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JFACC: COMMAND AND CONTROL

WHAT ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMANDERS NEED TO KNOW

BY

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This study will provide the reader with a historical overview of the command and control of United States air assets during joint operations. It will trace the evolution of the role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander to include mission, function, roles, and structure that are essential to the Joint Force Commander for planning, coordinating, and controlling his combat air power. It will provide views of the issues arising from interservice command and control procedures. These issues are derived from joint air operations that include Army ground based air defense systems, United States Air Force aircraft, United States Marine Corps Aviation Task Force, and Naval Carrier Task Force aircraft. The study will draw on current joint publications on command and control of the Joint Force Commander's air assets. Each service's doctrine on the planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of air assets in a theater of operations will be reviewed. Other documents, letters, memos, and papers that relate to the study will further classify the interservice issues of disagreement. Army Air Defense Commanders should be aware of the
issues because they fight in a joint force and may be under the command and control of either a USAF, Naval, or Marine Corps Air Component Commander.
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JFACC: COMMAND AND CONTROL;
WHAT ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMANDERS NEED TO KNOW. (U)

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Abstract

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This study will provide the reader with a historical overview of the command and control of United States air assets during joint operations. It will trace the evolution of the role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander to include mission, function, roles, and structure that are essential to the Joint Force Commander for planning, coordinating, and controlling his combat air power. It will provide views of the issues arising from interservice command and control procedures. These issues are derived from joint air operations that include Army ground based air defense systems, United States Air Force aircraft, United States Marine Corps Aviation Task Force, and Naval Carrier Task Force aircraft. The study will draw on current joint publications on command and control of the Joint Force Commander's air assets. Each service's doctrine on the planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of air assets in a theater of operations will be reviewed. Other documents, letters, memos, and papers that relate to the study will further classify the interservice issues of disagreement. Army Air Defense Commanders should be aware of the issues because they fight in a joint force and may be under the command and control of either a USAF, Naval, or Marine Corps Air Component Commander.
INTRODUCTION

Desert STORM affirmed that to fulfill the function of command and control in a joint arena, the Services must jointly field and train forces that are able to conduct effective air-land combat operations. Desert STORM was a prime example of the complexities of command and control in a joint arena.

Desert STORM has further shown that the use of high-tech weapons of our air power and the diverse types of aircraft from multiple nations, and the command and control of our combat air power have become increasingly important. To further cloud the skies of the future, high-tech will provide the software that will allow the integration of Army Air Defense surface to air missiles and aircraft with simultaneous engagements in a Joint Engagement Zone. It is therefore important for Army Air Defenders to become aware of conflicting issues arising from the command and control system that will operate in joint force airspace.

The air-land battle will be fought in all three dimensions. In addition, the ground commander must plan to execute deep, rear, and close operations. Fire support assets, Army aviation, Army Air Defense, United States Air Forces, Naval and Marine Corps Aviation, and Allied Air Forces are potential users of this airspace. Air defense is probably the most inherently joint operation in air-land combat. Its objective limits "the effectiveness of enemy offensive air efforts to a level permitting freedom of action to friendly forces..." Air defense is con-
ducted by the Air Force within the counter air mission, directly
by defensive counter air operations and indirectly through offen-
sive counter air operations. Army air defense is performed by
units assigned to divisions, corps, and others employed as
directed by the joint force commander. The importance of the
linkage between air and ground operations cannot be over empha-
sized. Also, unresolved interservice issues, especially those of
a doctrinal nature, limit progress in joint operations.

This study will address those conflicting issues by present-
ing various views of the issues by Service. First, it will look
at the historical development of centralized planning and decen-
tralized execution of combat air assets. Second, it will review
doctrinal procedures by service as they are today. Third, it
will examine the conflicting issues that arise when interservice
forces operate within a joint area of operations. Finally, it
will examine joint doctrine as stated in current joint publica-
tions and how that joint doctrine was applied during Desert
STORM.

