THE CHANGING GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: IMPACT ON U.S. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE PACIFIC

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### Abstract
THIS PAPER ADDRESSES THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE OF U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION FOR A TWENTY YEAR PERIOD FROM 1991 TO 2010. THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THIS STUDY IS THE CONDUCT OF THEATER LEVEL FORCE PLANNING IN AN ERA OF AMBIGUOUS THREAT. GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANT GLOBAL CHANGES IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAS SUPPLANTED THAT OF THE COLD WAR ERA. PRESIDENT BUSH'S REACTION TO THESE CHANGES, EMBODIED IN HIS VISION OF A "NEW WORLD ORDER", REQUIRES A NEW MILITARY STRATEGY AND A NEW APPROACH TO FORCE PLANNING. A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF GLOBAL STABILITY AND A MORE POSITIVE AND PROACTIVE MILITARY STRATEGY OF "PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT" ARE POSITED AS APPROPRIATE TO THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. CONSISTENT WITH THE BUSH VISION, THIS MILITARY STRATEGY RELIES ON FORWARD PRESENCE IN PLACE OF DETERRENCE AS ITS CORNERSTONE. A TOP DOWN APPROACH TO FORCE PLANNING IS USED IN THIS PAPER, BUT WITH THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF PEACETIME ACTIVITIES SUBSTITUTING FOR THREATS. USING THIS METHODOLOGY AND PROJECTING PACIFIC TRENDS OUT TEN TO TWENTY YEARS, A U.S. ARMY FORCE COMPONENT FOR THE PACIFIC THEATER IS SIZED, SHAPED, AND
POSTURED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT IN A JOINT AND COMBINED ENVIRONMENT. A CORPS HEADQUARTERS WITH THREE TRIPLE CAPABILITY DIVISIONS IS RECOMMENDED AS THE APPROPRIATE ARMY FORCE FOR THE PACIFIC. THE JOINT CONTEXT MANDATED A CURSORY CONSIDERATION OF AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURES AND POSTURES.
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THIS PAPER ADDRESSES THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE OF U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION FOR A TWENTY YEAR PERIOD FROM 1991 TO 2010. THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THIS STUDY IS THE CONDUCT OF THEATER LEVEL FORCE PLANNING IN AN ERA OF AMBIGUOUS THREAT. GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANT GLOBAL CHANGES IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAS SUPPLANTED THAT OF THE COLD WAR ERA. PRESIDENT BUSH'S REACTION TO THESE CHANGES, EMBODIED IN HIS VISION OF A "NEW WORLD ORDER", REQUIRES A NEW MILITARY STRATEGY AND A NEW APPROACH TO FORCE PLANNING. A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF GLOBAL STABILITY AND A MORE POSITIVE AND PROACTIVE MILITARY STRATEGY ARE POSITED AS APPROPRIATE TO THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. CONSISTENT WITH THE BUSH VISION, THIS MILITARY STRATEGY RELIES ON FORWARD PRESENCE INSTEAD OF DETERRENCE AS ITS CORNERSTONE. A TOP DOWN APPROACH TO FORCE PLANNING IS USED IN THIS PAPER, BUT WITH THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF PEACETIME ACTIVITIES SUBSTITUTING FOR THREATS. USING THIS METHODOLOGY AND PROJECTING PACIFIC TRENDS OUT TEN TO TWENTY YEARS, A U.S. ARMY FORCE COMPONENT FOR THE PACIFIC THEATER IS SIZED, SHAPED, AND POSTURED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT IN A JOINT AND COMBINED ENVIRONMENT. A CORPS HEADQUARTERS WITH THREE TRIPLE CAPABILITY DIVISIONS IS RECOMMENDED AS THE APPROPRIATE ARMY FORCE FOR THE PACIFIC THEATER. THE JOINT CONTEXT MANDATED A CURSORY CONSIDERATION OF AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURES AND POSTURES.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..............................................................................................................i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................iii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION................................................................................1

CHAPTER 2: THE EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.................................11

CHAPTER 3: PACIFIC REGIONAL TRENDS......................................................24

CHAPTER 4: A U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A
          DECADE OF TRANSITION AND BEYOND............................................37

CHAPTER 5: A U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY
          FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION......................................................48

CHAPTER 6: STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT OF U.S.
          ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC THEATER.................................67

ANNEX A: TABLE 1 - STRATEGIC AND FORCE
          PLANNING CONTRASTS.................................................................89

ANNEX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................90

ANNEX C: BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.................................................................108
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"'THE FUTURE' DOES NOT EXIST; IS OURS TO MAKE,
OR UNMAKE."

A BASIC PREMISE OF AMERICAN CULTURE IS THE BELIEF THAT THE FUTURE DOES
NOT HAVE TO BE PASSIVELY ACCEPTED. IF ONE HAS A DEFINITE OBJECTIVE THE FUTURE
CAN BE SHAPED BY POSITIVE AND PROACTIVE POLICIES. THE HISTORIC CHANGES WHICH
BEGAN TO SURFACE IN THE LATE 1980'S PRESENT THE WORLD AND THE UNITED STATES
WITH NEW CHALLENGES AND UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITIES. AS THE COLD WAR ERA
RECEDES THE WORLD ENTERS A TRANSITION PERIOD THAT WILL PROBABLY EXTEND FOR
ONE OR TWO DECADES. THE DECISIONS MADE IN THIS TRANSITION PERIOD WILL AFFECT
THE STATE OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS FOR DECADES TO COME. WITH THE ONSET OF THE LAST
DECADE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, AMERICA, MORE THAN ANY OTHER NATION ON
EARTH HAS THE CAPABILITY, AND MANY WOULD CONTENT THE RESPONSIBILITY, TO SHAPE
A NEW WORLD ORDER.

FOUR FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE EVOLVING GLOBAL SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT AND THE AMERICAN ROLE THEREIN UNDERLAY THIS STUDY:

(1) THE SOVIET THREAT HAS DECLINED TO THE POINT WHERE IT NO LONGER IS THE
PRIMARY DRIVER OF U.S. FORCE PLANNING;

(2) U.S. ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS AND OTHER DOMESTIC REQUIREMENTS WILL
MAINTAIN DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON MILITARY SPENDING;

(3) ALTHOUGH THE U.S. WILL WITHDRAW MOST COMBAT FORCES FROM FORWARD
BASES, THE U.S. WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE WORLD;

(4) THAT THE KOREAN PENINSULA WILL NOT BE THE FOCAL POINT FOR U.S. DEFENSE
EFFORTS IN THE PACIFIC THEATER.

GEORGE BUSH'S READING OF THE HISTORIC CHANGES TAKING PLACE HAS LED HIM
TO PORTRAY A VISION OF THIS NEW WORLD ORDER IN WHICH A PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS,
WITH AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRUCTURE A MORE
COOPERATIVE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL. THE BUSH VISION
REQUIRES AN AMERICA ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN WORLD AFFAIRS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AND

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1 MICHAEL VLAHOS, THINKING ABOUT WORLD CHANGE, (WASHINGTON: DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, 1990), P. 11.
MAINTAIN GLOBAL STABILITY WHICH IS THE NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR THE SPREAD
OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY.

TO BE IN A POSITION TO SHAPE THIS NEW WORLD ORDER THE UNITED STATES MUST
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL STRATEGY WITH ACTIVE POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY COMPONENTS. THE WORLD IS TOO COMPLEX AND
INTERDEPENDENT TO SOLVE PROBLEMS THROUGH THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCE
ALONE. THE ELEMENTS OF THIS COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY MUST BE PROACTIVE AND
POSITIVE RATHER THAN REACTIVE AND NEGATIVE. IT IS A STRATEGY THAT MUST SEEK TO
BE SENSITIVE TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES AND THAT SEeks TO ADDRESS CAUSES
AND NOT SYMPTOMS OF CHAOS AND INSTABILITY.

IN TERMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY, THE MOMENTOUS PARADIGM SHIFT THAT IS NOW
TAKING PLACE GREATLY COMPLICATES FORCE PLANNING FOR ALL SERVICES. THE LACK
OF AN OVERWHELMING AND UNAMBIGUOUS THREAT INVALIDATES THE FORCE PLANNING
METHODOLOGY USED FOR THE PAST FOUR DECADES. ATTEMPTING TO SIZE AND SHAPE
FORCES FOR A THEATER OF OPERATION IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF AMBIGUOUS THREAT
DEMANDS A DIFFERENT FORCE PLANNING APPROACH.

WHILE THIS STUDY MAINTAINS THAT THE TOP-DOWN FORCE PLANNING
METHODOLOGY REMAINS VALID, A SINGLE CLEAR THREAT IS NO LONGER THE DRIVER.
INSTEAD PEACETIME MILITARY REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS COMBINED EXERCISES, TRAINING
EXCHANGES, SHIP VISITS, AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE, MUST BE THE FORCE PLANNING
DRIVERS FOR THE THEATER BASELINE FORCE STRUCTURE. SPECIFIC OR NOTIONAL
CONFLICT SCENARIOS, THREAT CONFIGURATIONS, AND THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS
OF DETERRENCE CAN BE USED TO REFINE AND GIVE MORE SPECIFIC CONTENT TO THEATER
BASELINE FORCE STRUCTURES.

FOR A NUMBER OF COGENT REASONS THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION WILL BE THE FOCAL
POINT OF THIS NEW STRATEGY. ONGOING TRENDS HAVE ALREADY SHIFTED THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOCAL CENTER OF GRAVITY FROM EUROPE TO THE PACIFIC. IT
IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE POLITICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY FOLLOWS SUIT.
MACKINDER’S HEARTLAND IS IN THE PROCESS OF SHIFTING FROM THE EURASIAN
HEARTLAND TO EAST ASIA AND PERHAPS MORE SPECIFICALLY, NORTHEAST ASIA. THE
MACKINDER THESIS CAN NOW BE RESTATED AS "HE WHO CONTROLS THE ECONOMIC AND
TECHNOCAL HEARTLAND OF EAST ASIA CONTROLS THE WORLD." THE FIRST PRINCIPLE
OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY MUST BE TO PREVENT THE DOMINATION OF THIS
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOCAL HEARTLAND BY ANY HOSTILE POWER OR COMBINATION
OF POWERS. IN THE MID AND LONG TERM (5-20 YEARS) FUTURE, JAPAN WILL BE THE KEY
FOCUS NOT ONLY OF U.S. PACIFIC STRATEGY, BUT OF U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY AS WELL. A PRIMARY NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PACIFIC IS TO PRECLUDE ACTIONS THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE REARMAMENT OF JAPAN. A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF GLOBAL STABILITY AND A PROACTIVE MILITARY STRATEGY FOCUSSING ON AN ACTIVE AND CREDIBLE U.S. REGIONAL PRESENCE MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE.

THE SHIFT OF THE STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY WILL HAVE PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICY, SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS, AND MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE. THE PACIFIC MUST NO LONGER BE THOUGHT OF AS THE ECONOMY OF FORCE THEATER. EUROPE, LONG THE MAIN EFFORT FOR U.S. GRAND STRATEGY AND DEFENSE POLICY HAS CEASED TO DESERVE SUCH ATTENTION. DUE TO STRONG CULTURAL (READ EMOTIONAL) TIES, THIS FAMILIAR AND LONG STANDING RELATIONSHIP WILL NOT BE EASILY CHANGED, BUT THE REALITY OF THE POST COLD WAR ERA DEMANDS A REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC FOCUS.


USING PEACETIME ACTIVITIES AS THE FORCE PLANNING DRIVER FOR U.S. ARMY FORCES FOR THE PACIFIC THEATER LEADS TO A STRUCTURE WHICH INCLUDES A CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND A U.S. ARMY AIR DIVISION (A-10s AND AH-64/LHXs) BOTH LOCATED IN HAWAII, THREE COMBAT DIVISIONS, AND A CAVALRY BRIGADE. TWO OF THE COMBAT DIVISIONS, LOCATED IN HAWAII AND ALASKA, ARE TRIPLE CAPABILITY UNITS COMPOSED OF MOTORIZED, AIRBORNE, AND AIR MANEUVER FORCES. A HEAVY COMBAT DIVISION OF TWO HEAVY AND ONE AIR MANEUVER BRIGADES IS LOCATED AT FT LEWIS. THE CAVALRY BRIGADE OF TWO MOTORIZED AND ONE AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON IS ALSO LOCATED AT FT LEWIS. THESE UNITS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FORCE STRUCTURE TO CONDUCT THE REQUIRED PEACETIME ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS THE VERSATILITY, LETHALITY, DEPLOYABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY NECESSARY FOR OPERATIONS IN THE DIVERSE AND EXPANSIVE PACIFIC THEATER IN TIMES OF PEACE, CRISIS, AND WAR.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"OUR TASK TODAY IS TO SHAPE OUR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES TO THESE CHANGING STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES."¹

OBJECTIVE: THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PAPER IS TO PROPOSE AN EFFECTIVE U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION OUT TO THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND.² ASSOCIATED WITH THIS PROPOSED STRATEGY IS AN ECONOMICALLY AFFORDABLE AND A POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE POSTURE. THE NEW STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE MUST BE APPROPRIATE TO THE SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC CHANGES NOW TAKING PLACE. THE TIMEFRAME SPANS A TRANSITION PERIOD MOVING FROM THE COLD WAR BIPOLAR STRUCTURE TO WHAT WILL TRULY BE, IF PRESENT TRENDS PERSIST, A NEW WORLD ORDER CHARACTERIZED BY MULTIPOLARITY, GREATER INTER-STATE COOPERATION, BUT MARKED BY POTENTIALLY GREATER NON-MILITARY COMPETITION. PROJECTIONS IN THIS STUDY Seldom EXTEND PAST THE YEAR 2010.


METHODOLOGY: A COMBINATION OF RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES ARE USED IN THIS STUDY. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE, INTERVIEWS AND SEMINAR

¹ GEORGE BUSH, SPEECH GIVEN AT THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, AUGUST 2, 1990 (HEREAFTER: "ASPEN SPEECH").

² THE TERM ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AS USED IN THIS STUDY IS TAKEN TO BE COTERMINOUS WITH THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM) AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
OBSERVATIONS ARE THE PRIMARY METHODOLOGIES USED TO IDENTIFY U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. AN AVERSION POLICY MODEL IS USED FOR PROJECTING PROBABLE GLOBAL AND PACIFIC REGIONAL TRENDS, IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL THREATS TO U.S. SECURITY, AND THEN DETERMINING THE STRATEGIES NECESSARY TO CONFRONT THOSE TRENDS AND THREATS. THE OVERALL BASELINE FORCE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF U.S. FORCES ARE TAKEN FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE PROJECTIONS FOR FY 1995. SOME MODIFICATIONS ARE MADE TO THIS FORCE STRUCTURE TO BETTER ALIGN IT WITH THE PROJECTED GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AS PORTRAYED IN THIS PAPER.

This study is both descriptive and prescriptive. It is descriptive of plausible future global and regional security environments and of the general outline of President Bush's strategic vision. It is prescriptive of future U.S. national and military strategies, Pacific regional strategy, and force structure and force allocation for the Pacific theater. While these latter areas are prescriptive, there is no pretension that the conclusions and recommendations of this study are original or innovative in nature. At best, one might hope that this study provides a view free from the confines of the traditional service or institutional vision.

This study was produced with reference to joint and service planning documents and future planning studies, but with the intention to avoid paralleling such documents and duplicating the established view. Many of the ideas and concepts put forth may be considered impractical, politically uneconomical, or even militarily unsound. The conclusions must be judged in the spirit of academic research.

Underlying this study are four primary assumptions about the evolving global security environment and the American role therein:

1. The Soviet threat has declined to the point where it no longer is the primary determinate of U.S. force planning;

2. U.S. economic constraints and other domestic requirements will

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4 Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, (Washington: Department of Defense, 1991), p.ix. The force structure for FY 1995 is planned to be 12 active Army divisions (6 reserve), 26 tactical fighter wing equivalents (15 active), and 12 Navy aircraft carriers and one training carrier.
CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON MILITARY SPENDING;

(3) ALTHOUGH THE U.S. WILL WITHDRAW MOST COMBAT FORCES FROM FORWARD BASES, THE U.S. WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE WORLD;

(4) BEYOND THE MIDDLE YEARS OF THE DECADE THE KOREAN PENINSULA WILL NOT BE THE FOCAL POINT FOR U.S. ARMY DEFENSE EFFORTS IN THE PACIFIC THEATER.\(^5\)

FORCE PLANNING FOR A NEW ERA: THE POST COLD WAR ERA PRESENTS SOME CHALLENGING FORCE PLANNING QUESTIONS. FIRST, HOW DOES ONE DETERMINE FORCE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS THREAT? SECOND, WHAT MECHANISM DOES ONE USE TO STRUCTURE FORCES FOR A UNIFIED COMMAND THEATER OF OPERATION? THIS STUDY WILL ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS AS THEY CONCERN U.S. ARMY FORCES FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

THE PACIFIC THEATER FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE POSTURE IS DEVELOPED USING A TOP-DOWN FORCE PLANNING APPROACH. UNLIKE PREVIOUS FORCE PLANNING APPROACHES WHICH HAVE BEEN THREAT BASED, THE APPROACH USED IN THIS PAPER FOCUSES ON NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF PEACETIME ACTIVITIES AS THE PRINCIPAL DETERMINANTS OF THEATER BASELINE FORCE STRUCTURE.\(^6\)

THIS UNORTHODOX FORCE PLANNING METHODOLOGY IS AN ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE LACK OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS THREAT. SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT A METHODOLOGY USING NATIONAL INTERESTS AND PEACETIME ACTIVITIES TO CONDUCT FORCE PLANNING LACKS THE RIGOR AND QUANTIFICATION THAT THE SOVIET NORMS AND NUMBERS HERETOFORE PROVIDED. AT THIS TIME THE ONLY ANSWER TO THIS CHARGE IS -- YES. SUCH A METHODOLOGY IS LACKING, BUT WITHOUT AN UNAMBIGUOUS THREAT AND WITH GREAT UNCERTAINTY CLOUDING THE FUTURE, WHAT OTHER METHODOLOGIES CAN BE USED TO CONDUCT FORCE PLANNING?

DEVELOPING STRATEGIC OPTIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO

\(^5\) THERE ARE TWO PLAUSIBLE REASONS FOR THIS ASSUMPTION. FIRST, THAT BY THE YEAR 2000 THE SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE NORTH WILL BE SO GREAT AS TO NO LONGER REQUIRE U.S. FORWARD DEPLOYMENT. SECOND, THAT A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION MAY WELL BE REACHED LEADING TO UNIFICATION. THERE IS ALSO A PRACTICAL REASON FOR THIS ASSUMPTION. ASSUMING AWAY THE KOREAN PROBLEM ALLOWS STRATEGISTS AND FORCE PLANNERS TO LOOK BEYOND KOREA AND BETTER ADJUST TO EVOLVING REGIONAL TRENDS UNENCUMBERED BY FOUR DECADES OF HISTORICAL BAGGAGE.

INFLUENCE FUTURE OUTCOMES, AND CONDUCT FORCE PLANNING TO THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND CAN NOT BE A SCIENTIFIC ENDEAVOR. TRENDS INVOLVING HUMAN INTERACTION ARE Seldom SUSCEPTIBLE TO STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTION OR PRECISE QUANTIFICATION. THIS PHENOMENON OF UNPREDICTABILITY IS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL IN TIMES OF GREAT CHANGE. IN NO ARENA HAS THIS BEEN MORE TRUE THAN IN THE REALM OF CONFLICT. STATESMEN AND MILITARY PLANNERS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN SURPRISED BY THE OUTBREAK AND THE CHARACTER OF WARS.\(^7\) UNPREDICTABILITY WILL BE A KEY FEATURE OF THE TRANSITION AND BEYOND.


"WE ARE AT ONE OF THOSE RARE POINTS OF LEVERAGE IN HISTORY WHEN FAMILIAR CONSTRAINTS HAVE DROPPED AWAY; WHAT WE DO NOW COULD ESTABLISH THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH EVENTS WILL PLAY THEMSELVES OUT FOR DECADES TO COME."\(^8\)


\(^7\) COLIN S. GRAY, "PLANNING FOR U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS," PROCEEDINGS, DECEMBER 1984, P. 38.

\(^8\) JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, "COPING WITH VICTORY," THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, MAY 1990, P. 49.
EFFECTIVELY MOVE FORWARD TOWARD A NEW GLOBAL PARADIGM.

SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC SHIFTS ARE NOW RESHAPING THE WORLD AS WE HAVE
KNOWN IT. THE STRAIGHT FORWARD BIPOLAR STRUCTURE IS GIVING WAY TO A LESS
STABLE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE, OR AS SOME WOULD ARGUE, A UNI-POLAR STRUCTURE.
WITH THE DECLINE OF THE SOVIET UNION, THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES HAVE SHIFTED
FROM THE GLOBAL TO THE REGIONAL. SUCH THREATS NOW ARE MORE AMBIGUOUS AND
COMPLEX THAN ANYTIME IN THE LAST HALF A CENTURY.

THE ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER IS INCREASING IN PROMINENCE
AS ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE TIES NATIONS CLOSER TOGETHER WHILE CONCURRENTLY
PROVIDING NEW GROUNDS FOR CONFLICT. U.S. ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPACTING
SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE AMERICAN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT.
SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE EXISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EMOTIONS PLACES LIMITS
ON THE ABILITY OF NATIONS TO DISMISS NATIONALISTIC FEELINGS AND HISTORICAL
ANTAGONISMS.9 FINALLY, RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES ARE CHANGING THE NATURE
OF INTER-STATE RELATIONS AND THE NATURE OF MILITARY CONFLICT AS WELL AS THE
GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY POWER.

THE BUSH WORLD VISION: IT IS IN THIS TUMULTUOUS ENVIRONMENT THAT
PRESIDENT BUSH HAS BEGUN TO UNVEIL HIS VISION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER.10 THE
ELEMENTS OF THIS VISION ARE:

(1) THE WORLD TODAY IS AT A UNIQUE MOMENT AT WHICH NATIONS CAN MOVE
TOWARD A HISTORIC PERIOD OF COOPERATION;

(2) THIS NEW WORLD ORDER MUST BE ANCHORED BY A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION;11

9 MICHAEL VLALOS, THINKING ABOUT WORLD CHANGE. (WASHINGTON, DC: UNITED STATES

10 THE BUSH VISION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER HAS BEEN OUTLINED BY THE PRESIDENT AND
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS IN VARIOUS SPEECHES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1990.
GOOD EXAMPLES OF THIS OUTLINE ARE CONTAINED IN: (1) GEORGE BUSH, "ASPEN SPEECH"; (2)
GEORGE BUSH. "TOWARD A NEW WORLD ORDER," SEPTEMBER 11, 1990 IN US DEPARTMENT OF
STATE DISPATCH, SEPTEMBER 17, 1990, PP. 91-94.; (3) GEORGE BUSH. ADDRESS BEFORE THE 45TH
SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 1, 1990 IN WEEKLY
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 1-7 OCTOBER 1990, PP. 1496-1499.

