in Washington needed to be more intimately involved with TASM than it had been with FOTL, in order to develop broad institutional support and insure that all agencies presented the same public position. They recognized that one of FOTL’s problems was the friction between SACEUR and the Army staff over technical requirements for the missile, and that this could happen again between SACEUR, USAFE, Tactical Air Command and the Air Staff if efforts were not made to preclude controversy.5 This dovetailed with another lesson: the need to keep the issue as quiet as possible. Nobody wanted to re-live the debate over early European commitment to FOTL deployment, which had been a serious political faux pas on the part of the US and led to negative reaction among the allies and within the US Congress.

The discussants also believed that FOTL suffered by having a military rationale limited to the European theater, especially given the

changes in the threat that occurred there. Better to give TASM a broader base of support, worldwide if possible, by getting all the theater CINC's to sign on to the program. This included changing all references to the system from "TASM" to "SRAM-T" in order to divorce the program from a purely European setting.\(^6\)

Another working group agreed that forcing a rapid decision on a European ally that was not ready to agree to future nuclear deployments had backfired in the FOTL case and should not be a technique used for TASM. It advocated a slower pace for TASM development and a delayed deployment decision as a way of keeping the program alive and enhancing its political chances.\(^7\)

We shall see many of these lessons applied in the TASM case analyzed later in this chapter.

**THE BIGGER THESIS: SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES OVER TIME**

In order to describe and explain the follow-on-to-Lance missile modernization story, we first separated the case into three discrete time periods, each of several years' duration. The events of each period were best explained, I proposed, using a different perspective or level of analysis. The three perspectives became increasingly narrow in their focus over the life of the story. Beginning with a systemic perspective, we explained the early years of FOTL in strategic terms. This period

\(^6\)"FOTL: Lessons Learned."

focused on early nuclear studies by the High Level Group that culminated in the October 1983 Montebello Decision and SHAPE's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study that followed. In these decisions, the Nuclear Planning Group decided to pursue the modernization of several SNF weapons, including a Lance missile follow-on.

The middle years of the program were best understood by taking a view focused on alliance politics. This period concentrated on the declining security consensus within West Germany, and general concern among several allies about the political practicality of deploying a new land-based nuclear missile on continental European soil. It led to the May 1989 NATO Summit where the Heads of State and Government approved a Comprehensive Concept which embedded the FOTL decision within a larger plan. This was meant to give the program less publicity and greater feasibility, but in fact simply postponed a final decision on the production and deployment of the missile for several more years.

FOTL's last year, leading up to the cancellation decision in May 1990, could best be explained through a combined approach of alliance politics and domestic politics, especially in the United States. With the strategic background in Eastern Europe changing rapidly, perspectives other than the systemic came to the fore as better explanatory tools for how such decisions were made by the US and its allies. A domestic politics approach worked best, but the alliance aspect cannot be overlooked as a necessary secondary explanatory perspective.

These perspectives can be summarized by looking at an updated version of the matrix presented in Chapter One, this time with the approaches we used highlighted. The systemic approach gave us a good
first cut at the story, but the later time periods cannot be explained using only a strategic outlook. One must apply the lower-level, so-called "reductionist" approaches in order to fully flesh out the details of such decision-making. This approach makes up for its lack of parsimony and simplicity with richness of detail about how governments actually operate.

Figure 7: Matrix of Perspectives Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY QUESTION</th>
<th>Why modernize?</th>
<th>Why continue?</th>
<th>Why cancel?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSPECTIVE</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Politics</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Politics</td>
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THE EARLY YEARS: A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE

The systemic perspective is fully adequate to explain the events of the early years of the FOTL story. The decision to proceed with SNF modernization, which included as one of its central programs a follow-on to the aging Lance missile, was made during a period when the alliance leadership seemed to hold a consensus view of the nature of the Soviet threat and the changing correlation of forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact. In this strategic environment the alliance felt that it needed to make the necessary efforts to counter these negative trends. Such moves included the INF dual-track decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM missiles in Europe, and the Montebello Decision to upgrade and rationalize the short-
range nuclear portion of the stockpile.

But the Montebello Decision had two major causal aspects. From a systemic perspective, the decision to eliminate certain obsolete weapons and modernize the remaining SNF systems in order to better meet a menacing opponent made perfect sense. One need go no further than this to adequately achieve a first-order explanation for the decision. At the same time, however, we also saw that there were political reasons for the decision which also played a role in the negotiations prior to Montebello and NWRS-85. The most important of these was the attempt to co-opt public opinion by giving the anti-nuclear opposition some stockpile reductions in return for its acceptance of modernization of the smaller remaining force. In this way, it was hoped, the alliance could continue the INF deployments and, eventually, achieve the proposed SNF modernization--both of which were necessitated by strategic rationale. Looking at this same NPG decision from the perspective of alliance politics, therefore, allows us to better understand some of the behind-the-scenes goings-on; this second perspective explains some of the residuals that dropped through the large mesh screen of a systemic perspective.

Of course, not every detail of the story told in Chapter Five falls into even these two perspectives. There are certain parts to each of our three periods which must be explained using one of the other perspectives. For instance, in the wake of the Montebello Decision the FOTL research program was delayed for a time by the personal animosity between General Rogers and Assistant Defense Secretary Perle, whose agreement was necessary for the program to move forward. This important part of the early FOTL story reflects bureaucratic politics (because both Americans
were leaders of important components of large organizations, and were competing within their own government to have their views accepted) and alliance politics (because the two were also competing in the international political arena as heads of multi-national organizations: the HLG and SHAPE) rather than a systemic perspective based on realist theory. What to do with such "outlier" details? One could ignore them for the sake of analytical parsimony in telling the story from a strictly systemic point of view, or one can point out that the crucial events of case studies seldom collapse into neat pre-packaged bundles that fit completely into one particular theoretical perspective.

FOTL'S MIDDLE YEARS AND ALLIANCE POLITICS

The dilemma for NATO policy makers concerning the follow-on-to-Lance lay in the probability that European public opinion seemed strongly opposed to NATO's introduction of new land-based missiles on the Continent, yet SACEUR had said such weapons were vital to the conduct of flexible response and forward defense. How could the alliance reconcile these divergent needs?

NATO itself had been ambivalent about SNF modernization for several years. In a special report by the North Atlantic Assembly published in 1987 the member states suggested a number of guidelines for future nuclear weapons deployments in Europe. Among them: "nuclear deployments should be judged in terms of their potential effect on Alliance cohesion and political consensus as well as their military utility." It went on to

say that "the Alliance should explore the potential willingness of the Soviet Union to reduce its short-range missiles and the imbalance in conventional forces before replacing the Lance system"—a position later embodied in NATO's Comprehensive Concept.

The question of Lance modernization during these years often seemed less a military issue than a political test of alliance solidarity. As a result, the SNF debate touched several deeper issues. Behind alliance concerns over SNF were questions about the continued viability of the doctrines of flexible response and forward defense; of the proper way for NATO to respond to Gorbachev's arms control initiatives; of the future role of West Germany in an evolving Europe; and of the need for a military alliance such as NATO in the years ahead.

British analyst Simon Lunn wrote that "Europeans must ask ourselves what we want for reassurance in the era of Gorbachev. And the Americans must ask what they require in terms of risk-sharing." Follow-on-to-Lance, in this view, boiled down to a test of the political will of the Western allies to share the nuclear burden of deterrence.

Many of these questions have bedeviled the alliance since its earliest days. As such, they were inherently unresolvable. Fortunately, the changing international system resulting from the Gorbachev initiatives in the late 1980's allowed several of these questions to be, if not solved, at least removed from the debate as no longer relevant. Others were addressed in the 1990 London Declaration and will be further tackled in NATO's ongoing strategy review in the years ahead.

The alliance politics perspective allowed us to better understand why the alliance continued to pursue FOTL during the late 1980’s in the face of increasing public and allied government opposition. As shown here, there were questions and ramifications at stake that would not have been evident in a first-level, systemic approach, nor would they have been better understood with a more detailed look at the domestic politics of the individual states. Rather, focusing on the politics of the alliance best captured the interplay of these multiple and often conflicting factors among NATO’s partners.

THE CANCELLATION DECISION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

The conclusion of the FOTL case showed how a leadership elite could come to the right decision without involving its bureaucracy, as long as the information it received from that bureaucracy was good enough to use in making those decisions. On the other hand, the Bush administration could have just as easily made the wrong decision regarding FOTL, that is, to push it on reluctant allies rather than cancelling it. Indeed, their early support of a "status quo plus" policy and seeming disregard for major changes occurring in Eastern Europe suggest that it almost did so.

When a barrier exists between the top layers and the rest of a bureaucracy, as seems to be the case in the Bush national security system, the bureaucrats—the real "experts" on a particular issue and its context—can no longer get their information, cautions, and warnings to the top people, and the leaders may not know how to interpret the data that they do receive. In that case, any successes by the elite may be due as much to luck as to good analysis and decision-making. In the FOTL case, prior
experience by the Bush administration's top foreign policy leadership in the inner circles of government overcame this potential danger. But this is not a model of national security policy making that one would recommend to a new administration, especially one whose top leaders are inexperienced in the ways of foreign policy making.

The Bush administration, to its credit, perceived the sea-change in world politics early enough to adapt its national security policies to the new realities. Without the revolutionary changes in Europe, however, the alliance would have still come to the same conclusion about FOTL, albeit via a different logical path. In that case, alliance politics and domestic factors would have been more obviously the reason for FOTL's cancellation, instead of being the less obvious, subterranean reasons behind the public explanation: a changed threat environment. The implications for future nuclear weapons modernization programs are apparent. To predict the deployment chances of a new nuclear system, such as TASM, one must look beyond simple East-West balances and military rationales to the inner politics of domestic and alliance bureaucracies in Washington, Bonn, and Brussels.

The real explanation for FOTL's cancellation was bound up in domestic bureaucratic politics and intra-alliance politics. The systemic factors, which at first glance seemed to neatly explain the end of FOTL, were in fact just happy coincidences. The peaceful revolution of '89 in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War made FOTL's cancellation easier to accomplish and accept by all members of the alliance, but they were not the principal factors in that decision.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF SNF MODERNIZATION

The implications of this analysis for the future of short-range nuclear modernization efforts by the North Atlantic Alliance are readily seen. The directional tendencies are apparent in Figure 3. The best explanatory perspective for an SNF modernization case in the near future is likely to be the domestic approach, with alliance politics necessary to understand certain residual factors. This assumes, of course, that the strategic environment does not dramatically change once again, that is, reverse itself and present a renewed Soviet threat to Central Europe that would require a major reassessment on the part of the allies. Realist theory would argue that a sudden change to a more threatening international system would propel our analysis out of the domestic level and back into the systemic plane. Perceived threats to national security are not dealt with at lower levels, but through the perspective of strategic level interactions. If we discount such a possibility, however, we can assume that near-term future decisions concerning nuclear weapons in Europe will continue to be made as in the recent past: by the bureaucratic process in the United States, with pressures from allied partners on those bureaucrats in Washington and in international NATO groups.

We can visually demonstrate the trend by looking one last time at our matrix of key questions and explanatory perspectives. In this case we have added the next key question for further research: What are TASM's chances of successful production and deployment in Europe? The large arrow superimposed over the matrix gives us the most likely answer to the secondary question: how can we best predict how the TASM story will turn
Figure 8: Trends from FOTL and the TASM Story

KEY QUESTION FOR FOTL:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why modernize?</th>
<th>Why continue?</th>
<th>Why cancel?</th>
<th>What are TASM's chances?</th>
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<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Alliance Politics</td>
<td>Domestic Politics</td>
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The directional trend of Table 4 makes it clear what perspective should best enable us to describe the only remaining case of theater nuclear modernization from the Montebello Decision—the tactical air-to-surface missile program—and predict its outcome. We shall therefore attempt to tell the story of TASM and make some tentative predictions about its future chances by applying the domestic perspective of US bureaucratic politics, with the expectation that we will also need an alliance perspective to adequately elucidate the case.

THE TACTICAL AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE STORY

The tactical air-to-surface missile, or TASM, will be a stand-off nuclear weapon that can be fired from a tactical fighter aircraft up to several hundred kilometers away from its target. A "fire and forget" weapon, it will feature flexible targeting and advanced terminal guidance capabilities, a ballistic trajectory (even when launched from low altitudes), and a tactical nuclear warhead. Its purpose will be to strike...
heavily defended targets deep behind enemy lines without subjecting the aircraft and pilot to the dangers of penetrating the enemy's air defense system. NATO has never had such a weapon system. It called for the production and introduction of a TASM into the allied air forces in conjunction with its 1983 Montebello Decision and subsequent Nuclear Weapons Requirements documents.

RATIONALE: A FUTURE NUCLEAR ROLE IN EUROPE?

Qui desiderat parem, praeparet bellum.\textsuperscript{10}

In the arena of European defense after the 1987 INF Treaty, there was considerable debate about the need for a continued nuclear element to NATO defense. Most persons of moderate political temperament agreed that there was such a residual requirement. After the 1989 political revolutions in Eastern Europe the same question was raised again. As before, most analysts foresaw a continued nuclear requirement for Western European defense, although no longer, perhaps, for an indefinite future.

Traditionally, US nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe for several reasons: to overcome Warsaw Pact conventional superiority; to link direct conventional defense to strategic nuclear weapons via a ladder of escalatory options; to couple European defense to US national interests; to deter Soviet first use of nuclear weapons; and for reasons of technological determinism ("because we had them").

Once the Soviet threat from Eastern Europe began to dissipate in the

aftermath of 1989, several of the reasons traditionally given for American forces there also disappeared, or were severely diminished.

Under-Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reiterated American policy goals in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 1990. He listed three fundamental principles that guided the US and NATO in their planning for the future: first, a continued US military presence in Europe; second, a continuing need for a modern US nuclear deterrent; and third, the need to maintain the NATO alliance, with full German membership.11 Secretary of Defense Cheney buttressed those remarks by saying that those in Congress who believed that the US could eliminate the nuclear leg of NATO defense just because the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority had vanished were engaged in "very shaky thinking."12

Along those lines, analysts on both sides of the Atlantic generally now present one or more of four reasons for a continued American theater nuclear force presence in Europe: 1) in the short term, to act as a stabilizing force in a period of great uncertainty; over the medium term, 2) to deter remaining Soviet capabilities, regardless of their stated intentions (TNF are valued as an "insurance policy" against a sudden reversal of the Soviet threat or increasing instability in Eastern Europe), and 3) to reassure the European allies of a continued US commitment to European security, and provide the coupling link to North America that has always been so important for European states; and 4) over

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12R. Jeffrey Smith, "NATO Nuclear Study: Pandora's Box?" Post, 13 May 1990.
the long term, to act as a brake on any German desires to develop their own nuclear capability. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of maintaining a US presence in Europe is relatively low.

