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MEASURING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFECTIVENESS IN COUNTERNARCOTICS SUPPORT

BY

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This paper will explore measurements of effectiveness for the Department of Defense's current and projected roles in providing support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies in counternarcotics operations. The scope of this study is a rather broad look at capabilities of the Department of Defense; including not only the active components, but also Reserve and National Guard contributions. The paper begins with a brief introduction into factors which led to the Department of Defense's involvement in counternarcotics. The second section provides a detailed discussion of studies that clarify and amplify the suggested measures in the recommendation section. Included is information from discussions with Commander in Chief Southern Command, the Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force Six, representatives of the National Guard Bureau and the various services, and the results of the surveys with the Governors, National Guard
Adjutants General, and drug law enforcement agencies. The last section is a list of recommended methods of measuring the Department of Defense counternarcotics support effectiveness.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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MEASURING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFECTIVENESS IN COUNTERNARCOTICS SUPPORT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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This paper will explore measurements of effectiveness for the Department of Defense's current and projected roles in providing support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies in counternarcotics operations. The scope of this study is a rather broad look at capabilities of the Department of Defense, including not only the active components, but also Reserve and National Guard contributions. The paper begins with a brief introduction into factors which led to the Department of Defense's involvement in counternarcotics. The second section provides a detailed discussion of studies that clarify and amplify the suggested measures in the recommendation section. Included is information from discussions with the Commander in Chief Southern Command, the Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force Six, representatives of the National Guard Bureau and the various services, and the results of the surveys with the Governors, National Guard Adjutants General, and drug law enforcement agencies. The last section is a list of recommended methods of measuring the Department of Defense counternarcotics support effectiveness.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The basis for this paper is a special project conducted in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Plans and Support (DASD/DEP&S) to identify appropriate methods to measure the effectiveness of Department of Defense counternarcotics support. This special project was undertaken by the below listed officers to satisfy the requirements for an internship program pursuant to a Master's Degree in Public Administration program at Shippensburg University and to provide data for the development of prepared statements for congressional testimony.

Colonel Guido J. Portante, Jr.
California Army National Guard

Colonel Dennis L. Hunter
United States Army National Guard

Colonel Arthur T. Estrada
United States Army

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Dunkelberger
United States Marine Corps

Each of the working group officers specialized in a different area. Colonel Portante's area of study was the operational side of the Army National Guard's role in counternarcotics support. Of particular note was a survey he conducted of the 54 Governors. It centered on how the State Governors employed their National Guardsmen and perceived effectiveness of these operations. Full results of this survey are available through the United States Army War College,

Colonel Hunter was the liaison officer between the working group and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He also conducted an interesting survey of 210 sheriffs and the 54 Adjutants General. This study asked how well the Department of Defense was doing at providing information to requesting agencies on what support was available and how to obtain it. The results of this survey can also be obtained through United States Army War College, Military Studies Program, under the title of Military Counter-Drug Support to Law Enforcement Agencies.

Colonel Estrada's area of interest dealt with the active component of the United States Army in regards to counternarcotics support. He conducted interviews and discussions with representatives of United States Special Operations Command, United States Southern Command, and Joint Task Force Six.

Lieutenant Colonel Dunkelberger's area of study was the sea-services contributions to counternarcotics. He conducted an in-depth interview with a senior member of the United States Coast Guard's Operational Law Enforcement Division and telephone interviews with representatives of the United States Marine Corps' Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Branch, the organization responsible for counternarcotics operations for the United States Marine Corps. A telephone interview was also conducted with a senior representative from the Center for Naval
Analysis, who has dealt extensively with the United States Navy's role in counternarcotics. In addition, he conducted a pre-test survey to analyze the role of the Department of Defense in counternarcotics and to establish measures of effectiveness for methods employed.
INTRODUCTION

Now when you commit military forces to any operation, whether it's training, combat, whatever, we usually measure success by win or lose. I think we will have to look at military engagement and counternarcotics as how we contribute.

General Robert C. Kinston, Retired
U.S. Special Operations Forces Commander

With passage of the Defense Authorization Act of 1989, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to be the single lead agency responsible for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime targets suspected of transporting illegal drugs into the United States. The Defense Authorization Act of 1989 further stated that the Department of Defense was to integrate command and control functions, communications, and intelligence assets dedicated to the interdiction of drugs into an effective network. Also, the Department of Defense was to provide enhanced National Guard support to state drug enforcement agencies.

