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ARTILLERY TERRAIN WALK GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD

BY

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The Battle of Gettysburg was fought on the first three days of July in 1863. The artillery of both sides played a significant role in this battle. This project is designed to be a training aid and stimulus for thought as it leads the young artillerymen on a terrain walk of the battlefield. Stops are at actual battery locations, and the reports of each particular action are read. These after action reports are the primary source of information presented.

The objective of this walk is for today's artilleryman to learn from his 1863 counterparts and to have a greater appreciation for the Redlegs who fought in the Battle of Gettysburg. It is also desired that he recognize the similarities in the requirements of the 1863 artilleryman and his doctrine to those of his own.
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ARTILLERY TERRAIN WALK GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Battle of Gettysburg was fought on the first three days of July in 1863. The artillery of both sides played a significant role in this battle.

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INTRODUCTION

This artillery terrain walk of the battle of Gettysburg is designed to be a self led tour of the battlefield. You will be your own teacher. This paper is your training aid.

At each stop on the tour, you will be able to read the official reports of the leaders who participated in this battle. In many cases, you will be amazed at the details contained in these reports. As you stand on the ground, read these first-hand accounts, and visualize the fight, try to translate what went on then to what goes on today.

Hopefully, you will see that your job today is not much different from the artillery lieutenant's or captain's jobs in 1863. Our guns are more destructive, they move faster and further, and they shoot greater distances; but now, as then, the basic considerations of putting steel on target are the same.

The artillerymen at the battle of Gettysburg were concerned with the proper positioning, providing the proper technical advice to the maneuver commander, firing the proper shell fuze combination, the friendly scheme of maneuver, logistics, etc. The playing field and equipment were different, but the concerns were the same. I hope that you will recognize this and be stimulated to be a better Redleg with a better appreciation of the Redlegs who fought this battle.

The principal object of artillery is to sustain the troops in attack and defense; to facilitate their movements and oppose the enemy's; to destroy his forces, as well as, the obstacles
which protect them; and to keep up the combat until an opportunity is offered for a decisive blow. This mission statement was that of the artilleryman of 1863. Is it much different than your mission statement today?

Before you begin the terrain walk, it is helpful to discuss the role and impact that artillery had in this battle. The artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia and that of the Army of the Potomac were alike and yet different in many ways.

The organization of the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia underwent a change in the winter of 1862-63. The practice of assigning batteries to infantry brigades ceased, and the artillery was organized into a number of battalions, usually of four batteries, with one or two field officers with the ranks of major or lieutenant-colonel to each. These battalions were supplied with an ordnance officer and a quartermaster. An adjutant was usually detailed from one of the batteries. The battalion commander reported to the chiefs of artillery of the corps, and on the march or in battle acted with, and received orders from, the general of the division with which they happened to be. On June 4th, 1863, just prior to the Gettysburg campaign, an officer of the rank of colonel was assigned to command the artillery of each corps.

This organization was the first step in allowing the Confederate artillery to mass its fires. Now, the chief of artillery of each corps could position his guns to provide the most efficient service. The rank of these chiefs of artillery was important in that it carried more influence than a lesser
rank. This was important when vying for positions or providing professional advice.

The Army of the Potomac had only recently been organized into artillery brigades. Each corps had an artillery brigade that fought with it, and a large artillery reserve was kept at both corps and army level. The rank of an artillery brigade commander assigned to a corps ranged from lieutenant to colonel. This presented the Union artillery problems. Brig. Gen. Hunt, the Chief of Artillery for the Army of the Potomac, recognized this and spent considerable time and effort after this battle in trying to correct this organizational problem.

The Confederate and Union artillery battalions were each comprised of 4-6 batteries. The guns were the same and, in most cases, Union ammunition was interchangeable with Confederate produced ammunition.

The Union batteries usually were composed of 6 guns of the same caliber. The Confederate batteries were composed of 4-6 guns of mixed caliber. Col. D.G. McIntosh, C.S.A., stated that the mixing of cannons caused many problems, in that it made ammunition supply more difficult and impaired the effectiveness of the batteries. He further observed that experience taught the value of concentrated fire, and that four Napoleons or four rifles were more effective than the fire of a mixed battery.3

Both sides suffered from ammunition problems. The Confederate manufactured ammunition was even more unreliable than that manufactured by the Union.

Employment tactics were essentially the same on both sides.
The advent of the rifled musket changed the employment somewhat because, heretofore, the artillery could advance to within 400-500 yards without much worry of being hit by the enemy's infantry. With the extended range of the newer rifled muskets, with ranges up to 800 yards, it made it very unwise for the artillery to advance to within canister range without infantry supports.

The way the Army of the Potomac, and specifically its chief of artillery, Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, used the artillery reserve was one of the pivotal points in the battle. Numerous accounts by men who were there describe Union batteries leaving their positions or being severely damaged only to be replaced by fresh batteries. The artillery reserve system of the Army of the Potomac was also used to resupply. A fresh battery was sent in to replace one that was out of ammunition enabling it to return to the reserve location and rearm and refit. This kept their guns in the fight.

The Confederates had a smaller artillery reserve and used it mainly to influence the battle by bringing more guns into the fight. Its batteries had to send back to ammunition trains for more ammunition. In several cases, batteries could not shoot for need of ammunition. The Union system was more efficient.

The Army of the Potomac had a Fire Support Coordinator in Brig. Gen. Hunt who also commanded the artillery. Hunt was one of the single most important factors in the outcome of the battle. In account after account, he was mentioned as being at hand. He seemed to be at the right time and place everytime.
His use of the artillery reserve, his instructions to his artillery commanders, and his read of the upcoming fights were uncannily correct. He was able to focus the combat power of his artillery. He was the single man in charge of the artillery, and it is obvious to me that he had the complete trust and confidence of Gen. Meade.

