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CONCEPT FOR THE STRATEGIC USE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN THE 1990'S AND BEYOND

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ABSTRACT

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In the geopolitical world of the future, Special Operations Forces (SOF) can plan an essential role in achieving U.S. national strategic objectives. The situation in the world today, which is characterized by instability, the roll back of communism, and the growth of pluralistic governments, is propitious for the U.S. to shape the future the way it would like to see it. President Bush has advocated a strategy called Peacetime Engagement to seize this opportunity. Peacetime Engagement means that the U.S. government should use all of the instruments of power (political, economic, informational, and military) during peacetime to ensure stability and promote U.S. interests and objectives. The SOF are an excellent military instrument to "provide for eventualities that cannot be foreseen with clarity, and for threats whose nature we may only guess." By employing SOF during peacetime they can: deter or counter threats to U.S. and allied security interests; permit access to and influence with foreign governments in a manner that would be mutually advantageous; detect and provide early assessments of forces inimical to U.S. interests thus permitting rational decision making; control instability to avoid the direct and costly involvement of conventional U.S. military forces; stabilize situations to redress local unrest and advance U.S. revolutionary ideals which support pluralistic political institutions and free market economies; promote and support democratic movements; contain instability while preparing the operational area for the introduction of conventional military forces; and support the actions of those forces if necessary. Therefore, SOF should be employed in peacetime in support of the President's policy of Peacetime Engagement.
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AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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Introduction:

In the geopolitical world of the future, Special Operations Forces (SOF) can play an essential role in achieving U.S. national strategic objectives. These forces are especially suited to operate in the current, volatile world. This paper includes the following as Special Operations Forces: Army Special Forces, Rangers, and special mission units; Navy Sea Air Land teams (SEAL), special boat units, and SEAL delivery vehicle teams; Air Force and Army special aviation, Air Force special tactics group composed of combat control teams and pararescue personnel; counterterrorist (CT), psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) forces.\(^1\) The following study will highlight the nature of the geopolitical situation, discuss how SOF has fit historically into the national strategy, and examine its future role in Eastern and Central Europe and the Third World.
World Situation:

For forty-five years we have relaxed in the comfortably predictable world of bi-polar power politics. For the most part the rules of the game were known and followed. Except for events on the periphery where we faced surrogates, satraps, and assorted others, the center held. Now this situation has been altered. The world has not entered a halcyon period of impending peace but rather the lid has been lifted on a Pandora’s box. The idea of democracy seems to be spreading along with rising expectations and accompanying instability. This instability will increase before conditions improve and the U.S., which has recently emerged from the Persian Gulf War, will be closer than ever before to being involved in other, lesser conflicts around the globe. During the first six months of General Colin Powell’s tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. military forces were used six times to respond to crises.2

The framework that lent predictability to existing alliance relationships, both in the East and the West, has crumbled leaving an instability that will not be easy to overcome, for the speed with which events are racing towards a but dimly discernible culmination makes understanding difficult and prediction impossible.3

This emerging world environment is marked by the
realignement of the balance of power and the restructuring of the "Soviet Empire". Its characteristics are not so much matters of competitive political ideologies as they are economic and cultural. Shifting economic equilibrium has brought significant reverberations: our own increased competition with allies and others; increased instability throughout the Third World because of debt, internal economic disparities, and rising social expectations fueled by the explosion of global communications; and trends towards protectionism. Compounding and exploiting this environment of turbulence are the threats of unconstrained weapons technology proliferation, drug trafficking and its attendant violence and economic subversion, insurgency, terrorism and nation-states which both foster and support such activities.

In the United States, the fiscal realities of trade and budget deficits, manifested by the dwindling support for high defense budgets to meet a perceived lessening Soviet threat, and a reluctance to support overseas commitments except where U.S. vital interests are clearly at risk, result in increasing constraints on defense spending and capabilities. Recent events in Central Europe, the Soviet Union, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, the continuing scourge of drugs on international society, and the pressures to reduce U.S. forward-based forces all signal a security environment in flux.

In spite of these fluctuations, the USSR retains the military capability to be the most serious threat to U.S. strategic interests. Even after the projected arms reductions,
the USSR will have the largest military capability in the world. Internal political problems may prevent the Soviets from using that capability, however, it is still possible that conservative forces could take over and change the direction of Soviet policy away from reform.4

Instability and uncertainty have become the hallmarks of the USSR and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's program of perestroika has unleashed again the old ethnic and nationalistic forces in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Caucasus is in flames; Central Asia, with all too many shared features with preindependence Algeria, is close to boiling point; the Baltic states have already left the Union in outlook and political objectives; and nationalist feeling is escalating in the Ukraine.5

Georgia, in a separatist move, has exempted its citizens from conscription into the Soviet army and formed its own national guard. Moldavia is calling for reunification with Romania. National sentiment is running high in Byelorussia as well as the Ukraine and has caused riots in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. The internal problems in the rest of East/Central Europe, the potential dissolution of Yugoslavia, the unification of Germany, the European Community (EC) relationship with Eastern Europe and the USSR, and the independent action of the Soviet republics increase uncertainty.6
In the Middle East traditional, conservative societies are attempting to deal with the forces of change. Jordan’s long term survival is at issue after the defeat of Iraq. Iraq’s attempt to reestablish the hegemony of the Babylonian Empire in the Gulf has been thwarted and, with the resulting Shi’ite and Kurdish insurgency, the long term outcome is unknown. Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia are now maneuvering for greater roles in the Gulf. The Israel/Palestinian question is unsettled while the Lebanese situation remains unclear in light of the Syrian elimination of the Christian Phalangist’s leadership. In the midst of this uncertainty, terrorism continues to be a tool for political intercourse.

In Africa, the sub-Saharan countries are in a deep social, economic, and ecological crisis. Liberia remains in turmoil while political control is being resolved. Although a peace accord has been accepted in Angola, after sixteen years of civil war the long term outcome remains uncertain. Namibia is moving toward independence amid suspicions and violence. Morocco, Chad, West Africa, and Libya continue to have their problems. The political and economic prospects for stability in the Horn of Africa are still remote, and the hope for a resolution to the South African problem is marred by violent intertribal and intra or inter-racial struggles.

In the Pacific the Soviets are expanding their economic and political influence particularly in the Philippines. Mrs. Aquino’s support in the Philippines is eroding and instability in
the form of insurgency and governmental power struggles increases. The hostility of North Korea toward the South continues unaffected by the changes that are occurring in the rest of the Communist world. The Cambodian situation remains unresolved with the Khmer Rouge trying to return to power. The growth of the heroin and opium trade centered in the Golden Triangle challenges the stability of the South East Asian area.

With the fading of super power confrontation, the South Asian area is rife with ethnic, religious and tribal rivalries along with the spread of drug cultivation and trafficking. The area on both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border is being turned into an Islamic drug cartel. In Afghanistan, where the conflict continues, the regime in Kabul has proven resilient in the face of a factious Mujaheddin. Pakistan and India are in conflict with one another and at the same time facing internal upheaval. The Sindhi-muhajirs' rivalry inside Pakistan and the Punjab-Kashmir and Assamian insurgency problems inside India are portents of significant internal upheaval in each country. Additionally, India must contend with the Tamils' insurgency in Sri Lanka.

In Latin America for the first time most of the governments have been popularly elected. However, these government are fragile. Mexico is attempting to cope with its drug trafficking problems as well as ripening conditions for internal insurgency such as demographic pressures and unequal distribution of wealth. The insurgency still rages in El Salvador with no end in sight.
Drug trafficking, insurgency and terrorism combine in varying degrees in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and have spread into Ecuador and Venezuela. Central America remains unstable; economic reverberations jeopardize the consolidation of democracy in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras. Costa Rica, the "Switzerland" of the hemisphere, is straining to absorb refugees from Nicaragua and Panama, while its economic opportunities dim. Even Cuba, the catalyst of instability, faces a future abounding with turmoil.  

Projections:

What does the future hold? The Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, a Blue Ribbon commission charged by the President with examining our national strategy, saw a world comprised of multiple centers of power. We may be returning to the type of state system which existed between the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and World War II (WWII), a system which created powerful incentives for aggression among nation-states.

The period between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and WWII, 1815-1939, was characterized by shifting alliances. There were 112 alliances, an average of one a year. Many did not last long and there was only a moderate tendency for nations that shared the same ideological view to undertake binding commitments. In the future, coalitions, like those in the period after the Napoleonic Wars, will be less permanent and will shift in accordance with the interests of the various states.
These coalitions may only last a few years and then only for the duration of the crisis for which they were formed. The U.S. will find itself increasingly participating in coalitions with strange bedfellows. The crisis in the Persian Gulf is a case in point where USSR and Syria have thrown their support with the U.S. In the new scheme of coalitions, the U.S. may not even play the leading role but will try to exert its influence either behind the scenes or as an equal participant.

Change and instability in the Third World will increase in the immediate future driven by economic, technological, informational, demographic, social, religious, and political forces. This instability will be characterized by insurgencies, terrorism, drug trafficking, a struggle to control vital material or natural resources, attempts to influence large populations of disaffected peoples, and a scramble for "state of the art" weapons.

Large movement of people in Africa south of the Sahara, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will be one of the major destabilizing forces. Driven by war, a deteriorating economic situation, and famine, people will continue their shift toward urban areas and across international boundaries into locations which will be increasingly unable and unwilling to absorb them. Acerbated by demographic and medical trends such as the youth explosion in Latin America and AIDS in Africa, the resultant frustration will create fertile ground for insurgents, drug traffickers and terrorists. In 1989, there were
over 15.2 million Eastern Europeans in search of homes, an increase of 50% from 1985. U.S. News and World Report estimates that there are 17 million refugees and at least twice as many displaced people in the Third World. The magnitude of the refugee problem from Persian Gulf War and the subsequent insurgency is just now being realized. 10

The increasing level of arms transfers is another area of major concern. Arms exports to the Third World rose from 548 billion dollars in 1978 to 634 billion dollars in 1988 (in constant 1988 dollars) with the USSR contributing over 40% of the transactions.11 As the US and the USSR cut back on military forces and redefine their roles, the countries in the Third World will seek alternate means to assure their security. This does not mean that the USSR and the Eastern Europe will drop out of the arms export business. As the USSR and Eastern Europe's need for cash, their stockpile of excess military equipment, and their desire to keep production lines open increase, pressure will mount to increase arms sales to the Third World. These same forces, coupled with the need to ameliorate years of deficit spending, will make arms sales attractive to the West. While East and West redefine their foreign policy, Third World arms dealers will increase their share of the market. Yet this is just the tip of the iceberg because the "grey" arms dealers, not affiliated with any country, are doing an increasing business which goes undocumented. The Persian Gulf War has demonstrated the lethality of Third World conflicts and has whetted many
countries' appetite for advanced weapons. "The Third World is arming well and quickly".\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{SOF Policy:}

This new and challenging world requires new approaches. Russell Weigley noted, "clearly, in the late twentieth century that United States can no longer rely on superior economic and manpower resources to overwhelm military adversaries."\textsuperscript{13} He went on to state that the U.S. should consider different approaches toward achieving our goals such as the guerrilla war strategy developed by Major General Nathanael Greene during our Revolutionary War or other "indirect approach" strategies adopted by other military leaders and advocated by Sir Basil Liddell Hart.\textsuperscript{14}

The President has advocated such an "indirect approach" policy called Peacetime Engagement. Peacetime Engagement means that the U.S. government should use all of the instruments of power (political, economic, informational, and military) during peacetime to ensure stability and promote U.S. interests and objectives. He is advocating the type of proactive policy Dr. Henry Kissinger described as not growing out of actions to counter the initiatives of others but one which "is able to assess the forces which move contemporary events and find the means for shaping them in the desired direction."\textsuperscript{15}