Of course, these rationales are "scenario dependent"—that is, the emphasis given to one or the other may change depending on the outcome of what is admittedly still a very tenuous situation as regards the future of European security. And certain of these reasons are stressed by particular allies more than others. The Germans, in particular, have considerable doubt as to the value of any remaining TNF forces on German soil. In line with these attitudes, and given the increasing political assertiveness shown by Germany in recent years, the fourth reason listed above could be construed as insulting to Germany, and could backfire against the US politically.

The specific rationale for a tactical air-to-surface missile stems in part from the changing international situation. While it had been called for by NATO military leaders well before the 1989 upheavals, these events added strength to the logical arguments for a TASM. For one thing, the removal of most Soviet forces from Eastern Europe meant that most of SACEUR's targets also disappeared. In the event of a new Soviet thrust into Western Europe, which would now begin about 900 kilometers further east than it would have just a few years earlier, the target set would include fixed and mobile sites that land-based SNF could not reach. Therefore, air delivered weapons are required; since the targets are now within the Soviet Union, with its air defense network, a stand-off capability improves pilot survivability and increases the probability of weapon penetration. At the same time, the removal of the Warsaw Pact links in the air defense network simultaneously improves the chances of aircraft reaching their deep targets, so a future nuclear deterrent can be based on this leg of the former NATO triad of nuclear forces.\(^\text{14}\) As General Galvin put it, "The requirement for a TASM clearly predates the INF Treaty, however the treaty further validates the requirement for an air-launched nuclear stand-off weapon...It will hold at risk highly defended hard and relocatable targets in the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union."\(^\text{15}\)


Opponents of TASM argue that the lack of a defined target list makes its mission too vague. As with FOTL before it, TASM seems to them to be a way of compensating for lost INF capabilities, without a solid plan or demonstrated need for such weapons in-theater. They point out that what the US and NATO seem to be protecting most of all is an abstract requirement for US nuclear forces in Europe, regardless of changing international conditions. As one observer put it, after the FOTL flap, for NATO to decide on another new system without a clear consensus on the nature of the post-Cold War nuclear mission and adequate preparation of its publics seems to risk the mobilization of antinuclear sentiment, the further breakdown of alliance consensus, and the failure of broader arms reduction efforts.

A Pentagon report to Congress summarized the military rationale for this weapon in its description of the missile selected for TASM:

The Short Range Attack Missile-Tactical is a first generation tactical nuclear air-delivered missile capable of penetrating Soviet and Warsaw Pact air defenses to strike defended, hard and relocatable targets without having to directly overfly targets. The need for SRAM-T is based upon an operational deficiency: there are no tactical stand-off nuclear weapons for Tactical Air Force, Navy, and NATO dual-capable aircraft.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The need for a stand-off weapon in the NATO air forces has been recognized for years. A primitive version, the W-45 Bullpup, was deployed

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16Kelleher, p. 19.
17Kelleher, p. 21.
in large numbers on aircraft in Europe well before the 1970's. A new air-to-surface missile, the W-72 Walleye, was developed and deployed in small numbers on US tactical aircraft assigned to NATO missions beginning in 1970, using information gathered from American use of "smart bomb" technology in the Vietnam War. Both missiles were retired by 1979.\(^1\)

One early attempt at developing a TASM began in 1972 with the Tactical Air-to-Surface Munition research program. This attempted to develop an accurate stand-off capability with nuclear bombs. By 1974, however, its research had been re-directed. Another early contender for the TASM was Sandia National Laboratory's TIGER guided nuclear bomb, which also began development in 1972.\(^2\)

Two new small tactical warheads were under Phase I feasibility studies by the national laboratories in 1982, but both warhead programs were dropped for lack of interest by the Air Force. They were revived when the TASM requirement became apparent a short time later.\(^3\) The need for such a weapon obviously predated the INF Treaty, and was quietly

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\(^{2}\)Nuclear Weapons Databook, p. 202; also Tertrais, para. 6.2. TIGER stood for "Terminal Guided and Extended Range Missile."

\(^{3}\)Tertrais, para. 6.2.4.
undergoing preliminary research by the time of the Montebello Decision.

The TASM program was kept exceedingly quiet during the mid-1980's. SACEUR and the HLG studies that began in 1979 both demonstrated a need for a TASM along the Central Front, in order to counter the ever-improving Soviet and Warsaw Pact air defenses. With TASM a Western pilot would not have to penetrate so far into WTO airspace before releasing his weapon. Equally important, especially to German military strategists, tactical NATO aircraft with TASM could now reach the Soviet homeland, thereby putting at risk the potential aggressor's most-valued assets and shifting NATO's nuclear emphasis from the battlefield to deterrent use.

Accordingly, along with stockpile reductions announced in the Montebello Decision, the Nuclear Planning Group in October 1983 called for the development of a stand-off air-delivered weapon as one of the four major modernization programs to be undertaken by the alliance.\(^2\) The new missile quickly became known by its acronym, TASM. Publicly, however, little was heard about the weapon. It effectively hid behind the coattails of its more noticeable sibling, the follow-on-to-Lance.

The US Air Force was slow to adopt the new missile concept. Apparently there were some misgivings about a stand-off weapon that did not require "a man in a machine" to put it on the target. Protection of the Air Force's "organizational essence" was as evident here as it had been in the Army's arguments against a FOTL missile that had too much range or too great accuracy. The Air Force dragged its feet on TASM. General Charles Donnelly, commander of US Air Forces Europe, refused to

\(^2\)The others were FOTL, modernized nuclear artillery, and modernized dual-capable aircraft. See Chapter Five.
present a statement of need to SACEUR for the weapon for several years after Montebello, despite SACEUR's direct order to him to do so. This slowed the program, since SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study of 1985 (NWRS-85) could not include a need statement from the end-user: USAFE.23

This opposition reflected a particular "fighter pilot" attitude within the Air Force, centered in the Tactical Air Command (TAC). After all, the other major combat element in the USAF, Strategic Air Command, had adopted a stand-off weapon years earlier—the short-range attack missile (SRAM). Eventually, under SACEUR pressure, USAFE accepted TASM's role and came out in support of the concept. According to insiders who worked with the Air Force in the early days of the TASM program, the lineup of organizational elements was lopsided: TAC opposed to the missile, with the rest of the Air Force, including USAFE and the Air Staff, as well as SHAPE, OSD, NATO, and the DOE weapons laboratories in favor of it. In the end the Secretary of Defense forced TAC to give in, and the Air Force wrote a mission-need statement that got the research and development ball rolling.24

The Air Force was already beginning to develop a follow-on missile for the strategic SRAM-A, designated SRAM-II. As late as the Fiscal Year 1987 USAF report to Congress, however, there was no mention of a TASM

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24TAC's change of heart was made easier by the arrival of a new CINC who was less antagonistic to the program than his predecessor. Similarly, a change of commanders in 1987 may have influenced USAFE's turnaround. From interviews in Washington, May and December 1990, NATO and SHAPE, June 1990, and Los Alamos, August 1990.
Several options were, however, under consideration for TASM, including: SRAM-II, Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS), and HAVE NAP, all Air Force programs; the Navy's Excalibur, Stand-off Land Attack Missile (SLAM), SLAT target drone, and Medium-Range Air-to-Surface Missile (MRASM); and a multi-national NATO program called the Modular Stand-Off Weapon (MSOW), which collapsed when the US pulled out in 1989.26

In September 1988 the Defense Acquisitions Board selected the SRAM-T, a derivative of SRAM-II, as America's TASM missile.27 Of all the candidates it could best meet the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) requirement set forth by SACEUR. The two finalists in the competition were variants of Boeing's SRAM-II and the Navy's SLAT missile.28

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26Excalibur is a potential strategic follow-on to the Tomahawk; HAVE NAP is an Israeli-designed SRAM; the MSOW was a Nunn cooperative project that began in 1987 between 7 NATO nations designing a family of three missiles with interchangeable parts (France and Canada pulled out in 1988); JTACMS may have become the Air Force's ACM. Most of these missiles had conventional taskings. British-American Security Information Council, NATO Nuclear Planning After the Cold War, BASIC Report 90.2, May 1990, p. 12; and Tertrais, para. 6.3.


28The SLAT, for Supersonic Low-Altitude Target, is a drone that can simulate high-speed, sea-skimming cruise missiles for active tests of AEGIS ship defensive systems. Under development since 1984, it had its first successful flight in June 1988, and was expected to enter production by late 1991. It was a spin-off of Martin-Marietta's SRAM replacement candidate, the Advanced Strategic Air-Launched Missile, and was itself an unsuccessful candidate for the TASM program. Nevertheless, the company made a separate offer to the UK for its TASM selection. SLAT is capable of Mach 2.5 with a range of 160 kilometers. It was given the DOD designator AQM-127A. "Martin Marietta Hopes for
was selected because "it was already being designed as a nuclear, stand-off missile and it met or exceeded all the TASM requirements and goals except the warhead...Overall, the SRAM-T is the least costly, most timely and lowest risk option to meet the tactical requirement for a stand-off nuclear weapon." By 1989 the Air Force was reporting to Congress that it planned a first buy of 450 TASM missiles at a cost of $339 million. The total number of missiles to be procured was still under study by SACEUR. General Galvin considered TASM to be his number one priority and the IOC of 1995 "imperative."

The Air Force said SRAM-T would "provide worldwide theater nuclear deterrence to the year 2010 and beyond."

EUROPEAN INTEREST

The TASM was scheduled to be placed mainly in Germany and the UK. Other countries considered for deployment included Italy, Greece, the

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Netherlands and Turkey. NATO was already constructing the new vaults for atomic weapons beneath the hardened aircraft shelters in all six of the countries listed above, plus Belgium.

One of the first times the TASM program was mentioned publicly was in 1986, when British Defense Minister George Younger told reporters about the British decision to look for a replacement for their WE-177 nuclear bombs on the Tornado aircraft. One of the options was a new tactical air-to-surface missile, either purchased from the US or developed jointly with the French. The history of British interest in air to surface missiles for nuclear purposes goes back much further, however. One will recall that the Skybolt episode of the early 1960's centered on British attempts to purchase an American ASM under development; when it was cancelled, the UK opted for the US Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile in its place.

By 1987 the British government was solidly behind the need to modernize the UK's theater nuclear stockpile in order to remain "credible


35Although Britain's TASM's would be committed to NATO planners and be fired from tactical aircraft, they would still perform a strategic mission for the United Kingdom as a deterrent force, similar to the French tactical nuclear forces in their pre-strategic role.
penetrators" of Soviet air defenses. The British and French defense ministers met to discuss possible joint efforts at such a development. The shock of the Reykjavik summit and the advent of the INF Treaty gave emphasis to these talks. The two European nuclear powers were reminded that the American guarantee could be withdrawn at any moment, without warning or pre-consultation. Earlier fears that developing a new missile might circumvent an INF treaty seemed to be disappearing. In addition, the nearing obsolescence of the air-delivered leg of Britain’s nuclear deterrent placed a time pressure on the decision. Finally, the rationale behind the need for a separate British nuclear force at the theater level was similar to the arguments presented for the British strategic forces:

it demonstrates a willingness to share this particular task with the USA, increases UK influence over NATO nuclear decision-making and offers more long-term insurance against a future collapse of the alliance. The decision might also be influenced by the perceived need to retain an active warhead development capability.

So TASM represented more than a marginal procurement decision to the British. For them it was a major decision that could affect whether the UK maintained a national nuclear capacity in the years to come.

In determining which missile to use for TASM, the existing British Sea Eagle anti-ship missile was rejected early in the considerations. According to Lawrence Freedman, the WE-177 was "becoming obsolete and technically unreliable." Freedman, "Britain's Other Nuclear Force," The Independent, 21 Jan 1988.


Ware, p. 12.
Britain was essentially left with the options of buying from the US or collaborating with France on a new system. The US air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) was too heavy to be carried aboard UK and French fighter-bomber aircraft, and the SRAM-A had too short a range for their purposes. In 1986 the French offered a co-development program to the British for a long-range missile to supplement their air-sol a moyenne portee (ASMP). The French hoped thereby to share some of the economic costs of developing a new system, and to keep the British a nuclear power tied into a cooperative project with France. This could evolve into a "European deterrent," something not possible at the strategic level because of the existing special relationship between the US and UK. But the British were also interested in two American designs, and received US approval for technical data sharing on those missiles: the SRAM-II (and later its SRAM-T offshoot) and the Supersonic Low Altitude Target drone (SLAT) produced by Martin-Marietta for the US Navy. The SRAM-T had an edge on SLAT, given that it had been selected by the US Air Force as its TASM version. The British military would purchase approximately 100-200 missiles, then mate them with nuclear warheads of their own design and


France had deployed its own TASM, the ASMP, on its Mirage aircraft in 1986. In addition, it planned a longer-range version, the Aerospatiale air-sol a longue portee (ASLP), which could reach 1000 to 1500 kilometers, for deployment in the mid-1990's.

The differences in design criteria—the British wanted a long-range missile, while the French were more interested in having a supersonic one, even if shorter ranged—meant that by 1989 the possibility of a joint project appeared slim. Financial questions also impacted upon the joint concept. If Britain were to participate in a new missile program, the unit costs of the ASLP would be significantly higher than if it were able to simply purchase the SRAM-T from a US manufacturer.

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43 BASIC Report 90.2, p. 28; BASIC Report 90.5/2, p. 6. Martin-Marietta had a pre-existing Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA) for a concept formulation phase with British Aerospace/Hunting Engineering. This team would advise MOD on SLAT's feasibility for performing the TASM mission on British Tornados. Boeing applied for and was granted a similar agreement with a British contractor sometime between mid-1989 and early 1991. Cook, 24 Jun 1989, p. 1285; and interview in Washington, May 1991.