Brig. Gen. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery for the Army of Northern Virginia, was more of a liaison officer than a Fire Support Coordinator. He did not have the authority of a commander. This was a factor in the Army of Northern Virginia not having its artillery coordinated. The reports and first hand accounts of each day's fight contain references to Confederate battalions not engaging in the fight. There was no Confederate artilleryman with the authority to order and coordinate the artillery efforts between the corps.

In fairness to the artillery of the Confederacy, it should be said that it was not only the artillery that lacked coordination in this battle, but that the entire Army of Northern Virginia was not able to mass its combat power for a killing blow.

In researching this project, I came upon a speech given by Col. D.G. McIntosh at a banquet in Baltimore in 1907. Col. McIntosh, an artillery battalion commander in the reserve artillery of Hill’s corps during the battle of Gettysburg, was placed in command of the corps artillery in the fights on the second and third days of the battle, and played a prominent role in these fights. The occasion of his speech was the one
hundredth anniversary of the birth of Gen. Robert E. Lee. The following is an excerpt from this speech and should serve to stimulate you prior to starting this terrain walk.

"But in speaking as I do of the army of Northern Virginia I am speaking for the artillery. The one was part of and complimentary to the other. If the cavalry performed the office of eyes and ears to the army, and if the long legs of the infantry furnished the transportation, it was the artillery which dealt the heavy ponderous blows.

The infantry, too, had to its advantage the excitement of rapid motion, when, with mad enthusiasm and deafening yells, it swept out of its lines, and bore down in resistless torrent upon the forces of the enemy.

But it was the province of the artillery to stand fast, and make up in dogged pluck what it lacked in energy of motion. It was commonly theirs to defend and repel, and clear the way for the action of others; but this called for no less valor, and often times for a superior degree of coolness and daring. There can be no better exhibition of heroic courage than that displayed by cannoneers fighting their guns in the face of the enemy.

In our time a gun detachment was the most perfect unit in the whole army organization. The corporal who, with the old muzzle loader handled the trail and sighted the gun, was selected for the steadiness of his nerve and the accuracy of his eye. His will and his movements dominated every man of the group, and made it a perfect living machine. No picture in art or reality can compare with that of a gun well served in the height of action.
The tallest and brawniest of the number stands at the mouth of the gun, with sponge staff in hand. You have seen him under a summer's sun, with bared throat and sleeves rolled up, his face blackened with smoke and reeking with great drops of sweat, but his eyes blazing with the fierce light of battle. Scarcely has the flame shot from the muzzle when brandishing his staff, at one stroke, he has plunged it the length of the bore and the piece is swabbed; number 2 inserts the charge, and with another stroke of his long arm, with staff reversed, the charge is rammed home. In a trice, the gunner has made good aim the primer is inserted and with a wave of the hands the wheels are cleared and another messenger of death has sped its way.

A cavalry charge is fine, but fighting a gun in the face of the enemy is sublime. The climax is reached when the desperate cannoneer has gun disabled or his comrades fallen, and escape cut off, meets the thrust of the bayonet with his broken staff and perishes by his gun. I don't know anything about the modern gun, but for the effective work at close range, give me a brass Napoleon and a gun detachment from the Army of Northern Virginia."

Hunt would have probably said the same thing, except that he would have preferred a gun detachment from the Army of the Potomac. In either case, the point is the same: artillerymen are a special breed, and the gun section is a thing of beauty.

Take your time, enjoy yourself, and take away from this a greater appreciation of your profession. Proceed to the first stop.


3. Ibid., p. 60.

4. David Greg McIntosh Papers, Civil War Miscellaneous Collection, Archives U.S. Army War College Military History Institute.
Wednesday 1 July 1863

We begin this terrain walk on McPherson's Ridge. Leave downtown Gettysburg on U.S. Highway 30 headed west towards Chambersburg. About 1.2 miles from the Gettysburg town square there is a large equestrian statue on the right side of the road. Just past the statue on the left side of the road there is a U.S. Park Service information center. You can park in this area, or you can turn left on Stone Avenue, the road between the statue and the information center, and go about 70 meters until you see a small parking area in the trees to your right. You may also park here. Get out and walk to the statue and stand between the statue and the highway. You are on the south side of the statue. The town of Gettysburg is to the east (left) and Chambersburg is to the west (right). The statue is to the north.

Look east towards Gettysburg, and you will see a white spiral on the right side of the road as it enters the built-up area. To the right of the spiral, and at a greater distance you see a large observation tower. This is the National Tower and can be used as a point of reference from most parts of the battlefield. It sits very close to Cemetery Hill and will quickly orient you. Almost equidistance between the spiral and the National Tower is the chapel of the Lutheran Seminary. Its cupola, which is barely visible in the summertime due to the foliage, is the observation post that was used at different times by both sides during the battle.

Now look west towards Chambersburg. The road slopes downward into a creek bed, Willowby Run, and rises to a prominent ridge. This is Herr Ridge and can be further identified by a large barn with a silo and several buildings on the right side of the road. On the left side of the road there is a large red barn. Now look south across the highway and there is a barn to your left at a distance of about 75 meters. This is McPherson's Barn. Behind it and a little to its left is the site where the McPherson's house once stood. Behind the barn is Herbst's Woods. Now walk to the other side of the statue. As you look north, you will see the large Peace Memorial located on the side of Oak Hill. Approximately 100-150 meters in front of you is the Railroad Cut. It runs parallel to the highway back through Gettysburg.

STOP 1


Gettysburg Seminary is situated on a ridge about a quarter of a mile from town, the ridge running nearly north and south and parallel with the Emmitsburg pike. It is crossed by the Cashtown turnpike about 100 yards north of the
The west front of the seminary is shaded by a grove of large trees, and the whole top of the ridge on both sides is more or less crowned with open woods through its entire length. Beyond this ridge the ground falls gradually to the west, and rises again into a parallel ridge at a distance of about 400 yards. This second ridge (McPherson's Ridge) is wider and smoother than that on which the seminary stands, but ends about 200 yards north of where the Cashtown pike crosses it.