Military power is one of the key instruments which will be used in executing the President's policy. Military
power, as Peter Paret observes, can create, maintain, and express political power. The military can extend the reach and influence of a government. The size and relative power of the military force may not be as important as its location, scope of activity, and appropriateness for the given situation. Throughout history, kings and emperors have understood this principle and successfully dispatched a few soldiers with toll collectors or as "agents of the crown" on sensitive missions to extend the reach of their authority.16 As kings and emperors knew, military forces operating abroad could support a nation's policy in that region "more directly and effectively than a force of equal capability kept at home."17 President Bush has stated that forward presence is a critical part of our national strategy, "Yet, even as the total number of U.S. forward-deployed forces is reduced, we will work to preserve a U.S. presence where needed."18

As the projected overseas presence of U.S. conventional forces is reduced, SOF should increase their forward deployed posture, extending the reach of the U.S. government by covering essential areas of the world. SOF should be one of the primary forces of choice to execute the military portion of the President's Peacetime Engagement policy. By its unconventional nature SOF embodies the "indirect approach." Through its capabilities and flexibility SOF can respond to a wide variety of challenges. LTG William Yarborough, Commander of Special Forces in 1961, stated that Special Forces are trained to have a
"flexibility of thinking" which will allow them to react to new situations in the correct manner.\(^{19}\)

SOF possess a wide range of capabilities. Some are linguistically and culturally oriented to certain geographic areas and comprised of individuals proficient in cross-cultural communications and negotiations. Trained to operate in small groups or independently, skilled in unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, psychological operations, nation-building techniques, and equally conversant with both the most sophisticated technology and the most primitive methods of field operations, they offer the National Command Authority (NCA) a useful "tool" to advance U.S. national objectives. Because of these capabilities, skills, and special relationships with conventional and special operation forces of other nations, SOF can gain access and be employed where the use of conventional forces would be expensive, premature, inappropriate, or not feasible. Additionally SOF provides the U.S. with a military option which does "not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of necessarily larger, or more visible, conventional non-SO forces."\(^{20}\)

Although the Special Operations "tool" has been used in the past, the current world situation demands that this economy of force capability be fully integrated into a coherent, interagency approach to achieving our national objectives.\(^{21}\)

Professor Eliot Cohen maintains that
Elite units offer two basic advantages [over other conventional military forces in carrying political signals]. First, they may be inherently valuable as a signal of serious commitment because of their reputation. Secondly, elite units tend to offer governments better chances for success than regular units in performing a sensitive signalling operation.\textsuperscript{22}

Most nations, constrained by dwindling resources and monies, have realized the distinct advantages that elite forces offer and have invested in some kind of SOF capability. These nations have been using and will continue to use their SOF to promote their national political and military goals. For these nations, SOF is becoming a significant tool of foreign policy. The British, since 1962, have oriented some of their special operations force, the Special Air Service (SAS), throughout many parts of the Third World. In Borneo in the 1960's, they provided the intelligence and communications to enhance London's capability to make sound political decisions. Later, because they had lived alone or in pairs among the tribes and learned the local language, they conducted successful counterinsurgency operations in that country. They have conducted other successful and well known operations in Malaya, Kenya, and the Dhofar in Oman. Additionally the SAS has extended the political influence of London through its training of Third World protection services primarily for chiefs of state. From Abu Dhabi to Zambia the SAS has provided body guards for the elites. According to Tony
Geraghty, the historian of the SAS, this activity both created and solved political problems. Although Geraghty does not list or further explain these problems, they could have stemmed from supporting the wrong political faction because of an incomplete assessment of the situation or political pressure from London, being "out of sync" with the political leadership in London, and conducting unilateral operations in contravention of host nation sensitivities. 23

The French have also maintained long term training assistance relationships with the special operation forces of their former colonies. Through these mutual assistance and mutual defense agreements and protection services for chiefs of state in Africa, the Indian Ocean area, and the Pacific basin they have retained considerable influence. The French have the Force d'Action Rapide, parts of the Foreign Legion, and the 11th Shock Parachute Regiment "to carry out low-visibility protection, security assistance, and intervention operations overseas."24 These forces were employed in Chad in 1970, 1983, 1989, in Zaire in 1978, and in New Caledonia in 1988 protecting French interests.

The Germans and the Israelis have also provided special operations assistance and training world wide. Such countries as Kenya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Austria, Colombia, and the Netherlands have availed themselves of this training opportunity.25

The Soviet Spetsnaz and the KGB have been involved in the
internal affairs of several nations from their direct action in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan in 1979 to their indirect action imposing Soviet influence through military and security aid missions to Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{26} The objective was to gain access to ruling or powerful military elites not only for political leverage, but also "to penetrate governments, movements, or parties; spot and recruit local nationals for future Soviet use; and create replicas of Soviet intelligence and security services."\textsuperscript{27} In the past, they were complemented with intelligence and security personnel from several East European countries. Until recently the East Germans have been the chief advisors for the Congo, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, and Libya where they trained bodyguards and intelligence and security services. The East German "STASI" has been withdrawn from all countries leaving only Soviet "advisors." Although the Eastern European countries have disestablished their intelligence services and we may see a much lower level of involvement in the immediate future from the Soviets, the organizations that the KGB, the Spetsnaz, the "STASI" and others have trained and influenced in the Third World will continue to be active and present challenges for the U.S.\textsuperscript{28}

The imprimatur of Soviet special operations thinking is also reflected in the operations of thousands of foreign terrorists trained by the Soviets or their
proxies, since the first special purpose training camp for foreigners was created by Lenin in Tashkent in 1920. Since the Cold War, the KGB and GRU have run a series of schools for foreigners staffed by Spetsnaz personnel ... in Czechoslovakia...Hungary...East Germany...the Soviet Union... There for six months, the Palestinians -- along with activists from Libya, Iraq, South Yemen and Algeria -- are given an arduous course of study....29

Other countries such as India, Egypt, and Pakistan who have modeled their special operations forces after the British, Soviets, and the U.S., will continue to use their forces for political influence inside their own countries as well as with their neighbors. Egypt has done this in the Sudan, India is doing it in Sri Lanka and Sind, and Pakistan is doing the same thing in Kashmir and Punjab.30

Another dimension of the use of SOF is the admixture of mercenary SOF with national SOF in the Third World. In Uganda in February 1986, a military training team provided by the North Korean Government and a group of mercenaries, composed of ex-SAS soldiers, provided by a British security firm, were both training and building Ugandan SOF. Some Ugandans attended both training sessions. Meanwhile, the Ugandans had a long standing training commitment with the British police and had hosted a British/Canadian Army training team. In 1982 the ex-President of Uganda, Binaisa, supported by U.S. business men, attempted to
hire 500 mercenaries from Raymond Ingram's Security Agency in Britain to overthrow Obote. The enterprise never "got off the ground." In Surinam from 1986-87, British mercenaries composed of ex-SAS and French Foreign Legionnaires conducted combat operations. Several countries, including the Congo and Yemen, have recruited ex-SAS members to form their own special operations forces. In Sri Lanka President Jimmy Mancham hired ex-SAS mercenaries to attack the Tamil rebels. In 1990 and 1991, British and Israeli "contractors" provided training to paramilitary organizations associated with the Colombian drug cartels. Anthony Mockler, who has studied mercenaries for twenty years, believes that "the mercenary world is permanently awash with activity."31

**SOF Operational Concept:**

U.S. SOF must be engaged in peacetime to ensure that the U.S. can compete successfully for political influence. SOF should be deployed today in or near those countries that the National Command Authority, through the national security policy process, has identified as within our interest. There, they should become familiar with the local situation and how it relates to U.S. national objectives while establishing contacts with selected foreign personnel and providing intelligence and advice through appropriate channels to U.S. policy makers. By the use of their developmental and assistance skills they can work to help stabilize the situation and deter aggression as part
of a coordinated interagency and/or multinational effort. If the situation deteriorates into conflict, SOF should be already forward deployed to support the political, economic, and informational aspects of national power in controlling or containing the crisis. Their cost effectiveness and low visibility allows policy makers to use them in delicate political situations and withdrawn them quietly at any time. They can support the escalation of the U.S. involvement by preparing the operational area and supporting the introduction and employment of conventional military forces. Upon the termination of conventional military operations, SOF can stabilize the situation and assist the foreign nation in meeting its civil responsibilities toward its citizens.

This operational concept is cyclical and complements the operational continuum. *JCS Publication 3-00* postulates that the contemporary strategic environment has created an operational continuum consisting of three states or conditions. Those states are: Peacetime Competition, Conflict, and War. Peacetime Competition includes all military measures short of combat operations or active support of such operations. Conflict is a politico-military struggle short of conventional armed action between organized parties. War is sustained armed conflict between nations or organized parties within nations.32

Figure one illustrates how this cyclic concept of SOF employment meshes with the operational continuum. SOF conducts the majority of its work during peacetime competition with the
SOF FOCUS IS AT THE TOP OF THE FIGURE
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT THE
SITUATION FROM REACHING THE BOTTOM

FIGURE 1
objective to prevent the situation from deteriorating from peace
to conflict and war. The six functions SOF performs in this
operational cycle are to: Deter, Detect, Control, Contain,
Support, and Stabilize. Some of these functions can occur
concurrently.

DETER: Under select circumstances, primarily in Central and
Eastern Europe, SOF can deter Soviet and other countries'
aggression by the threat of supporting national resistance
movements. In other areas of the world affected by Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC), deterrence takes on a different
meaning. SOF's deterrent comes from being actively engaged
rather than as a force in being.

DETECT: SOF should be engaged in selected foreign countries
developing relationships with the host nations special
units, military, civil government, and the population,
obtaining an appreciation for the local situation and thus
complementing the national intelligence effort. By being so
engaged, they will be in a position to detect potential
instability and provide a basis for policy development.

CONTROL: The rapport with and knowledge of host nation
individuals and situations SOF have developed places them in
a unique position to use their special capabilities in
insurgent support, counterinsurgency, terrorism
counteraction, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and
psychological operations to control instability or support selected insurgencies precluding the need for further military involvement. SOF, as a cost effective, economy-of-force measure in important areas of the world, is an essential part of the new, leaner military force structure.

CONTAIN: If the situation is such that it cannot be controlled by SOF, then SOF can help to contain it until the NCA analyzes and develops course of action. While containing the situation they are forward deployed to prepare the area of operations to support the introduction of conventional military forces.

SUPPORT: If the NCA decides to commit conventional military forces, then SOF can support the introduction of those forces. SOF can "prepare the operational area" by providing intelligence, destroying critical target systems, providing liaison and coordination with the host nation, receiving combat forces by establishing landing and drop zones, and providing security and intelligence. During combat operations SOF provide a range of capabilities from special reconnaissance and direct action against key targets to unconventional warfare and counterterrorist activities to liaison with and training of the host nation's coalition forces to PSYOP and CA.
STABILIZE: Following conventional military operations, SOF can use their foreign internal defense skills to assist the interagency effort in stabilizing the country. Now SOF can work its way toward the top end of the cycle again (Figure 1) and begin the detection and deterrence function.

The following two sections discuss how the above cyclic operational concept can be applied to Europe and the Third World.

EUROPE

The Challenge:

The dissolution of the Soviet Empire and the rise of nationalism gives the West a unique opportunity to reshape European security policy. Robert Hunter, head of European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has recommended four key objectives for the U.S. to pursue in Eastern Europe:

--Help demonstrate that democracy can succeed.
--Reduce opportunities for a reintroduction of Soviet political or military power.
--Help erode the causes of internal and regional turmoil.
--Create a broad base of Western states involved in the development of the region.33

In meeting these objectives, SOF can pay a key role. SOF
can deter Soviet and other countries' adventurism by assisting, through training and support, the countries of Eastern Europe in developing a total defense posture built around a combination of conventional and resistance forces. Additionally, they can developing the democratic responsibilities of the East European militaries and assist them in controlling instability. This section will examine the threat to the stability of Europe, the deterrence potential of a defense strategy based on guerrilla warfare/resistance, and the integration of nation building techniques into a general policy of developing Eastern Europe into democratic societies while helping to erode the causes of internal and regional instability.

