Campaign Planning and the Drug War

Murl D. Munger
William W. Mendel

Foreword by Edwin Meese III
DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to those brave and devoted law enforcement officers who daily put their lives on the line to combat the drug menace.
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FOREWORD

Over the past three decades, the problems resulting from drug abuse and drug trafficking have greatly increased throughout the world. No nation remains untouched. In the United States, every citizen has been affected by the immense harm resulting from the sale and use of illicit drugs. Those not directly involved in a drug abuse problem still must pay the social and economic costs resulting from drug-related crime and punishment, addict treatment and rehabilitation, and drug-induced absenteeism, accidents, and productivity lost in the workplace. We also risk greater public health problems, more disrupted families, and decreased public safety as drug abuse continues. On the international scene, America’s national security is being affected as drug cartels damage the political structure and economic system of friendly nations around the world. The drug problem is of such great magnitude that we must constantly seek new and better ways to combat this menace.

Experience gained during the past 30 years, and particularly while serving with the National Drug Policy Board, has convinced me that a more efficient integration of law enforcement resources, greater interagency cooperation and improved operational techniques are needed at all levels of government. Generally accepted methods of matching ways and means in a coherent and sequential manner to achieve desired goals are required, as we recognize the limitations on available resources. Interagency operational planning over an extended period (1 to 3 years) is necessary if strategic efforts are to be successful.

We have often heard about a “war on drugs.” While this metaphor may not be totally appropriate for dealing with a complex social phenomenon, certainly military experience is relevant to the effort against illegal drugs. The need to utilize intelligence, develop strategic and operational plans, and conduct coordinated tactical actions exists as much in the battle against drugs as it does on the battlefield. Thus, leaders in the fight against drugs can learn much from established military techniques.

With this in mind, it is a personal pleasure to comment on this new and timely text which suggests a different approach to agency and interagency planning for antidrug operations. Written by two experienced military planners, Colonel Murl Munger and Colonel Bill Mendel, this book provides the reader with a basic overview of the drug problem in the United States and then describes in detail the existing infrastructure which controls U.S. counterdrug activities both at home and overseas. I am impressed with the depth of research, the contributions from representatives of law enforcement agencies, and the thinking that have gone into this volume. It adapts sound military concepts to the various aspects of drug control activities.

It is imperative that those involved in strategic planning at the national and regional levels fully understand the importance of organizational concepts and recognize the levels of planning required within and among the agencies involved. Without this understanding, attempts to develop plans and allocate resources for sustained operations cannot fully succeed.

The authors present a portrayal of military campaign planning principles and how they may be adapted to counterdrug operations. The example of a plan set forth at Appendix D shows how
Military doctrine can be applied to coordinated, sustained interagency efforts. It is important to
cognize that considerable effort is required to make a plan work. Interagency life demands
operation and consensus as well as patience in order to make progress. However, the
successes of Operation Alliance along the Southwestern U.S. border give cause for optimism.
Within the drug law enforcement community, the climate for interagency cooperation has never
been better.

Some have suggested that the answers to the complexities of the drug problem lie in new
organizations or even a single federal agency to enforce the nation's drug laws. History shows
that this will not work in practice and is neither politically nor economically feasible. Instead, we
must make the existing system more efficient. The unified action plan set forth by Munger and
Hendel provides a useful model for this purpose. By using the Lead Agency concept and by
specifying geographic areas of responsibility to lead agencies, interagency campaign planning
can become more effective. Many civilian law enforcement officials have been looking for a way
to improve their planning efforts and this book may fill the need.

We have heard much about the idea of a "drug czar." My own experience indicates that only
leadership by the President of the United States can fulfill this role. Only he can provide the
authority necessary to ensure cooperation by the various federal departments and agencies
involved in drug law enforcement. By his example and inspiration, he can provide the motivation
for cooperation and coordination at other levels of government.

In the coming decade, government leaders at all levels will be confronted with a number of
domestic and international challenges. The effort against drugs must compete with social
services, defense, and other requirements in an era of constrained resources. It is imperative
then, that whatever assets are allocated to drug law enforcement be used in a cost-effective
manner.

The ideas set forth in this book on campaign planning and their application to antidrug efforts
deserve not only serious consideration but an opportunity to prove they can enhance the
effectiveness of counterdrug operations in both the individual agency and interagency arenas.
Additionally, the book is an excellent reference manual for those who seek to understand the
complexities of the drug problem and related law enforcement activities above the tactical level.
I commend it to every person interested in this subject.

Edwin Meese III

February 1991
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Meese is a former Attorney General of the United States and served as Chairman of the National Drug Policy
Board in the Reagan Administration. He has long been interested and involved in drug law enforcement issues. He
was involved in the development of the South Florida Task Force, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System,
and Operation Alliance. Mr. Meese currently holds the Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy at The Heritage
Foundation and is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
PREFACE

Of all the challenges now facing the United States, none may be more important than ending the drug abuse problem. The massive use of illicit drugs is threatening our economy, our criminal justice system, and the very foundations of American social and family life. While attacking the production sources and distribution network of the drug trafficker is not the end solution to the problem, it is a vital component of drug control strategy—necessary until demand reduction efforts prove successful.

Unfortunately, the money, materiel and manpower resources available to combat drug trafficking are limited. This then requires maximum efficiency in utilizing those resources if we are to do any significant damage to the illicit drug trade.

In studying the problem, we at the U.S. Army War College find that while a viable national unternarcotics strategy is in being and that efforts at the tactical level are quite commendable, void exists at the operational planning level. There is no adequate system for translating strategy to sustained operations supported by plans, programs and budgets. We believe that the techniques used in military campaign planning can be adapted to bridge the operational gap.

This book demonstrates the applicability of campaign planning to drug law enforcement activities and military support. We hope it will be helpful to those civilian and military planners involved in protecting our nation from the scourge of narcotrafficking and drug abuse.

Paul G. Cerjan
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant
INTRODUCTION

This publication is primarily about the campaign planning process and how it can be useful to federal agencies involved in the supply reduction side of the war on drugs. It resulted from a concern voiced by Major General Paul G. Cerjan that a void in drug war planning may exist at the operational level. Was there a gap between National Drug Control Strategy and law enforcement tactical actions that could be bridged by military campaign planning methods as taught at the U.S. Army War College? This text is intended to provoke thought within the interagency arena regarding better ways to synchronize and sustain cooperative multiagency assaults on drug trafficking networks. Principles, formats, and examples of military operational planning techniques are offered as models for interagency civil-military actions. We trust that this material will be helpful to drug law enforcement officials as they consider operational planning and to military officers to seek to enhance military support to the counternarcotics effort.

When facing an enemy that is capable of outspending us several times over in the tactical arena, the planning and programming procedures we employ are vital to success. The efficient use of available assets is paramount. Even the most brilliant military strategies fail when those involved in planning cannot translate strategy into a coordinated sequence of properly supported tactical actions. The same is likely true for law enforcement efforts when attempted at a grand scale. The drug war battlefield is international as well as domestic, and border defense is a major component of the battle plan. Such a widespread arena requires integrated planning and programming efforts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels if we are to maximize the return on our expenditures and substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

The national leadership has set forth a counternarcotics strategy which provides guidance for both supply reduction and demand reduction activities and establishes a variety of offices, committees, and working groups within the bureaucracy to disseminate policy guidance to subordinate organizations. Congress has supported the National Drug Control Strategy with appropriate legislation and has formed oversight committees to assist in implementation. Supplemental strategic guidance has been issued in such documents as the Andean Strategy and the International Cocaine Strategy. Subordinate federal agencies and headquarters such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Forces Command, the U.S. Southern Command, and Operation Alliance Joint Command Group are developing their own strategies in support of the national strategy. Meanwhile, at the tactical level, thousands of field operatives work diligently in dangerous conditions to stem the drug flow. The following chapters examine the connecting idea between drug strategy and tactics with the intent of identifying planning techniques that can fill the void now existing at the operational level. If this can be successfully done, then a coordinated multiagency effort can be orchestrated and sustained.

We suggest that campaign planning can be a useful means to establish unity of effort among drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of activity. Campaign planning methodology is especially important when resources are limited and must be applied in a sequential manner in order to achieve strategic objectives. The campaign planning approach, therefore, affords a framework that would encourage drug law enforcement agencies to program and budget resources for operations several years ahead. Such campaign planning...
techniques would also help the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide more extensive and timely support to the drug law enforcement agencies. This is because the military could then synchronize its training and budget programs with the planned actions of civilian law enforcement authority.

It would be naive to believe that integrated interagency planning and programming for counterdrug activities will be easily accomplished. Waging coalition war or conducting combined operations is never easy. Real obstacles exist, both systemically and at the human level. But it was an allied effort that won World War II. Perhaps military planning techniques can be of benefit only within individual agencies. It may even be presumptuous for military planners to believe that they might offer ideas to improve procedures developed over time by drug law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, international drug trafficking on the current scale is a relatively new game and the stakes are high enough to make us give interagency operations a try.

A secondary objective of this publication is to acquaint the reader with the fundamental concerns resulting from our drug problem and with the organizational structure of the two major U.S. counternarcotics systems involved in supply reduction. Chapter One provides basic information necessary to understand what is involved in the War on Drugs. In Chapters Two and Three the reader will learn the complexities of both systems. While the system which controls counterdrug activities within the continental United States (CONUS) differs substantially from those outside the continental limits (OCONUS), they are closely interrelated. Likewise the several organizations within each system must work closely together. Without this knowledge of the "cast of characters" and the roles they play, planning at the operational level for tactical actions and military support cannot be effectively accomplished.

Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are therefore intended for the reader who does not have a comprehensive understanding of the drug problem and with the organizational structure of the two major U.S. counternarcotics systems involved in supply reduction. This reading is tedious but necessary. Those readers who understand both the problem and U.S. counternarcotics organizations and who are interested in how campaign planning techniques can be applied in the drug war can move directly to Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.

Chapter 4 presents a planning model—attainable only under ideal conditions. Chapter 5 takes that model, adapts it to real world conditions, and presents a system that could be acceptable to the various players engaged in supply reduction. Appendix D provides an example of fitting campaign planning to a drug war environment. Chapter 6 addresses the interagency arena and what is reasonable and feasible in terms of multiagency organizations and their use of campaign planning for counterdrug operations. The final chapter sets forth the several significant conclusions reached.

The methodology used in preparing this book consisted of in-depth interviews with responsible individuals who work or who have recently been involved in U.S. counternarcotics efforts. This includes civilian officials of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP); the U.S. Departments of Justice, State, and Defense; and members of the several specific agencies involved in drug law enforcement. Interviewees ranged from those in Washington D.C. concerned
with high-level policy development, to regional-level law enforcement officials, to local field agents involved in detecting, investigating, and arresting individuals for trafficking in drugs. Military personnel interviewed ranged from general officers at Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level to National Guardsmen involved in military support operations along the southwestern U.S. border. Information from interviews supplemented data available from congressional reports, Department of State and Department of Defense documents, the U.S. intelligence community, and a wealth of material from the DLEAs. Visits to various field locations provided needed perspectives on the existing systems. Scholarly journals and reputable media publications were also used. From information gained from all sources, we have set forth those current conditions that would affect the establishment of a planning process designed to support sustained tactical operations.

We hope the reader will not only gain an insight into the existing supply reduction organizational systems but also an appreciation of the need for an efficient planning mechanism for integrating and sustaining U.S. counterdrug activities.

William W. Mendel
Murl D. Munger
CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING THE DRUG PROBLEM

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

Drug abuse and drug trafficking pose a threat of far greater magnitude to the United States than is commonly perceived. During 1989 an estimated 25 million Americans, about one in ten of our citizens, used some form of illicit drug. The damage to our social fabric is pronounced and the toll in human misery is incalculable. Over 200,000 babies are born each year to mothers who use drugs. Intravenous drug use is now the single largest source of new HIV/AIDS infection and perhaps one half of all AIDS deaths are drug related. Drug related emergency hospital admissions increased 120 percent between 1985 and 1989. In varying degrees, all Americans are paying for the over $150 billion that annually flows to the drug dealers and the additional $60 to $80 billion that are lost through absenteeism, inefficiency, embezzlement, nonproductivity and medical expense. Drug addiction stimulates street crime while the lure of drug dollars fosters the corruption of government officials and the criminalization of business and banking establishments. All economic groups and social classes in the United States are affected by the drug problem.

Though we are making progress in convincing the populace that illicit drugs are dangerous and that their use is not glamorous, exciting, or victimless, too many still engage in this destructive practice. Despite magnificent efforts by DLEAs, the courts, and our penal system, drug trafficking thrives in most cities, towns, and villages across the United States. The work of medical and social services personnel notwithstanding, the road to recovery from drug addiction is long, painful, expensive and littered with wrecked lives. This does not mean the “War on Drugs” is unwinnable, but that the campaigns will be long and the battles many. With dedication, increased efforts, and ingenuity, the blight of drugs can be essentially removed from American society.

The Drugs of Choice.

The three principal drugs of abuse within the United States are marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. Other dangerous drugs include Crystal Methamphetamine (ice), Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD), Phencyclidine (PCP), and illegally obtained prescription drugs. Marijuana is the most frequently used illicit drug in America. Although its use is generally considered to be declining, some 21 million Americans are believed to have used marijuana in 1989 and about 12 million U.S. citizens regularly use it. Their habit costs them approximately $65 per week. For the period 1986-89, potency increased as did emergency room admissions as many users combined marijuana with other drugs such as cocaine, PCP, and alcohol. At the same time, the foreign and domestic production of marijuana increased and the retail price has risen. This may portend a growth in future marijuana consumption.

Cocaine, the drug most threatening to U.S. society, is readily available throughout the United States. In large cities multikilogram quantities can be acquired while multiounce buys can be made in most smaller cities. An estimated four and one half million U.S. citizens use cocaine
regularly. Three million of these are addicts. A "coke-head" spends about $200 per week on his habit while those hooked on the "crack" variety of cocaine may easily spend over $1,000 per week. During 1989, the average purity of a wholesale kilogram of cocaine was 84 percent and there was no shortage of supply. Reports of increased prices are believed to have resulted from "price gouging" and unfounded fears of shortages by those at the retail level.

Heroin use is on the increase. After years of a rather constant estimate of one half million heroin addicts, the number is now between 750,000 and one million. Heroin production is up worldwide and the import purity of SE Asian and Mexican heroin in the United States now averages about 85 percent (which may account for the 8 percent increase in emergency room admissions). Cost of maintaining a heroin habit is about $500 weekly. The number of regular users of other dangerous drugs is unknown but literally billions of doses are consumed annually.

To meet this huge demand, traffickers daily move large quantities of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other dangerous drugs into and throughout the United States. Although no one knows the true quantities of import tonnage or consumption, Figure I-1 reflects the data available on world-wide production and is considered sufficiently reliable to indicate both magnitudes and trends.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Drug Produced</th>
<th>1987*</th>
<th>1988*</th>
<th>1989**</th>
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<tr>
<td>Marijuana (metric tons)</td>
<td>9,565</td>
<td>18,420</td>
<td>54,281**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine HCL (metric tons)***</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium (metric tons) (Heroin is an opium derivative)</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>2,886</td>
<td>4,196</td>
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* Reflect mid-point of estimation range.
** This large increase is due to improved estimation methodologies and the discovery of cultivation areas in Mexico not previously included. Therefore 1987-88 estimates of marijuana production are probably too low.
*** Based on 500 kilograms of drug coca leaf equals one kilogram of cocaine hydrochloride (HCL).

Figure I-1.

Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs).

To stem the massive flow of drugs, there are at present 14 federal agencies directly involved in some aspect of drug law enforcement. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the principal investigative agency and works closely with such other organizations as the U.S. Customs Service (USCS); the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP); and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in apprehending drug law offenders. Chapter Two will discuss in detail the various federal DLEAs and how they interrelate. In addition to the federal agencies, there are a myriad of state and local law enforcement groups that are at least partially engaged in counterdrug operations.
Despite little success in increasing their ranks, the DLEAs are making more drug crime arrests, and vigorously searching for ways to apprehend even more of those profiting from the drug trade. In general they demonstrate a high degree of professionalism and remarkable dedication. Though often frustrated with what sometimes seems to be a never-ending stream of drug traffic and the inability of the courts and prisons to handle the load, DLEAs are making significant progress in interagency cooperation within and among local, state and federal forces. Problems remain, however.

In comparison with the money available to their criminal adversaries, DLEAs are significantly underfunded. At present the drug trafficking networks appear to have better transportation and communication equipment, more sophisticated firearms, and more effective intelligence support than do the DLEAs. Both the U.S. Border Patrol and the U.S. Customs Service need additional manpower for border monitoring, and the Drug Enforcement Administration requires more officers for intelligence gathering and investigating drug cases.

Turf battles create problems as the varying DLEAs compete for federal dollars while operating in overlapping jurisdictions. Federal, state, and local law enforcement groups often have differing perspectives that inhibit cooperation and intelligence sharing. Fortunately these problems are less now than in the past. However, another problem, now minor but growing, is the number of instances of corruption found in DLEAs. With so much drug money available for bribery, plus the added threats of violence to those who do not cooperate, it is not surprising that some law officers are corrupted. Similar cases have occurred in the U.S. military. Fortunately, the instances in both the DLEAs and the military are relatively few.

Military Support to DLEAs.

The Department of Defense and the several armed services have supported national counterdrug efforts for many years by providing DLEAs with equipment and training services and with limited operational assistance such as providing transportation platforms and general intelligence data. National Guard units operating in a state status provide similar services. However, on September 18, 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued new guidance for a deeper, more comprehensive military support role in counternarcotics activities. (See Appendix A.) This guidance supports the National Drug Control Strategy of attacking drugs at the production source, while in transit, and within the United States. Secretary Cheney also directed those Unified and Specified Commanders, who could contribute to prepare plans for detecting and countering illicit drug entry into the United States (See examples at Appendix C.) Three Joint Task Forces now exist: JTF-4 in Key West, Florida; JTF-5 in Alameda, California; and JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas) to coordinate military support to DLEAs in their areas of responsibility. Careful to follow DOD policy and the posse comitatus law prohibiting search, seizure, or arrest powers, the military will become a more significant provider of support to the criminal justice community.

The military is also active on the demand reduction side with educational and counseling services, medical assistance, drug testing, and drug offender programs. Reducing drug use within the military has been a success story. The major drug-related disciplinary and efficiency problems of the 1970s and early 1980s have nearly vanished. Though military life is much
different from civilian society, perhaps some lessons learned by the military have application in the civilian work place.

Some Implications for U.S. Society.

The consumption of illicit narcotics by both casual users and addicts has profound implications for the citizenry as a whole. The direct economic drain, the effects of drug-related crimes, and the individual and family problems resulting from drug abuse must be corrected if we are to preserve a way of life commensurate with traditional American values. Consider the following implications:

• Economic

The losses resulting from the “drug problem” are staggering, particularly in a period of slow economic growth or recession. On the global scene, the drug trade may absorb $500 billion annually, more than twice the value of all U.S. currency in circulation.7 The $210 to $230 billion total loss each year to the U.S. economy is almost four times the amount of money that American consumers spend for oil.8 According to the September 1989 National Drug Control Strategy, this is also more than the U.S. gross agricultural income and over triple the profits earned in 1988 by all the Fortune 500 companies combined.9

Business and industrial leaders are now aware that drug abuse is reducing their profits through lost efficiency and diminished productivity, accidents, medical expense, absenteeism, and theft by employees to support their habits. The DEA-endorsed Cocaine Hotline organization reported that:10

- Drug users are three-and-a-half times as likely to be involved in a plant accident.
- Drug users are five times as likely to file a worker’s compensation claim.
- Drug users receive three times the average level of sick benefits.
- Drug users function at 67 percent of their work potential.

This type of employee behavior results in the indirect losses of $60 to $80 billion per year. When combined with the estimated $150 billion that went into criminal hands during 1989, the $9.48 billion federal dollars allocated for counterdrug activities in FY90, and the considerable funds spent by state and local governments on criminal justice, medical, and social counterdrug programs, the loss to the U.S. economy is enormous.11

• Criminal Justice - Courts and Prisons

Besides pronouncing punishment for crimes committed, the court system has traditionally served to deter potential violators. Because of the magnitude of drug trafficking and substance abuse in recent years, this is changing. American courts have become grossly overloaded with drug-related cases. A Superior Court Judge in Los Angeles County recently stated that of the 30 cases per day average for his court, 75 percent are drug related. Thirty-four judges in that county
handled over 17,000 cases in 1989, a majority of which involved illicit drug use in some manner. The same is true in other metropolitan areas where a survey of 12 cities showed 60 to 80 percent of all male arrestees tested positive for drug use (see Figure 1-2.)

The large numbers of drug cases have had several significant results. Prosecutors can no longer spend much time on cases involving small amounts of drugs. In many of these, the small-time offender pleads guilty to a lesser drug charge, receives a small sentence (60 to 90 days) and often receives probation. In some areas, he may never even face trial. Five years ago in California, an ounce of cocaine was a major case. Now it might not merit prosecution. A New York woman convicted of attempting to sell 174 vials of "crack" cocaine was placed on probation in 1987.

Probation, lesser sentences, or early release may also result because of overcrowded jails and prisons. Virtually all state and federal prisons are confining more felons than the designed capacity. Figure 1-3 illustrates seriousness of the situation. County and city jails may be even worse. The Los Angeles County jail is designed to hold 5,500 prisoners but at one point in 1989 it was holding almost 8,000 inmates, 78 percent of whom were convicted on drug related charges. In Texas, the average drug offender in state prison serves only 1/12 of his sentence due to the need to reduce prison populations.

The end result of overcrowded court dockets and insufficient prison cells is more drug criminals on the street and less deterrent value of the court and penal systems.

