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BY

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**Title:** U.S. Army Forces in Europe: 1991-1997

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany were the beginning of a serious impact on U.S. Army force planning strategists. Further complications were added with U.S. support of the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement. The National Command Authority confirmed to our NATO allies that the U.S. would not abandon the defense of Europe. Yet the Congress of the U.S. took quick measures in the defense establishment by limiting the end strength of the Army by the year 1997. The end strength reductions were quickly followed by a drastic cut in the Army’s budget. Facing these complex constraints, and a build up for a pending war in the Middle East, Army force planners are poised with some very complex problems. This paper addresses some of these problems and offers a solution that seems to best fit our national interests in Europe.
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AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany were the beginning of a serious impact on U.S. Army force planning strategists. Further complications were added with U.S. support of the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement. The National Command Authority confirmed to our NATO allies that the U.S. would not abandon the defense of Europe. Yet the Congress of the U.S. took quick measures in the defense establishment by limiting the end strength of the Army by the year 1997. The end strength reductions were quickly followed by a drastic cut in the Army's budget. Facing these complex constraints, and a build up for a pending war in the Middle East, Army force planners are poised with some very complex problems. This paper addresses some of these problems and offers a solution that seems to best fit our national interests in Europe.
INTRODUCTION

November 9, 1989, marked for mankind the fall of the infamous "Berlin Wall" between East and West Germany. This historic event came 46 years after Britain's Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, delivered his "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri on March 16, 1946. The collapse of the physical barrier between west and east only spurred on the euphoria among citizens of Europe for a reunited Germany.

The myriad of events that took place in 1989 toward German reunification have forced national strategy planners to rethink United States' policies and objectives on the Eurasia land mass. In this paper I intend to look at the role of the United States Army as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in Europe. More specifically, I will address the size and composition of the forces needed to be forward based in Germany. This forward presence in Germany supports the current direction of the National Command Authority till 1997.

It should be noted that in this short paper I will not discuss all the factors involved. For example, I will not discuss the U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy. Nor will I discuss the other branches of service of the Department of Defense. I will, however, focus on some past and projected national strategies of a ground based deterrence in Germany. It is this policy that has provided the cornerstone of U.S. military objectives on the continent since the end of World War II.
NATIONAL STRATEGY

In the preface to the 1990 National Security Strategy of the United States, President George Bush stated, "Today, after four decades, the international landscape is marked by change that is breath-taking in its character, dimension, and pace. The familiar moorings of postwar security policy are being loosened by developments that were barely imagined years or even months ago. Yet, our goals and interests remain constant. And, as we look toward—and hope for—a better tomorrow, we must also look to those elements of our past policy that have played a major role in bringing us to where we are today."¹ In addressing Western Europe more specifically, he went on to add "As I have pledged, the United States will maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as our allies desire our presence as part of a common security effort."²

At the outset this may appear to be a clear definition of America's resolve to continue supporting of our NATO partners in Europe. Yet, several questions quickly come to mind. First, is the past policy of Soviet containment still valid? Second, what does the President mean when he says "significant" military forces stationed in Europe? Finally, does the Executive Branch of our government have the sole power to make foreign policy; or isn't it more likely that the Congress will have a more active role? After all, Congress controls the purse strings.
THE THREAT

In evaluating the Soviet threat to our strategic interests in Europe one must keep in mind that the only physical change on the continent is a unified Germany. Except for that, the geographical land mass has not changed. Political alliances may appear shaken with the end of the Warsaw Pact, but the Soviet Union has yet to change. We can only forecast the future outcome of the U.S.S.R. as a political entity. True, short-warning, all out attack by the Warsaw Pact against NATO has receded. Still, the Soviets have a very formidable military capability. They are the only nation on earth that can threaten the U.S. and her allies with nuclear destruction. Unilateral reductions in the Soviet ground forces still leave the Red Army the largest standing force in the world, despite their location. Finally, U.S. policy makers should not be too quick to forget that during the past 45 years, the Soviet armed forces have been the dominant instrument of enforcing Soviet foreign policy.3 In the May/June issue of Defense 90, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated, "... the heart of the threat has been Moscow's use of that power as a source of intimidation, aggression, attempted dominance and expansion. And so today, for any real and lasting change in the threat, it is the Soviets' use of power that must change."4