The Threat:

There are two threats to peace and stability in Europe, the continuing capability of the Soviet military and the inter and intra national instability which has surfaced because of the restructuring policy of the USSR.

The Soviets:

Lord Carrington, when he was the Secretary General of NATO in 1988, stated, "I don't think there's a threat in the sense that we're going to get an invasion by the Soviet Union. But what I do think is that the military potential is still there and we have to be prudent."\(^\text{34}\)

There are many ambiguities and uncertainties about the future course of the Soviet defense establishment.\(^\text{35}\) Although the Soviets are reducing their conventional forces, they will
still retain the largest and one of the most capable military organizations in the world. Older equipment is being withdrawn from the Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe and Western USSR but, rather than being destroyed, it is being stockpiled east of the Urals outside of the geographic areas specified by the conventional force reduction treaty.\textsuperscript{36} Soviet Flogger aircraft have been removed from the central front and redeployed to the Kola peninsula in the northern area. The Soviet North Sea Fleet is not being reduced but the ships are being replaced on a one for one basis by modern ones.\textsuperscript{37} The Soviets continue to modernize. For example, they have fielded new T-80 and T-72M1, M1986 tanks and the Bear H and Blackjack bombers with long range cruise missile. Soviet naval aviation is now a "growth industry". The strategic nuclear forces are being updated while research and development continues to have a high priority at the expense of the civilian economic sector.\textsuperscript{38}

The Soviet military continues to conduct offensive training and exercises while maintaining that their force is purely defensive. General Yazov stated in 1989 that defense was the main form of military operations and that the military doctrine has been brought into line with political doctrine.\textsuperscript{39} In fact, on the political level the Soviets have been advocating a defensive doctrine since 1948. They have been stating that their military doctrine is defensive since 1977. In spite of these statements, Soviet military doctrine has been developed around and has always emphasized the concept of the offensive. Although the focus
appears to have shifted, offensive doctrine is deeply ingrained. Offensive and defense operations are complementary and inseparable.⁴⁰

Senior Soviet leaders insist that in this era of uncertainty, the military danger to the Soviet Union may in fact be growing instead of decreasing.

In fact, while the June (90) summit was meeting, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov reaffirmed the Russian intent to maintain military readiness despite reduced East-West tensions.⁴¹

William Odom believes that reducing the size of the Soviet military will threaten the internal stability of the USSR.⁴² Several Soviet leaders also recognize this problem. KGB Chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov, stated before the 28th Party Congress, July 1990, that the "danger of war continues to be a real one...we should have no illusions."⁴³ This fear increases the likelihood that the reactionary elements will once again use the military offensively to control rebellious republics and former allied states as they have in Lithuania in January 1991.⁴⁴

Based on the results of the 28th Soviet Party Congress the Soviets have abandoned neither Marx-Leninism nor the export of their revolutionary ideology. Gorbachev has written and stated that the goal of perestroika is restoring Leninism, strengthening socialism, and restoring real Soviet power.⁴⁵
To insure victory in the ongoing conflict with the West, the Soviets have developed an overwhelming military structure at the expense of the political, economic, and other aspects of national power. Recently, however, the economic and scientific-technical gap between the USSR and the West has been rapidly widening. Shevardnadze stated at the party congress that military parity with the West has been reached only "by throwing the country into poverty." The future of the USSR was in jeopardy and Gorbachev had to apply corrective action known as perestroika.

He took the political initiative to deemphasize both the class struggle and the risk of war to reduce the current military spending and redirect resources toward domestic "economic rejuvenation and technological innovation." The Soviet leadership hopes that by having a smaller military they can force the West to reduce their respective militaries so that the correlation of forces will still be in the Soviet's favor. Thus, the Soviets plan to come out of perestroika saving their economy and possessing a sizable and capable military ready to ensure victory in the inevitable conflict with the capitalist West.

However, it is problematic whether Gorbachev's reforms will succeed or throw the nation into a civil war. In the midst of this uncertainty it can not be discounted that the USSR might relapse into old patterns of behavior. Ambassador David Abshire, President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
predicts that if the current Soviet government fails, the country may move to the right and become reactionary. Recent evidence gives credence to this prediction: the resignation of Shevardnadze, the appointment of Boris Pugo, the Latvian KGB chief, as Interior Minister, the statements by KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov that the KGB will wage battle with all means available against anti-communist forces, the joint military and police patrols of all major Soviet cities, the KGB inspection of all domestic and foreign businesses, and the intervention of elite Soviet military forces in the Baltic under the same rationale used in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1978. Although the Soviets are withdrawing from Eastern Europe and have signed the mutual nonaggression pledge, that does not mean there will never be a situation which will force them to return despite their rhetoric. Eastern Europe has been historically significant to Russia. Their presence there "has surged and ebbed repeatedly over the past few centuries" in response to both real and perceived threats.

The other possibility is that the USSR could dissolve and the resulting anarchy could spill over into Eastern and Western Europe with disaffected military units and nationalistic groups attempting to settle old scores and obtain previously claimed territory from neighboring countries. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "The most dangerous time for a bad government is when it starts to reform itself."

The other major threat is that of inter and intra country
upheaval in Eastern Europe. No longer contained by USSR
hegemony, most of these countries ethnocentric and nationalistic
disputes, fueled by ancient rivalries, animosities, and racism,
have burst out spawning insurgent and terrorist acts. Zbigniew
Brzezinski writes that Nationalism is the "central reality of the
once seemingly homogeneous Soviet world." Some examples are:
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are feuding over Macedonia; Hungary and
Yugoslavia over northern Serbia which contains many Hungarians;
Hungary and Romania over Transylvania; Romania, Bessarabia,
Moldavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania,
Byelorussia, and the Ukraine over their borders. Yugoslavia is
in danger of unraveling, and everyone fears the newly united
Germany. As a result, ethnic groups are migrating across
Eastern Europe to escape persecution and Poland has deployed
troops to its eastern border to defend against the ethnic
instability inside the USSR. The cry has gone out from East
European leaders for some European security organization to
provide stability.

Deterrence:

The world community needs some insurance against the
unstable situation in Eastern Europe and inside the USSR as well
as the possible reemergence of the USSR. The classic policy of
deterrence which has been practiced for over forty five years is
no longer sufficient.

The current NATO security policy is based on deterring a
Soviet threat through nuclear weapons; however, the face of deterrence must changed. Michael Howard believes that nuclear deterrence has traditionally focused on the technological dimensions and neglected the sociopolitical and operational. Deterrence has been defined as "the ability ... to make an opponent refrain from what he might otherwise want to do". Thomas Schelling looks at the issue broadly and identifies "dynamic deterrence" as progressive realization by an aggressor that resistance to his encroachment can make the cost too high. For deterrence to succeed, "the enemy has to be persuaded that the deterrence has the capacity to act; that in acting he could inflict costs greater than the advantages to be won from attaining the objective, and that he really would act as specified in the stated contingency".

The new deterrence in Europe, in addition to its nuclear component, lies in the potential of the Eastern European peoples to mount a credible civilian resistance in concert with a conventional defense against a Soviet invasion or, for that matter, any external aggression. Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Albania, and Austria have followed some type of "total resistance" defense policy for years. A "total resistance" defense policy exposes any attacker to the ubiquitous and unceasing hostility of an entire country. It would mean the involvement of all the citizens in a combined small professional active force, a much larger militia force, and civilian resistance organizations, conducting military combat.
(conventional and guerrilla) in depth in countryside and population centers along with violent, nonviolent, and persistent resistance. An aggressor could invade these countries, but trying to move through and occupy them would be like trying to swallow a porcupine. The aggressor would fail to meet any of his political or economic objectives.

"Total resistance" of the Eastern European peoples could break up the continuity of any Soviet or other nation's advance, slow and canalize their forces, and leave them vulnerable for long-range interdiction. This type of defense could negate the advantages of the Soviet set piece attack and make them vulnerable to the maneuver operations of Western forces as demonstrated in operation DESERT STORM against Iraq. Additionally, resistance forces, supported by SOF, could provide timely intelligence to aid the Western commanders in making critical decisions. In short, this type of defense can complement the West's war fighting doctrine.

A high Swiss government official stated that their defense structure, "serves the prevention of war by demonstrating to the aggressor that he can achieve his war aims only under disproportionately high losses... that he would have to reckon with the bitter resistance of army and people so that even victory would be very costly for him." U.S. SOF can assist these nations in realizing this potential by training them in peacetime and supporting them in war.
Soviet View of Resistance

The threat of resistance forces in Eastern Europe supported by SOF poses a credible deterrent for either the Soviets or other aggressors especially after the use of SOF during DESERT STORM. The Soviets have a healthy respect for resistance movements and/or guerrilla/partisan war and have made unconventional warfare a basic part of their policy.62 "Guerrilla fighting has a long tradition in Russia, and many of the old folk songs tell of partisan heroism in other generations and centuries."63

Not only have the Soviets used resistance/guerrilla warfare to forward their own interests, but they have also fought numerous such movements inside the Soviet Union and its satellites. Guerrilla resistance to Napoleon and Hitler is part of their national tradition. After the Bolshevik revolution, Bolshevik guerrilla forces successfully defended the revolution against the "White Army" of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia and against the German, Austro-Hungarian occupation of the Ukraine in 1918. In the 1920's and the 1930's the Bolsheviks had to suppress numerous nationalistic resistance movements in Siberia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkistan, and Georgia to insure their survival. 64

From 1936 to 1939, Spain served as testing ground where the lessons of guerrilla warfare were learned and later applied in WWII.65 The exploits of the partisan warriors of the Great Patriotic War, World War II, are officially revered in the USSR. After the Germans departed, popular resistance to Moscow mounted
in the areas of previous German occupation. It took the Soviets over twelve years after the war to suppress these resistance movements, especially in the Ukraine and Lithuania. In the 1950's, the 1960's, and the 1980's they suppressed resistance movements in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In the 1990's as in the 1920's they are faced with controlling the same nationalistic movements in the same parts of their own country. The memory of their defeat in Afghanistan by a U.S. supported guerrilla force is still fresh. Based on this history, the Soviets

...would likely be very cautious about any proposal to invade and occupy countries with populations highly motivated, well prepared, and carefully trained to defend their societies, defeat attackers, and subvert occupation troops and functionaries. The spirit and knowledge of this type of resistance could well spread to other countries under Soviet rule or hegemony and to the peoples and troops of the USSR. The Soviet Union's political and economic difficulties, and the linguistic, ethnic and nationality diversity of its population provide potentially fertile grounds for the spread of this type action.

The Soviets cannot risk the long war that Eastern European guerrilla resistance would insure. The Soviets have always planned for a short decisive war in Europe because of
their fear of internal revolt and economic defeat. A long war would stir up the uncontrollable nationalistic forces of internal dissolution causing the fracturing of Soviet society. In a long war the West could mass the economic power of many states such as Japan against the Soviets.\textsuperscript{68}

Additionally, the Soviets know that the West is not as vulnerable to similar internal dissolution. There is no significant body of citizenry hostile to Western governments which the Soviet SOF (Spetsnaz or KGB) could exploit. Therefore, the concept of a defense policy based on resistance forces is a "competitive strategy" because it pits a Western strength, democratic governments supported by the populace, against a Soviet weakness, totalitarian governments characterized by popular suppression.

Given all these concerns, Rod Paschall believes that "Moscow's fear of armed, internal revolt may be as high or higher than its fear of nuclear war."\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{Advantages for Eastern Europe:}

For Eastern Europe, "total resistance" has several advantages. It can help to erode the causes of internal and regional turmoil, is non-offensive, inexpensive, enhanced by new technology, and supported by local traditions.

