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AN APPROACH TO COMPLETING A SENIOR OFFICER ORAL HISTORY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT P. REDDY
United States Army

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An Approach to Completing A Senior Officer Oral History

The Military History Institute's Senior Officer Oral History Program is an essential component of the Army's efforts to capture and record our history. The objective of the Senior Officer Oral History Program is to use student officers assigned to the US Army War College to interview all retired lieutenant generals and generals several years after they have retired. These documents as well as official records and various accounts of historically significant events, provide a very rich and complete accounting of the past.
This paper describes, from the perspective of a student officer, the various steps associated with completing a Senior Officer Oral History. Hopefully, the document will assist future students who become involved in the program. The paper focuses on the importance of research into the subject officer's military career, the importance of an outline which is a key document for communicating proposed ideas to the subject officer, and some innovative ways to employ computer technology in completing the final product. The paper has appended to it an outline as well as the question set which was used in the process of completing a Senior Officer Oral History.
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AN APPROACH TO COMPLETING A SENIOR OFFICER ORAL HISTORY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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INTRODUCTION

The Senior Officer Oral History Program represents an opportunity for retired strategic leaders to provide insight into the circumstances surrounding key events in which they were involved and to record those key lessons which they learned while in the profession of arms. This program also provides an opportunity for interested student officers to research the career of a strategic leader as well as discuss with the officer many of the events and decisions which shaped the Army.

The purpose of the program is to fill many gaps in our history and provide a more complete understanding why certain key events occurred or why key decisions were made. A thoughtfully prepared document will become an invaluable source of research material for future military historians or for others who are merely interested in learning more about our past strategic leaders and how they saw the challenges which faced them. The Military History Institute's goal is to interview all retired lieutenant generals and above. The documents are normally organized as an autobiographical chronology in the question and answer format.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to describe the process used to complete a Senior Officer Oral History. Further, the paper will discuss various alternative approaches and techniques which could be equally effective. The report will center primarily around the research and preparation phases of the effort and will link this with the development of a useful question set. The key contribution of
this document will be to provide an organizational alternative to the normal autobiographical chronology as well as propose an different approach to collecting the data. The paper will treat the following steps associated with completing a Senior Officer Oral History

a. The decision process
b. Research
c. Organizational alternatives
d. The Oral history proposal
e. The question set

THE DECISION PROCESS

The decision to complete a Senior Officer Oral History should not be made lightly. The project requires a significant amount of personal effort and can represent a real demand on a student's time. Further, there must be some sense that the subject officer will be sufficiently committed to expend the time and effort necessary to complete the project. During the interview process, the student officer can become a captive of the subject officers calendar. As a result, the process can extend late into the academic year. Further, the student officer must be prepared to make several trips, often to the subject officer's home, to conduct the interviews.

Some previous association with the subject officer can be very helpful. This previous experience helps the interviewer gain insight into the personality of the subject officer in terms of his likes and dislikes. Also, previous exposure to the officer will give the student officer at least some first hand knowledge of the officer's career accomplishments. This insight will prove to be a valuable time saver during the research phase.
RESEARCH

Thorough research of the subject officer's military career is essential for developing a question set which will capture the significant events and issues in which the officer was involved. An additional area of research might be the subject officer's service since retirement. Many senior officers are called upon to serve on high level commissions and DoD study groups which investigate particularly vexing problems. Insights relative to these efforts may be worth investigating with the senior officer.

The key document necessary to begin the research effort is the subject officer's complete biography. It should contain a detailed chronology of all assignments and promotions. Normally, a biography can be obtained from the Military History Institute, the protocol section at the Army War College, or the General Officer Management Office in Washington, DC. The other, very broad, primary sources of research information are informal interviews with people who served with the subject officer and a myriad of written documents.

Written Documentation: Using the subject officer's record of assignments as a start point, the Military History Institute's unit files, after action reports, and unit histories may provide invaluable background information concerning key events or issues that the subject officer was involved in such as, battles, significant unit deployments, and "task forces" which studied some of the Army's most vexing problems. A review of these documents can form the basis for questions for the subject officer which should amplify and serve to get at the "why" and "how" the interviewee was associated with these key events. Other areas for research include a review of articles, books or study reports which the subject officer authored or participated in during his career. Unit histories also
provide information concerning commanders which the subject officer served under during his career. A review of historical documents relative to the subject officer's commanders may also provide worthwhile references. Another potential source of information is the history detachments of the various MACOM's to which the subject officer was assigned. This source will be particularly helpful if the subject officer served as a primary staff officer or division chief on the MACOM staff. These agencies can provide a wealth of information relative to the issues and initiatives that were being worked at the time the subject officer served with the MACOM. Also, correlating the subject officer's assigned duties with your basic knowledge of the Army will lead you to major issues which the subject officer was involved in or may have opinions about.

b. Personal Interviews: Personal contact with the subject officer early in the research phase will greatly assist in providing focus to the research effort. Key questions relative to recommended areas of research and key documents that will facilitate the research process should be discussed. Further, it is appropriate to ask the subject officer if there are key areas about which he would prefer not to discuss. Also, the subject officer can provide information relative to other people who the interviewer could question to gain information which would be appropriate to incorporate into the oral history. These people can provide key information relative to the kinds of issues which the subject officer faced during his career and can provide leads relative to information which should be reviewed by the interviewer before developing the question set.
ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