BACKGROUND

During World War II, Air Chief Marshal Tedder stated:
"Given centralized control of air forces,
this flexibility brings with it an immense
power of concentration which is unequalled in
any other form of warfare. In other words,
if properly used, the flexibility of air
force allows it to be highly economical. The important words in my previous sentences are "if properly used" and "given centralized control."

And the controversy begins. In wars involving two or more Services on the same side, command and control of assigned forces was very controversial. This controversy was prevalent in WWII from the early days of North Africa to the invasion of Europe, and it persisted throughout the Korean War. In Vietnam, United States politics and Service doctrine aggravated the situation.

At the beginning of aviation employment, the tremendous capabilities of air power were used in a centralized, coordinated effort to mass air assets focused on a single objective. General Giulio Douhet, 1921 was quoted as saying:

"Therefore although the commander of the Army, Naval, and Air Force should be given the greatest freedom of action in their respective sphere, it would be in the interests of national defense to have a supreme authority coordinating their various actions."

World War II

In late 1942, the lessons learned in North Africa further enhanced the realization of the need for centralized control of air assets and the inefficiency of piecemealing air assets to substantiate ground forces that were focused on short term
tactical operations rather than the total campaign plan.

After the disaster at Kasserine Pass, there was a reorganization of air power that was approved at the Casablanca Conference.

Air Marshal Tedder explains:

"The proposals for the new air command were finally approved by Roosevelt and Churchill on 26 January (1943). An Air Commander-in-Chief for the whole Mediterranean Theater would set up his headquarters at Algiers; under him would serve the Air Officers Commanding Northwest Africa, the Middle East and Malta. He would be subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force in Northwest Africa."

With this reorganization, the Air Commander-in-Chief concentrated his total air assets in the theater to obtain air superiority and to attack the advancing German Army.

Immediately, the first indication of the problems to come when joint forces operated under centralized control appeared. The Air Forces' chain-of-command was suspicious of General Harold L. Alexander's dual role as Deputy CINC of Allied Forces and Commanding General of the 18th Army Group. The idea of a commander occupying a dual role troubled the chain of command. Sensing that he may lose his objectivity they concluded that Alexander should not operate in a component commander's position.
In North Africa, the entire air element was under one centralized air component commander, General Carl Spaatz. The air component commander had operational control (direct control) and he decided how to use his air assets within the guidance of the CINC. This command structure worked well when it only related to land based air forces; the Navy had its own concerns.

In the Mediterranean, the Naval component commander, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, had concerns about the land based aviation of the German and Italian air forces. When the Navy moved near shore to use their large guns, they became vulnerable to land based aviation; therefore, he wanted to retain control of at least part of his air resources to protect the fleet. Air Marshal Tedder, aware of the lessons learned from air operations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, refused to parcel his air power to the operational control of the Royal Navy. There were many conflicting demands for air power and the only effective way to use it was by centralized control. He employed air power from task to task as the intensity and priority of the threat required while maintaining air superiority. He supported the Army in the close air support role, defended Alexandria, Cairo, and desert bases, and interdicted the land and sea lines of communications that supported Rommel. He did not fragment his air power. Additionally, naval forces that were not directly involved in the defense of the fleet were integrated and controlled by the theater air component commander. This centralized
procedure of command and control of aviation assets in a theater proved to be very effective throughout the remainder of the war.\textsuperscript{3}

Korea

General MacArthur failed to establish an Army component commander. He reserved that command for himself. Therefore, he had the simultaneous roles of the Far East Commander and Commander of Army Forces, Far East. There was an established Air Force and Navy Component Commander designated to the Far East Air Force (FEAF) and Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) respectively.\textsuperscript{3} The lessons learned from WWII were forgotten. The Korean War was the first conflict to test the unified military forces of the United States.\textsuperscript{6}