For the moment it appears that the long standing policy of the western allies to contain the Soviets has worked. I believe that the joy of seeing some East European nations struggling for a democratic society ought to be offset by the stark realities of recent developments within the U.S.S.R. To develop an effective
military strategy for Europe we need to proceed with cautious optimism when we consider the Soviet's as a potential adversary.

The Soviets aren't the only threat that we should consider. In his article titled "Force Planning In An Era Of Uncertainty," Dr. Mackubin Owens points out potential problems for the security of Western Europe. He states, "Some may object that without the Soviet Union, there is no single power or coalition capable of dominating Eurasia, and that a U.S. presence, or at least the ability to project power onto the continent, is unnecessary. But who is to say what new power balance may arise on the continent? A resurgent Germany, ethnic strife in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union itself, and emerging problems in Southern and East Asia all contain the seeds of conflict. Any of these could lead to a rapidly altered Eurasian balance of power that adversely affects the security interests of the United States."

UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO NATO

I think it is a fair assumption to say the National Command Authority has clearly stated that we will continue to support our NATO allies. The problem for the Defense Department policy makers then becomes one of how to define the "significant" forces mentioned by the President. For the moment I will leave that question unanswered. I think it is important to mention here that there is no indication from any of our NATO allies that would suggest that they favor a total troop withdrawal. All the ministers that took part in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) discussions, clearly showed that the mandate was for troop
reductions, not total troop removal. Writing for *Survival* Mr. Peter Corterier, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Assembly stated, "... NATO will remain necessary and desirable for well into the future. Its basic purpose of defending and furthering Western values endures, as does its permanent worth as the only forum in which the 16 like-minded North American and European democracies can discuss the political, economic and military dimensions of security policy."

Before I can address the question of the size of the U.S. forces that will remain in Europe, we need to examine the role of the United States Congress. It is now very clear that Congress intend to play a dominant role in the foreign policy decision making process.

**CONGRESS AND THE PURSE STRINGS**

Congress played a very active role during the past year when it came to foreign policy and the size of our forces. The muscle being flexed is clearly mandated in the U.S. Constitution. For example, Congress must ratify treaties negotiated by the Executive Branch. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty falls into this category. Congress also controls the size of military forces and provides the funding to support the armed forces. When the Executive Branch approved the CFE agreement, Congress moved quickly to pass legislation limiting the size of the armed forces. The actual figure for the Army's size in the out-years is not final. Official estimates range between 520,000 to 570,000 by 1997. This then, becomes the crux of the problem for
our force planners. How can the United States maintain its collective security arrangements for Europe and the rest of the world with such dramatic troop reductions?

In his article, "Quo vadis NATO?," Mr. Corterier offers some insights for the force planners. He feels that the lower force levels mandated by CFE will require some "new conceptual" thinking. He is supported by the current U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell. Also writing for the May/June issue of Defense 90, General Powell states that Americans generally feel very comfortable with our past policies of collective security for Europe. General Powell said that most Americans, "... still want a strong Free World, a strong America and a credible defense, they simply want it at a reasonable cost. We can give them that reasonable cost - and we can avoid putting them at risk, too. The way to accomplish that two-fold task is an evolutionary approach to reshaping our armed forces."  

With the idea that new thinking within budgetary constraints is the mandate for force planners, we need to examine force planning procedures. I will first lay out the past and current procedures and then transition to try to answer the lingering question of the composition of Army units to be left in Europe.