This defense structure will not have the capability for sustained offensive action. This policy will help allay the fears and suspicion that these countries will seek to gain
territories from their neighbors by use of force. Any country with a reduced offensive capability would be facing the total resistance of their neighbor supported by a pan-European organization if they contemplated military action to obtain national objectives. Because critical terrain such as the Carpathian mountains crosses national boundaries, planning for this defense will require cooperation by neighboring countries. Negotiation rather than force of arms should become their international tools.

This type of defense is cost effective. Yugoslavia reevaluated its defense policy after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They decided that they could never afford a strong enough conventional mechanized force to prevent a similar circumstance from occurring in their country. Therefore, they decreased the size of their conventional force and emphasized resistance warfare based on the militia concept. This proved cost effective and was supported by the history and traditions of their people. Eastern Europe could realize similar economic savings.70

New technology gives resistance forces advantages they have never had before. FAX machines, cellular phones, hand held anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons give teeth to local defense forces. The Afghani guerrillas’ use of the Stinger anti-aircraft weapon against the Soviets proved decisive.71

Eastern Europe has a credible tradition of popular resistance which can form the basis for the new defense concept.
Poland's tradition can be traced back to the 1794 Galician revolution against the Russians proclaimed by Kosciuszko who had been influence by his service in the American Revolution. Poles participated in resistance the movements of 1830, 1848, 1871, and WWII. After the WWII, protests, strikes and resistance again surfaced in 1953, 1956, 1968, 1970-71, 1976, and Solidarity's struggles after December 1981 which have led to the current situation.\textsuperscript{72}

In 1711, Hungarian nationalistic forces revolted against the Austrian monarchy. In 1830, Lajos Kossuth called for a revolution of the people against the Hapsburg rulers. The Hungarians were involved in the revolutions of 1848 but were suppressed by the Russians. From 1850 until 1867 there was intermittent resistance. During 1956-57 the Hungarians conducted open resistance against Soviet hegemony.\textsuperscript{73}

Czech and Slovak resistance has a long history, starting in 1526 against the Hapsburg rule. In 1619 the Bohemian states' revolt was the opening act of the Thirty Years War. In 1848, the Czechs, Slovaks and the Hungarian revolts were suppressed with the aid of Russian troops. In World War II the Slovakian partisan forces conducted resistance operations against the Germans in 1944 in the Carpathian Mountains. The "Prague Spring" of 1968, when overwhelming Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces were needed to suppress the Czech resistance is an example of the potential power contained in resistance movements even when they receive no external support.\textsuperscript{74}
Some Eastern European countries are now considering this type of defense policy and have established contacts with the West for assistance and advise. Officials in Hungary and Czechoslovakia have been considering military policies similar to Switzerland and Austria based on a defensive rather than an offensive posture. Additionally, Czechoslovakia has made contact with the U.S. to consider the possibility of training for their special purpose and counterintelligence units.75

Deterrent Policy:

For the "total resistance" policy to work it must be incorporated into a pan-European defense structure. The initial step would be to include "total resistance" as part of the war fighting doctrine of the pan-European nations. Next, either an expanded NATO, Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or some other international body, composed of all the nations of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, should assume the security requirements for all of Europe. The next step would be to develop a strategy based on the principle that any invasion of Eastern Europe by the Soviets or other aggressor would trigger a response from this new security body. Key aspects of this strategy should be the declaration of Eastern Europe as a cordon sanitaire and a nuclear free zone. Previously, both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviets have proposed a 300 kilometer "demilitarized zone" in central Europe. However, unlike their proposal, local conventional and militia/resistance forces would be required to
defend this *cordon sanitaire* using the "total resistance" concept as part of their burden sharing in the new security body. SOF, skilled in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, would be provided to Eastern Europe upon request as a commitment of support by the pan-European organization. This type of defense policy will work if it is supported jointly by the NATO countries and Eastern Europe.

**SOF Role:**

SOF can make a significant contribution by signalling the U.S. commitment to the defense and democratic development of the new Europe. SOF is the force of choice to support the "total resistance" defense policy of Eastern Europe. In fact, U.S. Special Forces were originally established to free Eastern Europe.

On 17 August 1948, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum 1807/1 to the Secretary of Defense supported the position that the U.S. should have a capability to "support foreign resistance movements...to the advantage of the United States national security during peace and war." The JCS formed a committee to examine the issue. In 1949 the committee "identified target areas with a resistance/guerrilla potential. These areas were primarily in eastern Europe..." The importance of partisan war as a key strategy for Europe was discussed in military journals.

This concept supported the overall U.S. and the U.K. policy
toward Eastern Europe. From 1945 thru 1956 the U.S. and U.K.
intelligence services launched several clandestine and covert
operations into Albania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and
the Ukraine to foment internal revolt in an attempt to break
these countries away from the USSR. These operations failed
because they were poorly conceived, infiltrated by Soviet agents,
and betrayed by Kim Philby, the liaison for British intelligence
with the CIA.81

This policy coupled with the intellectual activity in the
military led to the establishment in 1952 of the 10th Special
Forces Group (SFG).

Its highly secret mission was to exploit the resistance
potential behind the Iron Curtain in the event of the
expected Russian invasion of western Europe. Should war
break out, it was visualized that clandestine contact would
be established with resistance groups. Upon their
agreement, small teams of Special Forces would be
infiltrated...to join them, help them organize and train,
call for equipment by radio, and try to guide and influence
their activities so as to enhance the overall war effort.82

In 1953, the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), deployed to
Germany in response to the worker's revolt in East Berlin. The
JCS had decided that the Special Forces needed to be deployed
well forward to send a political signal and to insure that they
were in place to exploit further revolts in satellite Soviet
countries. However, after the continued failure of the U.S. and
U.K. clandestine operations, support for such activities waned.
In the 1960's the U.S.'s attention and that of the SOF was
focused increasingly on South East Asia. In 1970, as part of the
REFORGER concept, the world wide reduction of Special Forces in
the wake of the Viet Nam War, and the belief that future conflict
in Europe would be short (i.e. 10 days therefore eliminating the
need for partisan operations), all but one Battalion of the 10th
SFG was withdrawn from Europe negating much of the political
signal. But the situation in Europe has changed. It is now time
to return those forces to Europe to send an unambiguous signal to
the Soviets and Eastern Europe in support of a new European
security policy. 83

Nation Building:

The second area where SOF can contribute is nation
building. While being in Europe to assist the East Europeans to
develop their resistance and guerrilla warfare capabilities they
can concurrently act as part of a nation building force.

Until the Iron Curtain was rent and the USSR removed its
support structure, the West had no appreciation of the
backwardness of the area's economy and society which, in some
aspects, approaches that of some Third World nations. For
example: the Philippines, Mexico, and Columbia have better
statistics for infant mortality than Albania; Yugoslavia's
inflation rate has increased to 2,700% comparable to Peru's 2,775%; and Poland and Romania's economic decline is in the same category with Bolivia, Burma, Argentina, and most of Africa.84

It is in our national interest to support these nations. President Bush, in the National Security Strategy declared:

The United States and it allies are dedicated to overcoming the division of Europe. All the countries of Eastern Europe are entitled to become part of the worldwide commonwealth of free nations as, one by one, they reclaim the European cultural and political tradition that is their heritage. Overcoming this division depends on their achievement of self-determination and independence.... The United States intends to play a role in fostering Eastern Europe's economic development, supporting its democratic institutions, and insuring the overall structure of stability.85

Robert Hunter believes that the West needs to make efforts in the public and private sector to help erode the causes of internal and regional turmoil and help reduce the opportunities for a reintroduction of Soviet political or military power. This can be accomplished by helping "train workers and managers, develop[ing] the underpinnings of democratic politics and market economics, creat[ing] new legal systems, moderniz[ing] infrastructure, [and providing] incentives for private
industry."\textsuperscript{86}

To realize these objectives some suggest that the U.S. should support a multinational reconstruction program, such as a new Marshall Plan, which would include a military developmental portion. Because Eastern Europe's problems have some similarity with those in the Third World, the U.S. should consider adapting the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine to the European situation. The joint military LIC doctrine states that, "The United States recognizes the legitimacy of popular unrest and may be supportive of it in instances where its goal is self-determination or democracy."\textsuperscript{87} It is also a U.S. national goal to help selected nations defend against internal and external threats by the integrated application of all instruments of national power, (the political, economic, informational, and military). Long-term political and economic development will reduce the underlying causes of instability.

Among [the] tools [at the disposal of the government are] moral and political example, military strength, economic incentives, alliance relationships, public diplomacy, security assistance, development assistance, science and technology cooperation, international organizations, provision of information, and diplomatic mediation.\textsuperscript{88}

This development program must target the military and security establishments of the East European countries. These
militaries must utilize their "energy, discipline, training and technical capability...for purposes other than illegal intervention in politics." In 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Prime Minister of Poland, established martial law and used the military to prevent the collapse of civic society to prevent the Soviets from applying an external solution. Although he had little choice, this political use of the military tore Polish society apart and tarnished the image of that institution. Now the Polish government is trying to reform the military so that it will be accountable to the nation, the people, and society. On 17 October 1990, General Miroslav Vacek, Minister of Defense for Czechoslovakia, was dismissed for preparing the army to intervene in the political process of the country in November 1989. A commission investigating the activities of the army concluded that Vacek, as chief of the general staff, planned an army takeover of the television and radio stations, coordinated support with the secret police, and alerted the Second Tank Regiment to deploy to Prague if needed. On 22 October, the new Defense Minister, Lubos Dobrovsky, called on all soldiers and civilians working for the military to "try to ensure that the Czechoslovakian Armed Forces... become a stabilizing factor in the development of our society." The Defense Minister of Bulgaria, on 14 November 1990, stated, "The people look to the Army as a guarantor for a peaceful transition to democracy." As all of the Eastern European countries restructure their militaries, the U.S, because of its long democratic
military tradition, is in the best position to initiate programs to help these militaries become responsible members of popularly supported governments. The U.S. should propose the concept of establishing a multinational Special Action Force (SAF) under international control to conduct this training and development. The SAF could be organized under the auspices of the Center for Prevention of Conflict which has been proposed by the thirty five nation Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Thomas-Durell Young and Colonel Karl Lowe of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College have proposed such an organization but oriented on disaster relief and environmental cleanup.

Special Action Force:

In 1962, the Department of the Army established Special Action Forces (SAF)

...to cure the substantial ills of ad hoc organization of mobile training teams. It provided by unity of command a method to ensure standardization and interoperability of our training efforts throughout the particular region; quick access to skilled, multi-disciplinary personnel in an environment that demands the ability to operate quickly; enhanced continuity of effort; personal and unit identification with the success of the mission at hand; and increased opportunities to develop rapport and personal
relationships with host nation counterparts through recurrent contact with SAF personnel.93

They were integrated organizations formed around the core of a Special Forces Group which consisted of the following units: Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Medical, Military Police, Signal, Electronic Warfare, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Engineers, and other augmented units such as aviation maintenance, to complement the U.S. government’s developmental programs. SOF formed the core of the SAF because of their area orientation, organizational flexibility, instructional skills, extensive experience with and knowledge of instability (i.e. terrorism, insurgency, and drug trafficking), prior connections with the host nation, and proven capability to work with host nations’ conventional and elite militaries.94

There were four SAFs each oriented toward four major areas: Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. Their assistance mission was coordinated with the embassy to complement the interagency development programs. 95

The SAF mission was military civic action, which is

...the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social
development which would serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.96

SAFs operated in South America, Africa, the Pacific region and the Middle East until 1970 when they were dissolved in the aftermath of the Viet Nam War. Disenchanted with the policy over Viet Nam, Congress withdrew from the consensus on the usefulness of military civic action. Assistance programs were cut, the size of the U.S. diplomatic missions was reduced, and the SAFs were eliminated. "Foreign aid was no longer to be linked to American strategic and political objectives."97 Broad scale approaches were abandoned and replaced with modest amounts of money for the "hunger and hurts" of the poorest. Under the philosophy that if a country was threatened by instability the U.S. should minimize the risk to Americans by removing them from that country, essential support was eliminated at the very time that the foreign nation needed it the most.98

After JUST CAUSE in Panama, a joint task force was formed under operation PROMOTE LIBERTY to assist the new Panamanian government in rebuilding their country. After DESERT STORM/SABER, task force FREEDOM and the KUWAIT TASK FORCE were formed to attend to the short and long term recovery of Kuwait. These task forces contain most of the pieces of a SAF and for all intents and purposes are SAFs.99 The success of these task forces indicates that it is time to reconsider forming standing SAFs.
The SAF concept of the 1960’s should be revitalized but in a multinational context. It succeeded in many areas of the world, especially Latin America, and was inexpensive. However, the new SAF should be a combined organization operating under the auspices of some regional organization such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or CSCE. The emphasis should be on the indigenous people performing the developmental effort assisted by the U.S. thus keeping the U.S. profile low. The regional SAF might be headed by a foreign national. This will allow the U.S. to maintain and nurture contact with key countries while placing assistance operations in a multinational context of regional security and development.