In an attempt to integrate the efforts of assigned air forces under a single air commander that would be directly responsible to General MacArthur, LTG George E. Stratemeyer, the FEAF Commander on 8 October 1950, requested that the Far East Command assign him operational control of air units engaged in the war over North and South Korea. His responsibilities included the coordination of air activities with the activities of other forces and specifying the amount of forces to be employed, type of munitions, time on and off targets, and the controlling agencies. He would use allied air power wherever the priority was the highest and the most critical to influence the battle.\textsuperscript{11}

The NAVFE opposed when LTG Stratemeyer, Air Component
Commander, insisted that the principle of centralized control of air power in a theater also applied to naval aviation. The NAVFE stated it would help maintain air superiority, interdict the battlefield, and provide close air support, but the planning of naval air must remain under the operational control of the NAVFE Commander and not the Air Component Commander. ¹

The argument to integrate naval aviation under the Air Component Commander revolved around naval air which was an augmentation of forces assigned to the FEAF for the theater air mission. The NAVFE's argument was that his mission was in fact to gain and maintain control of the sea and to secure sea lines of communications. The NAVFE maintained that the naval aviation forces must not be restricted to the control of the theater commander, but free to engage opposing naval forces. ¹¹ The problem of command and control of a joint force commander's air assets had not been solved. As was stated before, when forces of two or more services operated in the same theater, there were going to be arguments about who had command and control authority.

The Chief of Staff of the Far East Command, on 8 July 1950, directed that the Commander, Far East Air Force (FEAF) would have the authority of command and control of all aircraft in the execution of the FEAF mission as assigned by the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Far East. Also, the Commander, Naval Far East (NAVFE) would have the authority of command and control of all aircraft that were executing the NAVFE mission as assigned by the
CINCFE. The same directive assigned missions in Korea to both NAVFE and FEAF. Therefore, for the first two years of the war, the Commander NAVFE considered his forces in support of Far East Command not Far East Air Force Command.4

To compound the situation, NAVFE requested that all targets assigned naval air should only be in the area of naval air areas of operations. These areas include the east coast of Korea close to Task Force-77. The FEAF Commander immediately objected. There was only limited action to the east with the main and primary battle threat in the west area of operations. Limiting naval aviation to a sector would reduce the air contribution to the air battle. The same situation applied to the arguments referring to the close air support operations. Changes were not made to the original directive, but an arrangement was agreed upon by FEAF and NAVFE by mid-1952.5

The arrangement recognized that the Far East Air Force Commander was the controlling authority for all air operations. A Joint Operations Center (JOC) of the 5th Air Force was formed; Task Force-77 (TF-77) placed a naval section in the JOC. A combat operations officer assigned missions to the TF-77 through the naval section. Finally, the full weight of Air Force and Navy air power was being applied in a joint integrated manner.6

As the United States Marine Corps entered the Korean Theater, FEAF stated that aviation would come under control of the 5th Air Force because marine aviation had the task of providing CAS to 8th Army. The Marines disagreed; they wanted the same
arrangement as the Navy. Marine aviation supported the Inchon landing by the Army during the amphibious assault, then returned to operational control of 5th Air Force and was used across the 8th Army front as the tactical situation dictated.

Again, at the conclusion of the war, the joint force air-space command and control system was in place and working efficiently. Also, the wartime organization started separate, but equal, and worked its way through the interservice conflicts to organize under one air component commander with centralized control.

Early in the 1960's, a trend developed that deviated from lessons of World War II and Korea. The command problems of World War II and Korea appeared again in Vietnam where they were compounded by national and international political concerns.

**Vietnam**

Initially, the Army and Air Force wanted a theater unified command, one that reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Far East Command did in the Korean War. As the conflict grew, the Army, Air Force, and Navy would each expand to meet the increased threat. The Navy opposed separate theater commands which would report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Navy wanted to maintain its relationship with CINCPAC. Any organization in Southeast Asia should be a sub-unified command under CINCPAC. CINCPAC would control all forces in the Pacific.