- Social

The dispassionate statistics showing the extent of drug abuse by American citizens translate directly into human misery and financial despair. Young women addicted to crack cocaine are producing thousands of babies each year that are malnourished and have birth defects. Many are born addicted to cocaine. Women and men have turned to prostitution and other criminal pursuits as a means to support their drug habits. The advent of AIDS in the addict population portends a more rapid spread of the disease. In each home where drug addiction exists, there is high potential for health problems, financial need, disruptive behavior, and criminal acts. Data collected by Cocaine Hotline officials reveals that 70 percent of adults calling for help indicated that cocaine was more important to them than family or friends. Of these adult callers 45 percent admitted stealing from either employers, friends, or family to pay for drugs. Of the teenagers calling, 89 percent admitted to family problems because of their drug use and 48 percent said they sold drugs in their school to support their own habits. Such behavior strikes at the heart of American family life. It contributes to lower social values and strains the fabric of our society. We must find ways to counter these problems.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

A majority of the illicit drugs consumed by Americans, particularly cocaine and heroin, are cultivated and processed on foreign soil. They are then transported into the United States by drug criminals from many nations and often travel through several countries before reaching the American consumer. The scope of this trafficking is so great and the political ramifications so
FIGURE I-2.
PERCENTAGE OF MALE ARRESTEES TESTING POSITIVE FOR DRUGS IN 12 CITIES.

FIGURE I-3.
complex that the United States alone cannot effectively combat the problem. Other nations are faced with a similar situation. Therefore the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy calls for a number of initiatives to maximize international cooperation for counterdrug activities. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) acts as lead agency for coordinating the U.S. role in international drug control efforts. Working closely with the DEA, the Agency for International Development (AID), the Department of Defense (DOD) and other pertinent federal agencies. DOS coordinates the efforts to attain international objectives for reducing the drug supply.

**Strategic Objectives.**

The President’s National Security Strategy provides two broad objectives:\(^\text{17}\)

- Reduction of the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
- Aid to [other nations] in combatting threats to democratic institutions from ... illicit drug trafficking.

Additional U.S. strategic objectives in controlling international drug trafficking include:\(^\text{18}\)

- Disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking organizations;
- Reducing cocaine supply by providing law enforcement, military, and economic assistance to Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia to isolate their major coca-producing regions; blocking delivery of chemicals used in cocaine processing; destroying cocaine labs; and dismantling the drug-running groups. This effort will also target drug transit areas in the Caribbean;
- Reducing heroin supply through efforts to convince other countries to exert influence on opium growers to reduce heroin processing and distribution;
- Reducing marijuana supply through strengthened foreign law enforcement and eradication and through efforts to discourage minor producers from becoming major producers; and.
- U.S. encouragement for European Community and other multilateral efforts aimed at source country and transit country production and distribution and at European consumption. European support against international and regional drug organizations will be enlisted.

Other international objectives include:

- Making antidrug efforts a top priority in U.S. bilateral relations with virtually every other country;
- U.S. ratification of the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and urging other nations to ratify the U.N. convention:
• Strictly enforcing existing U.S. laws that make foreign aid contingent on the recipient countries' compliance with antinarcotics efforts; and,

• Strengthening domestic and international efforts against the "laundering" of drug money.

Such initiatives will take time, money, and international cooperation to achieve. Officials of many of the drug producing nations will be in life-threatening situations and violence will be commonplace as they fight the powerful drug cartels. Some may seek to blame American demand for drugs as the principal cause for their countries' woes. Patience, understanding, and diplomacy will be required to make the international partnerships effective. The Document of Cartagena, signed by President Bush and the Presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia at the Andean summit in February 1990 shows that progress is being made. This document specifies the objectives, ways and means the nations will pursue in attacking cocaine production in the Andean Region. The United States also has major bilateral narcotics control programs with 11 nations and is strengthening ties with others through training assistance, equipment supply, and through INTERPOL, an international organization that coordinates the work of police forces.

The United Nations Organization has also made encouraging moves in counternarcotics efforts. The 1987 U.N. Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking which met in Vienna, Austria, brought officials of 138 countries together to consider the economic, social, and health implications of expanded drug abuse. In the December 1988 conference in Vienna, 67 nations, including the United States, signed a convention agreeing to provide assistance in the investigation and prosecution of narcotics cases. Other U.N. actions include the establishment of a U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control which is administered from Vienna.

Source Countries and Trafficking Routes.

A large majority of the illicit drugs which enter the United States come from Latin America and the Caribbean region. While Asia remains the principal source of heroin, Mexico is challenging the Asian connection. Mexican heroin now is often being sold in a more potent, yet cheaper, form than the Asian variety. Mexican brown and the less refined Mexican black tar heroin are sold mostly in the western United States while Asian heroin is sold mostly on the East Coast and in the Pacific Northwest.

Figure 1-4 shows the major worldwide producers of illegal drugs. Note that virtually all of the world's cocaine and most of the marijuana comes from Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States, however, is a major producer of marijuana and also is an exporter of high grade products.

Major Western Hemisphere narcotics trafficking routes from the source countries to the United States are shown on Figure 1-5. The sea and air routes through the Caribbean into the southern and southeastern parts of the United States are heavily used. Other busy air routes are over Central America and Mexico to the southwestern states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. Sea routes are constricted at the Yucatan Channel, and the Windward, Mona, and Anegada Passages providing the interdiction forces some advantage in detecting surface traffic.
BASIC DATA DERIVED FOR NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE
CONSUMERS COMMITTEE REPORT - 1989 STATISTICS

FIGURE I-4. SOURCES OF NARCOTICS FOR U.S. CITIZENS.
Recently sea routes along the western coast of Mexico into the Baja area of Mexico also have been used. The large areas involved, plus limited interdiction assets and trafficker initiative, place the odds for success largely with the drug smugglers. This is even more true for the air routes, despite laudable successes in the Florida Bahamas region. Many drug-carrying aircraft enter the southwestern United States via Mexico despite U.S. radar coverage. Similar problems are encountered along the Mexican border in trying to stem the overland flow of drugs through and around the official crossing stations.

Opiates from Southeast Asia enter the United States primarily in Hawaii, California, and Washington. Similar drugs from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran follow a different route through the Middle East and southern Turkey, then enter the northeastern United States directly or through Europe or Canada.

**National Security Implications.**

Trafficking and consumption of illicit narcotics generate national security problems at home and abroad. Considering the enormous sums of money involved and the sophistication of the larger trafficking operations, efforts by drug cartels to either buy the support of government officials or intimidate them must be expected. Such activities are undermining governments friendly to the United States and are subverting the loyalties of some U.S. political, judicial, law enforcement, and military personnel. Insurgents and revolutionary groups overseas such as the Sendero Luminoso (Peru) or the Columbian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) often support illicit drug trafficking as a source of revenue. Private armies in Asia also traffic in drugs and operate in manners which degrade the effectiveness of the central governments. Additionally, the tremendous social impact of widespread U.S. drug abuse and the drain on the American economy have indirect but real national security implications.

Recognizing the threat, President Reagan signed NSDD 221 declaring the international drug trade a threat to national security. President Bush has affirmed this condition and the U.S. Congress concurred and financed the Administration’s “War on Drugs.” In reality they only confirmed the obvious. Whenever a nation is menaced by forces capable of creating the social, economic, and political disruptions described above, the national security of that nation is in jeopardy. Not even a nation as powerful and prosperous as the United States can afford to lose over $200 billion annually to an underground economy, or absorb the medical and rehabilitation expenses and lost productivity. And it cannot afford a degradation of social and moral values among its youth as that which now endangers its younger generations. In addition, on a broader plane, the United States can ill-afford to have the governments of other Western Hemisphere nations weakened by the illicit narcotic trafficker or fall prey to insurgents who are sustained by arms and equipment financed by narcodollars.

**ATTACKING THE PROBLEM**

Drug trafficking will end only when it is no longer profitable to continue. Either the numbers of individuals wanting drugs must fall to an insignificant level or the costs of doing business must become unbearably high. A combination of these would be the ideal. Such business costs are measured in terms of whatever the trafficker holds dear: his fortune, his freedom, or his life.
recognizing the above, the National Drug Control Strategy sets forth two mutually supporting approaches aimed at preventing the use of illicit narcotics—Demand Reduction and Supply reduction—and the President received $10.5 billion to prosecute the strategy in FY 1991.

**Demand Reduction.**

A combination of programs, all of which show promise, are now underway to help reduce the demand for drugs. The most fundamental ones concern education, community involvement, and cooperative effort by management and labor to keep drugs from the workplace. The education programs begin in grammar schools and continue through the college level to inform young Americans of the harmful effects of drug use. The education approach continues through media campaigns to educate youngsters and adults alike. Demand reduction is also fostered by a number of community action efforts designed to stimulate participation by neighborhood organizations such as civic groups, churches, or other citizens’ organizations. Another attack on drug demand is being conducted at the workplace where screening of job applicants and testing of workers are gaining acceptance as means to curtail drug use. Particular efforts are being made in the transportation industry where public safety is threatened by those working under the influence of drugs.

As demand reduction becomes more successful, it eases the burden of those involved in supply reduction. If fully implemented, programs suggested in the National Drug Control Strategy can be effective.

**Supply Reduction.**

The second approach to curtail drug abuse and drug trafficking is by reducing the supply. Supply reduction enhances demand reduction by limiting drugs available, and by making them more difficult and more expensive to obtain. However the main purpose of supply reduction efforts is to put the traffickers out of business. Whether it be by attacking the production source, interdiction efforts on the drug routes, or the apprehension, conviction, and incarceration of drug criminals in the United States, the objective is the same—to stop the drug flow.

The following two chapters concentrate on the agencies involved in supply reduction and on the interagency organizations formed to accomplish that objective. A knowledge of the various agencies’ roles and missions and how they normally operate is necessary before any attempt can be made at interagency campaign planning.
CHAPTER 1

ENDNOTES


3. Bush, p. 2 as modified as a result of recent interviews with DLEA officials.

4. Unless otherwise indicated, all statistics in the Drugs of Choice section are from *The NNICC Report, 1989*.

5. Data extracted from a Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley, Virginia, briefing received June 21, 1990, at the Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington, DC.


8. *Ibid*.


12. Presentation by J. D. Smith, Jud., Superior Court, Los Angeles at the Armed Forces Reserve Center, Los Alamitos, California, November 19, 1989.


14. Presentation by Robert Edmons, Undersheriff of Los Angeles County at the Armed Forces Reserve Center, Los Alamitos, California, November 19, 1989.

15. Presentation by Knox Fitzpatrick, Office of the Governor, Austin, Texas, at a Southwest Border States Seminar, Austin, Texas, May 24, 1990.


CHAPTER 2

AN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR
DOMESTIC DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT

THREE LEVELS OF EFFORT

As in the conduct of a military campaign, three levels of effort apply to drug law enforcement. These are the strategic, operational and tactical levels. National and theater strategic objectives must be translated into operational guidance that specifies tactical actions.

At the national strategic level, broad policy is established and desired conditions are agreed upon. At this level, leaders set forth strategic objectives (what needs to be done to support policy and protect interests), strategic concepts (how we are going to do it), and priorities for resources (what will it take in terms of money, manpower, time and so on to get the job done). At the theater strategic level the commander designs his theater strategy and campaign to accomplish the broad national direction.

At the operational level are found planners and organizations that translate the broad vision and strategic intent of the national and theater leadership into practical direction to achieve strategic objectives. Ideally, officials at this level should have the authority of law and regulation to compel the synchronized efforts of myriad supporting tactical elements. Within the military chain of command, such authority exists. The synchronization is accomplished through detailed planning which phases joint operations and the application of resources. If such planning can be achieved through cooperative and coordinated efforts by DLEAs at the operational level, the effectiveness of our counternarcotics effort can be greatly enhanced.

At the tactical level the actual battles and engagements are fought within the intent of the strategic guidance and operational plans. Here are found Federal, State and local Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, often combined in various task forces.

This chapter describes key government organizations and DLEAs that are involved in fighting the supply side of America's drug war within the continental United States (CONUS). It identifies positions and organizations with strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities for the CONUS drug law enforcement system. (See Figure II-1.)

THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Office of National Drug Control Policy.

As the Bush Administration acceded to national leadership, the old National Drug Policy Board and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) were phased out and a new Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was established. It coordinates Federal, State and local
FIGURE II - 1. CONUS DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM.
efforts to control illegal drug abuse. It devises policies, objectives, and priorities for the nation’s antidrug activities. Each year it develops the National Drug Control Strategy for the President’s submission to the Congress.¹

The Director of ONDCP enjoys considerable visibility as a member of the Executive Office of the President, yet he has little statutory authority to ensure vigorous support for the Drug Strategy. The Director can, however, advise the President on the performance of Federal agencies in supporting the strategy.

Another means of influence results from the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690) which instructs the Director of ONDCP to “develop for each fiscal year, with the advice of the program managers of Departments and agencies with responsibilities under the National Drug Control Program, a consolidated National Drug Control Program budget proposal to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, and . . . [to] transmit such budget proposal to the President and to Congress.” Moreover, the law requires the Director to certify as to the adequacy of each drug control agency’s drug budget request. This gives ONDCP some control over the level of funding and the content of agency budget requests. Furthermore, once the budgets are certified, agencies cannot reprogram monies from the drug program without ONDCP approval. The law gives ONDCP authority to determine what the President requests to Congress and what is actually funded for drug control efforts.²

ONDCP apportions some monies for new programs, research and development, and demand reduction, but Departments of Treasury and Justice maintain tight control of their operational money. However, until Congress determines to give ONDCP more power of the purse, its principal function will remain the development of national policy and strategy for the nation’s effort to counter narcotics.

The ONDCP organization reflects the strategy it has developed. The Director has the typical administrative staff, an Associate Director for state and local affairs and two Deputy Directors to pursue demand reduction and supply reduction. An illustration of ONDCP organization is provided at Figure II-2.

Supply Reduction Working Group. The Supply Reduction Working Group originated in the September 1989 National Drug Control Strategy which expressed “a need for a central coordinating drug body that could provide policy oversight, establish supply-related priorities, and identify those areas where two or more agencies could work together.”³ This is based on Title 21 of the U.S. Code which extends to the Director, ONDCP, the authority to “coordinate and oversee”⁴ the implementation of the strategy. To do this, he has designated the Deputy Director for Supply Reduction as Chairman of the Working Group. The 1990 Strategy identifies these Group members: State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Interior, USDA, Transportation, CIA, NSC and OMB. This group serves to coordinate planning for implementing the supply reduction aspects of the strategy. It develops policy for writing and implementing plans to counter the supply side of narcotics.

Implementation of supply reduction strategy is further addressed in several coordinating subcommittees of the Supply Reduction Working Group. Among these are the High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Committee, the Border Interdiction Committee (BIC), and the Southwest Border Committee.

- High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Committee. In Title 21 of the U.S. Code the Congress established a requirement that each year the National Drug Control Strategy shall include a "... designation of areas of the United States as high intensity drug trafficking areas..." In the 1990 Strategy, five areas were designated HIDTAs because of the seriousness of their drug trafficking problems and their impact on the rest of the nation. Those currently identified are New York City, Los Angeles, Miami, Houston, and the Southwest Border area (Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas). Because of the strength of narcotraffickers, drug law enforcement agencies (DLEA) in these areas will be targeted for federal assistance.

The HIDTA Committee promotes coordination of Federal, State and local drug enforcement actions with a focus on the four metropolitan areas. The Department of Justice chairs the HIDTA Committee and appoints a Coordinator (typically an Assistant U.S. Attorney) in each of the four metropolitan HIDTAs. The HIDTA Committee then provides policy guidance to, and facilitates coordination among, the New York, Los Angeles, Miami and Houston HIDTAs. Monthly meetings between the HIDTA Coordinators, the HIDTA Committee and representatives of the State and Local Working Group are conducted to coordinate DLEA activities at all levels of government.
• Border Interdiction Committee (BIC). The discussion of interdiction issues in this committee is useful to build consensus and deconflict operational issues which concern the membership. The BIC's mission is "to facilitate interagency coordination of interdiction policy programs established by the National Drug Control Strategy." The Chairman of the BIC is the Commissioner of Customs who answers to the Secretary of the Treasury. BIC Deputy Chairmen are the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. Other key members represent the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics Matters), Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice Criminal Division, Federal Aviation Administration, the National Security Council Staff, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

The BIC forum developed lead agency responsibility to deter or interdict narcotrafficking. The Coast Guard (Department of Transportation) is responsible for maritime interdiction, the Customs Service (Department of Treasury) for land interdiction, and both Customs and Coast Guard share joint lead for air interdiction.

• Southwest Border Committee. The Southwest Border Committee originated in 1986 under the Reagan Administration's National Drug Enforcement Policy Board. Today it serves as a subcommittee to ONDCP's Supply Reduction Working Group. As it did under President Reagan's Administration, it continues the task of providing general "oversight responsibility to Operation Alliance," an office for coordinating multiagency counternarcotics efforts in the SW Border region.

Membership on the SW Border Committee includes these officials: Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Enforcement), Chairman: Commissioner, U.S. Customs; Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service; and the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration. The SW Border Committee establishes broad policy guidelines for counternarcotics operations in the California-Arizona-New Mexico-Texas border areas. This region, just as the four metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, and New York, has been designated a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) by the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

• The State and Local Drug Enforcement Working Group. The State and Local Group is a component of the Supply Reduction Working Group. It was established to promote drug enforcement coordination at the local level with federal action. Its task is to ensure "that national policy decisions include the concerns of our state and local agencies and their respective national organizations." Of interest to this Working Group are gang-related drug crime, training, and technical assistance to improve the level of expertise of local police and investigators.

Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice is a key player in the drug war and it has a variety of important activities to oversee. These include supervision of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is a Justice Department activity which enforces narcotics and controlled substance laws. It investigates major interstate and international drug violations. DEA is responsible, within the policy guidance of the Department of State and the Chiefs of U.S. missions, for cooperation with counterpart agencies abroad. A major mission of DEA is the management of a national narcotics intelligence system. Therefore, DEA chairs the 11-agency National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (reports on drug production and trafficking, abuse trends), manages the El Paso Intelligence Center (strategic and tactical case-related drug intelligence) and it may manage the National Drug Intelligence Center now being considered for establishment.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the principal Justice Department investigative bureau, shares concurrent jurisdiction (with DEA) over investigations of drug violations. The FBI has experience with prosecuting organized crime, and therefore, it focuses its efforts against major trafficking organizations and gangs in the United States. In order to collect information for prosecution, the FBI maintains a network of agents overseas.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) tasks include the prevention of unlawful entry into the United States. Its subordinate organization, the Border Patrol (USBP) works to deter illegal entry and smuggling of contraband into the United States.

The Department of Justice chairs the metropolitan High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Committee and appoints the metropolitan HIDTA coordinators.

Department of the Treasury.

The Department of the Treasury is another player with directive authority in the counternarcotics effort. Its U.S. Customs Service is Treasury's principal border enforcement agency. Customs interdicts and seizes contraband at U.S. ports of entry and border areas.

Also under the Department of the Treasury is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) which reinforces the efforts of Customs to deter and eliminate the trafficking of contraband, particularly firearms and explosives.

The Internal Revenue Service supports the drug interdiction effort through its mission of administering and enforcing the tax laws. It is especially effective in tracking large sums of money to counter money laundering attempts at home and abroad.

In this regard, the Department of the Treasury created the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in 1989 to develop intelligence on financial crimes. This is a multidiscipline activity with participants from Internal Revenue Service and other government and law enforcement agencies. Through analysis of its data, the FinCEN detects irregularities that indicate criminal activity such as money laundering. One example is aggregating data to evidence smurfing, whereby one (the SMURF) makes a series of deposits into a bank, each under $10,000. This avoids currency transaction reporting requirements under Title 31 U.S.C.
It is interesting to note that the Treasury Department provides the Commissioner of Customs to chair the Border Interdiction Committee, provides the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement to chair the South West Border Committee and appoints the Director of Operation Alliance (the multiagency drug law enforcement coordinating center for the South West border area).

Department of Transportation.

The Department of Transportation provides U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) support to drug interdiction.

The Coast Guard plays a major role in drug traffic interdiction. It works with U.S. Customs within the 12-mile coastal limit. Outside this 12-mile limit, the Coast Guard, working with other government agencies, is the primary agency to interdict the seaborne flow of drugs into the United States. The Coast Guard shares responsibility for air interdiction with U.S. Customs. To coordinate both air and sea interdiction operations, the Coast Guard and Customs jointly man and operate command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) centers located in Miami, Florida and Riverside, California.

The FAA assists investigative agencies by providing information and special agent support concerning aircraft and pilots to help counter drug smuggling by general and commercial aviation.

Department of the Interior.

Under the Department of the Interior, the Bureaus of Land Management and Indian Affairs and the National Park Service directly support the National Drug Control Strategy through their efforts to maintain public access to Federal Lands and prevent the use of these lands by operations in the illicit drug trade. Over the past year the Department of the Interior has provided the lead or participated in interagency marijuana eradication efforts involving numerous state and local DLEAs as well as the military. Examples of these types of operations include Operation Ghost Dancer in Oregon, Operation GreenSweep in California, and Operation Badge in Kentucky.

Department of Defense.

Within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs also has been designated as the DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. This office broadly oversees DOD’s mission: to serve as lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; to provide operational (units and personnel) and nonoperational (equipment and training) support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA); and to assist in developing an effective command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) network among the DLEAs and supporting agencies. Under his hat as DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, the Assistant Secretary directs DLEA support from the active duty services and reserves which function under the authority of Title 10, U.S. Code. Wearing his Reserve Affairs hat, the Assistant Secretary provides policy guidance for DLEA support through the National Guard Bureau to enjoin the
participation of National Guard units which function under state governors in accordance with Title 32 of the U.S. Code.

To provide strategic guidance and the rationale for resourcing DOD support to the CONUS and OCONUS drug interdiction effort, the Joint Staff has written a National Military Counternarcotics Strategy. It was developed in March 1990 and it has been attached to the Fiscal Years 1992-1997 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). (Similar guidance for theater commanders can be found in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, our current military strategy.) This should fund the CINC's efforts to support the President's Drug Control Strategy. The Joint Staff's Counter Narcotics Operations Division (CNOD) is the staff focal point for military operations in support of the counterdrug effort. CNOD of the J3 Operations Directorate is discussed in Chapter 3.

The Secretary of Defense has tasked his unified commands, Forces Command, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to support the national drug strategy. Southern and Pacific Commands combat production and trafficking in cooperation with host governments. Atlantic Command seeks to reduce the flow of drugs from Latin America through its task forces ashore and at sea. Forces Command provides units to support the law enforcement agencies in CONUS and overseas. NORAD assists DLEAs by providing aerial detection of drug trafficking.

At the operational level, Atlantic and Pacific Commands have established joint task forces (JTF) to facilitate coordinating the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking. The Forces Command JTF coordinates military support to ground drug law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border.