On the south side of this point is a house and large barn, with an apple orchard and some 5 acres of wood to the south of it; the rest of the ridge is cleared. It was around this house and wood that the first skirmish, in which General Reynolds fell, took place.... (Wainwright's report is from The War of Rebellion: a compilation of the Union and Confederate Armies (129 vols., Washington 1880-1901) Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 1, p.355. Hereafter this source will be cited as O.R., XXVII, Parts 1,2, or 3 plus the page information.)

This terrain description helps to orient you to the terrain through the eyes of an actual participant in this part of the battle. The Chambersburg road is also referred to in several reports as the Cashtown Road. The first battery to arrive in position on McPherson's Ridge was Battery A, Second U.S. Artillery.
June 30.—Marched... to Gettysburg, Pa., and went into position just outside of town. Hill's corps of the enemy reported to be about 3 miles from town. Strong cavalry pickets thrown out about a mile and a half. Our position on Carlisle road.

July 1.—Enemy reported to be advancing in heavy columns on Carlisle pike, and preparations were immediately made to receive them. This was about 8 a.m. Colonel Gamble, commanding the brigade of cavalry to which my battery was attached, requested me to select my own position. I accordingly selected a position about 600 yards in front of the one held during the night....I moved forward and took up the advanced position. No sooner was this accomplished than General Buford sent for me, and told me he wished one section on the left of the road and one still farther to the left. I accordingly placed First Sergeant Newman, commanding left section, on immediate left of road, and Sergeant Pergel, commanding center section, still farther to the left. No sooner was the latter placed in position than I heard the enemy's skirmishers open upon our pickets, who were retiring.

Lieutenant Roder now fired the first gun (which opened the sanguinary battle of Gettysburg) on the head of a column of rebel cavalry advancing on the right of the road. Two of the enemy's batteries, one on each side of the road, now opened on my guns near the road. The number of guns in each battery, as near as I could judge, was four; so that they
outnumbered mine just two to one. The enemy's infantry advanced rapidly, and the musketry and artillery fire soon became extremely warm. We, however, held our position until the arrival of the First Corps. At this juncture, General Buford ordered me to withdraw my guns in each section by piece, which was accordingly executed in good order. Sergeant Newman having four horses killed and disabled at his left piece, I immediately sent back for a limber from one of the caissons, but before it could be gotten up, Sergeant Newman, by strenuous exertions, drew off the piece with one team. The enemy's infantry was so close that it was impossible to take off all the harness; two sets out of the four were, however, afterward recovered by Sergeant Newman.

Riding over to Sergeant Pergel's section, I found that the enemy had advanced out of the woods in his front, and were making rapidly for his guns. He had already opened on them, and, by well-directed shots, had succeeded in checking them for the time. Having but a small cavalry support, and the woods occupied by the enemy extending up within 200 yards of the right of the section, I thought it inadvisable to wait till they arrived within canister range, and therefore withdrew the section, and took it, with the remainder of the battery, which had by this time withdrawn, to a point indicated by Colonel Gamble, and awaited orders. While there, I had the ammunition chests replenished, which was no sooner accomplished than General Buford sent for a piece to enfilade a ditch occupied by the enemy. Lieutenant Roder
took his right piece to the spot, and opened with canister, which had the effect of driving the enemy in great confusion....

Captain Hall's...battery, belonging to the First Corps, occupied the first position on the right of the road held by Lieutenant Roder's section after the latter had withdrawn. In about half an hour this battery was disabled, and leaving two pieces on the field, withdrew. The left and center sections of my battery were then ordered up again by General Wadsworth to reoccupy the ground just abandoned by Captain Hall, which was done under a heavy fire of musketry. As soon as the first gun was fired from my battery, three four-gun rebel batteries opened from the front and right of my position.

In this spot I had most men wounded, and by musketry. After occupying the ground about fifteen minutes, the rebel battery on my right and front moved off still more to the right, under cover of the woods, and took up a position so as to nearly enfilade my guns. I held this position as long as possible, but, the enemy having a cross-fire with several batteries, I was forced to withdraw. I then took up a position nearly on a line with my former one, but better covered by a corner of woods from the batteries in front, and remained in that position until relieved by a battery of the First Corps; then took up a position in a wheat-field about 500 yards to the rear and left of former position. Here I opened on a heavy column of rebel infantry advancing down the
Carlisle Pike. Remained in this position until toward evening, when we moved to the left about a mile, and bivouacked for the night. (Ope, XXVII. Part 1, pp. 1030-1032.)

There are several interesting points that can be made from Calef's report. The first is that Gen. Buford positioned Calef's guns. He obviously placed the guns in response to his own read of the threat. He saw the threat approaching from the west along the south side of Chambersburg road. Here we have a maneuver commander intimately involved with his fire support. In those days, artillery was a primary weapon against massed attacks, and the good maneuver commanders worked the artillery into the plan. At the time of this positioning, Calef's battery was the only artillery available in the area. It was therefore necessary for it to cover a wide frontage. Sgt. Pergel's section was probably emplaced several hundred meters to the left in order to cover the woodline between Herbst's Woods and Fairfield Road.

The "two enemy batteries, one on each side of the road" to which Calef refers were batteries belonging to the battalions of McIntosh and Pegram. These were located on Herr Ridge immediately to Calef's front. The ditch that Lieut. Roder was sent to cover was probably the Railroad Cut.

By withdrawing his sections by piece, he was able to protect his sections and the infantry as well. After withdrawing, he was again ordered back. Calef states that, "As soon as the first gun fired from my battery, three four-gun rebel batteries opened from the front and right of my position." The guns to the front were
again those of McIntosh or Pegram. The guns on the right marked the arrival of Carter's battalion in support of Podes' Division in Exell's Corps. These guns were located on Oak Hill. Buford and his forces were now being pressed by Hill's Corps from the west and Exell's Corps from the north. Note that he mistakenly refers to the Chambersburg Road as the Carlisle Pike.