With this piece of legislation, the Department of Defense was thrust into a social and economic problem of monumental proportions. Until now, the drug problem had been the exclusive responsibility of the drug law enforcement agencies (DLEA). The 1981 congressional amendment to the post-Civil War Posse Comitatus Act, the Defense Authorization Act of 1989, and the 1989 Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel opinion, which expanded the United States military's authority to arrest drug traffickers and other fugitives overseas, changed all this. The Department of Defense would play a much larger role in counternarcotics operations.
Since assuming these new responsibilities, the Department of Defense has been struggling to identify appropriate measures to determine the effectiveness of the support provided to drug law enforcement agencies. In spite of the Department of Defense guidance to its agencies with specific responsibility for these missions to develop measures of effectiveness, there are still no accepted written measures.

In September 1990, The Department of Defense tasked its subordinate agencies to provide written measures of effectiveness. In October 1990, The Department of Defense asked federal law enforcement agencies to assess the counternarcotics support provided by the Department of Defense thus far, provide feedback on the effectiveness of that support, as well as, recommendations for future activities. The working group, mentioned earlier, assisted in reviewing the input provided by these agencies; studied Department of Defense support activities within the United States and internationally; interviewed various service representatives; received briefings from Commander in Chief Southern Command and the Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force Six; and surveyed Governors, National Guard Adjutants General, and drug law enforcement agencies nation-wide. The results of these studies and some suggested methods for evaluating Department of Defense's counternarcotics support performance are contained in the remainder of this paper.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN COUNTERNARCOTICS

At the direction of the President of the United States, the Department of Defense has become directly involved in the National Drug Control Strategy. The major elements of that national strategy are as follows:

- Strengthen the Criminal Justice System
- Expand and Increase Effectiveness of Drug Treatment Programs
- Increase Education, Strengthen Community Action, and Provide a Drug Free Work Place
- Implement a Drug Research Agenda
- Expand International Initiatives
- Increase Interdiction Efforts
- Implement an Intelligence Agenda

The Department of Defense plays a major role in the last three areas listed above and is becoming increasingly involved in the education and community action arena, as well. The Department of Defense’s primary counternarcotics responsibilities are as follows:

- Serve as the single lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
- Integrate C3I assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network.
- Approve and fund State Governor’s plans for expanded use of the National Guard in counternarcotics support to drug law enforcement agencies.

The Department of Defense conducts domestic and international operations to counter drug trafficking. Joint Task
Force-Four at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, and Joint Task Force-Five at Almeda, California, were created to plan and coordinate the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs. Joint Task Force-Six at Fort Bliss, Texas, was established to assist in the interdiction of illegal drugs across the southwest land border. Within the continental United States, the mission to coordinate the Department of Defense's ground support to counternarcotics operations has been given to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM). The Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) plans and coordinates the aerial detection and monitoring counternarcotics support within the United States.7

Most of our international efforts focus on stemming the flow of drugs from their sources in Latin America. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has responsibility for this geographic area. In response to its mission to protect and promote United States interests in Latin America, USSOUTHCOM has identified the curtailment of drug production and trafficking as one of its theater strategic objectives.

**HOW TO MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS**

Department of Defense counternarcotics efforts attack the illegal drug problem at all three phases of the drug flow. These three phases with the elements of support provided by the Department of Defense are:8
1. Attack on Drugs at the Source
   A. Assistance for nation-building
   B. Operational support to host-country forces
   C. Cooperation with host-country forces to prevent drug exports

2. Attack on Drugs in Transit
   A. Interdiction
   B. Deterrence efforts

3. Attack on Drugs in the United States
   A. Reduction of drug abuse within the Department
   B. Emphasize drug abuse awareness in the Department's schools
   C. Assist the Department of Justice with its responsibilities for incarceration and rehabilitation of drug criminals
   D. Support to drug law enforcement agencies

The Department of Defense has been asked to quantify and measure the effectiveness of their counternarcotics efforts. Typically, drug law enforcement agencies (DLEA) measure success of their drug interdiction efforts in terms of quantities of illegal drugs seized, number of arrests, number of convictions, fluctuating market prices for drugs, crime rates, etc. However, it is not feasible for the Department of Defense to measure its effectiveness by drug law enforcement agencies' standards.

The Department of Defense is a support agency in the counternarcotics arena without police or judicial authority to seize contraband or apprehend illegal drug traffickers. The Department of Defense accomplishes its mission by assisting United States and international drug law enforcement agencies accomplish their legally sanctioned counternarcotics tasks and responsibilities.