Most Senior Officer Oral Histories represent a series of questions which attempt to chronicle the achievements and the evolution of fundamental beliefs of the subject officer. To this end they are loosely organized as follows:

a. Formative Years. The period of time from early childhood to entrance into the Army. These questions capture the key events or experiences which shaped the subject officer's ethics and values as well as capture the subject officer's motives for joining the Army.

b. Early Service (company grade service) These questions center around the subject officer's experience as a company grade officer. If the subject officer served in combat during this period, the interviewer focuses on those experiences and the impact they had on later service. Experiences in command, schools and with training often are explored. Normally this portion of the oral history is not the primary focus of the effort.

c. Field Grade Service. This portion of the document chronicles the subject officer's command and staff assignments while in the grade of major through colonel. It appears that during this period of service many strategic leaders lay the foundation for future service in terms of the issues that they worked on or the organizations which they commanded.

d. General Officer Service. This section is of the the real focus of the document as it is during this period that most officers make their most significant contributions to the Army. Further, it is during this period of service that the greatest quantity of research material is readily available.

Although the above organization is very straightforward, one could argue that this approach does not facilitate use of the final product as a research source. For example, if a particular officer worked an issue over time at several different
grades and in different assignments, a researcher will be required to go through several sections of the oral history in order to complete his survey of that subject. Therefore, a blending of the chronological and functional organization may better facilitate the needs of future historians. This "hybrid" organization would be based on the subject officer's career experiences. For example, an officer who served in Korea, Vietnam and with Southern Command may have some unique and very valuable thoughts on the evolution of limited wars and low intensity conflict which might otherwise be lost in the more conventional chronological approach to Senior Officer Oral Histories. Therefore, chronicling all these experiences in a section titled "Low Intensity Conflict" may be useful. Another clear example might be the evolution of a strategic leader's leadership philosophy as it emerged from that of a company grade officer to a general officer.

The final aspect of the organization of the document should be based on the objective of the interviewer. One could argue that the real value of the oral history is not to chronicle events in a senior officer's career but rather, to gain insight into why the subject officer did what he did, how he was able to make things happen and why, to the best of the subject officer's recollection, the particular issue was important to the future of the Army. This kind of thrust will place additional demands on the interviewer in terms of framing questions to the subject officer to elicit the "how" and the "why" but will make the final product much richer.

THE ORAL HISTORY PROPOSAL and QUESTION SET

Upon completion of the research, the interviewer should develop an outline which lays out the proposed organization of the document as well as the intent in terms of issues to be pursued. The proposal should be detailed enough to give the
subject officer a clear understanding of the interviewer's focus in terms of issues which will be pursued as well as the general thrust of the questions which will be developed in the next phase. Further, the interviewer should be prepared for the subject officer to make major changes or even completely recast the proposal and send the interviewer in a new direction. A Senior Officer Oral History proposal is attached at Annex A.

The proposal should not contain specific questions but should be detailed enough to serve as the primary source for developing the question set once the subject officer has reviewed the proposal and concurred with the contents. Further, the interviewer must realize that the questions which are ultimately put to the subject officer may change several times even while the interview is in progress. Once there is agreement on the proposal, the next step is to develop the question set.

The question set should follow the contents of the proposal which the subject officer reviewed and approved. If the subject officer has consented to completing the effort through a series of face to face interviews, the challenge is to develop questions which cover the subject officer's career as well as get at the most important issues. However, there is a real danger that the question set can become too detailed and bog the subject officer down in unimportant details or send the subject officer on excursions which do not support the focus of the document. In this instance, the student officer must make a conscious effort to ensure that during the interview, the relevant questions are asked but that the interview process stays on track.

Some senior officers may prefer to complete the oral history process by responding to questions privately and sending the text of the answers back to the student officer by mail or electronically via computer modem with a minimum amount of fact to face contact. In this case the questions will have to be more
detailed to ensure that the subject officer treats all aspects of the issues
previously agreed upon

The subject officer which I interviewed desired to complete his oral history
process via computer using electronic mail to transmit information back and forth.
The advantage to this approach is that the subject officer will have a complete
document which is digitized and indexed, and one which can be easily catalogued
for future reference. This approach had not been attempted previously at the War
College but was accommodated. Although the subject officer operated exclusively
in a non-MS DOS environment, the problems associated with compatibility can be
overcome. The College owns the hardware necessary to recompile data from one
environment into the MS DOS environment. The final product will be identical to
those oral histories previously published.

The question set which was developed to support this new approach was
significantly more detailed and is at Annex B. The ultimate organization of the
questions does not resemble the proposed organization which was submitted to the
subject officer. The changes were made at the subject officer's request.
However, the substance of the questions is essentially the same, only their
relative grouping has been changed.

The mechanics for completing this fully automated approach were relatively
simple. The questions were typed into a computer, compiled in an ASCII format and
sent to the subject officer via electronic mail using a modem. The subject officer
recompiled the data from ASCII to a word processing format, made final
adjustments to the questions as necessary and typed answers to each one of them
and then sent the questions and answers back via the same electronic mail system.
Once received, the data was again run through a "black box" and converted, in an
ASCII format to an MS DOS environment which could be addressed and organized in
the word processing systems used by the Military History Institute. This approach
placed a heavy burden for data input on the subject officer and eliminated the need for someone to transcribe magnetic taped interviews to text.

There is still be a need for face to face contact between the subject officer and the interviewer once the subject officer has completed responses to the questions. During the session additional questions can be asked to clarify answers and pursue additional questions which evolved from the subject officers initial responses.