U.S. Active Duty and Reserve Component forces (except state National Guard) respond to DOD and Unified and Specified Command taskings for operational and nonoperational support. Operational support includes units in support of DLEAs and host countries. Nonoperational support is a broad category which can include facilities, training opportunities, intelligence, equipment loans, counternarcotics funding, and personnel support to non-DOD agencies. In this last category, the services are providing about 275 people (fields of intelligence, planning, logistics, communications) to Departments of State and Justice, FBI, DEA, U.S. Customs, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

National Guard Bureau and State Military Forces.

The National Guard was an early advocate of military support to counterdrug activities and is today an eager and valuable participant. States such as California, Florida, Texas, Georgia, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Arizona have long been involved in supporting drug law enforcement and have developed considerable expertise in combatting the drug trafficker. Virtually all states now have significant counternarcotics programs that include both demand and supply reduction activities. The District of Columbia National Guard has been particularly involved in demand reduction programs.

The State Adjutants General (TAGs) provide National Guard troop support to DLEAs under Title 32 of the U.S. Code. This support is resourced by DOD through the National Guard Bureau
(a strong and effective promoter of military support in drug law enforcement), but must be approved by the State Governor. State troops operating under Title 32 are not subject to the Posse Comitatus law which prohibits Federal troops (Active and Reserve) from conducting law enforcement activities. As a matter of policy, however, National Guard troops have avoided participation in such law enforcement actions as seizing and arresting civilians.

**Forces Command.**

Department of Defense's Forces Command (FORSCOM) is of special interest in providing support for the CONUS counternarcotics effort. FORSCOM is a specified command located in Atlanta, Georgia. It is charged by the Secretary of Defense to prepare plans for the land defense of CONUS and to prepare Army units for overseas deployment. However, in a September 1989 letter, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney directed that FORSCOM prepare "a plan to deploy forces to complement and support the counternarcotics actions of U.S. law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments."¹³ (The full text of this and related Secretary of Defense guidance tasking the military to support the drug war is provided in Appendix B.)

Following the Cheney directive, the Commander of FORSCOM provided strategic counternarcotics guidance to his major subordinate commanders in a letter containing his statement of the strategic mission, his assessment, and his vision for FORSCOM operation. The letter includes long-term and short-term goals and provides guidance for regional support operations based on an annual cycle of planned support operations. The idea is to avoid being pinned down to a series of individual requests and create a support planning model based on military training programs and calendars. To do this FORSCOM intends to "educate civilian law enforcement agencies on military planning practices." and assist them with long range planning.¹⁴ This would help FORSCOM to program resources to provide timely support to the DLEAs.

The strategy calls for force packages of typical task organizations which are thought to be optimal for supporting various counternarcotics operations. This will standardize support operations and facilitate timely response. Also by designating priorities for support effort, the strategy seeks to focus on missions with the potential for a high payoff in terms of the interests of the DLEAs.

Finally, by focusing on the moral imperatives plus the training opportunities, the strategy is intended to create incentives among participating military units to support the counternarcotics effort.

To place its counternarcotics support efforts into action, FORSCOM provides overall coordination and sets the priorities among its major subordinate commands. These include the five continental U.S. Armies (1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 6th), three Army corps (I, III, XVIII), and Joint Task Force 6. Figure II-3 illustrates this organization. FORSCOM does not effect directive authority for counternarcotics operations over U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Army National Guard units, rather, the CINCs and services (USN, USAF, USMC) support CINCFOR as a supported command in its CN role. Coordination is conducted with the National Guard to avoid duplication of effort.
FORSCOM's operational support can include units for reconnaissance and surveillance (within legal guidelines), ground and air mobility support to the DLEAs, loans, maintenance and operation of specialized equipment (communications, sensors, night mission devices, radar), and intelligence. In this regard, FORSCOM can be especially helpful to the DLEAs and to subordinate military units in providing intelligence fusion capabilities and intelligence training and support to enhance the predictive quality of counterdrug intelligence.¹⁵

Since its September 1989 tasking by the Secretary of Defense, FORSCOM has completed numerous counternarcotics support missions. These efforts have included a wide variety of people, equipment and facilities: drivers and divers, linguists and communications operators, tugboats and engineer construction, research and development facilities and tunnel detection equipment, radar teams and mobile training teams. The future thrust of FORSCOM's strategy is to synchronize such support in accordance with the long-term planning of training, operations and budgets. Priority of effort is directed to the Southwest Border, but the FORSCOM counterdrug mission applies throughout the United States.

National Drug Intelligence Center.

The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) is a proposed strategic drug intelligence organization. When established, it will function under the aegis of the Department of Justice. The NDIC task will be to coordinate and consolidate all strategic drug intelligence gathered by law enforcement agencies with the goal of developing a complete picture of narcotrafficking.²⁶ It will
maintain a data base to support the DLEAs and serve as an information exchange point for the DLEAs and foreign intelligence communities. NDIC will establish intelligence collection requirements, and, hopefully, promote the sharing of intelligence among the national drug control agencies. It also will provide intelligence to policy and law makers to assist them with budget development. Prior to implementation, the NDIC must receive congressional funding and adequate manning.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The following activities and DLEAs are well positioned to take guidance from the strategic level to develop operational direction for the many tactical law enforcement agencies.

Metropolitan High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA).

Taking their strategic direction from the HIDTA Committee, the coordinators of the Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, and New York HIDTAs help to coordinate the tactical actions of Federal, State and local drug law enforcement agencies in their areas. The HIDTA Coordinator is typically an Assistant U.S. Attorney who is appointed by the Department of Justice. Through the Chair of a Law Enforcement Coordination Committee, the coordinators build consensus for drug enforcement cooperation in the field. The HIDTA coordinators meet monthly with representatives of ONDCP's State and Local Drug Enforcement Working Group, and with the HIDTA Committee. The four metropolitan HIDTA coordinators also coordinate with the Justice Department's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), and consider the actions of DEA's State and Local Task Force in their HIDTA areas. Further, they "conduct all necessary coordination with State and Local officials, Federal investigators and prosecutors, . . . and jail and prison administrators."17

Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA).

The SW Border HIDTA differs from the metropolitan HIDTAs by covering the border regions of four states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) and emphasizing the interdiction component of drug law enforcement. It does not incorporate the Los Angeles and Houston HIDTAs, which are separate operating areas. As the lead agency for the SW Border HIDTA, the Department of the Treasury appoints the SW Border HIDTA coordinator. His tasks are the same as the metropolitan HIDTA coordinators, but in addition he serves as Director of Operation Alliance and its Joint Command Group (planning-coordinating body). He also coordinates Department of Defense support of the SW Border HIDTA with Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6).

Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees (LECC).

The LECCs are chaired by an Assistant U.S. Attorney. They help the HIDTA coordinators as a coordinating and planning forum concerning the tactical activities of the DLEAs in the HIDTAs. Typically, the LECCs help to program work loads among sheriff and police departments to facilitate the distribution of federal and state funds. Through the LECCs, the U.S. Attorneys work with state prosecutors to insure important drug cases are brought to trial.
DLEA Regional Offices.

The local (tactical) actions of law enforcement activities such as U.S. Customs and the Drug Enforcement Administration are supervised by regional offices. The Customs Regional Commissioner and the DEA Field Division Agent in Charge are at a level to synchronize tactical actions within their separate organizations or in the interagency arena. The District Offices of the U.S. Attorneys can influence tactical actions via HIDTA policy direction and case load guidance for Organized Drug Law Enforcement Task Forces and the like.

Operation Alliance.

Operation Alliance was organized in 1986 under Vice President George Bush as head of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) and Attorney General Edwin Meese III, then Chairman of the National Drug Policy Board. Today, it serves as a multiagency joint coordination center "to halt the flow of illegal drugs, firearms, and other contraband across Mexico's northern border." It operates under the policy guidance of the ONDCP SW Border Committee and the Joint Command Group and under the direction of the SW Border HIDTA coordinator who is also Director of Operation Alliance. To run Alliance on a daily (0700-1700 hours) basis, three Tactical Coordinators are provided, one each by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Border Patrol. The Senior Tactical Coordinator, who is a representative of the Border Patrol, the Customs Service, or (in the near future) the Drug Enforcement Administration, serves on a rotational basis, with the two others acting as his deputies. A permanent staff of about 27 people has been established to assist the tactical coordinators. Functional staff management includes these areas: Intelligence; Requests for Military Assistance; Operational Planning and Support; Support; Statistics; Liaison. (See Figure II-4.)

Operation Alliance responds to requests for operational support from all DLEAs in the SW Border region. Its principal focus is support from its coordination center located on Fort Bliss, Texas, adjacent to Joint Task Force 6.

In organizing a typical drug law enforcement operation, Alliance identifies a lead DLEA for the operation. After objectives and task organization have been agreed upon by the Operation Alliance Joint Command Group (OAJCG), the Alliance staff coordinates through various state committees, DLEA or State Adjutants General (National Guard) to confirm participating organizations and their support. Requests for military support radiate from Alliance to Joint Task Force 6 (Title 10, Active and Reserve Component), the State Adjutants General (Title 32, National Guard), North American Aerospace Defense Command (aircraft tracking and intelligence), and the Regional Logistics Support Office (DOD liaison for equipment transfer and loan, and training).

For major joint operations, a forward Joint Tactical Operations Center (TOC) may be established in the operating area with the supported DLEA as the lead. Supporting DLEAs and military units provide liaison to this Joint TOC for the duration of the operation.

Command authorities are diverse in these operations. The authority of Operation Alliance to coordinate SW Border drug law enforcement activity can be traced through the SW Border
ommittee and ONDCP to Title 21 of the U.S. Code. This requires the Director, ONDCP to coordinate and oversee the implementation by National Drug Control Program agencies of the policies, objectives, and priorities established by the Director. The National Drug Control agencies are those U.S. Government departments and agencies that are tasked under the national Drug Control Strategy, or designated by the President, or tasked jointly by the head of department or agency and the Director, ONDCP.

Title 21, therefore, obligates government agencies to support ONDCP's strategy, yet it does not define specific command relationships for getting the job done at the Operation Alliance level. Alliance functions under the Title 21 authority of the ONDCP SW Border Committee and the Federal, state and local interagency consensus established via the Joint Command Group's monthly meetings. Further, by the procedure of designating a lead DLEA for a particular tactical action, the OAJCG and Alliance provide a focus for support which enjoins unity of effort.

The initiative for concept development, tactical planning and execution resides with the lead LEA and its chain of command. while Alliance coordinates the support for such operations by state Adjutants General, DOD and supporting Federal, state, and local DLEAs.

Aside from the open chain of authority described above for Operation Alliance, each of the Alliance Senior Tactical Coordinators reports through his own chain of command. Only the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Senior Tactical Coordinator reports directly to Washington: DEA and Customs Tactical Coordinators report through intermediate (regional) offices. (See Figure II-5.)

FIGURE II-4. OPERATION ALLIANCE COORDINATION CENTER.
Federal military support to Operational Alliance comes from Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and the Department of Defense Regional Logistics Support Office (RLSO).

The Operation Alliance Joint Command Group (OAJCG).

The OAJCG functions under the Director, Operation Alliance as a coordinating and planning group. Its membership includes over 20 Federal, state and local DLEAs. Group meetings are chaired by the Senior Tactical Coordinator of Operation Alliance who has influence in establishing its agenda. The OAJCG takes policy guidance from and reports to the SW Border Committee. Such reports "describe ongoing operations, successes, planned operations, problems, and policy issues requiring resolution." The SW Border Committee provides the OAJCG a staff of full time positions. The Command Group serves as a consensus-building and coordinating forum to ensure intelligence sharing among participants, to examine appropriate investigative responses to drug seizures, and to define objectives and performance measures for operations. In essence, the OAJCG "was established to plan and direct the coordinated efforts of Operation Alliance and to promote effective liaison between participating agencies."

Joint Task Force 6.

JTF-6 was established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 15, 1989, at Fort Bliss, Texas, to assist Operation Alliance by coordinating Department of Defense support to Federal, state and local DLEAs in the South West border area. The JTF-6 Joint Operations Area (JOA) coincides with that of Alliance: the Southwest land border of the United States running from San Diego to Brownsville. The area encompasses Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California south of Fresno. It does not include the Los Angeles High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. The Joint Task Force is organized with a commander, deputy commander, assistant commander and a joint staff (J1 through J6). (See Figure II-6.)

To provide DOD support to the DLEAs, JTF-6 processes requests for assistance from Operation Alliance, and passes these requests through U.S. Forces Command to the Joint Staff (J33, Counternarcotics Operations Division) for approval. When unit support to Operation Alliance is approved, allocated units serve under the tactical control of JTF-6. When a mission is given to a National Guard unit, command of that unit remains with the state military authority. The Task Force tasks such units to support the Alliance-designated lead DLEA. The Task Force has no assigned DOD forces, and it relies upon nonorganic intelligence units for such information.

Typical Federal (Title 10) military support which is coordinated by JTF-6 is intelligence analysis, ground radar sensing, airborne reconnaissance, ground and air transportation, engineer operations, military exercises, ground reconnaissance, and mobile training teams.

In addition to its coordinating function for DOD support, JTF-6 has assisted Operation Alliance to develop a Southwest Border Strategy, now approved by ONDCP. The JTF will assist in developing further plans and procedures to implement this strategy.

NORAD is a combined Canadian-United States command with the mission of contributing to the strategic defense of the North American continent. It is organized with three defense regions: Canada, Alaska, and the continental United States. In September 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney directed NORAD to prepare plans to detect and counter illegal drug trafficking into the United States (see Appendix C). Today, NORAD plans and conducts surveillance missions with airborne and ground radars and provides fighter intercepts of potential drug smuggling targets. It has the capability to detect and monitor air movement into Central American countries to assist Latin American authorities in interdicting drugs before they cross our Southwest border via ground transportation. In this way NORAD can assist civil law enforcement organizations (such as Operation Alliance) with the counternarcotics mission.30

Joint Task Forces Four and Five.

While JTF-6 spends most of its energy coordinating support to the DLEAs in the Southwest border region, Task Forces 4 and 5 emphasize their air and sea detection and monitoring role. Both have an organic intelligence gathering capability, and they have assigned DOD forces.

JTF-4 is a subordinate joint command of U.S. Atlantic Command. Located in Key West, Florida, JTF-4 coordinates surveillance of the air and sea approaches to CONUS through the Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic Ocean, and Caribbean Sea, and assists in developing counternarcotics com-
munications and intelligence networks. It provides information and support to assist DLEAs. Its principal mission is to help DLEAs reduce the flow of drugs to CONUS from Latin America.

JTF-5 is a subordinate joint command of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). It is located on Coast Guard Island in Alameda, California. The principal mission of JTF-5 is to detect and monitor maritime and air narcotrafficking from the Far East into the U.S. mainland. It supports DLEAs through the collection and processing of counternarcotics intelligence. JTF-5 shares USPACOM counternarcotics responsibilities with U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), a service component of USPACOM, which is responsible to USPACOM for DOD operations in support of DLEAs in Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories and possessions; and for support to nations in the USPACOM area of responsibility. USARPAC provides training support to DLEAs, drug demand education, military assistance to host nations, and civil affairs and psychological operations support.

As with the other Joint Task Forces, JTF-5 has an additional mission to integrate DOD and law enforcement communications networks to enhance command and control of counternarcotics operations.\(^{31}\)

**Operation North Star.**

A coordinating agency similar to Alliance was established in July 1990 to assist DLEAs working along the Canadian-U.S. borders. Operation North Star is located at Buffalo, New York, and it is assisted by a DOD Regional Logistics Support Office. Currently there are no plans to provide a JTF to support Operation North Star.

**Regional Logistics Support Office.**

To assist CONUS drug law enforcement agencies, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Drug Enforcement Plans and Support has established four Regional Logistics Support Offices (RLSO) located in Miami, El Paso (with Operation Alliance), Long Beach, and Buffalo (with Operation North Star). There is also a two-man RLSO cell with U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. The RLSOs coordinate support for Federal, state and local agencies. This support includes temporary loan of equipment, training from various service schools, and transfer of excess DOD property. The RLSOs forward requests for such support directly to the Director for Plans and Support at the Office of the DASD for approval and coordination.\(^{32}\)

**El Paso Intelligence Center.**

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was organized by DEA and operates under an advisory board chaired by DEA's Office of Intelligence. Participating in this intelligence center are representatives from the Coast Guard, Customs, FAA, INS, BATF, DOD, IRS, U.S. Marshals Service and the FBI.\(^{33}\) EPIC provides intelligence support to Operation Alliance and directly to DLEAs throughout the United States. It provides an intelligence picture of air, sea, and land drug movement throughout the world, and it supports other law enforcement programs concerned with contraband and alien smuggling. Its goal is to give time-sensitive information about narcotrafficking to the DLEAs at the tactical level.\(^{34}\)
THE TACTICAL LEVEL

This section describes some of the many DLEAs which are at the tactical level and fight the battles and engagements of the drug interdiction effort. Risks are taken at the tactical level by law enforcement officers to achieve results to support the National Drug Control Strategy.

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force.

The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) is a Department of Justice program which integrates law enforcement agencies and skills to identify and dismantle larger, sophisticated drug trafficking organizations. There are 13 OCDETF located in core cities across the United States (Figure 11-7).

The OCDETF process reviews significant drug cases in routine meetings (often weekly) chaired by an Assistant U.S. Attorney. About a dozen agencies are represented in these meetings where cases may be presented for committee review (Figure II-8). When a case is seen to have broad implications requiring significant resources, the case is transferred from the individual agency to OCDETF for further action. A task force is established with agents from appropriate agencies assigned to the case.

In a large HIDTA such as Houston, 20 or more agents may be dedicated to an OCDETF case (although the agents may work several cases simultaneously). These are usually interstate cases that local police forces cannot work by themselves. In order to fund the OCDETF, each participating agency requests money from its department in Washington, plus the Department of Justice apportions OCDETF money as requested by the U.S. Attorneys’ offices. The purpose for the OCDETF Program is to pool Federal, state and local DLEA resources to bring particular cases to court.35

Drug Enforcement Agency State and Local Task Forces.

The 48 DEA State and Local Task Forces are DEA units with dedicated investigators and staff. They were established to “promote cooperation between DEA and State and local law enforcement officials, with the goal of immobilizing local drug trafficking groups.”36 They pursue open-ended drug problems such as money laundering, the Jamaican connection, and Nigerian smugglers.

The HIDTA Coordinator (an Assistant U.S. Attorney) assists the OCDETF and DEA State and Local Task Forces and other Federal agencies by requesting funds from Department of Justice. HIDTA money ($25 million in Fiscal Year 1990, $50 million for Fiscal Year 1991) is then apportioned through the HIDTAs to enhance drug law enforcement at the tactical level.

Drug Law Enforcement Agencies.

Numerous other organizations of Federal, state and local governments at the tactical level are conveniently grouped together under the term Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA). Examples of Federal, state and local DLEA include: state Departments of Justice and Public Safety.
FIGURE II-7.
ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM.

FIGURE II-8.
THE ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE AGENCIES.
State Police, metropolitan police, county sheriffs, prison officials, U.S. Marshals Service agents, Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) aboard U.S. Navy ships, and even U.S. Forest Service agents cutting marijuana plants on Federal land.

These units and men represent the foot soldiers who fight the war against drugs. Their unselfish and heroic actions deserve thoughtful policy direction and a cogent national drug strategy. The diversity of their operations requires a unity of effort to synchronize their actions at the operational and tactical levels.

The system for countering narcotrafficking in overseas areas resides in different domains than discussed in this chapter. The next chapter looks at our order of battle for prosecuting the drug war overseas.
CHAPTER 2
ENDNOTES


2. Bruce M. Carnes, Director, Office of Planning, Budget and Administration, Office of National Drug Control Policy, letter to the authors, January 22, 1991.


7. Ibid.


10. Ibid., pp. 16-17.


15. Interview with Brigadier General Barry J. Sottak, U.S. Army, Deputy Director, Operations Directorate (J3), Forces Command, Atlanta, Georgia, September 14, 1990.


17. Ibid, p. 95.


22. Ibid.


24. Operation Plan (Draft), p. 2. The Operation Alliance Command Group includes representatives from these activities: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Bureau of Land Management; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Immigration and Naturalization Service/Border Patrol; Internal Revenue Service; Joint Task Force Six (DOD); U.S. Attorney; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Customs Service; U.S. Forestry Service; U.S. Marshals Service; U.S. Park Service; U.S. Secret Service; Arizona Department of Public Safety; California Department of Justice; New Mexico Department of Public Safety; Texas Department of Public Safety; plus local police and sheriffs’ offices.

25. Ibid., p. 4.
26. Ibid., p. 5.
28. Message, 131350ZJUL90, CINC Forces Command (FCJ3-D), Fort McPherson, GA.
33. Interagency Coordination for Military Support to the Counterdrug Campaign Plan, p. B-5.
34. Joint Task Force Six Briefing.
CHAPTER 3

AN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OVERSEAS COUNTERNARCOTICS INITIATIVES

THE OCONUS STRATEGY

The President's National Drug Control Strategy extends its objectives and concepts to overseas areas where it seeks to motivate other nations to assist the United States. Such bilateral or multilateral efforts would disrupt drug trafficking and dismantle the means of growing and producing illicit drugs. In essence, the supply reduction strategy calls for eradication of drug crops, assistance for crop substitution, and continued interdiction of the drug trade. The first priority is to stop cocaine, then other drugs such as heroin, marijuana, methamphetamines and the like. By disrupting the growing, processing and transportation of coca and its products, the strategy would reduce the supply of cocaine to the United States. Because nearly all cocaine brought in is grown in Latin America, counternarcotics organizations and efforts there provide the framework for this discussion.

To attack cocaine production and trafficking overseas, the U.S. strategy calls for enhanced security training and equipment and military assistance to strengthen the will and institutional capability of the Andean Ridge nations (Bolivia, Columbia, Peru); improved control of waterways, land routes and airspace to increase the effectiveness of host country law enforcement and military activities; and increased efforts to dismantle trafficking operations, seize the assets of traffickers and put key leaders in jail to damage international drug trafficking organizations.1

The President's strategy for OCONUS action generally follows and supports the Cartagena Agreements reached by the United States and the Andean Ridge countries during the Andean Summit Meeting in February 1990.2

This chapter will review the principal organizations at the strategic level which support the President's strategy, and the players at the operational level. Tactical elements which confront the drug war on a daily basis in remote overseas areas will also be mentioned. A view of the relationships among key OCONUS players is seen in Figure III-1.

THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Several U.S. Government organizations are responsible for developing policy and recommending strategy to the President for overseas implementation. This section describes the strategic level players who write, coordinate, and oversee our international drug supply reduction effort.
FIGURE III - 1. OCONUS DRUG INTERDICTION SYSTEM.
The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum for national security issues that require Presidential decision. Its statutory function is to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as to enable the departments and agencies of government to cooperate effectively together.\(^3\) It develops interagency policies and strategies for Presidential consideration. Once the President makes a decision, the NSC Staff assists in the promulgation of National Security Directives and coordinates and monitors their implementation.

In general, the NSC focuses its energy in developing policy recommendations to the President for the OCONUS effort while the ONDCP orients on a stateside policy. There is a great deal of overlap, and ONDCP representatives attend many of the relevant NSC interagency meetings. Interagency groups constitute the principal mechanism for developing advice and recommendations for Presidential consideration. These groups formulate, recommend, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of national security policy and strategy. Often a government department such as Department of State or ONDCP will take the lead or chair of an interagency group; otherwise, the group will be chaired by a member of the NSC staff. Under the Bush Administration, the Deputies Committee, a deputy cabinet-level interagency group chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor, is the senior high-level group for interagency policy formulation.

The Deputies Committee is subordinate to the Principals Committee (the NSC without the President and Vice-President), and in turn, it has two tiers of supporting interagency committees. First, a number of Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC) are formed at the Assistant Secretary level. These PCCs replace the senior interagency groups (SIGs) of the Reagan Administration. The NSC has established regional PCCs chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State of the appropriate DOS regional bureau. The NSC has also established two functional PCCs to deal with combating terrorism (CT) and counternarcotics (CN) as global issues. Functional PCC would be chaired by a member of the NSC staff or at the Assistant Secretary level. See Figure III-2.

Because PCC meetings normally focus on the philosophical issues of policy formulation, additional groups can be formed to assist the Deputies Committee. The Coordinating Subgroup (CSG), an informal interagency working group, is action oriented upon a specific field of endeavor. The CSGs work at the deputy assistant secretary, office director, and action officer level. These working groups are typically chaired by members of the NSC staff or by directors from lead agencies. They monitor activities and formulate policy recommendations for the Deputies Committee. A Coordinating Sub-Group for Narcotics (CSGN) has been established to support the PCC and Deputies Committee, and it is in the CSGN that the work is done. Its participants include government officials at the Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels as well as various staff officers at the Director level. To facilitate policy development over a broad range of drug issues the CSGN has divided major issues among several smaller working groups. These are typically teams of 10 to 20 people from agencies related to the issue. The CSGN working groups develop policy recommendations for the President’s international initiatives as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAIR</th>
<th>FORUM</th>
<th>PARTICIPANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| PRESIDENT | NSC | - VICE PRESIDENT  
- SECKSTATE  
- SECDEF  
- STATUTORY ADVISORS: DCI 
- OTHER ADVISORS: DR. ACIA  
- DIR. USA |
| NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR | PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE  
(CABINET LEVEL) | - SECSTATE  
- SECDEF  
- DCI  
- CJCS  
- WHITE HOUSE COS  
- OTHERS |
| DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR | DEPUTIES COMMITTEE  
(SUB-CABINET LEVEL) | - UNDER SECSTATE, POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
- UNDER SECDEF, POLICY  
- DEPUTY DCI  
- VICE CHAIRMAN, JCS  
- OTHERS FROM DEPTs AGENCIES |
| DEPT/AGENCY ASSISTANT SECRETARY | POLICY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
(ASST SECRETARY LEVEL) | - MEMBERSHIP AT ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL OF DEPTs AGENCIES  
- REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEES: EUROPE, USSR, LAT AM, EAST ASIA, AFRICA, NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA, DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTELLIGENCE, ARMS CONTROL |
| DIRECTOR LEVEL | COORDINATING SUB-GROUP NARCOTICS  
(WORKING GROUPS) | - NSC STAFF AND DEPARTMENT AGENCY ACTION OFFICERS  
- WORKING GROUPS: ANDEAN STRATEGY, CARTAGENA AGREEMENT, HEROIN STRATEGY, MILITARY INITIATIVES, TRANSIT SECONDARY SOURCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE |

**Figure III-2. National Security Council Interagency Fora.**
• Andean Counterdrug Implementation Working Group - chaired by ONDCP and NSC; oversees the implementation of Department of State plans, evaluates both host nation and U.S. agency performance.


• Heroin Strategy Working Group - chaired by State INM: is developing a policy approach toward heroin.

• Military Initiatives Working Group - chaired by DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support; oversees the military role in the drug war.

• Transit and Secondary Source Working Group - chaired by State INM/ONDCP: develops policy recommendations for countries involved in the transiting of drugs from the Andean Ridge to the United States.

• Foreign Intelligence Working Group - chaired by the Central Intelligence Agency: coordinates intelligence architecture for the counternarcotics effort.

These working groups coordinate policy development for international initiatives in the drug war. Upon Presidential approval, the departments of the Federal Government, such as the Department of State, implement the policy.

**Department of State.**

A key participant in the NSC interagency process is the Department of State (DOS). It was a major contributor of concepts for international initiatives in the National Drug Control Strategy assembled by ONDCP for the President. Several bureaus of DOS have been active in developing policy aims for OCONUS counternarcotics activities.

The regional bureau for Inter-American Affairs (to include Caribbean Affairs and Mexico) provides general policy guidance to the Chiefs of Mission throughout the region. The functional bureau for International Narcotics Matters (INM) provides administrative and technical guidance to Narcotics Assistance Units located with the Ambassador's staff (Country Team). (See Figure III-3.) INM (through its in-country units) emphasizes developing programs with the host nation to tackle the problems of drug eradication and crop substitution. INM supports programs for aircraft support to host nations (the Air Wing initiative) and aerial spraying of drug crops. The Bureau for Political Military Affairs coordinates such actions with DOD agencies at home and abroad.4

The Chief of Mission—the Ambassador—represents the President, but takes policy guidance from the Secretary of State through the regional bureau. Responsible for all U.S. activities within the host nation, he interprets U.S. National Drug policy and strategy and oversees its application. Typically he uses his Country Team to assist in translating strategy or policy into operational direction within the country. For counternarcotics issues, the Deputy Chief of Mission is often
tasked as the Narcotics Control Coordinator to chair Country Team meetings concerning counternarcotics actions.

**Department of Defense.**

Department of Defense (DOD) policy and direction for OCONUS military counternarcotics operations emanates from a number of sources. Principal among these are the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy (who also heads the Defense Security Assistance Agency) and the DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy (who is also Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs). For ongoing strategic direction, the Joint Staff is the key.

**The Joint Staff.**

The central coordinating element for OCONUS operations is found in the Joint Staff, Operations Directorate (J3), Counternarcotics Operations Division (CNOD). Through CNOD, the Unified and Specified Commands are brought into action. For strategic direction CNOD relies upon the President's National Drug Control Strategy, and his National Security Directive which implements the international part of his strategy. Other strategic guidance comes from the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, who plays a direct role in coordinating the counternarcotics actions of the unified and specified commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Finally, CNOD representatives attend various interagency meetings held under the aegis of the National Security Council and ONDCP where international drug policy is developed.

The Counternarcotics Operations Division operates through three branches: Resource Management reviews the DOD program and budget, and provides guidance to the CINCs and Joint Staff input to the services' requested programs; Detection and Monitoring provides staff support for CONUS operations; and Host Nation Operations has cognizance for policy, strategy and resource management of U.S. military activity within the borders of host nations. See Figure III-4.

Other Federal Departments.

Alongside the State and Defense Departments, other Federal Departments support the National Drug Control Strategy’s international initiatives “to disrupt and dismantle the multinational criminal organizations that support the production, processing, transportation, and distribution of drugs to the United States. . .”

The Treasury Department is responsible for money laundering control programs and its U.S. Customs Service works to disrupt the smuggling of contraband and drugs. Transportation
Department’s U.S. Coast Guard intercepts and apprehends drug traffickers on the high seas and (with host nation permission) in foreign waters. The Coast Guard provides law enforcement detachments aboard U.S. Navy ships to support maritime detection, interception, and apprehension of drug smugglers. The Justice Department’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) coordinates drug intelligence collection and works with host countries on counternarcotics projects. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) works in selected countries to collect information to support drug-related investigations of major drug organizations.

**U.S. Southern Command.**

The U.S. Southern Command is located at Quarry Heights, Panama, with three service components: U.S. Army South, U.S. Southern Air Force, and U.S. Naval Forces South. Only the Army component has a significant force (the 193d Infantry Brigade) forward deployed in Panama. Because of its location astride the cocaine trafficking routes into the United States and the cocaine production centers within its theater, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is an important actor in the National Drug Control Strategy.

The Strategy’s OCONUS objectives are directed toward coopting some 750 thousand campesinos along the Andean Ridge from producing 300 thousand metric tons of cocoa leaf annually. Each year Southern Command is faced with the difficult task of working with host nations to deter or intercept the approximately 1,200 metric tons of cocaine that moves along air, land and sea routes to the 6 million cocaine users in the United States. The problem is how best to disrupt the growing, processing and transport of cocaine to the United States.

The U.S. Southern Command supports the President’s National Drug Control Strategy by actions which are broadly outlined in its SOUTHCOM Strategy and placed into operation in three regional campaign plans. The three campaign plans orient on Central America, the Andean Ridge (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru) and the Southern Cone. While the SOUTHCOM strategy and campaign plans reflect a number of concerns, such as access to minerals and raw materials, insurgencies, democratization, and regional emigration, a common theme is assisting host nations to defeat narcotrafficking.

In Central America the focus is on encouraging host nations to deter and interdict drug transiting. Also, through its participation in the Caribbean Basin Radar Network, USSOUTHCOM and cooperating host nations contribute toward the detection and monitoring mission of U.S. Atlantic Command’s JTF-4 in Key West, Florida. Because of the incidental overlap of transiting cocaine upon traditional insurgent areas, the potential for cooperative efforts between narcotraffickers and guerrillas lends urgency to USSOUTHCOM’s counterinsurgency effort.

In the Andean Ridge countries, insurgency is the condition in which USSOUTHCOM must work while encouraging host nations to interdict cocaine production and trafficking. USSOUTHCOM’s objectives are to encourage and strengthen democratization and economic growth, especially through training and operational support to host government institutions.
The Southern Cone is a region of developing democracies and economic potential, yet it is vulnerable to the spread of the cocaine market and its trafficking. To counter this, USSOUTHCOM seeks to enhance the institutions of government through limited security assistance.

Security assistance and operational training exercises are the principal means for USSOUTHCOM to support its strategic objectives and concepts. The scanty funding by Congress of security assistance to Latin American countries (only 5 percent of the Foreign Military Financing Program) could place at risk USSOUTHCOM's counternarcotics effort. To ensure maximum use of limited resources, USSOUTHCOM is developing resourcing programs with the Security Assistance Offices (SAO) which are part of the U.S. Ambassadors' Country Teams. (The SAO are often named the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) or the U.S. Military Group (MILGP)). The Commander-in-Chief of USSOUTHCOM exercises combatant command of the SAO (minus, of course, the U.S. Ambassadors' operational control for matters affecting the diplomatic missions). Each SAO has been tasked to develop a 5-year program for security assistance in support of the host nation's goals and strategy. These programs are aggregated to provide a resource basis for the three USSOUTHCOM campaign plans: Central America, Andean Ridge, and Southern Cone. In this way USCINCSOUTH supports the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Several organizations are in good position to translate strategic policy and objectives into operational direction that can synchronize counternarcotics tactical actions within the host countries. These organizations reside at a level below the strategic players. Given the authority to coordinate and the comity of participating agencies, they could make a major contribution toward unity of effort in the OCONUS drug war. These organizations include military task forces and the U.S. Ambassadors' Country Teams.

The Country Team.

The Country Team meets for many reasons, but when it assembles to coordinate in-country counternarcotics actions, it is usually chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission. Principal players with counternarcotic interests can include the Security Assistance Office (SAO), Chief of Station, DEA Narcotics Attache, INS Attache, Customs Attache, Narcotics Assistance Unit (Department of State, International Narcotics Matters), FBI Legal Attache, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Information Service, and the Defense Attache.

Typically Country Team members maintain stovepipe communications with parent organizations located stateside as well as directive authority for any related teams they may have operating within the host country. For example the Narcotics Attache maintains a link with DEA in Arlington, Virginia, while he also directs actions of DEA teams in the field. The same stovepipe effect is true of the Legal Attache (FBI), Security Assistance Officer (Defense Security Assistance Agency and Unified Command), Defense Attache (Defense Intelligence Agency), Public Affairs/USIS Officer (U.S. Information Agency), the Narcotics Assistance Unit officer (State Department, International Narcotics Matters) and so on. In addition, the Treasury Department's U.S. Customs
Service and Justice Department’s U.S. Border Patrol send training teams to numerous countries to assist in professionalizing those services.

This heterogeneous assemblage demands the close attention of the Ambassador and his Deputy Chief of Mission to ensure their coordinated action within the host country.

**USSOUTHCOM Subordinate Commands.**

The U.S. Southern Command has Army, Navy and Air Force service components and three subordinate joint forces. The Special Operations Command South (SOSCOUTH) is a subordinate unified command with air, land and maritime forces which can be employed throughout the theater to provide training for host nation forces, or it can conduct operations to counter insurgency, terrorism and narcotrafficking and production in cooperation with host countries.

Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B), located at Soto Cano Airbase in Honduras, is a support facility of about 1,200 service personnel whose mission is to conduct training, perform contingency planning and support nation building projects within Honduras. While JTF Bravo does not have a specific counterdrug mission of its own, it is in an excellent location to support U.S. Government and host nation agencies in their efforts to gather information about, and conduct operations against the transiting of drugs and other contraband through Central America.

Another USSOUTHCOM joint organization is JTF Panama, a new responsibility for the Commander, U.S. Army South. The JTF has several U.S. Air Force and Navy staff officers assigned to assist in the nation building effort within Panama. If USSOUTHCOM withdraws from Panama to a new location in the United States, JTF Panama will remain until December 31, 1999, to close our forward stationed military activities. U.S. Army South/JTF Panama will remain in a good position to support U.S. Government counternarcotics efforts, at least until it is withdrawn from Panama. While Latin American countries most need economic help (especially for commercially viable crop substitution for coca) these USSOUTHCOM forces can help train government institutions so that the host country can successfully suppress lawlessness, insurgency and the drug business.

Commander, U.S. Army South is also the Commander of U.S. Army Security Assistance Agency Latin America (USASAALA). This organization coordinates mobile training teams deployed in Latin America and monitors International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Army security assistance programs. It has good potential for support to the counternarcotics effort by helping host countries strengthen and professionalize their government institutions.

America’s counterdrug effort in Latin America is seen as a 10-year effort, and USCINCSOUTH has formed a staff office under the Deputy Director for Narcotics (DDN) as a subelement of the Operations Directorate (J3). This staff is located at Howard Air Force Base in Panama. Future consideration will be given to reconfiguring intelligence capabilities to focus on counternarcotics and forming a JTF for counternarcotics.
THE TACTICAL LEVEL

At the tactical level within the host country the United States has positioned the functional teams that fight the drug war. In most cases these teams work with host country counterparts to help them improve their performance and educate their sensitivities to the proper role of government officials in a democratic society.

U.S. Customs Service, for example, often provides teams for counterpart training in nations around the world. The DEA has agents working with host country officials to develop intelligence about narcotrafficking. Narcotics Assistance Unit agents and contract personnel coordinate with the host country to spray cocaine crops with defoliants while U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel seek to construct crop substitution and economic development programs. Military training teams working in a supporting role under the SAO or Joint Task Force Bravo endeavor to improve the viability and professionalism of the host country military structure while contributing to humanitarian assistance and nation building projects.

These illustrations evidence the need for the close coordination and cooperation of these teams. In the overseas arena the tactical activities are coordinated by the U.S. Ambassador through his Country Team procedure and by the Unified Commander (CINC) through joint planning procedures. When compared with their stateside counterparts, both the Ambassador and the CINC seem to enjoy considerably more authority to effect tactical cross-department coordination within their domains.

If we are going to be successful in projecting the President’s Drug Control Strategy overseas, then the sovereign rights and interests of the separate nations will have to be fully considered. The Ambassador’s Country Team and his country plans will remain the most effective means of guiding our counternarcotics efforts within the host nation. Regional approaches will be difficult to implement until multilateral agreements provide the foundation for combined law enforcement and military actions.13

The next chapter proposes a notional model for planning the CONUS and overseas supply side counterdrug effort at the strategic and operational levels.
CHAPTER 3

ENDNOTES

3. 50 USC 402.
6. USSOUTHCOM overview, Command Information Briefing, Quarry Heights, Panama, March 5, 1990.
7. Ibid.
CHAPTER 4

FILLING THE GAP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND TACTICS

INTRODUCTION

The President's first National Drug Control Strategy suggests that "...a truly integrated, effective and efficient national strategy requires that various law enforcement authorities coordinate their efforts when drugs are involved." This chapter offers the thesis that the ideas of national and theater military strategy and strategic and operational campaign planning can make a significant contribution toward unified counternarcotics action. The issue is not limiting the authorities and jurisdictions of the many drug law enforcement agencies; rather, it is synchronizing the inherently interdisciplinary counternarcotics effort among well-established, if overlapping, domains.

First, a military view of strategy will be provided: what it is; how it applies to the national drug control effort; and who should write it. Then, operational art is suggested as a means to place strategy into action: what are military campaign plans; how do they apply here; who should write campaign plans. Finally, the chapter posits several tenets to guide campaign planning for counternarcotics operations.

LEVELS OF STRATEGY


National Security Strategy is the art and science of developing and using all the elements of national power (political, economic, informational, and military) to secure the nation's strategic objectives. National military strategy, on the other hand, is the art and science of using the military element of power to achieve national strategic objectives with force or the threat of force. Thus, "military strategy must support national [security] strategy and comply with national policy."2

The President's National Security Strategy broadly translates our national interests into generalized strategic concepts and objectives. It does not address resources.3

The National Security Strategy is influenced by politics at the highest level. It is comprised of goals, interests, objectives and guidance per political, economic and defense agendas, and it has global and regional implications. Details concerning the distribution of scarce resources are left to the budget process.

Military strategy, however, is composed of three essential ingredients: military strategic objectives (ends) protect national interests; military strategic concepts (ways) describe how the job will get done; military resources (means) describe what it will take to support the concept.
Military strategy equals military objectives plus military strategic concepts plus military resources.
This conceptual approach is applicable to all three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.  

Military strategy enjoins the leader toward a disciplined balance of ends, ways and means. This is requisite because the stakes are high; results can be immediate and evident. The degree to which balance is not achieved indicates the risk accepted by the strategy.

A second fundamental of national military strategy is that it exists in two time dimensions: mid-range strategy looks ahead about 10 years while current strategy deals with the here and now. Examples are found in the DOD Joint Strategic and Operational Planning Systems:

- The mid-range National Military Strategy Document provides a view of future objectives and concepts and suggests the resources that should be built over the years ahead to support the emerging strategy. It is the rationale for the Six Year Defense Program and eventual budget.

- The current national military strategy is found in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). This provides strategic guidance from the National Command Authorities to the operational chain of command based on current forces and other military resources. It is the strategy for the present.

- Based on current resources apportioned to them by the JSCP, the U.S. Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) write theater strategies to meet planning requirements in peacetime and war.

**Application to the National Drug Control Effort.**

The President's National Drug Control Strategy can be seen as a functional level of strategy subordinate to his National Security Strategy. As such it brings greater definition to strategic objectives and strategic concepts concerning drug control. The January 1990 edition provides, in its Appendix B, program and budget priorities. This is further developed and explained by a separate January 1990 Budget Summary to the National Drug Control Strategy.

As mandated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (21 U.S.C. 1504) and crafted through interagency processes by ONDCP, the National Drug Control Strategy provides the broad strategic guidance appropriate to the national level of government. Given the circumscribed budgetary authority afforded the Director, ONDCP, it is remarkable that progress has been made on implementing resource apportionment.

As future iterations of the Drug Control Strategy are written, it could be useful to differentiate mid-range and current aspects of the strategy.

- A Mid-Range Drug Control Strategy could provide the President's view of the desired end-state or condition several years ahead: what continuing objectives will be required to meet the drug threat, what general concepts are envisioned for the agencies of government to execute, and what resources must be developed to get there. Such an
approach could bring continuity to the budget process and a rationale for needed resources.

- A companion Current Strategy could address the year or two ahead in terms of ends-ways-means. Given near-term strategic objectives based on extant resources and reasonable concepts for operations, measures of effectiveness could be designed—and met.

Contributions to both Current and Mid-Range strategies could be made by the Federal Departments (especially Treasury, Justice, Transportation, and Defense) who hold the program authority and build their department budgets. Current Strategy for both supply and demand reduction based on existing resources would further benefit from the contributions of the ONDCP working groups: South West Border Committee, HIDTA Committee, and the like.

Focusing most of their effort on the current strategy, the various Federal Departments could write supporting strategies to establish departmental objectives, concepts and resources.

Finally, while the authors see the HIDTAs as essentially operational level organizations, it may be useful for the HIDTA Coordinators to construct a type of "theater" strategy based upon known resources to provide strategic direction for DLEAs within their areas of responsibility. Federal, State and local DLEAs could participate in strategy development as a consensus-building measure. The South West Border HIDTA under the aegis of Operation Alliance provides an early example of such an effort as seen in the South West Border Strategy of July 1990.5 Also, the Drug Enforcement Administration has recently developed a strategy to guide its subordinate elements.

OPERATIONAL ART

In military parlance, operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and their major operations. Operational Art translates theater strategy into operational and, ultimately, tactical action. No specific level of command is solely concerned with operational art.6 Operational Art is the skill that causes strategic intent to influence operational design and tactical action. Operational Art facilitates the top-down relationships among national military strategy, theater strategy, theater campaigns (strategic level), subordinate campaigns (operational level), and tactical battles.7 In turn, campaigns are "a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given space and time."8

Campaigns.