44 ASMP has a range of 250-300 kilometers and is deployed on the Mirage IVP, the Mirage 2000-N, and the Super Entendard. These have replaced the Mirage III-E and Jaguar aircraft, carrying nuclear free-fall bombs, in the pre-strategic role. Ware, p. 13; and "A Very Peculiar Contest," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 Sep 90, p. 334. The ASLP's range comes from Otfried Nassauer, Daniel Plesch, and David Schorr, "Allies Walk on Nuclear Eggshells," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1990, p. 11; the ASMP's from Tertrais, para. 6.3.2, and Nick Cook and Jacques Isnard, "UK Stand-Off Missile Choice Delay," Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 Nov 89, p. 949. Pentagon sources pointed out that the ASLP is still a "paper missile;" nothing has been done beyond the planning stage. Its earliest IOC would be around the year 2000, several years after SRAM-T was scheduled to be delivered. Interviews in Washington, April 1991.

45 Tertrais, para. 6.3.1; Cook, 24 Jun 1989, p. 1285. A supersonic missile has the advantage of greater penetrability due to its speed and the resulting reduced likelihood of successful defense against it.
In January 1989 the British Minister of State at MOD confirmed in the House of Commons that the UK was looking primarily to the US for a collaborative approach to the replacement of the WE-177, with the two systems under consideration being the SRAM-T and the SLAT. To some observers, this presented a "lost opportunity" for increased Anglo-French and European defense cooperation in favor of continued British dependence on the US.

In November 1989, however, President Bush authorized the release of US technical details on "nuclear weaponry" to France if necessary in an Anglo-French collaborative TASM project. This effectively restored the possibility of a joint TASM by the two European powers, especially given the increasing problems being faced by SRAM-T. Technical set-backs, plus the possibility of the program being cancelled for domestic US reasons, meant that by 1990 the UK was again leaning toward a cooperative deal with France as a fall-back position. Britain’s preferred option was to deal with the United States, in keeping with their 30 years of nuclear cooperation. But due to several recent events that showed a lack of consultation with its allies before America took unilateral action, there

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46 Ware, p. 13.


48 Peter Almond, "Bush Approves Anglo-French Missile," Washington Times, 1 Dec 1989, p. 4. British Aerospace and the French company Thompson-CSF had just formed a joint-venture company to develop an anti-air missile system, perhaps the precursor of future joint projects such as ASLP. This article implied that the information to be released had to do with missiles, not warheads, but it was unclear exactly what technical details the UK would be authorized to share with the French under this arrangement.
was some concern over US willingness to carry through with the SRAM-T program.49

TECHNICAL DETAILS

This modified SRAM-II has been designated SRAM-T. Its extended range...supersonic speed, low observability and variable flight profiles will make the SRAM-T a highly survivable weapon, significantly compounding enemy defense requirements. The required SRAM-T performance modifications are attainable with existing technology. It is not the intent of this program to stress technology to its limits, but rather to build a state of the art missile using available technology.50

The TASM as currently proposed will be a nearly identical variant of the SRAM-II strategic missile. The two are so much alike, in fact, that they are designated the AGM-113A (SRAM II) and AGM-113B (SRAM-T).51 The TASM variant, which reportedly has 95% commonality with SRAM-II,52 will be called SRAM-T, for Short-Range Attack Missile-Tactical. It will have a smaller nuclear warhead than the SRAM-II, according to DOD testimony

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49 For example, the Libya raid, the Grenada and Panama invasions, and the FOTL cancellation were all mentioned. Interviews in London, July 1990. Also see "A Very Peculiar Contest," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 Sep 90, pp. 339-340.


51 "In 'New Europe,' SRAM-T Would Make More Flexible Follow-on to Lance," Aerospace Daily, 8 Jan 1990, p. 36.

52 General Ronald Yates, testimony before Subcommittee on Research and Development, House Armed Services Committee, 15 March 1990. The similarities between the missiles are evident from comparing information in two flyers put out by the Boeing Company in 1990: "SRAM II: Air-to-Ground Missile Modernization for the 1990s and Beyond," and "SRAM T: Enhanced Theater Deterrent Capability at Least Cost."
before Congress, with selectable yields of 10 or 100 kilotons.\textsuperscript{53} This reflects the desire to minimize collateral damage in the European theater and the generally smaller size needed for tactical, as opposed to strategic, targets. SRAM-T will also have longer range than its strategic namesake—a bit of a paradox that reflects the different missions for the two missiles. Their strategic/tactical designations reflect their launch platforms rather than any traditional definition of the terms.

Both variants achieve longer range than one would expect of a missile of this size through a combination of sophisticated technical factors: high energy propellant, aerodynamic design (the SRAM-II/T, while essentially a ballistic missile, also acts as a "lifting body"), and use of a two-pulse rocket motor. The SRAM-T manages to surpass its parent system range because of its lighter warhead, different missile release techniques ("lofting") by tactical aircraft, and software-driven flight profile modifications.\textsuperscript{54}

SRAM-T will be 14 feet long and weigh just under 2000 pounds. It could be carried on F-15E, F-16, F-111E/F, F-111G (formerly the FB-111), and Tornado aircraft, although no decisions have been announced as to deployment aircraft. It was also planned for use on the recently


\textsuperscript{54}Interviews in Washington, April 1991, and Boeing Company handouts on SRAM II and SRAM T.
cancelled Advanced Tactical Aircraft. Its range will nominally be about 400 kilometers (250 miles), although this comes at the end of an aircraft delivery distance (combat radius) of about a thousand miles. Furthermore, the range of the missile itself can be increased by pilot technique: flying higher, faster, and at a positive angle-of-attack when releasing the missile all add to the distance it will travel. By changing the software within the missile's computer, the flight profile could also be changed to increase its range.

The SRAM-II program was eighteen months to two years ahead of SRAM-T, with an initial operating capability target date of 1993. That meshed with SACEUR's requirement for an IOC for TASM (as it had been for FOTL): 1995. The Air Force planned to have 5 F-15E's equipped with 12 SRAM-T missiles in place in Europe no later than April 1995.

55Yates, testimony before the Subcommittee on Research and Development, House Armed Services Committee, 15 March 1989; also General Ed Leland, USEUCOM Chief of Staff, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 June 1989, p. 426.


57The combat radius of the F-15E is about 1600 km (The European, 6-8 Jul 1990). For the Tornado, it is 1390 km (Ware, p. 17).

58Yates, testimony before SASC, 13 June 1989, p. 391; and interviews at SHAPE, June 1990, and Washington, April 1991. The missile flight profile includes a final "pop-up" maneuver, which trades speed for altitude and range and gives it a steeper, slower final approach on the target than the SRAM-II. On the negative side, this also increases the missile's vulnerability by reducing its velocity.

the 200 planned F-15E's would be based in Great Britain. The total initial SRAM-T buy, to include spares and operational test assets, would be 450 missiles with a procurement cost of $339 million.

A warhead for TASM was also in development. In this case, however, the designers could not build on the SRAM-II program, because the warhead was the major difference between the two systems. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) received the contract for the SRAM-II W-89 warhead, with a strategic yield. The W-91 SRAM-T warhead, with its smaller yield, would also be a slightly smaller physical package, in keeping with its dual-role criteria: it was also supposed to be the warhead for FOTL. As described in Chapter Four, the joint warhead design was awarded to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). After a Congressionally mandated study of the possibility of using either the Pershing II or GLCM warheads coming off the destroyed INF missiles, LANL determined that the size and weight of these warheads were too great for TASM. Therefore, the SRAM-T warhead would be a new design, based on proven systems. Parts would come from existing systems, primarily the

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62 Thirteen designs were considered for the SRAM-II warhead, and LLNL won the contract in November 1986. The winner was a modified W-87 warhead that is also used on the MX ICBM. "Choosing Warhead Designs," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1987, p.62.
versatile B-61 bomb and the W-85 missile warhead. The SRAM-T warhead would fit inside the standard SRAM missile casing, and would include the latest safety and security devices: insensitive explosives, advanced electronic PAL release coding switches, anti-terrorist disenabling devices, and so on.

SRAM-T warhead development was projected to enter Phase 3 in February 1990, and Phase 4 (production) in July 1992. In fact, however, the Phase 3 start date was delayed by the Department of Energy several months; only after Air Force vented its frustrations and charged DOE with endangering the SRAM-T IOC by its delays did the Nuclear Weapons Council approve the Phase 3 development engineering program on 31 July. Furthermore, problems in the SRAM-II led to a one-year delay in the projected production start-up date by January 1991.

The SRAM-T missile was scheduled to begin flight testing in the spring of 1992, with a total of 16 live launches from an F-15E and 4 from an F-111F/G. Other testing would follow for additional aircraft to be

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64 DOE Construction Project Data Sheet, 1990.


66 The Phase 4 date was slipped to July 1993 in the FY 1992 budget request. DOE Construction Project Data Sheet, 1991.
certified to carry the TASM (the F-16 and Tornado).\textsuperscript{67} SRAM-T's flight test series would follow and build on the extensive test program of the SRAM-II. The first captive flight test for SRAM-T took place on an F-15E in November 1990.\textsuperscript{68}

The Defense Department's procurement Milestone II was successfully passed in November 1989. Once the warhead entered Phase 3 eight months later, the SRAM-T had progressed further in the acquisition pipeline than FOTL ever reached before its cancellation.\textsuperscript{69} The plans for SRAM-T called for missile design changes, DOE warhead design, and F-15E integration efforts beginning in fiscal year 1990; first flight test in late 1992; and production approval in April 1994, with fielding of the first missile a year later.\textsuperscript{70} The allies would deploy TASM on their aircraft in the year 2000.\textsuperscript{71} As we shall see, however, delays in the parent SRAM-II program


\textsuperscript{68}Casey Anderson, "SRAM II Director Says Failures Threaten Program," \textit{Air Force Times}, 15 Nov 1990. Thirteen captured flight tests took place on an F-15E at Edwards AFB, California, over the next six months, ending on 26 April 1991. Their purpose was to gather "real" data on F-15E flight envelope parameters and vibration to compare with computer models. All tests were successful. Interviews in Washington, April and May 1991.


\textsuperscript{71}Interview at NATO, June 1990.
soon led the Air Force to adopt a planned three-year delay in SRAM-T's IOC, slipping it to "early 1998." 72

Prime contractor for the conversion of SRAM-II to SRAM-T is Boeing Aerospace, with McDonnell Douglas Astronautics in charge of integrating the SRAM-T on to the F-15E. The modification effort began in FY 1990, although Boeing had received $1.9 million in late 1988 to study the feasibility of modifying its SRAM-II to fit the F-15E and F-111. 73

Congressional funding for the SRAM-T was spread around a number of different programs. The integration of the missile with the aircraft was funded in the F-15E package; the parent missile design was covered under SRAM-II budget allocations; and the hardened shelters for missile storage in Europe were paid out of the Weapons Storage and Security System program. As always, the warhead and necessary production facility construction fell within the Department of Energy budget. 74 Line-item budgeting for the SRAM-T program per se was, therefore, modest.

In general, the DOD approach to the SRAM-T was a valiant attempt to cut costs, time, and unforeseen technical problems by linking it to the SRAM-II program. The SRAM-II was not expected to have any problems; after all, the Air Force had nearly 20 years of experience with the SRAM-A system and only wanted to tinker with its replacement. SRAM-T would not test fly until after SRAM-II had already flown 25 tests; production would

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72The contract was awarded to Boeing on 3 April 1990. Interviews in Washington, April and May 1991; also "Draft Department of Defense Information Paper," unclassified memorandum from AF/AQQS, 27 February 91.


74DOE Construction Data Sheet, January 1990.

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not begin until nearly 400 SRAM-II's had already been made. The Air Force believed the SRAM-T approach, by following Senator Nunn's guidelines for modifying and improving existing systems instead of developing new programs, would save over $700 million compared to alternative development programs.\textsuperscript{75} As the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy testified before Congress in 1989,

The SRAM II program is a low risk approach, we are building a 'state of the art' missile having 20 years of experience with the SRAM A... By initiating the SRAM-T development program in fiscal year 1990, we can link it to the well-established SRAM II program and achieve subsequent production efficiencies... This approach is smart, and SRAM II's current stage of development supports this plan.\textsuperscript{76}

These words would come back to haunt the administration, however, once the SRAM-II program ran into technical difficulties of its own.

RECENT PROBLEMS

\textit{To complicate the debate further, the present TASM candidate, the SRAM-T, has run into considerable technical difficulty, congressional opposition, and European disinterest.}\textsuperscript{77}

TECHNICAL GLITCHES. The first flight of the SRAM-II, scheduled for November 1989, was delayed for seven months due to problems with its solid-fuel rocket motor. The fuel developed cracks after being cold-soaked ("thermal cycle testing"), which could lead to uneven burning and potential explosions. As a result of this delay, the IOC for SRAM-II was pushed back a full year, to 1994. The prime contractor for the motor,


\textsuperscript{76}Joseph, testimony before the SASC, 14 June 1989, p. 429.

\textsuperscript{77}Kelleher, p. 19.
Hercules, downplayed the delay by pointing out that it was better to understand and correct faults in the rocket before production rather than face corrections later. The delay was expected to have a ripple effect on SRAM-T timing, although none was announced at this time.

After developing a more stable, less propulsive propellant mixture, Hercules again tested the SRAM II rocket, with the same results. The propellant again cracked when exposed to extreme cold. The SRAM II's first live launch was delayed to April 1991.

In April 1990 the Air Force awarded Boeing a $10.2 million contract for start-up work on SRAM-T full-scale development. The Pentagon's fiscal year 1991 defense budget requested $118.6 million for continued research and development on the SRAM-T.

Air Force sources in the summer of 1990 were publicly complaining about the Department of Energy's refusal to release funds for full-scale development of the W-91 warhead program. This action, the Air Force said, would delay the initial operational capability date for the SRAM-T. DOE's reasons for the delay were not clear, but probably had to do with the technical problems which SRAM-II was having with its rocket motor. The Air Force program manager proclaimed that Boeing had corrected the

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problem, and that no more delays were anticipated. 82

The Phase 3 approval was given to LANL on 31 July. 83 On 31 August another rocket test failed when the motor blew up on the test pad when ignited following a cold soak. 84 The problem had not gone away, and the SRAM-T program managers were beginning to get concerned over potential spillover problems and delays affecting the tactical version, since the propellant problem was equally applicable to SRAM-T.