As the number of computer literate senior officers increases more potential interviewees more may be very comfortable with this approach. For example, the subject officer would be able to work at the oral history a little at a time as his schedule and time permits rather than carving blocks of time from his schedule and doing the project in a series of interviews. Further, this approach provides the subject officer the opportunity to review his papers and other documents which are relevant to the issue before framing his answers.

The Senior Officer Oral History Program is an enriching experience for the student officer and a vital component of the Army's efforts to more completely capture our history. The student officer gains a unique perspective on key aspects of our history as well as the opportunity to be personally tutored or mentored by one of the Army's most senior officers. The final document will provide future historians the information necessary to fill in many gaps in our recorded history. Further, the Senior Officer Oral Histories have the effect of making the often very dry subject of history come alive and personalizing it.
Appendix A
Oral History Proposal

Oral History Proposal

1. General Comments
   A. Attempt to chronicle your early history, then focus on initiatives, issues, and service since retirement.
      1. Proposed sections of the oral history are:
         a) Early history
            (1) Significant events prior to graduation from USMA
            (2) Early service -- Lt - LTC
         b) Command philosophy and leadership
         c) The evolution of training
         d) Low intensity conflict
         e) Service since retirement
   B. The thrust of the questions will center on issues (vice a chronology) and, hopefully capture:
      1. What did you do and why did you do it?
      2. How did you make it happen?
      3. What difference did the idea make?
      4. How will the result relate to the Army’s readiness 25 years from now?

II. Proposed Organization
   A. Early History
      1. Discuss those significant aspects of your early life which helped shaped your values.
      2. Early military service
         a) Discuss, in some detail, the Korean war
            (1) How you were assigned to Korea
            (2) What the war was like
            (3) Personal experiences and lessons learned
         b) Outline the significant aspects of your service from Korea until assignment to RVN as Commander, 1-26 In.
   B. Command Philosophy & Leadership
      1. Leadership competencies
         a) Discuss what they are and how they change as we move through the system -- should they
         b) Outline your views associated with leadership - Discuss why you were so successful and effective.
Appendix A
Oral History Proposal

c) Compare how the Army selected, developed and trained officers for key positions with how it is accomplished today.
d) Discuss value of long range planning given Gen De Puy's feelings

2. Command philosophy
   a) Discuss the core of your philosophy and what changed over time
   b) Command environment. What is it how is it created and maintained
   c) Effective leadership in command and on staff -- is it the same or different.

3. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Goldwater - Nichols Act
   a) What relationships have changed in SOUTHCOM since you were CINC
   b) Are the services joint enough

C. Training

Largely because of your efforts, the Army changed the training paradigm. This effort began with the publication of The Report of the Board for Dynamic Training. Individual & collective training to observable standards was adopted, the potential of technology was recognized as viable, the idea of combat training centers was proposed and has matured, and our doctrine and training focus was better aligned. In this segment I would like to capture how you made all this happen and how you could envision all the complex parts fitting together so well.

1. Training philosophy
   a) The mechanics of moving the Army from a mobilization based approach to training to an observably measurable performance based approach to the problem
   b) The TRADOC focus on training vice education
      (1) In the school house & in units
      (2) What is the best mix of training and education for officers
   c) How were we able to determine the balance between the use of technology and the more traditional methods
   d) What was the impact of the fighting vehicle systems - then under development - on this paradigm shift
   e) Would like to get at how you were able to make all this happen in an environment which is slow to accept new ways in an area where consensus is almost impossible to achieve

2. Development and acceptance of performance based training in units --
Appendix A
Oral History Proposal

how were you able to make this happen?
  a) Individual skills training as proposed by the Board for Dynamic Training
  b) Evolution and development of the ARTEP

3. The linkage of technology to training
  a) Tactical engagement simulations as an example
  b) The integration of simulation based training from individual drivers to command and control exercises to networked heavy force crews.
    (1) Your current efforts with the DoD Simulation Policy Study seem to be a logical extension of all your previous work in this area
  c) Linkage of the Combat Training Centers to an overarching technology based training strategy for units

4. The National Training Center concept
  a) Impact of "Red Flag & Top Gun" on your concept
  b) The development of the '76 concept from a one site facility to three sites
  c) The vision of how technology could essentially make this happen
  d) How were you able to make the most risky and expensive training initiative in history work
  e) What impact did you think this facility would have
  f) How are we doing now and what is the next step

5. Discuss how these emerging concepts were applied by you as
   a) ADC of 4th Mech Div. (Given results of Board for Dynamic Training)
   b) As CG of 8th In Div (Given all TRADOC efforts through 1977)

D. Low Intensity Conflict
Given your combat and command experience, you have witnessed the complete evolution of our strategy and tactics for limited wars, counterinsurgency, and all other aspects of Low Intensity Conflict. It would be very valuable to trace your experience in this area and outline your feelings relative to how we arrived at our current strategy and tactics.