Campaigns are the way a commander employs and sustains his forces in a phased series of unified or joint actions to achieve strategic objectives. The synergetic effect of these phased operations creates an advantage, or leverage, which makes the opponent’s position untenable. An important characteristic of the campaign is the authority given its commander to synchronize air, land, and sea effort to attain his objective.9
Campaigns can be conducted at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, campaigns achieve theater of war strategic objectives by the conduct of a series of related unified operations. When there are several lines of action within a theater of war, the Commander-in-Chief may establish subordinate theaters of operation. Each theater of operation commander could conduct subordinate (operational level) campaigns to achieve both the CINC's strategic objectives as well as supporting operational objectives by the conduct of a series of related joint and service operations.

**Campaign Plans.**

A theater campaign plan translates strategic intent into operational focus for subordinates. It provides the theater commander's intent—what he plans to do with his resources to achieve strategic objectives. This includes a description of the condition or desired end-state he wants to achieve.

The campaign plan provides broad concepts for phased operations and sustainment. The plan defines the initial phases(s) of the campaign clearly and establishes what spells success at the end of the campaign; however, to the extent that the commander comprehends the potential for war's "fog and friction" which may affect planning and operations, the mid-phases of the campaign may show less definition. Campaign plans, therefore, are supplemented with contingency plans to provide flexibility in dealing with changing situations.

**Center of Gravity.**

Both strategic and operational level campaign plans orient on the enemy's center of gravity in order to put him at a disadvantage, rob him of the initiative or will to continue, and defeat him. The center of gravity has been described by Clausewitz as the "hub of... power and movement, on which everything depends." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Basic National Defense Doctrine (Final Draft) (Joint Publication O-1) describes center of gravity in these terms:

> The characteristic, capability, or locality from which an opposing nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight is called the enemy strategic center of gravity. If it can be reduced to a singular capability, that... should be the... objective. If complete destruction or neutralization of the center of gravity is not feasible, major inroads against several components thereof may provide... [success].

The components of the center of gravity have been described as decisive points, critical nodes, intermediate objectives and the like. The center of gravity is not a vulnerability or a weakness. Rather, it is easiest to discern in terms of that main concentration of enemy power which can interpose itself between us and our strategic objective, thus causing our campaign to fail.

In a counternarcotics campaign, examples of an enemy center of gravity could include: key individuals (first and second echelon leaders); key nodes in the distribution system; major transportation assets; communications capabilities; or perhaps most important, the financial war chest, i.e., major money caches necessary to sustain operations. In identifying the enemy's center of gravity, one might ask what could win for the enemy or what is vital to the enemy to accomplish his strategic aim.
Unity of Effort.

Most important is that the campaign plan synchronizes the varied and diverse actions of subordinate commands to achieve a synergistic effect in attacking the center of gravity and its components. Such synchronization enjoins unity of effort, the prerequisite for success.

Unity of effort is created by establishing command relationships among the commander, his subordinates and those other commands and agencies charged to support him. This authority, written into the plan, is based on law, treaties, regulations, and standing procedures.

Of course, the campaign plan can exact unity of effort by way of its commander's precise mission statement, his statement of intent (what he intends to accomplish) and his phased concept for operations throughout the campaign. The plan organizes the terrain and key functions to delineate responsibility and it composes forces into unified and joint forces for the operations of each phase of the campaign.

The campaign plan provides a theater logistics concept for sustaining the command throughout the campaign. This includes logistics goals and priorities for each phase of the campaign. It describes, by phase, direction for procuring resources, establishing logistics bases for operations, and opening and maintaining lines of communication (supply) to the fighting forces. The campaign plan, therefore, provides a logical and powerful rationale to justify the funding programs requisite for success.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS

Having discussed the campaign plan's contents and its relationship to strategy, it is now useful to address the process—how to do it. Here, a conceptual procedure for writing the plan is suggested. Reduced to its essentials, operational art requires the leader to answer these questions: what condition must be produced to achieve the strategic objective; what sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition; how should resources be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? The process for campaign planning describes the leader's vision for fighting and articulates his intent.

This process is a cognitive and conceptual exercise of conducting an assessment (estimate of the situation): developing campaign design through assigned missions, concepts of operation and logistics: establishing theater organization and command relationships: writing these into a plan: and leading its execution.

Assessment.

In the assessment a myriad of variables must be considered. Intelligence resources are an essential aid in the assessment for both historical and predictive information of enemy capabilities and intent. Yet other information is also critical in assessing the strategic situation: political-diplomatic considerations, personalities of key leaders, the cultural and religious environment, geography and climate, and so on.
Staff techniques used by the military services can facilitate this assessment process. Joint planners look at command, control, and communications countermeasures (C³CM) to thwart the enemy's capability to perform his mission. For example, Air Force planners (targeteers) look for "critical nodes" in enemy command and control systems in order to disadvantage the enemy at points where he is vulnerable.

The Army's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a process uniquely suited to effect predictive intelligence fusion. The IPB process integrates known enemy procedures and activities with environmental factors and relates these to the mission at hand. IPB "provides a basis for determining and evaluating enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action."16

These staff processes are helpful in assessing the situation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

**Design.**

Campaign design addresses the concepts of center of gravity (discussed above), lines of operation, culminating points, and offense and defense. The line of operation connects the force with its base of operations at the rear (where it gets its reinforcements and supplies) and its objective at the front (where it operates against the enemy). This is important for developing a zone of supply, communication, transportation, and the like.

Another concept for campaign design is the notion of culminating point—the point in time and space at which the offensive becomes overextended and offensive combat power no longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defender to allow continuation of the offense.

This is a useful concept as it reminds the leader to generate sufficient resources to enable him to achieve the strategic objective before reaching the culminating point—running out of steam! Conversely, when on the defensive, the leader draws his enemy to culmination, then strikes him when he has exhausted his resources. This goes hand-in-hand with the essential decision of offense or defense, and various combinations of these at both strategic and operational levels.

Other elements of design are self-explained but deserve mention. These are also considered: objectives, sequence of operations (deployment, phased employment, sustainment), intelligence architecture, maneuver, firepower, and deception. So many factors must be considered in designing the campaign.

**Organization and Command Relationships.**

While considering the conceptual constructs described above, the campaign planner decides how to get organized. Both area and functional organization are considered. Often a combination of area commands (theaters, regions, sectors, zones) and functional commands (air support, transportation, intelligence) is decided. As the organization is determined, the command relationship among units and their commanders must be described based upon the authority given the commander by law or regulation. Command relationships answer the question: "Who's in
charge?" Also described are subordinate and supporting relationships. When authority for establishing firm relationships is not granted the leader, his campaign is placed at risk in execution by the competing demands within participating organizations.

In any event, command relationships should be described in specific terms: command, operational control, tactical control, attachment, coordinating authority, support. Each of these must be defined in the plan so that all participants understand their meaning.

Writing the Plan.

With all this conceptualizing, it eventually becomes necessary to write the commanders vision into a cogent command and control instrument—the campaign plan. The best format is the simple military order: friendly and enemy situation (assessment); mission; execution (phased concept of operations); logistics (sustainment); command and communications. (See Figure IV-1.) The Annex to Chapter 5, Campaign Plan Format, suggests a detailed format for a campaign plan that can be helpful to DLEAs.

Leadership.

Finally, as the campaign plan is published, the leader must supervise its execution by his technical competence, his timely commitment and positioning of resources, and his presence.

CAMPAIGN PLANS: HOW DO THEY APPLY TO THE DRUG CONTROL EFFORT?

The campaign planning process can be helpful in tying together the broad strategic objectives and concepts of the National Drug Control Strategy and other strategies (see DEA strategy in next chapter) and policy and the tactical efforts of federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies. The campaign plan is an effective command and control instrument that fills the gap between strategy and tactics.

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas.

The HIDTA Coordinators could design campaign plans that would synchronize the efforts of DEA, state and local task forces, organized crime drug enforcement task forces, and police and sheriff's departme "s in a phased manner to achieve the objectives of strategy. Such a plan would logically justify the apportionment of HIDTA money to the DLEAs in accordance with the phases of a campaign.

A cogent campaign plan at the HIDTA (or Operation Alliance, Operation North Star) level would be especially helpful to those who provide support to the DLEAs. Regional Logistics Support Offices, Joint Task Force Six State Adjutants General (National Guard), Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, National Guard Bureau and the Joint Staff (J33) all would provide improved support if they could develop supporting plans in line with an overall campaign. Such a campaign plan would go a long way to answering the lament, "Who's in charge here?"
1. SITUATION
   STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
   ENEMY SITUATION
   FRIENDLY SITUATION

2. MISSION

3. EXECUTION
   CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
   TASKS

4. LOGISTICS

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

   FIGURE IV-1. PLAN FORMAT.

Tenets of Campaign Planning—An Ideal Model.

The following tenets of campaign planning can guide the supply side counterdrug planning process. These tenets describe what a campaign plan is and does:

- Orients on the center of gravity of the threat.
- Provides concepts for operations and sustainment to achieve strategic objectives.
- Displays the commander's vision and intent.
- Provides the basis for subordinate planning and clearly defines what constitutes success.
- Phases a series of major operations and their tactical actions.
- Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates.
- Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships.
In the final analysis, the campaign planning process described in this chapter is not important for the written plan—a document to be placed on the shelf. Rather, it is the process itself that is significant—the process of the leader’s vision and guidance, the planning conferences, the liaison visits, the building of consensus toward specific goals, the continuous talking together at all levels. The campaign planning process provides a structure and sense of direction which can encourage a community of cooperation, even where formal authority and command relationships are inadequate.

The following chapter withdraws from this theoretical construct to describe current strategic planning and suggests a model for campaign planning at the operational level.
CHAPTER 4
ENDNOTES


2. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., Military Strategy: Theory and Application, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 6, 1989, p. 3. This essay provides an excellent discussion of military strategy. Lykke defines policy as a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.


4. Lykke, p. 4.


10. Ibid., p. 99.


16. Department of the Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, May 23, 1989, p. 4-1, see also FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, March 15, 1990, Chapter 4.

17. Mendel and Banks, p. 100; see also Joint Publication 3-0, pp. III-7 and III-8.
CHAPTER 5
PLANNING THE COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORT

USING THE MODEL

The previous chapter offered a campaign planning process and tenets which can be followed in developing a military campaign. Several examples of the strategy and campaigning process employed today, as well as some ideas for using the campaign planning model at the operational level follow. First, we will look at national level strategic direction practiced within the Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration within the Justice Department. Then, we will review regional strategies and campaign plans. The chapter concludes with a notional campaign plan format adapted for use at the strategic and operational levels of the drug war. A fictional example of how this format can be applied is found at Appendix D.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION—THE NATIONAL LEVEL

In developing strategy and campaign plans the first step is conducting an assessment of the strategic environment or situation. While many variables (discussed in Chapter 4) are considered, the most compelling task is assembling the strategic guidance, missions and tasks promulgated by higher authorities. This is a difficult chore because the reality of high level, interagency bureaucracy finds that our key civilian and military leaders often work for several bosses. So strategic guidance can come from many directions. After getting the lay of the land, the leader can begin to provide his own strategic guidance to subordinates. The military describes this process as estimating the situation and providing initial and subsequent commander’s planning guidance.

Department of Defense.

One departmental level example of the product of this process is seen in the Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy (Appendix A). This document draws upon Presidential and congressional guidance to frame its strategic concepts. It briefly assesses the threat and identifies tasks required by the President and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.

The broad concept of supply interdiction that it outlines is repeated from the President’s Drug Control Strategy: attack the flow of drugs to the United States in source countries, in transit, and within the United States. This is a broad policy document that underscores the Secretary’s intent to use DOD assets to support the National Drug Control Strategy.

As a supplement to the DOD Guidance document the Secretary provided a memorandum of instruction to his staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Appendix B). Such a memorandum provides follow-on guidance for a strategy or a campaign plan. In this case it directed the Department to “undertake immediately the initial actions set forth... in the
memorandum. At very high levels of authority a memorandum is a more appropriate document for providing coordinating direction than a fully developed campaign plan. This seems always to be the case at the military national strategic level and likely has application to other departments such as the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Transportation. The memorandum can accommodate most of the tenets of a campaign plan listed in Chapter 4 (leader’s vision and intent, direction and tasks, command relationships), but may not include the details of phased operations and logistics. Those are usually left to subordinate levels of leadership.

In this manner several unified and specified commanders received memorandums of instruction from Secretary Cheney (Appendix C), which told the combatant commanders what to do and synchronized their actions in accordance with the DOD Guidance. For example, Forces Command was directed to support the DLEAs; Atlantic Command was tasked to deploy a Caribbean Counternarcotics Task Force; Pacific and Southern Commands were to combat drug production and trafficking in coordination with host countries; and North American Aerospace Defense Command was to complement and support the DLEAs through detection and countering illegal drug trafficking.

The drug control policy of the Secretary of Defense will become an ongoing feature within the several documents that comprise the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS provides the national military strategies for mid-range and near-term planning. Thus, DOD support to counternarcotics efforts are to be a permanent part of national military strategy.

In a similar way, the Drug Enforcement Administration has recently developed a strategic planning system to promulgate its drug strategy.

**Department of Justice and Its Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).**

Through the summer of 1990 the Justice Department’s Drug Enforcement Administration developed a draft DEA Strategic Management System. This was produced in the Office of the Assistant Administrator for Investigations and Planning with assistance from planners from the Army and Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. DEA’s Strategic Management System (SMS) sets the objectives and priorities for dealing with its environment in three levels of documents: at the macro level is a Drug Control Strategy; supplementing the strategy are nine Program Directives; and regional Field Plans complete the SMS.

The Drug Control Strategy assesses the environment, then provides the Administrator’s strategic vision (what he will accomplish) and his mission. Its statement of strategy will include strategic concepts and a discussion of resources needed to get the job done.

The Program Directives are somewhat akin to military campaign plans. They provide specific guidance in functional and operational areas. Four functional plans concern the support efforts of training, intelligence, investigations, and management. Five operational areas orient on categories of drugs: cocaine, marijuana, heroin, diverted legal drugs, and chemically produced drugs. Field plans are required of special agents in charge at various field divisions and offices.
The DEA Strategic Management System coordinates the planning and operations of the Administration Headquarters, 19 Field Divisions within the United States, and offices in 43 foreign countries. This is a practical and logical planning system designed to synchronize effort at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The SMS applies within DEA and carries no authority across departmental lines; however, by establishing vision and direction it will assist supporting agencies to efficiently focus their help in useful areas.

**STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING—THE REGIONAL LEVEL**

The pattern for direction at regional levels includes broad strategies and specific action plans. In the U.S. joint military arena, unified commanders (such as U.S. CINCSOUTH) write theater strategies and augment these with campaign plans. The same approach, if less structured, can be found in civilian agencies. The military and civilian regional planning efforts described below represent current efforts to bridge the operational gap in the drug war with strategic and operational direction.

**U.S. Southern Command—Strategy and Campaign Plans.**

During the last quarter of 1989, the Southern Command revised its strategy and plans. A result has been a new SOUTHCOM strategy and supportive campaign plans.

The SOUTHCOM strategy was derived from national military strategy and the Commander-in-Chief's vision of his goals in the region. The strategy contains a theater strategic assessment, and identifies narcotrafficking, money laundering and narcoterrorism as immediate threats to U.S. interests. It reviews national level strategic direction, identifies national strategic objectives for the SOUTHCOM region, and lists USSOUTHCOM's military objectives. "To stem the flow of drugs into the U.S. from Central and South America" is one of SOUTHCOM's objectives.

An interesting component of the SOUTHCOM strategy is the section, USSOUTHCOM Vision 2000, which states that "the counternarcotics mission has become the number one priority of USSOUTHCOM."

The narcotics threat begins with demand in the United States, but hinges on the fact that coca has many suitable habitats in the hemisphere and the opium poppy is nearly as prolific. Ultimately, if left untouched, this narcotics industry will totally destroy the cultural fabric upon which stable, prosperous, and free societies are based. Any successful attack along this vector must address both the immediate threat—the flow of drugs into the U.S.—as well as the complicated interrelationships among the narcotraffickers and the conditions which breed political instability and economic underdevelopment.

To implement his strategic vision, the SOUTHCOM CINC has published three campaign plans: Central America, Andean Ridge, and Southern Cone. These theater campaign plans bridge the gap between strategy and tactics by providing coordinating guidance to USSOUTHCOM's service components, its joint command, and the U.S. Military Groups and Security Assistance Offices throughout the region. The SOUTHCOM strategy and campaign plans have established a basis for funding and sustaining counternarcotics efforts in the region.
Forces Command — Campaign Planning.

Since the summer of 1990, the Forces Command Operations Directorate has worked on a counternarcotics strategy. It will be published as a memorandum to subordinates outlining the major areas of strategic emphasis for deploying forces in support of the DLEAs. The FORSCOM Counterdrug Guidance (see draft at Appendix E) is a short letter of instruction which provides the springboard for a much expanded effort—writing the FORSCOM Counternarcotics Campaign Plan. As of this writing, the FORSCOM staff is continuing to develop the strategy and campaign plan. Its focus will be nationwide and special emphasis will be placed on the JTF-6 (Southwest Border) area. The plan is expected to be published by the summer of 1991 and will synchronize the counternarcotics support efforts of the CONUS Armies and Corps and JTF-6, and provide a long-range basis for support planning. It will also help to coordinate actions with State Adjutants General and U.S. Marine Corps units by providing them with a long-term view of FORSCOM activities.

Operation Alliance—A Coalition Strategy.

The Director of Operation Alliance (SW Border HIDTA Coordinator) has produced a drug control strategy for his region. Because Operation Alliance lacks the authority to compel the cooperation of DLEAs in the drug interdiction effort, the strategy serves the critical function of consensus building. Using the guidance of the National Drug Control Strategy, authors nominated by the Operation Alliance Joint Command Group wrote the initial draft during a strategy authors' convention. Some 21 Southwest Border agencies provided authors to build the strategy. The result is a generalized document which announces a consensus on the strategic situation (threat), strategic objectives, and support requirements and resources needed for drug interdiction in the Southwest Border area.

The Operation Alliance strategy provides the agreed framework for drug law enforcement actions in the Southwest Border area, yet by definition, strategies lack the specific coordinating guidance by which subordinates must operate. For this, campaign plans are used. Indeed, the essence of Operational Art is achieving the objectives of strategy through campaigns.

The reason for campaign plans, after all, is that we seldom have the resources at hand to achieve strategic objectives at once. The strategic situation is complex, the enemy difficult and our resources limited. We, therefore, visualize a desired end-state or condition and phase the application of resources over time toward its achievement. The phases of a campaign represent a series of major operations, or events, along the path toward success. Given such a phased plan, subordinates can plan their major operations in coordination with each other, and supporting agencies can estimate when, where and why their support will be needed. For these reasons Operation Alliance is considering writing a campaign plan, with the participation of JTF-6 Staff, to address operations in the SW Border area.

An Operation Alliance campaign plan would be a useful planning vehicle for coordinating DLEA activity over a period of time. A 2-year campaign, in step with ONDCP's 2-year objectives may be appropriate, as would any timeframe which supports the Operation Alliance strategic objectives. The Operation Alliance Campaign Plan would enable JTF-6 to program military resources...
over time to support DLEA operations. Such a phased plan would assist the DEA Special Agent in Charge, the Customs Assistant Regional Commissioner (enforcement), and the Chief, Border Patrol, to program their resources to support the phases of the Alliance campaign as requested by the DEA, Border Patrol, and Customs Tactical Coordinators.

Finally, by establishing a plan for action within the limits of its own domain, an organization can generate the magnetic effect of pulling along the participation of other agencies because the plan is cogent and compelling in its support of the President’s National Drug Strategy. This effect can be seen in USCINCSOUTH’s strategy and campaign plans discussed above. Lacking authority over U.S. Ambassadors and various stovepipe activities throughout Latin America, the USCINCSOUTH regional strategy and campaign plans have encouraged coordinated counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency effort because they set logical objectives, and provide concepts and resources. It is no surprise that USCINCSOUTH’s coordinating efforts have been most successful in areas where he has had the resources to commit. Money talks, and it is the glue which binds together disparate agencies with common goals. An Operation Alliance Campaign Plan would provide a sound basis for increased congressional funding of our counternarcotics effort in the Southwest Border area. In turn, more money would give Operation Alliance more clout in synchronizing DLEA operations.

If, as the Southwest Border strategy suggests, 11 additional task forces are to be organized to investigate border narcotics smuggling, then an Alliance campaign plan could synchronize the actions of diverse organizations: U.S. Customs Office of Enforcement, DEA, USBP, INS, BATF, IRS, U.S. Marshals Service, and state and local organizations.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING—BRIDGING THE OPERATIONAL GAP

The idea for an Operation Alliance Campaign Plan to bridge the gap between strategy and tactics has equal application with other mid-level agencies.

The campaign planning methodology could also be helpful to coordinate various field divisions within single agencies such as DEA and Customs. For example, in developing the DEA Field Plans, the Special Agent in charge of various field divisions could use the campaign planning process and tenets cited in Chapter 4 to insure a coordinated effort to attain the goals of the DEA Strategy and Program Directives.

If the metropolitan HIDTA coordinators become active in coordinating numerous DLEAs, then they will find the campaign planning process useful to ensure synchronized effort. Indeed, the campaign plan will be helpful to coordinate the operations of tactical elements in a phased manner to achieve strategic objectives.

In OCONUS areas, a Country Team campaign plan can be effective in coordinating the activities of its members in harmony with a logical, phased plan. Members of the Security Assistance Organization, who already coordinate their actions under the CINC’s campaign plan, could help the Deputy Chief of Mission in designing the campaign and supervising its execution.
There should be no illusions about the effectiveness of such campaign plans when participating agencies determine not to cooperate. Because operational leaders in the drug war lack command authority, the tenets of campaign planning (described in the previous chapter) will be imperfectly satisfied. Even with this problem, it is better to proceed by a plan of vision than to operate on a near-term basis without a sure sense of strategic destiny.

From the review of counternarcotics planning in this chapter, it is apparent that the effort and guidance provided has been largely at the strategic level. Strategic objectives and concepts are important but necessarily generalized. At lower echelons, campaign plans are harder to write and specifics are needed. There is no mystique associated with campaign plans—research, planning conferences, coordination, and hard work. The campaign plan is simply another plan with a certain style.