11 RECENT EVENTS CALL INTO QUESTION THE ENDURANCE OF A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THERE ARE SOME WHO MAINTAIN THAT SUCH A COOPERATIVE
RELATIONSHIP IS NOT NECESSARY. SEE: CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, "THE UNIPOLAR
WHILE THE WORLD REMAINS A HOPEFUL PLACE IT ALSO REMAINS A DANGEROUS PLACE WITH SERIOUS THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS;

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS BASED ON CONSULTATION, COOPERATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND AN EQUITABLE SHARING OF COSTS AND COMMITMENT;

A GREATER RELIANCE ON INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO MANAGE THIS NEW PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS;

A WORLD OF OPEN BORDERS, OPEN TRADE AND OPEN MINDS WHERE DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY WILL THRIVE;

THE U.S. HAS A SPECIAL LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING THIS NEW WORLD ORDER ABOUT. THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP.

A NEW ERA IN WHICH THE U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY AND MILITARY STRUCTURE NEEDED TO ENSURE PEACE CAN AND MUST BE DIFFERENT.

PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER, CHARACTERIZED BY GLOBAL STABILITY, REPRESENTS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO STRUCTURE A PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM BASED ON A PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS, OPERATING IN CONCERT TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOALS. IN THIS SENSE THE BUSH VISION IS AN ATTEMPT TO SHAPE THE FUTURE RATHER THAN TO REACT TO THE PRESENT. IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A REASONABLE LEVEL OF GLOBAL STABILITY.

IN ORDER TO INSURE THE PEACE AND PRESERVE AMERICAN INTERESTS, PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY INCORPORATING A ROBUST MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE. THIS NEW AMERICAN DEFENSE FRAMEWORK MUST BE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ERA OF GLOBAL STABILITY. A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DERIVED FROM THE BUSH VISION REQUIRES THE APPLICATION OF A PROACTIVE AND POSITIVE STRATEGY OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY COMPONENTS. THE BUSH DEFENSE POLICY INCLUDES FORWARD PRESENCE, DETERRENCE, RECONSTITUTION, CRISIS RESPONSE, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION. THIS IS A STRATEGIC VISION TO INSURE THAT AMERICA REMAINS A PIVOTAL FACTOR FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE AND ENDURING GLOBAL STABILITY.

IN SUMMARY, PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER IS THE NEW U.S. NATIONAL OBJECTIVE FOR THE POST COLD WAR ERA. THIS NATIONAL OBJECTIVE IS TO BE ACHIEVED BY THE CREATION OF A COOPERATIVE AND STABLE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF GLOBAL STABILITY MUST BE A POSITIVE AND PROACTIVE MILITARY POLICY WHICH
SEEKS TO CONTRIBUTE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES, TO THE
SHAPING OF A STABLE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT THE
NEW WORLD ORDER.

STRATEGIC CHANGE AND THE MILITARY: MOVING FROM THE COLD WAR FOCUS ON
DETERRENCE TO A NEW WORLD ORDER FOCUS ON GLOBAL STABILITY WILL REQUIRE A
DIFFERENT MISSION ORIENTATION FOR THE AMERICAN MILITARY. THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF GLOBAL STABILITY WILL REQUIRE LESS EMPHASIS ON MILITARY MEANS AND
MORE EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INSTITUTIONAL MEANS.\textsuperscript{12} AS THE GULF
WAR OF 1991 DEMONSTRATED, WHILE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER ARE GAINING IN
IMPORTANCE, THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT IS FAR FROM BEING INEFFECTIVE OR OBSOLETE.

THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THE SUBSEQUENT COALITION REACTION
PROVIDED THE FIRST TEST OF THE BUSH VISION. WHILE AMERICAN ACTIONS APPEARED TO
BE VERY SUCCESSFUL, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT FROM POLICY TO TACTICS, THE ENTIRE
EPISODE WAS UNIQUE. AT THE TIME OF THIS WRITING IT IS TOO EARLY TO DRAW
ANYTHING BUT TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS, HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING STAND OUT:

(1) THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY WILL NOT TOLERATE AGGRESSION;
(2) AMERICAN LEADERSHIP PROVED NECESSARY AND EFFECTIVE;
(3) AD HOC COALITIONS (PARTNERSHIPS OF NATIONS) AND THE UNITED NATIONS CAN
BE EFFECTIVE;
(4) THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL SUPPORT MILITARY INTERVENTION UNDER THE
RIGHT CONDITIONS;
(5) WEAPONS PROLIFERATION MUST BE STRICTLY LIMITED;
(6) THE COOPERATION OF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN
THE OVERALL EFFORT;
(7) THE ENHANCED CREDIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN THREAT SHOULD REDUCE THE
INCIDENCE OF AGGRESSION.

(8) AMERICAN ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND MORE IMPORTANTLY
OPERATIONAL MANAGERIAL SKILLS (SYNCHRONIZATION) FOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
FAR EXCEED THOSE OF ANY THIRD WORLD NATION, NO MATTER THE SIZE OR TECHNICAL
LEVEL OF THE FORCE.

(9) WHILE HIGH TECHNOLOGY WAS CRITICAL TO THE VICTORY, IT WAS THE PURPOSE
FOR WHICH THE TECHNOLOGY WAS EMPLOYED THAT WAS CRITICAL. THE PERCEIVED

\textsuperscript{12} SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, "AMERICA'S CHANGING STRATEGIC INTERESTS," \textit{SURVIVAL},
FOCUS OF TECHNOLOGY WAS ON FIREPOWER TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES. IN REALITY, THE CRITICAL IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY WAS TO VASTLY RAISE THE TEMPO OF BATTLE, NOT TO DESTROY MEN AND MATERIAL, BUT TO OVERLOAD AND DISORIENT THE IRAQI COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM IN BOTH A MATERIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE. THE DEFEAT MECHANISM IN THE IRAQ WAR WAS PREDICATED ON A HIGH TECHNOLOGY, RELATIONAL MANEUVER STRATEGY, NOT ON A HIGH TECHNOLOGY ATTRITION STRATEGY (ALTHOUGH IRAQI LOSS RATES WERE CATASTROPHIC).


THE PACIFIC REGIONAL SETTING IS MARKED BY DYNAMISM, DISTANCE AND DIVERSITY. THE DECADE OF THE 1980's HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IS THE WORLD'S MOST ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL REGION. OVER 36% OF U.S. WORLD WIDE TRADE IS NOW WITH THE PACIFIC AND IS INCREASING AT A FASTER RATE THAN WITH EUROPE. THE WORLD ECONOMIC CENTER OF GRAVITY HAS SHIFTED TO THE PACIFIC. WITH THE INCREASING UTILITY OF ECONOMIC POWER, ONE COULD ARGUE (AS THIS PAPER DOES) THAT THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY IS IN THE PROCESS OF FOLLOWING SUIT.

NOT ONLY IS THE REGION DYNAMIC, IT IS ALSO VAST. THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER COVERS MORE THAN 100 MILLION SQUARE MILES, ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF THE EARTH'S SURFACE. THE DISTANCE FROM SAN DIEGO TO SINGAPORE IS ALMOST 8,000 MILES, FROM THE WEST COAST OF THE U.S. TO JAPAN IS ABOUT 5,000 MILES, AND TO THE PHILIPPINES IS ALMOST 7,000 MILES. FROM THE PHILIPPINES IT IS ANOTHER 3,000 MILES TO DIEGO GARCIA. STEAMING TIMES ARE BETTER REPRESENTED IN TERMS OF WEEKS RATHER THAN DAYS. THESE DISTANCES IMPACT SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND TRADE IN THE REGION. THE IMPACT OF DISTANCE ON U.S. DEFENSE PLANNING HARDLY NEEDS ELABORATION.

FINALLY, THE PACIFIC IS DIVERSE. THE AREA ENCOMPASSES TWO-THIRDS OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION IN 50 COUNTRIES, WITH HUNDREDS OF ETHNIC GROUPS AND THOUSANDS OF LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS. THREE OF THE WORLD'S MAJOR RELIGIONS


IN TERMS OF THE CURRENCY OF WORLD POWER WE ARE SEEING THE BEGINNING OF A SHIFT FROM A FOCUS ON MILITARY POWER TO AN INCREASING FOCUS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER. THE UTILITY OF ARMIES AND MILITARY POWER MAY BE GIVING WAY TO ECONOMIC STRENGTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROWESS. WHILE MILITARY FORCE REMAINS USEFUL, AS THE WAR WITH IRAQ VIVIDLY DEMONSTRATED, OTHER FACTORS ARE BECOMING MORE INFLUENTIAL. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL POWER IS INCREASINGLY REPRESENTED BY INTELLECTUAL AND TECHNICAL ELEMENTS RATHER THAN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE FACTORS. THIS SHIFT FAVORS THE DYNAMIC ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

THE SECOND SHIFT REPRESENTS A MOVE FROM THE CONTINENTAL HEARTLAND VIEW OF SIR HALFORD MACKINDER TO THE MARITIME ORIENTATION OF NICHOLAS SPYKMAN'S RIMLAND THESIS. AGAIN THIS SECOND SHIFT FOCUSES ATTENTION ON THE DYNAMIC ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. THE GEO-POLITICAL CENTER OF THE WORLD IS MOVING FROM MITTELEUROPA AND THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. THE CONTENDERS FOR THIS NEW GEO-POLITICAL, OR PERHAPS GEO-ECONOMIC HEARTLAND, INCLUDE JAPAN, CHINA AND INDIA.

THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC TRADITION OF "EUROPE FIRST" MUST NOW GIVE WAY TO A STRATEGIC APPROACH WHERE THE PACIFIC IS RIGHTLY THE MAIN EFFORT. THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, LONG AN ECONOMY OF FORCE THEATER, MUST NOW BECOME THE FOCUS FOR GREATER U.S. ATTENTION AND RESOURCE EXPENDITURE. THIS WILL HAVE A LONG TERM AND SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE SIZE, STRUCTURE AND POSTURE OF U.S. FORCES.
IN THE REGION.

CHAPTER 2

THE EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

"THE NEW WORLD ORDER IS NOT A FACT--IT IS AN ASPIRATION."¹

GLOBAL TRENDS

ENVISIONING THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OUT TO THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND REQUIRES AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY TRENDS AND A CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ON THESE TRENDS. SUCH AN ANALYSIS IMPLIES A RATIONAL, STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTION OF CURRENT EVENTS EVEN THOUGH HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT EVENTS SELDOM MOVE IN A DIRECT LINE FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME. TREND PROJECTIONS, CONDITIONED BY THE UNEXPECTED WILL RESULT IN A RANGE OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS. THIS RANGE OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS CAN BE NARROWED OR AVERTED BY THE STRATEGIC CHOICES U.S. POLICY MAKERS SELECT NOW AND IN THE NEXT DECADE.


AS THE DECADE OF THE 1990's OPENS, CHANGES ARE EMERGING THAT WILL CONDITION THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. SOME INFORMED OBSERVERS HAVE CATEGORIZED THE TOTALITY OF THESE RAPID AND FAR REACHING CHANGES AS REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE OR A "PARADIGM SHIFT."² A PARADIGM SHIFT IS A DRAMATIC CHANGE THAT REQUIRES ORGANIZATIONS MAKE ADAPTIVE EFFORTS TO COMPENSATE FOR


² MICHAEL VLAHOS, OP. CIT., P. 169.
A SHIFTING REALITY. THIS REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE MAKES FAMILIAR STRATEGIC LANGUAGE, CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL CODES OBSOLETE.

STRATEGIC TRENDS

CONSTRUCTING A STRATEGIC VISION, ASSESSING THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT, AND ENGAGING IN FORCE PLANNING FOR A DECADE AND MORE INTO THE FUTURE WOULD BE DIFFICULT IN THE BEST OF TIMES. DOING SO IN THE MIDST OF A PARADIGM SHIFT IS NOT ONLY DIFFICULT, BUT RISKY. NEVERTHELESS, THESE TASKS MUST BE TACKLED IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS A VISION OF THE PROBABLE FUTURE THAT IS CONGRUENT WITH REALITY AND THAT U.S. POLICY MAKERS HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL TO BRING THAT VISION ABOUT.


AS REGIONAL POWERS GROW IN STRENGTH AND THE THREAT OF GLOBAL WAR FADES NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE INFLUENCE THAT PREVIOUSLY CHARACTERIZED THEIR COLD WAR LEADERSHIP. FORMER CLIENTS AND ALLIES MAY FEEL FREE TO FOLLOW THE DICTATES OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND REGIONAL POWERS WILL MOVE TO FILL THE VACUUM CREATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE.4 HOWEVER, AS THE WORLD LEADER IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY ARENAS, THE UNITED STATES STILL REMAINS THE ONLY COMPLETE SUPERPOWER. OTHER NATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE U.S. TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP WHEN A CRISIS CONFRONTS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

SOVIET DECLINE: THIS DECLINE OF SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE, HOWEVER, HAS NOT BEEN SYMMETRICAL. THE SOVIET UNION’S INFLUENCE WITHIN ITS OWN BLOCK AND THE

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WORLD IN GENERAL, HAS DECLINED MUCH MORE THAN THAT OF THE U.S. WHILE THE SOVIET'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER HAVE ATROPHIED APPRECIABLY, ITS MILITARY STRENGTH HAS NOT. MILITARILY THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS THE SOLE POWER IN THE WORLD CAPABLE OF DESTROYING THE UNITED STATES.  


ECONOMIC POWER: A COROLLARY TO THE DECLINE OF SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE IS THE INCREASING UTILITY OF THE ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER. IN THE GLOBAL SENSE, ECONOMIC POWER IS MEASURED IN THE CAPITAL AND GOODS THAT A NATION IS ABLE TO EMPLOY ABROAD AND IN MARKET CAPACITY THAT CAN BE OPENED UP TO OUTSIDE TRADE.  

THE RISE IN THE UTILITY OF ECONOMIC POWER IS A TWO EDGED SWORD: IT CAN INCLUDE COOPERATIVE INTERDEPENDENCE AS WELL AS GREATER POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC CONFLICT. IRONICALLY, ECONOMICALLY DRIVEN CONFLICT POTENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES MAY BE GREATER WITH PRESENT FRIENDS AND ALLIES THAN WITH HISTORIC COLD WAR ADVERSARIES. IN FACT IT IS THE FEAR OF TRADE CONFLICT,
PROTECTIONISM, THIRD WORLD DEBT, AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC RUIN THAT MAY PROVIDE THE RATIONALE NOT ONLY FOR CONFLICT, BUT ALSO FOR MAINTAINING OR DEVELOPING NEW FORMS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND ALLIANCE STRUCTURES.⁸

While economic interdependence implies a decline in the potential for conflict, some observers doubt the ability of interdependence to overcome the historic conditions that have made conflict an integral part of international relations. These observers maintain that economic relations are being driven by geo-economics which is the pursuit of domination, prestige, and control through the use of economic means.⁹

It may be that the industrialized nations can establish a cooperative international structure based on economic interdependence, and that this structure will overcome the enduring tendencies toward interstate conflict. However, a trend is developing among the western powers toward geo-economic behavior wherein the logic of conflict is governed by the grammar of commerce.¹⁰ Unlike interdependence, geo-economic behavior can be a conflictual relationship carried on by non-military means.

Between the Western powers and the developing world a very different picture arises. For the foreseeable future the logic of conflict will continue to be ruled, as it has since the time of Thucydides, by the Periclean view of the not always rational grammar of force. The millennium implied by the end of history theme proposed by Francis Fukuyama has still not arrived. The third world is still very much mired in conflictual relationships and will so for many years to come.¹¹

**SHIFTING ECONOMIC CENTER OF GRAVITY:** No matter what direction economic relations take during the transition period, the global economic center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific basin. Evolving trends point to the vibrant economies of the Pacific as the prime contenders for the economic

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¹⁰ EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, *IBID*, P. 17.


DECLINING UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER: ALONG WITH THE TREND TOWARD THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER IS THE PURPORTED DECLINE IN THE UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER. NOT ONLY IS ECONOMICS DRIVING THIS CHANGE, BUT THE FACTORS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SHIFTS, WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES, AND THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS ARE ALSO KEY PARTS OF THE EQUATION. WHILE THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS BY NO MEANS INEFFECTIVE OR OBSOLETE, ITS USE HAS BECOME MORE COSTLY AND LESS TRANSFERABLE THAN IN EARLIER TIMES.13

COALITION INSTABILITY: THE DECLINE OF SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE, THE INCREASE OF ECONOMIC INFLUENCE, AND THE LACK OF A CLEAR MILITARY THREAT, ALL COMBINE TO BRING ON A CONDITION OF INCREASING COALITION INSTABILITY. DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE COALITIONS WILL BECOME MORE DIFFICULT AND THUS WILL REQUIRE MORE INTENSIVE EFFORTS ON THE PART OF U.S. POLICY MAKERS. COALITIONS WILL TEND TO BE AD HOC ORGANIZATIONS THAT COALESCE AROUND TEMPORARY ISSUES. FIRM LEADERSHIP BY THE UNITED STATES WILL BE THE NECESSARY INGREDIENT FOR COALITION STABILITY.


CONTAINING AS MANY AS SIX POINTS (U.S., SOVIET UNION, EUROPE, JAPAN, CHINA, AND INDIA), THIS MULTIPOLAR WORLD IS INHERENTLY LESS STABLE THAN THE FAMILIAR BIPOLAR WORLD. ONE REASON FOR THIS INSTABILITY IS THAT THE POLES WILL HAVE DIFFERENT CURRENCIES OF POWER. IT APPEARS THAT THIS EVOLVING MULTIPOLAR WORLD CONTAINS TWO SUBSETS OF STATES. ONE SUBSET IS BASED MORE ON MILITARY POWER, THE OTHER MORE ON ECONOMIC POWER.

THE RISE OF REGIONAL HEGEMONS: ANOTHER CONTRIBUTOR TO INCREASING INSTABILITY OF A MULTIPOLAR SYSTEM IS THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY POWER ASSOCIATED WITH THE RISE OF REGIONAL HEGEMONS. PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP INCLUDE INDIA, CHINA, JAPAN, GERMANY, IRAQ, IRAN, BRAZIL AND PERHAPS A UNIFIED KOREA. FEW OF THESE POWERS CAN BE CLASSIFIED AS SATISFIED POWERS. THIS FRAGILE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM MAY BE A PRIME BREEDING GROUND FOR THE RISE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND THE RESURGENCE OF HISTORIC ANTAGONISMS.

PROLIFERATION: COMPETITION BETWEEN THESE REGIONAL HEGEMONS HAS GREATER POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR GLOBAL STABILITY DUE TO THE PROLIFERATION OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. BY THE YEAR 2000 SOME 15 NATIONS WILL HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY, ABOUT 40 WILL POSSESS THE TECHNICAL ABILITY TO MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 30 WILL HAVE AN OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL CAPABILITY, AND SOME 20 NATIONS WILL HAVE DEVELOPED A BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY. ADDITIONALLY, A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WILL HAVE DEVELOPED RELATIVELY CAPABLE INDIGENOUS ARMS INDUSTRIES.

CONFLICT INTENSITY: THE SPREAD OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MAY BE EVEN MORE DESTABILIZING AS THE USE OF THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPONS IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED RESTRICTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF ARMS FOUND IN POTENTIAL REGIONAL CONFLICT AREAS GIVE MANY REGIONAL POWERS THE ABILITY TO

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PROJECT MILITARY FORCE FAR BEYOND THEIR BORDERS. THIS ALL ADDS UP TO THE FACT THAT WARS OF MID-INTENSITY MAY COME TO DOMINATE THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM. INTERSTATE CONFLICT AS WELL AS CONFLICT RESULTING FROM TRANSNATIONAL SOURCES WILL Seldom BE LOW IN INTENSITY. THOMAS ETTZOLD SAYs IT WELL:

"MIDDLE AND LOW INTENSITY WARS WILL BE COSTLY AND RISKY, NOT CHEAP, ESPECIALLY AS U.S. FORCES CONTRACT, SYSTEMS COSTS RISE, AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ACQUIRE BETTER WEAPONS. IN THIS SENSE THERE MAY BE NO SUCH THING AS A "SMALL WAR"." THE COMBINATION OF REGIONAL HEGEMONS AND THE SPREAD OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY REPRESENT THE MAJOR EMERGING THREAT TO WORLD SECURITY IN THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS: DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS THAT COULD IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FALL INTO THREE CATEGORIES. THE FIRST IS A SERIES OF MIGRATION SHIFTS THAT COULD SEE MOVEMENTS FROM SOUTH TO NORTH OR MORE SPECIFICALLY FROM LOW GROWTH AREAS TO PROXIMATE HIGH GROWTH AREAS. SECOND, IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF YOUTH BULGES IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. HISTORICALLY, YOUTH BULGES HAVE HAD A HIGH CORRELATION WITH THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT. THIRD, IS THE RAPID URBANIZATION OF MAJOR METROPOLITAN COMPLEXES OF WHICH MEXICO CITY, SEOUL, AND BOMBAY ARE PRIME EXAMPLES. STRETCHING MANAGERIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO THE LIMITS, THESE CONURBATIONS ARE BREEDING GROUNDS FOR ALL MANNER OF SOCIAL UNREST.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: AS POWER BLOCKS AND COALITIONS LOSE THEIR UTILITY AND AS ECONOMICS INCREASES IN IMPORTANCE, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MAY BECOME MORE INFLUENTIAL. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE DEFEAT OF IRAQ MAY INVIGORATE THIS MUCH MALIGNED INSTITUTION. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RESULTED IN SURPRISINGLY EFFECTIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

17 GEOFFREY KEMP, OP. CIT., P.37.


SANCTIONS CULMINATING IN A RESOLUTION TO USE WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY TO GET IRAQ TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT), THE WORLD BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), WHICH FOCUS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, ARE NOW ATTRACTING GREAT INTEREST AND ACCRUING NEW INFLUENCE AS NATIONS SEEK TO IMPROVE THEIR ECONOMIC STANDING.

CULTURE AREAS: WHILE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ESPECIALLY COMMUNICATIONS, ARE BRINGING THE WORLD CLOSER TOGETHER, THE GLOBAL VILLAGE REMAINS A LONG TERM PROSPECT. IN THE NEAR TERM, BRINGING DIVERSE CULTURE AREAS CLOSER TOGETHER INSURES THAT GLOBALIZATION WILL NOT BE A QUICK OR PEACEFUL PROCESS. CLASHING CULTURE AREAS WHICH EXACERBATE ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS DISPARITIES, RESURGENT NATIONALISM, AND RACIAL AND ETHNIC ANTAGONISMS, POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO A STABLE AND PEACEFUL WORLD ORDER.

DECLINING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY: THE DISSOLUTION OF THE RESTRAINTS OF THE OLD ORDER WILL IMPACT ON THE DOMESTIC CHARACTER OF NATION STATES AS WELL AS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE RISE OF NATIONAL, ETHNIC, TRIBAL, AND RELIGIOUS FEELINGS COMBINED WITH INCREASING EXPECTATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOWS AND GENERAL SOCIAL DISCONTENT WILL COMPLICATE THE CONTROL OF DOMESTIC POPULATIONS. AS PROBLEMS INCREASE IN VARIETY, COMPLEXITY AND SCALE, GOVERNMENTS WILL FIND IT MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE AND GOVERN EFFECTIVELY. THIS CONDITION OF UNGOVERNABILITY WILL ADD TO THE CLIMATE OF GLOBAL INSTABILITY.