It is especially important to note that there may be two distinctly different approaches between the Department of Defense and drug law enforcement agencies.
typically react in response to crimes being committed, whereas, the Department of Defense attempts to develop and disseminate intelligence which drives counternarcotics operations as opposed to operating in an environment where operations drive intelligence. Deterrence is the traditional military mission which the Department of Defense defines as its primary role in counternarcotics.

Adding to the difficult task of quantifying effectiveness measures is the impossible task of precisely measuring the amount of drugs entering the United States. We lack a quantifiable benchmark as to the size and composition of illicit drug shipments.

There is a reluctance on the part of the Department of Defense, and in particular the military services, to engage in what may be perceived as a "bodycount" syndrome which could lead to abuses in reporting and misconceptions about the role of the Department of Defense in counternarcotics. Since the Department of Defense does not play a direct role in seizures and apprehensions, it must use other criteria to gauge the value of its contributions.

**DOMESTIC OPERATIONS**

In general, the Department of Defense attempts to enhance the effectiveness of federal, state, and local law enforcement counternarcotics efforts through the application of all available Department of Defense capabilities and assets. The near term
goal is to significantly increase the pressure against all modes of narcotics smuggling along the United States borders. The long term goal is to significantly reduce the supply of illegal narcotics across the borders.

The Department of Defense domestic operations are coordinated regionally by the joint task forces. Support provided by these task forces to drug law enforcement agencies includes the following:

- Airborne Surveillance
- Maritime Surveillance
- Ground Surveillance
- Terrain Denial
- Ground Surveillance Radar and Other Sensors
- Transportation
- Fused/Analyzed Intelligence
- Mobile Training Teams
- Engineer Operations

One of the major challenges which the task forces have encountered is the multiplicity of government agencies involved in counternarcotics. Local jurisdictional responsibilities have to be sorted and analyzed when Department of Defense support is requested and provided. The overlapping of jurisdictions has led to some confusion in support channels in the past. However, over time the joint task forces are becoming much more proficient in their ability to deconflict jurisdictional redundancy.
Perhaps the greatest testimony to the effectiveness of the Department of Defense's contributions has been the increase in the number of requests for assistance from drug law enforcement agencies. For example, Joint Task Force-Six, which has responsibility for the Southwestern United States' land border, is currently providing support to over 30 agencies, who are requesting counternarcotics assistance. With time, it will be possible to evaluate the number of valid requests filled and the timeliness of support provided by the Department of Defense.

Where possible, support operations are conducted with the collateral purpose of providing military occupational specialty (MOS) related training to the military personnel involved. Although military personnel are prohibited from directly apprehending narco-traffickers or seizing contraband, there is a deterrence value associated with the physical presence of a visible military along or within traditional smuggling routes. By this measurement, the Department of Defense is able to accomplish part of its interdiction support by denying narcotics smugglers access to historical routes because the military is occupying them.

Another facet of the domestic anti-drug effort is demand reduction. The most striking example in attacking the demand side of the drug problem has been the reduction of drug abuse in the Armed Forces. Since 1980, the services have reduced drug abuse by 82%. This is a result of an aggressive drug abuse education and drug-testing program. This accomplishment of drug
abuse reduction is serving as a model of a drug-free working place for the remainder of the Department of Defense.9

More can be done by the services in combating drug abuse. Each of the services is working on anti-drug community assistance programs. An example of one of these programs is the Marine Corps Community Drug Education and Assistance Program. The object of this program is "to promote community awareness of the drug problem by making speakers available for local seminars and setting up community-oriented drug prevention programs, which target, ... schools and youth groups." Many individuals, particularly those involved in drug law enforcement, believe the only long term solution to our country's drug problem lies in curbing our insatiable demand for illicit drugs.10

NATIONAL GUARD SUPPORT

A significant portion of the Department of Defense counternarcotics effort is the increased role of the National Guard in drug interdiction and enforcement. This enhanced role must be under the command and control of state authorities and includes any law enforcement activities authorized by state and local law and requested by the governor. As part of a related study, a survey was directed to the governor of each state, territory, and the District of Columbia in October 1990. Several of the questions asked were directly related to measurements of effectiveness. The following are some questions and responses to the survey.11
Question #11. Do you consider the counternarcotics effort conducted by your Guard organization to be effective in the curtailment of drugs in your state?