On the morning of Wednesday, July 1....One battery of Napoleons, Captain R.S. Rice, and a section of Whitworths were placed first in position a short distance to the right of the turnpike, by the side of a portion of Major Pegram's battalion, and fire was opened slowly upon the enemy wherever they brought into view considerable bodies of troops, and occasionally upon their batteries. The Whitworth guns were used to shell the woods to the right of the town.

After a short interval, Captain M. Johnson's battery and the remaining section of Captain W.B. Hurt's were placed on a commanding hill some distance to the right, near the Fairfield road, at or near which point they remained during the first day's action without any occasion for an active participation, though frequently under fire. The remaining battery of the command, under Lieutenant Samuel Wallace, was also placed in a position near the Cashtown pike, and contributed its portion of work.

The artillery fire on both sides was occasionally brisk.
but deliberate on our part. At the time General Ewell's batteries occupied the enemy's attention, I opened on them a flank fire, which caused them to leave the position in haste. A fine opportunity was also afforded at this time of enfilading a heavy column of the enemy's infantry, formed in the railroad cut and along a line of fence, which was employed to advantage by my batteries in connection with Major Pegram, and the enemy, entirely discomfited, disappeared from the field. Previous to this time, I had advanced two of my batteries to the intervening hollow, and followed close upon the enemy as he left the hills.

(O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p. 674-675)


At 9 a.m. marched, following the advance brigade of the First Division, First Army Corps, to the battle-field, about a half mile south and west of town, where we were ordered into position by General Reynolds on the right of the Casstown road, some 400 yards beyond Seminary Hill. The enemy had previously opened a battery of six guns directly in our front at 1,300 yards distance, which they concentrated upon me as I went into position, but with very little effect.

We opened upon this battery with shot and shell at 10.45 a.m., our first six shots causing the enemy to change the position of two of his guns and place them under cover behind a barn. In twenty-five minutes from the time we opened fire, a column of the enemy's infantry charged up a ravine on our
right flank within 60 yards of my right piece, when they commenced shooting down my horses and wounding my men. I ordered the right and center sections to open upon this column with canister, and kept the left firing upon the enemy's artillery. This canister fire was very effective, and broke the charge of the enemy, when, just at this moment, to my surprise I saw my support falling back without any order having been given me to retire. Feeling that if the position was too advanced for infantry it was equally so for artillery, I ordered the battery to retire by sections although having no order to do so. The support falling back rapidly, the right section of the battery, which I ordered to take position some 75 yards to the rear, to cover the retiring of the other four pieces, was charged upon by the enemy's skirmishers and 4 of the horses from one of the guns shot. The men of the section dragged this gun off by hand.

As the last piece of the battery was coming away, all its horses were shot, and I was about to return for it myself, when General Wadsworth gave me a peremptory order to lose no time, but get my battery in position near the town, on the heights, to cover the retiring of the troops. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.359)

As mentioned in Calef's report, Hall's battery moved into positions to the right of Lt. Roder's section's initial firing position. This would have him occupying a front which stretched almost from the Chambersburg Road to the Railroad Cut. By the
time Hall arrived, Calef had already pulled out. Hall was initially concerned with engaging the guns of McIntosh and Pegram on Herr Ridge. The fact that he kept firing at the artillery on Herr Ridge when he was attacked by infantry, speaks to the effect that this artillery must have been having on the Union forces. In addition to countering this artillery, Hall's primary mission at this time was the survival of his battery.

The importance of knowing the enemy situation and coordinating with friendly units is evident in this report. Hall was not aware of the gravity of the situation until he saw his infantry support on the right retiring.

Another interesting point revealed in this report is that Colonel Wainwright, the senior Union artilleryman present, used his authority as the Chief of Artillery for First Corps to countermand the order of Gen. Wadsworth, a division commander. Here we see the early effects of the Union Army's reorganization of the artillery prior to Gettysburg.

Return to your vehicle. Proceed south on STONE AVENUE. As you go through the woods, the road turns and becomes MEREDITH AVENUE.

As you approach the stop sign, look south (right) along REYNOLDS AVENUE and you will see a monument flanked by guns. This marks the general location of Sergeant Pergel's section from Calef's battery. He was covering the open ground between the woods and FAIRFIELD ROAD.

Turn LEFT at the stop sign and drive about 100 meters. Park just short of the artillery position near the northeast side of HERBST'S WOODS. Get out of your vehicle and walk forward to the corner of the woods.

STOP 2

From this position, you get a good view of McPHERSON'S BARN.
HERR RIDGE, and Calef's and Hall's first positions, the PEACE MEMORIAL, the RAILROAD CUT, and the SEMINARY. The small stand of trees in the field just short of McPHERSON'S BARN is the site where McPherson's house formerly stood. From here, you also get a good appreciation of the advantage the Confederate artillery had in occupying both HERR RIDGE and OAK HILL. Notice how both sides were exposed when they crossed the terrain bounded by McPHERSON'S RIDGE, OAK HILL, and SEMINARY RIDGE.

Imagine being a Confederate soldier attacking along the south side of the Chambersburg Road into the canister of the Union batteries set up between the north side of the Railroad Cut and the Seminary.


As we came upon the field, the enemy opened fire upon us from two batteries on the opposite ridge, and continued it, with some intermissions, during the action. Our low ridge afforded slight shelter from this fire, but no better was attainable, and our first disposition was unchanged until between 12 and 1 o'clock, when a new battery upon a hill on the extreme right opened a most destructive enfilade of our line, and at the same time, all the troops upon my right fell back nearly a half mile to the Seminary Ridge.