EMPIRE FRAGMENTATION: ANOTHER RESULT OF CULTURE AREAS AND RESURGENT NATIONALISM WILL BE EMPIRE FRAGMENTATION. NATIONS WHICH ARE ARTIFICIAL COMMUNITIES OF DISPARATE ETHNIC GROUPS WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN UNITY. THE SOVIET UNION, INDIA, CHINA, CANADA, AND YUGOSLAVIA ARE CANDIDATES LIKELY TO BE SUBJECT TO THE PULL OF CENTRIFUGAL FORCES. HISTORICALLY, PERIODS OF EMPIRE FRAGMENTATION HAVE BEEN MARKED BY PERIODS OF GREAT INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PACE OF SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT AND

21 FOR A DEFINITION OF CULTURE AREAS SEE: MICHAEL VLAHOS, THINKING ABOUT WORLD CHANGE. (WASHINGTON: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1990), P. 159.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD AT AN INCREDIBLE RATE. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE DOUBLES EVERY DECADE, GENERAL TECHNOLOGY IS OBSOLETE IN 5-7 YEARS WHILE IN ELECTRONICS IT IS 2-3 YEARS. TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES IN THE AREAS OF COMPUTERS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS, BIOTECHNOLOGY, ADVANCED MATERIALS, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS WILL BE ESPECIALLY CRITICAL IN THE COMING DECADE.

TECHNOLOGY WILL AFFECT MILITARY STATUS ON TWO LEVELS. AT THE UPPER TECHNOLOGY LEVEL, ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY WILL CAUSE A GREATER SEPARATION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. ADVANCED SYSTEMS SUCH AS ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSES, PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS, LOW-OBSERVABLE AIRCRAFT, DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS, SPACE BASED COMMUNICATIONS, LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE AND OFFENSIVE STRIKE PLATFORMS, AND A HOST OF SOPHISTICATED NON-LETHAL WEAPONS WILL LEAD TO GREATER ASYMMETRIES AMONG NATIONS OF THE WORLD. THE U.S. LED COALITION THAT DEFEATED IRAQ IN 1991 VIVIDLY DEMONSTRATED THIS PHENOMENON. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WHILE MANY STATES POSSES SOME HIGH TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS, FEW STATES HAVE THE MANAGERIAL SKILLS OR EXPERIENCE TO PROPERLY UTILIZE, LET ALONE MAXIMIZE, THE POTENTIAL SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS OF THESE WEAPONS.

AT THE LOWER LEVELS, THE TECHNOLOGY FOR LESS SOPHISTICATED, BUT EFFECTIVE WEAPONS, WILL SPREAD IN GREATER NUMBERS TO A MUCH WIDER NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS. TECHNOLOGY MAY WELL ENCOURAGE A GLOBAL SPIRIT BY MAKING THE WORLD SMALLER BUT, IT ALSO MAKES IT DEADLIER.

THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY: THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY IS A POSITIVE TREND THAT REFLECTS THE ATTRACTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE. DEMOCRACY STILL HAS SHALLOW ROOTS IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, BUT AUTOCRACY IS IN RETREAT EVERYWHERE. THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO WORK THROUGH THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CULTURE AREAS. DUE TO A SHARED SYSTEM OF BELIEFS AND VALUES LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES HAVE SELDOM ENGAGED IN MUTUAL ARMED

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23 WILLIAM VAN DUSEN WISHARD, "WHAT IN THE WORLD IS GOING ON?" VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, MARCH 1, 1990. P.312.


CONFLICT. This may be encouraging but, it is worth noting that history is not linear and, more to the point, progress is far from automatic. Additionally, the seeds of economic conflict may find the fields of the liberal democracies to be quite fertile.

**Transnational Issues:** Transnational issues that threaten the security of the United States and that have the potential for conflict include terrorism, narcotics flow, trade wars, and environmental degradation. These issues are not necessarily susceptible to resolution by the application of military power. A comprehensive approach including military, economic, diplomatic and informational instruments will be necessary to combat transnational threats.

**Global Security Environment to the Year 2000 and Beyond**

While the above list of trends is not exhaustive it outlines the main forces which will shape the global security environment and the U.S. national security strategy for the next decade or two. The next ten to twenty years will be a critical period as the international structure transitions from the Cold War bipolar arrangements to a multipolar world in which economics, for better or worse, may play a larger role in shaping the strategic environment. This transitional period will present great opportunities as well as great risks to U.S. policy makers. Seizing the opportunities will require a proactive approach balanced by a recognition of the limits of U.S. power. Risk is inherent in transitional periods as historical animosities combine with new sources of conflict to produce a potentially turbulent world. Although global war increasingly appears to be a remote possibility, the potential for regionally based conflict is likely to increase.

A portion of regionally based conflict will increasingly be brought about by economic causes. As previously noted, economics can be a source of cooperative interdependence or it can be a wellspring of conflict laden relationships. Far sighted diplomacy and open reciprocal trade and commercial activities, set in a stable environment, supported by engaged

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MILITARY POWER ARE THE BASIC STRUCTURES OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER.

IN TERMS OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WILL DEVELOP INTO A BIFURCATED STRUCTURE WITH DEVELOPED NATIONS OF THE WEST AT ONE LEVEL AND LESS DEVELOPED SOUTHERN OR EASTERN NATIONS AT ANOTHER LEVEL. THESE SHIFTING GROUPS MAY BE CATEGORIZED BY DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL CHARACTER, ECONOMIC STATUS, GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, CULTURAL DIVERSITY, AND STRATEGIC MATURITY. IN THIS BIFURCATED GLOBAL STRUCTURE, ONE GROUP OF NATIONS FINDS FORCE TO BE OF DECLINING UTILITY IN RESOLVING INTERSTATE ISSUES WHILE THE OTHER GROUP BELIEVES THAT FORCE REMAINS THE KEY ELEMENT OF STATE POWER.

THE ADVANCES OF TECHNOLOGY AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION WILL ENSURE THAT CONFLICT WILL BE LETHAL, RISKY, AND SOMETHING MORE INVOLVED THAN THE POPULAR TERM "LOW INTENSITY WARFARE" WOULD IMPLY. "SPLENDID LITTLE WARS" MAY OCCUR, BUT THE THREAT OF MID-INTENSITY CONFLICT, WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE IN A WIDE VARIETY OF GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS, LOOMS LARGE ON THE HORIZON. ADDITIONALLY, RESPONSE TIME TO THESE CONFLICTS MAY BE VERY LIMITED AND OUTCOMES MAY BE REACHED RAPIDLY. EFFECTIVE U.S. REACTION TO THREATS TO GLOBAL STABILITY WILL RELY ON A SOLID FOUNDATION OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT, APPROPRIATE STRATEGY, ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, BALANCED DEPLOYABILITY, AND WELL TRAINED MANPOWER.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNERS WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO RELY ON A SINGLE, FIXED, AND OVERWHENMING THREAT TO SERVE AS THE FOCAL POINT FOR CONCEPT AND ACTION. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN A COMPLEX MULTIPOLAR WORLD WILL BE SHAPED BY NEW FOCAL POINTS SUCH AS NATIONAL INTERESTS, THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF GLOBAL STABILITY, AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF PEACETIME ACTIVITIES. IN THIS AMBIGUOUS ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY WILL EXIST CONCERNING THE TIME, PLACE AND INTENSITY OF THREATS. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A CONSISTENT SECURITY STRATEGY, JUSTIFYING FUNDING FOR FORCE STRUCTURE, AND MAINTAINING COALITIONS WILL BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT.

THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN GLOBAL STABILITY AND SHAPE A WORLD ORDER COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. LONG TERM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. WHILE THE UNITED STATES WILL BE THE ONLY COMPLETE SUPERPOWER, TRANSLATING THAT POWER INTO INFLUENCE WILL BE MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT. IN RESPONSE TO FUTURE SECURITY THREATS THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER STATES, COALITIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THESE "OTHERS" WILL HAVE TO SHARE BOTH THE COSTS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUCH ACTIONS. U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP WILL REQUIRE A 
HEALTHY ECONOMY, DOMESTIC STABILITY, A THOUGHTFUL COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY 
STRATEGY, AND A CAPABLE MILITARY INSTRUMENT. IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER 
ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER THE USE OF FORCE BY THE U.S. AND WESTERN NATIONS 
WILL REQUIRE EXTENSIVE JUSTIFICATION, MULTILATERAL EFFORTS AND DISCRIMINATE 
APPLICATION.

THE IMPACT OF DISCONTINUITIES

DISCONTINUITIES ARE EVENTS WHICH DISLOCATE CURRENT TRENDS AND PRESENT 
NEW AND UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS. DISCONTINUITIES CREATE A CHAOTIC ENVIRONMENT 
IN WHICH EXISTING CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND INSTRUMENTS ARE Seldom APPROPRIATE. 
The following is a partial list of plausible discontinuities:

- GLOBAL ECONOMIC COLLAPSE COULD COME ABOUT FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS 
AND WOULD WREAK HAVOC ON THE EMERGING INTERDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL ORDER. 
A SIGNIFICANT DEPRESSION COULD LEAD TO REACTION, DESPAIR, LEADERSHIP CHANGES, 
RELIANCE ON TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND RESURGENT MILITARISM.

- REVIVAL OF SOVIET POWER MIGHT COME ABOUT AS A RESULT OF A LEADERSHIP 
CHANGE OR THROUGH THE SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OF THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP TO REFORM 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS. IF REFORM FAILS, THE SOVIET UNION COULD 
CONTRACT, CONSOLIDATE ITS POWER, AND THEN BEGIN TO EXPAND ONCE AGAIN. THE U.S. 
MUST CONSTRUCT AN INSURANCE POLICY FOR SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.

- A U.S. RETURN TO ISOLATIONISM COULD RESULT IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF 
AMERICAN INFLUENCE FROM THE GLOBAL SCENE. THIS WOULD INHIBIT THE ABILITY OF 
U.S. POLICY MAKERS TO SHAPE INTERNATIONAL EVENTS IN WAYS BENEFICIAL TO 
AMERICAN INTERESTS AND GLOBAL STABILITY. WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. INFLUENCE FROM 
THE GLOBAL ARENA WOULD INTERJECT A GREAT DEAL OF UNCERTAINTY INTO THE 
EVOLVING PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

- TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS MAY CAUSE AN UNEXPECTED LOSS OF U.S. 
LEADERSHIP OR SUPREMACY IN SPECIFIC REALMS WHICH COULD TILT THE ECONOMIC OR 
MILITARY BALANCE OUT OF U.S. FAVOR.

- JAPANESE OR GERMAN RETURN TO MILITARISM MIGHT WELL COME ABOUT AS A 
RESULT OF SOME OF THE OTHER DISCONTINUITIES. WHATEVER THE CAUSE, THE IMPACT
COULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR REGIONAL AND WORLD STABILITY.

- NUCLEAR CONFLICT COULD UNLEASH THE NUCLEAR GENIE AND CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO A GLOBAL POWER SHIFT AND A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. SUCH AN EVENT COULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE LEGITIMIZATION OF OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

UNFORESEEN EVENTS COMPLICATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY AND THE CONDUCT OF FORCE PLANNING. THE OTHER DISCONTINUITIES PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED CAN BE ROUGHLY ENVISIONED, THUS REDUCING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF SURPRISE. UNFORESEEN EVENTS CAUSE COMPLETE SURPRISE AND CAN RESULT IN A TOTAL LACK OF INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL PREPARATION. THE POTENTIAL FOR THE RISE OF SUCH CONDITIONS IN THE TRANSITION ERA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT REQUIRES FLEXIBLE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, A PREMIUM ON INFORMED DECISION MAKING, RAPID REACTION, AND OVERWHELMING POWER DISCRIMINATELY APPLIED.

ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF DISCONTINUITIES IS TO REDUCE THE SCOPE OF UNCERTAINTY BY A STRUCTURING OF THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH A PROACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY. NOT A PANACEA, A PROACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY SEeks TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN STABILITY, INCREASE U.S. ACCESS AND INFLUENCE, AND IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THROUGHOUT THE GLOBE. THIS POLICY REQUIRES A MILITARY FORCE THAT IS FLEXIBLY ORGANIZED, THAT MAINTAINS A HIGH LEVEL OF FORWARD PRESENCE IN KEY REGIONS, AND THAT CAN OPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN A WIDE VARIETY OF ENVIRONMENTS.
CHAPTER 3

"OUR FUTURE HISTORY WILL BE MORE DETERMINED BY OUR POSITION ON THE PACIFIC FACING CHINA THAN BY OUR POSITION ON THE ATLANTIC FACING EUROPE."¹

PACIFIC REGIONAL TRENDS


POWER STRUCTURE: THE DECLINE OF SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE AND THE INCREASE IN ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION HAVE COMBINED TO SET THE STAGE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL POWERS IN AN ASYMMETRICAL MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE. THESE ASPIRING POWERS MAY BE CATEGORIZED AS BEING ON ONE OF TWO LEVELS. ON THE FIRST LEVEL ARE NATIONS THAT MAY HAVE THE DESIRE, AND BY THE YEAR 2000, THE POTENTIAL TO DOMINATE REGIONAL EVENTS AND TO FILL ANY VACUUM CREATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE. JAPAN, CHINA AND INDIA ARE INCLUDED IN THIS CATEGORY. ON THE SECOND LEVEL ARE NATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE THE DESIRE, BUT NOT THE CAPABILITY, TO DOMINATE REGIONAL EVENTS. SOUTH KOREA (A UNIFIED KOREA COULD BE PLACED IN THE FIRST LEVEL), INDONESIA, TAIWAN, AND POSSIBLY VIETNAM CONSTITUTE THIS SECOND LEVEL.

ECONOMIC DYNAMISM: AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, THE ASIA-PACIFIC ARENA IS THE WORLD'S MOST ECONOMICALLY DYNAMIC REGION. DURING THE 1980's ASIA'S ECONOMIC


INCREASING ASIAN DYNAMISM HAS RESULTED IN A NEW FOUND SELF-CONFIDENCE BACKED UP BY THE MEANS FOR PRACTICAL ACTION. THIS DYNAMISM IS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT MANY OF THE LEADING ACTORS IN THE REGION STILL HAVE POLITICAL CULTURES AND EXPERIENCES IN WHICH FORCE PLAYS A CENTRAL ROLE IN BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES. THE SIMULTANEOUS DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG AND GROWING SENSE OF THEIR ECONOMIC PRIMACY AND THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON THE PART OF THE NATIONS IN THE REGION REPRESENTS A POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING SITUATION.

MUCH OF THE SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION HAS RESULTED FROM THE INCREASING OPENNESS OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK. THIS HAS LED TO THE DRAMATIC EXPANSION OF INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT FLOWS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, STRONGER REGIONAL LINKAGES. THE PRIMARY INSTITUTIONAL MANIFESTATION OF THESE LINKAGES IS THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC), WHICH CONSISTS OF THE ASEAN NATIONS, JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES. MEMBERSHIPS FOR CHINA, HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN ARE CURRENTLY PENDING. THE STATED PURPOSE OF THIS ORGANIZATION IS TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COOPERATION BASED ON FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES.

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COMMUNITY, THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IS MOVING TOWARD STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT MAY FACILITATE CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INTEGRATION.

ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION: THERE ARE OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION THAT DO NOT BODE WELL FOR REGIONAL STABILITY. AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY CAN BE A TWO-EDGED SWORD. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WHEN THE ACQUISITION OF ECONOMIC POWER IS REGARDED MORE AS AN ACCOUTREMENT OF GREAT POWER STATUS THAN AS A MEANS TO ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. IN THIS GEO-ECONOMIC SENSE, THE OBJECT OF COMMERCE IS NOT PROFIT, BUT STATE POWER AND PRESTIGE. PROFIT BASED COMMERCE CAN BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, BUT GEO-ECONOMICS, WHICH THRIVES ON THE LOGIC OF CONFLICT, IS A ZERO SUM GAME.6 THUS, WHILE POSITIVE POLITICAL LINKAGES CAN DEVELOP AS A RESULT OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, CONFLICT IS ALSO INHERENT IN SUCH RELATIONSHIPS. SHINTARO ISHIHARA HAS PREDICTED THAT "THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WILL BE A CENTURY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE." AS ONE HIGHLY REGARDED STUDY PUTS IT:

"... WHILE LEADERS IN THE REGION GENERALLY ASSERT A COMMITMENT TO AN OPEN GLOBAL TRADING REGIME, ONE OF THE CLEarest FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY IS THAT IN PRACTICE EACH STATE ADHERES TO DOMESTIC AND NATIONAL GOALS THAT ARE FUNDAMENTALLY IN CONFLICT WITH THAT ASSERTION."7

IN THE PACIFIC, SUCH GEO-ECONOMIC CONFLICT COULD EASILY SURFACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.8


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6 EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, "OP. CIT." P. 18.

7 BERNARD K. GORDON, OP. CIT., P. 31.

FOR STABILITY AND PEACE.9


ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO COMPARE MANPOWER INTENSIVE LAND FORCES TO EQUIPMENT INTENSIVE NAVAL FORCES SUCH COMPARISONS ARE REVEALING AS TO THE MILITARY FOCUS OF A STATE. AS A BENCHMARK, THE U.S. LAND TO NAVAL FORCE MANPOWER RATIO IS 1.3:1 AND WILL BE CLOSE TO 1:1 IF THE SECDEF’S PRESENTLY PLANNED REDUCTIONS FOR 1995 ARE REACHED. IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION THREE NATIONS HAVE NO NAVAL FORCES, SEVEN NATIONS HAVE A LAND TO NAVAL FORCE RATIO OF 20:1 OR GREATER, SIX A RATIO OF 10:1 OR GREATER, SEVEN A RATIO OF 4:1 OR GREATER, AND

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THREE A RATIO OF 2:1. Additionally, many of the governments of the Asia-Pacific nations rely very heavily on land forces for regime support and internal stability. A number of countries in the region are controlled by retired or active army leaders and in general the national strategic culture is land oriented. In such cases the opportunity and responsibility for maintaining U.S. access and influence falls mainly on the U.S. Army.

Nevertheless, some powers in the Asia-Pacific region increasingly see confrontation and national interest concerns from an maritime perspective. Some analysts contend that the locus of confrontation in the region is moving from the land arena to the oceanic theater. For purposes of defense, securing national interests, and acquiring the prestige associated with a regional power, trends indicate that naval forces are becoming a more important requirement, with air forces following close behind. Naval and air forces have the advantage of being highly visible and capable of force projection. It should come as no surprise that six of the world's ten largest naval forces (ranked by tonnage) belong to Asia-Pacific powers.

The high levels and the importance of the flow of natural resources and trade in the region, and the reliance on sea lines of communication (SLOCs), reinforce the trends toward increased naval and air power. Additionally many nations see the ocean areas as a source of natural resources and food products to supply and feed their growing populations. For the past decade there has been a greater focus on regional naval arms procurement and acquisition. The trends in the growth of regional navies, such as the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese forces, are attracting particular attention.

THE MILITARY BALANCE, OP.CIT., PP. 145-179.


REGIONAL TENSION: While many long term trends point to an increase in Asia-Pacific regional tension, in the short term is declining. The continued decline of regional tension depends in large part on the role of the U.S. The end of the Cold War and the reduction in U.S.-Soviet rivalry has been a prime factor in this change. The reduced influence of ideology has contributed to the decline in regional tensions as has the focus by states in the region on internal development and improved economic status.

The ripple effect of the Soviet policy of glasnost has led to the softening in the Vietnamese approach to Kampuchea and an opening to a possible solution to that bloody problem. The more moderate Soviet policy and the retrenchment of Soviet economic aid has also led the Vietnamese to a greater willingness to participate in the economic and political intercourse of the region. Soviet overtures to Japan have begun to produce positive results in anticipation of a Soviet agreement to return the "Northern Territories." Waf.m Soviet relations with South Korea, unthinkable just a few years ago, have moved rapidly resulting in the establishment of diplomatic relations in September of 1990. Sino-Soviet relations have improved to the point where trade has increased dramatically, force reductions have occurred along the common border, and the sale of military equipment is being seriously negotiated.

Combined with the above actions, Soviet military reductions in naval forces and operations tempos have also led to increased optimism vis-a-vis Soviet intentions in the region. While the Soviets are not withdrawing from the Pacific and will continue to be an important player in the area, they appear to have abandoned their rigid and intimidating style. The emerging broad trend has been to reduce military presence, to limit alliance ties, to integrate into the region's market economies, and to cooperate with regional states to defuse tensions. Soviet cooperation with its previous adversary the United States, is one of the prime characteristics of the new world order.


COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. ON THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT MUST GIVE SOVIET ALLIES IN THE REGION, NAMELY NORTH KOREA AND VIETNAM, PAUSE FOR CONCERN.


SOURCES OF INCREASING TENSION: FROM THE ABOVE DISCUSSION IT IS CLEAR THAT EVEN WHILE TENSION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION IS DECREASING ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS, SOME NATIONS ARE MOVING TO INSURE THEIR APPROPRIATE PLACE IN THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL POWER LINE UP. THUS, MANY POWERS ARE IMPROVING THEIR CAPABILITIES TO PROJECT THEIR MILITARY POWER FAR FROM THEIR BORDERS AND SHORES. EVEN A CURSORY REVIEW OF THE EMERGING POWERS IN THE REGION DEMONSTRATES THE EXTENT OF THESE IMPROVING CAPABILITIES.

A NUMBER OF FACTORS WILL TEND TO LIMIT THE REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. ONGOING CONFLICTS, THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER, AND HISTORIC ANIMOSITIES POSE DISTINCT BARRIERS TO INCREASED DETENTE. THE MAJOR INHIBITOR TO DETENTE, HOWEVER, IS TO BE FOUND IN THE CULTURAL

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19 BRADLEY HAHN, OP. CIT., PP. 8 AND 11.

ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH MAY LIMIT THE RELAXATION OF TENSION IS THE CHARACTER OF REGIONAL POLITICAL REGIMES. WHILE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE WERE FALLING IN RAPID SUCCESSION IN 1989 AND 1990, NO SUCH TRENDS WAS APPARENT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION. COMMUNIST AND NEO-AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS SOLIDLY MAINTAINED THEIR HARD LINE POSITIONS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, EVEN THE MORE DEMOCRATIC STATES OF THE REGION CAN HARDLY BE CONSIDERED IN A CLASS WITH THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY IS MAKING UNDENIABLE PROGRESS IN THE REGION, BUT NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM CONTINUES TO BE NOT ONLY POPULAR IN SOME SOCIETIES, BUT ALSO EFFECTIVE. MOREOVER, SETBACKS TO DEMOCRATIZATION SUCH AS THE ANTI-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT FOLLOWING THE TIANANMEN INCIDENT IN CHINA, CONTINUE TO LOOM MENACINGLY IN THE BACKGROUND.