1. Combat commands in RVN
   a) Discuss the evolution of our tactics and their linkage with the
Appendix A
Oral History Proposal

Known strategy
b) Was our approach to counterinsurgency viable in the long run
c) Explore the effectiveness of our nation building efforts and their linkage with combat operations
d) What should we have done differently in Vietnam & why

2. Commander in Chief Southern Command
   a) Discuss your command relationships and their adequacy
      (1) Does the CINC have the authority and the resources necessary to accomplish the mission
   b) How did you apply your insights gained in RVN to Central America
   c) Discuss the environment of the operational area with focus on Central America -- what was SOUTHCOM's role
      (1) El Salvador
         (a) Contrast with Vietnam
            i) What were the key differences in El Salvador
         (b) What RVN lessons learned did we apply in El Salvador
            i) How did you implement this guidance
               ii) Did you believe that the strategy was correct & why
      (2) Honduras
         (a) What were our objectives for the country
         (b) How well were we able to accomplish them
      (3) War on drugs.
         (a) Is this an appropriate mission for the military
         (b) How effective was the military
         (c) How does this fit in the context of LIC and what do we need to do
   d) Discuss the relevance of US tactics and strategy relative to Low Intensity conflict.
      (1) What changes need to be made

E. Since Retirement
   Much of your service since retirement is logically linked to many of your initiatives while on active duty. Therefore, if it turns out to make more sense we can eliminate this section discuss these issues where they logically fit above.
   1. Packard Commission
Appendix A
Oral History Proposal

a) The reason for the commission and your role in the effort
b) Discuss the scope of the effort and the makeup of the commission
c) Was the commission necessary
d) Assess the final results and the value of the recommendations
e) What has changed and has it changed for the better
f) What is left to be done

2. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy
a) Explore how experience in Army influenced your beliefs which are outlined in following reports
   (1) “Security Assistance as a US Policy Instrument in the Third World”
   (2) “Supporting US Strategy for Third World Conflict”
b) Discuss why recommendations will improve our national strategy
c) How will you affect implementation of the recommendations and how successful have you been to date

3. DoD Simulation Policy Study
a) Outline the mission of the group
b) What effect will the policy recommendations have on services
c) Discuss your vision of where the DoD should be going in the area of simulation technology
   (1) What would be the effect

F. Thoughts on the Future
   1. Explain your vision of the DoD in the year 2015
   2. Discuss your vision of how military will train in 2015
Annex B

Proposed Questions for Gen (Ret) Gorman's
Senior Officer Oral History

A. Childhood and Early Education -- (1927 - 1950):

1. What in your childhood -- your family life, hobbies and interests, and secondary education -- inspired you to serve in the military?

2. In 1945 you enlisted in the Navy and spent one year as a seaman first class before entering the Military Academy in 1946. Why did you enlist in the Navy and go on to the Military Academy? What were your motivations for these choices?

3. How did your experience as a seaman influence you as an officer?

4. What stands out in your mind about your experiences at West Point -- the nature and the quality of the experience?

5. What were the best and the worst times which you can recall while you were a Cadet?

6. Did any of your classmates really surprise you as officers when compared to your opinion of them as Cadets?

7. Are there any other interesting issues concerning your formative years which you think we should include?

B. Assignments to Schools:

1. After receiving your commission, you were assigned directly to a unit which supported institutional training at Ft Benning. From your perspective as a platoon leader, in the 82d Airborne Division, and supporting institutional training, what were your impressions of how the Army trained infantry officers.
a. Were the doctrine and tactics which were taught at the Infantry School relevant from your perspective as a platoon leader?

2. I believe that after your initial assignment with the 82d Airborne Division you were sent to the Infantry Officer Basic Course.

   a. What sticks out in your mind about the Basic Course?
   b. Did you feel that Ft Benning did a good job of preparing you for combat?
   c. Was the school sensitive to integrating the tactics and techniques developed in Korea into the accepted body of doctrine which they were teaching at the time?

3. You attended the Marine Corps equivalent of the Infantry Officer Advanced Course before assuming command of an armored rifle company in Europe. How well did the school prepare you for command? Were there any differences between the Marine Corps approach to training captains and the way the Army did it at Ft Benning? Would you discuss those differences please?

4. What were your responsibilities at and impressions of West Point when you returned as an instructor -- did you find many changes?

   a. Did you think there were needs for additional changes -- if so, what and how did you try to make them happen?
   b. What is your opinion about how West Point prepares men and women to be officers today compared with how it was done while you were an instructor?

5. In 1960 - 1961 you attended the Command and General Staff College at Ft Leavenworth.

   a. What were your expectations for the course before you arrived?
   b. What was the educational philosophy of the school and did it meet the standard of being the "Army's Senior Tactical School?"
   c. What were your personal goals for this year and did you meet them and if not why?

   What impact did Gen Marchall's experiences and philosophy have on you in terms of your expectations of professional military education?

6. In your critique of your National War College experience (1965 - 1966), you wrote "... I cannot condone so elaborate an institution for the promotion of private contemplation, nor can I say with certitude that the 38th year of my life was productively spent on behalf of the United States."

   a. Could you explain what caused you to feel that way?
   b. What did you recommend be changed and why?
b. What happened to your critique of the school? Were any changes instituted?

7. When you arrived at the Infantry School in 1971 as the Assistant Commandant (a position which Gen Marshall held 40 years earlier), did you find a teaching environment different than what you experienced as a lieutenant?
   a. What, in your view, were the problems and how did you try to fix them?
   b. What responsibility did the school have for developing training systems used in units and what aspects of this system did you feel required change?
   b. Based on your research of Gen Marshall's life, how did he find our professional military education system in the 1930's and did you find many parallels 40 years later?

8. While serving at the Infantry School, you led the efforts of the Board for Dynamic Training. This effort provided the cornerstone upon which the Army changed the training paradigm. Would you discuss why and how this "ad hoc" investigative body was established?
   a. What was your charter and how did you go about fulfilling it?
   b. What do you recall were the key recommendations?
   c. How were you able to work to make these recommendations a reality, especially the performance oriented SQT, the establishment of the Combat Arms Training Board, and the incorporation of some training devices into training plans.
   d. What was the prevailing feeling among commanders concerning the use of training devices to support training plans? How did you feel about their use and why?