In Europe it should be oriented on assisting the military and state security apparatus in Eastern Europe. Its purpose would be to mobilize those security organizations to work for the good of the people, to teach them positive methods for dealing with the instability of drug trafficking, terrorism, and insurgency while assisting them in developing into organizations which can support popular governments and pluralistic political systems. It can open up dialogues and moderate the views of both the military and civilians. The separation of the military and civilians in many countries has been a source of problems. Gabriel Marcella writes that in Latin America this lack of "dialogue weakens the militaries' claim to the legitimacy of their professional mission within a democracy. It also seriously diminishes civilian understanding of the legitimate concerns of
A SAF can expand feedback mechanisms between the military and civilians. It can also develop healthy military self-criticism to use lessons learned as a guide for future U.S. and host nation doctrine. Strengthened civil military cooperation will be vital to further development and security.102

A SAF concept can strengthen Eastern Europe’s ties to the West and help unify the continent. It engages the West in a positive project and supports the objective of a new international order. It exposes the East to the ideas and examples of democracy and free government. And finally, it allows the West to understand up close the plight of the East. The knowledge gained by such a venture can be used to forge political, social, cultural, and economic bonds.

THIRD WORLD

General Situation:

As previously discussed, much of the Third World is in upheaval and transition. Although a surprising number of countries have turned from totalitarian and/or communist rule towards popularly elected, multi-party government, these governments are not yet stable. This movement toward multi-party
In spite of these new governments, the Third World will continue to exhibit all the indicators of instability; unchecked population growth, land misuse, urbanization, drug trafficking, water shortages, hunger, disenfranchised members of society, poverty, disease (AIDS for Africa), defaulting economies, arms races, and religious and nationalistic extremism.

**Soviets in the Third World:**

The Soviet involvement in the Third World has changed. From 1967 to 1978 the Soviets appeared to succeed in their Third World programs. However, from 1978 until the present those programs proved to be chimeras. They drained resources and failed to produce the influence the Soviets were seeking.

Therefore, disillusioned by their past policy and driven by the need to solve their internal economic crisis, the Soviets were forced to alter their approach to foreign policy. They appear to be applying a cost benefit analysis to the Third World and using political, informational, and diplomatic power rather than military power to advance their influence. The Soviet Third World objective is to eliminate U.S. influence at minimum economic and military cost and maximum return to themselves. Vernon Aspaturian believes that this is a fundamental new approach to world affairs while William Griffith feels that the Soviets are only pausing to gather strength for a major expansion of power without a major risk. In any case, this new approach
"in no way presupposes lessened Soviet determination to play a global role [nor] ... a diminution of the Soviet version of arrogance of power. 105

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney believes that:

The USSR now appears to believe that it needs to court potentially important states regardless of their ideology or the sentiments of traditional friends. The primary Soviet objective in regional affairs appears to be to strengthen and broaden links with emerging powers, and to identify potential areas of cooperation with the United States. At the same time, Moscow is likely to continue striving to increase its power and influence at the expense of the West—through diplomacy, economic and military aid, and limited support of movements hostile to Western interests. 106

To that end the USSR is looking toward Mexico, India, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and others. When conditions are propitious, they continue to assist selected Third World countries such as Cuba, Viet Nam, North Korea, and Cambodia, states with terrorist connections such as Libya, Iraq and Syria, organizations with terrorist agendas such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the African National Conference (ANC) (who now claim no terrorist connections), and the Southwest African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), and encourage insurgents in Chile, Paraguay, El Salvador, South Africa, New Caledonia, and possibly
The USSR has stated that they will support national liberation movements but not terrorist organizations. They say that they will not support the export of revolution but will counter the West's export of "counter revolution."

They appear to be increasing their support for the KGB and Spetsnez and for "Active Measures", which is disinformation and covert support for new political fronts and anti-Western movements aimed at limiting U.S. presence in the Third World. According to W. Douglas Gow, intelligence chief for the FBI, the KGB is increasing its recruiting and increasingly targeting Western economic and scientific secrets. Mark Katz believes,

It would be ironic indeed if Gorbachev succeeds in reducing the U.S. military presence in the Third World by making a virtue of the decreased Soviet military presence that he considers necessary for other reasons. It is possible that by de-emphasizing positive military goals and pursuing negative ones more assiduously, Gorbachev's military policy toward the Third World may threaten U.S. interests more than Brezhnev's ham-fisted policy, which pursued positive and negative objectives simultaneously.

U.S. Approach:

Now, as in no time in the past forty-five years, the U.S. has an opportunity to project its influence. The "emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and in the Third World are the
symbols of victory of the American post-war strategy. In places such as Latin America, the Left is "at sea" with the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. Communism has lost its appeal especially with the defeat of the Sandinista Front in 1990 by its own people. Marxism held out the offer of a different future and superior progress but it has proved itself incapable, under pressure, of providing either. According to the editors of the *Journal of Democracy*, "Marxism-Leninism and the various brands of authoritarianism that have dominated the Third World have proven themselves incapable both of securing popular legitimacy and of achieving satisfactory economic progress." It is time to eliminate the U.S. reactionary strategy and forge a proactive strategy.

In his *National Security Strategy*, President Bush outlined a proactive strategy.

[In order to obtain a] stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.

We seek to:...

- support aid, trade, and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress;
- promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions, as the surest guarantee of both human rights and economic and social progress; and
- aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from
aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, 
and illicit drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{112}

Richard Armatige best stated the issue in \textit{Strategic Review} in 
writing about the Pacific region:

At the very moment of triumph, some suggest that retreat is 
the only course open to us, or that having accomplished some 
good in the region there is little left for the U.S. to do. The 
indisputable fact is that the \textit{United States is the only 
remaining superpower in the world}. This nation exercises 
significant influence in every corner of the globe. Nothing 
of great moment can take place anywhere without its 
involvement. Of no other nation can this be said. The 
prestige, power, relative wealth and influence of the 
United States are unsurpassed. Now is the exact time to 
translate that unique position into meaningful policy. The 
United States must firmly grasp the reins of leadership in 
the international political arena, keep markets free from 
stifling protectionism, remain militarily engaged with 
sufficient strength, mobility, and flexibility to act the 
honest broker, and help maintain the emerging democratic 
world order we have done so much to create. \textsuperscript{113}

This proactive strategy has had a long tradition in the 
U.S. James Robertson wrote that the history of the U.S. is one
of "the struggle, physically and geographically as well as morally and ideally, to spread freedom across the continent and throughout the world." This manifested itself again and again in President Adams and Jefferson's support of the French Revolution, James Monroe's support of various revolutions in 1821, the general sympathy with the revolutions of 1830, 1848, and 1870, Wilson's Fourteen Points, the "Crusade in Europe" in WWII, Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms [Want, Fear, Religion, and Speech], Truman's Point Four Program, Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, Reagan's support of the Contra and the Afghanistan Freedom Fighters, up to and including Bush's "Enterprise for the Americas" initiative in Latin America and his national strategy objectives.¹¹⁴

One of the principal methods for bringing the American revolutionary example of democracy to the world is the concept of foreign assistance and security assistance. Truman, in 1949, inaugurated his support for the Third World by stating:

Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples in the world to triumphant action, not only against human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies—hunger, misery, and despair...¹¹⁵

That a government, through foreign aid, could "enable other peoples to make the most of their land and resources" was an American innovation according to Daniel Boorstin. America
could "save the world for democracy by the purposeful sharing of American know-how, American education, American resources, and American dollars..."\textsuperscript{116}

The establishment of Special Forces in the 1950's to free the oppressed peoples of Europe and later to carry the message of freedom, under the auspices of military assistance missions to Third World nations engaged in countering insurgencies, fits squarely within this traditional American message, a revolutionary organization to spread a revolutionary message. SOF has been trained to do more than just pass on military and nation building techniques. They represent U.S. society and present an example of a democratic military while sharing with others U.S. political concepts and way of life.\textsuperscript{117}

**SOF Roles:**

SOF can advance U.S. national interests and spread the American message in the Third World by being engaged during peacetime. Early introduction and early action by SOF, deterring, detecting, stabilizing, and controlling instability will nurture an environment in which emerging democracies can develop.

**Deterring:**

Unlike deterrence in Europe where the presence of military force and the threat to use that force deters the Soviets, in the Third World military force must be engaged to deter aggression. The existence of a fully capable Special Forces Group ready to
support either an insurgency or a counterinsurgency has not prevented either. The recent establishment of the 1st and 3rd Special Forces Groups did not affect the insurgencies in the Pacific or Africa. Likewise the existence of a credible counter terrorist unit has not prevented terrorist incidents.

Several "think tanks" such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Rand Corporation, and Defense Systems Incorporated have considered this issue and concluded that the existence of forces oriented on or stationed in the Third World does not deter either terrorism or insurgency. Research indicates that the mere use of force to react to an event like a terrorist incident also has little deterrent value. Israeli retaliatory raids against Arab guerrilla bases in the 1950's stimulated more fedayeen raids. The Israeli assassination in 1988 of Khalil al-Wazir, the master mind of Palestinian terrorism, did not stop the Palestinian activities. Instead, the Combatting Terrorism Panel at the Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded that "It is the effective use of these forces that inhibits [terrorist] incidents." The 1986 air raid on Colonel Qadhafi did not stop him from supporting international terrorism, but the international diplomatic pressure in concert with preemptive raids on local terrorists by the paramilitary forces of Turkey, France, Italy, Britain, and Spain which resulted from the U.S. action forced him to alter his proactive Europe-wide terrorism offensive.

Actions must be taken to deprive the terrorist of the
intelligence which is the key to his success. His organization must be infiltrated and divided. His supporters must be coopted and his nerve broken. This type of action can only be taken through international cooperation on the diplomatic, political, legal, military, technological, economic, and informational levels. SOF can play a part, but deterrence of terrorism is broader. Assets in action rather than in being are the key.\textsuperscript{122}

The international community took preemptive action against terrorists supporting Iraq during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Western intelligence, police, and counter-terrorist organizations cooperated with each other as never before to defeat terrorist attempts. Countries such as Greece, which had been reticent in the past, were integrated into the effort. This preemptive action disrupted several operations. Suspected terrorists were deported, jailed, interrogated, and carefully monitored.\textsuperscript{123}

In countering or supporting insurgencies early action is the most effective. By having SOF on the ground early, they can determine the situation and establish links with host nation individuals at all levels to assist in stabilizing the country and contain or control the situation as appropriate.\textsuperscript{124}

\textbf{Detecting:}

SOF is a valuable asset to detect instability and to develop the intelligence basis for further action because they not only possess a detailed knowledge of the area but also have the capability for action. Much of T.E. Lawrence's success can
be attributed to his knowledge of the Middle East and its peoples. This knowledge was obtained well before the war while Lawrence traveled the area over which he would later fight, participating in archeological digs. He travelled on foot as he wrote, "I have perhaps, living as an Arab with the Arabs, got a better insight into the daily life of the people than those who travel with caravan and dragomen." His work in the area as a scholar also benefited the British government which used the information he collected to help form their Mid-Eastern policy. He also participated in several political/military missions before WWI. In 1912-13 he accompanied the Royal Engineers in the Sinai as he wrote, "to give archaeological colour to a political job."  