EUROPEAN BASING RIGHTS. After the revolutions of 1989, the only politically realistic deployment possibilities in Europe for SRAM-T were Britain and Germany, and perhaps Italy and Turkey. 85 When asked about TASM deployments following the May 1990 Calgary NPG meeting, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner said that while no decisions had to be made then ("I don't want to open up a debate at this moment"), he was confident that when the time came for such decisions, all the allies "would do the right thing," implying adherence to earlier commitments. 86 German Defense Minister Stoltenberg rejected Wörner's view, saying that conditions were not right for German acceptance of TASM deployment. He

85Although officially neither NATO nor the US was ruling out any of the seven nations in which the WS3 storage bunkers had been built. Interviews in Washington, May and December 1990, Brussels and SHAPE, June 1990, and London, July 1990.

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preferred to see TASM included in SNF negotiations with the USSR.\textsuperscript{87} German Foreign Minister Genscher stated in August 1990 that "short-range nuclear missiles no longer have a place in the new Europe."\textsuperscript{88} Many Germans were reluctant to even discuss the possibility of TASM deployments because they feared it would influence Soviet positions in the "Two-Plus-Four Talks" then going on over German unification.\textsuperscript{89}

One German official questioned how a decision on TASM would look to the Soviet Union after 1990. It would be like saying, in his words, "Thanks very much for making German reunification possible, Mr. Gorbachev. To show our appreciation we are about to equip German aircraft for the first time since World War Two with missiles that can strike the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{90} This concern over Soviet sensitivities is prevalent among German elites across the political and bureaucratic spectrum.

Germans who were sympathetic to the traditional justifications for American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe stressed the need for keeping the issue quiet, so as to avoid headlines and preclude the re-emergence of a hostile anti-nuclear public. This was also the preferred American approach after the FOTL episode. The application of the tactic can be seen in the total lack of reference to TASM in any NATO communiques since early 1990, and in defense ministers and heads of state brushing aside questions on TASM or future weapons in press conferences. If any

\textsuperscript{87}Interview on East Berlin ADN, 11 May 1990, reported in unclassified message from FBIS London to FBIS Reston, VA, 11/1402Z May 1990.

\textsuperscript{88}Sloan, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{89}Nassauer, Plesch, and Schorr, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{90}Interview at SHAPE, July 1990.
reference is made, it is that NATO is undergoing a "strategy review," and comments should await the outcome of those studies. The German government has taken the lead in keeping TASM and the issue of SNF arms control negotiations out of the public eye since FOTL was cancelled—quite a turnaround from its demands for early resolution of the FOTL question a year earlier.\textsuperscript{91}

Arguments by German security experts have generally stressed a continued need for some TNF systems in Europe, in line with the points made earlier in this chapter regarding a rationale for theater nuclear weapons. The Germans are also participating in the search within NATO circles for a new methodology for nuclear force sizing and deployments. This would be based on a minimum (or existential) deterrent concept, relying on dual-capable aircraft and sea-based weapons. In theory, as one recent American study pointed out, such attitudes should translate into German support for TASM and DCA based on German soil. In fact, however, there is considerable doubt whether any German government would undertake the politically risky effort to persuade its public of the need for such weapons. Certain elements within Germany (including the SPD and the Greens) have already voiced their opposition to TASM deployments, as have some members of the ruling CDU/FDP coalition.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{91}Interviews in Bonn, Brussels, SHAPE, and London, June-July 1990, and Washington, December 1990, January and April 1991. One source who attended HLG meetings during the 1990-1991 period told me that there was absolutely no discussion of SRAM-T basing or deployment within NATO meetings, even during the closed, secret sessions. The issue was too sensitive; the participants, too wary of a repeat of FOTL.

As of the summer of 1990 no European state appeared to relish the idea of deploying a new tactical nuclear weapon on its soil. "Nuclear nimbyism" (not-in-my-backyard) was affecting all the NATO allies, including those that most favored the weapon. Many British leaders were skeptical about whether the UK should take TASM if Germany did not; they feared singularization of Britain in this matter. The British Labour Party was prepared to fight the new nuclear weapons, and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament held a protest against TASM in London during the NATO Summit there in July. The British government originally planned to make a decision on a TASM selection by the end of 1990; that date was slipped to April 1991 and then delayed "for at least a year." The reasons for the delays included the changing European security environment, the development difficulties with the SRAM-II and its probable impact on the SRAM-T, a change of government in the fall, distractions caused by the Gulf War, and the general reluctance of the Treasury to fund new weapons when the Warsaw Pact was disintegrating.

BAD PRESS REVIEWS ON NUCLEAR SAFETY. A report in the Washington Post in May 1990 broke the story of dangerous warheads in certain older nuclear systems, including the W-69 in the SRAM-A and the W-79 8-inch...
artillery shell. The AFAPS were repaired in their European storage facilities by a "crash effort," apparently without notifying the European host governments of the dangers; the SRAM's were grounded from SAC aircraft by Secretary Cheney, pending further investigation. On the one hand this disclosure emphasized the need for a replacement program for the SRAM-A, but on the other it pointed out the untold dangers of nuclear weaponry and made some of the European allies question their trust in the US over such matters.

MULTI-NATIONAL UNITS AS POTENTIAL FIG LEAVES. One suggestion made in 1990 to overcome both German and British concerns over nuclear singularization was the creation of multinational aviation units. This could include, for example, a wing consisting of an American F-15 squadron.

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97R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pentagon Urged to Ground Nuclear Missile for Safety," Washington Post (hereafter Post), 24 May 1990, p. 1; and Smith, "Bomber Missiles Banned," Post, 9 Jun 1990, p. 1. The problem lay in the fact that these warheads used older conventional high explosives to set off the atomic reaction, as opposed to newer "insensitive" high explosives (IHE) which were less liable to go off accidentally in case of droppage, fire, or sabotage. If the explosives did detonate, they would not cause a nuclear explosion, but they could rupture the bomb's physics package and allow plutonium to scatter. The warheads also had inadequately insulated electrical triggering mechanisms and atomic "triggers" (called "plutonium pits") that were less resistant to fire than newer models. The SRAM-A's were permanently grounded in December after the Secretary received a Congressional report, chaired by Sidney Drell, on their safety problems. ("Cheney Orders Removal of Missiles from Planes," NYT, 9 Dec 1990; Casey Anderson, "Safety Study Concludes DOD Should Modify Warheads," Air Force Times, Dec 1990, p. 16; "Safety Last," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1991, p. 48.) See Chapter Eight for more on the W-79. Other warheads facing the same potential problems were the older Minuteman II and Minuteman III, both with the W-69, and the new W-88 on the MIRVed Trident D-5 missile. Insensitive high explosives have only 2/3 the explosive power of regular explosives; for the same effect, therefore, you need more of them, which adds weight to the warhead. The Navy chose not to use IHE in its Trident because increasing the weight of the warheads would decrease the missile's range by some 4%. The Army and Marine Corps had similar concerns over size and weight restrictions in the small W-79 artillery shell. ("Safety Last," March 1991.)
and two Tornado squadrons, one each from Britain and Germany. The wing could be based in the UK, or it could rotate its aircraft through several participating NATO allied airfields, to increase the sense of nuclear risk-sharing without imposing the burden of permanent weapons stationing in those countries. Since the TASM will be stored in WS3 vaults beneath the aircraft in hardened shelters, rather than in separate weapons storage facilities, the impact on the public awareness would be lessened even further. A third deployment option for the multinational wing would be for forward countries like Germany to approve advance basing rights for deployment in a crisis situation, with the weapons normally stored in the US or UK. The WS3 vaults to hold SRAM-T were built at 19 air bases in seven states across Europe, so the possibilities of dispersed alert are great. If Britain chose to allow basing rights for TASM, a multinational squadron could provide the "political fig leaf to save [the Tory] government from the embarrassment of a nuclear build-up in Britain

88 Sloan, p. 10; Peter Almond, "NATO Considers Joint Air Force to Carry New Missile," Washington Times, 14 May 1990, p. 5; Patrick Tyler, "US Asks NATO to Consider Using Multinational Units," Post, 23 May 1990, p. 33; and interviews in Washington, May 1990, and at SHAPE and NATO, June 1990. Tyler wrote that this idea had been discussed within high-level US interagency circles since January 1990. This most likely occurred in the NSC's European Strategy Steering Group discussed in Chapter Eight.

99 This option has been quietly considered in NATO feasibility studies and internal Air Force discussions. See "TASM Deployment 'In Crisis Only,'" Jane's Defense Weekly, 14 Jul 90; also interviews in Bonn, June 1990, and Washington, April 1991. As is well known, this type of political situation, complete with unilateral force restrictions, already exists in Norway and Denmark with respect to foreign troops and nuclear weapons on their soil--they would only be allowed in time of crisis.

as the rest of Europe moves to become free of nuclear weapons."\textsuperscript{101}

AIR FORCE IMPATIENCE WITH CONTRACTORS. By late 1990 the Air Force was becoming gravely concerned over persistent technical problems with SRAM-II development. It was threatening to cancel the contract if Boeing didn't come up with some solutions to several nagging problems: cracks in the solid fuel propellant, delays in writing the guidance system software, inadequate computer speed, and concerns that the final product would not be able to meet the contracted range requirement.\textsuperscript{102} The Air Force Program Manager for SRAM-II warned Boeing that technical problems and cost overruns "may ultimately doom the program to cancellation."\textsuperscript{103} Secretary Cheney’s abrupt decision in December to cancel the Navy's A-12 advanced fighter program added teeth to the threat, as did the termination of a Boeing program by Air Force Acquisitions.\textsuperscript{104} The Air Force admitted that the SRAM-II problems would probably delay the SRAM-T delivery by about a year, to 1996. Nevertheless, the SRAM-T program was proceeding well, although it no longer appeared possible to keep it on a development schedule 18 months behind SRAM-II, as originally planned. The two were drawing closer together as SRAM-II faced delays.\textsuperscript{105} SLAT was mentioned

\textsuperscript{101}Christy Campbell, "Alliance Faces Dilemma on Joint Nuclear Jet Squadron," \textit{The European} (London), 6-8 July 1990.


\textsuperscript{103}"Defense Spending Bills Differ," \textit{Arms Control Today}, December 1990, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{104}Assistant Secretary of the Air Force John Welch cancelled Boeing’s contract for the "Peace Shield" project, citing default on the contractual terms by Boeing. Interview in Washington, May 1991.

\textsuperscript{105}Casey Anderson, "SRAM II Director Says Failures Threaten Program," \textit{Air Force Times}, 15 Nov 1990.

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as the leading alternative candidate to SRAM-T, although extending short range would require substantial modifications to meet SACEUR's requirement or British desires.  

In the meantime, the Air Force chose to remain loyal to SRAM-T. But it delayed the first delivery date until 1998, which resulted in a program slow-down in fiscal years 1992 and beyond. This reflected budgetary realities as well as a desire to keep SRAM-II development out in front, allowing the tactical version to continue to reap the benefits of the testing and production experience gained by its parent program.

REDUCED FUNDING REQUEST. The combination of several factors--European ambivalence about the program; technical problems in the development of the SRAM-II mother program; and mixed signals from Congress on funding--led the administration to significantly lower its fiscal year 1992 budget request for SRAM-T. Whereas it had asked for $118.6 million the previous year, and was fully funded at that amount (although not without some confusing signals from Congress--see below), the Air Force only wanted $34.3 million for FY92. It forecast a $107 million request for the next year.  

This represented USAF acceptance of a slow-down

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106 BASIC Report 90.5/2, December 1990, pp. 5, 7.

107 "Draft DOD Information Letter," 27 Feb 1991; "Position Paper on the Short-Range Attack Missile--Tactical (SRAM T)," unclassified memorandum from SAF/AQQS, 3 May 1991; and interviews in Washington, April 1991. The decision to delay SRAM-T also resulted from fiscally driven bureaucratic pressures, as the Air Force (along with the rest of the Pentagon) searched for money saving steps prior to submission of the final FY 1992 budget.

in the planned pace of TASM procurement and a corresponding slip in the IOC in order to keep SRAM-T two years behind the SRAM-II program.

ANALYSIS OF TASM USING DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

Inadequate funding, schedule delays, and a changed European political landscape that spurns the deployment of short-range nuclear weapons is likely to threaten the US Air Force's SRAM-T program.\(^{109}\)

SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE.

A systemic approach to understanding the TASM case and predicting its future relies on a realist view of the interaction of states and multi-national non-state actors within the arena of international political relations. State policy is driven by self-interested units striving for relative power gains and increased security. From this perspective, the radical changes in Soviet foreign policy that the world has witnessed over the past few years have dramatically altered the fundamental basis of post-war bipolarity, with a corresponding decline in the threat to the West from the USSR. This change should allow the NATO allies to reduce their defense burdens accordingly, presumably to include less reliance on short-range nuclear forces, such as TASM.

Nevertheless, the Western alliance has been hesitant to restructure its forces and doctrines until the permanence of such changes in the opposition can be assured. NATO officially maintains that there is a valid need for European-based nuclear forces in a post-Cold War European security structure, as a deterrent against possible restoration of Soviet power aims. As an institution, the alliance would welcome a tactical air-

to-surface missile as part of those forces.