9. In 1973 you were assigned as the second Deputy Chief of Staff for Training of the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command. During this period of your service, the Army essentially changed its training paradigm. In your view what was the the single most important event which provided the impetus for this change?
   a. In general terms, how were you and TRADOC able to move the Army from what essentially was a mobilization based approach to training to the performance oriented approach which we currently have? What was the impact of programmed force modernization on this change?
   b. Did the lessons of the 1973 Arab Israeli War have an impact on the emerging changes in our training philosophy and if so, what was the impact?
   c. Would you discuss how and why the Army implemented a performance oriented approach to individual training and was able to publish
the necessary documents in such a short time? Why did you believe that this approach was so important and how did you make this happen? What is your assessment of how the Army conducts individual training and MOS testing today?

d. While you were the DCS-T, the Army Training Support Center was established. I believe that the original idea for this organization essentially was yours. Why did you believe that this organization was necessary and how did you see it contributing to training readiness? How did you make this concept a reality?

e. Would you discuss how and the Army decided to develop and field MILES? Why, in your view, was it important and how were you able to capture the resources and gain the necessary support of field commanders for the system? During development, did you envision that MILES would be used to support task force level force on force maneuver? Should there be a follow-on system?

f. MILES is just one example of the much broader issue of technology based solutions to training challenges. During your tenure as DCS-T, the Army began the almost wholesale development of a full range of training devices, simulators, and simulations which continues today. Would you please discuss how all this came about and why you believed that training technology had a place in units? Sir, how did you set all this in motion?

g. How were you able to determine the balance between the use of technology in support of training and the more traditional training methods? Do we have the proper balance?

h. The first "fleshed out" concept paper for the National Training Center was produced in 1976 and then updated less than one year later. The National Training Center represents the most expensive peace time training effort in our history; how did this come about and how were you able to make it all happen?

1. Why did the concept grow from a single site facility in 1976 to three sites in 1977?

2. Why did you believe that a National training center was important and what impact did you think it would have on combat readiness?

3. In the original concept there was no provision for a training center for light forces -- why?

4. How were you able to identify the technology which would support the concept, why did you feel this technology would work and how were you able to gain agreement among commanders to rely so heavily on training technology?

5. How were the resources earmarked to establish the NTC at Ft Irwin?

6. What effect did you feel that the prospect of a NTC rotation would have on a commander's training plan?
7. Do you feel that the NTC effectively simulates combat for battalions and command elements of the brigade?
8. Would you comment on how well the current Combat Training Centers concept compares with your vision of 15 years ago?
9. What should be the next step in the evolution of the NTC concept?

While you were the DCS-T, the Army changed its collective training and evaluation philosophy. Will you explain how this came about as well as some of the difficulties associated with instituting the ARTEP and how you were able to overcome them?

During this period the TRADOC was also formulating a new approach to training management. Macro and micro training management as well as strategies for the use of training technology as well as the linkage of individual tasks and collective missions. How did all this come about? Did you see the Battalion Training Management System as an interim product or the real solution to training management?

Would like for you to discuss how the TRADOC was able to make this revolution in unit training happen in an environment which is slow to accept new ways and in an area where consensus is almost impossible to achieve?

While the DCS-T, what issues did you work relative to our institutional training conducted in the schools

1. The service schools transitioned from a classroom based education approach for schooling officers to a performance based training approach. Was it met with resistance and again how did you make it happen? In terms of officer education, what is the best mix?
2. Was this performance based training approach reflected on the curriculum at the C&GSC when you conducted a general inspection of the institution in 1975?
3. What was your role in affecting the educational philosophy of the Senior Service Colleges during your tenure as the DCS-T?


a. What was the purpose of these hearings and from your perspective what was the focus of the panel?
b. What was the thrust of your testimony?
c. I believe that during the hearing a member suggested that you "undervalued" the Professional MILITARY education process. Do you believe that was a fair assessment?
d. What can the Nation do to assure that we can produce competent strategists in the future?
e. What are your feelings on those aspects of the Goldwater/Nichols act which talk to joint service schools and joint service assignment requirements which are intended to support the CINC's?
Proposed Questions for Gen (Ret) Gorman's
Senior Officer Oral History
Troops and Command

Schools: (Final question of this section)

1. On 12 May 88 you testified with Gen Y.F. Smith, USAF, before the Panel on Military Education of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
   a. What was the purpose of these hearings and from your perspective what was the focus of the panel?
   b. What was the thrust of your testimony?
   c. I believe that during the hearing a member suggested that you "undervalued" the Professional Military Education process. Do you believe that was a fair assessment?
   d. What can the Nation do to assure that we can produce competent strategists in the future?
   e. What are your feelings on those aspects of the Goldwater/Nichols Act which talk to joint service schools and joint service assignment requirements which are intended to support the CINC's?

Troops and Command

1. Immediately after graduation from the Military Academy you were assigned to the 62d Airborne Division and served in the 325th and 508th Airborne Infantry. Would you generally describe the the environment in these units and the unit training system which was in place at that time?