FORCE INTEGRATION

As far back as World War II, U.S. force planners have used a system known as Division Force Equivalent (DFE) to develop the right mix of forces to support our national objectives. The Army
planners established a balanced mix of "auxiliary administrative troops" considered necessary to fight and sustain combat operations. The original definition was focused on a small field army equivalent of a current U.S. army corps. This composition of forces was roughly four or fewer divisions with their balance of support equating to 45,000 personnel per division. Revisions in 1970 brought this figure up to 48,000 spaces.

The force planners included in the total figure a Division Increment (DI) equaling 16,000 personnel; a Non-Division Combat Increment (NDCI) inclusive of separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, corps artillery, engineer, and attack helicopters of 12,000; and a Tactical Support Increment (TSI) that included units of a Combat Service Support nature like military police, signal corps and military intelligence units equalling 20,000. The Army's total force using these calculations was 24 divisions.

Various manipulations and an authorization of an end strength increase in the early 1980s enabled the planners of "Army 86" to increase the number of divisions to 24. The current force structure is a result of the planning for the Army of Excellence (AOE). With the creation of four additional divisions, the planners increased the total force to 28 divisions. It was generally felt that "the ability to maintain and sustain was supported by: productivity and labor-saving enhancements; subjective analysis; offsets from Host Nation Support (HNS); senior leader guidance; and risk acceptance."
The Army's FY 92-97 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) points out a different direction for the force planners. Figure 1 below is a representation of those calculations.

Figure 1

\[
\text{DI} + \text{NDCI} + \text{TSI} = \text{DFE} \times \# \text{OF DIV} = \text{TOTAL}
\]

POM DFE 15K + 10K + 15K = 40K \times 22 = 880K

With this foundation laid, I will now attempt to draw all the pieces together to see what we might have left to sustain our commitment in NATO ground forces.

EUROPEAN GROUND FORCES OUT TO 1997

To begin this analysis there are certain facts and assumptions that must be considered.

FACTS

1. The NCA has stated that we will keep forces in Europe.
2. The Congress has legislated a troop reduction in both Active and Reserve Forces.
3. Our NATO allies have not asked us to remove all ground forces from Germany.
4. The U.S.S.R remains a threat to the security of Europe.
5. The U.S. has a worldwide military commitment.
ASSUMPTIONS

1. Reaction time to a European threat has increased.
2. The DOD budget will remain at zero growth through 1997.
3. The United States will defend North America including Hawaii, Alaska, friendly nations in the Caribbean and Central America and in the Panama Canal.
4. The actions in Desert Storm will not alter the congressionally mandated cuts in the Army's end strength.
5. CFE I will be followed by further troop reductions in a follow-on agreement.
6. The U.S. Army's FY 1997 end strength will be between 520K and 570K active forces.
7. The establishment of the European Economic Community will not alter the military requirements for NATO.
8. Germany will not ask the U.S. to withdraw all ground forces before 1997.
9. Congress will not undercut the Executive Branch and demand withdrawal of ground forces before 1997.
10. POMCUS stocks (at least four division sets) will remain in Europe.

CRITERIA

There are four criteria that I will use to analyze the various options for the force composition. They are: cost, flexibility, political feasibility, and power projection. Listed below is a brief description of each criterion.
1. Cost: The force composition measured in current year U.S. dollars with the least cost considered the best.

2. Flexibility: The force composition that can provide the greatest versatility of combat operations.

3. Political Feasibility: The force composition that demonstrates U.S. resolve to reduce European ground forces yet maintains our commitment to NATO.

4. Power Projection: The force composition that provides the greatest amount of combat power.

FORCE COMPOSITION OPTIONS

In my initial analysis I considered a variety of force compositions. However, I have narrowed the options down to only four that I feel should be considered and measured against the stated criteria. I will list the four options and then discuss each option against the stated criteria in terms of advantages or disadvantages. It should be noted that this discussion will measure each option independently. I will then compare and contrast the four options against each other in their relation to the stated criteria. To support my recommendation, I will use a decision matrix. A full description of the matrix and the associated weighting of the criteria will be presented with the matrix.

The four options for consideration are:

Option 1: U.S. army corps with two armored divisions.