**Predictive Intelligence Support.**

Timely and effective intelligence support will be critical for law enforcement agencies in developing their campaign plans. "To be truly dynamic, campaign planning must have a predictive intelligence fusion process." Military staff officers assigned to DLEAs from the military services bring to drug law enforcement planning such critical capabilities and techniques as the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process.

As the services lend more of their intelligence support to the counternarcotics effort, organizations such as EPIC, the proposed NDIC, and the Customs-Coast Guard C3I Centers could benefit from predictive intelligence techniques such as IPB.

**A FORMAT AND NOTIONAL PLAN**

This chapter has described current strategic planning and suggested that law enforcement agencies will find campaign planning useful as they prosecute the drug war.

To help the DLEA planner tackle the task of campaign planning, the authors suggest a format (see annex that follows) that has proven useful to military planners: and to give the DLEA planner a sense of the flavor and style of a campaign plan, a notional plan has been written. Appendix D illustrates how this format can be used in counternarcotics planning. A countermarijuana campaign for federal lands in northern California, Oregon, and Washington is described.

Clearly, format is much less important than content, but the authors suggest that a universally accepted format would be helpful in improving communications among the many organizations involved in counternarcotics operations. When organizations opt to use other established formats, the "Campaign Planning Tenets" found at the end of Chapter 4 will provide a solid touchstone for effective planning.

The following chapter addresses what is feasible in developing a national counternarcotics structure that can plan campaigns and provide the command and control necessary to conduct America's war on drugs.
ANNEX

CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMAT*

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

Copy No. _______
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature

DRUG INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents

1. Situation. Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses.

   a. Strategic Guidance. Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memorandums, and strategic plans, including plans from higher authority, that apply to the plan.

      (1) Relate the strategic direction to the situation in your domain.

      (2) List strategic objectives and tasks assigned.

      (3) Constraints: List actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority (rules of engagement, legal, jurisdictional).

   b. Criminal Forces (the threat). Provide a summary of intelligence data:

      (1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of narco-trafficers that can influence your domain.

      (2) Strategic concept. Describe threat intentions.

      (3) Major threat objectives.

*SOURCE: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0. Doctrine for Unified Joint Operations, January 1990, Appendix C, Campaign Plan Format, as modified by the authors.

NOTE: An intelligence annex can be provided for more detailed information.
(4) Idiosyncrasies and operating patterns of key personalities and organizations.

(5) Operational and sustainment capabilities.

(6) Vulnerabilities.

(7) Center of gravity. Describe the main source of threat power.

c. Friendly Forces. State here information on friendly DLEAs or supporting military forces not assigned or attached that may directly affect the organization.

(1) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting DLEAs and military forces.

(2) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting foreign agencies.

d. Assumptions. State here assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole.

2. Mission. State the task(s) of the organization (lead agency) and the purpose(s) and relationship(s) to achieving the strategic objectives(s). State in terms of what, where, when and why.

3. Execution.

a. Overall Concept. State the broad concept (how) for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of participating DLEAs during the campaign as a whole.

(1) Area organization (where will each DLEA operate).

(2) Objectives for overall campaign.

(3) Phases of major events or operation of the campaign.

(4) Timing. Indicate the expected time periods of each phase. EXAMPLES: Phase I, D-Day —D+45, or Phase I, March 29 - August 1, etc.

b. Phase 1 (Timing for Phase).

(1) Operational Concept. How will participating DLEAs and supporting activities accomplish the objectives of this phase. Include operational objectives, and detailed scheme of operations (actions) for the phase. Indicate lead and supporting DLEAs required to do the job. Consider role of supporting Department of Defense forces.

(2) Tasks of DLEAs and other units participating in this phase of the campaign. (List each organization separately and assign it a job for this phase).
(3) Forces Held in Reserve. Location and composition. Explain "be prepared" missions.

(4) Deception. Consider a concept for deception. Describe your concept. Who do you wish to trick; what behavior do you want him to effect; what do you wish to protect; what (friendly force) will do the deception effort. Use an annex for details.

(5) Psychological. Describe any psychological operations that might support your strategic objectives.

c. Phases II through Subsequent Phases. Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3.b. above for each subsequent phase. Provide a separate phase for each step in the campaign at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and/or another significant action initiated.

d. Coordinating Instructions. General instructions applicable to two or more phases or multiple elements of the organization may be placed here.

4. Logistics. Brief, broad paragraph describing how you will provide supply, service, and other support over the course of the campaign. Provide overall logistics goals and priorities.

a. Phase I (Timing - same as in Paragraph 3). Consider providing the following information as it applies to your plan.

(1) Assumptions.

(2) Logistics goals and priorities for this phase of the campaign.

(3) Supply aspects (include role of each DLEA in providing supplies; consider any foreign participating DLEAs).

(4) Base development (develop a base from which you will provide supply and services if required).

(5) Transportation.

(6) Maintenance of equipment.

(7) Medical service.

(8) Personnel (common procedure for replacements, manning, etc).

(9) Administration (describe any administrative management procedures which impact on the campaign).

b. Phases II through Subsequent Phases. Cite information stated in subparagraph 4.a. above for each subsequent phase.
5. Command and Communications.

a. Command Relationships. If using lead agency concept, state lead agency by phase. State generally the command/coordination relationships for the entire campaign or phases thereof. Indicate any shifts of command or lead contemplated during the campaign, indicating time of the expected shift. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give location of commander or Special Agent in Charge and command posts. If commander, or lead agency is out of action, who is next in charge.

b. Communications. Plans of communications. (May be contained in an annex.) Include time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions, and plans for using radio, telephone, and computer networks.

(Signed)____________________

(Director/Senior Tactical Coordinator)

ANNEXES: As required

DISTRIBUTION:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
CHAPTER 5

ENDNOTES


5. Ibid., Executive Summary, Theater Strategic Assessment, p. 4.


8. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

9. Operation Alliance, Southwest Border Drug Control Strategy, pp. 140-142. Agencies which participated in writing this strategy include: Arizona Department of Public Safety; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Bureau of Land Management; Bureau of Prisons; California Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics; California National Guard; Drug Enforcement Administration; El Paso Intelligence Center; FBI; IRS; JTF-6; Los Angeles Sheriff's Department; New Mexico Department of Public Safety; New Mexico Region VI Drug Enforcement Coordinating Committee; Pima County Sheriff's Department, Tucson, Arizona; Texas Department of Public Safety; Texas National Guard; U.S. Border Patrol; U.S. Customs Service; U.S. Forest Service; and U.S. Marshals Service. In addition these organizations provided input: the ONDCP Border Interdiction Committee; Financial Crimes Enforcement Center; International Criminal Police Organization, U.S. National Central Bureau; New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Office of Drug Control; Texas Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse; U.S. Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

10. George Bush. National Drug Control Strategy, Washington: The White House, January 25, 1990. Appendix D. Quantified Two-and Ten-Year Objectives, p. 117. One of the most problematic issues in counterdrug planning is defining meaningful and measurable objectives. Explaining the intent of a counterdrug campaign acquires that success be fully defined. Then, resources can be applied toward reaching the objective. Yet, the statistics of drug supply and demand are uncertain and more likely to support turf issues than strategy and campaign planning.


CHAPTER 6
CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND THE INTERAGENCY ARENA

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE

Earlier chapters described the problems caused by drug trafficking, listed the key organizations involved, and set forth a series of planning principles that would ideally be followed in developing any military campaign. Unfortunately, real world situations seldom permit the formulation of an ideal military plan, or the optimum utilization of all assets, even when unity of command is present and all subordinates try to be cooperative. Theory and reality are often incompatible. When armies of different nations are involved in allied efforts, their individual agendas may force compromise by all concerned. Even U.S. joint military operations (those involving more than one branch of service in cooperative efforts) are often confronted with honest disagreement that must be resolved. Interservice rivalry is not unknown. This same rivalry exists within the federal bureaucracy and between state and local agencies.

It is therefore reasonable that any counternarcotics campaign involving different DLEAs and varied military support units that operate in areas of overlapping jurisdictions cannot expect to be free of honest disagreements. But this does not alter the fact that adhering to the basic tenets of strategic and operational planning will enhance the effectiveness of sustained tactical actions directed towards a defined objective. This is true whether the organization be a unified military command or a group of DLEAs responsible for areas along the U.S. border.

The challenge then is to determine how strategic and operational planning techniques can be made useful to DLEAs and the military units that support them. What is possible in terms of an organization structure that can use such planning for programming and budgeting as well as guiding tactical efforts? This chapter addresses that question.

THE SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATION

The quest for an organizational structure that can efficiently and effectively meet the challenge of drug trafficking is not new. In the past 25 years alone, there have been at least 16 attempts to reorganize Federal drug control programs. Theoretically speaking, what is needed is a single organization, properly manned and funded, that operates under one leader who has directive authority to control all counternarcotics programming, planning, and tactical efforts, both domestically and overseas. That will not happen.

The need for a single agency was recognized by the Nixon Administration and attempts in that direction were made during the 1973 Executive Branch reorganizations. The effort failed for bureaucratic and political reasons, but the Drug Enforcement Administration was formed and made lead agency for investigating violations of federal narcotics and dangerous drugs law. However, other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard retained primary law enforcement roles in preventing the entry of illicit narcotics into the United
States. Today some 33 federal agencies (to include such seemingly unrelated agencies as the Bureau of Land Management; the Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; and the Federal Aviation Administration) have responsibilities in combating the flow of drugs. No one person or agency (excluding the President of the United States) coordinates or integrates the operational planning or tactical actions of the many agencies. The ONDCP is not given this authority nor is it structured to do so. The ONDCP is a policy developing organization, concerned with national drug strategy, and serves as a coordinating mechanism at the national level for the implementation of Presidential policy. At the operational (campaign) planning level and at the tactical level, no one is "in charge" nor is it likely that any one person or agency ever will be. This does not mean that efficient operational and tactical activities cannot be accomplished. It means only that they must be done through efforts of a coalition. The "headquarters" or lead agency must be supported by diverse groups with a common interest.

**COALITION EFFORT**

Until the advent of Operation Alliance in 1986, there had been little success in establishing multiagency organizations designed to coordinate and support tactical drug operations. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) had shown that interagency cooperation was possible but EPIC was a special case of cooperation within the intelligence community that posed no significant threat to the roles and missions of major agencies. It was intended to provide a service to all. Operation Alliance, on the other hand, is concerned with supporting tactical actions by federal, state and local officials along the entire Southwest Border and could have been perceived as an attempt to attain centralized directive authority over all tactical counterdrug operations in the border area. Some did initially see Operational Alliance as a threat to their autonomy. After 4 years of consensus building through multiagency conferences and a demonstrated desire to be a nonthreatening support coordinating office, Operational Alliance is now showing success as a coalition effort. (JTF-6 is now in the spot Operation Alliance was in 1986. It must prove itself to be an effective instrument for providing federal military support while not suggesting any tendency to become dominant in operational or tactical matters.) The main contribution that Operation Alliance has made to date is to prove that DLEA coalitions are possible and can become effective. Despite its success, however, Operation Alliance has no directive authority. It has no status as a "lead agency." It cannot develop operational-level plans for multiyear operation and then direct tactical action. In sum, Operation Alliance is becoming a success story for what it was designed to do but such an arrangement does not meet the national need for an organization capable of planning and prosecuting a campaign plan designed to eliminate or control drug trafficking. Since a single federal agency option seems to be infeasible, some other type of coalition headquarters must be developed.

**WAR PLANNING AND COUNTERNARCOTICS**

Many similarities exist between the planning efforts for a global military war and the U.S. role in an international and domestic war on drugs. Certain common considerations exist. Defining the strategic objectives, understanding enemy intentions and capabilities, specifying areas of operations, setting priorities of effort, establishing functional organizations with workable command and control structures, sequencing operations, following span of control principles and making sound resource allocation should be similar in either military or drug law enforcement
strategic and operational planning. To date, the United States has been only marginally successful in a number of counterdrug planning endeavors. The supply reduction side of our drug war could be much more successful if military planning methods were used to support drug law enforcement activities.

As an example, when fighting a war that is spread over vast areas, the strategist must determine what geographic subdivision should be made in order to effectively combat the enemy. He must consider all the factors mentioned above plus time-distance factors, international law, sovereignty issues, the interests and objectives of his allies, domestic political considerations, and budget constraints. In military conflicts, these geographic subdivisions are often called theaters of war (strategic level) and theaters of operation (operational level). A Theater Commander is appointed who devises a theater strategy which complements national military strategy and, within his resource allocation, begins formulating a campaign plan(s) to attain the strategic objectives for this theater. His plans consider not only the troops and assets under his control but also those friendly forces that may become available. In coalition efforts, he becomes a soldier-diplomat in order to achieve harmony and unity of effort among the allies involved. He must consider the agendas and objectives of all forces under his command if he is to be successful in obtaining maximum effort against the enemy. Compromise is both necessary and productive in coalition warfare. These principles also apply to drug war planning where regional commissioners, special agents, U.S. Attorneys and the like must coordinate activities in their interagency operating areas.

A UNIFIED ACTION PLAN FOR SUPPLY REDUCTION OPERATIONS

If DLEAs are to utilize campaign planning techniques in the drug war, there must be organizational structures in place that can function as headquarters for “theaters” or operating areas. Experience tells us that no single organization will control all drug supply reduction activities and it is unlikely there can be a “purple suit” force of agents from the various DLEAs and the military who would serve tours of duty in a special counterdrug force. Even overseas, it is not feasible for the Department of Defense or the Department of State to have unilateral control over forces attacking production sources or interdicting drugs in transit. Therefore what remains feasible is some form of coalition headquarters within a geographic region that can accomplish campaign planning and direct coordinate tactical operations within that region. Building upon the lead agency concept, such a headquarters can be constructed.

Although the authors do not know the optimum solution, the following unified action plan is provided as an example of what would be a sound organizational structure to facilitate campaign planning and one that may be politically feasible.

The continental United States could be viewed as a theater of war. Borrowing from military language, this term supports the President’s intent to win the “drug war.” Strategic direction for the CONUS theater could be provided by the President through the Director, ONDCP. In any event, whoever is designated, the CONUS “theater commander” would provide strategic guidelines to subordinate areas (called theaters of operation in military parlance). The term Interagency Operating Area (IOA) may be a better descriptor of these subordinate areas since interagency DLEA effort is required.
Within the continental United States, certain operating areas lend themselves to geographic breakout for supply reduction operations. The Southwest Border area; the Southeastern region with its maritime approach; the U.S.-Canadian border; the metropolitan HIDTAs; the several major ports of entry for commercial cargo and passenger arrival; and the interior of the United States, subdivided as necessary, all are appropriate IOAs which merit an operational level headquarters for conducting counterdrug planning.

We suggest that a lead agency be designated for each IOA within the United States and be given the authority and responsibility for preparing a campaign plan for counternarcotics operations. This plan would involve the cooperative participation of all appropriate federal agencies. Each federal DLEA which now plays a major counternarcotics role should be designated a lead agency and assigned an appropriate IOA. In those IOAs where it is not the lead agency, each DLEA would serve in a supporting role. This concept plays to the strength of each group by selecting as lead agency that agency best suited for the IOA environment. Such an arrangement also gives each major DLEA a special domain in which to excel. Cooperative efforts are enhanced in that each agency needs help from the others in order to succeed within its IOA. Agency heads will encourage cooperation by subordinate officers in IOAs where they are not the lead agency. Assignment could be as shown in Figure VI-I.

The breakout of IOAs shown is made by the authors for illustration only. Recommending geographical boundaries and lead agency designations are more appropriately the role of ONDCP in responding to requirements of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 after consult with departments and agencies concerned.

Each lead agency should maintain close liaison with the U.S. Forces Command, the state Adjutants General, and with the supporting military joint task force if one is established within its operating area. These military headquarters can be of considerable assistance in operational planning and in providing federal assets for mission accomplishment.

In overseas operations, the designation of a lead agency is more complicated. International law, treaty agreements, U.S. foreign policy objectives, security considerations, military-to-military relationships, the role of an American Ambassador and his country team, and the internal social and political environment of the foreign nation concerned are all piled upon and intertwined with drug war problems. It is therefore difficult to specify one lead agency or theater headquarters to plan for counternarcotics alone.

The best solution appears to be that the lead agency for drug strategy in an overseas region should be the Assistant Secretary of State for the region concerned. Working in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters and the Director of Political-Military Affairs, and in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Attorney General, he is in the best position to lead the regional strategy formulation. When it comes to operational planning, however, the American Ambassador and his country team are the only persons in place with the knowledge, access and opportunity to develop plans for an in-country combined counterdrug campaign. The regional U.S. military commander-in-chief can provide both strategic and operational planning support as requested by the Assistant Secretary of State in charge or the American Ambassador concerned. To underutilize the talents and assets of the
Figure VI-1
Illustrative Example of Interagency Operating Areas.

As designated by the President after consultation with ONDCP and the Cabinet Office concerned.
regional military headquarters would be a mistake. (The regional military headquarters may also be able to provide considerable intelligence data to the several lead DLEAs in the United States regarding the flow of narcotics from overseas theaters to the United States.)

**CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND THE INTERAGENCY ARENA — CAN IT WORK?**

There is the compelling need for a solution to the drug problem and no single approach will suffice. While demand reduction programs proceed toward fruition, supply reduction efforts must become more effective.

History teaches us that coalitions of different forces working toward a common goal have been successful — particularly when the threat is beyond the capability of any one coalition member to defeat. The drug threat is of that magnitude. A coalition of various drug law enforcement entities, supported by the U.S. military, is both feasible and necessary if the United States is to continue its progress in defeating the drug trafficker.

The authors are convinced that campaign planning is adaptable to drug law enforcement operations and that a Lead Agency, responsible for coordinating coalition efforts within a geographic area, can use this military planning technique to great advantage. The same principles are applicable to U.S. elements operating in an overseas environment.

Necessity stimulates innovation and both campaign planning and a unified action plan are within the art of the possible.

**CAMPAIGN PLANNING WITHIN SEPARATE DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES**

In addition to interagency campaign planning, the campaign planning process can be of help within the separate DLEAs to coordinate their tactical actions. The agent in charge of a field division will find this methodology helpful. Other opportunities for applying campaign planning methods might be found at regional, area or sector offices. In this way, mid-level leadership within the chains of command of our DLEAs can synchronize their activities in phased operations to achieve their objectives.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Research for this publication included numerous interviews with officials at national, state, and local levels concerned with drug supply reduction, as well as field visits involving direct observation of law enforcement and military personnel engaged in tactical operations (see Appendix G). The authors also did extensive reading on the drug trafficking problem. These experiences led to the following conclusions regarding the drug war and how it should be waged.

- The problems created by drug abuse and drug trafficking are enormous. American social structures and moral standards are being degraded and the economic drain is staggering. Drug-related problems have impaired our relationships with foreign governments and our national security programs have been jeopardized. In the long run, America's drug war is more critical for its national interests than regional conflicts in places like Southwest Asia, Africa, or even the Persian Gulf. A $200 billion yearly drain on the U.S. economy from drug trafficking and abuse far exceeds our estimated dollar cost for conducting Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf area.

- The drug war is winnable but the United States is not yet winning. We define winning the war as reducing the amount of drug abuse and drug traffic to a level which is acceptable to U.S. society and which does not seriously degrade our national security, our economic well-being, and our social order.

- The American people continue to demand a solution to the drug dilemma. As evidenced by legislation enacted and by the number of legislative proposals, the Congress appears more sensitive to these demands than does the Executive Branch. It may mandate actions if a sustained lack of Executive progress is perceived.

- Though not endorsed by many, some well-meaning individuals have called for legalization and the controlled sale of drugs to raise funds for education, medical, and rehabilitation efforts to reduce demand. These critics of current policy argue that present counterdrug efforts have failed and that monies now going to drug dealers could be channeled into demand reduction programs. President Bush and the national leadership feel this argument is ill-conceived and would do much more harm than good. We agree with the President. The "War on Drugs" can be won, legalization is morally repugnant, and the problems caused by any legalization could be more severe than those now at hand.

- While improvement has been made in the past two years, the 33 federal agencies involved in drug law enforcement actions and the myriad of state and local law enforcement entities are not yet working effectively together in a synchronized or
coherent manner nationwide. Operation Alliance is the best example of large scale, sustained interagency operations.

- Complaints of "no one's in charge" are pointless. In our system, no one but the President can really be in overall control of the drug war at the national level. Only he can be the "Drug Czar" for only someone above the Cabinet level has sufficient authority to control the departments and agencies which are responsible for the various counterdrug forces. This does not preclude strong influence by subordinates in policy development, strategy formulation and operational guidance. It simply ensures centralized authority. Nor does it interfere with the execution of policy by DLEAs in the several Interagency Operating Areas. Rather it ensures uniformity of guidance.

- The ONDCP, though located in the Executive Office of the President, effectively operates below the Cabinet level. Reestablishing a Cabinet level board, similar to the old National Drug Policy Board but chaired by the President, is the best way to reinforce ONDCP and ensure cooperation among the several departments and agencies. While ONDCP can develop and administer strategy and policy guidance for the President, the President through his Cabinet level board must still play an active, continuous role in directing the interagency counternarcotics effort. Further, only by his direct participation can we hope to pull together and fully integrate our CONUS and OCONUS efforts.

- At the tactical level, interagency cooperation and joint operations are quite feasible if an atmosphere of understanding and trust can be established. This has often been accomplished by continuous liaison, frequent planning conferences, and working together in joint operations. The challenge is to achieve similar harmony at the operational and strategic level.

- Designating a lead agency to coordinate and control all joint (interagency) planning and tactical operations within a geographical area (an IOA) appears to be the best and most feasible way to reap the benefits of campaign planning.

- The U.S. military can make a substantial contribution to the drug war. It must actively seek its proper role and act in a positive but nonthreatening manner. Temptation to go beyond a support role when providing needed help for DLEAs, American Embassy Country Teams, and friendly foreign governments should be avoided. Being proactive is fine as long as the rules of engagement are remembered.

- An expansion of military support activities is warranted. However no promises of increased support should be made until adequate resources are available.