MAJOR REGIONAL POWERS

JAPAN: AS A LEADING ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER, JAPAN'S MILITARY POTENTIAL EXCEEDS THAT OF ANY OTHER ASIA-PACIFIC NATION. WITH THE WORLD'S THIRD LARGEST DEFENSE BUDGET AND SIXTH LARGEST ARMED FORCE, JAPAN IS NOT ONLY A LEADING MILITARY POWER IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, BUT IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES, JAPAN COULD WELL BE A GLOBAL POWER. JAPAN HAS MORE MAJOR SURFACE WARSHIPS THAN THE UNITED KINGDOM, TWICE AS MANY

20 MICHAEL VLAHOS, OP.CIT., P. 162.

DESTROYERS, FOUR TIMES AS MANY P-3C MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT AS THE U.S. HAS IN THE FAR EAST, AND MORE FIRST LINE AIR FORCE FIGHTERS THAN THE U.S. HAS IN EAST ASIA. ADDITIONALLY, THE JAPANESE SELF DEFENSE FORCE IS EQUIPPED WITH HIGH QUALITY, HIGH TECHNOLOGY WEAPON SYSTEMS, MANY OF WHICH ARE PRODUCED BY JAPAN'S OWN MILITARY INDUSTRY.2

THE FOCUS OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUILD UP HAS BEEN THE SOVIET THREAT IN NORTHEAST ASIA. THE BUILD UP WAS LABELED AS A PURELY DEFENSIVE ACTION IN KEEPING WITH JAPAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON OFFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE LINE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY, HOWEVER, IS FUZZY AT BEST. WITH THE CURRENT DECLINE IN THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE RISE OF JAPAN AS A GLOBAL ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER, MANY NATIONS ARE QUESTIONING THE BASIS OF JAPAN'S "DEFENSIVE" SECURITY POLICY. RECENT TRENDS IN WEAPONS ACQUISITION, AND A MORE CONFIDENT APPROACH TO WORLD INVOLVEMENT HAS LED TO THE REAWAKENING OF OLD FEARS OF JAPANESE DOMINATION BY SOME NATIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.2

CHINA: CHINA HAS HISTORICALLY VIEWED ITSELF AS THE PREEMINENT CULTURAL, POLITICAL AND MILITARY POWER IN EAST ASIA. THE MIDDLE KINGDOM COMPLEX WITH ITS ETHNOCENTRIC FOCUS IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE CHINESE WORLD VIEW. IN THIS WORLD VIEW THE INDICATIONS ARE CLEAR THAT CHINA IS NOT, IN THE CLASSIC SENSE, A 'SATISFIED' POWER.24

LACKING THE ECONOMIC POWER OF JAPAN, CHINA HAS, NEVERTHELESS DEVELOPED AN IMPRESSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY. SIZE ALONE MAKES CHINA A SIGNIFICANT REGIONAL PLAYER. STRATEGIC LOCATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY HAS THE POTENTIAL TO MAKE CHINA A KEY PLAYER ON THE GLOBAL SCENE. THE EVOLVING SHAPE OF THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY AND THE ARTICULATION OF AN OFFENSIVELY BASED LOCAL WAR


STRATEGY IS OF GROWING CONCERN TO CHINA'S NEIGHBORS. RECENT INCREASES IN DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS OF 15% FOR 1990 AND 12% FOR 1991 MARK A SIGNIFICANT TURNABOUT IN PRC DEFENSE SPENDING. THE BULK OF THESE INCREASES ARE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN HIGHER EXPENDITURES FOR EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION.

INDIA: THE THIRD EMERGING MILITARY POWER IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER IS INDIA. IN THE CASE OF INDIA, BOTH CAPABILITY AND INTENT TO BE THE DOMINANT POWER IN THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION IS RELATIVELY CLEAR. WITH THE WORLD'S FOURTH LARGEST ARMY AND SEVENTH LARGEST NAVY, INDIA IS WELL DISPOSED TO ACHIEVE ITS SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL OBJECTIVES. THE DIRECTIONS OF INDIAN STRATEGIC PLANNING INDICATE A LARGER REGIONAL OBJECTIVE THAT MAY INCLUDE A MAJOR PORTION OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

ASEAN: EVEN THE ASEAN NATIONS HAVE BEGUN TO IMPROVE THEIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN THE FACE OF PROJECTED U.S. MILITARY REDUCTIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. THIS IMPROVEMENT HAS FOCUSED ON THE ACQUISITION OF HIGH-TECH DEFENSE SYSTEMS WITH AN ABILITY TO PROJECT POWER BEYOND THEIR SHORES. THE EMPHASIS OF THIS POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY HAS BEEN NAVAL AND AIR SYSTEMS. COMMONLY MENTIONED THREATS WHICH ARE USED TO JUSTIFY THE DEFENSE BUILD-UPS INCLUDE CHINA, JAPAN AND INDIA.

ASIA-PACIFIC DISCONTINUITIES

IN THE DIVERSE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, UNFORSEEN EVENTS HAVE GREAT POTENTIAL TO CREATE UNSTABLE CONDITIONS.

WHILE WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA MAY BE INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY, SUCH


AN EVENTUALITY WOULD HAVE DIRE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES: IT MAY NOT BE EASY TO CONFINE A NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT TO THE PENINSULA.

IN A MORE OPTIMISTIC VEIN, THE PROSPECT OF KOREAN UNIFICATION IS ALSO POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING. WHILE SUCH A PROSPECT WAS UNTHINKABLE AS RECENTLY AS TWO YEARS AGO, SOUTH KOREA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DIPLOMATIC PROGRESS IN THE LAST DECADE HAS SERVED TO ISOLATE NORTH KOREA AND PUSH IT INTO MORE SERIOUS TALKS ON UNIFICATION. KOREAN UNIFICATION WILL BE NEITHER AS EASY NOR AS QUICK AS THE GERMAN CASE. MUCH DEPENDS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION STRUGGLE IN NORTH KOREA. IF SUCCESSION DOES COME IN THE DECADE OF THE 1990S IT WOULD BRING WITH IT THE POTENTIAL OF UPSETTING THE POWER BALANCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA.  

LEADERSHIP OR GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA, NORTH KOREA, INDONESIA, VIETNAM, AND BURMA COULD LEAD TO GREATER INTERNAL INSTABILITY AND A MORE BELLIGERENT FOREIGN POLICY. A LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN NORTH KOREA HAS THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY. THE SITUATION IN CHINA IS NOT AS BLEAK, BUT THE DEATH OF DENG XIAOPING AND A HANDFUL OF OCTOGENARIANS COULD RADICALLY ALTER THE CHINESE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE.

BECAUSE THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IS SO DEPENDENT ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, A WORLD ECONOMIC RECESSION WOULD HAVE DISASTROUS RESULTS. TRADE BARRIERS, PROTECTIONISM AND NARROW SELF-INTEREST WOULD TEND TO EXACERBATE POTENTIALLY ANTAGONISTIC INTER-STATE RELATIONS. COOPERATIVE INTERDEPENDENT LINKAGES COULD GIVE WAY TO CONFRONTATION AND CONFLICT OVER MARKETS, RESOURCE SUPPLIES, AND TRADE ISSUES. AS ECONOMIES COLLAPSE, INTERNAL STABILITY COULD BE THREATENED IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE REGION. DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY WOULD SUFFER SERIOUS SETBACKS.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE REGION WOULD INCREASE THE LEVEL OF UNCERTAINTY AND ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO CONTENTION AMONG THE LOCAL POWERS TO FILL THE VACUUM.  INDIA, CHINA AND JAPAN WOULD BE THE PRINCIPLE CONTENDERS FOR HEGEMONY IN THE REGION. THE RISE OF A MILITARILY STRONG JAPAN WOULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES GIVEN THE HISTORICAL FEAR OF JAPANESE

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DOMINATION OF THE REGION. CHINESE MOVES TO FILL THE VACUUM WOULD NOT BE LOOKED ON WITH EQUANIMITY BY JAPAN, TAIWAN, INDIA, THE SOVIET UNION, OR THE ASEAN POWERS. INDIAN MOVES WOULD CERTAINLY INCREASE THE APPREHENSION OF CHINA, ASEAN AND EVEN JAPAN. WITHOUT THE U.S. TO BALANCE POWER RELATIONS IN THE REGION, A TURBULENT SITUATION OF ARMS RACES AND CONFRONTATION COULD EASILY DEVELOP.

WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, ESPECIALLY IF IT WERE TO INVOLVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WOULD NOT ONLY BE DISASTROUS FOR THE SUB-CONTINENT, BUT IT COULD ALSO HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO INVOLVE THE U.S., THE SOVIET UNION, AND CHINA. INVOLVEMENT OF THE MUSLIM WORLD COULD NOT BE RULED OUT.

A CHINESE ATTEMPT TO FORCEFULLY REUNIFY WITH TAIWAN WOULD POSE SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES IN LIGHT OF THE CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. JAPANESE AND KOREAN CONCERNS, DUE TO THE EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC TIES WITH TAIWAN, WOULD INEVITABLY HEIGHTEN THE TENSION IN THE REGION.

THESE AND OTHER EVENTS COULD DISRUPT THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AS WELL AS THAT OF THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY. IN TURN WHAT HAPPENS IN ASIA IS OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. WHAT THE U.S. DOES IN ASIA CAN HAVE A VITAL IMPACT ON THE SHAPE OF THE REGION AND ON GLOBAL STABILITY. A LEADING JAPANESE STRATEGIC THINKER PUT IT THIS WAY:

"AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT AND LEADERSHIP ARE INDISPENSABLE TO UNDERTAKINGS AIMED AT REDUCING TENSION AND ENHANCING POLITICAL STABILITY AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, LET ALONE THOSE ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY THERE."

CONCLUSION


THE UNITED STATES MUST CONTINUE TO PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE REGION.

"...WE FACE NEW CHALLENGES NOT ONLY TO OUR SECURITY, BUT TO OUR WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT SECURITY.**1

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES ARE THE FOUNDATIONS ON WHICH THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IS ULTIMATELY BASED. SINCE ISOLATIONISM WAS CAST ASIDE AT PEARL HARBOR ON 7 DECEMBER 1941, THE CORE INTERESTS WHICH HAVE GUIDED U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY HAVE BEEN:

- SURVIVAL OF THE U.S. AS A FREE AND INDEPENDENT NATION
- MAINTENANCE OF A HEALTHY ECONOMY
- DEVELOPMENT OF A STABLE AND SECURE WORLD
- GROWTH OF HUMAN FREEDOM, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND FREE MARKET ECONOMIES
- BUILDING OF HEALTHY ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS.**2


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**1 GEORGE BUSH, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT, P. 7.

POST COLD WAR ERA?

THERE ARE NO SET ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS. SURVIVAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY ARE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTANTS, BUT IN THE TRANSITION ERA THE THREATS TO SURVIVAL MAY INCREASINGLY BE ECONOMIC OR TECHNOLOGICAL IN THEIR ORIENTATION. AS ONE OBSERVER PUT IT, AMERICA MAY HAVE TO LEARN TO OPERATE ON A WORLD STAGE WHERE SUPERCONDUCTORS ARE BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT TO THE BALANCE OF POWER THAN SUPERCARRIERS.


THE PRESIDENT ENVISIONS A "NEW PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS THAT TRANSCENDS THE COLD WAR: A PARTNERSHIP BASED ON CONSULTATION, COOPERATION, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION, ESPECIALLY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS." THIS PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS, UNDER U.S. LEADERSHIP, MUST SEIZE THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY CREATED BY THE END OF THE COLD WAR. ALTHOUGH NATIONS IN THIS GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP ARE EXPECTED TO EQUITABLY SHARE BOTH COSTS AND COMMITMENT IN THE DEFENSE OF COMMON VITAL INTERESTS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN LEADERSHIP.

IN HIS 2 AUGUST 1990 SPEECH TO THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, THE PRESIDENT OUTLINED A PROACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY AS ONE OF THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS OF THIS NEW WORLD VISION. THIS POLICY IS DRIVEN NOT BY THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE U.S.

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4 GEORGE BUSH, "ASPEN SPEECH"; AND CHAPTER 1 ABOVE, PP. 4-5.

5 GEORGE BUSH. "TOWARD A NEW WORLD ORDER," OP. CIT., P.2.

6 GEORGE BUSH. ADDRESS BEFORE THE 45TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. OP. CIT., P. 1498.

7 GEORGE BUSH. "TOWARD A NEW WORLD ORDER," OP. CIT., P. 2.
OR ITS ALLIES, BUT BY ENDURING U.S. INTERESTS AS EFFECTED BY THE PRESSURES OF REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES AND THE NEEDS OF PEACETIME PRESENCE. THIS DEFENSE POLICY, WHICH WILL INFORM A NEW U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY, IMPLIES THAT ONLY AMERICA HAS THE WILL AND CAPABILITY TO LEAD THE WORLD AND TO SHAPE A MORE POSITIVE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. AMERICA MUST BE ENGAGED IN PEACETIME SHAPING THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO ACHIEVE STABILITY, PRECLUDE WAR, OR IF WAR SHOULD OCCUR, SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

THE PROACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY IS THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF GLOBAL STABILITY WHICH INCLUDES POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMPONENTS. THIS POSITIVE AND PROACTIVE POLICY IS MUCH MORE COMPATIBLE WITH TRADITIONAL AMERICAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VALUES AND POLICIES. IN CONTRAST, THE COLD WAR POLICY OF CONTAINMENT, WITH ITS NEGATIVE CHARACTER, WAS OFTEN AT ODDS WITH FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN VALUES AND POLICIES. WITH THE INITIATION OF THIS NEW DEFENSE POLICY A POTENTIAL FOR SYNERGY NOW EXISTS AMONG THE COMPONENTS OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.

A NEW MILITARY STRATEGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY STRATEGY INVOLVES RELATING ENDS TO MEANS. IN THE ERA OF TRANSITION NOT ONLY WILL THREATS AND ENDS BE AMBIGUOUS, AND THUS CARRY LESS URGENCY, BUT CONSTRAINTS ON MEANS WILL BE MORE INTENSE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PROJECTION IS NOT OPTIMISTIC FOR A STRATEGY-BASED APPROACH TO RATIONAL FORCE PLANNING. WITHOUT STRATEGIC GUIDANCE, FORCE PLANNING WILL DEGENERATE TO BUDGET BASED PROGRAMMING. SUCH AN APPROACH TO FORCE PLANNING TENDS TO BE MYOPIC AS IT FOCUSES ON BUREAUCRATIC FACTORS INSTEAD OF STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, EVALUATING RISK IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION IS A PRECARIOUS ACTIVITY. THIS COMBINATION OF INTENSE CONSTRAINTS AND UNRELIABLE RISK ASSESSMENT GIVES RISE TO A DANGEROUS SITUATION FOR RATIONAL FORCE PLANNING. A STRATEGY DRIVEN FORCE PLANNING FRAMEWORK RELYING ON PEACETIME ACTIVITIES MUST BE DEVELOPED TO RATIONALLY PLAN U.S. FORCES. IN TURN, FORCES MUST BE STRUCTURED, POSTURED AND EMPLOYED TO PROVIDE THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY WITH THE CAPABILITY OF SHAPING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO BRING ABOUT THE NEW WORLD ORDER.

THE COMPONENTS OF THE BUSH DEFENSE POLICY ARE DETERRENCE, THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CRISES, FORWARD PRESENCE, AND RECONSTITUTION.

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*MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS, "FORCE PLANNING IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY," STRATEGIC REVIEW, SPRING, 1990, P.*
Although global war is highly unlikely, the potential for regional conflict may have increased in the post-containment world, thus deterrence remains an essential ingredient of U.S. military strategy. Credible deterrence is supported by forward presence and by the capability to respond to crises. Forward presence is a primary military vehicle that provides America the access and influence necessary to shape the global security environment. Crisis response, the ability to rapidly bring American military power to bear, will remain an important element of U.S. military strategy. Reconstitution is the hedge against the resurgence of Soviet military power. The ability of the U.S. to implement these pillars of the military strategy will determine the success or failure of President Bush's vision of a new world order.

**Deterrence:** The goal of strategic and conventional deterrence will be to persuade potential adversaries that the costs of aggression or coercion will exceed the possible gains. This is a matter of creating perceptions of determined will and of having the military capability to support that will. The U.S. deterrent strategy is guided by "flexible response" which encompasses options for direct response, the threat of escalation, and the threat of retaliation. Deterrence of non-traditional strategic threats, such as chemical and biological weapons, involves a high degree of uncertainty and thus poses unique problems for strategic planners. Unrestrained proliferation of ballistic missiles may eventually spark U.S. domestic demand for some form of defensive strategic deterrent capability.

Although deterrence was the cornerstone of the U.S. defense strategy in the past, in the post-Cold War era America's strategic interest does not lie in deterring an existing threat, but rather in preserving an equilibrium and preventing the emergence of new threats. In the transition decade and beyond deterrence will remain a necessary ingredient of U.S. national security, but it will no longer be the focal point or the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy.

While deterrence is undeniably a useful and necessary phenomenon, it

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**FORWARD PRESENCE:** IN ORDER TO INSURE STABILITY AND TO ASSURE FRIENDS AND ALLIES OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT, THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY WILL CONTINUE TO FEATURE FORWARD PRESENCE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF THE U.S. DEFENSE POLICY. AS A HIGH LEVEL AMERICAN POLICY MAKER NOTED:

"**THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES ADVANCES OUR INTERESTS IN MANY AREAS OF THE WORLD. THEY ENHANCE MILITARY COOPERATION AND SECURITY TIES AND OFFER ASSURANCES TO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THEIR SECURITY. THEY HELP SUPPORT OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND ENHANCE U.S. PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE.**"

ADDITIONALLY, FORCES FOR FORWARD PRESENCE ARE ESSENTIAL FOR MAINTAINING STRONG SECURITY ALLIANCES, DETERRING AGGRESSION, PRESERVING REGIONAL STABILITY, PROTECTING U.S. INTERESTS, PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, AND PROVIDING THE INITIAL CAPABILITY FOR CRISIS RESPONSE AND ESCALATION CONTROL.

FORWARD PRESENCE IS PRIMARILY COMPOSED OF FORWARD BASED FORCES, A NETWORK OF BASES, FACILITIES, AND LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS, AS WELL AS OPERATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE FORM OF PERIODIC PATROLS, EXERCISES, AND VISITS OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS. IN THE FUTURE, THIS FORWARD PRESENCE WILL INCLUDE FEWER PERMANENTLY FORWARD-BASED FORCES AND MORE PERIODIC DEPLOYMENTS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES FOR VARYING DURATIONS.12 FORWARD PRESENCE HAS A MAJOR ROLE IN UNDERWRITING CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO

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CRISIS RESPONSE: The U.S. defense policy will have to provide for rapidly executable contingency operations in response to unpredictable regional events.\textsuperscript{13} Because overseas bases will probably decline in number and because the U.S. will have a continuing need to employ the military instrument in crisis situations, the ability to project power will increase in importance. As one author noted:

"In a regionalized, competitive world, with numerous sources of unresolved conflict, the United States is destined to remain a key world power with global interests as well as the need to retain the military capacity to intervene directly or indirectly in those regional conflicts where its interests are most clearly at stake."\textsuperscript{14}

The requirements of crisis response have important ramifications for a balanced policy of strategic mobility and improved rapid deployment capability. This balanced policy must include airlift, sealift and the maritime and land based prepositioning of equipment. The allocation of these assets must be apportioned to the theaters based on the new U.S. national strategy. In terms of manpower, crisis response forces should primarily consist of active forces.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY: In this new world order the U.S. may not always want nor be able to execute its military strategy in a unilateral fashion. The demands of domestic and international politics, of economic and military expediency will drive American military strategy to a focus on collective security. In the transition decade and beyond the American military will have a reduced operational capability and decreasing budgetary resources that will affect the U.S. ability to deploy and employ forces unilaterally. The U.S. goal must be to lead the way toward a new world order in which the security of all nations is preserved by their collective resolve, and in which

\textsuperscript{13} CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, "1990 JOINT MILITARY NET ASSESSMENT," OP. CIT., P. 2.

\textsuperscript{14} GEOFFREY KEMP, OP. CIT., P. 44.
UNILATERAL ACTION WOULD RARELY BE NECESSARY. Nevertheless, the U.S. must retain the capability to act either in concert with friends and allies or, if necessary, unilaterally where American vital interests are threatened.

In the transition period, due to the lack of a compelling threat, formal alliances will tend to disintegrate and ad hoc transitory coalitions will be the more prominent vehicle for collective action. This situation will require greater leadership from the United States and from international organizations. The U.S. must look to allies and friendly nations to assume a greater share in providing for the common security. The objective is not only to share defense burdens, but more importantly, to increase overall defense capabilities without provoking the dangerous cycle of threat driven insecurity.

Whenever possible the U.S. must support allied and friendly efforts rather than introduce American forces. The reliance on indigenous forces is especially crucial in 'low intensity' conflict situations. Much of low intensity conflict is not primarily a problem for the military. It often will require a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary effort. Allies must accept greater responsibility for day-to-day deterrence and initial defense. The maintenance of effective coalitions and healthy alliance structures demands a sharing of the responsibility for the common defense. Alliances in which the U.S. provides all the resources and makes all the sacrifices will be neither militarily effective nor politically supportable. Although alliances will seldom be symmetrical, a general parity must prevail in terms of benefits, burdens and responsibilities.

RECONSTITUTION: To guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions, a strategy must be developed to insure the timely reconstitution of U.S. forces. This concept is predicated on the time required for the Soviet Union to reestablish a significant military threat to the United States.


17 Ibid. p.2.

18 George Bush, "Aspen Speech".
Assumption is that this will allow U.S. defense planners sufficient time to generate wholly new forces if U.S. leaders recognize the threat and then act on it. Reconstitution should apply not only to the Soviet Union, but also to any developing regional power or combination of powers that may pose a major threat to the United States.

**Security Assistance:** An element of forward presence, security assistance is designed to assist allies and friends, protect mutual interests, and to promote peace and stability. Security assistance, consisting of foreign military financing (FMF), economic support funds (ESF), international military education and training (IMET), foreign military sales (FMS), and peacekeeping activities, is a low cost, proactive set of programs that can be an effective tool of U.S. influence. As the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy noted, a marginal dollar invested in security assistance buys more security for the United States than it could if allocated instead to U.S. forces. Security assistance should be directed toward providing increases in non-threatening security for U.S. friends and allies, increasing U.S. influence and access, improving interoperability, and as a final goal, seeking to foster pluralistic forms of government.

The administration of this program must be revised to bring it into line with the changing global strategic environment and the evolving defense policy. Funds need to be redirected from the core of five countries which draw 86% of all security assistance monies. Statutory restrictions must be relaxed to allow security assistance to deal with the fast pace of contemporary change. In conjunction with U.S. foreign aid, security assistance should work toward helping U.S. friends and allies to reduce the underlying causes of instability. IMET programs must be the key element of the U.S. security assistance program for the post Cold War era.

**Arms Control:** As ideal and important as it is, arms control must not be an end in itself. It should be a means to reduce military threats, inject

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GREATER PREDICTABILITY INTO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND TO CHANNEL FORCE POSTURES INTO MORE STABILIZING DIRECTIONS. A KEY FOCUS OF ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS MUST BE TO RESTRICT THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS. ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS SHOULD BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED THROUGH THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. MANAGING THE TRANSFER OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY MUST ALSO BE A LONG TERM FACET OF ARMS CONTROL.

DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY: AMERICA MUST MAINTAIN ITS POSITION AS A WORLD LEADER IN DEFENSE RELATED TECHNOLOGY. THE MILITARY DEVASTATION OF IRAQ WAS DUE TO A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH WAS THE U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY SUCH AS OPTO-ELECTRONICS, COMMUNICATIONS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, SPACE BASED SYSTEMS, RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION, MUNITIONS, ROBOTICS, COMPOSITE MATERIALS, STEALTH TECHNOLOGY, DIRECTED ENERGY, AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ARE KEY ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN MILITARY SUPERIORITY. TO MAINTAIN THIS LEVEL OF SUPERIORITY, INCREASED EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON AN ACTIVE AND FAR RANGING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM TO BE SUSTAINED EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF PROCUREMENT.