2. Upon graduation form the Infantry Officer Basic Course in Mar 52 you were assigned to the 32d Infantry in Korea.
   a. How did this assignment come about?
   b. What was the the general situation and readiness of your unit like when you arrived?
   c. What stands out, in your mind, about your leadership style and what persons or events most influenced it?
d. What was the quality of our force in Korea and what problems and challenges were you faced with? Was the organizational structure of your unit satisfactory to accomplish the mission given the terrain and threat?

  e. What battles did the battalion participate in and what assets were reasonably available to the commander in terms of support arms?

  f. How did you plan to conduct small unit raids for the purpose of taking prisoners and did the plan succeed?

  g. Did your combat experiences have any lingering effect on you and how you viewed war later? If so, what and how?

  h. What lasting lessons did you learn from your experience in Korea which you either applied in future assignments or assured that you avoided?

  i. While in Korea you were hospitalized twice and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Would you discuss how you won the award and why you were hospitalized? How did you lose your West Point class ring?

  j. Is there anything else about the Korean conflict which you wish to discuss?

3. Upon graduation from the Marine Corps Junior School in 1958, you were assigned to the 2d Armored Rifle Battalion, 51st Infantry as a company commander:

  a. What was the command environment in Europe like?

  b. How was training planned, resourced, and executed and were you satisfied with the training environment?

  c. What aspects of the accepted training methods did you change -- if any and why?

  d. How much freedom did you have to command and train your company? How was your company evaluated?

  e. Did your combat experiences and your recent experience with the Marine Corps Junior School affect how you approached training?

  f. How did you teach your lieutenants?

4. Upon completion of company command you were assigned the S-3 and XO of the 1st Armored Rifle Battalion, 54th Infantry.

  a. Did you find that the current doctrine for employment of heavy forces relevant to how you believed the battalion would fight the battle?

  b. Were the training programs within the battalion centralized or decentralized?

  c. What was the focus of the unit training programs and why?

  d. How were units evaluated and were these evaluations a fair assessment of a unit's tactical proficiency?
5. In 1966, you assumed command of the 1st Battalion 26th Infantry in Vietnam. Would you discuss the operational concept and tactics employed by the 1st Division and your battalion?
   a. In your view, did our operational concepts and tactics support the National Strategy?
   b. Was our approach to fighting the war in 1966 viable in the long run?
      (1). From your perspective as a commander and given the mission as you understood it, what would you have changed?
      (2). What was the linkage between combat operations and pacification operations and was this linkage effective?
   c. What were the soldiers of the battalion like compared with the soldiers you led in Korea?
      (1). Did your soldiers understand why we were in Vietnam?
      (2). How did you go about making an assessment of the battalion readiness?
   d. Is it better to institute change quickly or gradually?
   e. What was your philosophy of command and how did you transmit that to your officers and soldiers?
   f. How did you use your Sergeant Major in the battalion?
   g. Again, how did your leadership style change from when you commanded a company commander and if so why?
   i. What was the climate in the battalion and how did you establish and sustain it?
   j. The 26th Infantry Regiment has a rich history dating back to 1901. As the commander of the battalion was that history a part of how you commanded the battalion and if so how did you use the regimental history to influence soldiers?

6. What was the command environment within the 1st Division? In his book "The 25 Year War", Gen Palmer suggests that the division was particularly bad about directing operations from helicopters and essentially by passing the chain of command. As a battalion commander and later as the G-3 of the division do you agree with that assessment?

7. As the Division G-3, what aspects of the division organization and division operations would you have changed?
   a. To what extent was the division involved in nation building activities and were they effective?
   b. Did the division have any interface with the ARVN and if so to what extent?
8. Would you discuss the division's operations against the 9th VC Division, your role in the operation and an assessment of the division's success?
   a. What were the key aspects of the operation?

9. When you left Vietnam in 1967 what were your feelings about the war and the way we were fighting it? Did you believe that South Vietnam would prevail?

10. You returned to Vietnam in 1970 to assume command of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Had the nature of the war changed at all from when you left in 1967 and if so how?
   a. Were the soldiers in 1970 any different than they were three years earlier?
   b. Generally, what tactics did the brigade employ? Given the political sensitivity of the war and the concern for casualties could you aggressively pursue the enemy and force him to fight as the 1st Division did earlier?
   c. What was the effect of the anti-war demonstrations and the Paris peace talks on the morale and aggressiveness of the soldiers?
   d. Did you find any similarities between Vietnam in 1970 and Korea in 1953?
   e. When you left country had your beliefs relative to the final outcome of the war changed and if so why?
   f. How did you go about transitioning into brigade command? How did you assess the capabilities of the brigade and then go about instituting the changes which you felt were necessary?
   g. The Brigade had several battalions which possessed a very rich history from WWII, most notably was the 502 Infantry. Did you focus on the history of the brigade and battalions as you did when you were a battalion commander?
   h. What did you do differently as you approached brigade command when compared to how you approached battalion command?

11. While serving at the Infantry School, you led the efforts of the Board for Dynamic Training. This effort provided the cornerstone upon which the Army changed its training paradigm. Would you discuss why and how this "ad hoc" investigative body was established?
   a. What was your charter and how did you go about fulfilling it?
   b. What do you recall were the key recommendations?
   c. How were you able to work to make these recommendations a reality, especially the performance oriented SOT, the establishment of the
Combat Arms Training Board, and the incorporation of some training devices into training plans.

d. What was the prevailing feeling among commanders concerning the use of training devices to support training plans? How did you feel about their use and why?

e. Aside from your duties with the Board for dynamic Training, how did you find the training environment and training philosophy at the school? Please explain why you were given a picture of the school without any walls?