Like Lawrence, Orde Wingate studied the Middle East, learned Arabic, and in 1927 was posted to the Sudan. He took nothing he had learned on trust but tested everything. For five years he went out of his way to share the life of the average Sudanese. This knowledge proved to be invaluable in his work with the Jews in Palestine and later in conducting a masterful unconventional warfare campaign against the Italians in Ethiopia during WWII.

SOF personnel, like Lawrence and Wingate, can walk the ground, live with the people, and, as the doctrinal manual for SOF states, develop a deep understanding of all aspects of the "environment, the political, economic, sociological, [cultural, religious], psychological, geographic, and military
[situation]... They must identify the friendly and hostile decision makers and ... their objectives and strategies."128 This assessment should form the basis for further action such as disengagement from a country, increased foreign assistance, support for insurgent groups, or U.S. conventional military involvement. In many situations SOF may be the only asset that the National Command Authority (NCA) has available to deploy to a certain area. In 1962, London depended on the SAS for all the intelligence from West Sarawak, Borneo, because they were not only qualified but also the only assets available. They were able to live in the interior of the country and immersed themselves in the culture so that the information provided was of such high quality it assisted the decision makers in Whitehall.129

SOF must be given the opportunity to develop this detailed knowledge of their areas much like Lawrence and Wingate. Therefore, the Department of Defense should reinstate the time honored practice of sending military observers to countries of interest in the Third World. Today, journalists seem to be able to gain access and knowledge of "hot spots" such as the Karen revolt in Burma, RENAMO in Mozambique, French in Chad, and the H'mong freedom fighters in Laos.130 In 1962, Department of the Army instituted such a program aimed at sending an officer on temporary duty "with a ... mission in a country confronted with active or potential insurgency with the maximum amount of time being spent in the field at the 'grass roots' level."131 This
program was targeted at brigadier generals and senior colonels on the Army staff who stayed in the country for only four to six weeks.

A new program needs to be established along the same lines with more flexible time arrangements and opened to the lower ranks of officers and NCOs. Additionally, SOF personnel should be stationed as a permanent party on the country teams of selected countries to provide special operations advice as well as gaining a fuller understanding of the military needs and assistance requirements of the host nation. These SOF personnel should be considered neither as foreign area officers in training nor as part of the security assistance organization. Their purpose is to provide advice and analysis on insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and other instability problems to the country team. Col (ret) John Waglestein, former operations officer for the 8th SAF in Latin America and the MilGroup commander in El Salvador, believes that this expertise is needed on the country team. The employment of the 8th SAF in Latin America in the 1960's was enhanced in those countries that had a Special Forces soldier assigned to the embassy.132

In addition to assisting the country team to understand the LIC threat and how SOF assets could be used, this immersion of SOF personnel into their country of orientation will enhance their contributions to U.S. policy development and execution. Brigadier General David Baratto, Commander of JFK Special Warfare Center and School, wrote that this type of orientation program
will assist in reducing the perishability of SOF language and cultural knowledge, add to area assessments, and develop coordination between SOF elements and the country team.\textsuperscript{133}

There is no way to predict where a crisis might occur or what the correct response should be. Therefore, we should hedge our bets by keeping individuals posted to a wide number of potential problem areas. Because our military will be smaller and limited in total capability, and the foreign assistance funds will be restricted, the U.S. can not afford to squander its precious resources. Detailed knowledge, the kind that stems from living and operating in a foreign country, is essential.

SOF's detection mission must complement traditional intelligence collection activities. Any intelligence activity in a country must be coordinated and orchestrated by the chief intelligence officer on the country team. B. Hugh Tovar wrote of the necessity to meld the assets of SOF and intelligence organizations to joint advantage. He believes that this can be done. The "burden is on the State Department to ensure that its chief of mission takes effective control of his resources and exerts both leadership and authority," he wrote.\textsuperscript{134} Because SOF can look at the information from an unconventional warfare operator's perspective and give policy makers the added dimension of being positioned to act on that intelligence, the U.S. can assemble a powerful team which can assist in proper decision making and policy execution.
Stabilizing:

SOF's role in stabilization should be to "influence human behavior in a way favorable to our objectives" by

...-aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendly nation to develop and mature along the lines such that those conditions normally associated with the causes of an insurgency can be prevented or diminished.

-aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendly nation which has thrown the yoke of communism [or totalitarianism] off its shoulders and is now attempting to grow along the road of democracy and self-determination.

-aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendly nation to recover from those conditions which exist as a result of an armed conflict or natural/manmade/technological disaster.

These tasks should be accomplished by SOF acting as a key part of the interagency and inter-service program for a country by working with the indigenous military and their special forces. Indigenous military will play a decisive role in helping to nurture the institutional basis on which the new democratic governments will exist.

In spite of the growth of democracy, the political power of the military of many Third World nations is still decisive. In Latin America, the military has loaned political power to the new civil governments. In Africa, the military has been and
remains a significant influence. In Asia, the military of such countries as Thailand, Taiwan, and Indonesia remains a most powerful force and cannot be ignored.138

Because of the important role of foreign militaries, the Brookings Institute studied the use of U.S. military personnel as instruments of policy and concluded that there were advantages in using them:

There will tend to be less suspicion, better communications, and a greater openness between the military personnel (and sometimes the political leaders) of the donor and recipient nations.... There often is a professional camaraderie among military officers, as in any profession, which can overshadow national distinctions. In consequence, the advisors may be useful conduits for communicating policy and for creating a favorable impression in the donor country. And individual officers may sometimes be able to influence their professional counterparts on particular issues... which can be turned into political gain.139

Raymond Barrett, a former foreign service officer, agrees that military officers have a direct and indirect impact on the attitudes of foreign military personnel. This is critical especially because the political and military interact closely in LIC.140

A Department of the Army mission analysis of SOF concluded
that, because of their capabilities, they are an excellent tool to "influence opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of foreign groups and individuals to support U.S. national interests."141 SOF, therefore, are useful "conduits for communicating policy and for creating a favorable impression... and individual officers may sometimes be able to influence their professional counterparts on particular issues."142

The Department of the Army has long recognized that SOF is only one of the tools which should be used to address the problems in the Third World. In 1959, President Eisenhower appointed the Draper Commission to study the military assistance programs. It concluded that U.S. military assistance to foreign nations was an important and critical element of our foreign policy. Annex C of the report suggested that

...as a matter of policy [we] encourage the use of the armed forces of underdeveloped countries as a major 'transmission belt' of socioeconomic reform and development...[Specifically, it urged much greater] ... emphasis on training and education of foreign personnel, particularly that 'military training assistance be extended beyond narrowly technical matters to broad orientation and schooling in leadership, managerial and executive skills....',143

As a result of these findings, the executive in concert
with the legislative branch of the government initiated a comprehensive overseas development program. In November 1961, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) was formed. By 1962, the government had marshalled its resources and coordinated its actions through the Foreign Assistance Act, the Act for International Development, the Presidential National Security Action Memorandum 119, and the AID Circular 360.

SOF actively participated in this development program as part of a SAF. It was difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of SAF operations. No measures of effectiveness were established for the SAFs, and no follow-up studies have been done to determine the long range impact of their operations and to what extent they enhance and supported U.S. political objectives. However, SAFs did manage security assistance training teams, provide continuity where none existed, prepared, deployed, and evaluated the training and assistance teams, and insured that the missions were in consonance with the regional CINC's overall strategy.

What the SAFs did do in addition to attempting to improve civilian and military relations in the countries in which they worked was to establish a reservoir of goodwill which the U.S. could draw on in time of need. The Brookings Institute's study of the use of armed forces as instruments of policy identified the establishment of good will as a key objective. In 1976, retired General Yarborough provided to an interviewer one of many such examples. In 1971, he and Ambassador Godley visited the
Plateau de Bolovens in Laos. In Atapeau, an old man came up and thanked them for the assistance the Americans had given the village ten years earlier. The Special Forces under operation WHITE STAR commanded by Colonel Arthur Simons had obtained a salvaged vehicle for the village, had helped organize a cooperative store which sold soft drinks among other goods, and had built a rice mill. All of this had enabled the village to prosper for over ten years and won the gratitude of that entire region.

Colonel Charles Simpson wrote about a similar experience he had among the Kurds. In 1963, he led Special Forces teams, who understood the culture and spoke the language, in assisting the Kurds in the town of Kangavar, Iran, to recover from an earthquake. For several weeks they worked with the people, training and organizing them to restore their village. Simpson wrote, "Word spread throughout Kurdistan, and the American soldiers with the funny green hats were welcomed, not just with courtesy, but with enthusiasm. Kurdistan today (1983) is undoubtedly the second (after Bavaria, FRG) best-prepared unconventional warfare area for Americans in the world."145 In April 1991, Special Forces, from that same Special Forces Group, deployed into the Iraqi portion of Kurdistan to support OPERATION COMFORT, the post DESERT STORM humanitarian assistance operation.146

In Latin America the SAF built bridges, roads, airstrips, and ferries, frequently remaining to instruct in their
operation and maintenance. In 1965, in Honduras thirty officers and men offered instruction in "agriculture, food processing, veterinary medicine, sanitary engineering, automotive mechanics, diesel engine, radio and television repair, welding, industrial machinery, electricity, and refrigeration." The training was offered to the military and civilians with selected individuals receiving training as instructors. Col Simpson in his book Inside the Green Berets writes that, "On a cost-effective basis, or on any terms, it was one of the best run and most serviceable programs in the history of U.S. aid, military or otherwise."  

The SAF psychological operations section developed and published a farmer's guide aimed at the rural population in Panama. "It contained lively tips on how to better the quality and increase production of crops and livestock, how to maintain farm tools and equipment, and it provided simple and easily implemented suggestions for first aid, child care, and sanitation." It was passed out by the Guardia Nacional to help establish rapport between the Panamanian government forces and the peasantry. It was so popular that eight other Latin American countries later invited SOF to develop something similar for them. 

Additionally, the SAF provided military training to selected forces in Latin America. In 1967, Major Shelton trained several companies of Bolivian Rangers in counter-guerrilla operations. Eleven days after graduation, one of the companies caught and killed Che Guevara thus crippling this attempt at
exporting the Cuban revolution.  

In the Pacific, in 1969, the SAF was used by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific to open up military relations with the Republic of Indonesia after the overthrow of President Sukarno in 1965. The civic action program was designed to teach the officers of the Indonesian army how to survey areas and develop and execute Civic Action programs. In the course of the training the SOF team discovered that much of the AID-provided equipment was in the warehouses because the people did not have the expertise to inventory, assemble, and operate it. A program was approved by the American Ambassador to dispatch small teams to fix the problem. This was done and the people were able to make gravel with the new AID rock crusher that was assembled by one sergeant first class in six months. SOF provided that extra dimension which was needed to complete a development program.

In that same year, the 1st Special Forces Group instituted the concept of Disaster Assistance and Relief Teams (DART) for use in the Pacific area. They consisted of a Special Forces team augmented by extra medical capability. They were used in the Philippines after a typhoon. Their mission was not only to provide assistance directly, but also to teach the Philippine Army to organize, train, and equip their own armed forces to help their own people. SOF provided the capability to make the military-to-military contacts which in the long run proved to be valuable in reshaping local forces into a responsible arm in support of the people.
During the 1960’s SAF conducted programs in the Congo, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Kenya, and Ethiopia performing such tasks as conducting basic training in counterinsurgency for a cadre of Ethiopian soldiers.