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY CAN AND MUST BE COST EFFECTIVE AND MUST PROVIDE A CLEAR ADVANTAGE OVER POTENTIAL THREAT SYSTEMS. IT SHOULD BE A NORMAL PRACTICE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO SUPPORT THE EXPLORATION OF WEAPONS CONCEPTS, UP TO AND INCLUDING THE EARLY STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPE TESTING, THAT HAVE NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF DEPLOYMENT. TECHNOLOGY MUST BE USED TO EXTEND OPERATIONAL UTILITY, REDUCE MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT COSTS, INCREASE LETHALITY, SURVIVABILITY, DEPLOYABILITY AND AGILITY. FINALLY, TECHNOLOGY MUST INSURE THAT EASE OF MAINTENANCE AND LOW SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ARE EMBEDDED IN SYSTEMS DESIGN.

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22 ASHTON B. CARTER AND WILLIAM J. PERRY, "NEW THINKING IN AMERICAN DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY," IN ERIC H. ARNETT, OP. CIT., P 36.

A HEDGE AGAINST UNCERTAINTY. FOR THE U.S. THERE CAN BE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A STRONG AND FORWARD LOOKING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

MARITIME AND AEROSPACE SUPERIORITY: CLOSELY RELATED TO ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY IS THE NEED TO MAINTAIN MARITIME AND AEROSPACE SUPERIORITY. THE CONTROL OF CRITICAL SEA, AIR AND SPACE LINES OF COMMUNICATION UNDERWRITES OUR OTHER STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. DETERRENCE, FORWARD PRESENCE AND CRISIS RESPONSE ALL DEPEND ON AMERICA'S ABILITY TO CONTROL THESE LINES OF COMMUNICATION. SPACE WILL BECOME AN EVEN MORE CRITICAL STRATEGIC ARENA IN THE TRANSITION DECADE AND BEYOND. THE IRAQ WAR DEMONSTRATED THE OVERWHELMING ADVANTAGES THAT SPACE BASED SYSTEMS PROVIDE IN SURVEILLANCE, EARLY WARNING, DATA TRANSMISSION AND GLOBAL POSITIONING FOR AIR, SEA, AND LAND NAVIGATION. RATHER THAN BEING A MEDIUM THROUGH WHICH MILITARY ACTION IS SUPPORTED, SPACE MAY BECOME A CRUCIAL FIRST THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

CONCLUSION

AS PRESIDENT BUSH RIGHTLY NOTED, THE WORLD WILL REMAIN A DANGEROUS PLACE WITH SERIOUS THREATS TO IMPORTANT U.S. INTERESTS. THESE THREATS CAN SPAN THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT, AND ARISE SUDDENLY IN A WIDE VARIETY OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS. THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE EVENTUALITIES THAT CANNOT BE FORESEEN WITH CLARITY, AND THREATS WHOSE NATURE WE MAY ONLY GUESS. U.S. FORCES MUST BE ABLE TO REACT RAPIDLY, OVER LONG DISTANCES, TO ENGAGE INCREASINGLY LETHAL HOSTILE FORCES. THESE FORCES WILL NEED TO BE MOBILE, FLEXIBLE, SUSTAINABLE, TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED, AND ABLE TO RESPOND RAPIDLY AND DISCRIMINATELY TO PROTECT AND DEFEND THE WIDE RANGE OF U.S. INTERESTS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONTINGENCIES.

THIS UNCERTAIN AND COMPLEX THREAT ENVIRONMENT DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR THE INSURANCE FUNCTION OF U.S. MILITARY POWER. THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY


26 ELIOT A. COHEN, OP. CIT., P. 11.

STRATEGY MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT TO ACHIEVE GLOBAL SECURITY AND YET REMAIN PREPARED TO COUNTER ACTIVITIES WHICH IMMEDIATELY THREATEN STABILITY. A PROACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY IS APPROPRIATE TO POST COLD WAR WORLD ORDER AND TO THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN APPROACH TO WORLD AFFAIRS. IT IS A POSITIVE POLICY DIRECTED TOWARD BRINGING ABOUT A STABLE WORLD ORDER. CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, AN ASTUTE OBSERVER OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE SUMS UP THE CHALLENGE FACING THE UNITED STATES:

"INTERNATIONAL STABILITY IS NEVER A GIVEN. IT IS NEVER THE NORM. WHEN ACHIEVED, IT IS THE PRODUCT OF SELF CONSCIOUS ACTION BY THE GREAT POWERS, AND MOST PARTICULARLY OF THE GREATEST POWER, WHICH NOW AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE IS THE UNITED STATES." 38

CHAPTER 5

A UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

"THE UNITED STATES IS A PACIFIC POWER NOT BY
CHOICE BUT BY DESTINY." 1

INTRODUCTION

FOR A NUMBER OF COGENT REASONS, THE FOCUS OF AMERICAN SECURITY
STRATEGY IN THE DECADE OF THE 1990's AND BEYOND WILL BE ON THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION. IN TERMS OF NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED
STATES, THE PACIFIC WILL BE THE CENTER OF GRAVITY IN A NEW WORLD ORDER. A
STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE REGION IS ESSENTIAL TO U.S. POLITICAL,
MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. WITHIN THE REGION, AND ONE MIGHT ARGUE THE
WORLD, JAPAN MUST BE THE FOCUS OF A U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY.

THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IS BASED ON A SOUND
HISTORICAL LEGACY. THE U.S. HAS LONG PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE PACIFIC. 2
OPERATING FROM A FIRMLY ESTABLISHED HISTORICAL FOUNDATION AND GIVEN THE
EVOLVING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY TRENDS, THE U.S. NOW STANDS ON THE
BRINK OF AN ERA IN WHICH THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION WILL COME TO THE FOREFRONT OF
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION SHOULD NO LONGER
BE CONSIDERED AN ECONOMY OF FORCE THEATER. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC,
GEOGRAPHIC AND MILITARY FACTORS ALL COMBINE TO MOVF THIS REGION ONTO CENTER
STAGE. AN AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE MUST REFLECT
THE IMPERATIVE OF THIS NEW REALITY.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF GLOBAL STABILITY AND THE SHIFT OF THE
GEO-POLITICAL AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC HEARTLAND TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY STRATEGY WITH ACTIVE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,

1 RONALD D. MCLAURIN AND CHUNG-IN MOON, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEFENSE OF

2 RONALD D. MCLAURIN AND CHUNG-IN MOON. OP. CIT., P.7-12.
AND MILITARY COMPONENTS. GLOBAL STABILITY ALSO REQUIRES FORWARD LOOKING AND PROACTIVE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP SUPPORTED BY VIBRANT ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IN WHICH POLITICAL OPENNESS AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY CAN THRIVE.

POLITICAL COMPONENTS

THE POLITICAL COMPONENTS OF AMERICAN SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, WORKING THROUGH A PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS, MUST SEEK TO SHAPE A STABLE AND COOPERATIVE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. ALTHOUGH THE AMERICA IS THE ONLY NATION WITH SUFFICIENT WILL, MORAL STANDING, AND CAPABILITY TO ASSUME THE LEADERSHIP OF SUCH AN EFFORT, THE U.S. MUST OPERATE IN CONSONANCE WITH STATES IN THE REGION IN ORDER TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THESE GOALS. BECAUSE AMERICAN CAPABILITY IS LIMITED, AND BECAUSE OF RISING NATIONALISM AND CONFIDENCE OF MANY PACIFIC STATES, THE U.S. MUST MORE SKILLFULLY DEVELOP BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL TIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS COOPERATING ON THE BASIS OF COMMON OBJECTIVES.

BECAUSE OF THE TREMENDOUS POLITICAL DIVERSITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION MUCH OF THE U.S. EFFORT WILL BE CARRIED OUT INITIALLY THROUGH BI-LATERAL FORA.

MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIPS

JAPAN: THE KEY AMERICAN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE REGION, AND ARGUABLY IN THE WORLD, IS WITH JAPAN. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP IS THE NECESSARY INGREDIENT FOR POLITICAL COOPERATION AND STABILITY, COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS, AND A STABLE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.3 THE U.S. STRATEGY SHOULD ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A STABLE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH JAPAN CAN AND WILL DEVELOP CONSTRUCTIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS. SUCH AN OBJECTIVE WILL REQUIRE A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY STRATEGY INCLUDING AN PROACTIVE MILITARY STRATEGY WITH CREDIBLE FORWARD PRESENCE AS ITS CENTERPIECE. THE DIRECTION OF JAPANESE POLICY AND THE REGIONAL RESPONSES TO THOSE POLICIES WILL DEPEND TO A GREAT DEGREE ON THE U.S.

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ROLE IN THE REGION.4

THERE ARE TWO PRIMARY DANGERS TO BE AVOIDED WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN. THE FIRST IS THE POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC CONFLICT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN LEADING TO ECONOMIC WARFARE. THE SECOND IS THE POTENTIAL FOR THE REMILITARIZATION OF JAPAN CAUSED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. PRESENCE OR THE RISE OF ANOTHER HEGEMONIC POWER IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. WITHOUT QUESTION, FOR THE TRANSITION DECADE AND BEYOND, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT JAPAN BE THE CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY NOT ONLY FOR THE PACIFIC, BUT FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE.

AT A TIME WHEN THE U.S. JAPAN RELATIONSHIP IS ACHIEVING RENEWED PROMINENCE AND WHEN A CLOSE U.S. JAPAN RELATIONSHIP IS SO NECESSARY, AMERICAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD JAPAN ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CRITICAL. BY SUBSTANTIAL MARGINS BOTH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND LEADERS BELIEVE THAT THE ECONOMIC POWER OF JAPAN WILL BE A MORE CRITICAL THREAT TO AMERICAN VITAL INTERESTS IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS THAN WILL SOVIET MILITARY POWER.3 AS UNCOMFORTABLE AS IT MIGHT BE, AMERICAN LEADERS NEED TO VIEW THIS SITUATION OBJECTIVELY AND INFORM THE PUBLIC THAT THE ORIGIN OF THIS THREAT HAS AS MUCH, IF NOT MORE, TO DO WITH AMERICAN DEFICIENCIES AS WITH PERCEIVED JAPANESE ECONOMIC BELLIGERENCY. RHETORIC CAN SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE.

CHINA: U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARE MARKED BY GREAT UNCERTAINTY. CHINA COULD BE ON THE VERGE OF A SUSTAINED PERIOD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH THAT MAY LEAD TO MORE AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR ON THE WORLD SCENE. THE EXTERNAL EXPANSION OF THE UK AND FRANCE, GERMANY AND JAPAN, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES COINCIDED WITH PHASES OF INTENSE INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.6 RECENT DOMESTIC TURMOIL IN CHINA, COUPLED WITH A TREND TOWARD A MORE AUTHORITARIAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT, DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR FUTURE SINO-U.S. MILITARY COOPERATION OR TO CHINA'S ROLE IN THE REGION. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WILL KEEP THE

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4 JONATHAN D. POLLACK AND JAMES A. WINNEFELD, OP. CIT., P. 22.


CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION CLOSED. THIS MAY LIMIT U.S. LONG TERM LEVERAGE ON THE PRC.


CHINA HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BE A DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE ON THE GLOBAL AS WELL AS THE REGIONAL LANDSCAPE. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS, TRAINING AND SUPPORT OF TERRORIST FORCES AND OTHER DESTABILIZING GROUPS, AND DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION HAVE BEEN USED BY CHINA IN THE PAST. ADDITIONALLY, CHINA HAS SOME INVOLVEMENT IN MANY OF THE POTENTIAL HOT SPOTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. A MAJOR CHINESE ARMS BUILDUP WOULD BE VERY DESTABILIZING IN THE REGION AND MORE THAN LIKELY WOULD CAUSE THE JAPANESE TO SERIOUSLY RETHINK THEIR SELF DEFENSE POSTURE.

KOREA: THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTHS HAVE ALLOWED KOREA TO PURCHASE OR INDIGENOUSLY DEVELOP A WIDE RANGE OF MODERN WEAPONRY. THE RESULT OF THIS IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IS A NEW FOUND NATIONAL CONFIDENCE THAT HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF FRICTION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND KOREA. THE NEED AND DESIRE TO RETAIN AMERICAN FORCES ON KOREAN SOIL STILL EXISTS, BUT THIS CONDITION IS INCREASINGLY BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION FOR BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL REASONS. THE U.S. HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BY EXECUTING A PHASED WITHDRAWAL TIED TO NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS. PLANS TO REDUCE U.S. FORCE

LEVELS AND TO REALIGN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS THE WOULD MOVE THE U.S. FROM A LEADING TO A SUPPORTING ROLE ON THE PENINSULA ARE CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED. CONTINGENT ON NORTH KOREAN TRENDS, THESE PLANS ARE BOTH REASONABLE AND UNAVOIDABLE.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) MUST FOCUS ON BRINGING ABOUT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT. AMERICAN MILITARY WITHDRAWALS FROM THE PENINSULA AND TO SOME EXTENT FROM THE REGION MUST BE CONTINGENT ON NORTH KOREAN BEHAVIOR AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S ABILITY TO TAKE THE LEADING ROLE IN THE U.S.-SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. IN THE LONGER TERM, AMERICAN EFFORTS MUST CONCENTRATE ON THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE TWO KOREAS AND SUBSEQUENTLY INTEGRATION OF A UNIFIED KOREA INTO THE ASIA-PACIFIC SYSTEM WITHOUT ALIENATING JAPAN.

THERE ARE SOME DISADVANTAGES TO THE U.S. TAKING THE LEAD IN THE UNIFICATION PROCESS. THE CLOSE POLITICAL AND MILITARY TIES WITH THE SOUTH AND THE HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY WITH THE NORTH MILITATE AGAINST A LEAD ROLE FOR AMERICA. AMERICA MIGHT WORK THROUGH EMERGING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC) TO FACILITATE UNIFICATION AND INTEGRATION. IN THE MACRO SENSE THE AMERICAN ROLE MAY BE MORE CLOSELY TIED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF REGIONAL STABILITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SECURITY ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS LONG STANDING PROBLEM. THE U.S. MUST REMAIN ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION TO PROTECT AMERICAN INTERESTS. IF UNIFICATION OCCURS IT WILL GREATLY ENHANCE KOREA'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY STANDING IN THE REGION. EVEN WITHOUT UNIFICATION THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WILL EMERGE AS A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH IN EAST ASIA AND AS A CHALLENGER TO JAPANESE DOMINANCE IN THE REGION.

SOVIET UNION: IN CONSONANCE WITH GORBACHEV'S GLASNOST POLICIES THE SOVIETS HAVE CUT BACK ON THEIR MILITARY FORCES AND OPTEMPO IN THE REGION. WHILE THIS IS ENCOURAGING, SUCH CUTBACKS ARE NOT IRREVERSIBLE. EVEN WITH THE


CUTBACKS, SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN EAST ASIA IS SUBSTANTIAL TO SAY THE LEAST AND WHILE PLATFORM NUMBERS AND OPTEMPO ARE DOWN, MODERNIZATION UPGRADES CONTINUES TO POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS. BENIGN SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION DEPEND AS MUCH ON SOVIET INTERNAL DYNAMICS AS ANYTHING THAT THE U.S MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT DO TO AFFECT SOVIET BEHAVIOR.


INDIA: THE UNITED STATES HAS BEGUN TO RECOGNIZE THE OPPORTUNITY AND REQUIREMENT FOR DEVELOPING A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA. THE REALITY IS THAT INDIA IS NOW AND WILL REMAIN THE MAJOR POWER IN SOUTH ASIA AND A MAJOR REGIONAL POWER IN ASIA.12 RECENT INDIAN NAVAL EXPANSION HAS CAUSED A NUMBER OF STATES TO TAKE NOTICE. INDONESIA, AUSTRALIA, AND CHINA HEAD THE LIST OF CONCERNED NATIONS.13

OTHER POWERS

AUSTRALIA: AUSTRALIA REMAINS A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT IN THE U.S. SECURITY


STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC, ESPECIALLY ON THE SOUTHWESTERN FLANK. RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HAVE LONG BEEN MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL DUE TO A COMMON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND SHARED WORLD VIEW. THE U.S. NEGLECT MAY JEOPARDIZE THIS RELATIONSHIP. THERE IS A GROWING CONCERN THAT THE DYNAMIC CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION WILL BY PASS AUSTRALIA. AS ONE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY ANALYST QUERIED, "WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN THIS GREATLY ALTERED WEST PACIFIC RIMLAND? WILL AUSTRALIA BE LEFT BEHIND, BECOMING A REGIONAL BACKWATER WITH LIMITED POWER AND INFLUENCE, EVEN IN ITS LOCAL APPROACHES?" 

VIETNAM: THE POWER OF ECONOMICS TO INFLUENCE NATIONS IS APPARENT WITH THE INITIAL MOVES OF VIETNAM TO JOIN THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MAINSTREAM. HOWEVER, WITHOUT INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES, IT MAY BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THIS SOCIALIST NATION TO SUSTAIN A LONG TERM ADVANCE LEADING TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD KEEP THE DOORS OPEN TO ANY ENCOURAGING VIETNAMESE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MOVES.


REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

AS A LONG TERM GOAL THE U.S. SHOULD TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS TO DEAL WITH REGIONAL ISSUES. ASEAN AND APEC

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ARE TWO GOOD STARTING POINTS THAT COULD POSSIBLY LEAD TO A ROUGH PARALLEL TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE). ALTHOUGH THE ETHNIC AND NATIONAL DIVERSITY IS MUCH GREATER IN THE PACIFIC, A CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN ASIA (CSCA) IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE.15


ECONOMIC COMPONENTS

WHILE INTERSTATE ECONOMICS CAN BE A SOURCE OF CONFLICT, SOME SEE THE ECONOMIC ARENA AS THE POTENTIAL SOURCE OF COHESION NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN THIS DYNAMIC, DIVERSE AND DISPERSED REGION. THE KEY TO REGIONAL

15 ZARA DIAN, "CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN ASIA?", ASIAN DEFENSE JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1990, P. 3.

16 TAI MING CHEUNG, "SHOULDER TO SHOULDER: ASEAN MEMBERS STRENGTHEN DEFENCE TIES." FEER, 25 MARCH 1990, P. 25.


18 DEFENSE ISSUES. "COLD WAR LESSONS AND OPERATION DESERT SHIELD," VOL 5, NO 47, 1990, P. 3.
Stability in the culturally diverse Pacific is to foster cohesion in areas where there is strong common interest such as economic development, trade, and investment. On the other hand, the maintenance and further development of these economic areas of common interest require a stable security environment.

The intertwining of economic and security factors is nowhere more apparent than in the Asia-Pacific region. In the Pacific, to modify Clausewitz's famous dictum, war is a continuation of political and economic intercourse carried on with other means. In the geo-economic sense it may be said that economics is a continuation of politics by other means. As pointed out in Chapter 2, economic relations can be ruled either by the logic of cooperation or of conflict.

To avoid conflict a dispassionate long term view on the part of all players will be required to identify and then converge on points of common economic interest. In an area as diverse as the Pacific, the lack of a dispassionate long term view can easily incite emotional responses, and thus be a major obstacle to stability. Not surprisingly, this problem may have more to do with perceptions than reality. A good example of an emotional approach to economic issues is 'Japan bashing'. While Japan should be encouraged to open its markets, Japan is hardly the only source or even the primary source of U.S. economic problems. Japan bashing and economic protectionism are non-productive or counter productive in terms of U.S. interests. With such high political, economic and security stakes at risk, it would be fatal to allow misperception to become the reality.

The economic element of a U.S. national strategy for the Pacific should focus on a furtherance of open markets and free trade activity. Mutually beneficial trade relationships can provide the basis for a common interest in regional stability. Closed markets, asymmetrical trade relationships, and

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RESOURCE MONOPOLIES WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT THE HEALTH OF THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIES. IN TURN, THE HEALTH OF THESE ECONOMIES CAN HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON WHETHER INTERSTATE RELATIONS ARE MARKED BY COOPERATIVE INTERDEPENDENCE OR CONFLICT.

ONE OF THE PITFALLS OF TRADE AND MARKET RELATIONSHIPS IS THE TENDENCY OF NATIONS TO STRIVE FOR POSITIONS OF UNILATERAL ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE. THE DECEMBER 1990 FAILURE OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) DEMONSTRATES THAT NARROW NATIONALISTIC CONCERNS ARE STILL IMPORTANT. IF STABILITY IS TO BE A LONG TERM OUTPUT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS THEN OPEN MARKETS AND RECIPROCITY MUST PREVAIL. THE STRONG ECONOMIES OF A GROWING NUMBER OF PACIFIC STATES NO LONGER ENTITLES THEM TO PREFERENTIAL MARKET AND TRADE TREATMENT BY THE UNITED STATES. THE WORDS OF A RECENT STUDY ADDRESSING THE SOUTH KOREAN SITUATION APPLY ACROSS THE BOARD TO RECIPROCAL AND REALISTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE PACIFIC.

"A LITTLE LESS PATERNALISM AND CONSIDERATION, AND A LITTLE MORE BLUNTPNESS AND INSISTENCE ON ABSOLUTE RECIPROCITY, MIGHT CREATE MORE SHORT TERM PROBLEMS, BUT PAVE THE WAY TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP OF GREATER REALISM AND MORE CONCRETE FOUNDATIONS."

DEFENSE BURDEN SHARING IS YET ANOTHER AREA THAT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DISRUPT POSITIVE RELATIONSHIPS. THE RECENT INCREASES BY JAPAN AND KOREA TO HELP SHOULDER THE HEAVY U.S. DEFENSE BURDEN SHOULD DO MUCH TO DAMPEN U.S. CRITICISMS OF ASIA GETTING A FREE SECURITY RIDE. JAPAN NOW PAYS FOR VIRTUALLY ALL YEN COSTS OF U.S. FORCES BASED ON JAPANESE TERRITORY. THIS INCLUDES ALL COSTS EXCEPT SALARIES AND EQUIPMENT. KOREA IS COMING CLOSE TO THIS LEVEL OF FUNDING. THERE ARE LIMITS ON HOW MUCH THESE POWERS ARE WILLING TO PAY AND HOW MUCH THEY SHOULD PAY. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, A HIGH LEVEL OF BURDEN SHARING MAY RESULT IN HOST NATION RESTRICTIONS THAT COULD LIMIT U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE REGION. 57

57 RONALD D. McLaurin and Chung-in Moon, OP. CIT., P. 289.

MILITARY COMPONENTS


A STABLE WORLD IN WHICH DEMOCRATIC ASPIRATIONS CAN BE NURTURED, COOPERATION CAN SUPPLANT CONFLICT, ECONOMIC PROSPERITY CAN BE SHARED, AND MILITARY SECURITY CAN BE ASSURED THROUGH COLLECTIVE EFFORTS, WILL DEPEND GREATLY ON U.S. LEADERSHIP. U.S. LEADERSHIP WILL IN TURN DEPEND ON THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. MILITARY TO OBTAIN ACCESS, MAXIMIZE INFLUENCE, AND TO WIELD POWER PROACTIVELY AND DISCRIMINATELY. IN NO OTHER REGION OF THE GLOBE DOES THE ABOVE APPLY AS MUCH AS IT DOES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. KEEPING AN AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS IMPORTANT. KEEPING ONE IN ASIA IS INDISPENSABLE IF WE ARE TO HAVE PEACE IN THE PACIFIC. 25

AN AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IN THE TRANSITIONAL DECADE AND BEYOND MUST FOCUS ON MAINTAINING REGIONAL STABILITY. IT SHOULD PREPARE THE U.S. FOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES AND NOT A GLOBAL WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT MUST EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS AN EXPANSIVE MARITIME THEATER IN WHICH SEVEN OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST LAND FORCES ARE LOCATED. IT MUST SEEK TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO REGIONAL STATES WHILE LIMITING WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. FINALLY, IT MUST BE SENSITIVE TO THE USE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER IN A THEATER DOMINATED BY ECONOMIC ISSUES.