Immediately, there was a return back to an early World War
II command and control system of air assets. The Army argued (1962) that counterinsurgency was primarily a land war and that the Army was responsible for such wars. Therefore, the command structure should reflect this relationship, and assigned air power should come under the control of the Army commander responsible for the campaign.¹³

As the conflict intensified in Vietnam, the command and control system became extremely complex. General Jacob E. Smart, CINCPACAF, acknowledged the main threat to the United States interests in the Far East was China and the PACAF command structure should be designed to meet that threat. Additionally, the PACAF HQ’s 13th AF should direct control of the Southeast Asia air command structures for the execution of the air campaign. Also, the air forces assigned to South Vietnam should be limited to the accomplishment of the mission.¹⁹

At this time, several new commands were established causing new questions about command relationships. A joint force, established as JTF 116, was sent to Thailand by the President. Questions such as which headquarters would be responsible for JTF 116 operations outside of South Vietnam, were being asked. At this time there were three commands in the area, the 2nd Air DIV ADVON in South Vietnam, JTF-116 Tactical Air Command, and the 13th Air Force.²⁰

Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp (new CINCPAC 1 July 1964) opposed basic changes in the PACOM command structure. He believed the air war in North Vietnam and Laos should be fought by his two
component commanders, CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT. The war in South Vietnam would be fought with forces assigned to MACV but supported by PACAF and PACFLT. Again, there was the absence of a single air component commander for the theater. Admiral Sharp determined which missions were assigned to PACAF and PACFLT, then each component commander detailed missions to their subordinate commands. No formal coordination between the two existed similar to that of Korea.

PACAF PAC FLT
13th AF 7th Fleet
2nd Air Div. TF 77 (Gulf of Tonkin)
No Formal Coordination

Although at this time there was no single air component commander for all air assets, an Air Deputy position for MACV was established. Throughout the war the Air Deputy experienced problems of limited authority. The Air Deputy's authority was further restricted by MACV Directive 95-4 on 6 May 1965 about Marine Air and its control.

The MACV Directive 95-4 (6 May 65) stated:

"Marine Corps aviation resources are organic to III MAF and are commanded and directed in support of tactical operations as designated by the CG III MAF. The Marine Corps tactical air control system will exercise positive
control over all USMC aircraft in support of Marine Corps operations and over other aircraft as may be in support of such operations. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, 2nd AIR DIV will assume operational control of certain air resources designated by COMUSMACV."

Finally, on March 1966, the 2nd AIR DIV was inactivated and the 7th Air Force of World War II was re-established to direct the air war in North/South Vietnam.

As Air Marshal Tedder wrote:

"Air warfare cannot be separated into little packets; it knows no boundaries on land or sea other than those imposed by the radius of action of the aircraft; it is a unity and demands unity of command."

DOCTRINE

The evolution of basic doctrine for the employment of air assets had two clearly distinguished periods separated by the year 1943. Prior to 1943 the Air Force was part of the Army and was tied closely to the surface forces. In 1926 the War Department declared that the purpose of air units was to support the ground forces by destroying enemy planes and attacking enemy ground forces. The manual of the period, "Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Services," (War Dept. TNG REG (TR)
440-15, 1926) stated:

"Air elements were controlled by Army Commanders who decided how aircraft would be employed."

The Army was the single air and ground component commander. All the targets and allocations of air assets were prioritized by the Army. War Department Training Regulation 440-15, 1935, recognized that Air Power might have some role beyond the land battle. Also War Department Training Regulation 440-15, in 1940, and Employment of the Aviation of the Army, War Department Field Manual 1-5, 1940, made steps toward independence of the Air Corps from the Army. As late as April 1942, Army Field Manual, (AFM 31-35), Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, continued to attach air forces to ground commanders who decided how to use them, including decisions on target priorities.

Learning from the lessons of North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, the War Department issued a statement that command and employment of Air Power was co-equal with land and an independent force. (FM 100-20 Command and Employment of Air Power, 21 July 1943, the USAF Declaration of Independence).