This made my position hazardous and difficult in the extreme, but rendered its maintenance all the more important. I threw one regiment (One hundred and forty-ninth, Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight commanding) into the road, and disposed the others on the left of the stone building, to conceal them from the enfilading battery. My line thus formed a right angle facing north and west. Soon after, as
the enemy's infantry was developed in heavy force upon the right. I sent another regiment (One hundred and forty-third, Colonel Dana) to the right of the One hundred and forty-ninth. At about 1.30 p.m. the grand advance of the enemy's infantry began. From my position I was enabled to trace their formation for at least 2 miles. It appeared to be a nearly continuous line of deployed battalions, with other battalions in mass or reserve. Their line being formed not parallel but obliquely to ours, their left first became engaged with the troops on the northern prolongation of Seminary Ridge. The battalions engaged soon took a direction parallel to those opposed to them, thus causing a break in their line and exposing the flank of those engaged to the fire of my two regiments in the Chambersburg road. Though at the longest range of our pieces, we poured a most destructive fire upon their flanks, and, together with the fire in their front, scattered them over the fields.

A heavy force was then formed in two lines parallel to the Chambersburg road, and pressed forward to the attack of my position. Anticipating this, I had sent Colonel Dwight (One hundred and forty-ninth) forward to occupy a deep railroad cutting about 100 yards from the road, and when they came to a fence within pistol-shot of his line he gave them a staggering volley; reloading as they climbed the fence, and waiting till they came within 30 yards, gave them another volley, and charged, driving them back over the fence in utter confusion.
Returning to the cut, he found that the enemy had planted a battery which perfectly enfiladed and made it untenable, and he was obliged to fall back to the road.... This made a retreat necessary to prevent being completely surrounded, and the command fell back, making an occasional stand and fighting all the way to Seminary Ridge. There a firm stand was made and a battery brought off: thence the retreat was continued through the town, in which the troops suffered heavily from the fire of the enemy, who already occupied the streets on both their flanks. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 329-330.)

Col. Stone’s brigade arrived on the field about 11 a.m. and occupied the ridge from the Chambersburg Road south along McPherson’s Ridge. When he reoriented his forces, he put two regiments along the Chambersburg Road from about where you are standing and stretched them back towards Gettysburg. His brigade was then in an "L" shaped configuration extending along both McPherson’s Ridge and the Chambersburg Road.

Visualize being in the railroad cut and being subjected to the artillery fire from the battalions on Herr Ridge. Imagine then climbing out of the cut, and being subjected to the combined fires of the artillery not only on Herr Ridge, but from Oak Hill as well.


On Wednesday, July 1, Chambersburg, Pa., having been
reached by easy marches and passed, after a rest of one or two days, and the army being in motion toward Gettysburg, occasional cannon-shots in that direction were heard by myself and others with the main body, as before noon we crossed the mountain. Two divisions of the Third Corps Heth's and Pender's, the former with Pegrams artillery battalion, the latter with McIntosh's were in advance on this road: while of the Second Corps, Early's division, attended by Jones' artillery battalion, was approaching from the direction of York, and Rodes from that of Carlisle, accompanied by Carter's battalion. The advance of the Third Corps had encountered at Gettysburg a force of the enemy, and the firing heard was the beginning of a battle. Its significance, however, was not then fully understood. It might be only a passing skirmish; it might be more serious. After a brief pause near Cashtown, to see how it would prove, the commanding general, finding the cannonade to continue and increase, moved rapidly forward. I did the same, and, at his request rode near him for instructions. Arriving near the crest of an eminence more than a mile west of the town, dismounting and leaving horses under cover, on foot we took position overlooking the field. It was, perhaps, 2 o'clock, and the battle was raging with considerable violence. The troops of the Second Corps having reached the field some time after the engagement was opened by those of the Third, Carter's and Jones' batteries were at the time of our arrival plied on the left with
freshness and vigor upon the batteries and infantry that had been pressing the Third Corps, and, when these turned upon their new assailants, they were handsomely enfiladed by the batteries of McIntosh and Pegram, posted in front of our lookout on the left and right of the road. To counteract this damaging double attack, the enemy made, especially with his artillery, such effort as he could. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 348-349.)

The significant information gained from this report is that Lee had his Fire Support Coordinator at his side. This is interesting because at this time Brig. Gen. Pendleton did not command the artillery. He was more like a liaison officer.


Having massed the batteries immediately in rear of the first ridge, I rode forward to examine the ground in front, and was met by a member of General Doubleday's staff, with an order to post a battery on the outer ridge, if possible. Directing Captain Reynolds to move his battery of six 3-inch guns forward, I rode up on to the ridge. but finding that the battery would be exposed and totally without support, I withdrew it before it reached the crest. Soon afterward the Third division, with Cooper's battery, arrived and took position along the open part of the crest, the battery being posted in an oat-field some 350 yards south c
the Cashtown road.

One brigade of the First Division had meantime occupied the wood where the first engagement took place, and General Wadsworth sent to ask for a battery, but as there was no infantry to protect its right flank, and Captain Hall had previously come so near to losing his battery in the same position, I did not consider it safe to place a battery in that position until our Second division, which was just arriving, had taken position and I had examined the ground on the flank, the enemy being quiet at this time. Finding General Robinson's division and the Second Brigade of the First Division occupying a wood on the west slope of Seminary Ridge north of the railroad, and the Eleventh Corps coming into position across the flat at right angles to our front, I returned to the Cashtown road, and directed Lieutenant Stewart to report to General Robinson with his battery, which had previously been posted some 200 yards south of the seminary, but not engaged.