The allies are hesitant to bring TASM or dual-capable aircraft (DCA) into any new SNF arms control negotiating forum with the Soviet Union. They prefer, at least at the moment, to try to limit such talks to land-based surface-to-surface nuclear missiles. Nevertheless, there is some debate within various NATO groups over whether to include DCA and their associated weapons in arms control negotiations. On one hand, this threatens the last remaining TNF leg with possible elimination; on the other, such a move could prevent their singularization as the only remaining systems left to be forced to zero. An arms control agreement could also authorize some small residual "minimal deterrent" force in an international treaty that might forestall possible public opposition. In this outlook placing TASM in a superpower arms control agreement that authorized a small number of missiles may be the only way to get the European allies to politically accept its deployment on their territory.110

An interesting arms control situation has developed as a result of NATO's ongoing SNF modernization programs that concerns FOTL despite its cancellation. Boeing had been promoting a ground-launched version of its SRAM T as a possible FOTL candidate; another major possibility, ATACKS, was being deployed in Europe by the US Army in a conventional role. The chosen FOTL launcher, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, was also being

deployed in Europe. The W-91 SRAM-T warhead was to be used on both TASM and FOTL. In other words, although FOTL was cancelled, the US was retaining separately the warhead, launcher, and two possible missiles for FOTL in different guises in the European theater. This led to a situation wherein one would expect the Soviets to demand the inclusion of SRAM-T in any SNF negotiations. Nor were all West European governments likely to stand by without pointing to this potential threat to further nuclear negotiations in Europe.\footnote{See British-American Security Information Council, Short Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, BASIC Report 90.5/1, December 1990, p. 7. What would be lacking in this scenario, however, would be the electronic and physical adaptor kits necessary to mate the conventional ATACMS with the nuclear warhead. These kits have supposedly not been produced. Interview in Washington, April 1991.}

In the summer of 1989 the joint staff validated SRAM-T’s worldwide requirement prior to approving it for Milestone II (full-scale development). But it was not until mid-1990 that the Air Force began stressing that SRAM-T had a global requirement. It was not, according to this view, a one-threat missile; potential conflicts outside Europe justified its production regardless of the changing European situation. SRAM-T had “a validated worldwide requirement to enhance the tactical nuclear capability of all the theater nuclear commander-in-chiefs.”\footnote{Quoted in The British-American Security Information Council, NATO Tactical Air to Surface missiles, BASIC Report 90.5/2, December 1990, p.4. See also "FOTL: Lessons Learned." According to a Pentagon source, prior to 1990 SRAM-T had not been sold very well to the public or Congress as anything other than a European weapon. Interviews in Washington, April 1991.}

The Air Force was attempting to broaden the base of support for SRAM-T by raising the argument above the parochial level of domestic and alliance politics to a higher strategic plane.
This explanation of what occurred in the TASM case is admittedly thin. Obviously the systemic perspective is not fully satisfactory as an explanatory device, nor can it accurately predict the likely outcome of the TASM debate. Too many of the details presented above are not encompassed by such a perspective. To fully understand the story, one needs to delve into the nuances of alliance and domestic politics.

ALLIANCE POLITICS.

The main argument in SACEUR's newest nuclear weapons requirements study calls for widespread TASM deployment in Europe as a means of maintaining nuclear risk- and burden-sharing among the allies.\textsuperscript{113} This concession to the importance of alliance political factors reflects the inability of a systemic perspective to adequately explain TASM without reverting to lower levels of analysis.

TASM deployment will be a bitter pill for the continental allies to swallow, given the changing international scene and the public's perceptions that the Cold War is over and the threat has disappeared. About the only sugar-coating NATO can put on that pill for those European publics is alliance-wide validation and approval of the program. To the European publics, it is still a nuclear weapon, based in Central Europe; strategic rationales have never been fully understood by the mass of society, nor will they be this time. While Germany has traditionally preferred longer-range weapons such as TASM for deterrent purposes, its public thinks the alliance got rid of those types of weapons in the INF Treaty. The Chancellor would like to stand by earlier agreements and

\textsuperscript{113}Interview at SHAPE, July 1991.
deploy such weapons, but he fears the electoral backlash of trying to convince an unwilling public of the need for such a system.\textsuperscript{114}

Recognizing the danger inherent in trying to persuade European public opinion of the necessity for new weapons of mass destruction, the alliance has adopted an official policy on TASM that could best be described as "the less said about it, the better." Only Great Britain has tried to keep the issue open to debate at NATO ministerial meetings, but it has been blocked by a consensus among the other big power members that the issue is best left alone, quietly pursued via national efforts to develop a missile system without pressuring any ally to make an early commitment to eventual deployment. The Kohl government has led the way in trying to keep TASM out of the public spotlight.

The United States will not make this an alliance issue, according to the State Department. That did not work in the FOTL case. Whether approval in an alliance-wide forum will be necessary at some point, or whether the US can simply arrange bilateral programs of cooperation with the necessary states for SRAM-T and F-15E basing rights, is still an issue of debate within Washington circles.\textsuperscript{115}

Practically speaking, no decision has to be made concerning TASM until a year or two before the system is ready for deployment, or in about

\textsuperscript{114}Interviews in Bonn, June 1990.

\textsuperscript{115}The State Department seems to prefer the latter approach: seeking bilateral POC's without exposing TASM to the whims of the entire NATO membership. Most other agencies (the NSC, DOD, and Congress) disagree. They see NATO's blessing of the program as an essential political element to successful deployment. Interviews in Washington, May and December 1990, January 1991.
1996 (given a delayed in-theater delivery date of 1998).\textsuperscript{116} As the SACEUR recently testified before Congress,

I think we need to look at the production and deployment of TASM as two different things. The US needs to produce TASM. I don't know when it would be possible to deploy TASM, but let's defer the deployment questions to when we need to deploy TASM... We have not started coordinating with any other countries [for eventual deployment].\textsuperscript{117}

Nor will Germany be willing to consider the question before it has to. The German delegation to the High Level Group has already asked the allies to defer any further decision on TASM until after the next German national elections, in late 1994.\textsuperscript{118} Trying to agree now would be political suicide for Helmut Kohl and his coalition government. Domestic politics within the German Republic ultimately drives its foreign policy, as it does in the US.

Within the German bureaucracy, one can identify three different policy positions concerning TASM and SNF more generally. The strongest support, not surprisingly, comes from the Defense Ministry, where the staff wants TASM but is pessimistic about its chances. They are hesitant to commit to any new weapon after the experience of FOTL. The Foreign Affairs Ministry, on the other hand, sees no chance for TASM deployment in Germany given the systemic changes in Europe since 1989. It is willing to keep the air-delivered nuclear missions currently in place in Germany, but does not want to add a new weapon that would be unpopular and, in its

\textsuperscript{116}"A decision to deploy TASMs is at least four or five years away, according to NATO officials." Theresa Hitchens, "Stand Off Capability to Key NATO Nuclear Plans," \textit{Defense News}, 18 Mar 91, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{117}General John Galvin, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 March 1991; transcript provided by ANSER, Washington.

\textsuperscript{118}Interviews in Washington, January and April 1991.
view, unnecessary. The Chancellory is caught in the middle of this debate, as it was during the FOTL episode. It wants to remain a good partner with America and NATO, but the politicians at the peak of government are more concerned with the political ramifications of trying to procure the system against widespread opposition. Germany, in effect, wants to maintain nuclear coupling to the US and its important role in alliance nuclear policy making without having to share the burden of deploying the modernized weaponry required for effective deterrence, as determined by SHAPE. Illustrative of this attitude were comments made by Kohl and his defense minister in the summer of 1990, wherein they opposed the denuclearization of Europe, but said nothing about Germany.

Once again the alliance finds itself running up against the nuclear dilemma. On one hand, the United States wants to make its defenses robust and militarily effective. This includes nuclear forces. The US Defense Department assumes that any delay in a new weapon program increases its costs as well as its chances for cancellation (this reflects the impact of domestic politics within the US, since Congressional second thoughts about a system that faces technical or allied resistance often translate into

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funding cuts). Germany, on the other hand, would prefer to use arms control to enhance its security, and favors a minimal deterrent force that is based outside of its borders. Bonn wants continued coupling, but without nuclear weapons on German soil. The Chancellor’s Office assumes that delaying TASM decisions actually improves its chances for deployment in Germany, since time and familiarity can wear down public opposition and interest.\textsuperscript{122}

Some allies see TASM deployment as a form of "club dues" that a NATO member must pay in order to retain its role in NATO security policy making. As one American wrote,

> If a German government does not deploy TASM it will not deploy any other nuclear system. TASM fits all the key German criteria for desirable nuclear systems. It is of long enough range to avoid the singularization problem. It will be deployed in quantities which will not allow it to be construed as a war fighting weapon. It will not be deployed on German territory alone. It will be linked to arms control but not to a zero goal. It will be a clearly political deterrent rather than a war fighting nuclear weapon. Finally, it will continue to link the American deterrent to German security without raising the spectre of limited nuclear war. To say no to TASM would be to say that nuclear deterrence on German soil is no longer necessary. It would raise questions in the United States and among other allies about Germany’s willingness to share risks... TASM could become the key test about the limits of cooperative security in a post Cold War Europe and the issue which helps decide the future of the American military presence in Europe.\textsuperscript{123}

Analysts from several intelligence organizations in the US have reported that Germany will ask the US to remove all its military forces after the Soviets pull out of eastern Germany in 1995. This would, of

\textsuperscript{122}Interviews in Bonn and Brussels, June 1990.

course, include American nuclear warheads. According to these analyses, Germany will begin to feel more comfortable about its security after several years of continual non-threatening instability in Eastern Europe, and will therefore see less need to keep foreign forces as a guarantee. While certain elements of the German elite may wish to maintain some residual nuclear forces as an insurance policy, as outlined above, this defense elite is withering away in Germany. Furthermore, opponents may try to link TASM and new DCA deployments to the very sensitive issue of low level flying in German airspace. There is near-unanimous opposition among Germans to low level flights by NATO aircraft, and while the connection to TASM would be specious, it would nevertheless be hard to, as one American diplomat put it in original bureaucratese, "disambiguate" the two.124

Finally, what about Germany's neighbors and allies? Some would certainly like to see a continued American nuclear presence in Germany for assurance purposes and for German "self-deterrence"--to preclude German desires for its own nuclear forces. As for TASM deployment, the UK is obviously the ally most interested in procuring and fielding the weapon. Britain needs a replacement for its aging gravity bombs, and will undoubtedly choose some type of TASM despite its arguments over not wanting to be singularized. Prime Minister Thatcher was particularly impressed with the need to maintain an alliance nuclear role into the

future, and she continually badgered her colleagues at NATO summits on this issue.\textsuperscript{125} Italy would like to get the TASM mission, if for no other reason than to enhance its prestige among the NATO partners. In addition, it would get a new NATO airbase at Crotone in return. If Germany says no, however, Italy will be less likely to accept TASM.\textsuperscript{126} Similarly, German refusal to accept TASM would almost certainly mean that Belgium and the Netherlands would also say no.

The only other possibility is Turkey, but it has traditionally imposed range limitations on its strike aircraft so as not to appear threatening to the Soviet Union. F-15's with SRAM-T would alter that arrangement dramatically. The Pentagon thinks that the Turks might accept the nuclear mission if the US was willing to sell them the modernized infrastructure and equipment that goes along with it; such a "pot sweetener" deal took place regarding nuclear artillery, a mission Turkey at first refused but eventually accepted when it was given the newest hardware as well.\textsuperscript{127}

There are obviously many issues and questions surrounding TASM's future that can only be understood, although not necessarily answered, by taking a perspective of alliance politics. As we saw, however, alliance politics alone could not explain the crucial debates that will ultimately determine whether SRAM-T, or any TASM candidate, lives or dies. Those

\textsuperscript{125}Interview in London, July 1990.

\textsuperscript{126}Interviews in London, July 1990, and Washington, May 1990. The Crotone Air Base is currently under construction, but its future is by no means secure, since the US Congress still remains ambivalent about the need for an expensive new base.

decisions are made within national capitals at the level of domestic politics. We have already addressed some of the concerns in Bonn, so we now turn to Washington and examine bureaucratic and organizational factors at play in the United States.

DOMESTIC POLITICS.

Many elements of the US bureaucracy are pessimistic over TASM’s chances for successful production and deployment in the European theater. Some officials in the Defense Department, staff members in the National Security Council, and contractors working on the project think that SRAM-T is likely to follow the same path as did the follow-on to Lance. Such concerns are amplified by open opposition to the program within a key committee in the House of Representatives. This opposition, which is based in part on Congress' reading of European opposition to new nuclear weapons, is buttressed by a lack of strong institutional support from the US Air Force--support which may drop off even more as the military draw-down begins in earnest and the Air Force faces major budget decreases.

There is support for the system in the Senate. As early as 1988 the Senate Armed Services Committee staff was enlisting outside experts to discuss whether the logic of European ground-based denuclearization and modernization requirements led inexorably to support of the TASM.128 All participants agreed that it did, and in early 1990 Senator Sam Nunn came out in favor of continued TASM funding as essential to future NATO


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deterrence. Nunn is a particularly important figure in the Senate; many other Senators look to him for guidance on how to vote on defense issues. As a senior Pentagon official put it, "If Nunn folds, TASM is dead."\(^{130}\)

The SRAM-T funding profile should draw less attention to itself than did FOTL's. It has a flatter rate of annual increases and is part of a larger program, whereas FOTL had to be rushed and stood alone in the budget figures. Nevertheless, as we saw above, considerable opposition to TASM spending has already developed in Congress, especially on the House side, and promises to continue in coming fiscal debates.

Congress required a deployment pledge from the European allies before it would fund follow-on-to-Lance; when that commitment was not forthcoming, FOTL's chances were dead. Will Congress require the same type of commitment for TASM? So far that seems not to be the case, and NATO has tried to preempt such thoughts by general statements in its communiques supporting continued "national efforts" at implementing the remaining portions of the Montebello Decision.

Finally, there are elements within the Washington bureaucracy that feel the key to future American influence in Europe, which they believe is a worthy goal, is continued US troop presence in Central Europe. To this end they are willing to sacrifice American nuclear forces, if necessary. As one recent study summarized this argument, "Better a de-nuclearized

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\(^{129}\)See Senator Sam Nunn's set of four speeches from the Senate floor, reprinted in Congressional Record, March-April 1990.

\(^{130}\)Interview in Pentagon, January 1991.
Europe than a de-Americanized one."¹³¹ This attitude seems to be prevalent among House defense specialists, and can be easily translated into opposition to a nuclear weapon that looks like it will damage US-European relations more than it will help alliance strategy. The recent success of high-technology conventional weapons in Desert Storm lends credence to arguments that nuclear weapons are no longer as necessary as once thought for adequate deterrence.