THE VOLATILITY AND UNIQUENESS OF THE PACIFIC ENVIRONMENT, COMBINED WITH THE EXISTING U.S. MILITARY POLICY OF ECONOMY OF FORCE, MAKE MAJOR FORCE

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REDUCTIONS IN THIS THEATER UNWISE. \(^*\) NOT ONLY ARE MAJOR REDUCTIONS UNWISE, BUT GIVEN U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE EVOLVING ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, ONE COULD ARGUE FOR AN INCREASE OF THE AMERICAN FORWARD MILITARY PRESENCE FOCUSED ON, OR ACTUALLY IN THE REGION. AT THE VERY LEAST, AS THE U.S. WITHDRAWS FROM KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINE BASES, A RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES WILL BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE MILITARY PRESENCE AND AVOID THE CREATION, OR PERCEPTION OF THE CREATION OF A POWER VACUUM. AN "ADEQUATE" PRESENCE IS ONE THAT IS SUFFICIENT TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENTS OF PEACETIME ACTIVITIES AND TO MAINTAIN THE PERCEPTION OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE REGION. THUS, WHILE PERMANENT FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED TO THE POINT WHERE FEW IF ANY AMERICAN MILITARY UNITS WILL EVENTUALLY BE STATIONED ON FOREIGN SOIL, FORWARD PRESENCE ACTIVITIES MUST BE INCREASED IF THE GOALS OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ARE TO BE ACHIEVED.

THE PRIMARY MILITARY COMPONENTS OF A SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION FOLLOW FROM THE NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY. THESE PRIMARY COMPONENTS OF DETERRENCE, FORWARD PRESENCE, THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO REGIONAL CRISSES, AND RECONSTITUTION ARE SUPPORTED BY COLLECTIVE SECURITY, SECURITY ASSISTANCE, ANTI-TERRORIST AND ANTI-DRUG OPERATIONS, AND ARMS CONTROL.

REGIONAL DETERRENCE: IN THE PACIFIC THEATER CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE IS BEST MAINTAINED BY HAVING CAPABLE, VISIBLE, AND USEABLE MILITARY POWER AND THE WILL TO EMPLOY THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT. AT THIS LEVEL DETERRENCE IS CREATED AND MAINTAINED BY MILITARY FORCES IN BEING, THAT OPERATE THROUGHOUT THE THEATER, THAT ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE VARIOUS CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION, AND THAT CAN RESPOND RAPIDLY AND DECISIVELY TO THE FULL RANGE OF POTENTIAL CRISIS SITUATIONS. THEATER LEVEL DETERRENCE IS REINFORCED BY STRONG COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND A SHARED VIEW ON AGGRESSION AND FORCEFUL INTERVENTION.

REGIONAL FORWARD PRESENCE: AN ACTIVE AND CREDIBLE FORWARD PRESENCE IN THE THEATER IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF A U.S. ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY STRATEGY. FORWARD PRESENCE ASSURES AMERICAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND INSURES

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THE U.S. ABILITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS AND PROVIDES A CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CRISSES PROMPTLY AND EFFECTIVELY. FORWARD PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC SUPPORTS U.S. DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY AND IS THE KEY TO THE REGIONAL STABILITY WHICH IS SO NECESSARY FOR POSITIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

AT A TIME WHEN FORWARD PRESENCE IS BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC, SUPPORT FOR PERMANENT BASING ON NON-U.S. TERRITORY IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN. THE BASING STRUCTURE IN THE PHILIPPINES, KOREA, AND EVEN JAPAN MAY COME UNDER INTENSIFYING PRESSURE TO REDUCE ACTIVITIES AND IN SOME CASES TO CEASE OPERATIONS ALTOGETHER.\footnote{JAMES R. BLAKER, "U.S. OVERSEAS BASING SYSTEM FACES A DIFFICULT TRANSITION." ARMY, OCTOBER 1990, P. 166.} PLANNING MUST BE DONE TO INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES THAT CAN BE USED ON A PERIODIC AND TEMPORARY BASIS. ADDITIONALLY, U.S. TERRITORY AS FAR FORWARD IN THE PACIFIC THEATER AS POSSIBLE MUST BE DEVELOPED TO SUPPORT BOTH PEACETIME FORWARD PRESENCE AND WARTIME OPERATIONS.

PERMANENT FACILITIES ENHANCE THE FORWARD PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES, BUT FORWARD PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC CAN AND MUST BE MAINTAINED WITH A MINIMUM OF PERMANENT OVERSEAS BASES. THE U.S. FORWARD PRESENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION MUST RELY ON NAVAL PATROLS, SHIP VISITS, JOINT AND COMBINED EXERCISES, RIGHTS OF ACCESS, LOGISTICS FACILITIES, VISITS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, TRAINING ASSISTANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, NATION BUILDING ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL EXCHANGES.


REGIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE: A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF FORWARD PRESENCE FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IS SECURITY ASSISTANCE. LOW IN COST AND PROACTIVE IN IMPLEMENTATION, SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS NOT ONLY EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN...
PROMOTING U.S. INTERESTS, BUT IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT REGARDING GLOBAL STABILITY. THE U.S. MILITARY, WORKING IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, CAN USE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO FURTHER BOTH SHORT AND LONG TERM AMERICAN GOALS IN THE REGION.

A PROACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY DEMANDS THAT MORE ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OFFICES NEED TO BE REVITALIZED THROUGH THE REGION. THESE OFFICES SHOULD BE MANNED AND TASKED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND NOT SOLELY BY THE DOLLAR VALUE OF SALES AND CONTRACTS. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OFFICERS SHOULD BE MANNED WITH CAPABLE AREA SPECIALISTS WHO ARE TRAINED AND EDUCATED ALONG THE LINES OF THE U.S. ARMY FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS. TRAINING PROGRAMS ESPECIALLY INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET), GENERALLY OUGHT TO HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER SALES PROGRAMS.

REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY: FORWARD PRESENCE IS REQUIRED BY AND IS SUPPORTIVE OF REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY.ALTHOUGH NATO HAS BEEN THE FOCUS OF U.S. COLLECTIVE SECURITY ATTENTION, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT FIVE OF THE SEVEN ACTIVE U.S. ALLIANCES ARE WITH COUNTRIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. WHILE THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH MANY OF THE ALLIANCES WERE BASED MAY NO LONGER BE VALID, THEY CONTINUE TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNICATION, FORCE INTEGRATION, INTEROPERABILITY, SHARED TRAINING, CONTINUED ACCESS AND BURDEN SHARING.

THE UNITED STATES, IN ITS DESIRE TO SHARE DEFENSE BURDENS EQUITABLY, MUST BE CAREFUL ABOUT PUSHING REGIONAL POWERS INTO ROLES AND MISSIONS THAT MAY BE INAPPROPRIATE GIVEN LOCAL CONDITIONS. THE U.S. MUST BE VERY SENSITIVE NOT TO CREATE A MILITARY POWER OR GROUP OF POWERS THAT THREATENS OTHER STATES IN THE REGION. FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS THE U.S. MAY BE PUSHING JAPAN TO DO TOO MUCH TOO FAST IN THE AREAS OF DEFENSE SPENDING AND MILITARY BUILD UP. SUCH AN APPROACH IS SHORTSIGHTED AND WOULD NOT LIKELY RESULT IN INCREASED SECURITY OR ECONOMIC SAVINGS IN THE LONG TERM. TO STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OR TO CHINA AND KOREA THIS HARDLY ADDS TO NATIONAL OR REGIONAL SECURITY. ENCOURAGING JAPAN TO ASSUME A MORE ACTIVE SECURITY ROLE MAY CREATE GREATER INSECURITY IN THE REGION.29 THE ULTIMATE AMERICAN GOAL SHOULD NOT

29 HASJIM DAJAL, "THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE REGIONAL ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA," THE INDONESIAN QUARTERLY, VOL XVIII, NO 1, P. 71.; AND DAVID I. HITCHCOCK JR., OP. CIT., P. 130.
PRIMARILY BE AN INCREASED LEVEL OF BURDEN SHARING, BUT AN INCREASED LEVEL OF SECURITY AND STABILITY.

AS AN EXAMPLE, THE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN IS FAR FROM PERFECT BUT MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. THE TRENDS IN JAPAN’S HOST NATION SUPPORT PROGRAM ARE ENCOURAGING. IN ASSUMING THE DESIRED ROLES AND MISSION CAPABILITIES JAPAN HAS ACHIEVED A HIGH DEGREE OF SUCCESS. IN FACT THERE ARE SOME NATIONS IN ASIA THAT BELIEVE JAPAN HAS BEEN TOO SUCCESSFUL -- TO THE POINT OF POsing A MILITARY THREAT TO THE REGION. IT MAY BE THAT IN DEVELOPING ITS ROLES AND MISSION CAPABILITIES JAPAN HAS GONE FAR ENOUGH AND THAT THE U.S. MAY DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD IN PUSHING JAPAN TO DO MORE.

REGIONAL SECURITY MUST BE MAINTAINED AND REINFORCED BY THE UNITED STATES IN CONJUNCTION WITH REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS MUST BE MADE A PART OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS AND ISSUES ADDS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL STRUCTURES CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

PERMANENT COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST, BUT THE DIVERSITY AND FLUID NATURE OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO AD HOC AND TEMPORARY COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL SPAN A SPECTRUM FROM BILATERAL TO MULTILATERAL TO INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES. AMERICA THROUGH ITS MILITARY PRESENCE WILL OFTEN PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP AND BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED FOR REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS.


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SCENE OF THE CRISIS GIVEN THE EXTREME DISTANCES IN THE PACIFIC THEATER. THUS, FOR A RAPIDLY BREAKING CRISIS WHERE AMERICAN FORCES MUST BE QUICKLY INSERTED ON THE GROUND, AILIFTED ASSETS SUCH AS U.S. ARMY AIRBORNE UNITS MAY BE REQUIRED.

THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CRISSES REQUIRES FORCES IN BEING THAT CAN MOVE TO THE AREA OF CONCERN IN A RAPID MANNER WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION. A CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE MUST BE COMPOSED ALMOST TOTALLY OF ACTIVE DUTY ELEMENTS FAMILIAR WITH THE MILITARY FORCES AND GEOGRAPHY OF THE DIVERSE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER. FLEXIBLE FORCE PACKAGES MUST BE DEVELOPED THAT ARE CAPABLE OF REACTING TO THREATS THAT SPAN THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM AND CAN OPERATE AT ALL LEVELS OF WARFARE. IN THIS REGARD, U.S. ARMY FORCES ARE ESPECIALLY WELL SUITED TO FUNCTION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WARFARE. THE CORPS LEVEL HEADQUARTERS AND CORPS PLANNERS PROVIDE THE HARDWARE AND THE MINDSET REQUIRED TO CONDUCT WARFARE AT THE CAMPAIGN LEVEL. PACIFIC CONTINGENCIES CONFORM TO "A COME-AS-YOU ARE WORLD OF 48 HOUR RESPONSE TIMES TO THE SPONTANEOUS, OFTEN UNPREDICTABLE CRISSES CALLING FOR HIGHLY TRAINED FORCES THAT ARE AIR DELIVERABLE AND LARGELY SELF-SUFFICIENT."

STRATEGIC MOBILITY ASSETS MUST BE LOCATED OR CAPABLE OF BEING LOCATED WITH THE FORCES THAT WILL RESPOND TO CRISSES. FAST SEALIFT SHIPS OR ROLL-ON ROLL-OFF SHIPS MUST BE LOCATED IN THE THEATER AND POSITIONED SO AS TO READILY MOVE MEDIUM OR HEAVY FORCES. LOGISTICS MATERIAL AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT MUST BE LOCATED ON PREPOSITIONED SHIP AND IN FIXED SITES THROUGHOUT THE REGION. UNITS MUST IMPROVE THEIR DEPLOYABILITY CAPABILITY THROUGH PLANNING, REORGANIZATION AND JOINT AND COMBINED TRAINING.

A CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CRISSES HELPS MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. DETERRENT IN THE PACIFIC THEATER. IT ALSO PROVIDES THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY WITH ADDITIONAL OPTIONS IN RESPONDING TO A CRISIS SITUATION. ADDITIONALLY, A CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY SUPPORTS FORWARD PRESENCE ACTIVITIES BY MAKING POSSIBLE THE TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENTS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES AND GROUND BASED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN COMBINED EXERCISES AND TRAINING MISSIONS.

REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ARMS CONTROL AND ASSOCIATED CONFIDENCE

"GEORGE L. BUTLER, "NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY." SPEECH TO THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE JOURNALISM, 27 SEPTEMBER 1990.

63
BUILDING MEASURES ARE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF A U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED IN EUROPE ARE NOT ALWAYS APPLICABLE TO THE ASIAN SCENE.\textsuperscript{2} THIS FACT WILL BE EVEN MORE EVIDENT IN THE TRANSITION DECADE AND BEYOND AS U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC THEATER WILL BE LESS ORIENTED TOWARD THE SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND MORE ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL IN THE PACIFIC THEATER CAN ONLY BE STRUCTURED ON THE SOUND FOUNDATION OF AN ACTIVE AND CREDIBLE MILITARY PRESENCE. AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC THEATER IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A CLIMATE OF SECURITY AND PREVENT DESTABILIZING ARMS BUILDUPS. IN AN ERA OF FLUID SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS, THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND OF SOPHISTICATED CONVENTIONAL ARMS CAN QUICKLY UPSET THE REGIONAL BALANCE. AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE CAN ESTABLISH A STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THUS REDUCE THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR WEAPONS BUILDUP. CONTROL OF WEAPONS PROLIFERATION MUST BE A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. THE IMMEDIATE FOCUS MUST BE TO REDUCE TENSION AND ACHIEVE MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE LONG TERM FOCUS OF EFFORT MUST BE ON STRUCTURING A STABLE ENVIRONMENT WHICH ASSURES JAPAN'S SECURITY SO THAT PERCEPTIONS OF INSECURITY DO NOT LEAD TO A DESTABILIZING ARMS BUILDUP.

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES: ANTI-DRUG EFFORTS HAVE A SPECIAL RELEVANCE FOR THE U.S. IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE, THE INTERSECTION OF BURMA, LAOS, THAILAND AND CHINA, IS ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST PRODUCTIVE OPIUM GROWING AREAS. ALL TOTALED, 60% OF THE WORLD'S POPPY PRODUCTION, 40% OF ALL HEROIN AND OPIUM, AND 45% OF ALL MARIJUANA ENTERING THE U.S. COMES FROM THE REGION. CHINA, HONG KONG AND THAILAND ARE MAJOR TRANSSHIPMENT AND FINANCIAL CENTERS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF A WIDE VARIETY OF DRUG PRODUCTS. AN AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION CAN SUPPORT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING EFFORTS, COMBINED INTERDICTION EFFORTS, TRAINING OF LOCAL SECURITY FORCES, AND IN GENERAL TO HELP CREATE CONDITIONS OF STABILITY THAT WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TO CONTROLLING CULTIVATION AND TRANSSHIPMENT ACTIVITIES.

THE THREAT OF TERRORIST ACTIONS DIRECTED TOWARD THE U.S. AND ITS FRIENDS

\textsuperscript{2} DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC RIM: LOOKING TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY. (WASHINGTON: 1990), P. 15.
HAS NOT BEEN A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. THE ONE AREA OF EXCEPTION HAS BEEN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES. COMBINED INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS, EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO LOCAL ANTI-TERRORIST AGENCIES, AND INTERNAL STABILIT! PROGRAMS SHOULD BE CONTINUED TO INSURE THAT TERRORISTS ACTIONS ARE BROUGHT TO OR REMAIN AT A LOW LEVEL.

CONCLUSION

IN THE DECADE OF TRANSITION AND BEYOND, THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY WILL SHIFT TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY MUST BE STRUCTURED TO EXPLOIT THIS CHANGE AND CREATE AN ERA OF PEACE AND STABILITY. A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY MUST BALANCE AND EMPLOY POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STRATEGIES IN A SYNERGISTIC MANNER TO BRING ABOUT THE ASIA-PACIFIC COMPONENT OF A NEW WORLD ORDER.


THE FOCUS OF THE U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION MUST BE


ON CREATING A STABLE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT TO PRECLUDE FEELINGS OF INSECURITY. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THIS STRATEGY IS AMERICA'S PRIMARY PARTNER AND COMPETITOR, JAPAN. A COOPERATIVE U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP WHICH DOES NOT THREATEN OTHER REGIONAL STATES IS BOTH THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR LONG TERM REGIONAL STABILITY.
CHAPTER 6

STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY FORCES
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER

INTRODUCTION

In the post Cold War era, American national interests in the must be
preserved through a policy of constructive engagement which seeks to
maintain regional stability. To achieve this objective, a comprehensive
national security strategy including a positive and proactive military
strategy must be put into effect. This strategy must focus not on military
threats, but on the requirements of peacetime activities such as combined
exercises, training exchanges, patrols, visits, security assistance and support
activities. The focal point for this strategy must not be deterrence -- it must
be forward presence.

The structure and deployment of U.S. army forces oriented to or in the
Asia-Pacific theater in the transitional period and beyond must be militarily
effective, economically affordable, politically acceptable and compatible
with the U.S. national security strategy. U.S. army forces for the theater
must be considered as one of the integral elements of the joint military force
- U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The structure, deployment and employment of
army forces must reflect these imperatives.

PACIFIC THEATER FORCE PLANNING FACTORS

Sizing and shaping forces for a theater of operations without the
driving force of an clear and compelling threat poses significant challenges
for the force planner. Add to this the declining budgets and the problem
becomes virtually insurmountable. Familiar methods of force planning may
be inappropriate to the changing strategic environment. Moving from a
strategy of deterrence to a strategy of global stability requires a different
mindset as long held basic assumptions are invalidated.

National interests, supporting alliance commitments and the
requirements of peacetime activities rather than security threats will define
THE NEED FOR AND PURPOSE OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES FOR THE PACIFIC. NATIONAL INTERESTS, HOWEVER, DO NOT PROVIDE A RIGOROUS METHOD FOR SIZING AND SHAPING MILITARY FORCES FOR A THEATER OF OPERATION, BUT ONLY TELL US THAT WE NEED MILITARY FORCES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER, AND WHY WE NEED THEM.

ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS PROVIDE NO FURTHER HELP TOWARD DEVELOPING A SYSTEM TO SIZE AND SHAPE PACIFIC THEATER FORCES. MANY OF THE ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS WERE PREDICATED ON A VERY DIFFERENT THREAT ENVIRONMENT THAN WHAT EXISTS NOW. ADDITIONALLY, SEVERAL OF THE ALLIES HAVE OR WILL HAVE DEVELOPED A MORE ROBUST CAPABILITY FOR SELF DEFENSE AND NO LONGER NEED TO RELY ON SPECIFIC U.S. MILITARY GUARANTEES AGAINST DIRECT THREATS.

IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE IN A REGION OF SUCH GREAT DIVERSITY AND GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSE TO SIZE AND SHAPE THEATER FORCES AGAINST POTENTIAL REGIONAL CONFLICT SCENARIOS OR THREAT CONFIGURATIONS. WHILE THESE FACTORS CANNOT BE IGNORED, THEY PROVIDE ONLY A LIMITED BASIS FOR STRUCTURING THEATER FORCES. THE THEATER FORCE ALONE CAN NOT BE DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH EVERY CONCEIVABLE THREAT. IN MOST CASES, HOWEVER, THE THEATER FORCE WILL BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONTINGENCIES. IN THOSE CASES WHERE THE THEATER FORCE IS INSUFFICIENT, IT CAN ACT AS THE SPEARHEAD FOR FOLLOW-ON FORCES. CONUS BASED CONTINGENCY AND REINFORCING FORCES, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEATER FORCES, HAVE THE MISSION OF DEALING WITH MAJOR AND LONG TERM CONFLICTS. MOREOVER, WHAT ARE SEEN AS THE MOST PROBABLE REGIONAL THREATS ARE AT THE LOW END OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM AND SELDOM REQUIRE THE COMMITMENT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES. FINALLY, UNPREDICTABILITY HAS ALWAYS BEEN A CENTRAL PROBLEM WHEN TRYING TO TARGET SPECIFIC CONFLICT SCENARIOS. IN THE PAST, NO ONE HAS EVER BEEN ABLE TO PREDICT THE CONTINGENCIES THAT HAVE BEEN MOST CRITICAL TO OUR SECURITY AND NO ONE WILL DO SO IN THE FUTURE EITHER.

CONFLICT SCENARIOS AND THREAT CONFIGURATIONS CAN, HOWEVER, DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCE STRUCTURES, POSTURES AND CAPABILITIES. IN THIS SENSE, THEY SERVE AS A SENSITIVITY CHECK TO INSURE THAT WARFIGHTING STRUCTURE AND CRISIS RESPONSE POSITIONING REQUIREMENTS ARE PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND FACTORED INTO THEATER LEVEL FORCE PLANNING. IN

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THE DIVERSE AND UNPREDICTABLE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION U.S. ARMY FORCES MUST BE VERSATILE, LETHAL, DEPLOYABLE AND ADAPTABLE.

SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND THREAT CONFIGURATIONS CAN ALSO BE VERY USEFUL IN SIZING AND SHAPING CONTINGENCY FORCE PACKAGES. A REVIEW OF POTENTIAL HOT SPOTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION MAKES IT OBVIOUS THAT THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICTS SPANS THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM FROM LOW TO HIGH INTENSITY, FROM INTERNAL INSTABILITY TO MAJOR WAR ON THE ASIAN MAINLAND.

CONTINGENCY FORCE PACKAGES DEVELOPED FOR NOTIONAL CONFLICT IS A POSSIBLE METHOD FOR DEALING WITH THE UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH POTENTIAL CONFLICT SCENARIOS. THE NOTIONAL CONFLICT SCENARIOS WOULD SPAN THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM AND INCLUDE TIME AND SPACE FACTORS. FLEXIBLE FORCE PACKAGES COULD RANGE FROM A TEN MAN TRAINING ASSISTANCE TEAM, TO A MULTI-CORPS, MULTI-WING, AND MAJOR FLEET FORCE. THE U.S. ARMY MUST POSSESS THE CAPABILITY TO PARTICIPATE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF A JOINT AND COMBINED TEAM WITH FORCE PACKAGES THAT MAY BE COMPOSED OF LIGHT, MEDIUM, OR HEAVY FORCES AND PREPARED TO OPERATE AT THE TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL OR STRATEGIC LEVELS OR ANY COMBINATION IN BETWEEN. SOME OF THESE FORCE PACKAGES WOULD BE WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF THEATER ALLOCATED FORCES WHILE SOME CLEARLY WOULD NOT.

AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD TO SIZE, SHAPE AND POSTURE THEATER LAND FORCES INVOLVES THE REQUIREMENTS OF PEACETIME ACTIVITIES WITH PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON FORWARD PRESENCE. THAT IS, TO USE THE DEMANDS ON U.S. FORCES FOR PRESENCE ACTIVITIES WHICH INCLUDE JOINT AND COMBINED EXERCISES, TRAINING AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE, PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES, TRAINING EXCHANGES, NATION BUILDING AND MILITARY VISITS, AS THE BASIC YARDSTICK FOR REGIONAL OR THEATER FORCE PLANNING. THESE MISSIONS PROVIDE THE RATIONALE FOR SIZING AND SHAPING THE THEATER BASELINE U.S. ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURES.

THESE BASELINE FORCE STRUCTURES, REFINED BY CONFLICT SCENARIOS AND THREAT CONFIGURATIONS MUST THEN BE ADJUSTED TO PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CRISIS. CRISIS RESPONSE CALLS FOR FORCES THAT MUST RESPOND QUICKLY, WITH ENOUGH FORCE TO DEAL WITH THE CONTINGENCY OR TO ACT AS THE SPEARHEAD FOR A LARGER FOLLOW-ON FORCE. THESE FORCES MUST BE LETHAL AND CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING AN FORCED ENTRY AND ENGAGING IN COMBAT IN DEFENSE OF U.S. INTERESTS
ANYWHERE.2

THUS, FOR A HETEROGENOUS, COMPLEX AND EXPANSIVE THEATER, IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF AMBIGUOUS THREAT, PEACETIME RATHER THAN WARTIME REQUIREMENTS WILL BE THE PRIME DETERMINANT OF THEATER LEVEL FORCE PLANNING. THE PLANNING PROCESS REMAINS A TOP-DOWN APPROACH, BUT USING PEACETIME ACTIVITIES IN PLACE OF THREATS TO DRIVE THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE FORCE. WHILE NOT AS COMPELLING AS AN UNAMBIGUOUS THREAT, THE FORWARD PRESENCE FOCUS OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT PROVIDES A MORE POSITIVE RATIONALE FOR PLANNING VERSATILE AND FLEXIBLE FORCES AND FOR CREATING A LESS DANGEROUS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

THE WARTIME ROLES OF THE VARIOUS SERVICES ARE ESTABLISHED BY PUBLIC LAW AND ARE SET OUT IN DOD DIRECTIVE 5100.1. THERE IS NO NEED TO REVIEW THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SERVICES EXCEPT TO SAY THAT ALL SERVICES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING PROMPT AND SUSTAINED COMBAT IN THEIR UNIQUE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, THE MARINE CORPS IS TASKED WITH THE SEIZURE OR DEFENSE OF ADVANCED NAVAL BASES AND FOR THE CONDUCT OF SUCH LAND OPERATIONS AS MAY BE ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSECUTION OF A NAVAL CAMPAIGN. THESE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTIONS, HOWEVER, DO NOT DO JUSTICE TO THE JOINT AND COMBINED REQUIREMENTS OF CONTEMPORARY OR FUTURE WARFARE, ESPECIALLY AS IT APPLIES IN THE EXPANSIVE AND DIVERSE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

THE ROLES AND MISSIONS INHERENT IN A MILITARY STRATEGY OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT FALL MOST HEAVILY ON THE U.S. ARMY. IT IS NOT THAT THE OTHER SERVICES HAVE NO ROLE IN THIS STRATEGY, BUT THAT THEIR ROLE IS CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE SERVICE COMPOSITIONS (WHICH FAVOR LAND FORCES) OF THE VARIOUS ASIA-PACIFIC NATIONS. AS NOTED IN CHAPTER 3, ALTHOUGH THE U.S. VIEWS THE PACIFIC AS A MARITIME THEATER, THE LAND FORCE IS THE DOMINANT SERVICE AND A MAJOR POWER FACTOR IN VIRTUALLY EVERY NATION IN THE REGION. THIS FACT ALONE OPENS UP MANY UNIQUE OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. ARMY FORCES TO OBTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF ACCESS AND

POTENTIAL INFLUENCE.

THE WARTIME ROLES OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION ARE TO:

* DEFEND ALASKA, HAWAII AND THE CONNECTING LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THE CONTINENTAL U.S.;
* ASSIST OUR ALLIES IN REGIONAL DEFENSE AS APPROPRIATE;
* CONTROL ESCALATION;
* TERMINATE CONFLICT ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO THE U.S.;
* MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE LOC’S THROUGHOUT THE PACIFIC;
* PROTECT U.S. TERRITORY AND FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES FOR WHICH THE U.S. RETAINS DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES.

THE PEACETIME ROLES OF AN AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION ARE TO:

* MAINTAIN REGIONAL STABILITY;
* SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE;
* REACT RAPIDLY TO CRISSES;
* PROMOTE THE SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY;
* LIMIT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS;
* ENCOURAGE THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY.3

ARMY ROLES AND MISSIONS: GIVEN THE ABOVE MISSIONS ARMY THEATER FORCES MUST BE CAPABLE OF OPERATING WITH OTHER SERVICES AT ALL LEVELS OF WARFARE, REACTING RAPIDLY TO CRISSES, REINFORCING CONTINGENCY FORCES, AND EXPANDING EFFECTIVELY IN THE FACE OF LARGER AND LONGER COMMITMENTS. SUFFICIENT FORCES, FAMILIAR WITH THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT, ABLE TO SPAN ALL INTENSITY LEVELS OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM, AND FUNCTION IN A WIDE VARIETY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, SHOULD BE READILY AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE EMPLOYMENT. THESE FORCES MUST BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH A MULTIPLICITY OF MISSIONS WHICH WOULD MORE THAN LIKELY INVOLVE GROUND FORCES FIGHTING AS PART OF A JOINT AND COMBINED

FORCES TEAM. DUE TO THE EVER CHANGING ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT VERSATILITY, DEPLOYABILITY, LETHALITY, AND ADAPTABILITY WILL BE KEY ATTRIBUTES OF U.S. ARMY FORCES THAT OPERATE AS PART OF THE THEATER FORCE IN A JOINT OR COMBINED ENVIRONMENT.*

WHILE THE U.S. ARMY MUST BE PREPARED FOR A WIDE VARIETY OF MISSIONS, AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON LAND CONFLICT IN THE PACIFIC THEATER HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN VIEWED FROM A VERY NARROW PERSPECTIVE. FOR THE PAST FOUR DECADES, SCENARIOS FOR U.S. ARMY WARTIME ROLES IN THE PACIFIC HAVE FOCUSED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. CONSEQUENTLY, STRATEGIC THINKERS HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO ENVISION OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN GROUND COMBAT IN ASIA. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE GROUND WAR IN VIETNAM HAS ALSO LIMITED THE EXAMINATION OF GROUND CONFLICT POSSIBILITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. FURTHERMORE, MANY SCENARIOS FOR CONFLICT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION FALL INTO THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ARENA, WITH INSURGENCIES BEING THE PROMINENT FORM OF CONFLICT. THIS HARDLY CALLS FOR A MAJOR ROLE FOR U.S. LAND FORCES AS IT HAS BECOME AN ARTICLE OF FAITH IN MANY QUARTERS THAT IT IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR A NON-INDEPENDENT FORCE TO DEFEAT A STAGE ONE INSURGENCY.⁵

NEVERTHELESS, SEVERAL POTENTIAL HOT SPOTS IN THE REGION INCLUDE SCENARIOS THAT COULD INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT GROUND FORCE EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDED IN THIS CATEGORY ARE: A FORCEFUL TAKEOVER OF TAIWAN BY CHINA; A CHINESE CIVIL WAR RESULTING IN A MAJOR NEO OPERATION; A WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN; A WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA; A CONFLICT IN INDO-CHINA; CONFLICT BETWEEN INDONESIA AND AUSTRALIA; AND OF COURSE A NORTH KOREAN ATTACK ON THE SOUTH. THESE SCENARIOS DO NOT INCLUDE THE EVER PRESENT BUT INCALCULABLE FORCES OF UNCERTAINTY.

THE POTENTIAL OF CONFLICT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE PROBABILITY OF U.S. GROUND FORCE INVOLVEMENT IS HIGH. MOST OBSERVERS WOULD CONTENT, WITH GOOD

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JUSTIFICATION, THAT IN FACT THE PROBABILITY IS LOW. UNCERTAINTY AND UNPREDICTABLE DISCONTINUITIES, HOWEVER, HAVE HISTORICALLY INVALIDATED THE BEST OF PROBABILITIES. IN A REGION THAT CONTAINS SEVEN (SOVIET UNION, CHINA, VIETNAM, BURMA, LAOS, CAMBODIA, NORTH KOREA) OF THE WORLD'S RECIDIVIST SOCIALIST REGIMES, IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO BE PREPARED FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. GROUND FORCES.

THE PEACETIME ROLES FOR THE U.S. ARMY IN THE PACIFIC MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD DEVELOPING A COOPERATIVE AND STABLE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ARMY, AS PART OF AN OVERALL AMERICAN MILITARY EFFORT, SHOULD BE ENGAGED IN THE REGION IN SUCH A WAY THAT WOULD DECREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE FOR THE CONFLICT SCENARIOS DISCUSSED ABOVE. THIS WILL REQUIRE A LONG TERM, PROACTIVE STRATEGY THAT SEeks TO DEAL WITH THE SOURCES OF INSTABILITY AS MUCH AS WITH THE SYMPTOMS. IN THIS SENSE, PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT COULD BE SAID TO EMPHASIZE PRECLUSION STRATEGIES AS OPPOSED TO DETERRENT STRATEGIES.

ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING REGIONAL STABILITY REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY COMPOSED OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY ELEMENTS. AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE JOINT PACOM TEAM, THE U.S. ARMY HAS A PRIMARY ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION THROUGH AGGRESSIVE AND MULTIFACETED FORWARD PRESENCE ACTIVITIES. INVOLVEMENT IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE, JOINT AND COMBINED EXERCISES, NATION BUILDING, TRAINING ASSISTANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS, ALL CONTRIBUTE TO OBTAINING ACCESS AND INFLUENCE. ACCESS AND INFLUENCE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO: THE BUILDING OF COALITIONS; LIMITING ARMS ACQUISITION AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION; IMPLEMENTING ARMS CONTROL MEASURES TO INCREASE SECURITY; AND ENCOURAGING INDIGENOUS DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY AND BURDEN SHARING.

THE EXECUTION OF THESE FORWARD PRESENCE ACTIVITIES ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO REGIONAL DETERRENCE AND CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES. DEMONSTRATING U.S. ARMY CAPABILITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER AMERICAN SERVICES AND REGIONAL ARMIES ADDS TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. DETERRENT. EXERCISES, VISITS, TRAINING ASSISTANCE AND LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS AND PREPOSITIONING CONTRIBUTE TO THE ARMY'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO CRISSES IN THE REGION.

AIRFORCE ROLES AND MISSIONS: THE WARTIME ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE IS INEXTRICABLY TIED TO ITS ABILITY TO RAPIDLY CONCENTRATE MASSIVE AND

73

U.S. AIR FORCE PEACETIME ROLES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD OBTAINING ACCESS AND MAINTAINING INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE REGION. PARTICIPATION IN JOINT AND COMBINED EXERCISES FACILITATES ACCESS, IMPROVES INTEROPERABILITY, AND FAMILIARIZES PILOTS WITH DIFFERENT REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTS. TRAINING OF ALLIED AND FRIENDLY AIR FORCES OFFER OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS. TRAINING ASSISTANCE CAN IMPROVE STANDARDIZATION AS CAN EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS AND SALES. COOPERATIVE SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS CAN OFFER UNIQUE OPPORTUNITIES FOR GAINING ACCESS AND IMPROVING INFLUENCE. WHILE THE AIR FORCE IS NOT ALWAYS A HIGHLY VISIBLE SERVICE, FREQUENT EXERCISE OF LANDING RIGHTS, AIR BASE UTILIZATION, AND AIR MOVEMENTS OF NATIONAL INFLUENCE CAN MAINTAIN A REASONABLE LEVEL OF FORWARD PRESENCE.

NAVY ROLES AND MISSIONS: THE ROLES OF THE NAVY INCLUDES SEA CONTROL, POWER PROJECTION, AND STRATEGIC SEALIFT. IN SOME SITUATIONS SEA CONTROL MAY BE A PRECONDITION FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE POWER PROJECTION AND SEALIFT ROLES. IN THE POWER PROJECTION ROLE, NAVAL FORCES HAVE MANY INHERENT ADVANTAGES. CARRIER OR LHD/LHA BASED AIR POWER IS HIGHLY MOBILE, FLEXIBLE AND REQUIRES NO DIPLOMATIC CONCESSIONS, AND PROVIDES A RELATIVELY SAFE, SECURE, AND SELF-SUFFICIENT AIRFIELD AND LOGISTIC BASE. NAVAL FORCES ARE OFTEN THE FIRST AMERICAN MILITARY ELEMENTS TO ARRIVE ON THE SCENE OF A CRISIS. WITHOUT AN ACCOMPANYING GROUND FORCE CAPABILITY OR THE SURGE CAPABILITY OF LAND-BASED AIR POWER, NAVAL FORCES MAY BE INADEQUATE IN SOME DETERRENCE OR CRISIS RESPONSE SITUATIONS.

GIVEN THE OPPOSING NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURES EXISTING IN THE PACIFIC IN THE TRANSITION DECADE AND BEYOND, SEA CONTROL MAY NOT BE THE NAVY'S PRIMARY
MISSION. WHEN SEA CONTROL DOES BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE PACIFIC REGION IT WILL MORE THAN LIKELY BE FOCUSED ALONG THE LITTORALS. THE TRADITIONAL MAHANIAN INJUNCTION THAT THE PROPER OBJECTIVE OF A NAVY IS THE ENEMY’S NAVY, MAY NOT BE APPLICABLE IN A MARITIME THEATER WHICH CONTAINS A GREATER PREponderANCE OF LAND FORCES THAN NAVAL FORCES. THE ROLES OF THE U.S. NAVY IN THE PACIFIC WILL FOCUS ON THE USE OF NAVAL POWER PROJECTION IN THE FORM OF SEA-BASED AIR POWER TO SUPPORT AIRLAND CAMPAIGNS AND AS A COMPONENT OF TRANSCOM, ON STRATEGIC SEALIFT TO MOVE LAND FORCES TO THE SCENE OF CONFLICT.6

BECAUSE THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IS A MARITIME THEATER, THE U.S. NAVY WILL PLAY A SIGNIFICANT PEACETIME ROLE WITH SHIP VISITS, TRAINING EXCHANGES AND ASSISTANCE, AND WITH PARTICIPATION IN JOINT AND COMBINED BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL EXERCISES. ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS THE NAVY PROVIDES A VISIBLE AND HIGHLY MOBILE PRESENCE IN THE THEATER.


IN PEACETIME THE MARINE CORPS CAN PARTICIPATE IN JOINT AND COMBINED EXERCISES WITH LAND, NAVAL AND OTHER MARINE FORCES THROUGHOUT THE REGION. TEN COUNTRIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION HAVE MARINE TYPE FORCES RANGING IN SIZE FROM BATTALION TO MULTI-DIVISION UNITS. THESE FORCES PROVIDE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S. MARINE UNITS TO ENGAGE IN FORWARD PRESENCE ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COMBINED EXERCISES, HIGH LEVEL VISITS, TRAINING ASSISTANCE, AND PERSONNEL EXCHANGES. WITH THEIR ESTABLISHED REPUTATION, MATURE DOCTRINE, AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE THE U.S. MARINE CORPS HAS MUCH TO OFFER TO REGIONAL MILITARY FORCES.

SPECIAL OPERATING FORCES ROLES AND MISSIONS: SPECIAL OPERATING FORCES (SOF) PROVIDE UNIQUE AND CRITICAL CAPABILITIES IN BOTH PEACETIME AND AT EVERY LEVEL OF CONFLICT IN WARTIME. THE STRUCTURE, TRAINING, AND MISSION OBJECTIVES

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OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATING FORCES COMBINE TO PROVIDE A COMPACT, VERSATILE, DEPLOYABLE, LETHAL AND ADAPTABLE FORCE. IN WARTIME SOF CAN OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH U.S. CONVENTIONAL FORCES AS WELL AS THE FORCES OF OTHER NATIONS. SOF CAN SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS THROUGH DIRECT ACTION, SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE, LONG RANGE SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. SOF CAN OPERATE DEEP IN THE ENEMY'S REAR TO DISRUPT COMMAND AND CONTROL, DESTROY SPECIAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS, AND DISRUPT LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN ORDER TO DISLOCATE ENEMY OPERATIONAL EFFORTS.

A PROACTIVE MILITARY STRATEGY FOCUSING ON PEACETIME ACTIVITIES HARNESS THE TALENT, TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND DOCTRINE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO DETER CONFLICT, TO OFFER OPPORTUNITIES TO ASSIST ALLIED AND FRIENDLY NATIONS, AND TO CONDUCT LOW-TO-HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS. THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORIENTATION OF THE SOF MAKE THEM ESPECIALLY VALUABLE IN SUPPORTING A PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC THEATER. WITH THEIR SPECIAL LANGUAGE AND AREA STUDIES SKILLS SOF ARE ABLE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN SITUATIONS WHERE MORE CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. CONDUCTING FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS SPEAKS TO THE ESSENCE OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT AS A PROACTIVE AND POSITIVE STRATEGY DIRECTED AT CAUSES AND NOT SYMPTOMS.

ORGANIZATION


TO ENHANCE THE MULTI-SERVICE EMPLOYMENT OF ITS FORCES, PACOM SHOULD ORGANIZE A STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING CELL TO PLAN FOR THEATER WIDE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. THIS PLANNING CELL WOULD ALSO COORDINATE THEATER WIDE JOINT PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES. SUCH A CELL WOULD SERVE AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION PROMOTING IF NOT MANDATING JOINT OPERATIONS. IT MIGHT BE FEASIBLE TO ORGANIZE TWO STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING CELLS WITH ONE

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ORIENTED TOWARD NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE OTHER TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA/SOUTH ASIA. THE ALASKA COMMAND (ALCOM) WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHOUT CHANGE AS A SUB-UNIFIED COMMAND UNDER CINCPAC.

THE U.S. ARMY STRUCTURE

IN THE TRANSITION DECADE AND BEYOND THE UNITED STATES ARMY STRUCTURE FOR THE PACIFIC IS CONTINGENT PRIMARILY ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. WHILE THE KOREAN PROBLEM IS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO U.S. DEFENSE PLANNERS, THE DISCUSSION BELOW ASSUMES THAT KOREA WILL NOT BE THE FOCUS OF AMERICAN DEFENSE EFFORTS IN THE MID TO LONG TERM (10 TO 20 YEARS). IN ORDER TO "LOOK BEYOND KOREA" THE DISCUSSION BELOW FURTHER ASSUMES THAT THE KOREAN ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED EITHER BECAUSE OF SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY PREEMINENCE OR DUE TO REUNIFICATION. CONSEQUENTLY THE 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN AND ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN COMBINED WITH THE 6TH ID IN ALASKA. NEEDLESS TO SAY, U.S. ACTIONS IN THE TRANSITION DECADE WILL HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM.

BY THE MIDDLE TO LATE 1990'S THE UNITED STATES ARMY PACIFIC (USARPAC) SHOULD BE THE ONLY ARMY MACOM IN THE THEATER WHEN THE EIGHTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS IS DEACTIVATED. THE ROK WILL ASSUME THE LEADING ROLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA WITH COMBINED FORCES COMMAND (CFC) BEING TURNED OVER TO ROK FORCES. THE COMBINED FIELD ARMY CAN ALSO BE DEACTIVATED AND THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND CAN BE DEACTIVATED OR ITS FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED TO EITHER CINCPAC OR USARPAC IF POLITICAL CONDITIONS WARRANT.

A FORWARD HEADQUARTERS WITH A ROBUST COMMAND AND CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY, AND A LOGISTICS SUPPORT COMMAND, UNDER THE COMMANDER U.S. FORCES KOREA (USFK) WOULD REMAIN AS THE ONLY U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE ROK. THESE UNITS COULD SERVE AS LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL RECEPTION UNITS FOR FORCES RETURNING IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS. DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD A HEAVY DIVISION POMCUS SET COULD BE PREPOSITIONED IN THE SOUTH AS A HEDGE AGAINST UNCERTAINTY. ADDITIONALLY, COMBAT UNITS COULD DEPLOY ON PERIODIC ROTATIONS AS THE STRATEGIC SITUATION DEMANDS.

THE STRUCTURE OF U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC THEATER MUST SUPPORT THE WARTIME AND PEACETIME ROLES AND MISSIONS AS SET FORTH ABOVE. THE ATTRIBUTES OF VERSATILITY, DEPLOYABILITY, LETHALITY, AND ADAPTABILITY ARE ESPECIALLY
APPROPRIATE TO THE UNCERTAINTY, GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSE, DIFFUSION OF MILITARY
POWER, AND THE DIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC THEATER.¹

THE UNCERTAINTY OF TIME, LOCATION, AND NATURE OF THREATS TO U.S. VITAL
INTERESTS DICTATES A VERSATILE FORCE ABLE TO COUNTER A WIDE ARRAY OF
UNPREDICTABLE THREATS. VERSATILITY REQUIRES THE CORRECT MIX OF FORCES,
ADEQUATE SUSTAINMENT, INTENSIVE TRAINING, FREQUENT EXERCISES, AND A
CONFIGURATION THAT ALLOWS FOR RAPID TAILORING OF APPROPRIATE FORCE PACKAGES.
DEPLOYABILITY DEMANDS FORCES THAT ARE HIGHLY READY, THAT ARE CAPABLE OF
CONDUCTING FORCED ENTRY OPERATIONS, THAT ARE LIGHT ENOUGH TO BE MOVED YET
HEAVY ENOUGH TO FIGHT AND WIN, THAT ARE LOCATED TO FACILITATE AIR AND SEA LIFT,
THAT HAVE ACCESS TO PREPOSITIONED STOCKS, AND THAT ARE STRUCTURED IN SELF
SUSTAINING FORCE PACKAGES. LEATHALITY DICTATES COMBAT READY, MODERNIZED
FORCES THAT CAN STRIKE DEEP WITH OVERWHELMING FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY, AND
OUT MANEUVER ENEMY FORCE WITH SURPRISE AND HIGH OPERATIONAL TEMPOS.
ADAPTABILITY REQUIRES A PROFESSIONAL ARMY THAT CAN LEAD MULTINATIONAL FORCES
AND OPERATE WITH A MULTIPLICITY OF OTHER ARMIES. THE U.S ARMY IN THE PACIFIC
MUST ACQUIRE A MORE COSMOPOLITAN OUTLOOK WITH RESPECT TO MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONS BOTH IN WAR AND PEACE.