Meantime General Wadsworth had ordered Captain Tidball's horse battery into position on the right of his First Brigade, where Captain Hall's battery had been, and it had just commenced a sharp engagement with the enemy's battery directly in front. As soon as possible, I moved Reynolds's battery up to relieve Tidball's, but it had not fairly gotten into position before the enemy opened a severe fire from a second battery immediately on our right. By this cross-fire both batteries were obliged to withdraw, Reynolds taking
position again at right angles to the ridge, so that his left was covered by the woods. While removing his battery, Captain Reynolds received a severe wound in the right eye, but refused for some time to leave the field. The enemy's battery soon after ceased firing. Receiving another request from General Wadsworth for some guns on his front, I posted Lieutenant Wilber with a section of Company L, First New York, in the orchard on the south side of the Casstown road, where he was sheltered from the fire of the enemy's battery on his right flank by the intervening house and barn, and moved the remaining four pieces around to the south side of the wood on the open crest.

Having heard incidentally some directions given to General Doubleday about holding Cemetery Hill, and not knowing that there was such a place, while the seminary was called indiscriminately cemetery and seminary, I supposed the latter was meant. I therefore directed Captain Cooper to take a good position in front of the professor's house on this ridge, and sent an order to Captain Stevens, of the Fifth Maine Battery, to occupy the position first assigned to Lieutenant Stewart. Soon after this, the enemy filed in two strong columns out of the woods, about 500 yards to our front, and marched steadily down to our left until they outflanked us barely a third of a mile. They then formed in double line of battle, and came directly up the crest. During this movement, Battery L opened on the columns, but the firing of Lieutenant Breck's four guns was much
interfered with by our own infantry moving in front of his
batteries. As we had no regular line of battle on this crest,
and the enemy outnumbered us five to one, I withdrew
Lieutenant Bieck's two sections when their first line was
within about 200 yards, and ordered him behind a strong stone
wall on the seminary crest.

Meantime General Doubleday had removed Captain Stevens'
battery to the right of Captain Cooper's, and Lieutenant
Wilber's section falling back with its support came into
position at the same point, thus concentrating twelve guns in
so small a space that they were hardly 5 yards apart.
Lieutenant Stewart's battery was also in position on the same
line, half the battery between the Cashtown pike and the
railroad, the other half across the railroad in the corner of
a wood.

The enemy's lines continued to advance steadily across
the space between the two crests, but when the first line was
within about 100 yards of the seminary, Lieutenant Davison,
commanding the left half of Stewart's battery, swung his guns
around on the Cashtown pike, so as to enfilade the whole
line. This, with the fire of the other batteries, checked
them for a moment at this point, but it was only for a
moment, as their second line did not halt, but pushed on,
strongly re-enforced by a third column deploying from the
Cashtown road. An order was now received by Captain Stevens
from General Wadsworth to withdraw his battery. Not knowing
that he had received such an order, and still under the false
impression as to the importance attached to holding Seminary Hill. I directed all the batteries to remain in position. A few minutes, however, showed me our infantry rapidly retreating to the town. All the batteries were at once limbered to the rear and moved at a walk down the Cashtown Pike until the infantry had all left it and passed under cover of the railroad embankment. By this time the enemy's skirmishers had lapped our retreating columns and opened a severe fire from behind a paling fence running parallel to and within 50 yards of the road. The pike being clear, the batteries now broke into a trot, but it was too late to save everything. Lieutenant Wilber's (Battery L, First New York) last piece had the off wheel-horse shot, and just as he had disengaged it, 3 more of the horses were shot down and his own horse killed, so that it was impossible for him to bring it off. It affords me pleasure to say that not the slightest blame can be attributed to Lieutenant Wilber in the loss of this gun.

Three caissons belonging to Battery B, Fourth U.S. Artillery, also broke down before we entered the town, and the bodies had to be abandoned. Another caisson of the same battery was struck by a shell and destroyed. Four officers were struck while in position on Seminary Hill, two of them severely wounded. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p.355-357.)

In this report, the battery commanded by Lieutenant Calef is referred to as Tidball's Battery. Capt. Tidball assumed command
of the Second Brigade Horse Cavalry in Buford's Cavalry Division
just prior to the battle, and turned the battery over to Calef.

It is beneficial to read this report because it gives the
reader the full story of the first day's battle of the Union
artillery on this portion of the battlefield. This reinforces
what has already been seen and read, and gives a better
appreciation for the movements of the batteries. A battery
commander at Gettysburg had to move and position his battery
during the fight just like today's battery commander and platoon
leader. A good knowledge of the terrain, the enemy, and friendly
situation was just as important then as it is today.

The final positions of the Union batteries, as reported by
Wainwright, can easily be seen from this position. Look east
along the Chambersburg Road, and you see a motel on the left side
of the road. Behind the line of trees, about 50 meters from the
motel sign, is the location of the left half of Stewart's
battery. About 200 meters north, on the far side of the railroad
tracks, is where Stewart's other guns were located. Starting on
the south side of the Chambersburg Road and stretching about 200
meters back to the seminary is where the other batteries were
located.

It was along this line that the artillery of the First Corps
put up its last defense before withdrawing to Cemetery Hill.
Colonel Wainwright had mistaken Seminary Hill for Cemetery Hill
and directed his artillery to hold at the seminary. By putting
them into positions here he very nearly lost them.
The cannons and monuments, just in front of where you parked, mark the vicinity of Reynolds' guns when they withdrew from Tidball's (Calef's) position and set up at right angles to the ridge with their left covered by the woods. The guns then would have been pointing north towards Carter's guns on OAK HILL and not as they are now. After Reynolds was wounded, Lieut. Breck took command of the battery. His report follows:


At about 11 a.m. of the 1st instant, my battery, then in command of Capt. Gilbert H. Reynolds, arrived at the scene of action, after a hurried march from Emmitsburg. The battery was immediately moved into the field west of the town... About 1 p.m. the battery was ordered by Col. C.S. Wainwright to advance to the support of Tidball's battery, which occupied a knoll across a road to the front and extreme left of our line as then engaged. One section of the battery had hardly come into position when, in addition to the galling fire in front, an enfilading fire was opened from the left, which completely swept the position and forced both batteries to retire. At this point, Captain Reynolds was severely wounded, and the command of the battery devolved upon me.