9. In 1973 you were assigned as the second Deputy Chief of Staff for Training of the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command. During this period of your service, the Army essentially changed its training paradigm. In your view what was the single most important event which provided the impetus for this change?

a. In general terms, how were you and TRADOC able to move the Army from what essentially was a mobilization based approach to training to the performance oriented approach which we currently have? What was the impact of programmed force modernization on this change?

b. Did the lessons of the 1973 Arab Israeli War have an impact on the emerging changes in our training philosophy and if so, what was the impact?

c. Would you discuss how and why the Army implemented a performance oriented approach to individual training and was able to publish the necessary documents in such a short time? Why did you believe that this approach was so important and how did you make this happen? What is your assessment of how the Army conducts individual training and MOS testing today?

d. While you were the DCS-T, the Army Training Support Center was established. I believe that the original idea for this organization essentially was yours. Why did you believe that this organization was necessary and how did you see it contributing to training readiness? How did you make this concept a reality?

e. Would you discuss how and the Army decided to develop and field MILES? Why, in your view, was it important and how were you able to capture the resources and gain the necessary support of field commanders for the system? During development, did you envision that MILES would be used to support task force level force on force maneuver? Should there be a follow-on system?

f. MILES is just one example of the much broader issue of technology based solutions to training challenges. During your tenure as DCS-T, the Army began the almost wholesale development of a full range of training devices, simulators, and simulations which continues today. Would you
please discuss how all this came about and why you believed that training technology had a place in units? Sir, how did you set all this in motion?

g. How were you able to determine the balance between the use of technology in support of training and the more traditional training methods? Do we have the proper balance?

h. The first “fleshed out” concept paper for the National Training Center was produced in 1976 and then updated less than one year later. The National Training Center represents the most expensive peace time training effort in our history; how did this come about and how were you able to make it all happen?

1. Why did the concept grow from a single site facility in 1976 to three sites in 1977?

2. Why did you believe that a National training center was important and what impact did you think it would have on combat readiness?

3. In the original concept there was no provision for a training center for light forces -- why?

4. How were you able to identify the technology which would support the concept, why did you feel this technology would work and how were you able to gain agreement among commanders to rely so heavily on training technology?

5. How were the resources earmarked to establish the NTC at Ft Irwin?

6. What effect did you feel that the prospect of a NTC rotation would have on a commander’s training plan?

7. Do you feel that the NTC effectively simulates combat for battalions and command elements of the brigade?

8. Would you comment on how well the current Combat Training Centers concept compares with your vision of 15 years ago?

9. What should be the next step in the evolution of the NTC concept?

i. While you were the DCS-T the Army changed its collective training and evaluation philosophy. Will you explain how this came about as well as some of the difficulties associated with instituting the ARTEP and how you were able to overcome them?

j. During this period the TRADOC was also formulating a new approach to training management. Macro and micro training management as well as strategies for the use of training technology as well as the linkage of individual tasks and collective missions. How did all this come about? Did you see the Battalion Training Management System as an interim product or the real solution to training management?

k. Would like for you to discuss how the TRADOC was able to make this revolution in unit training happen in an environment which is slow to
accept new ways and in an area where consensus is almost impossible to achieve?

10. While in TRADOC, Gen Depuy stopped most of the long range planning efforts, associated with combat developments because he felt it was ineffective. He felt that long range planners merely restated what was already known to be possible. He states that he was heavily criticized for this. Did you agree?

11. In 1977 you assumed command of the 8th Infantry Division in Germany. How did you approach your transition into command?
   a. Were there aspects of your leadership style which you found effective in the past which were not appropriate to use in this assignment and if so why?
   b. Did you deliberately try to create a command climate in the division and if so what was that climate and how did you go about it?
   c. What do you feel were the core aspects of your leadership style which did not change over time?

12. Would you describe training strategy which you found in the 8th Infantry Division in 1977?
   a. What aspects of the in place training philosophy did you feel needed to be changed? How did you go about making these changes within the division?
   b. What role did training devices and simulations play in your training strategy and did you find these items useful?
   c. Did you experiment with different training approaches and if so which ones worked best?
   d. I believe that while commander you developed a scenario which incorporated maneuver based evaluations for platoons and squads while commanders and their staff's participated in a simulation supported command post exercise. How was this approach conceived, was it effective training for the participants, and how were the results used within the division?
   e. Why did you incorporate so much training technology into the division's training plans? Did you feel that it provided more effective and better training or did it provide a worthwhile substitute for the lack of training land and facilities in the division area?
   f. Did your experience in the division cause you to rethink any of the major initiatives which TRADOC was developing for use in units?

13. In 1983 you were assigned as Commander in Chief of Southern Command. What were your major responsibilities?
a. What, generally, was our National Military Strategy for the region and, in your opinion, was it adequate?

b. Could you describe the political/military environment in your theater of operations? What were the major priorities and how did you address them?

c. Could you specifically discuss Central America and Panama and your role in executing our policies? Do you believe that our policies were correct and if so why?

d. I believe that during your tenure as CINC, the DoD began its involvement in the drug war. What were your feelings about this and what was the extent of the command's involvement?

e. Did you have Naval forces assigned to you and if so what was the command relationship?

f. The command was involved— in some degree—in several low intensity conflicts, for example El Salvador, did you find any differences in the nature of these conflicts and the war in Viet Nam? What was the nature of our involvement in these conflicts?

g. What major lessons did we learn in Viet Nam which were applied in your theater of operations?

h. In your opinion what aspects of Low Intensity Conflict are we as a nation and a military best capable of dealing with and conversely what aspects are we least capable of dealing with and why?

14. What were the command relationships which were in place when you arrived at US Southern Command?

a. How were you supporting commanders organized—by function or by service component? Were you satisfied with the command relationships and if not how would you have changed them?

b. What was your relationship with the OJCS staff—was this arrangement satisfactory?

c. What vehicle did the command employ to articulate resource requirements which would compete in the POM development cycle? Was this process sensitive to your requirements?

d. Did you feel that you had the necessary authority and latitude to efficiently accomplish your mission?