Perhaps the best example of how domestic politics may eventually determine the fate of the TASM program was seen in the Congressional budget maneuverings in the fall of 1990. SRAM-T received full funding from the joint Appropriations Committee in the FY 1991 defense budget passed in November, in spite of the fact that the House Armed Services Committee had zeroed the program out in its initial mark-up of the authorization bill. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees in conference agreed to a compromise that approved $35 million of the $118.6 million requested. Both houses of Congress then passed the final bill approving two separate figures for SRAM-T: $35 million authorized, $118.6 million appropriated.¹³²

How did this situation develop? The debate on Capitol Hill had little to do with strategic or alliance concerns once it left the two Armed Services Committees. Rather, the issue seemed to be domestic

¹³¹Murdoch, CSIS paper, July 1990.

politics and placating the home districts in an election year. The key players supporting full SRAM-T funding were Representative Norman Dicks of Washington (home of Boeing, the prime contractor), and Senators Robert Byrd of West Virginia and Jake Garn of Utah (in both of whose states Hercules Corporation, maker of the rocket and propellant, is a dominant company). Byrd is chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and both he and Garn sit on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. In July they wrote a letter to Senator Inouye, chairman of the Subcommittee, expressing their support for all projects at the Hercules plants in West Virginia and Utah. This gave the program enough support on the Senate side to have no trouble clearing the Appropriations Committee with full funding.

In the House Appropriations Committee, however, SRAM-T was opposed by Rep. Ronald Dellums, chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, and Rep. John Spratt, who chairs a nuclear facilities panel that sets warhead production policy. In a grand deal by House Armed Services Committee chairman Rep. Les Aspin that enabled him to get tentative agreement to cancel the B-2 bomber, the SRAM-T was also scrapped.

The chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Rep. John Murtha, initially went along with the Armed Services Committee deal to cut SRAM-T. But in a closed-door session of House appropriators, Dicks persuaded Murtha to change his mind. Accordingly, the Committee came forth with full funding for SRAM-T, matching the Senate's proposal.

Most observers felt that the Pentagon would not spend above the authorized level, regardless of the appropriated amount, out of respect
for the traditional pro-defense Armed Services Committee. As it turned out, the Air Force did not need as much money as they had planned for SRAM-T anyway, because of delays in the program.

The much diminished DOD budget request for SRAM-T in the FY92 budget submitted to Congress just two months after the maneuvering described above may have reflected the mixed signals coming out of the Capitol. In any case, the program's future no longer looked very bright. Said one analyst, "the House tried to kill the SRAM-T last year and it has been reported that both congressional and industry sources are predicting the missile's termination in FY 93." The SRAM-T Program Manager said underfunding by the Air Force in FY92 would delay the program at least two years. More broadly, he added pessimistically that "The SRAM-T program does not appear executable." A Boeing spokesman said that the chances for the program's cancellation appeared about "50-50." The SACEUR, General Galvin, had not yet specifically endorsed the SRAM-T, although he had called for TASM development in the past; and the head of Tactical Air Command, General Robert Russ, refused to comment on the future military utility of SRAM-T, deferring to General Galvin as the theater commander.

There still seems to be modest support for SRAM-T in the Senate; the lineup for the FY 92 debate has not changed much since that of the

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136 Hitchens and Opall, 18 Feb 1991, p. 3.
previous year. But, as one Senate staff member explained it, "if the House wants to kill the Stealth bomber, what is the Senate Armed Services Committee [which supports the B-2] willing to give up in conference to save it?" The SRAM-T program pops up as one potential sacrifice. Representative Dellums told the press in February that "the SRAM-T is no longer justified or needed." A defense advisor to Rep. Les AuCoin of the House Appropriations Committee said that greater efforts would be made in 1991 to kill the program. He called it "a Cold War weapon designed for use against a Warsaw Pact that no longer exists." Whether that conclusion proves true or not, if it is an attitude held by enough US Congressmen or enough leading European politicians it will effectively terminate the TASM program regardless of any strategic rationale the alliance may provide.

CONCLUSIONS

It's 

--- Yogi Berra

One needs to be careful applying "lessons" of the follow-on-to-Lance missile case to another episode of SNF modernization. The strategic environment has changed, and lessons from one case may not work the same way when applied to a different program with different actors and agendas.

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137Interview in Washington, April 1991. This vividly demonstrates the extent to which NATO's SNF modernization programs are hostage to domestic politics in Washington, and underlies the concern by many allies over the degree to which they can rely on the US to carry out its commitments.

138Hitchens and Opall, 18 Feb 1991, p. 3.

139Yogi probably wasn't talking about theater nuclear forces when he coined the phrase. Nevertheless, it is an apt epigram for the considerable parallels evident between the FOTL and SRAM-T programs.
But what we can show by comparing our FOTL case with future cases is how one can apply different analytical perspectives to different time periods within the case in order to better understand what happened, and what might happen, to that case.

One can make some tentative predictions as to which perspective will best explain the TASM modernization program, if not its actual outcome. The key approaches will be alliance politics and domestic politics, as was true of the final year of FOTL. As Table 4 showed, there is an obvious trend in the direction of these lower-level analytical approaches evident over the past decade.

Those favoring TASM development point out that it is not a "sea-change" in weaponry as were the INF missiles or even FOTL. TASM is an improved system to be hung on existing dual-capable aircraft that are already based in the theater. Little new work will be necessary to prepare the allies or the infrastructure for its delivery. It is more narrowly a modernization or upgrade than was the new FOTL missile.

Further helping its chances is the fact that the US is likely to quietly pursue SRAM-T as a national decision, without the demands for early allied commitment to eventual deployment that backfired against FOTL. The US will tell the Europeans, in effect, "Look, we are not going out of the nuclear business, and you don't want us to, so here is a new system that we are producing that you might like to consider having over in your neighborhood for enhanced security reasons." All the US wants at this point is a general NATO commitment to continue development, which it has received in all recent alliance meetings. The alliance is intentionally taking a low-key approach to this issue, largely due to the
obvious negative lesson of the opposite approach applied to the FOTL case.

So alliance politics is indirectly determining TASM’s future. But alliance politics is unlikely to kill the program, if only because it will not get the chance to do so. The US will not allow SRAM-T to be sacrificed to European public opinion if it perceives a valid national need for the weapon. Conversely, alliance politics could save the program, if the allies asked the US to stay and keep a robust nuclear capability stationed in-theater. This would most likely only happen if there was a sudden change in the currently diminishing Soviet threat.

Domestic American politics is the most probable location of factors that will determine TASM’s fate. The evidence to date points to eventual cancellation of the program. This would be due to several domestic pressures: opposition in the House of Representatives, Congressional budget restrictions, continuing technical problems, diminished contractor interest in a money-losing system having an uncertain future, and potential loss of Air Force support as it faces major cutbacks in the years ahead.

We may also see a combination of the two perspectives as the pattern of recent years continues: European allied pressures teamed up with Congress opposing the administration (especially DOD, DOE, and the NSC) in interagency bureaucratic struggles. We saw this take place in the FOTL case, and it is beginning to appear once again regarding SRAM-T.\textsuperscript{140}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{140}Interviews in Washington, December 1990, January and April 1991.
\end{flushright}
THE KEY QUESTIONS ANSWERED

While I have tried to show in this study that there are certain perspectives that are better at explaining certain aspects or temporal periods of nuclear modernization cases than others, I do not mean to imply that one can focus on one perspective to the exclusion of the others. Rather, we have seen that there are unexplained "residuals" that fall through the filter of each perspective that call for more in-depth study by a lower-level perspective. As Richard Neustadt wrote,

We do not pull apart these models for the sake of independent application. We have no notion that the causal factors emphasized by each are separable in real life. But having sorted these out analytically, we now are in position to begin their reassembly, asking ourselves where, against what circumstances, different combinations of those factors yield most fruitful explanations.¹⁴¹

The answers to our key questions presented in Chapter One may now be summarized.

1. Why did NATO decide in the early 1980's to upgrade its SNF forces, particularly FOTL? NATO made this decision primarily for systemic reasons, given a consensus among the allied states that the increasing Soviet strategic threat required a military response. Secondarily, the Montebello Decision provided the European allies with a public relations tactic (unilateral SNF stockpile reductions) that the allies hoped would take some of the public pressure off of on-going INF deployments.

2. Why did NATO continue to support FOTL's development in the face of increasing public opposition as the decade wore on? Alliance politics called for unanimity and consensus on any change to established practices or decisions; organizational inertia and unwillingness to sacrifice a

¹⁴¹Neustadt, p. 141.
successful long-term relationship kept the partners in general agreement over the ends of the SNF modernization program, even as that program began to take on an air of unreality.

3. *Why did the United States cancel FOTL when it did?* The domestic politics of the United States explained much of the background to the cancellation decision and the timing of the President's announcement. A combination of factors led to a convergence of pressure vectors on the administration by the spring of 1990 that left it with little choice but the obvious one: cancellation of the FOTL program. Alliance politics also played an important role, as European, and particularly German, pressure on the US teamed with Congressional resistance and US Army ambivalence to oppose the weapon. All of this took place, of course, against the backdrop of dramatic changes in the international security environment between 1989 and 1990. Yet these systemic changes merely supported well-established domestic and alliance political trends pointing toward FOTL's termination, rather than directly determining its fate.

Finally, in this chapter we asked one final question: *Can we predict how the TASM program will turn out?* Based on the methodological trends towards lower-level perspectives shown in Table 4, we concluded that domestic and alliance politics would also best predict and eventually explain the outcome of the tactical air-to-surface missile program. We then examined the case history and its current situation to assess this conclusion. Our analysis suggested that the most likely causal factors in TASM's successful deployment or cancellation would be domestic (Congressional opposition, budgetary restrictions, technical problems, loss of Air Force support) and alliance (European unwillingness to allow
basing rights, potential German de-nuclearization). We recognized, however, that a reversal of the strategic threat in Europe would immediately place renewed emphasis on the systemic level; the alliance would likely respond to the renewed threat with positive decisions regarding TASM production and deployment.

The Lance missile modernization program provided a good case with which to apply our methodological approach. The use of different analytical perspectives to study different periods of a single case seems a sound approach, and one with broader applicability, as shown in the TASM case. Most importantly, the use of these three perspectives allowed us to better appreciate the complex details behind what seemed, at first glance, to be a rather straight-forward story of an alliance weapon system that was cast aside as no longer necessary in the post-Cold War international security environment. On the contrary, the follow-on-to-Lance missile case was a complex and interesting example of the intertwined politics of the international system, of alliances, and of bureaucratic and organizational politics at the domestic level.
APPENDIX I:
INTERVIEW SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES

Were a student made to choose, God forbid, between the files and memories of participants, he would do well to take the latter.¹

Original interviews make a substantial contribution to this dissertation. The purpose of interviews in my research was to attempt to reconstruct events that occurred behind the scenes, out of the glare of the public eye, since they were often classified or sensitive. Accordingly, I chose to pursue elite interviews with those key government, military, weapons laboratory and research center personnel who had some influence or involvement with the FOTL case as it developed over the time span of my study. I conducted nearly 250 separate interviews with over 180 people during the two-year course of my research.²

The need for conducting interviews is obvious to anyone who has attempted to write about sensitive matters where decisions are made off the public record. Certainly there are few matters more sensitive to governments than those surrounding national security, especially when they concern nuclear weapons. The available public documents are interesting and valuable to some extent, but are often unable to make a substantial contribution to one's work. For example, witness the following exchange during hearings on nuclear weapons in Europe for the FY 1985 defense authorizations bill:

Senator Nunn: Certainly our battlefield people have authority to


²See list of names, locations, and dates, below.
move the tubes but [deleted].

Dr Wagner: [Deleted.]
SenatoN Nunn: How close are the [deleted].
Dr Wagner: [Deleted.]
SenatoN Nunn: Plans to move those [deleted].
General Davis: Yes, sir.
SenatoN Nunn: You can move the [deleted].
Dr Wagner: [Deleted.]
SenatoN Nunn: [Deleted.]
Dr Wagner: Yes, sir.
SenatoN Nunn: [Deleted.]
General Davis: [Deleted.]
Dr Wagner: That is not a trivial decision itself. [Deleted.]
SenatoN Nunn: [Deleted.]
Dr Wagner: That is right.
General Peat: [Deleted.]

And so on. This usually happens just when you are getting to the "good" parts in Congressional testimony.

Due to the dearth of material published on the underlying politics of the follow-on to Lance case, much of the material in this dissertation originates in these interviews. 4

There were difficulties arranging interviews with very senior government personnel, of course. 5 This constitutes one weakness in this


4 A glance at the bibliography accompanying this dissertation would seem to decry this lack of published open-source information. But most articles on SNF modernization were written at a simplistic level for the general readership. For instance, few of these works attempted to explain the politics behind decisions that were made, or to explain the strategic rationale or theory behind certain moves. Nor are there many books yet written on SNF or FOTL, because the case is too recent.

5 As the reader will note from the list of interview subjects, I interviewed people in all sectors of the nuclear decision-making process in Washington and other NATO capitols, but I had very few interviews with persons above the Assistant Secretary level (using the American bureaucracy as a frame of reference). The key decisions on FOTL, as I point out in Chapter Five, were made at the Asst. Secretary level and above--usually well above. These people are, for the most part, still in
dissertation, but it is one that is nearly impossible to overcome when dealing with a subject that was a) classified, b) still a live issue through the first year of my research, and c) no longer an issue during my second year (after FOTL's cancellation), and therefore "out of mind" for the busy bureaucrats at the apex of the national security policy apparatus. Most simply did not have time to spend with a graduate student who wanted to talk about what had suddenly become a historical case study, when there were myriad other issues demanding their energies.

I began my interviews with lower-level staff personnel that were less central to the case but relatively easy to see, moving up a notch in the bureaucratic hierarchy on each successive visit to that organization. My reasoning was that it was better to learn all I could about the case before meeting the crucial players in the story, since my time with them would be valuable and I would want to use it to fill in missing details that only they would have. If I interviewed senior people too early in my research phase, I would not even know what questions to ask--these would only be apparent to me after first talking with their subordinates. I began with persons I knew and sources suggested to me by my advisors at those high positions as I write this dissertation, and are thus unable to speak with me. I must leave it to a future study to interview those elites and confirm my findings which are based on speculation and circumstantial evidence from their staffs.

6I followed the general guidelines for conducting elite interview research found in numerous textbooks on political analysis, including Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1981), Chapter 8, "Interviewing." I also tried to emulate successful past studies that were based largely on original interviews, such as Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). See especially her Appendix, "Sources."
Princeton; once the process was started, I built on these initial contacts with other names suggested by those I had already interviewed and gleaned from relevant articles and books.