I brought the pieces again into position about 500 yards in rear of the first position, and in a line nearly west of the brick seminary.
After an engagement of nearly an hour's duration in the
last-named position, I moved my battery to the crest of a
hill to the left and front, and fired about 6 rounds at the
lines of the enemy, which were very steadily extended around
our left.

The right section of the battery, under command of
Lieut. B.W. Wilbur, was ordered to go still farther to the
left, where a few rounds only were fired, when the section
was forced to retire with our troops, who were rapidly
falling back, closely pressed by the enemy. The other four
pieces, under command of Lieut. William H. Bower and the
immediate supervision of Colonel Wainwright, returned to the
second position above named. As the infantry were falling
back close upon the guns, no fire was opened, and the four
pieces again retired, and took position upon the ridge
running south from the brick seminary and in rear of the
belt of timber to the left of that building. After firing a
number of rounds in this position, including some canister,
and with great effect, the enemy charging upon the guns, the
four pieces again retired under cover of the line of cavalry
already formed to cover the withdrawal of our troops. These
pieces, the supply of ammunition being exhausted, were then
conducted from here by Lieutenant Bower to a position of
security on the Taneytown road. I accompanied the right
section, which, continuing to retire, took its third
position on the ridge running south from the seminary, near
a small house and orchard. Here, after expending a few
rounds, including canister, the section was ordered to again retire, which it did by a road leading through the town....

I took position with the five remaining pieces of the battery to the front and right of the cemetery gate, as before mentioned, which position, by order of Colonel Wainwright, I caused to be intrenched; and held during the two following days of the battle.(O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p.362-363.)


On the morning of the 1st of July, the battery marched from camp near Emmitsburg, Md., to the vicinity of Gettysburg, Pa. Here it was placed in position by Colonel Wainwright, about 12 m., on the left of the Third Division, First Army Corps, and fired about twenty-five shots at a battery in front, which was firing upon the infantry of the corps and Captain Hall's battery. This battery soon ceased firing, and another directly on the right opened, when we changed front to the right, by order of Colonel Wainwright, and engaged it for a few minutes, when the colonel ordered the battery to be placed in position near the Gettysburg seminary. Here it remained unengaged for a few minutes, when a battery in front again opened and fired a few minutes, when the enemy's infantry made its appearance along the woods and crest in our front. The fire of the battery was then concentrated upon them, case shot and shell being
used until canister range was obtained, and this, with the assistance of Lieutenant Stewart's and Captain Stevens' batteries, reduced the enemy's lines very much. At about 5 p.m., all infantry support having been driven back, the battery was compelled to retire through Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill. In this day's engagement about 400 rounds of ammunition were expended, but three guns being engaged, one axle having broken from recoil at the first few shots....(O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p.364-365.)

The most interesting aspect of Cooper's report is that he states that the battery fired about 400 shots, of which about 25 were fired at a battery, then he changed front and fired for a few more minutes. This means that most of his shots were fired at close range from his position at the seminary. His rate of fire must have been tremendous and the action as heavy as described. The enemy battery he refers to must have been one of McIntosh's which had moved forward at this time and occupied positions on McPherson's Ridge.

The reports of Major Engelhard and Lieut. Col. Scales are provided to give the Confederate picture of this portion of the battle. Both describe the intense firing put up by the Union forces near the seminary. Engelhard also describes the situation that led to the Union batteries escaping capture. In Engelhard's report, he describes ascending a hill to his front. This hill is actually the ridge on which you are now standing.
Simultaneous with the appearance of Lieutenant-General Ewell on the left, a general advance was ordered on the right....

About 4 o'clock, General Pender ordered an advance of the three brigades, with instructions to pass General Heth's Division, if found at a halt, and charge the enemy's position, which was on a prominent ridge between a quarter and a half mile from Gettysburg....

Colonel Perrin, after passing General Heth's Division, took advantage of a ravine to reform his line, and moved rapidly forward, preserving an alignment with General Scales, on his left.

Upon ascending a hill in front, the brigade was met by a furious storm of musketry and shell from infantry posted behind temporary breastworks and artillery from batteries to the left of the road near Gettysburg. The brigade steadily advanced at a charge, reserving its fire, as ordered, easily dislodging the enemy from his several positions, and meeting with but little opposition, excepting from an enfilade fire from the artillery on the left, until it came within 200 yards of his last position, the ridge upon which is situated the theological college.

The brigade, in crossing a line of fencing, received a most withering and destructive fire, but continued to charge without returning the fire of the enemy until reaching the
edge of the grove which crowns the crest of the ridge. Colonel Perrin, here finding himself without support either on the right or left (General Lane having been delayed by the attack on his flank, and General Scales' brigade having halted to return the fire of the enemy after their brigade commander had been wounded), attacked the enemy determinedly in his immediate front with success, suffering greatly by an enfilade fire on both flanks, and then, dividing his command by ordering the two right regiments to change front to the left, he attacked the enemy posted on the right behind a stone wall and on the left behind a breastwork of rails in flank, easily routing them, driving them through the town to Cemetery Hill.

This movement caused the artillery on the left, which had continued to keep up a constant and destructive fire upon the advancing lines of the division, to limber up and move to the rear. Much of this artillery would have been captured, but the two left regiments met a second force of the enemy posted behind a stone fence to the left of the college, which was easily dislodged, but not in time to intercept the fleeing batteries....

General Scales, on the left, with his left resting on the turnpike, after passing the troops of General Heth, advanced at a charge upon the flank of a brigade of the enemy which was engaged with the extreme left of General Heth's division, upon the opposite side of the road, which soon caused the enemy to fall back. The brigade continued
to advance rapidly, and as it commenced to descend the hill opposite the ridge upon which the enemy was posted, it encountered a most terrific fire of grape and shell on the left flank, and grape and musketry in front, but still it pressed forward at a double-quick until the bottom was reached, a distance of about 75 yards from the enemy's fortified position. Here the fire was most severe. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p. 656-657.)