The Governors responded overwhelmingly that counternarcotics operations within their state are effective. A few others believe that it is too early to tell.
Question #20. Congress is asking the Office of National Drug Control Policy to determine the effectiveness (in terms of dollars allocated by Congress to fight the drug war) of the counternarcotics operations. How should the effectiveness of the counternarcotics effort conducted by the National Guard organizations in your state be measured?

As indicated in the chart, 39% felt that all of the methods listed should be used. Also, 32% indicated that the number of law enforcement requests supported by the Guard should be the measurement of effectiveness.
Constituent support can be considered as an indicator of a measure of effectiveness. Our poll indicated that 74% of the respondents felt that constituency support was high and 24% indicated moderate support. Two percent indicated no preference.
Question #32. How do law enforcement agencies in your state rate National Guard counternarcotics activities in support of law enforcement mission requirements?

As indicated in the chart above, all those polled indicated that law enforcement agencies within their states rated National Guard support as either high or very high. Similar comments have been received from federal law enforcement.

This is another way of measuring or rating effectiveness. In this case, customer satisfaction of the state drug law enforcement agencies is the measurement used. The Department of Defense in the support role can only be evaluated on activities they have been asked to assist.
Question #33. How would you rate law enforcement and the National Guard in terms of cooperation, mutual support, and team effectiveness?

All respondents rated cooperation, team effectiveness, and mutual support between National Guard elements and law enforcement as either high or very high. The majority (74%) rated this aspect of interagency cooperation as very high.

This survey dealt strictly with National Guard acting under Title 32 or the "state status" as directed by the state governors. The next section will explore the role of the Department of Defense acting under Title 10 in the international theater.
INTERNSATIONAL EFFORTS

The counternarcotics efforts of United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) can be used to illustrate a regional approach which is necessary in combating the illicit drug problem. International drug trafficking threatens the United States and Latin American regional security. United States Southern Command has developed a strategy to interdict and eradicate hemispheric drug crop cultivation and distribution through successful implementation of the following tasks:12

1. Assist host nations (HN) in disrupting the flow of drugs by helping to strengthen their will and capability to combat drug trafficking and production.

2. Increase detection and monitoring of the flow of illegal drugs (share with host nations).

3. Increase/optimize collection, analysis and flow of intelligence with local host nations, theater, USSOUTHCOM, and national United State’s assets.

4. Assess, organize, and develop host nation counternarcotics training capabilities.

5. Develop host nation surveillance, intercept, and neutralization of insurgent support of traffickers; increase assistance to host nation law enforcement, civil affairs, PSYOP and security assistance teams to help maintain political stability.

6. In concert with host nations, develop/deploy C3I assets in support of counternarcotic trafficking operations.

The intent of United States Southern Command in following this strategy can be summarized as follows:13

1. United States military forces in supporting role, not the lead.

2. Ambassador and country team have the lead with USSOUTHCOM in support.

3. Provide integrated, fused counternarcotics’s intelligence through the use of tactical analysis teams.
o Institute an enhanced detection and monitoring system throughout the region.

o Implement a region-wide integrated command management system (CMS) to support ambassador's and host nation's counternarcotics forces.

o Support host nation involvement in counternarcotics operations.

o Emphasize concern for human rights.

USSOUTHCOM's nation building efforts in cooperation with the Department of State may ultimately prove to be the most effective Department of Defense strategy to curtail drug production and trafficking. However, even if the Latin connection to the drug trade were to be totally severed, an illegal drug supply would reappear from some other location of the world, so long as there is a demand for drugs in the United States. The United States, which accounts for approximately five percent of the world's population, consumes 60 percent of the world's illicit drugs.14 The Department of Defense's ongoing and near term domestic and international counternarcotics actions should be viewed not from the perspective of how much of the drug supply has been disrupted or destroyed, but rather how much time are we gaining in the overall struggle to reduce demand.

GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING SUPPORT

Support from one agency to another can only be as effective as the understanding of the supported agency of what support is available and the procedures for obtaining it. Therefore, a true measurement of effectiveness must include an assessment of the written guidance provided by the various Department of Defense
elements, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) down to the lowest level headquarters, to law enforcement agencies on what kinds of support can be provided and how to get it.

Inquiries made as part of this and another related study\textsuperscript{15} indicate that the guidance has been spotty, erratic, and for the most part, oral rather than written. Most federal agencies, at least at the headquarters level, vaguely understand what support is available from the Department of Defense. The level of understanding within the agencies seems to diminish at the regional and local levels.