- The military should offer greater participation in the area of predictive intelligence production and fusion (to include systems architecture, collection methods, analysis, dissemination, and retrievability) and in strategic and operational level planning at various DLEA and interagency headquarters and offices.
Drug Law Enforcement officers, U.S. military men, and the Washington bureaucracy (to include the Congress) all speak different professional languages. Ways must be found to improve communications. ONDCP should lead an interagency effort to publish a doctrinal concept for drug interdiction activities to include a dictionary of common terms.

The campaign planning process can serve the drug law enforcement community as a planning technique to synchronize interagency operations in the war on drugs. The stakes in this war are high. Thousands of dedicated people work long hours, often in dangerous situations, attempting to stem the flow of drugs. They deserve more and better support than they now receive, particularly in terms of personnel resourcing, current technology and interagency coordination. When fighting a foe that is cunning, ruthless, and well-financed, to win we need a force of sufficient size that is better trained and at least equally well-equipped. That force should use the best methods known to plan and control the battles. Until demand reduction programs are successful, we must continue the supply reduction struggle.

The principal point the authors wish to convey is that there is a better way to plan for sustained counternarcotics efforts. If joint efforts can be coordinated under lead agency supervision, and the method for planning a campaign and marshalling assets needed is used, then greater success in our war on drugs can be realized. Ultimately we will win.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 18, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

On September 5, 1989, the President issued the National Drug Control Strategy pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The President's strategy provides for an integrated program of counternarcotics actions designed to move the country substantially closer to the goal of a drug-free America. This guidance is designed to assist in the swift and effective implementation of the President's strategy within the Department of Defense.

The supply of illicit drugs to the United States from abroad, the associated violence and international instability, and the use of illegal drugs within the country pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the country. The threat of illicit drugs strikes at the heart of the Nation's values. It inflicts increased crime and violence on our society and attacks the well-being and productivity of our citizenry. One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. Also, the Congress has by statute assigned to the Department the duty to serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States. For these reasons, the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense.

The Nation ultimately will be rid of the scourge of illegal drugs only through the sustained application of the energy, courage and determination of the American people. As the President's Strategy reflects, the Nation must seek to eliminate both the demand and the supply for illegal drugs, for the Nation will conquer neither if the other is left unchecked.

The Department of Defense, with the Department of State and U.S. law enforcement agencies, will help lead the attack on the supply of illegal drugs from abroad under the President's Strategy. The efforts of the Department of Defense will complement those of other U.S. agencies and cooperating foreign countries. The Department of Defense will work to advance substantially the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States through the effective application of available resources consistent with our national values and legal framework.

An effective attack on the flow of illegal drugs depends upon action at every phase of the flow: (1) in the countries that are the sources of the drugs, (2) in transit from the source countries to the United States, and (3) in distribution in the United States. The United States Armed Forces can assist in the attack on the supply of drugs in each of these phases.
I. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS AT THE SOURCE

The Department of Defense will assist in the attack on production of illegal drugs at the source. The production of illegal drugs is a complex criminal enterprise. The criminal enterprise requires illicit labor, capital, entrepreneurship and a substantial infrastructure to grow the plants that are the raw materials for illegal drugs and to refine and manufacture the illegal drugs. Reducing the availability of these elements of illegal drug production in the countries from which illegal drugs originate would reduce the flow of illegal drugs to the United States.

The Department of Defense can assist in the three elements of an effective attack on the supply of drugs in source countries: (1) assistance for nation-building, (2) operational support to host-country forces, and (3) cooperation with host-country forces to prevent drug exports. Pursuant to the National Drug Control Strategy, near-term efforts will focus on the Andean nations from which most cocaine entering the United States originates. A key requirement for the success of U.S. efforts directed at the supply of illegal drugs, and in particular U.S. counternarcotics operations, will be the cooperation of the foreign countries involved.

As the National Drug Control Strategy indicates with respect to the Andean countries, a sustained, multi-year effort to provide economic, security, and law enforcement assistance is an essential element for a successful fight against illegal drugs abroad. Drug-producing criminal organizations control what amounts to private armies that challenge the law enforcement and military forces of their countries. Often such organizations are intertwined with insurgent forces that challenge directly the governments of their countries. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for the United States to reinforce the abilities of the governments of the countries cooperating in the fight against illegal drugs to combat drug-producing organizations. Security assistance will help enable such a government to protect itself from criminal drug enterprises and drug-related insurgencies, and to enforce its laws against drug producers and traffickers. Future economic assistance will help to strengthen the national economy and keep the labor, capital and entrepreneurship available in the country channeled toward useful production and away from drug production. Success in other efforts to attack the supply of illegal drugs depends in the long-run upon the establishment of healthy economies in drug-producing countries and the restoration of governmental authority in those countries. To assist in the implementation of this element of the National Drug Control Strategy, the Department of Defense will execute security assistance programs in accordance with Presidential instructions and applicable law, and in coordination with the Department of State.

Effective implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy requires that the Department of Defense be prepared to provide counternarcotics operational support to the forces of cooperating countries. The U.S. Armed forces can provide foreign forces substantial assistance in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, logistics, medical support and civic action in connection with foreign forces’ operations against the infrastructure of drug-producing criminal enterprises. Such U.S. military support would be designed to increase the effectiveness of foreign forces’ efforts to destroy drug processing laboratories, disrupt drug-producing enterprises, and control the land, river and air routes by which the enterprises extililate illegal drugs from the country.

In addition to assistance for nation-building and support for foreign forces’ strikes on drug-producing enterprises, the U.S. can assist law enforcement agencies of
cooperating foreign countries in combatting the export of drugs from those
countries. The Department of Defense can assist with an improved intelligence
collection effort, which will be essential not only to assist the governments of the
source countries, but also for U.S. actions in the second line of defense -- the attack
on drugs in transit to the United States.

II. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS IN TRANSIT

The substantially increased effort to attack drugs at their source in the drug-
producing countries as a first line of defense should help reduce over time the export
of illegal drugs to the U.S. Nevertheless, drug-producing criminal enterprises in
those countries currently are so vast in scope that, even if U.S. efforts to attack
drugs at the source are highly successful, the flow of drugs by sea, air, and land will
continue. As the second line of defense against the flow of illegal drugs, the U.S.
armed forces will implement the National Drug Control Strategy through substantial
efforts to counter the flow of illegal drugs in transit to the United States, both
outside the United States and at the Nation's borders and ports of entry. The
Department's service pursuant to statutory direction as the single lead agency of the
Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit
of illegal drugs to the United States will prove particularly important to the success
of this effort.

Deployment of appropriate elements of the U.S. armed forces with the primary
mission to interdict and deter the flow of drugs should over time help reduce the
flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. At a minimum, deploying the armed forces with
this mission should have the immediate effect of substantially complicating the
logistical difficulties of criminal drug traffickers and increasing the costs and risks of
their drug smuggling activities.

As a high priority, United States military counternarcotics deployments will
emphasize combatting the flow of drugs across the Caribbean Sea and across the
southern border of the United States. The Department of Defense will proceed with
planning to deploy a substantial Caribbean Counternarcotics Task Force, with
appropriate air and maritime drug interdiction assets and aerial and maritime
detection and monitoring assets, to combat the flow of illegal drugs from Latin
America through the Caribbean Sea. The Department also will proceed with
planning for other deployments of U.S. forces to complement the counternarcotics
actions of U.S. law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

Success of the attack on drugs in transit will require sustained deployment of
appropriately trained and equipped members of the U.S. armed forces and
substantially improved cooperation between the armed forces and U.S. law
enforcement agencies. The substantial increase in military participation in the
attack on drugs in transit is intended to be in addition to, rather than in place of,
Federal law enforcement agencies' efforts.

The success of interdiction and deterrence efforts will depend greatly upon the
ability of the Department of Defense and law enforcement agencies to marshal
effectively the myriad command, control, communications and intelligence
resources they possess into an integrated counternarcotics network. The
Department of Defense will serve as the single lead Federal agency for the detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs and will be prepared,
with the cooperation of U.S. law enforcement agencies, to integrate expeditiously
into an effective network the Federal command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets that are dedicated to the mission of interdicting illegal drugs from abroad. The Department of Defense will seek to develop and employ when appropriate the capability to exercise tactical control of Federal detection and monitoring assets actively dedicated to counternarcotics operations outside the United States and in border areas.

To ensure that action to implement the President's National Drug Control Strategy begins immediately, the Commanders-in-Chief of all unified and specified combatant commands will be directed to elevate substantially the mission priority within their commands of actions to fight illegal drugs.

III. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES

After the first and second lines of defense -- actions directed at illegal drugs in source countries and in transit -- the third line of defense against drugs will be in the United States itself. The role of the armed forces in the third line of defense includes both actions to reduce the supply of illegal drugs and actions to reduce the demand for those drugs.

Within the United States, to assist in reducing the supply of illegal drugs, the counternarcotics actions of the Department of Defense will emphasize support to Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, and the National Guard in State status. The Department of Defense will assist requesting law enforcement agencies and the National Guard with training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, and logistics for counternarcotics operations. In appropriate cases, armed forces personnel and equipment will be detailed directly to law enforcement agencies to assist in the fight. The Department of Defense will ensure that its administrative and command structures permit rapid and effective response to appropriate requests for counternarcotics assistance from law enforcement agencies and the National Guard. The Department will continue to assist the Governors of the several States in employing the National Guard in the fight against illegal drugs.

With respect to reduction of demand for drugs within the United States, the Department of Defense bears an important responsibility to reduce the use of illegal drugs within the armed forces and among its civilian personnel. The Department of Defense has met with substantial success in its demand reduction efforts with armed forces personnel through aggressive drug abuse education and drug-testing programs -- an 82% reduction in drug abuse since 1980. The Department will step up its efforts to combat illegal drug use by departmental personnel and will make available to other large organizations its experience in reducing the demand for illegal drugs. The Department also will emphasize drug abuse awareness and prevention programs in the Department's school system, which educates over 190,000 of America's children.

The Department of Defense will be prepared to assist the Department of Justice with its responsibilities for incarceration and rehabilitation of drug criminals, through means such as training Federal, State and local personnel in the conduct of rehabilitation-oriented training camps for first-offense drug abusers and providing overflow facilities for incarceration of those convicted of drug crimes.
The President's National Drug Control Strategy emphasizes a multi-national and multi-agency approach to reduction of the drug supply. The Department of Defense plays a crucial role in defending the United States from the scourge of illegal drugs. The Department will employ the resources at its command to accomplish that mission effectively. Should it prove necessary in implementing the President's strategy effectively, any needed additional statutory authority will be sought. The men and women of America's armed forces will fight the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs, as an important part of the national effort to secure for all Americans a drug-free America.

Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense
September 18, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
THE COORDINATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY
AND SUPPORT
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Initial Additional Actions to Implement the National Drug Control Strategy and the Related DOD Guidance

In addition to the substantial counternarcotics efforts the Department already has underway and items specifically discussed in the National Drug Control Strategy and the related DOD Guidance, the Department will undertake immediately the initial actions set forth below. These items are to be implemented consistently with national policy, available resources, and our national values and legal framework.

Please work together to execute the actions listed below. I have designated the officers of primary responsibility for each item. The Comptroller will assist in preparing cost estimates and providing resources.

Air and Maritime Source Country Surveillance Systems Study. Determine the feasibility of installing mobile or surveillance radars in source countries and on offshore-based aerial platforms as part of a system to detect and monitor air and maritime narcotics trafficking. (CJCS)

Expanded Training Including Use of Mobile Training Teams. Explore the opportunities for training the counternarcotics forces of cooperating foreign countries, to increase the effectiveness of those forces. Such training could include, for example, use of Mobile Training Teams to train host-country forces in riverine, airmobile, and small unit tactics; medical training; communications training; and civic action training. (CJCS)

Details to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies. Arrange for the detail of military personnel to Federal drug law enforcement agencies and the Office of National Drug Control Policy to perform liaison, training, and planning functions as appropriate to assist in implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy and the DOD Guidance for implementation of that Strategy. (Drug Coordinator)

Training of Drug Law Enforcement Personnel. Expand the program of DOD training for drug law enforcement agency personnel in languages, planning, logistics, communications, tactics, equipment operation and maintenance, and intelligence. (Drug Coordinator)

Assistance in National Guard Efforts. Continue and, as appropriate, expand programs for support of the counternarcotics efforts of the National Guard in State status. (Drug Coordinator)
Training in Rehabilitation-Oriented Training Camp Establishment and Operation. Provide appropriate training services to requesting Federal, State and local agencies on establishment and operation of rehabilitation-oriented training camps for first-offense drug abusers. (Drug Coordinator)

Overflow Prison Services. Review the potential for DOD to provide temporary overflow facilities, upon the request of appropriate Federal, State or local authorities, for incarceration of individuals convicted of drug crimes. (Drug Coordinator)

Canine Support. Expand the program of DOD assistance to drug law enforcement agencies' canine counternarcotics programs. (Drug Coordinator)

Regional Logistical Support Offices. Arrange for establishment of DOD Regional Logistical Support Offices to coordinate DOD responses to Federal, State and local law enforcement requests for DOD support in drug law enforcement activities. These Offices should process and coordinate through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all requests for Department of Defense equipment and training in support of drug law enforcement missions. (Drug Coordinator)

Review of Rules of Engagement. In light of the enhanced counternarcotics mission of the Department of Defense, review existing Rules of Engagement to make certain that they are appropriate. (CJCS)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED
COMBATANT COMMANDS

SUBJECT: Elevation of the Mission Priority of Counternarcotics Operations

One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense.

I direct you to elevate the priority of the counternarcotics mission within your command. Keep me informed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the progress of your command in carrying out this mission within your area of responsibility.

[Signature]

Dwight D. Eisenhower
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE FORCES COMMAND

SUBJECT: Counternarcotics Operations

One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. The United States Forces Command has the capability to advance substantially the accomplishment of that mission.

I direct you to prepare and submit to me for approval through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by October 15, 1989 a plan to deploy forces to complement and support the counternarcotics actions of U.S. law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

Ensure that the necessary forces are prepared to execute the plan shortly after I approve it.

[Signature]

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, SOUTHERN COMMAND

SUBJECT: Counternarcotics Operations

One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. The United States Southern Command has the capability to advance substantially the accomplishment of that mission.

I direct you to prepare and submit to me for approval through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by October 15, 1989 a plan to combat, in conjunction with cooperating host countries, the production and trafficking of illegal drugs within your area of responsibility.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC

SUBJECT: Caribbean Counternarcotics Task Force

One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. The United States Atlantic forces have the capability to advance substantially the accomplishment of that mission.

I direct you to prepare and submit to me for approval through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by October 15, 1989 a plan to deploy a substantial Caribbean Counternarcotics Task Force, with appropriate air and maritime drug interdiction assets and aerial and maritime detection and monitoring assets, to combat the flow of illegal drugs from Latin America through the Caribbean Sea.

Ensure that the necessary forces are prepared to execute the plan shortly after I approve it.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC

SUBJECT: Countering the Flow of Illegal Drugs to the United States

One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. The United States Pacific forces have the capability to advance substantially the accomplishment of that mission.

I direct you to prepare and submit to me for approval through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by October 15, 1989 a plan to combat, in conjunction with cooperating host countries, the production and trafficking of illegal drugs within your area of responsibility.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

SUBJECT: Detection and Countering of Illegal Drug Trafficking

One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. The North American Aerospace Defense Command has the capability to advance substantially the accomplishment of that mission.

I direct you to prepare and submit to me for approval through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by October 15, 1989 a plan for increased detection and countering of illegal drug trafficking to the United States. You should design the plan to complement and support the counternarcotics actions of U.S. law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

[Signature]

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The following example of a multiagency campaign plan assumes that a coordinating headquarters (West Star) is established to facilitate broad based counternarcotics operations on federal land in the Western United States. It further assumes that the participating agencies under West Star provided representatives to a planning conference to develop this plan. The campaign provides information about the situation, describes the mission (strategic objective), identifies an agency for each phase of the campaign, and assigns tasks to other participating agencies. It identifies required resources and gives priorities for their use. This type of plan also can be helpful to the supervisory chain of a single agency in the conduct of extensive operations involving meritorious groups.

Copy No
Headquarters, Operation West Star
Sacramento, California
1 August 1991

Interdiction Campaign Plan: Paul Bunyon I
References: (Note: Here would be listed appropriate maps, or any special directives from higher echelon offices pertaining to this operation)

Situation. Marijuana consumption in the United States has declined only slightly in the past years while U.S. production now exceeds 40 percent of the demand. Projections indicate this will become over 50 percent by 1995 given that the current consumption rate remains constant. With new plant materials being cultivated in the Western United States, a high concentration of THC (about 7 percent) has made the U.S. product popular with drug users at home and abroad. The governments of Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and Barbados have reported substantial sales of high potency U.S. marijuana in their countries and have requested action be taken to curtail U.S. exports. President Bush has directed increased efforts be placed on marijuana eradication and apprehension and conviction of U.S. marijuana producers and traffickers. The Congress has been consulted and supports the effort. However no additional funds are expected this fiscal year to finance the campaign.

Much of the high potency U.S. marijuana is grown in the Operation West Star area of responsibility (AOR). Intelligence reports indicate that U.S. National Parks and other federal and state owned lands now under lease for future timber harvesting are principal growing areas for marijuana cultivation. The Northwest Border Committee will be augmented with representatives from the Interior Department, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This committee will furnish guidance and technical assistance for Paul Bunyon I and assist in coordination necessary between Operation...
West Star and their respective field offices. The U.S. Attorney General has made Paul Bunyon a priority effort and has requested the Administrator, DEA and the Director, FBI to support this campaign to the maximum extent possible. State Attorneys General in the West Star AOR have been informed and all promised their cooperation. Likewise, appropriate state police officials, federal and state military leaders, and county sheriffs have been alerted that countermarijuana efforts will be intensified.

a. Strategic Guidance. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for stepped-up efforts against domestic marijuana cultivation and places success or failure in this program as an indicator of national antidrug resolve. The strategic objective is a 10 percent decrease in domestic production between 1990 and 1992 and a 50 percent reduction by the year 2000. Both the U.S. Attorney General and the Administrator, DEA have directed that antimarijuana efforts be sustained and not be neglected in favor of anticocaine heroin programs.

(1) Current strategy and Presidential direction dictate that enhanced efforts be taken to eliminate marijuana production that now exists within the West Star AOR. Action must begin as soon as feasible. Priority of effort should be at least equal to that being devoted to other illicit narcotics.

(2) ONDCP, Office of Supply Reduction policy letter of February 2, 1990 provides these policy aims:

(a) To end marijuana production on federal lands, first priority to the Western Region.

(b) To destroy the infrastructure now controlling marijuana trafficking within the United States.

(3) Normal rules of engagement apply. No operations on land affected by treaty with American Indians will be conducted without prior approval by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Care will be taken to minimize danger of forest fires. Supporting military units will be employed in accordance with current DOD policy and serve under Title 10 USC or Title 32 USC as appropriate.

b. Criminal Forces.

(1) A majority of the marijuana production and distribution in the Pacific Northwest is controlled by the Carlos Pena-Ortega family. Their operations are based along the coastal regions running north of Fresno, California to the Canadian border and inland throughout the forested areas of California, Oregon, and Washington. Marijuana cultivation occurs mainly on federally-owned lands but also has been found on state-owned lands and private property. The Pena-Ortega organization is subdivided into several distinct groups, each with different functional responsibilities. The groups may also be subdivided on a regional basis to reduce command and control problems. The exact size of the Pena-Ortega family is unknown but is believed to exceed 200 persons.

(2) Functional subdivisions include (a) cultivation and harvest operations; (b) transportation, packaging, and warehousing; (c) market and distribution; (d) finance and accounting; and (e)
security. Each subdivision is headed either by a relative of Carlos Pena-Ortega or a trusted friend. (See Annex A, Intelligence.)

(3) Geographic subdivision of cultivation operations is based on both political boundaries and terrain features. In general, the overall operation is separated by states into California, Oregon, and Washington. State operations are further subdivided as required by terrain features. Other components of the organization operate across the boundaries set for the cultivation and harvesting division. (See Annex A, Intelligence).

(4) Pena-Ortega intends to maintain operations on National and State Parks land indefinitely. He pays nothing for the land, avoids populated areas, enjoys excellent growing conditions, and, to date, has not experienced significant loss to law enforcement actions. He is likely to expand his operation as the market permits.

(5) The family intends to expand their control over marijuana production and distribution throughout the Western United States. He will avoid dealing in other narcotics but will attempt to establish connections with foreign dealers for exporting his higher grade marijuana.

(6) Pena-Ortega seldom visits his field operations, spending most of his efforts on marketing, distribution, and financial planning. His son-in-law, Eduardo Montez, acts as an "executive vice-president" in managing routine affairs. Both Pena-Ortega and Montez are residents of Walnut Grove, California. Another son-in-law, Charles E. Kelly, is in charge of transportation and warehousing. Kelly lives in Portland, Oregon. These three individuals make the major decisions concerning operations. In charge of security is Alan Lynn, a bachelor and a loner who reports only to Carlos Pena-Ortega. Lynn resides in Oakland, California but constantly circulates throughout the Pacific Northwest.

(7) The operation is so large that elimination of a few fields will not substantially degrade its position. However loss of the crops and fields covered in extensive eradication operations will hurt him if the denial can be sustained. The family could suspend operations for one growing season and still be a viable organization.

(8) Vulnerabilities.

(a) The decision making apparatus of the family is small. Apprehension and conviction of Pena-Ortega, Montez, Kelly, or Lynn would drastically weaken the family.

(b) Harvest season, when most members of the field divisions will be on-site, offers the best time to damage the lower levels of the organization.

(9) Center of Gravity. The main source of enemy power is the efficient and disciplined senior leadership group of the Pena-Ortega organization. There are several decisive factors contributing to the success of the organization:

(a) Their ability to control large sections of land and use it for marijuana cultivation.
(b) Substantial financial reserves which permit sustained operations and expansion even during period of decreased production.

(c) Efficient managerial expertise at the higher levels.

(d) Loyalty to Pena-Ortega and cohesion of upper echelon leadership.

c. **Friendly Forces.**

(1) ONDCP will assist in coordination with Washington, D.C., based officials as requested. Deputy Administrator for Operations, DEA, will monitor and assist as required. Assistant Regional Commissioners, Enforcement, and U.S. Customs Service will provide support as necessary to augment Customs officials participating directly in Paul Bunyon I. U.S. Border Patrol will continue normal operations. U.S. Attorneys and State Attorneys General concerned will assist in warrant and/or wiretap assistance and advise on jurisdictional issues. Bureau of Indian Affairs Liaison will advise on any actions concerning Indian Treaty rights. State Police and Highway patrol support will be coordinated through appropriate liaison officers. Federal military support will be coordinated through Commander, JTF-8 and state military support will be requested through The Adjutant General of the state concerned.