15. While Commander in Chief of US Southern Command were there opportunities to train your staff and component commanders and if so would you describe them?

a. Did you feel that the training systems that were in place to practice command and control, etc. were adequate and if not why not?

b. How could technology be used to more effectively prepare the command for war?
Proposed Questions for Gen (Ret) Gorman's
Senior Officer Oral History

A. Staff Assignments

1. Your first high level staff assignment was in 1960 as the Assistant Secretary of the General Staff, Hq, Seventh Army.
   a. What was the scope of your responsibilities?
   b. You were involved in an effort identify all the training requirements imposed on commanders in an armored rifle battalion. Could you explain the scope and the results of your assessment?

2. After graduation from the Army Command and General Staff College you were assigned to ODCSOPS, HQDA for three years. Would you discuss the scope of your responsibilities and what it was like to work on the Army Staff?
   a. Do you feel that an assignment to the Army Staff is important for a career officer and if so why?
   b. Did this experience help you in later assignments?
   c. How was an assignment to OJCS viewed by you and your contemporaries at the time?

3. Upon completion of your tour in Vietnam you returned to Washington to work on the DoD staff. What stands out about that tour -- your responsibilities and the projects which you worked?
   a. What was your impression of the Tet Offensive of 1968 and its impact within on the OSD?

4. Upon completion of your DoD assignment you were assigned to OJCS as a member of the US Delegation to the Vietnam Peace Negotiations. For the second time in your career soldiers were fighting while peace talks were being conducted.
   a. How did you find the North Vietnamese?
   b. What was the atmosphere of the negotiations and what were the issues which were being debated?
   c. What was your role?

5. Upon completion of division command you were assigned to the CIA as the National Intelligence officer for General Purpose Forces. Could you explain the scope of your responsibilities and the more significant issues which you worked while in this position?
6. In 1980 you were assigned as the J-5 OJCS. What major issues did you work while in this assignment?
   a. How would you characterize your relationships with the service staffs?
   b. What aspects of command relationships which were in place at the time frustrated you?
   c. Do you feel that you were able to support the CINC's adequately?

7. In 1981 you were assigned as the Assistant to the Chairman for a period of two years. Would you describe your duties and responsibilities?
   a. In your opinion did the Chairman have the necessary authority to effectively advise the National Command Authority?
   b. What caliber of officers were the services sending to joint billets?
   c. Were the pre-Goldwater Nichols command relationships and procedures adequate and effective? If not why not?
   d. Was there interservice rivalry which was - in your view - counterproductive?

B. Service Since Retirement:

1. Shortly after retirement from active duty you served as a member of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management or more commonly known as the Packard Commission. Would you explain the purpose of the Commission and your role in that effort?
   a. What were the significant recommendations which resulted from your efforts?
   b. Have these recommendations been implemented by the services and if they have been implemented are they as effective as the Commission thought they would be?
   c. What are your feelings relative to the Army's efforts to reorganize the way we acquire end items of equipment?

2. In 1988 you served as a member of the Commission on Long Term Strategy and published reports on Supporting US Strategy for Third World Conflict and Security Assistance as a US Policy Instrument in the Third World. Both of these documents deal with aspects of Low Intensity Conflict. During this period we were involved in a bi-polar competition with the Soviet Union. Given the events of the past year, are there any aspects of the recommendations contained in the two reports which you would change and if so why?
   a. How do you see the nature of low Intensity Conflict changing, if at all, given the current situation in the Soviet Union?
b. How much did your experience with limited war in Korea and your experience with Low Intensity conflict in Vietnam and South America play in the development of these two documents? Was the Congress and the President receptive to the recommendations? What progress have we made since the documents were published?

3. As the former commander of US Southern Command, were you involved, in any way, in the planning or execution of Operation Just Cause and if so in what capacity?
   a. What was the effect of our action on the country of Panama?
   b. How do you see the country evolving in the future?

4. Most recently, you chaired a DoD Simulation Policy study to develop immediate and long range management plans, policies, and procedures for oversight of war games, models and simulations used for DoD training and acquisition.
   a. Was this effort necessary and if so why?
   b. What do you expect to be the outcome of your effort and how will this affect the services?
   c. What role do you expect simulations to play in the future relative to training readiness?
   d. Will models, both training and acquisition, be standard across DoD and fully integrated?

C. Vision of the Future:

1. How do you see the military evolving their training strategies over the next 25 years in terms of collective and joint training?
   a. What role will technology play in the training of soldiers, smaller units and headquarters?
   b. Is the current system of joint training effective? What kind of joint training systems do you envision in the future?
   c. How do we determine the best mix between technology based training and the more traditional methods?
   d. Do you envision any changes being made to the Combat Training Centers concept in the future?

2. There are some who believe that we have developed equipment which is too complex and more capable than the ability of a human being to effectively employ. An example might be the pilot blackout and stimulus overload problems associated with our modern fighter aircraft. How do we solve this problem in the future if it is in fact a problem?
3. What different ways can we harness to train the individual soldier and small units more effectively and how can we make the individual soldier more effective and safe on future battlefields?

4. How will the battlefield of 35 years from now be different from today?

5. Do you envision the joint command relationships which have come about as part of Goldwater-Nichols changing in the future and if so how?
   a. Does the current legislation make a CINC's job easier or harder? Are we more effective now than we were before the legislation?