Understanding by the state and local law enforcement appears to be a product of the level of Department of Defense interest in the geographical area. Joint Task Force-Six and the National Guard headquarters in the four southwest border states have a high level of interest in counternarcotics support efforts. Therefore, the understanding of what assets are available and how to request them is proportionally higher than in other areas. Two central elements in all areas are lack of \textit{written} guidance available to law enforcement and the failure of law enforcement agencies to pass the information down to the lowest level.\textsuperscript{16}

In a related study, a survey was sent to 210 county sheriffs nation-wide to determine their level of understanding of the Department of Defense's counternarcotics support available to them. Some of the results of survey are provided as possible indicators of the Department of Defense's effectiveness.\textsuperscript{17}
The survey asked if sufficient written guidance on what support is available and the procedures for requesting it had been provided by the various Department of Defense's headquarters. The following four charts show the responses relative to Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Guard Bureau, Joint Task Force-Six, and National Guard State headquarters.

Responses to this question range from "I have had no information at all on this program" and "From your questions it is obvious that there is a great deal of information that has not made its way to us. We can't call on these services if we don't know what they are or how to ask for them." to "The California National Guard and Joint Task Force-Six have been excellent sources and resources." and "...they provide contacts, equipment, helicopters, and media relations for our eradication program."
The majority of the comments indicate that little in the way of written guidance on what kind of support and how to request it has been provided to state and local law enforcement agencies. The neutral response on the charts indicates that the respondent does not know if written guidance has been provided or not. While that does not mean that guidance has not been provided, it indicates that the law enforcement agency does not have an understanding of what is available and how to get it. Therefore, the agency cannot take advantage of available support. The trend seems to be that...
the states in or near high intensity drug trafficking areas are doing a much better job providing guidance than those in other areas. In the southwest border states, law enforcement agencies in the southern part of the states, near the border, are receiving better guidance than those in the northern sectors. Many law enforcement agencies in the middle section of the country indicate that they have received no information at all on military support.
The survey asked if the appropriate military headquarters had provided written lists to law enforcement agencies of what equipment and support are available.

A total of 63% strongly disagree, disagree, or are neutral (indicating they don't know what support or equipment is available or how to request it). Another question asked if a list of military points of contact had been provided. Only 37% answered that it had.
The survey also asked if respondents know what a Regional Logistics Support Center is, where the one for their region is located, and how to contact it.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY ANTI-DRUG SUPPORT</th>
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<tr>
<td>REGIONAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT CENTERS</td>
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<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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1. I know where it is and how to contact it

Sixty percent indicated that they do not know what or where it is or how to contact it. The Regional Logistics Support Centers are fairly new. However, better coordination is needed at the state and local level to ensure this valuable asset is used as intended.
Another question which could provide some indication of the effectiveness of military counternarcotics support asked for an opinion of their community’s acceptance of visible military support.

More than 60% rated their community acceptance good to excellent. Six percent rated it adequate, while 33% rated it poor. While this indicates there is public relations work to be done in some areas, it appears the public supports the Department of Defense’s role in drug interdiction and enforcement. This support can be used as an indicator of the level of effectiveness.

The significance of this question as compared with the one on page 12 is the sample population of county sheriffs can be considered as constituents. The question on page 12 asked the Governors for their opinion as to what they felt constituent support was for military involvement in the counternarcotics effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis of these two surveys, interviews, briefings and related references the following recommendations are provided. These recommendations were the foundation for the briefing presented by the special project working group to Michael A. Wermuth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy, and Major General Arnold Schlossberg, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Plans and Support on the 22nd of February 1991 at the Pentagon, Washington D.C.

Given the significant commitment of personnel and assets that the Department of Defense is directing to the fight against illegal drugs, it is essential that we monitor not only the level of effort, but the effectiveness of our performance. Typically, drug law enforcement agencies measure their success in counternarcotics efforts by quantities of illegal drugs seized, numbers of arrests, crime rates, etc. The Department of Defense is a support agency without search, seizure, or apprehension authority over drug traffickers. Therefore, it is not possible to measure the Department of Defense performance by drug law enforcement standards.

