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USAREUR SMALL UNIT TRAINING
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"THE REQUIRED CHANGES"

BY

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The US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine is based on the ability of small units (company/team) to fight independently and win on the modern battlefield. The current USAREUR training program does not focus on the maneuver training of these small units resulting in small units being deficient in maneuver skills. This paper discusses the current and future USAREUR training programs and recommends changes that will enhance small unit maneuver training.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

USAREUR SMALL UNIT TRAINING

"The Required Changes"

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine is based on the ability of small units (company/team) to fight independently and win on the modern battlefield. The current USAREUR training program does not focus on the maneuver training of these small units resulting in small units being deficient in maneuver skills. This paper discusses the current and future USAREUR training programs and recommends changes that will enhance small unit maneuver training.
The history of combat from World Wars I and II, the Korean conflict, and the Israeli wars in the Middle East, indicates that battles are won or lost at the platoon and company/team level. In other words, at the small unit level. The US Army Air Land Battle Doctrine supports this thesis and says we will have to fight and win at this level to be successful on the battlefield. This then, suggests that the ability to fight and win at the platoon and company/team level is critical and must be a top training priority for the US Army.

During the past 30 years the US Army has used one method of training in the Federal Republic of Germany. This has been a combination of using Major Training Areas (MTAs), Local Training Areas (LTAs), and Maneuver Rights Areas (MRAs) to develop a training program to produce a combat ready army well balanced in maneuver, gunnery, tactics, and command and control skills. This was accomplished by conducting maneuver exercises from platoon through division in MRA's, allowing leaders to lead and control their units in the field while permitting soldiers to develop maneuver skills necessary to fight and win on the battlefield. These exercises normally progressed from platoon level to higher echelons, building on each level as they progressed. These large maneuver exercises, when combined with gunnery exercises at Grafenwohr and maneuver training (ARTEP) at Hohenfels, produced an Army trained and ready to fight in Europe. This program worked extremely well and was very effective through the mid-1980s. During the late-1980s, however, the maneuver damage payments to the host nation citizens increased and the political and
environmental concerns of the host nation government began to severely restrict the ability of the US Army to conduct maneuver training on the countryside. In addition, the environmentalists began a program to restrict the amount of training the US forces could do at the MTAs in terms of limiting firing hours and maneuver time in order to reduce the noise and environmental impact on the local populace and land. These actions resulted in the US Army having to make changes in its training strategy and move towards computer generated maneuver exercises, simulations, and sub-caliber firing devices. Where are we in this strategy and what has it done to the combat readiness of the US Army will be the focus of this paper.

The US Army Field Manual (series 25) provides directives and guidance on how we are to train the Army. In the preface of FM 25-100, General Vuono, Chief of Staff, USA, says, "The Army must be trained and ready in peacetime to deter war, to fight and control wars that do start, and to terminate wars on terms favorable to the US and allied interest."(1) The manual then dictates how we are to train to fight at all echelons and makes the commander the primary trainer.(2) Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training, gives additional direction on preparing and executing training at battalion, company, soldier, leader, and unit level.(3) The "Training Hierarchy" is established in FM 24-4, which requires a building block approach to training starting with individual proficiency and continuing through crew,
platoon, and unit, culminating in combined arms and services proficiency at the battalion/task force level. (4) The manual also directs that all training will: a. Sustain and reinforce individual and collective skills; b. Develop and sustain command and control skills of commanders and staffs; and c. Support multi-echelon training. (5) The question in the Federal Republic of Germany is not one of knowing what to do, but do we have the resources available to do the training as directed?

USAREUR currently operates 10 simulation centers in Europe. The cost to operate these simulation centers in 1990 was approximately $6.2 million. In addition a joint Warrior Preparation Center is operated by the USAFE at a cost of $16 million with the Army paying $8 million of this. Thus, the total simulation cost for USAREUR is $14+ million. When the hardware and facility investment is added in it comes to $20+ million annually. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) for FY 90 in USAREUR was $1.6 MILLION, The Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) and Simulation Networking (SIMNET), which are funded by DARPA, cost another $3 million for base support. The total cost of simulations in USAREUR for FY90 were approximately $25 million. (6)