In all of these programs the importance of the SAF activities transcended the physical construction of a road or a well or a basic airborne training school. The seeds of goodwill and the example of what a responsible military, dedicated to the welfare of a people’s government is like outweighed the small, transitory projects.

In the 1980’s SOF was rejuvenated but the SAF concept was not. Since 1982, SOF increased its force structure adding the 1st SFG for the Pacific and the 3rd SFG for Africa. From 1987 to 1989, SOF increased its activities by conducting an average of 166 deployments a year. In 1989 SOF conducted forty mobile training team (MTT) missions to twenty countries and sixty-six bilateral exchange training events and/or deployments for training. These figures include deployments to NATO nations as well as Third World nations. In comparison, from 1963 to 1970 SOF conducted an average of seventy MTT missions a year to the Third World. These estimates may be low because Col (ret) John Waglestein recalled that in 1964 the 8th SAF alone launched 275 MTTs into Latin America. Although SOF is active again it is not being employed as part of a coherent multi-capable structure that the SAF provided.
Controlling:

In spite of all the efforts to stabilize a country, conflict can occur. If that happens, then SOF must control the situation, attempting to turn it around while preventing escalation. SOF support to Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay from 1960-70 enabled those countries to successfully withstand the forces of insurgency. SOF can control the situation by providing intelligence support, PSYOP support, civil affairs support, training, advisor assistance, and operational elements. Additionally, SOF can participate in operations as advisors, or conduct operations unilaterally or in conjunction with host national forces. Additionally, they can provide special capabilities like psychological operations printing or audio/visual personnel and equipment.

Containing:

If a crisis develops and war is imminent, SOF can attempt to contain the situation while the NCA decides on courses of action. Because SOF should have been forward deployed all along and would be familiar with the situation, they can prepare the operational area for the introduction and support of military forces if deployed and also prepare for non-combatant evacuation and escape and evasion if required. General Joseph Lutz, when commander of Special Forces in 1982, stated that:

In the special operations forces we have the capability of
being introduced into a given country, being established on the ground with contacts, maybe even with our own intelligence networks. If war ultimately breaks out within that region, there are people on hand who understand the region and are available to go there. That is the secret of the peacetime to wartime transition.\textsuperscript{155}

As mentioned earlier in this paper, the goodwill that SOF spread in the world and the relationships with host nation forces military force and civilians which have been developed last for years and can be used as the basis for support in such a time of crisis.\textsuperscript{156}

In addition to intelligence support, SOF can conduct combat operations to prepare the operational area for the introduction of conventional forces. These include attacking infrastructure target systems such as transportation, communications, power, command-control-communication-computers-intelligence (C4I), and air defense. SOF can organize selected people into a guerrilla force to conduct unconventional warfare in support of conventional forces. They can also take steps to reduce a hostage situation or prepare the indigenous people to accept the introduction of American forces through the application of psychological operations and civil affairs techniques.

**Supporting War:**

If military power is introduced, then SOF can provide a
wide range of support. Local resistance forces guided by SOF can conduct unconventional warfare, including guerrilla warfare, sabotage, subversion and the establishment of evasion and escape nets especially for downed pilots. SOF can conduct direct action against selected targets, provide terminal guidance for aircraft munitions, and interdict lines of communications (LOC) or other systems such as transportation, C4I, air defense, or power. They can conduct special reconnaissance and psychological operations. Civil Affairs elements can identify and coordinate U.S. requirements for, and assist in the acquisition of, local resources, facilities, and support, as well as minimizing local population interference with the U.S. military operations.\textsuperscript{157}

\textbf{Concept in Action:}

Unlike Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, JUST CAUSE, the operation to remove General Manuel Noriega from the government of Panama in December 1989 and PROMOTE LIBERTY, the subsequent operation to reestablish governmental functions in that country are examples of how SOF can be integrated into the strategic picture.\textsuperscript{158} SOF has been continuously stationed in Panama since January 1962. During this time they performed their detection mission, gaining in-depth knowledge of the country and building relationships with the indigenous people both civilian and military. When the situation developed that made the continuation of General Noriega's government inimical to the
...interests of the people of Panama and the U.S., Operation JUST CAUSE was approved. SOF participated in the planning, reconnaissance, and preparation of the potential operational area supporting JUST CAUSE. This assistance proved invaluable because of the cultural and linguistic capability of SOF and the "local knowledge [SOF] developed over a series of tours in one area." Months in advance, capitalizing on their capability to conduct low visibility operations, SOF moved elements to Panama to support the assault forces. Task Force Black was one such organization which assisted the 7th Infantry Division during the operation.

The operation was marked by the shock of simultaneous strikes by many SOF units operating with or quickly followed by conventional forces. Fifteen minutes prior to the assault, on 20 December 1989 at 12:45 AM, SOF, supported by conventional forces burst into the Carcel Modelo, a prison where Kurt Muse, an American businessman who was working for the State Department was being held, freed Muse, and withdrew. Muse had been told by his captors that if the U.S. attacked Panama and attempted to free him, he would be killed. The SOF assault on the prison was so precisely executed that not only were Muse and several other political prisoners saved, but the guards were so stunned that they did not even go for their weapons.

In the first few minutes of the operation around 1:00 AM, SOF conducted airborne assaults to neutralize and seize Rio Hato and Torrijos/Tocumen airports, seized critical nodes in the...
power and communications systems, such as disabling state
controlled Television Station 2, and controlled critical choke
points in transportation systems such as the Pacora Bridge. At
the Pacora Bridge, the SOF team dropped from helicopters just as
the lead vehicles of Noriega's elite Battalion 2000 approached.
Using AT-4 and LAW anti-armor rockets and support from a SOF Air
Force AC-130 gunship, the team stopped Battalion 2000 and
prevented them from reinforcing any of Noriega's other forces.\textsuperscript{162}
Several SOF teams simultaneously seized Noriega's known hideouts
in an attempt to capture him. Although they failed to apprehend
Noriega, these operations successfully isolated Noriega, shut off
his avenues of escape, and left him no alternative except the
Papal Nunciatora.\textsuperscript{163}

The advantages of deploying SOF well forward in peace to
spend time in developing an understanding of and relationships
with the indigenous people was demonstrated on several occasions
during the operation. A SOF team confronted a Panamanian Defense
Force (PDF) element held up in David Garrison prepared to fight.
The SOF commander, Major Kevin Higgins, talked the PDF commander,
who happened to be a former comrade-in-arms, into surrender.
Major Higgins also convinced this PDF commander to call the other
garrisons and tell them to surrender, which he did.

The psychological operations units developed surrender
leaflets based on their in depth knowledge of the psychological
motivations of the PDF. Major Higgins later stated that hundreds
of PDF members surrendered to SOF elements at La Chorrers, forty
miles outside of Panama City, clutching the surrender leaflets which had been prepared by the psychological operations unit and dropped by helicopter.\textsuperscript{164}

JUST CAUSE witnessed the full integration of SOF and conventional aviation airspace (about the size of the area bounded by the peripheral "Beltway" around the District of Columbia). There were no midair collisions or even reports of near-collisions in the opening hours of the operations or three weeks thereafter.\textsuperscript{165}

After the successful operation, SOF shifted to the mission of stabilization. The country had to be put back together and be protected against a potential insurgency. Many of the PDF had gone underground or escaped into the countryside. There was and still is the threat of an insurgency against the new government of Panama organized by those elements who were pro-Noriega and have access to large amounts of weapons and munitions which may still be cached in the countryside.\textsuperscript{166} On January 11, a joint nation building task force was established, called the Military Support Group, to coordinate all the activities to reestablish the structure of Panama. The 4th Psychological Operations Group had 250 personnel as part of the task force which managed a campaign to demoralize the loyalists to Noriega and bolster the Guillermo Endara government. Also apart of this task force were Civil Affairs specialists representing two dozen largely civilian fields including public service, medical, public safety, finance, and others who went to work restoring the civil administrative
Although overall the PSYOP and CA appear to have been successful, early interagency planning did not occur. This affected the selection and efficient use of SOF assets. The ability to integrate the nation building aspects of SOF with conventional military and interagency cooperation was lacking according to Colonel Edward Dandar Jr., the deputy commander and chief of staff of the Joint Civil Affairs Task Force in Panama.\textsuperscript{167}

As the conventional forces withdrew, the 7th Special Forces Group began their long term and most difficult mission. Keeping a low profile, they deployed into the interior to each of the provinces to search for hidden PDF, arms, and munitions caches, and established mechanisms to ferret out incipient insurgency. Additionally, they are working with the people and the reconstituted police force acting as a buffer between both groups and assisting them in the transition toward a democratic society.\textsuperscript{168} Only the future will reveal how good a job SOF is doing in Panama. The signs are ambiguous because of the resurgence of the drug and gun smuggling operations and the lose of interest by both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The U.S. has an unprecedented opportunity to provide
insurance against the unknown and shape the future the way it would like to see it. SOF are an excellent military instrument to "provide for eventualities that cannot be foreseen with clarity, and for threats whose nature we may only guess." By employing SOF during peacetime they can: deter or counter threats to U.S. and allied security interests; permit access to and influence with foreign governments in a manner that would be mutually advantageous; detect and provide early assessments of forces inimical to U.S. interests thus permitting rational decision making; control instability to avoid the direct and costly involvement of conventional U.S. military forces; stabilize situations to redress local unrest and advance U.S. revolutionary ideals which support pluralistic political institutions and free market economies; promote and support democratic movements; contain instability while preparing the operational area for the introduction of conventional military forces; and support the actions of those forces if necessary. Casper Weinberger, the former Secretary of Defense, stated that the "value of these [SOF] forces transcends the limited investment in resources they represent." 169
FOOTNOTES


26. Major William H. Burgess III ed., *Inside Spetsnaz* (California: Presidio Press, 1990), pp. 3,257, identifies two types of Spetsnaz, the KGB Spetsnaz which is strategic and used during peacetime and the Military Spetsnaz which is operational and used during conflict and war. The KGB Spetsnaz conducts cadre training for foreign terrorists and ideological mercenaries.


30. Steven Coll, "India, Pakistan Wage Covert 'Proxy Wars','*Washington Post*, 8 December 1990, pp. A10, A14, writes that Pakistan is supporting moslem guerrillas and Sikhs fighting the Indians in Kashmir and the Punjab while the Indians are supporting the ethnic movement in the Pakistan province of Sind through military assistance and covert war.


35. Max Kampelman, "NATO and the Northern Region: Security and Arms Control," Northern Region Conference, Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 October 1990, unpublished speech given during a CSIS Conference "for the record", stated that there is too much that is unknown about the USSR. If the current trends toward democracy fail then the impact on the USSR will be immense.
36. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S., Soviets Disagree on Arms Cuts: Moscow Officials Said to Understate Number Due for Destruction," Washington Post, 17 December 1990, p. 1. Not only have the Soviets declared 20,000 fewer weapons than the West says they have, but they have transferred some undeclared arms outside the region after the treaty was signed, an action the treaty does not permit. David Remnick, "Soviets Said to Avoid Destroying Arms," Washington Post, 10 January 1991, p. A14. William Drozdiak, "Europeans View Shift by Soviets with Concern," Washington Post, 20 March 1991, p. 21, identifies the three Soviet army divisions which have been redesignated as naval infantry.

37. Kjeld Vibe, Ambassador of Norway to the United States, and Admiral Torolf Rein, Chief of Defense, Norway, "Strategic Appraisal of the Situation in the Northern Region," Northern Region Conference, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 October 1990, unpublished lecture given during a CSIS Conference "for the record".


41. Michael P. W. Stone, Secretary of the Army, "First Echelon of Strategic Deterrence In a Turbulent World of Diverse Threats," Army (October 1990) p. 11.