Sometimes the hardest part of an elite interview is getting on a busy bureaucrat's schedule. One key to successfully scheduling an interview is to have "a connection"—some way in which you can make the interviewee want to help you in your project by giving you a few minutes of his precious time. The approaches that worked best for me, depending on the situation, included: the Princeton connection, with alumni and academic colleagues of my advisors; the Air Force Academy faculty "old-boy network," with former faculty members; my military rank, which opened up many doors in the Pentagon, the weapons labs, and at various NATO headquarters in Europe; or a personal "spin-off" recommendation from one interview subject to another.

My technique for arranging interviews involved writing in advance, then calling the subject to set up an appointment just prior to my arrival or once I arrived in the same city, if I was there for an extended stay. Writing in advance worked especially well in Europe, where the academic and government people with whom I spoke were more than willing to meet me if I had notified them in advance, but less willing (and harder to reach) on short notice. Equally important for a graduate student visiting the Continent during the summer holiday season, several of my targets in Europe wrote back to say that they would be on vacation during my visit;

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My military clearance also allowed me access to some sensitive files and documents, which were extremely interesting but which, for security reasons, I could not use in this thesis. As stated in the introduction, this dissertation is written at the UNCLASSIFIED level, and has been cleared by DOD security monitors.
this saved time trying to track them down once there.

Writing to contacts in Washington was less necessary, although calling in advance was essential, especially for higher-ranking government officials on a tight schedule. If the subject was in the lower bureaucratic levels, and was not away from town on a trip, he was most likely able to see me on the same day, or the next. Indeed, the Pentagon was the most casual about this; "give me a call once you're in the building" was about as formal as my interview schedule got in DOD.

My interview technique was based on an unstructured approach. In a first interview, I would introduce myself, my topic, and the general thrust of my research questions, which were tailored to that particular person or his organization and its relationship to the FOTL story. The format and time frame for each interview then proceeded on an ad hoc basis, using follow-on questions, subject interest, and degree of researcher-subject empathy as guides to the interview's direction.

Most interviews took place in the subject's office, although I did have several over the telephone, and occasionally we would conduct our talk at lunch or after work. In these meetings I would remain polite, unbiased, non-threatening, and interested in order to establish a conversational air. I would ask the subject's permission to take notes, on a non-attribution basis, then sit back and write rapidly while the subject presented his side of the story.\(^8\) In situations where the subject spoke too fast or had too much information for me to keep up during the

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\(^8\)I also taped a few particularly important interviews using an unobtrusive micro-cassette recorder. Written notes proved to be far easier to work with later, however, when referring back to the interviews while writing the dissertation.
interview, I would find a quiet place to sit for a few minutes immediately after the meeting was over. This gave me the chance to reconstruct the key ideas of our conversation and fill in any gaps in my notes.

In some cases I had to probe with additional questions, or steer the conversation back on track after a digression, but most of the persons I interviewed were more than happy to talk at length about FOTL's rise and fall and the future of NATO nuclear forces. Several of them obviously had a political agenda, often defined by their organizational position or, in the case of the Europeans, by their desire to "educate" the American author as to the right views. But nearly all of my interview subjects were forthcoming, open, and generous with their time, and all recommended further contacts for more interviews. In a couple of wonderful cases they even opened up their personal files on SNF and allowed me to photocopy whatever I wanted. Most of the interviews lasted between 45 minutes and one hour, with notable exceptions (especially with the Germans) extending to two hours or more. We used English in nearly all of the meetings, although a few in Bonn were conducted in German. In only a handful of interviews did I consider the meeting a waste of time, or find it necessary to cut it short.

I discovered that a second or third visit to a subject created a relationship between us that allowed for more open discourse and considerably better information. This was due, I presume, to two primary factors: first, the interviewee now knew me, unlike the first visit when I was just a graduate student who had come in "off the street" with an unknown agenda; second, in many cases the subject became personally interested in the progress of my study, and would question me as to what
I had learned since our last visit together. While repeat visits were nearly impossible with senior members of the government, it did occur at the intermediate levels of the bureaucracy, including some key offices.

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I have tabulated my interview sources in the table below.

Number of persons interviewed at:

**Washington**

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<tr>
<td>SHAPE HQ, Mons</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Embassy, Bonn</td>
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**European Institutions**

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</table>

**TOTAL**

| Number | 181 |

[Number interviewed multiple times: 50 (27%)]

Although my interviews were conducted both "on" and "off the record," I have nevertheless intentionally kept my all of my interview
sources anonymous within the dissertation to protect their identity. Not all of them requested to be distanced from their comments, but doing so opened up our conversations considerably and made for more open, interesting, and, one would hope, accurate discussions. The list that follows is my way of saying thanks to all of those who gave of their time and knowledge to help me overcome the informational deficiencies which I confronted once I had committed to the FOTL case story. The interviewees are listed alphabetically, with their organization and, in most cases, their position at the time of the interview (in the case of retirees, their highest position relevant to this study). The date of the interview(s) is also shown.

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9With one important exception. General Bernard Rogers, in his 8-year tenure as SACEUR, was so central to the early years of the SNF modernization process that I felt it important to cite his comments when appropriate, particularly in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. Our meeting on 1 February 1991 was conducted on a "for attribution" basis.
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 1989-1991

WASHINGTON, DC: US GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Grommol, Robert, Strategic Programs, Theater Affairs Div., May 90
Koch, Dr Susan, Assistant Director for Strategic Programs, Jan 91
Lawson, Karin, Director, Theater Affairs Division, Strategic Programs, (ACDA/SP/TA), May 90
Lehman, Ambassador Ronald, Director, Jan 91
Mahley, Col Don, Deputy Asst. Director, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs (former NSC staff, Defense Plans & Arms Control Division, 1982-1989), Dec 91

Central Intelligence Agency
Schindler, Norm, Acting Director, Office of European Analysis, May 90

US Congress: Congressional Research Service
Stanley Sloan, Senior Specialist in International Security Policy, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Mar, May, & Dec 90

US Congress: House Armed Services Committee
Murdock, Dr Clark, Armed Services Committee, Defense Policy Staff (majority party), May 90

US Congress: Senate Armed Services Committee
Bell, Robert, Armed Services Committee Staff, Arms Control (majority party), May 90
Dailey, Dr Brian, Armed Services Committee Staff, Arms Control (minority party), Mar 90, May 90

US Department of Defense
Barker, Dr Robert, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and Director, Nuclear Weapons Standing Committee, Joint DOD/DOE Nuclear Weapons Council (ASD/AE), Jan 91
Boyd, Maj Rick, Western Europe Desk, AF Studies and Analysis (AF/CVAX), May 90, Jan 91
Cassidy, Paul, Theater Nuclear Forces Policy, Strategic Forces and Arms Control, Secretary of Defense (OSD/ISP), Mar 90
Chinn, Maj Courtney, TNF Officer, Nuclear-Chemical Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (JCS/J-5), Mar 90, May 90
Crouch, Dr J.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (OSD/ISP), Apr 91
Dellerman, Col Frank, Deputy Director, Strategic Arms Control Policy, Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy, International Security Policy, Secretary of Defense (OSD/ISP/START), Jun 89
Earp, Col Edwin, Chief, CFE Branch, JCS/J-5 Regional Negotiations, Jun 89
Evans, Lt Col William, Nuclear & Chemical Div, Theater Nuclear Policy Branch, Strategy Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS/J-5), Mar 90
Haffa, Col Robert, Chief, Staff Group, AF Chief of Staff (AF/CVAX), Jun 89
Halgus, Dr. Joseph, FRG Country Director, European & NATO Policy, European Policy Div, International Security Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/ISP), Jun 89

Healy, Col Richard, Director, Regional Negotiations Division, Strategic Plans & Policy Directorate (JCS/J-5/DIN), Jun 89

Irvine, Col Rob, SRAM-T Officer, Office of Theater Nuclear Forces Policy, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD/ISP), Apr 91

Kamp, LtCol R., FRG Desk, AF Regional Plans & Policy, Europe/NATO (AF/XOXXE), May 90

Kahn, William, Director, Theater Forces Policy, Strategic Forces & Arms Control, International Security Policy, SecDef (OSD/ISP), May 90

Kohout, Col John, AF Studies and Analysis, Mar 90

Kuhl, LtCol Ron, Chief, Fighter Tactics Branch, AF Tactical Forces (AF/XOOTT), May 90

Linam, Col J., Air Staff (AF/CVAX), Jun 89

Longstreth, Dr. Thomas, Council for Foreign Relations Fellow, Strategy Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS/J-5), Dec 90

Lowenkron, Barry, Special Assistant to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mar 90, Jan 91

Marshall, LtCol Robert, Tactical Forces Branch, Army Strategic Weapons, (DAMO-SWN), May 90

Maynard, Cmdr Brigette, JCS Military Secretariat (JCS/J6), May 90, Jan 91

Michela, Col Robert, Special Assistant for Army Nuclear Matters, Office of the Asst. Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (OSD/AE), Dec 90, Jan 91

Miller, Franklin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, International Security Policy, SecDef (OSD/ISP), May 90

Palmer, Don, The RAND Corporation, DOD Liaison Office, Jun 89

Ruggiero, LtCol Frank, Regional Plans & Security, Negotiations Branch, Air Staff (AF/XOXXI), Jun 89

Schlesinger, LtCol James, FOTL Launcher Project Officer, Army Force Development (DAMO-FDG), May 90

Schmidt, Col Ernie, FOTL and Nuc Artillery Officer, Office of Theater Forces Policy, Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Division, International Security Policy (OSD/ISP), May 90, Dec 90, Feb 91

Schulte, Gregory, Director, Strategic Forces Policy, Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Policy, International Security Policy, SecDef, (OSD/ISP) May 90, Jan 91

Shirey, Maj Joe, Air Staff, Operations, Tactical Forces Division, AF Plans Directorate (AF/XOOTT), May 90, Dec 90

Speelman, Col Thomas, Chief, CSCE Branch, JCS/J-5 Regional Negotiations, Jun 89

Stephens, David, Assistant for TNF Policy, Theater Forces Division, Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Policy, International Security Policy, SecDef, (OSD/ISP), May 90

Tinberg, Col Larry, SNF Force Planning, Office of Theater Nuclear Forces Policy, Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Division, International Security Policy (OSD/ISP), Dec 90

Wahlquist, LtCol John, AF Studies & Analysis, Africa and Middle East,
Jan 91
Waller, LtCol Forrest, Strategic Arms Control Policy, Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Policy, International Security Policy, Secretary of Defense (OSD/ISP/START), Jun 89
Wax, LtCol Rich, FOTL Warhead Officer, Army Strategic Weapons (DAMO/SWN), May 90
Youngbluth, LtCol Tim, SRAM-T Program Element Manager, Air Force Acquisitions (AF/AQQS), Apr 91
Yount, LtCol Joseph, CFE, Negotiations Branch, Air Staff (AF/XOXXI), Jun 89

US Department of State
Bodde, Ambassador William, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European and Canadian Affairs (EUR), Jun 1989
Cohen, Bradley, SNF Issues, Office of Policy Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/PMP), May 90, Jan 91
Creagan, David, European Division, Regional Pol-Mil, European Political & Security Affairs, Mar 90, May 90
Fairlamb, LtCol John, Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs (PM), June 1989
Grobel, Olaf, Director, Office of Central European Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs (EUR/CE), Dec 90
Hooper, James, Deputy Director, Eastern Europe & Yugoslavia (EUR/EE), May 90, Jan 91
Ianacone, LtCol Bruce, SNF Issues, European Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European & Canadian Affairs (EUR/RPM), Jan 91
Janzer, Monica, Public Affairs (PA), Jun 89, Mar 90
Lekson, Michael, Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs (EUR/RPM), Dec 90
Menold, William, Desk Officer, FRG Political Affairs, Central Europe (EUR/CE), May 90
Miller, Bowman, Director, Office of Analysis for Western Europe and Canada, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/WECA), Jun 89, Dec 90
Phillips, Craig, EUR/Central Europe, FRG Desk Officer, Mar 90
Reichert, LtCol John, Policy Planning Staff (SP), Mar 90, May 90, Jan 91
Soskel, Mark, NATO Political Developments (INR/WECA), June 1989
Tulenko, Timothy, FRG Desk Officer, Office of Central European Affairs (EUR/CE), Jun 89
Zetkulik, Jack, West German Political Developments, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR/WECA), Jun 89

National Defense University
Fischer, Oberst Eckart, Bundeswehr Exchange Fellow (former Chief, Führungs III, Nuclear Plans, MOD Bonn), Jan 91
Friedberg, Dr Aaron, Council for Foreign Relations Fellow, Strategic Capabilities Assessment Center, Institute for National Security Studies, Dec 90, Jan 91, Apr 91
Kiley, Dr Fred, President, NDU Press, May 90, Sep 90, Dec 90, Jan 91
Lewis, Col Kirk, Administrative Dean, National War College (formerly Deputy to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters (Ambassador Rowney), Dec 90
National Security Council
Fry, Col Michael, TNF Issues, Defense Policy and Arms Control Directorate, May 90, Dec 90
Gompert, Dr David, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Division, Dec 90
Hutchings, Robert, Central European Political Analysis, European and Soviet Affairs Division, Dec 90
Lowenkron, Barry, Central European Affairs, Jun 89
Zelikow, Dr Philip, Political-Military Analysis, Euro/Soviet Division, Dec 90

WASHINGTON, D.C.: NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

American Enterprise Institute
Perle, Richard, Analyst (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and Chairman, NATO High Level Group), May 90

Analytical Services (ANSER)
Kartchner, Dr Kerry, Policy Analyst, May 90, Apr 91

Arms Control Association (ACA)
Mendolsohn, Jack, Deputy Director, May 90

British-American Security Information Center
Schorr, David, Public Relations, May 90

Brookings Institution
Stares, Paul, Research Associate, Foreign Policy Studies, May 90

Carnegie Endowment
Walker, Jenonne, Senior Associate (former Director, Theater Military Policy, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department), May 90

Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland (CISSM)
Daalder, Dr Ivo, CISSM Fellow, May 90, Dec 90, Feb 91, Apr 91
Kelleher, Dr Catherine, Director, Nuclear History Project, Apr & May 90
Kennedy, Maj John, AF Research Associate, May 90
Wrightson, Patricia, Acting Assistant Director, May 90