What are we getting for this? Were our forces ready to deploy to Saudi Arabia and fight? If so, then why did all the units in USAREUR conduct a live fire exercise at Grafenwohr prior to deployment to Saudi Arabia for Desert Storm? Why too, did all USAREUR units require 30 days of intensive training in the area of operations prior to being considered operationally ready
by the Commander, CENTCOM? Could it be that the USAREUR units were not ready because of a lack of maneuver skills necessary for combat operations at the company/team level? It appears, based on the USAREUR training program, that it is because of the inability of small units to conduct proper maneuver training in USAREUR. It is not the fault of the soldiers or leaders; rather it is due to a lack of resources for units to conduct maneuver training at this level. This lack of resources is caused by the host nation governments concerns for the environment and its citizens which have continued to put restraints on the maneuver training that USAREUR units can conduct. The results of these concerns has forced USAREUR to relook its training programs.

The training realm that USAREUR is currently working under is at Figure 1. Based on these factors the Seventh Army Training Command has developed a simulation based training program for the future to overcome the loss of maneuver rights. The future program uses limited maneuver (wheel vehicle only) in local training areas and maneuver rights areas, while increasing the time for maneuver and gunnery at the battalion/task force level at the MTAs. The simulation based program provides for the training of corps and divisions down to platoon and squad leader in command and control skills.

This program incorporates the use of battle simulation exercises such as Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), Battalion Brigade Simulation (BBS), Army Training Battle Simulation System (ARTBASS), Urban Combat Computer Assisted Training Simulation
Figure 1: Training, Factors and Constraints

- Reduced Training Funds
- Political Concerns
- Environmental Pressures
- Training Needs of Allies
- Space
- Noise
- Increased Sophistication of Systems
- Costs

More Efficient Training
Effective Training Devices
Simulations
Reduction of Time to Train to Standard
(UCCATS), and JANUS. These computer assisted simulation exercises allow commanders and their staffs to accomplish command, control, communications, and intelligence training and decision making in a simulated battlefield environment. The exercises also provide training opportunities for all levels of commanders and staffs from corps to battalion task force. The training program also incorporates maneuver rights areas, local and home station training areas, and devices, simulations, and instrumentation at all locations. The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) deployment will be extended to a seven day exercise with the brigade commander and staff fighting two task forces on the ground with a third in the WARLORD BBS simulation exercise for three of the seven days of each task force rotation. The task force time at Grafenwohr will be extended to allow units to conduct Situational Training Exercises (STXs) as part of their training density. The STXs will be done at the platoon level. (8) (Figure 2)

This program will make use of the available resources and provide excellent training for all echelons of forces except the company/team level. The company/team has no time available or maneuver area in which to train under the direction of the company/team commander prior to moving into the CMTC exercise at Hohenfels. Training Circular 25-1 states that battalions and brigades undertake advanced combined arms training at a National Training Center after completing their ARTEP requirements. (9)
PROPOSED
ROTATION SCHEDULE

D = DEPLOYMENT
X = ESX
E = STX
R = REDEPLOYMENT
WARLORD

= TWO TF IN BOX

TRAIN TO FIGHT
How can we expect company/teams to perform or to be combat ready without an opportunity to train to standards prior to having to conduct a CMTC rotation as part of a task force? This is unrealistic and does not comply with US Army training directives. How do we fix this?

First, we must provide the company/team commander time and resources (land, MILES, OPFOR) to conduct company/team level training and maneuver prior to his participating in a CMTC rotation as part of a battalion/task force. This can be accomplished through the extension of the time units are allowed for densities at Grafenwohr and Hohenfels and through opening up more areas at Grafenwohr to maneuver. The Army Training and Evaluation Plan (ARTEP) requires an external evaluation of units every 18 months. However, most commands in CONUS and USAREUR require units to undergo an external evaluation to ARTEP standards annually. If we return to the Department of the Army standard of an external evaluation every 18 months and with the reduction of forces in Europe, time will be available at MTAs to conduct company/team maneuver training for all maneuver elements.