The performance of the Department of Defense must be judged by standards that are appropriate to its assigned missions: lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; integrating
command, control, communications and technical intelligence assets dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs into an effective communications network; enhancing the role of the National Guard in support of drug interdiction; and enhancing law enforcement support.18

The following are indicators of the effectiveness of Department of Defense counternarcotics activities to accomplish the missions designated by the president's National Drug Control Strategy, Congress, and the Secretary of Defense.

* Indicators that are only indirectly attributable to Department of Defense support.

I. Attack on Drugs at the Source
   A. Increased foreign government commitment *
   B. Increased requests for mobile training teams
   C. Increased requests for equipment and operators
   D. Increased cooperative intelligence operations
   E. Increased crop substitution *
   F. Increased retaliatory reaction by cartels against United States supported foreign government anti-drug activities *
   G. Willingness of cartel members to seek government amnesty *
II. Attack on Drugs in Transit

A. Change in behavior of drug smugglers
   1. Change in transit routes
   2. Change in level of activities
   3. Change in methods of transit (air/land/sea)

B. Identified aborted transit missions
   1. Incoming flights that abort their delivery because of military presence
   2. Incoming deliveries that dump their load because of military detection or presence

III. Increased Intelligence Processing and Distribution

A. Completion of the Communications Master Plan
B. Level of completion of the three phases of the Anti-Drug Network
C. Increased capability of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) to analyze and provide predictive intelligence
D. Increased capability of federal, state, and local Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA) to analyze, process, and distribute intelligence due to Department of Defense (DoD) support.

IV. Attack on Drugs in the United States

A. Level of DLEA understanding of military support available and how to request it
B. Published procedures for providing military support at the lowest possible level to increase timeliness and responsiveness

C. Amount of interagency training provided; e.g. California National Guard Interagency School and DEA pre-deployment training at the Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico, VA

D. Amount of satisfied customers as indicated by increased number of DLEA requests and by repeat requests

E. DLEA force multiplier effects of military support
   1. Administration/Logistical support to free law enforcement personnel for direct drug enforcement duties
   2. Increased aviation capability
   3. Increased surveillance capability, both human and technological
   4. Increased capability to search cargo containers from source countries; e.g. an increase of 4% to 14% since 1989

F. Infrastructure development/improvement/provision
   1. Engineer improvements (roads, fences, buildings)
   2. Southwestern border radar fence
   3. Storage facilities for contraband, toxic chemicals, confiscated property, etc.
   4. Confinement facilities
   5. Training facilities/weapons ranges
G. Demand Reduction

1. Anti-drug education programs in civilian communities near military facilities (schools, youth groups, etc.)
2. Reduced drug use in DoD; e.g. drug use decline from 28% to 4.5% since 1980

VI. Level of Effort Indicators

A. Percentage of DLEA requests filled
B. Percentage of requests filled to the level requested
C. Percentage of requests filled within specified timeframe
D. Percentage of increase to DLEA operational capability due to DoD support
   1. Percentage increase of border surveillance
   2. Percentage increase of border radar coverage
   3. Percentage of increased DLEA/agency staffing
   4. Number of DLEA personnel trained by DoD
   5. Increased provision of equipment by DoD
E. Degree of acceptance of military support by DLEA
F. Increased DLEA requests for military support
G. Public acceptance of visible military support

As stated in the introductory quote by General Robert C. Kinston, Ret., the Department of Defense's contribution to the National Drug Control Strategy should be evaluated by how the Department of Defense contributes and enhances drug law enforcement efforts and not by short-term win or lose analysis.
The effectiveness measures, when applied to the three phases of drug interdiction—interdiction at the source, in transit and on the streets of the United States—are a complicated and multifaceted problem. Success will emerge slowly as all aspects are coordinated and pursued. Because of the dynamics of the drug problem, the effectiveness measures listed above should not be evaluated over a relatively short period. There seem to be no accurate short-term indicators of effectiveness, either favorable or unfavorable.

The effectiveness measures may be more readily analyzed on the supply side by the availability of drugs on the streets. However, caution should be taken in this evaluation because many outside factors may affect the short-term supply. An even more difficult aspect to determine is the demand side. Drug education and its effectiveness may take years or as long as a generation before a positive trend may be established.

The monumental job of fighting the drug problem on so many fronts will take continued effort. Some impact can be seen in the Andean countries and to the streets of the United States. A long-term effort will be necessary both on the supply and demand side to achieve progress toward the goal of a drug-free America.
ENDNOTES


9. Ibid., p. 4.


13. Ibid.


16. Ibid., pp. 28-33.
17. Ibid., pp. 29-31.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