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Hunter, Dr Robert, Director of European Studies, May 90, Jan 91
Legere, Laurance, Visiting Scholar (former Director, Nuclear Affairs, US Mission to NATO, Brussels), Jul 90

Defense Forecasts, Inc.
Blechman, Barry, Analyst
Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
Longstreth, Dr Thomas, Associate Director, Strategic Weapons Policy, Jun 89, Mar 90, May 90

Greenpeace
Arkin, Dr William, National Security Analyst, May 90

Heritage Foundation
Holmes, Dr Kim, Deputy Director, Defense Policy Studies, Jun 89

Hudson Institute
Record, Jeffrey, Analyst, May 90

Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)
Biddle, Stephen, Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Mar 90
Laird, Robin, Analyst, May 90
Utgoff, Dr Victor, Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Mar 90

Natural Resources Defense Council
Norris, Dr Stan, Senior Policy Analyst, Apr 91

National Security Research, Inc.
Kohout, Col (retd.) John, Analyst, May 90

National Strategy Information Center
Snyder, Dr Jed, Senior Fellow, NATO & International Security Policy, Jun 89, May 90

Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University
Davis, Dr Lynn, Professor (former Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Dec 90

Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation
Gormley, Dennis, Deputy Director, May 90

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Bajusz, Dr Bill, Vice President and Manager, Defense Acquisition Operation, Jan 91
Farris, Col (ret.) Ivan, Senior Scientist (former Director, Army Nuclear Planning (DAMO/SWN)), Jan 91

Smithsonian Institute
Friedberg, Dr Aaron, Woodrow Wilson Scholar, Apr 90, May 90

System Planning Corporation (SPC)
Wheeler, Col (ret.)/Dr Michael, Analyst (former Special Assistant for Arms Control to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Jan 91

United Services Organization (USO)
Rogers, Gen Bernard, Director (former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe), Jan 91
Washington Post
Smith, R. Jeffrey, National Security Affairs Correspondent

LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

Center For National Security Studies (CNSS)
Garrity, Dr Patrick, Staff Researcher, Aug 90
Maaranen, Steve, Deputy Director, Jul 89, Aug 90
Salmon, Lt Scott, Graduate Research Assistant, Harvard Univ., Aug 90

Nuclear Weapons Technology Directorate (NWT)
Groves, Dr Paul, Program Manager, SRAM-T (Weapons Programs), Aug 90
Mangeng, Carolyn, Weapons Programs, Aug 90
Palanek, Ed, Chief of Staff, NWT, Jul 89, Aug 90
Roeder, Denny, Weapons Safety (Weapons Programs), Aug 90
Smith, Frank, SNF Issues (Weapons Programs), Aug 90

Defense Research and Applications Directorate, Analysis and Assessment Division (A)
Howard, Lt Col Joe, Military Systems Analysis Section (A-5), Aug 90

Service Academy Researc Associates Program (SARA)
Lier, Capt (USN, ret.) Doug, Military Liaison, Interagency Programs Office, Jul 89, Aug 90

OTHER U.S. LOCATIONS

New York, NY
Sigal, Dr Leon, Editor, New York Times, Feb 90

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Banchoff, Thomas, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics
Dorns, Dr George, War and Peace Professor of Politics
Drohan, Maj Thomas, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics, and Assistant Professor of Political Science, US Air Force Academy, Colorado
Farkus, Andrew, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics
Friedberg, Dr Aaron, Assistant Professor of Politics
Gambles, Ian, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics
Kacowicz, Arie, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics
Kupchan, Dr Charles, Assistant Professor of Politics
McAdams, Dr A. James, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics
Meese, Cpt Michael, PhD Candidate, Woodrow Wilson School, and Assistant Professor of Social Sciences, US Military Academy, West Point, NY
Oye, Dr Kenneth, Assistant Professor of Politics
Ullman, Dr Richard, David K. Bruce Professor of International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School
Walt, Dr Stephen, Assistant Professor of Politics

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US Air Force Academy, Colorado
Foerster, LtCol/Dr Schuyler, Associate Professor & Director of International Affairs, Department of Political Science (former Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels), Jul 90
Giffen, Col/Dr Robert, Professor & Head, Department of Astronautical Engineering (former Air Attache, US Embassy Bonn, 1987-89), Jul 89
Lorenzen, Maj/Dr Jay, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mar, May, & Jul 89, Apr & Aug 90
Viotti, Col/Dr Paul, Senior Associate Professor & Deputy Head, Department of Political Science (former Deputy Political Advisor, US European Command, Germany), Mar & May 89, Apr, Sep, & Nov 90

US Space Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado
Cole, LtCol Don, Deputy Political Advisor to CINCSpace, Mar 89, Jan 91

WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERVIEWS: US GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

Belgium

US Delegation to the NATO Military Committee, Brussels, Belgium
Sullivan, LtCol/Dr Ronald, Political-Military Affairs Planner, Aug 90

US Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium
Dunkerley, Craig, Political Advisor to US Ambassador to NATO, Jun 90
Eddins, Keith, Political Attache, Jun 90, Dec 90
Huffman, Kenneth, Program Analyst, Defense Operations Division, Aug 89
Klotz, Col Frank, Defense Plans Division (Nuclear), Aug 89, Jun 90
Palenchar, LtCol David, Defense Operations Division, Aug 89
Taylor, William, Special Deputy Defense Advisor to the US Ambassador for Policy Analysis (Nuclear), Aug 89, Jun 90
Watters, Robert, Defense Plans/Conventional, Jun 90

Germany

US Embassy, Bonn, Germany
Bean, James, Political-Military Attache, Political Section, Aug 89, Jun 90
Dudley, Richards, Political-Military Attache, Political Section, Aug 89
Duringer, LtCol Pierre, Assistant Air Attache, Defense Attache Office, Aug 89, Jun 90
Ochiltree, Thomas, Chief, Internal Political Affairs, Political Section, Aug 89, Jun 90
Hilton, Col, Defense Attache, Aug 89
Stinnes, Manfred, Public Affairs Section (US Information Service), Aug 89

US European Command, Stuttgart, Germany
Bruner, LtCol Carl, Branch Chief, CDE, Arms Control Division (ECJ5-C), Jul 89
Bryant, LtCol John, Branch Chief, CFE, Arms Control Div (ECJ5-C), Jul 89
Johnson, LtCol Greg, Chief, Arms Control Division, Plans & Policy Directorate (ECJ5-C), Jul 89
Myers, LtCol Gene, Nuclear/Missile Division, Plans & Policy Directorate (ECJ5-N), Jul 89
Oatman, Maj Keith, CFE, Arms Control Division (ECJ5-C), Jul 89
Stewart, Maj Clay, Assistant Secretary for Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (ECJS), Jul 89, Feb 90

US Mission to Soviet Group of Forces Germany, Berlin, Germany
Anderson, Cpt Joel, US Army, Aug 89, Jun 90

WESTERN EUROPE: ALLIED, MULTI-NATIONAL, AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS

Belgium

International Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
Walters, Merrill, Director, NATO Nuclear Planning, Jul 90

North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, Belgium
Tertrais, Bruno, Research Fellow and PhD Candidate, Sorbonne, Jun 90

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium
DeWolfe, Col Howard, (USAF), Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff (SPACOS), Jun 90
Gelber, Minister-Counselor, (US), Special Assistant to Supreme Allied Commander Europe for International Affairs (POLAD), Aug 89
Goslin, Col Thomas, (USAF), Chief, Nuclear Policy Section, Special Weapons Branch, Policy Division, Aug 89, Jun 90
Gough, Col Jamie, (USAF), Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, CINCEUR Matters (SPACOS), Aug 89
Klingenberger, Maj Kurt, (USAF), Deputy Advisor to SACEUR for International Affairs, Mar 89, Apr 90, Jun 90, Apr 91
Kohler, Oberst, (Bundeswehr), Nuclear Concepts Section, Special Weapons Branch, Aug 89
Krehbiel, LtCol Karl, (USA), Current Issues Section, Arms Control Branch, Policy Division, Aug 89
Lang, Maj Jeff, (USA), Military Assistant, SACEUR, and Asst. Professor of Social Sciences, US Military Academy, West Point, NY, Jun 90
McClement, Commander Chris, (Royal Navy), Nuclear Concepts Section, Special Weapons Branch, Policy Division, Aug 89, Jun 90
Rae, Air Commodore (RAF), Director, Nuclear Plans Division, Special Weapons Branch, Jun 90
Vorbach, Oberst Lutz, (Bundeswehr), Chief, Nuclear Concepts Section, Special Weapons Branch, Policy Division, Jun 90

Germany

Bundestag, Bonn, Germany
Buch, Oberst Heinrich, (Bundeswehr), Security Policy Analyst, Social Democratic Party Parliamentary Group, Aug 89

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Kunz, Gerhard, Foreign Affairs Analyst, Christian Democratic Party-Christian Socialist Union Parliamentary Group, Aug 89

Chancellor's Office (Bundeskanzleramt). Bonn, Germany
Lange, Kapitän zur See Rudolf, Defense Advisor to the Chancellor, Jun 90

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. Bonn, Germany
Broer, Michael, Research Fellow and PhD Candidate, Jun 90

Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt). Bonn, Germany
Ischinger, Wolfgang, Director of Legislative and Cabinet Affairs, Foreign Office, Aug 89, Jun 90

Free University. Berlin, Germany
Haftendorn, Dr Helga, Professor, Department of Political Science, Institute for International Politics and Regional Studies, Aug 89

Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. Bonn, Germany
Lübkeemeier, Eckhard, Analyst, Security & Arms Control Study Group, Forschungsinstitut, Aug 89

Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustine, Germany
Kamp, Karl-Heinz, Researcher, Security & Arms Control Study Group, Forschungsinstitut, and PhD Candidate, Aug 89, Jun 90
Rühle, Dr Michael, Analyst, Forschungsinstitut, Aug 89, Jun 90

Ministry of Defense (Verteidigungministerium). Bonn, Germany
Etzold, Dr Thomas, Long-Range Planner, Führungsstab III (Planning), Jun 90
Mey, Holger, Analyst, Planungsstab, and PhD Candidate, Jun 90
Vorbach, Oberst-Leutnant Lutz, Military-Political Section, Chief of Defense (Fu. III-1), Aug 89

Great Britain

British-American Security Information Council (BASIC). London
Plesch, Dan, Director, Jul 90

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Binnendijk, Dr Hans, Director of Studies, Jul 90
Brown, Dr Michael, Senior Research Fellow, Apr 90, Jul 90
Heisbourg, Francois, Director, Jul 90
Ruiz-Palmer, Diego, Research Associate, Jul 90

Kings College, London
Freedman, Dr Lawrence, Professor and Head, Department of War Studies, Jul 90
Halvorson, Thomas, PhD Candidate, Jul 90

Library, House of Commons, London
Ware, Dr Richard, International Affairs and Defence Section, Jul 90
APPENDIX II: 
KEY NUCLEAR DECISION-MAKERS IN THE EARLY BUSH ADMINISTRATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

George Bush, President
John Sununu, White House Chief of Staff
Marvin Fitzwater, White House Press Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor
Robert Blackwill, Special Asst. & Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs
Robert Gates, Deputy NSA
Philip Zelikow, European and Soviet Affairs
Arnold Kanter, Special Asst., Defense Policy & Arms Control
Robert Hutchings, European and Soviet Affairs
Col Michael Fry, Defense Policy & Arms Control

STATE DEPARTMENT

James Baker, Secretary
Robert Zoellick, Chief Counsellor
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Raymond Seitz, Asst. Secy. for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Kimmett, Under Secretary for Politics
Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Ronald Lehman, Director
Col Dan Mailey, Multinational Affairs

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Richard Cheney, Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary for Policy
Stephen Hadley, Asst. Secretary for Int’l. Security Policy
Franklin Miller, Deputy Asst. Secy. for Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Policy
Gen Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
MajGen Lee Butler, Director, JCS J-5 (Strat Plans & Policy)
Robert Barker, Chairman, Nuc Weapons Council Standing Cmte
LtGen Howard Graves, Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

ENERGY DEPARTMENT

James Watkins, Secretary
Rear Adm. J.M. Barr, Deputy Asst. Secy. for Mil. Applications
John Tuck, Under Secretary for Defense Programs

* * * * * *

INNER CIRCLE

Bush Baker Sununu Cheney Scowcroft

SECOND CIRCLE

DOD: Powell Hadley Wolfowitz Butler Barker
State: Seitz Zoellick Bartholomew Kimmett Ross
NSC: Kanter Blackwill Gates
DOE: Watkins

THIRD CIRCLE

Asst. Secys., NSC staff, depending on issue (interagency process)
APPENDIX III:
US LAND-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE 1953-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>First Deployed</th>
<th>Max Range (miles)</th>
<th>Yield (kt)</th>
<th>Year Removed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Range Missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redstone</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jupiter</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thor</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>5-50</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matador</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>10-50</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing II</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>10-50</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Range Missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing IA</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>60/200/400</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Range Missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulus</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest John</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1-20</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacrosse</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1-100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Short Range Artillery²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Year Deployed</th>
<th>Caliber (mm)</th>
<th>Range (mi)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year Deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>280 mm Atomic Cannon</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1953-1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 inch (203 mm) Howitzer</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18-12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm Howitzer</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Year Deployed</th>
<th>Caliber (mm)</th>
<th>Range (mi)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year Deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Davy Crockett (bazooka)</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Demolition Munitions</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>&quot;low&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike-Hercules (SAM)</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1-20</td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falcon (SAM)</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADM</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Not included in table above: sea-based or air-delivered weapons, including Walleye and Walleye II ASM’s, ASROC, Bullpup, SUBROC, Tomahawk SLCM’s, Polaris SLBM’s, nuclear depth bombs, Talos and Terrier naval SAM’s, air-delivered bombs, ALCM’s, SRAM’s, air-to-air missiles)

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²Nuclear artillery have been continuously updated. Current systems deployed to Europe, all dual-capable, are the M-109 155 mm self-propelled howitzer (first deployed 1962), the M-110 8-inch self-propelled howitzer (introduced in 1964), and the M-114 155 mm towed howitzer (deployed since 1979).
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Sagan, Scott D. Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National


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