The 3d Infantry Division developed a training plan that uses all available resources (Figure 3). However, there is no time or location for company/team maneuver because of a lack of maneuver space in the LTAs. (10) We must provide time for company/team training as history indicates over and over that battles are won and lost at the small unit level.
ROCK TRAINING STRATEGY

SIMULATIONS & DEVICES  ORG. LEVEL  RANGES

UCOFT  CREW  TCPC  GTA: VII, VIII

SIMNET  PLATOON  BCPC

BBS (JANUS)  COMPANY  PRIME  GTA XII

(FY 91)  -BN/TF  PRIME  GTA CALFEX

CBS - BCTP  BDE  HTA

DIV  HTA

FIGURE 3: 3d ID TRAINING STRATEGY
The 1st Armored Division developed a plan to conduct company/team maneuver at Grafenwohr in the spring of 1990 which was approved and executed. The program added a company/team maneuver training day for each company/team following their completion of the Combined Arms Livefire Exercise (CALFEX) on range 301. Upon completing the CALFEX each company/team moved to an assembly area, downloaded live ammunition and mounted Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) equipment on their combat vehicles. The unit then received an order to prepare to conduct an offensive operation and execute on order. The unit then conducted an offensive operations against an opposing force also equipped with MILES systems. The 1st AD, G3 provided observer/controllers and the space along side Range 301 for the training. However, the company/team commander was the trainer and he had the day to maneuver and train his unit against an opposing force. He also had the option to stop and start the training at any time for critiques and after action reviews as he saw necessary, or to rerun any training he felt the unit was weak in. It was the company/team commanders training day with no interference from higher headquarters. (11) (Figures 4&5) The resulting training was excellent and should be a base program for a total MTA package for the future in USAREUR. This program would combine Grafenwohr and Hohenfels densities into a continuous training program.
COMPANY/TEAM
MANEUVER EXERCISE AT GTA

Fig 4, INO GTA Plan, Apr-May 1990
COMPANY/TEAM MANEUVER TRAINING AT GTA
(IMAECT AREA B OPTION)
I recommend that USAREUR develop a training program that begins with an 18 month cycle instead of an annual one. During this time period each unit would conduct two MTA densities. The first density would begin at Grafenwohr with gunnery, and platoon and company/team maneuver (three weeks) based on the 1st AD model. Then the unit would move to Hohenfels for an extended maneuver density as described at figure 2 for task force and brigade maneuver training. The second density would be shorter and be a gunnery, company/team maneuver density at Grafenwohr only.

This MTA program when combined with the other training, use of simulations, computer assisted exercises, and wheel vehicle exercises, would utilize all available resources while providing maneuver training at every level of tactical maneuver. The results would be better trained small units, platoons and company/teams, which would produce an overall more combat ready USAREUR, which is the mission of the Army and its leaders.
ENDNOTES

1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force, Soldiers, Units, and Leaders, Nov 1988, pg i.
2. ibid, pg 1-5.
4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 24-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises, Sep 1984, pg 2.
5. ibid
6. Interview with Arthur Bradshaw, LTC, USA, Chief of Training, USAREUR and Seventh Army Training Command, Grafenwohr, FRG, 5 Dec 1990. (Cited with permission)
8. USAREUR Training Program briefing prepared for CINCUSAREUR by Seventh Army Training Command (LTC Bradshaw) Dec 1990. (Cited with permission)
10. Interview with Wilson Shoffner, MG, USA, Cdr, 3d Inf Div, Wurzburg, FRG 4 Dec 1990. (Cited with permission)
11. 1st AD, Training Briefing presented at USAREUR Major Leaders Training Conference, Grafenwohr, FRG, May 1990, prepared by Watson, Rodney, LTC, USA, G3, 1st AD, Apr 1990. (Cited with permission)

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3. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 24-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises, Sep 1984.
5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, PAM 350-9, Index and Description of Army Training Devices, 9 Dec 1988.
6. Interview with Arthur Bradshaw, LTC, USA, Chief of Training, USAREUR and Seventh Army Training Command, Grafenwohr, FRG, 5 Dec 1990.
7. Interview with Wilson Shoffner, MG, USA, Cdr 3d Inf Div, Wurzburg, FRG, 4 Dec 1990.
8. Interview with Robert Coon, LTC, USA, G3, 3d Inf Div, Wurzburg, FRG, 4 Dec 1990.