Option 2: U.S. army corps with one mechanized and one armored division.
Option 3: A multi-national corps headquarters with two U.S. armored divisions.

Option 4: A Multi-national corps headquarters with one U.S. mechanized and one armored division.

ANALYSIS OF FORCE COMPOSITION OPTIONS

OPTION 1: The advantage of this option is the power projection capability of the two tank heavy divisions. This could be an important factor if hostilities increased within the region that would require a very lethal force capable of countering a tank heavy assault by an aggressor. However, there are three disadvantages to this option. First, the cost to the U.S. would be very high. Resources to sustain this force structure are high in terms of petroleum products, ammunition and repair parts. Second, this composition is not very flexible for a variety of combat operations. There are very few infantry soldiers in a tank heavy force with which to conduct combat operations in the cities. Additionally, the rugged terrain in parts of Europe often restricts the movement and fighting capabilities of a tank force. Third, although this option would appear feasible to both the U.S. and our NATO allies, it does not demonstrate a firm resolve on our part to reduce U.S. combat capabilities in the theater because of the large number of tanks remaining in the force.

OPTION 2: This option has two of advantages. First, it is a very flexible force. The balance of one mechanized and one tank heavy division allows the commander a variety of options for
different operations. The force could be employed in forested or mountainous terrain and in the cities. Second, this force is more politically feasible because it shows U.S. resolve to reduce tank combat power while simultaneously maintaining our commitment to our allies. There are two disadvantages to this option. First, there are not enough tanks in this force to be a major deterrent to a heavy ground assault. Second, the costs of maintaining this force structure still remain high for the same reasons as option one.

OPTION 3: The main advantage of this option is the power projection capability. Although controlled by a multi-national headquarters, the two tank heavy armored divisions are very capable of projecting combat power. There are three disadvantages to this option. First, the force is not very flexible. It has a tank power base and cannot operate effectively in a variety of combat operations, such as cities and wooded terrain. Second, because of the dominant weapon systems, the cost of sustaining this force is high. Third, it does not appear to be a politically feasible option because of the tank power base and lack of resolve to reduce combat capabilities.

OPTION 4: There are three advantages to this option. First, in terms of cost this option is low. The U.S. would only have to pay the associated costs of maintaining some corps staff; the costs for petroleum, ammunition, and repair parts are considerably reduced with the reduction of tank systems. Second, this is a very flexible force capable of operating in a variety of combat operations. Third, this force shows the U.S.
willingness to reduce combat capability yet still provide support to our allies. The only disadvantage to this option is the lack of tank power projection.

SUMMARY OF OPTIONS

The end state of the United States' strategic military objectives are: deter war, terminate war on favorable conditions, defend U.S. territory, protect U.S. citizens and secure sea and air lines of communication. The means available to the NCA to accomplish these objectives are the use of military forces in being and programmed forces. In the traditional view of national military strategy our deterrence has consisted of forward deployed forces with a large central reserve. It was also backed up by strong allied participation, the use of our strategic TRIAD and a robust theater of nuclear forces.

The National Military Strategy Document - '89 changes the traditional approach in several important ways. Large numbers of heavily equipped combat forces forward deployed will be replaced by smaller forces to give us a forward presence. United States' theater strategies will shift toward a more regional focus. Additionally, our force projection reduction will be replaced by the necessity of military force adaptability to rapidly changing situations.

This shift in emphasis because of force reductions and budget cuts directly affects how our force planners must accomplish the president's directive to maintain significant forces in Europe. The NATO doctrine of a "layer cake" defense in
Europe is no longer valid because the unification of Germany eliminated the inter-German border. Furthermore, by 1993, the Soviets will remove the remainder of their forward deployed forces from eastern European.

For now the NATO military planning document MC 14/4 is still a viable option. However, as the results of the CFE agreement start to take effect, the planning strategy will shift more toward the use of multinational formations to counter threats to the region. Important in this concept is the use of United States' ground military forces. This force must be highly mobile, no smaller than a corps, oriented on force destruction and be capable of operating in a variety of combat operations.