UNDER USARPAC CONTROL, A CORPS HEADQUARTERS WITH THREE TO FOUR GROUND
DIVISIONS AND ONE TACTICAL AIR DIVISION WOULD CONSTITUTE A VERSATILE AND LETHAL
CORPS AND WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN SIZE AND STRUCTURE TO ACCOMPLISH VARIOUS
THEATER MISSIONS. THE INCLUSION OF A CORPS AS THE PACIFIC THEATER'S OPERATIONAL
LEVEL GROUND HEADQUARTERS HAS IMPORTANT RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF
BOTH PEACETIME AND WARTIME OPERATIONS. THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS WHICH COULD
PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS
IS THE IDEAL ORGANIZATION TO ACT AS A JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
ADDITIONALLY, THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS IS THE LOWEST LEVEL OF LAND FORCE
ORGANIZATION SPECIFICALLY CAPABLE OF FUNCTIONING AS A CONTINGENCY PLANNING
HEADQUARTERS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR. THE I CORPS HEADQUARTERS,
PRESENTLY STATIONED AT FT LEWIS, WOULD BE THE IDEAL CANDIDATE TO BE THE PACOM
OPERATIONAL LEVEL LAND FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

¹ THE DISCUSSION BELOW DRAWS HEAVILY FROM GENERAL CARL E. VUONO'S STATEMENT
BEFORE THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 20
FEBRUARY 1991.
THE PEACETIME IMPLICATIONS OF A FORWARD POSITIONED CORPS HEADQUARTERS FOR THE PACOM THEATER INCLUDES AN IMPROVED CAPABILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF HIGH LEVEL MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES, A HIGHER LEVEL OF U.S. MILITARY REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITIES, THE ABILITY TO EXCHANGE EXPERIENCES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR, AND THE CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND NATION BUILDING ACTIVITIES WITH THE EXPANDED ORGANIC ASSETS OF A CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

THE I CORPS, AS THE PACIFIC THEATER CORPS SHOULD BE LOCATED IN HAWAII. POSITIONING THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS IN HAWAII HAS IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES. WHILE STILL ON U.S. TERRITORY, Basing THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS IN HAWAII PUTS THIS MAJOR UNIT SQUARELY IN THE PACIFIC THEATER. IF POLITICAL CONDITIONS PERMIT, A FORWARD COMMAND POST COULD BE LOCATED IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. ADDITIONALLY, SUCH A CORPS FORWARD HEADQUARTERS COULD SERVE AS A NORTHEAST ASIA CONTINGENCY PLANNING AGENCY AND AS THE NUCLEUS OF A NORTHEAST ASIA JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS.


EACH DIVISION WOULD ALSO HAVE A COMBAT AVIATION MANEUVER BRIGADE ORGANIZED WITH TWO ASSAULT LIFT BATTALIONS (UH-60), ONE ATTACK BATTALION (LHX AND AH-64), ONE MEDIUM LIFT BATTALION (CH-47), AND A MIXED GROUND-AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON (M-3 AND LHX). THIS TRIPLE CAPABILITY WOULD PROVIDE

79

These divisions with the versatility, lethality, and mobility required of units that will have to operate in the diverse Asia-Pacific environment. In addition to the obvious combat related advantages of the this triple capability, the advantages to the conduct of a broad range of peacetime activities can be significant. Most of the helicopter assets from these two divisions, with the exception of the AH-64, could self deploy to almost any location in the theater if sufficient base rights were available. The airlift requirement for these divisions would be on the order of 750 to 800 C-141 equivalent sorties. This compares with 500 and 3000 sorties for the light and heavy divisions respectively.

The 4th Mech Division provides the Corps with its heavy firepower punch. To increase the level of operational tempo this division would consist of two heavy brigades and two air maneuver brigades. The air maneuver brigades would be organized with three attack battalions, one heavy lift battalion and one air assault company. The two aviation maneuver brigades provide increased flexibility, firepower and tactical and operational mobility free of the restraints of terrain.

The Air Division would consist of one wing of A-10 aircraft (72) and an aviation maneuver brigade composed of three attack battalions (AH-64 and LHX) and two medium lift battalions (CH-47). The Air Division provides the Corps commander the ability to strike deep, to control close air support, and to mass fires of unprecedented lethality. While the Air Division may place Army personnel in non-traditional roles in the case of A-10 operations, finally achieves the complete integration of air and land operations.

The 199th BDE would function as the Corps cavalry force. This unit would be composed of two motorized squadrons (HMMWV) and one air cavalry squadron (LHX).

Positioning the 4th and the 199th at Ft Lewis facilitates movement to the port of Seattle Tacoma where a second contingent of eight SL-7 fast sealift ships or a suitable number of roll-on roll-off ships would be home ported. SL-

ARE PREFERABLE DUE TO THE VAST DISTANCES TO BE TRAVERSED IN THE REGION. THESE SHIPS WOULD BE USED BOTH IN PEACETIME EXERCISES AND IN WARTIME TO MOVE THESE HEAVIER UNITS TO OPERATIONAL AREAS IN THE THEATER. THE PROXIMITY OF FT LEWIS TO MCCORD AIR BASE ALSO FACILITATES RAPID AILIFT DEPLOYMENT OF SELECTED AVIATION UNITS OF THE 4TH DIVISION AND THE BULK OF THE 199TH BRIGADE.

THE STATIONING OF THE 6TH ID AT FT WAINWRIGHT PLACES THIS UNIT IN THE THEATER IN A LOCATION RELATIVELY CLOSE TO THE POTENTIAL HOT SPOTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA. IT ALSO PUTS IT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO EIELSON AIR FORCE BASE TO FACILITATE STRATEGIC AILIFT. SEASONAL CONDITIONS PERMITTING, THE AVIATION MANEUVER BRIGADE HELICOPTERS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE AH-64) COULD SELF DEPLOY TO NORTHEAST ASIA AND BEYOND IF NECESSARY.

AIR FORCE STRUCTURE

THE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR TACTICAL AIR FORCES CAN BE DRIVEN BY THE LAND FORCE STRUCTURE. THIS IMPLIES A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR AND LAND ELEMENTS OF A MILITARY FORCE AS REPRESENTED IN THE U.S. ARMY'S AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE. IN FACT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR AND LAND ASSETS SHOULD BE SO CLOSE THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SPEAK OF AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE AS A SERVICE PECULIAR DOCTRINE.11 SUCH A VIEWPOINT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE NUMBER OF GROUND UNITS WOULD DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF AIR UNITS. IN THIS REGARD A RULE OF THUMB IS THAT EACH GROUND DIVISION REQUIRES THE SUPPORT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF TO TWO TACTICAL AIR WINGS.12

SUCH A FORCE PLANNING CONSTRUCT IS NOT MEANT TO IMPLY THAT THE AIR FORCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE LAND FORCES, BUT THAT WARFARE IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND BEYOND WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY A BLURRING OF THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONAL SERVICE DISTINCTIONS. IN FACT, WITH A DEGREE OF CAUTION, IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT THE EXPERIENCE IN THE IRAQ WAR HAS STOOD THE TRADITIONAL TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND AND AIR FORCES ON ITS HEAD. IN THE IRAQ WAR, THE LAND FORCES IN THEIR TRADITIONAL ROLE, CLOSED WITH THE ENEMY BY FIRE AND MANEUVER. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, THE LAND FORCES MANEUVERED IN


such a manner to force the enemy into a position so that air power could be brought to bear for decisive effect. this maneuver warfare strategy, in the best tradition of airland battle doctrine, places land forces in role supporting the application of air power. 1

air wings would best be organized as composite wings that include all the functional areas necessary to conduct airland warfare. the principle to be followed is to organize units as they would operate in combat. to further improve operational effectiveness some composite wings should develop habitual supporting relationships with specific ground divisions. this may involve some peacetime inefficiencies, but the resulting increase in combat effectiveness would represent a more than adequate compensation. each composite wing could include some combination of reconnaissance, strike, electronic warfare, air defense, forward air control, and refueling capabilities. mixes of the units could then easily form pre-selected force packages. 2

the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1991 contained a provision to transfer air force a-10 close air support (cas) aircraft to the army and marines on a one-for-one basis with the retirement of the army ov-1 mohawk observation aircraft and marine ov-10 aircraft respectively. 3 the intention of this provision is that the a-10's would be converted to observation aircraft.

instead, consideration should be given to assigning the close air support mission and all a-10 aircraft to the army and the marines. for the army in the pacific, an a-10 wing (72 aircraft) could be assigned at the corps level as part of an aviation division composed of fixed and rotary wing air craft for close integration into the airland battle plan. command and control, surveillance, interdiction and counterair missions would be retained by the

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1 this role reversal between air and land warfare functions was discussed in the context of rotary wing aircraft by major anthony m. coroalles. in "the master weapon: the tactical thought of j.f.c. fuller applied to future warfare," military review, january 1991. p. 71.


3 benjamin f. schemmer, "congress mandates air force transfer its a-10 aircraft to army and marines," armed forces journal international, december 1990. p. 20.
AIR FORCE AS WOULD SURGE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS. THIS LATTER MISSION COULD BE PERFORMED BY DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AS THE THEATER COMMANDER DIRECTS.

IN A SIMILAR VEIN, STRATEGIC AIR TRANSPORT ASSETS SHOULD BE ALLOCATED TO THE THEATER ON THE BASIS OF ONE HALF A WING FOR EACH GROUND DIVISION. THIS WOULD TRANSLATE TO 6 TO 8 WINGS AS FOLLOWS: 2 WINGS C-17 AND ONE WING C-5A (ACTIVE); AND 1 OR 2 WINGS C-5A, 2 WINGS C-141, AND 1 OR 2 WINGS UPGRADED C-130 (RESERVE). AT BEST THESE AIRLIFT ASSETS SHOULD BE COLLOCATED WITH OR LOCATED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO MAJOR GROUND FORCE UNITS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE RAPID DEPLOYABILITY CONDITIONS. MORE REALISTICALLY, THEATER GROUND UNITS SHOULD BE LOCATED IN PROXIMITY TO AIRFIELDS THAT HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO HANDLE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT ASSETS ON SHORT NOTICE.

NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE

NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO PLAN. CLEARLY, DUE TO THE DECLINE IN THE SOVIET THREAT TO PURSUE A GLOBAL WAR, A LESS ROBUST MARITIME STRATEGY IS APPROPRIATE. WITHOUT THE OVERWHELMING THREAT OF GLOBAL WAR THE NAVY LABORS UNDER A SIMILAR THEATER LEVEL FORCE PLANNING DILEMMA THAT U.S. GROUND FORCES FACE. AS A RESULT, NAVAL FORCE PLANNING COULD WELL USE THE SAME METHODOLOGY USED BY GROUND FORCES, THAT IS TO RELY ON THE PEACETIME REQUIREMENTS OF FORWARD PRESENCE TO STRUCTURE AND POSTURE THE BASELINE PACIFIC NAVAL FORCES. SUBSEQUENTLY, THEATER DETERRENCE AND CRISIS RESPONSE MISSIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO REFINE THE NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND DEPLOYMENT FRAMEWORKS.

PEACETIME REQUIREMENTS OF COMBINED EXERCISES, SHIP VISITS, AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE, REQUIRE AT LEAST ONE CARRIER GROUP ON STATION IN THE EAST ASIA REGION WITH THE FOCUS OF EFFORT BEING IN THE NORTHEAST ASIA AREA. PERIODIC DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR PEACETIME REQUIREMENTS IN THAT REGION. DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS COULD BE ADJUSTED ACCORDING TO THE POLITICAL-MILITARY CLIMATE IN THE VARIOUS SUB-REGIONS. SURGE DEPLOYMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE FACE OF A REGIONAL CRISIS OF APPROPRIATE SIZE AND SCOPE.

NORMAL ROTATION AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS WOULD LEAD TO A FORCE STRUCTURE OF FIVE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS FOR THE THEATER. GIVEN THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT IN THE REGION, CVBGs COULD SAFELY BE REDUCED IN SIZE FROM THE
PRESENT 8 OR 10 SHIPS TO 4 SHIPS FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, SURFACE ACTION GROUPS (SAG) OF 3 OR 4 SHIPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUPS (ARG) OF 4 SHIPS (WITH A WASP CLASS LHD OR A TARAWA CLASS LHA) COULD FULFILL PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT MISSIONS AS EFFECTIVELY AS CVBGs, WITH FAR FEWER ASSETS AND AT A MUCH LOWER COST. THESE VARIOUS GROUPS COULD BE COMBINED AS REQUIRED BY THE RISE OF SPECIFIC THREATS.

ARGs ORGANIZED AROUND AN LHD OR AN LHA, PROVIDE A HIGH LEVEL OF FLEXIBILITY AND VERSATILITY FOR PEACETIME PRESENCE ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS FOR SOME CRISIS RESPONSE MISSIONS. IN MANY SITUATIONS CVBGs, EVEN REDUCED IN SCALE, WOULD EXCEED THE REASONABLE NEEDS OF BOTH PRESENCE AND CRISIS RESPONSE MISSIONS. NOT ONLY ARE CVBGs INEFFICIENT IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, BUT THEY COULD BE CONSIDERED INTIMIDATING OR OFFENSIVE BY SOME REGIONAL POWERS.\(^6\) IN THIS CONTEXT A CASE COULD BE MADE THAT CARRIER BATTLE GROUP PRESENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION CAN BE SAFELY REDUCED. THIS WOULD PERMIT ONE OR TWO CARRIERS TO BE PLACED IN A RESERVE STATUS REDUCING THE OVERALL WORLD WIDE FLEET SIZE TO 10 CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS.

A PORTION OF THE STRIKE ROLE OF CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT CAN BE PERFORMED BY SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (SCLM) WITH GREAT EFFECT AND AT LESS RISK. WHILE LACKING THE FLEXIBILITY OF CARRIER STRIKE AIRCRAFT, LAUNCHING SUCH EFFECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATING WEAPONS FROM SUBMERSIBLE PLATFORMS ADDS A MEASURE OF PRECISION, SECURITY, AND SAFETY NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE WITH COMPARABLE CARRIER OPERATIONS.

**MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE**

MARINE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE PACIFIC THEATER WOULD CONSIST OF ONE MARINE DIVISION OF THREE ACTIVE BRIGADES. SUFFICIENT AIR AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO CONSTITUTE THREE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADES (MEB). THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (MEU) AFOAT OR A ARG/MEU PROVIDE EXCELLENT FLEXIBILITY AND A HIGH DEGREE OF MOBILITY FOR FORWARD PRESENCE ACTIVITIES. DEPENDING ON THE MISSION, THE MEF OR SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS ARE CAPABLE OF OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OR UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A JOINT TASK

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FORCE COMMANDER OR THE THEATER LAND FORCE COMMANDER. THIS MARINE FORCE WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY FOR FORWARD PRESENCE MISSIONS, FOR PROJECTING NAVAL POWER ASHORE AND AS ONE OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE.

BASING

THE BASING OF U.S. FORCES, LOGISTICS FACILITIES, INTELLIGENCE, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL COMPONENTS IN THE PACIFIC THEATER WILL BE FURTHER RESTRICTED IN THE TRANSITION DECADE AND BEYOND. RISING NATIONALISM, RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. FORCE USE, CONFLICTING THREAT PERCEPTIONS, ALL COMBINE WITH U.S. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PRESSURES TO BRING INTO QUESTION CONTINUED PERMANENT ACCESS TO OVERSEAS BASES.

THEATER DEPLOYMENTS OF ALL AMERICAN COMBAT FORCES SHOULD BE ON U.S. TERRITORY BY THE YEAR 2000. SOME INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, COMMAND AND CONTROL, SUPPORT AND LOGISTICS FACILITIES MAY REMAIN ON NON-U.S. TERRITORY, SUCH AS THE FACILITIES LOCATED IN JAPAN. TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENTS OR ROTATIONS OF U.S. FORCES SHOULD BE MADE WHERE EVER POSSIBLE THROUGHOUT THE REGION.

REPLACING EXISTING BASES SUCH AS SUBIC, CLARK, WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE. A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY MUST BE PUT INTO EFFECT WHICH INCLUDES TEMPORARY BASING RIGHTS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE THEATER, PREPOSITIONED ASSETS, RESTRUCTURING FORCES FOR IMPROVED DEPLOYABILITY, TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES, AND GREATER USE OF U.S. TERRITORIES FURTHER OUT IN THE PACIFIC.

WHILE THERE ARE OBVIOUS DRAWBACKS TO VACATING LONG TERM, EFFECTIVE FACILITIES, THERE ARE SOME ADVANTAGES. DECENTRALIZING LOGISTICS AND BASING FACILITIES WOULD MAKE THEM LESS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK, LOCATING THEM ON U.S. TERRITORY INCREASES SECURITY, REDUCES SOURCES OF POLITICAL FRICTION, ELIMINATES RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCES, AND ALLAYS AMERICAN DOMESTIC CONCERNS.

Restructuring U.S. forces to improve deployability must be accomplished while giving proper consideration to maintaining the mission capability of the forces. Technology, organizational structures and deployment patterns can all contribute to improved deployability. Technology must be focused to increase lethality, reduce weight, and streamline support requirements. Innovative organizational patterns must be designed to reduce unit size, to better synchronize organic and supporting assets, and to improve joint operational capability. Deployment patterns utilizing the concept of echelonment rearward, where smaller elements of a unit are forward deployed and supported by sophisticated communications technology, can be a part of the answer.\(^\text{17}\)

The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy proposed a number of technological fixes to compensate for reduced foreign basing. Included in these proposals are the following:

- **Arapaho Concept of Various Types of Support Units Organized Into Specially Configured Modules That Can Be Loaded Into Any International Standard Organization Containers.** These containers could then be loaded on any container ship which then becomes a floating base of operations.

- **Other Concepts Include Deployable Waterfront Facilities, Mobile Platforms as Air Bases for Fixed Wing Aircraft, Superships as Air Bases and Floating Equipment Depots, Very Fast Advanced Cargo Ships, and Low Cost Long Endurance Aircraft.\(^\text{18}\)**

Maximum use must be made of U.S. territory as far forward in the theater as possible. Use of Guam and Hawaii could be expanded. Limited restoration of former U.S. military facilities on Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas, and on Palau, located further south would contribute to the U.S. strategic status in the region. Saipan and Tinian could be developed for the Air Force and Palau for the Navy and the Air Force.\(^\text{19}\) Maritime prepositioned ships (MPS). Prepositioned stocks of supplies (classes I, III, V, VII, and IX). And

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\(^2\) Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, ibid, p. 46.

LOGISTICS FACILITIES COULD BE LOCATED ON ANY OF THE ISLANDS. U.S. ARMY FORCES COULD BE EITHER PERMANENTLY STATIONED OR ROTATED INTO THESE BASES FOR 3 TO 6 MONTH PERIODS FOR REGIONAL TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT THAT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER THAT THE ARMY MUST OPERATE NOT ONLY WITH THE OTHER SERVICE BUT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE JOINT WARFARE TEAM. THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF CHOICE OR DOCTRINAL NICETY, IT IS A MATTER OF THE GRAVEST NECESSITY. JOINT OPERATIONS ARE AN IMPERATIVE OF BOTH PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT AND WARFIGHTING. AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE IS IN PART AN ATTEMPT TO INSTITUTIONALIZE JOINT OPERATIONS OF LAND AND AIR COMPONENTS. IN A SYNERGISTIC EFFECT THE SUM OF THE JOINT COMPONENTS ADDS UP TO MUCH MORE THAN THEIR CONSTITUENT PARTS. IN MANY INSTANCES THE ARMY WILL FIGHT ON THE GROUND ALONG SIDE THE U.S. MARINES. IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THE AIR FORCE ROLE OF CONTROLLING ALL FIXED WING AIR ASSETS IN AN AIR OPERATION, THE ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDER SHOULD CONTROL ALL GROUND FORCES ENGAGED IN THE SAME OPERATION.

THE U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC INEVITABLY WILL BE IN SITUATIONS WHERE THEY WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS ALONG SIDE OTHER NATIONS. GIVEN THE PROSPECTIVE PACIFIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE REDUCTIONS IN U.S. CAPABILITY, COMBINED OPERATIONS AND COALITION WARFARE WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT. THIS MAY INVOLVE PARTICIPATION WITH FORMAL OR AD HOC COALITIONS. IN EITHER CASE THE ARMY MUST BE READY. PRIOR PREPARATION THROUGH FORWARD PRESENCE ACTIVITIES, SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, AND COMBINED PLANNING ARE THE MINIMUM ESSENTIALS FOR FUTURE SUCCESS IN WHAT IS SURE TO BE A MULTINATIONAL ARENA.

CONCLUSION

THE INTENT OF THIS PAPER WAS TO TAKE THE READER THROUGH A PROCESS WHICH CONSIDERED THE DRAMATIC CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN GENERAL AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION SPECIFICALLY AND PROPOSE AN AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THESE CHANGES. THE TOP DOWN APPROACH TO FORCE PLANNING WAS
CONSIDERED AN APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY TO TRAVERSE THIS COMPLEX SUBJECT. A MAJOR MODIFICATION TO THE METHODOLOGY WAS MADE TO ACCOMMODATE THE EMERGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT. THE LACK OF A CLEAR AND COMPELLING THREAT AND THE CONSEQUENT FOCUS ON GLOBAL STABILITY DEMANDED THE SUBSTITUTION OF PEACETIME REQUIREMENTS AS THE FORCE PLANNING DRIVER.

THE EMERGING GLOBAL TRENDS POINTED TO A SHIFT IN THE WORLD STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY FROM EUROPE/SOVIET UNION TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. IN THE DYNAMIC EAST ASIA REGION JAPAN STANDS OUT AS THE CLEAR FOCAL POINT FOR U.S. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC EFFORTS. PARADOXICALLY, THE PACIFIC REGION IS BY GEOGRAPHY A MARITIME THEATER, BUT IN TERMS OF ATTITUDE AND FORCE STRUCTURE IT HAS A DOMINANT LAND FORCE ORIENTATION.

GIVEN THE ABOVE CONDITIONS, AN IDEAL FORCE STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED TO MEET THE POSITIVE AND PROACTIVE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS.
### ANNEX A: TABLE 1. STRATEGIC AND FORCE PLANNING CONTRASTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1945-1990</th>
<th>1990-2010</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COLD WAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIPOLAR STRUCTURE</td>
<td>UNI- OR MULTI-POLAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILITARY OVER ECONOMIC</td>
<td>CURRENCY OF POWER</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONTAINMENT</td>
<td>NATIONAL OBJECTIVE</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURASIAN HEARTLAND CENTER OF GRAVITY</td>
<td>ASIA-PACIFIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>REACTIVE/NEGATIVE POLICY CHARACTER</td>
<td>PROACTIVE/POSITIVE</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYMPTOMS POLICY OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>CAUSES</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORWARD DEFENSE MILITARY STRATEGY</td>
<td>PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOVIET THREAT DRIVEN DEFENSE PLANNING DRIVER</td>
<td>PEACETIME ACTIVITY DRIVEN</td>
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<td>DETERRENCE STRATEGIC CORNERSTONE</td>
<td>FORWARD PRESENCE</td>
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<td>FORWARD DEPLOYMENT DEPLOYMENT PATTERN</td>
<td>STRATEGIC RESERVE</td>
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<td>FORMAL ALLIANCES SECURITY PATTERNS</td>
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<td>SOVIET/CERTAIN THREAT FOCUS</td>
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<td>SPECIALIZED FORCES FORCE CHARACTER</td>
<td>VERSATILE FORCES</td>
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<td>OVERWHELMING FIREPOWER</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASSIVELY EMPLOYED</td>
<td>DISCRIMINATELY EMPLOYED</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADEQUATE BUDGETS</td>
<td>FINANCIAL STATUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATURAL RESOURCES POWER BASE</td>
<td>INTELLECTUAL/TECHNOLOGICAL</td>
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ANNEX B

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SPEECHES


106

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ANNEX C

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