As with any declaration of independence the battle began. Services doctrine will now be reviewed as it applies to the command and control of air assets, and in the case of the Army, surface to air assets.
Army Doctrine

When discussing Army airspace command and control doctrine, a few terms must be defined in accordance with current Army definitions. Army airspace command and control replaced the term airspace management. The airspace control area is the airspace above the Army's area of operations and the airspace above the joint force's entire area of operation.\textsuperscript{13}

Airspace control involves four basic functional activities:

* command and control
* air defense
* fire support coordination
* air traffic control \textsuperscript{29}

The integration of the Army with the Air Component is very important. The ground tactical commanders must have the freedom to use the airspace over their forces. The commanders must have maximum flexibility to use organic and supporting assets within that airspace and within the limitations exposed by the Joint Force Commander. Through airspace command and control, the ground commander fully synchronizes his combat activities and employs his aviation assets and air maneuver to contribute decisively to the outcome of the battle.\textsuperscript{30}

To accomplish this synchronization of combat aviation assets, the ground commander uses an Airspace Control Authority (ACA). Because of similar responsibilities between airspace control and air defense, the ACA normally is the area air defense commander (AADC).\textsuperscript{31} To fulfill this responsibility he utilizes the inte-
grated airspace control system. This system is normally structured around the Air Force Tactical Air Control System (TACS) and includes the Army Airspace Command and Control System (A2C2). If the joint force includes U. S. Marine Corps or Navy forces then either AF TACS or the Marine Corps Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) or the Naval Tactical Air Control System (NTACS) is the controlling agency. Therefore, it is extremely important that Army Air Defense Commanders understand the other Service’s doctrine and who has authority for implementing command and control procedures for the Joint Force Commander.

The bottom line is that the air defense commanders must have the capability to ensure that friendly aircraft may enter, depart, or move within the defended areas without undue restrictions upon their movements and with the least adverse impact upon the offensive and defensive capabilities of the joint force command.

**Air Force Doctrine**

The National Security Act of 1947 established that the Air Force "shall be organized, trained, and equipped to perform prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations." Primary functions include Counter Air (CA) and Defensive Counter Air (DCA). Counter Air objectives are to gain control of the aerospace environment. Counter air operations protect friendly forces, ensure freedom to use the aerospace environment to accomplish assigned missions and tasks, and deny the use of that
environment to an enemy. The ultimate goal of counter air is air supremacy. Defensive Counter Air (DCA) is aerospace operations conducted to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy enemy aerospace forces or penetrate friendly airspace. The operations defend friendly lines of communications, protect friendly bases, and support friendly land naval forces while denying the enemy the freedom to carry out offensive operations.\textsuperscript{13}

Collateral functions of the Air Force are to interdict enemy sea power through air operations, conduct antisubmarine warfare and protect shipping, and conduct aerial mingling.\textsuperscript{14}

Primary and collateral functions may be done unilaterally or with the forces of another service. To accomplish these functions, an air commander normally will be established with authority over all air assets.

The air commander, as the central authority for the air effort, develops strategies, plans, determines priorities, allocates resources and controls assigned aerospace forces to get the primary objective.\textsuperscript{15}

The Air Force bottom line focuses on a single air commander, responsible for all air power/assets. The imperative is centralized planning and decentralized execution; air assets must be under the authority of one commander. This commander must ensure combat air power is available when and where the priority of effort is required to influence the battle.
Navy air doctrine is centered around the protection of the fleet. When the Navy is at deep sea there is no conflict between their operations and those of the USAF. As the Navy moves closer to shore to support an amphibious operation, there is an overlap of airspace utilization and the issue of a single air component commander surfaces.

Marine Corps/Air

The difference in roles between the Air Force and the Marine Corps is established by law:

Title 10 minelaying: USAF "shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations." Whereas the title 10 USC 5063: "The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet...in the prosecution of a naval campaign...and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct."