**COMPARISON OF OPTIONS**

Option 1 does not compare favorably with the other options. It is the most costly and the least politically feasible option. This option is tied with option 3 as a very non-flexible force composition. It does rank first among the others as the force capable of projecting the most combat power. Option 2 ranks second highest in cost. It is tied with option 4 as the force with the least power projection. It is also tied with option 4 as the most flexible of all the options. Option 2 ranks second as the most politically feasible of all the options. Option 3 is tied for first with option 1 for power projection. It ranks second as the least costly of the options. This option is tied for second best in flexibility and is third in the feasibility
criterion. Option 4 favors well against all the other options. It is the least costly and the most politically feasible option. It is tied with option 2 as the most flexible. Option 4 is also tied with option 2 as the worst in terms of power projection.

RECOMMENDATION: The composition of the U.S. Army ground forces in Europe through 1997 should consist of a multi-national corps headquarters supported by one U.S. Army armored and one mechanized division.

DECISION MATRIX

As stated before a decision matrix is used as a tool to help me in this analysis. The matrix is attached as enclosure 1. The weights for the matrix were developed using the pair-wise comparison technique. Simply stated this technique allows the user to generate unbiased weights to be applied to the criteria. Pair-wise comparison takes all the criteria and compares them to each other one at a time. The user selects which criterion is favored over the other and determines the importance factor for the comparison. At the conclusion a consistency ratio analysis is run to figure out if there were any biases added by the user to the process. For this analysis the consistency ratio was 92.66%. Any consistency ratio above 90% is considered valid. Additionally, on the enclosed matrix you will note a table that shows a sensitivity analysis. This analysis is conducted after all data is entered into the matrix. The computer program then recalculates the entire matrix applying numerical values up to
three higher and lower that the base weights assigned. If the computer determines that a state of nature (criterion) is sensitive to a change in the numerical value of the weight, then it prints out what criterion is effected and at what numerical change. In this matrix, there are no states of nature sensitive to change.

Finally, the type of matrix used is called "assignment of relative values." All the options considered are assigned a value of best to worst against each criterion. In my matrix I chose the minimum value as the best. In rank ordering the options, if it is considered that two or more of the options are equal, then their relative values are added together and divided to obtain the correct rank order.

CONCLUSIONS

The problems facing the Army force planners are numerous indeed. They are compounded by the uncertainty of the Soviet threat to Europe. Throw in the emergence of developing democracies in Eastern Europe, and we have a region of the world that could develop very quickly into an unstable region. Our National Command Authority has promised the NATO allies that we will not abandon them. Still, Congress moved quickly to reduce both money and force size from the Army. What the future in Europe will be is uncertain. If we reflect on recorded history, we should not forget that Europe has had a continuous history of religious, political, boundary and economic rivalries. The policy of collective security for Europe has resulted in peace for the past
45 years. Today is not the time to abandon this region in the hopes that the desire for a peaceful coexistence will be shared by all leaders in the region. The United States should remain a committed partner by maintaining U.S. Army ground forces till the year 1997. My solution of a multi-national corps headquarters with two U.S. Army divisions and part of the corps staff, will support our commitment to Europe. I believe that this solution will meet the goals of the NCA, the Congress, our Allies, and our force capabilities for world wide employment.
Selected weights

\[ W_1 = 4.4 \]
\[ W_2 = 3.2 \]
\[ W_3 = 1.7 \]
\[ W_4 = 1.0 \]

Consistency ratio = 92.66%

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<th>Feasible</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The optimal strategy is 4

State of nature 1
Not sensitive

State of nature 2
Not sensitive

State of nature 3
Not sensitive

State of nature 4
Not sensitive
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 10.


5. Owens, p. 12.


7. Ibid., p. 7.


10. Ibid., p. B-1.


Shaver, David E. *Justifying the Army*. Director, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 25 September, 1990.