42. William Odom, "Smashing an Icon," National Interest (Fall 1990), p. 67


48. George Selden, Jr., Perestroika p.23-24; Edward Atkeson, "The 'Fault Line' in the Warsaw Pact: Implications for NATO Strategy," Orbis (Spring 86), p.117, discusses this scientific approach. David Rees, Peaceful Coexistence: A Study in Soviet Doctrine (Washington D.C.: International Security Council, 1989), pp. 67-70, is an extensive study of the continuity of Soviet doctrine from Lenin through Gorbachev. "On one hand the Soviet's emphasize that 'the revolutionary struggle of the working class,' the term underlying the peaceful coexistence doctrine, is unchanged. On the other hand, Gorbachev advocates an accommodating between East and West under the rubric of 'interdependence.' Common action, he says, is needed to solve 'all human,' 'above-class' problems that are common to mankind." Lenin's concept of interdependence does not mean a truly cooperative policy with the West. "The Leninist idea means that the two hostile classes are mutually dependent on each other even as they are simultaneously involved in struggle." Chiesa, p.30.


53. Ibid. pp. 3-4.


59. Ibid. p.9.


65. Dr. John Dziak, "Historical Precedents," in Major Burgess, *Inside Spetsnaz*, p.35. Owen A. Lock, "The Spanish Civil War," in Burgess, p. 47-49. The Soviets sent the NKVD, the predecessor to the KGB, to assist guerrilla forces on both sides in the Spanish Civil War. "Terrorist and guerrilla activities were carried out on Stalin’s orders behind Nationalist and Republican lines." Many of the Soviet officers who fought in Spain used this knowledge in WWII.

Soviet preoccupation with SOF. Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla* pp. 207-214. In July 1941, Stalin officially appealed for the Soviet patriots to conduct resistance operations against the German forces. Before the war ended over 100,000 people may have been involved in the Soviet Partisan movement. In the wake of the German invasion of the USSR indigenous resistance movements hostile to Moscow sprung up. The Germans failed to exploit these popular movements and, through repressive measures, turn the movements against themselves.


69. Paschall, p.75.


71. Dobbs, "Workers of the World FAX," calls the Fax, video tape, cassette recorders and xerox machines ‘subversive technology’ which played a key role in the Polish revolt.

72. Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable* pp. 93-94; Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla* p. 167. The Poles participated in revolutionary movements in 1830, 1848, and in 1871. Metternich stated that,"the Polish struggle had become the embodiment of the revolution itself." In the 1920’s in Upper Silesia, Polish guerrilla forces fought German guerrilla forces. Altogether, 60,000 Poles and 30,000 Germans were involved in the fighting. In World War II, Polish resistance fought the German occupation for years, culminating in the battle for Warsaw in the summer of 1944. The resistance has been credited with destroying around 7,000 locomotives, 20,000 rail cars, and 4,600 tons of fuel during the war.


76. Kipp, p.109, Garthoff, p.175.


84. CIA, *World Fact Book 90* pp.250, 344; Czechoslovakian Country Report 4-1990 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 21 September, 1990), pp 3, 15; Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Country Report 3-1990 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 28 August 1990), pp3, 9, states that the disappearance of the USSR and GDR markets have increased the economic decline of the East. Steven Greenhouse, "Long, Painful, Road Ahead to Free Markets for East," *New York Times*, 10 November 1990, pp A1, A4, states that the foreign debt in Hungary requires 20% of each workers income to service annually, $330 per person; CIA, *World Fact Book* p.140, lists $6,108 as the per capita income of Hungary; Robin Knight, "Cautious Capitalism," *U.S. News and World Report* (5 November 1990), p. 54-56; Clyde Haberman, "Bulgaria and Neighbors In East Block are Reeling After Cuts in Soviet Oil," *New York Times*, 14 November 1990, p. A12; Andre Gunder Frank "Revolution in East Europe: Lessons for Democratic (and Socialists) Social Movements," *Third World Quarterly* (April 1990), p.46, writes that the breakup of the Soviet Empire will relegate the countries of East Europe and the USSR to a Third World category. He goes on to compare Poland and Romanian economic downsides with Africa other Third World counties. "Hepatitis Cases Decline, Cholera Restrictions End, Sofia, Bulgaria, 2 November 1990," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (2 November 1990), p.15. "Deteriorating East European Credit Rating Noted," *DER STANDARD*, Vienna, 30 October 1990, p.18, *Foreign Broadcast Service* (2 November 1990), p.2. The production and distribution systems of Eastern Europe have broken down with stunning speed. Unemployment and food lines have appeared in several countries like Bulgaria for the first time. The Bulgarians must work one and one-half days to afford one kilogram of beef, if it is available. The health systems are not responsive and outbreaks of cholera and hepatitis have recently occurred in Romania. In Bulgaria, energy shortages have required the government to alternate their electrical power output every two hours. Their nuclear power plant in Kozloduy may shut down for safety depriving the country of 35% of its energy. Industrial output and real growth in all of these countries is dropping quickly as the USSR removes its supports. The industrial output of Hungary has dropped by 10%, Romania by 28%, and Bulgaria by 30%. Real economic growth in Bulgaria has decline by 3.5%, in Czechoslovakia by 2.7%, in Hungary by 2.2%, in Romania by 3.5% and in Poland by 12.8%. On 1 November 1990, Romania devaluated its currency by 50% to stop the economic freefall. The credit ratings of all the East European
countries is deteriorating.


86. Hunter, p. 62.


88. *JCS PUB 3-07* pp. I-6, I-12, I-16.


91. CSIS, "New Military Strategy" p. 10, in July 1990 the CSCE propose such an organization during their London meeting.


94. Simpson, p.82 and Yarborough, p.57, all state that the SAF for Africa and Latin America were very successful. HQ DA DC^2PS, "Implementation of US Army Special Warfare Program FY 63-68," [unpublished memorandum], (Carlisle: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1962),p.1; HQ DA DCSOPS, "Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces in Paramilitary Operations, 2 Jan 62," Unpublished memorandum, (Carlisle: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1962), pp. 3,4,6, a full SAF, in addition to an SF Group, consisted of the following numbers:

PSYOP: 72
Civil Affairs: 86
Engineers: 60
Military Intelligence: 47
ASA: 44
Medical: 66
Military Police: 57
Signal: 40


100. Yarborough, p.57 also mentioned that the SAF operations in Ethiopia were successful. Simpson, p.82. TRADOC, Special Operations Forces in Low Intensity Conflict p. 8-1 stated that the 8th SFG was successful in LATAM.

102. U.S. Army, SOF in Low Intensity Conflict pp. 3-9, 8-1. The parts used are unclassified. Marcella, p. 77-78.


117. Paschall, p. 35. Louis D. F. Frashe Papers, "After Action Report Exercise Fast Circle I, 23 March - 13 April 1963, 10 SRG(A), Bad Toelz, FRG," [unpublished papers], (Carlisle: US Army Military History Institute), p.9, states that a Special Forces "A" Team was required to train resistance forces in US history,
government, and English language. Author's experience with the 1st Bn, 10 SFG(A), Bad Toelz, FRG, 1976-80; 1986-87.


120. Robert Kupperman, p.53.
121. Ibid. p.53. Kelly, pp.146,149.


Morrison describes how he gained access and participated in LIC while writing for SoF magazine.


132. Waglestein, p. 8, "Question: Do you think the Officers and NCO’s that were assigned to MilGps understood how to use the SAF, and understood low intensity conflict, and insurgency or was that a problem? Answer: ...unless the MilGp Commanders of MilGp personnel had a previous assignment with SF, they didn’t know what they had, they didn’t know the talent they had. A couple of occasions we had MilGp personnel who know SF, had been in SF themselves in fact, so there were minimum problems."


136. U.S. Army, Operation And Organizational Concept For Active Component Civil Affairs Assets [DRAFT] (FT Bragg, NC: JFK Special Warfare Center and School, September 1990), pp. 1,2.

137. Marcella, p.61.

Asian life: David Morell on Thailand, Harold Maynard on Indonesia, and Edward Ross on Taiwan.


147. Simpson, p. 84.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid. p.85.

150. Ibid. p.189. Colonel Simpson was the 1st Special Forces Group Commander responsible for this operation.

151. Ibid. p.187.


156. Simpson, p.187.


165. Ropelewski, p. 28.


This is a selective bibliographic guide to those works which proved most useful in preparing this paper. Not all the works cited in the footnotes are contained in this bibliography.

**Overall World View**


**U.S. Security Policy**


**Historical Perspective on Deterrence**

U.S. Special Operations Policy

I divided this section into three parts. The first lists the official doctrine and policy documents, the second the military and non-military academic views on future SOF policy, and the third on the history of SOF policy.

Official Policy and Doctrine:


Future Policy:

Rod Paschall. LIC 2010, Special Operations & Warfare in the Next Century. Washington D.C.: Brassey's (U.S.) Inc., 1991 provides a broad overview of where he believes SOF should focus its training, force structure and material. This is a useful work

History of SOF:

Charles M. Simpson III. Inside the Green Berets, The First Thirty Years, A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces. California: The Presidio Press, 1983 in one of the best single sources. It contains facts that are not readily available elsewhere. Although short on analysis, it presents a great deal of background especially in the areas where the author had first hand knowledge. He addresses nation building and security assistance and provides several "grass root" examples of successful programs. Unfortunately he neither evaluates the success of the nation building policy nor the interagency problems associated with its execution. Two other useful works are Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins, Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-52. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982 and Aaron Bank. From OSS to Green Berets, The Birth of Special Forces. California: The Presidio Press, 1986. Al Paddock concentrates on the bureaucratic maneuvering which brought SOF into existence whereas Col. (ret) Bank provides the color and flavor of those early years and the perspective on one of the key founders of Special Forces. Col. Bank presents an excellent discussion on the conceptual basis for SOF doctrine. An early commander of
Special Forces, LTG William Yarborough (ret) was interviewed in 1975 for an "Oral History," which is now in the archives of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks PA. He provides some information on the early concepts of SOF employment and insights into SOF involvement in nation building. Although not a history of SOF, this work provides needed background on the covert and clandestine operations which were launched against Eastern Europe from 1946-1956: Phillip Knightley. The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989.

SOF Policy of Other Nations

Security considerations limited what could be obtained about the peacetime employment of the SOF of other nations.

British Special Air Services:


French Special Forces:

Kelly's book, Special Operations and National Purpose was useful. Colonel Henri Bentegreat, Assistant Military Attache with the French Embassy, provided invaluable insight.

Soviet Special Forces:

Major William H. Burgess III ed. Inside Spetsnaz. California: Presidio Press, 1990 has collected a number of essays by noted specialists on this topic. It is one of the most useful and up to date work available. Kelly and Paschall's works added some insight as did Barnett and Tovar's Special Operations in U.S. Strategy.

Mercenaries:

One area which has received little attention if the role of mercenaries in the Third World politics. Several nations have purchased a SOF to use for political purposes. How do these forces fit into the equation? There are few reliable sources on

European Policy


Soviet European Policy


**Soviet Views on Resistance Movements/Guerrilla War**


**Unrest in Eastern Europe and the USSR**


Economic and Social Situation in Eastern Europe


Eastern Europe's Resistance Potential


Total Resistance/Partisan War


Third World

I have divided this section into three parts. The first examines
U.S. LIC policy, the second the general problems in the Third World, and the last the Soviet’s role in the Third World.

U.S. LIC Policy:


General Issues:


**Soviet Involvement:**


**Terrorism**


Nation Building/Foreign Internal Defense


Security Assistance Force (SAF)

There is little analytical data on the success or failure of the SAF concept. Two directives from the Department of the Army which established SAF’s are: HQ DA DCSOPS. "Implementation of U.S. Army Special Warfare Program FY 63-68." [unpublished

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Lawrence and Wingate