The Marine Corps states that Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations constitute their primary mission. Marine air assets must support the MAGTF in its attainment of ground objectives. Marine air focus is on the land or amphibious portion of a naval campaign. Also, the Marine Corps thinks in terms of
The Marine Corps splits the battlefield vertically, emphasizing an integrated combined arms battle with extensive close air support.

Joint Doctrine/Air

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission.

The Joint Force Commander will normally designate a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFACC's responsibilities are assigned by the JFC. The responsibilities include but are not limited to:

- planning
- coordination
- allocation
- tasking - based on JFC apportionment decision

If designated, the JFACC should normally be delegated the duties of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC). The JFACC mission is to coordinate and integrate the entire air defense effort within the Joint Force Command. Also, the JFACC, as the ACA for the Joint Force, provides a service that coordinates, integrates, and regulates the use of airspace within boundaries established by the Joint Force Commander.
An additional joint operation consists of amphibious operations. The Air Force commander will provide appropriate Air Force representation to the Joint Amphibious Task Force (JATF) commander. When the preponderance of the tactical air support falls to the Air Force for the assault phase of an amphibious operation, the JFACC will designate an Air Force officer to direct the total air effort in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). He will exercise such direction under the JATF commander. When the preponderance of tactical aviation comes from the Navy or Marine Corps, the overall air effort in the AOA will be directed by naval aviation under the command Amphibious Task Force (CATF) until control is passed ashore.

ISSUES

Joint Force Air Component Commander/JFACC

The following are issues regarding the establishment of a JFACC by a joint force commander as stated by Naval/Marine Corps services and responded to by Air Force personnel. JCS joint publications say the joint force commander will "normally" designate a Joint Force Component Commander. Not all agree on this issue. The Air Force and the Navy/Marine Corps have two views concerning this issue.

A joint force commander exercising Operational Control (OPCON) has the authority to organize the way he wants. The traditional organizational method is by Service components, but another option is to organize by function; i.e., land, sea, and
air components. However, the Navy and Marine Corps do not totally agree with an organization along functional lines.

In a "fully functional" organization a single commander (e.g., JFACC or ACC) would have OPCON of all air forces. Another commander would have OPCON of all land forces, and a third would have OPCON of all naval forces. Neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps is content to accept this situation. The Navy could lose control of their aviation assets used for air superiority and air defense of the fleet. At a minimum, a non-naval commander could be controlling naval air assets and not fully consider the complexities of fleet defense.\textsuperscript{43}

The Marine Corps stands behind the Omnibus Agreement in general:

"The MAGTF Commander will retain OPCON of his organic air assets...during joint operations, MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission."\textsuperscript{41}

Therefore the Navy and Marine Corps would like to limit the authority of the JFACC or possibly eliminate the idea of a single air component commander responsible for command and control of all air assets under the joint force commander.

As stated, the JFACC can exist and function effectively under either a fully functional organization or in a service component command structure. OPCON is not required, and only the ability to task is necessary. The authority to task is available with all the command relationships except coordinating authority.\textsuperscript{41}
The final argument refers to the use of the word "normally" when talking about establishing a JFACC, that it is too directive. Maybe so, but as the JCS Publications say; "the joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander." The intent is clear. As stated before, the JFACC is the only JCS approved tool for a joint force commander to task, coordinate, and unify the efforts of the air forces available for his assigned mission.¹

Sustain Operations Ashore

When the Navy is at sea and the Marines remain an amphibious force, command and control are relatively simple. The problems start when the Navy is too close to shore or within range of enemy land based aircraft, or when the Marine Corps operates ashore for a long period of time.