(2) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police will furnish a Liaison Officer to Headquarters West Star during Phases I and II of the campaign. Canadian Authority will support the operation as deemed feasible.

d. **Assumptions.**

(1) Permission to operate on federal and state-owned lands will be forthcoming throughout the duration of the campaign.

(2) State and local political support will continue throughout the campaign.

(3) Title 10 (Active and Reserve) and Title 32 (National Guard) military support will be available, especially for air transportation.

2. **Mission.** West Star coordinates phased Drug Law Enforcement Agency operations to eliminate marijuana production and distribution from federal and state-owned lands within Washington, Oregon, and California (north of Fresno) and to destroy the Pena-Ortega marijuana trafficking organization.

3. **Execution.**

a. **Concept.** The participating agencies of West Star intend to conduct phased operations over a two-and-one-half year period to stop marijuana cultivation and trafficking from federal and state-owned lands in the West Star area of operation: success in this campaign will be marked by the destruction of the Carlos Pena-Ortega organization and the incarceration of its key leaders.
Participating DLEA will achieve the above objectives by a coordinated two-and-one-half year effort which will include these actions:

1. Eliminating secure areas for cultivation of marijuana; destroying marijuana crops wherever located.

2. Seizing drug related assets of the Pena-Ortega organization.

3. Disrupting the Pena-Ortega transportation network by seizing or destroying transloading sites, warehousing, packaging equipment, air and ground fleet.

4. Seizing capital (currency and other instruments) to obstruct the financing of the organization.

To accomplish the above actions, a campaign in three phases is envisioned:

Phase I. Preparation (March 1, 1992 - August 1, 1992).
Phase III. Exploitation (November 1, 1992 - October 1, 1994).

b. Phase I, Preparation. (March 1, 1992 - August 1, 1992). During Phase I, intelligence about the Pena-Ortega organization will continue to be gathered with emphasis on plots under cultivation and locations of facilities and personnel. A tactical planning workshop will be held under the aegis of DEA to prepare plans for the Phase II operation, and to effect detailed coordination among DLEA for that operation. Rehearsals will be conducted, especially with supporting military units to ensure mutual understanding of standing procedures. Late in Phase I, participating DLEA and supporting military units will deploy to forward operating areas and establish logistics/supporting bases. The time for transition to Phase II will be when the lead DLEA (DEA) establishes a forward command post and confirms that supporting agencies are ready. HQ West Star will retain the lead for overall support coordination for this campaign.

1. Lead Agency. DEA is lead agency for operational planning and rehearsals in this phase; provides a special agent in charge who will coordinate DEA support from Seattle and San Francisco Field Offices. DEA takes the lead in preparing a plan for the operation in Phase II; conducts preliminary investigations and assimilates intelligence information as available; identifies support or logistics shortfalls to West Star for resolution; develops rules of engagement, guidance for legal procedures, search and seizure, arrest; establishes operational command post for Phase II; directs rehearsals as required; assures coordination with HQ West Star, within DEA supervisory chain of command, and with other law enforcement agencies.

2. Supporting Agencies.

(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides intelligence and reconnaissance information; assists in identifying friendly facilities such as assembly points, command posts and logistics bases. Provides liaison personnel to DEA command post and provides liaison to military units as required. Provides planner to attend plan development conference.
(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, State Forest/Park Services. Provide operational and technical support. Advise during operations via liaison officers.

(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Provides technical advice via liaison officer. Supports planning phase by providing liaison officer to plan conference.

(d) NDIC/EPIC. Provides intelligence support to planning process.

(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). State Adjutants General will provide liaison personnel for planning and to support establishing command post and logistics facilities.

(f) 6th Army. Provides liaison officer to planning conference; coordinates for Federal and Reserve troop unit support.

(g) RLSO-Long Beach. Assists in planning; coordinates for federal loan and grants of DOD property in support of this plan.

(h) JTF-5. Assists West Star to coordinate Title 10 military support. Provides liaison for planning conference; provides liaison to DEA operational command post.

(i) FBI. Sacramento Field Office will provide liaison to DEA during planning and is prepared to supplement DEA investigative effort.

(j) USMS. Provides liaison support for operational planning conference.

c. Phase II, Eradication, Investigation, Apprehension. (August 2, 1992 - October 30, 1992). During this phase, DLEAs will isolate and destroy marijuana crops growing on federal and state-owned lands; related assets will be seized and criminals apprehended; case work in preparation for trial will continue; public relations efforts will be conducted by West Star to encourage support for countermarijuana operations. The destruction of identified growing plots and arrest of persons involved will signal the end of Phase II.

(1) Lead Agency. DEA is lead agency for this phase; provides Special Agent in Charge to direct operations and coordinate with DEA Field Offices. DEA will coordinate the crop eradication operation and provide guidance for arrests, seizure of property, and preparation of evidence.

(2) Supporting Agencies.

(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides support for eradication operations to include security for seized assets, highway control/access, special weapons and tactics reaction teams and intelligence support. Provides liaison officer to command post.

(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, State Forest/Park Services. Continue with technical advise and liaison to command post. Provide facilities for DLEA operations in forest and park areas.
(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Continues liaison to Command Post and provides Marijuana Eradication Reconnaissance Team.

(d) NDIC-EPIC. Provides, within capabilities, intelligence concerning this campaign phase.

(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). Provides administrative, planning, intelligence and communications personnel to supplement DEA command post. Provides troop units for reconnaissance and to support crop eradication on federal and state-owned lands as directed by DEA.

(f) 6th Army. Provides troop support (one helicopter composite company) under the tactical control of JTF-5 to support Phase II. Provides communications equipment on loan basis with operators to support lead agency command post and West Star Headquarters. Provides ground sensor equipment and personnel to support lead agency.

(g) RLSO-Long Beach. Provides coordination for grants and loans of DOD equipment and training in support of this phase.

(h) JTF-5. Conducts coordination with military services to assure DOD support; serves as single point of contact for Title 10 support for this phase.

(i) FBI. Sacramento Field Office will provide supplemental investigative support as requested by DEA. Investigative resources will focus on Pena-Ortega linkage to Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization as well as its support infrastructure to include money launderers, transporters and distributors.

(j) USMS. Supports lead agency with seizure of property related to drug trafficking, executing court orders and arrests, witness security, and apprehending fugitives.

(k) OCDETF. By approval of the Associate Attorney General and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Office for U.S. Attorney, Northern California District (San Francisco) will be prepared to provide OCDETF Program support as needed. If the campaign develops a case of sufficient scope (interstate) with national implications, then an OCDETF will be formed to bring the case to court.

(l) ONDCP. Facilitates coordination and liaison for campaign with ONDCP and other Federal agencies.

d. Phase III, Exploitation. (November 1, 1992 - October 1, 1994). During the Exploitation Phase, investigations will be expanded based on information developed in Phase II. The DEA forward command post will be disestablished as needed. Reconnaissance will be conducted to identify new marijuana growing plots and surveillance will be maintained over areas previously subject to eradication. DEA, supported by State and local police, will maintain a rapid reaction capability to destroy new-found growing areas and apprehend persons involved. The ultimate destruction of the Pena-Ortega organization and incarceration of its leadership will mark success for this phase.
(1) **Lead Agency.** DEA continues as lead agency for coordinating reconnaissance, surveillance, and rapid reaction operations for further eradication, arrests, and seizure of property. Continue case work leading to prosecution.

(2) **Supporting Agencies.**

(a) State Police (Washington, Oregon, California). Continues Phase II support on as-needed basis to prevent resurgence of marijuana growing and trafficking.

(b) Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, State Park and Forest Services. Continue support and liaison as in Phase II.

(c) Bureau of Indian Affairs. Continues support as in previous phases.

(d) NDIC/EPIC. Continues to provide information concerning marijuana trafficking.

(e) National Guard (Washington, Oregon, California). Continues to provide liaison to DEA; as forward command post is disestablished, support personnel will be released to home units. Provides troop units as in Phase II on an as-needed basis to support rapid reaction requirements.

(f) 6th Army. As in Phase II, except helicopter company availability limited to 48 hours’ notice for support of reaction force.

(g) RLSO-Long Beach. Same as Phase II.

(h) JTF-5. Same as Phase II.

(i) FBI. Same as Phase II.

(j) USMS. Same as Phase II.

(k) OCDETF-Office of U.S. Attorneys, Northern California District. Same as Phase II.

(l) ONDCP. Same as Phase II.

e. **Coordinating Instructions.**

(1) West Star retains lead for overall coordination support throughout this campaign. DLEAs should submit requests for support to HQ, West Star.

(2) HQ West Star will maintain intelligence fusion cell throughout campaign to support lead agency.

(3) Phase I planning conference for lead agency operations will be held March 29, 1992 at the Command Conference Center, Presidio of San Francisco; coordinating point of contact is West Star Senior Coordinator. Request participating agencies provide planner to conference.
(4) Code name for this campaign is Paul Bunyon I.

(5) HQ West Star will provide overall Public Affairs support. The lead agency will prepare and execute specific Public Affairs announcements concerning arrests, investigations and drug seizures conducted.

4. Logistics. Throughout the campaign, supplies and services (to include maintenance) will be the responsibility of the separate DLEAs and military units except as specifically addressed in this plan or by bilateral agreements between agencies.

a. Phase I, Preparation (March 1, 1992 - August 1, 1992). The goal in this phase is to establish supply and service procedures and to preposition required supplies to be ready to support operations in Phase II. Priority for supply and services will be to the lead agency and its efforts to establish a forward command post for the campaign. Procedures for interagency transfer of funds will be established by participating DLEAs and military units. Requirements for support will be identified by the lead agency so that supporting agencies can plan for providing support.

(1) Base Development. California National Guard will provide the Gordon Dilmore Armory in Sacramento to all participating agencies for assembling vehicles, equipment and supplies as required. National Park Service will provide forward Command Post facilities at Lassen Volcanic National Park. Additional facilities will be available at Crater Lake National Park in Oregon.

(2) Transportation. Transportation will be provided by commercial contract or within the means of participating agencies.

(3) Medical Services. Medical services will be provided on a local procurement basis in accordance with the standing procedures of the DLEAs.

b. Phase II, Eradication, Investigations, Apprehension (August 2, 1992 - October 30, 1992). Principal logistics goal in this phase is to assure Lead Agency of sufficient transportation (especially airlift) and communications facilities to efficiently conduct eradication operations. Priority for all logistics efforts will be to support DEA then state and local agencies.

(1) Assumptions. Army helicopter support (one assault helicopter company of no less than 10 UH60 type aircraft) will be available to support the campaign in this phase. JTF-5 will coordinate for command and intelligence communication equipment with military personnel to enable 24-hour operation of forward command post.

(2) Transportation. DLEAs will use organic and commercially contracted transportation means as funded by each agency. JTF-5 will coordinate through Forces Command to provide one Army assault helicopter company in support of the lead agency throughout Phase II. In addition, TAGs of California and Oregon have agreed to provide truck transportation throughout Phase II in support of eradication efforts. Requests for additional transportation support will be forwarded to HQ West Star for action. Lead DLEA will establish priorities for transportation.
(3) Maintenance. DLEAs will be responsible for maintenance of their organic equipment. Active and Reserve component forces established in forward operating bases can provide maintenance assistance to DLEA equipment within capabilities on an interagency reimbursable basis. Maintenance for all military supporting equipment (to include C3I) will be provided by sending Active/RC units.

(4) Medical. DLEAs will be responsible for routine medical support for their personnel within agency guidelines. Army helicopters will provide medical evacuation to local hospitals on emergency basis. Active and Reserve Component personnel will be evacuated through military medical channels except when sent to local hospitals for life-threatening emergencies.

(5) Personnel. DLEAs and supporting military units will be responsible to insure prompt replacements for sick or injured personnel. Temporary transfer of personnel or teams from one agency to the tactical control of another DLEA will be authorized by the sending DLEA.

(6) Administration. Procedures for loan of equipment and interagency transfer of funds will be established in bilateral agreements among DLEA.

c. Phase III, Exploitation (November 1, 1992 - October 1, 1994). Procedures and arrangements established to support Phase II will also apply during the Exploitation phase. It is not envisioned that a forward command post or support bases will be needed, however, DLEA and military supporting units must be prepared to provide resources as needed to support short notice response operations.

5. Command and Communications.

a. Command Relationships. HQ West Star will retain overall support coordination authority throughout this campaign to provide a single point of contact for Federal, State and local DLEA requests for assistance (transportation, equipment, personnel). West Star will retain intelligence fusion responsibility during the campaign.

(1) Phase I. DEA is lead agency. It directs operational planning, rehearsals, and establishment of tactical command posts as needed. Other DLEAs and military organizations provide direct support in accordance with the objectives and priorities of the lead agency.

(2) Phase II. DEA is lead agency. It provides direction for conduct of investigations, eradication operations and guidance concerning arrest and evidence. Other DLEAs support. West Star continues support coordination function.

(3) Phase III. Initially DEA continues as lead agency, other DLEAs provide operational support. West Star continues as coordinating headquarters. On a contingency basis, OCDETF (USAO, Northern California District) is prepared to serve as lead agency if scope of case(s) developed by this campaign is sufficient to justify transfer to the OCDETF Program.

(4) Command Post Locations.
(a) HQ West Star. Dilmore Reserve Armory, 133 West North Street, Sacramento, CA 94300; Telephone: 916-XXX-XXXX; Fax 916-XXX-XXXX.

(b) DEA Task Force. Phases I and III: 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102; Telephone: 415-XXX-XXXX; Fax 415-XXX-XXXX. Phase II: Honeymoon Lodge, Larsen Volcanic National Park, CA 95113; Telephone: 916-XXX-XXXX; Fax 916-XXX-XXXX.

(c) OCDETF Program. Office of U.S. Attorney, N. California District, 45 Pillory Place, San Francisco, CA 94102; Telephone: 415-XXX-XXXX; Fax 415-XXX-XXXX.

6. Communications. In addition to routine and organic communications provided by DLEAs, West Star will coordinate through JTF-5 to assure military communications support throughout Phase II and on-call as needed in Phase III. See Annex K, Communication Instructions.

William Walker
Senior Tactical Coordinator
West Star

ANNEXES (Omitted):
A - Participating agencies
B - Intelligence assessment
K - Communications instructions

DISTRIBUTION: A
APPENDIX E

FORSCOM STRATEGY

DRAFT

FCJ3-OD (70)

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanders, Major Subordinate Commands

SUBJECT: FORSCOM Counter-drug Guidance

1. MISSION. Forces Command employs forces and conducts operations, in accordance with the law, to support law enforcement agencies (LEA) and cooperating foreign governments to counter the flow of drugs across U.S. borders and to assist LEA in the elimination of illegal drug growing/manufacturing operations on federal lands within CONUS.

2. CINC ASSESSMENT. Out of the political, economic, and social changes characterizing today's strategic environment, an atypical threat has emerged—illicit drug production, trafficking, and use. In short, there are too many drugs in America and too many Americans use them. This situation poses a significant risk to U.S. values, society, and, ultimately, our national security. Accordingly, combating this threat will take on a greater role in FORSCOM's larger, overarching mission.

3. CINC VISION. National counter-drug strategy targets the areas of supply, distribution, and demand. Our efforts must move on an axis that simultaneously attacks those areas; encompasses all of CONUS; is long-term in scope; and supports the principal combatants—LEA, state governors, other CINCs, and local communities. Counter-drug strategy is also the newest form of the total or coalition force concept and brings with it some inherent challenges. The LEA are unfamiliar with our capabilities and may be reluctant, even suspicious, in accepting our involvement. We must build a reputation for timely, thorough, and sensible support; respecting the desires and sensitivities of the many civilian agencies involved. The finesse required in this effort does not imply the absence of initiative nor does it excuse operational inertia. Success depends upon developing precedent setting incentives and finding innovative ways of contributing without overpowering the other organizations involved in the counter-drug effort. To achieve our goals, each FORSCOM staff section, each CONUSA, and each Corps must commit to this new mission: getting actively involved and working together to make a difference.

DRAFT
SUBJECT: FORSCOM Counter-drug Guidance

a. Long-term goals are to:

(1) Increase the potency of LEA, cooperating allies, and supported CINCs—supporting efforts that increase the risk to suppliers.

(2) Become a full-time partner in the war against demand—supporting existing demand reduction programs and creating new ones where none exist.

b. Short-term goals are to:

(1) Increase support tempo. Seek active ways to contribute. Develop methodologies to support JTF-6 and regional, state, and local efforts. Concentrate efforts toward providing and maintaining military equipment; transporting personnel and their equipment; establishing bases of operations and training facilities; training law enforcement personnel; providing air and ground reconnaissance; constructing roads, fences, and lighting; and establishing counter-drug command, control, communications, and computer (C4) networks. Focus demand reduction efforts toward our most vulnerable citizens; the young, the disadvantaged, and inner-city residents—building foundations that will ultimately prevent drug use.

(2) Improve annual projections. Expose LEA to your planning methodology, seek their participation, and incorporate support needs into training plans, budget forecasts, and the equipment development and acquisition process. Learn the language, practices, and vision of the other agencies and services in our coalition. Develop menus advertising past successes, support capabilities we offer, and other missions you envision. Use planning conferences to synchronize your efforts and share lessons learned; keeping me, and each other, informed on your progress.

(3) Improve responsiveness. Train staffs to collect, fuse, and share intelligence; anticipate and quickly resolve unique planning and approval requirements; and arrange the complex and sensitive C2 requirements inherent to counter-drug missions. Identify units for upcoming support missions and use emergency deployment readiness exercise methodology to test responsiveness.
(4) Establish incentives. Develop projects encouraging units to support JTF-6 and counter-drug operations in other regions. Rewards must be sensible and within the bounds of good stewardship. Treat counter-drug missions as unique training opportunities—opportunities that will become invaluable as competition for shrinking funds increases. Find ways to relate the unique aspects of each counter-drug mission to mission essential task lists and other battle-focus skills. Force subordinate leaders to grapple with the real-world challenges of counter-drug missions: political legal diplomatic sensitivities, multi-agency coordination, and rules of engagement. Use military assets, especially our technology, to help free LEA from the consuming burden of intelligence, planning, and logistics support; freeing their manpower to do what they do best—apprehend drug traffickers and their contraband.

c. I envision an end state where LEA routinely seek and expect our support: anti-drug support missions are customary military training events and we are actively sought out for the effectiveness of our counter-drug message.

4. COMMAND INVOLVEMENT. It will take long-term command emphasis to implement this guidance. Do more than commit resources; I expect a commitment of spirit. With the exception of Desert Shield, there is no higher operational priority in this command. This headquarters will continue to seek your input and push toward publishing a counter-drug strategy and campaign plan. I’ll continue to press for the funding and legal rulings we need to do the job. During my visits, brief me on how you are implementing this guidance and show me the results.

EDWIN H. BURBA
General, USA
Commanding General
APPENDIX F

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AG - Adjutant General (also TAG: The Adjutant General)

AOR - Area of Responsibility

ARSTAF - Headquarters. Department of the Army Staff

ATF - (Bureau of) Alcohol. Tobacco and Firearms

AUSA - Assistant U.S. Attorney

BATF - Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco and Firearms

BIA - Bureau of Indian Affairs

BIC - Border Interdiction Committee

BLM - Bureau of Land Management

BuP - Bureau of Prisons

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CINC - Command-in-Chief (of a U.S. Unified or Specified Command)

CMIR - Currency Monetary Instrument Report (a U.S. Treasury Form 4790 by which cash entering the U.S. is declared to Customs)

CN - Counternarcotics

CNOD - Counternarcotics Operation Division. J3. The Joint Staff

CONUS - Continental United States

CSGN - Coordinating Subgroup Narcotics of the NSC

CT - Counterterrorism

CTR - Currency Transaction Report (a U.S. Treasury Form 4789 by which U.S. banks report deposits over $10,000)
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAWN</td>
<td>Drug Abuse Warning Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLEA</td>
<td>Drug Law Enforcement Agency</td>
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<td>High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area</td>
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<td>International Narcotics Matters</td>
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<td>Immigration and Naturalization Service</td>
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<td>International Organization of Police Forces</td>
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<td>Interagency Operating Area</td>
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<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<td>Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Military Assistance and Advisory Group</td>
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MILGROUP - Military Group

NAU - Narcotics Assistance Unit

NDIC - National Drug Intelligence Center

NGB - National Guard Bureau

NORAD - North American Aerospace Defense Command

NPS - National Park Service

NSC - National Security Council

NNBIS - National Narcotics Border Interdiction System

NNICC - National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee

OAJCG - Operation Alliance Joint Command Group

OASIS - Operation Activities Special Information System (Immigration and Naturalization Service’s file on aliens, drug smugglers and fraudulent documents)

OCDETF - Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

OCONUS - Outside the Continental United States (overseas)

OMB - Office of Management and Budget

ONDCP - Office of National Drug Control Policy

PCC - Policy Coordinating Committee of the NSC

POM - Program Objective Memorandum

RLSO - Regional Logistics Support Office

RMIN - Rocky Mountain Information Network

SAC - Special Agent-in-Charge

SAO - Security Assistance Office

SMURF - To make a number of deposits under $10,000 into a bank to avoid CTR requirements of Department of Treasury
SOCSOUTH - Special Operations Command South (a Subordinate Unified Command of USSOUTHCOM)

SWB - Southwest Border

TAG - The Adjutant General

TECS II - Treasury Enforcement Communications System data base

USAID - U.S. Agency for International Development

USAO - U.S. Attorney's Office

USARPAC - U.S. Army, Pacific

USASAALA - U.S. Army Security Assistance Agency Latin America

USBP - U.S. Border Patrol

USCS - U.S. Customs Service

USDA - U.S. Department of Agriculture

USFORSCOM - U.S. Forces Command

USIS - U.S. Information Service

USLANTCOM - U.S. Atlantic Command

USPACOM - U.S. Pacific Command

USSOUTHCOM - U.S. Southern Command

WSIN - Western States Information Network (state and local DLEA network for criminal case information)
APPENDIX G

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