The basic idea of employment of marine aviation is "centralized command and coordination," and "decentralized control and execution."(FMF ref Pub 14-5 Marine Air Command and Control System Operational Concept). Also the Marines insist on centralized allocation of air power within the MAGTF's aviation combat element. While sustaining operations ashore in support of a joint force, they resist centralized allocation and want to provide sorties only after their particular requirements are met.⁴

To provide fire support, the MAGTF lacks heavy artillery; therefore, it relies heavily on organic air power to support the
ground forces. When the mission is of short duration, often with limited objectives, the MAGTF air power is probably adequate. During sustained operations ashore, the MAGTF requires additional fire support and logistical support by the Navy as well as by other Services.¹

Joint commands are large MAGTFs that are composed of air, naval, and land components. Any one of these components can provide support to each other. Therefore, a MAGTF operating ashore for a long period can receive air support from the Navy or Air Force, and artillery support from the Army. By not piece-mealing the battlefield with boundaries that create vulnerabilities, it would be in the best interest of all involved to centralize command and coordination to include all air assets in theater. The United States has a Marine Corps for its self-contained expeditionary capability; nothing should be done to compromise that capability. Sustained operations ashore should be an exception, not the rule; such missions are suited for the Air Force and Army.⁴

The command and control of USMC tactical air in sustained operations ashore issue was resolved, somewhat, in the 1986 Omnibus Agreement. The Omnibus Agreement, the definition of the JFACC, and appropriate JCS Publications stated:

"The MAGTF Commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element."
During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF Commander will make sorties available to the JFACC, for tasking through his ACC, for AD, long range interdiction, long range recon. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or Joint Force Commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign mission, redirect efforts (e.g. the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIR sortie. When it has been determined by the joint force commander that they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders."

General P.X. Kelley in a White Letter # 4-86, dated 18 March 1986, fully endorsed the contents, spirit, and intent of the Chairman’s, JCS Publication, the definition of JFACC and the 1986 Omnibus Agreement for command and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained operations ashore.

Desert Storm: 1991

History will show that during Desert Storm the appropriate level of authority for command and control of air assets in the
theater of operations was established. USAF Service Component Commander, LTG Charles A. Horner, was designated the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and granted clear authority to centralize control and decentralize execution.

As the JFACC, LTG Horner allocated sorties to do the mission by air tasking order. Only after close coordination with LTG Walter E. Boomer, USMC Forces Central Command and Major General Royal N. Moore Jr., Commander 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, the JFACC tasked all available aircraft (Air Force, Army, and excess Navy and Marine sorties) to carry out missions as apportioned by the Joint Force Commander, General H.N. Schwarzkoph, USA.58

As the complete history of this most successful joint and combined campaign continues to be written, one of the most telling stories will relate how military commanders learned from history and put into practice Air Marshall Tedder's admonition that air warfare "is a unity and demands unity of command."59

Conclusions

Desert STORM has been an excellent example of the value of having a single air component commander. The tremendous volume of sorties flying every day represented a potential command and control problem far greater than any in the past. It goes without saying that without the high-tech command and control systems hardware the operations could not have been as effective. Maybe we have finally learned our lesson from past wars that the only way to employ air power is by centralized control and decentral-
ized execution and the massing of available assets regardless of
the Service of origin.

Hopefully, the old biases of Service ownership and the ideas
that focused our air power in narrow sectors of operations and
tactics will not again arise.

For Air Defenders it will be important to ensure they are
fully aware of the entire command and control picture and how
they play an important role. Our commanders must continue to
fine tune their knowledge of the command and control system in a
joint force environment.
ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 100-103, p. 1-3 (hereafter referred to as "AFM 100-103").


3. Ibid., p. 39.


7. Ibid., p. 43.

8. Ibid., p. 44.

9. Ibid., p. 53.


11. Momyer, p. 54.

12. Ibid., p. 57.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


17. Momyer, p. 61.

18. Ibid., p. 70.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 71.

21. Ibid., p. 78.

22. Ibid., p. 81.

23. Ibid., p. 108.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. AFM 1-1., p. 3-3.
34. Ibid., p. 3-1.
35. Ibid., p. 2-8.
36. S. J. Cobain, LTC, Air Command and Control (AC²) of MAGTF Aviation.
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