We pressed on until coming up with the line in our front, which was at a halt and lying down. I received orders to halt, and wait for this line to advance. This they soon did, and pressed forward in quick time. That I might keep in supporting distance, I again ordered an advance, and, after marching one-fourth of a mile or more, again came upon the front line, halted and lying down. The officers on this part of the line informed me that they were without ammunition, and would not advance farther. I immediately ordered my brigade to advance. We passed over them, up the ascent, crossed the ridge, and commenced the descent just opposite the theological seminary. Here the brigade encountered a most terrific fire of grape and shell on our flank, and grape and musketry in our front. Every discharge made sad havoc in our line, but still we pressed on at a double-quick until we reached the bottom, a distance
of about 75 yards from the ridge we had just crossed, and about the same distance from the college, in our front. Here I received a painful wound from a piece of shell, and was disabled. Our line had been broken up, and now only a squad here and there marked the place where regiments had rested.

Every field officer of the brigade save one had been disabled, and the following list of casualties will attest sufficiently the terrible ordeal through which the brigade passed....(O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p.669-670.)

The ridge that Scales reports they had just crossed is McPherson's Ridge. This fight, for all intents and purposes ended the fight for the artillery on the first day. There were still engagements around Cemetery Hill, but no major battles.

Brig. Gen. Hunt gives a good summary of the losses sustained by the Union artillery around the seminary in this first day’s fight.


The losses of the batteries of the First Corps in these operations were heavy: 83 officers and men killed and wounded...and about 80 horses, a large proportion of the latter between the Seminary Ridge and the town, the enemy having at that time a fire upon them from both flanks and the rear, and no infantry replying. The batteries passed immediately through the town, and were placed with those of
the Eleventh Corps in position on Cemetery Hill, so as to command the town and the approaches from the northwest.
(O.P., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 231.)

Return to your vehicle and proceed NORTH to the next stop.

As you approach the stop sign at the CHAMBERSBURG ROAD, look left and right to get a better appreciation of the terrain between McPHERSON'S RIDGE and SEMINARY RIDGE. As the ground dips between the two ridges, you can certainly understand how the artillery firing canister was able to buy the time needed for the Union's retreat through town.

Cross the CHAMBERSBURG ROAD and slow down as you cross the RAILROAD CUT. Look up and down the cut. It should be obvious to you that this could either offer protection from attacks and fires from the north and south, or could also be a deadly kill zone from fires along its length. This proved to be the case for both sides during this battle.

Turn LEFT onto BUFORD AVENUE after crossing the RAILROAD CUT and continue. Cross the MUMMASBURG ROAD and park in the parking lot in front of the PEACE MEMORIAL. Get out and walk to the memorial and look back towards McPHERSON'S BARN.

STOP 3

Visualize yourself as a cannoneer in Carter's battalion coming into this position and seeing the First Union Corps deployed along Seminary Ridge and McPherson's Ridge. The Union units were oriented to the west in the direction of Herr Ridge. The fires from your battalion enfiladed their positions and had major impact on this first day's battle.


On reaching the field, July 1, the enemy was found to be in possession of a high ridge west of Gettysburg. Their
advance line occupied a small crest still farther west, and was engaged with A.P. Hill's corps when we arrived. Rodes' division was deployed in two lines, at right angles to the high crest and to the enemy's lines of battle. The batteries of Captain W.P. Carter and Captain C.W. Fry were ordered to a high point in front of Rodes' lines, near the Cashtown turnpike, to enfilade the enemy's lines and batteries, which stretched along the small crest to the railroad cut. The batteries fired with very decided effect, compelling the infantry to take shelter in the railroad cut, and causing them to change front on their right. The enemy's guns replied slowly. Owing to the exposed position of Captain Carter's battery, which was unavoidable, it suffered much at this point; having 4 men killed outright and 7 more or less severely wounded.

The enemy, finding their position untenable and turned by a strong force, extended their line to their right, to confront us. General Rodes, therefore, sent for two batteries, and posted them on the left. Captain R.C.M. Page and W.J. Reese, then not engaged, were ordered to report to him. Captain Page opened from a point at the foot of the high ridge on the infantry advancing on Colonel O'Neal. The artillery of the enemy by this time had taken position in the valley north of Gettysburg, and delivered a very destructive oblique fire on Page's battery. His loss here was heavy—2 men killed, 2 mortally wounded, 26 more or less badly wounded, and 17 horses killed and disabled; but
it was borne with unflinching courage by the gallant captain and his officers and men until ordered to retire to another position.

General Doles, on the left of the front line of General Rodes' division, reported a large force massing on his front and left, near the Heidlersburg Road, and asked to be supported by artillery. Leaving Captain Fry at the first position on the high ridge, Carter's, Page's, and Reese's batteries were put in position at the foot of the high ridge, and in rear of Doles' brigade, to prevent the enemy from turning Rodes' extreme left. Here these batteries rendered excellent service, driving back both infantry and artillery. Captain Carter's battery was particularly effective in its fire at this position.

General Early now advanced, Doles took it up, and Rodes' whole line pressed forward, forcing back the enemy at all points. My battalion followed, a few pieces unlimbering from time to time to break up the formations of the enemy as they endeavored to rally under cover of the small crests near the town. After the capture of Gettysburg, no further movement was made during the afternoon. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p. 602-603.)

Carter's report does not mention the fact that Fry's battery moved forward with Col. O'Neal's brigade.

An advance and charge was immediately ordered. Captain W.C. Fry moved up his battery, and by his energy, coolness, and skill aided materially in driving the enemy across the plain and through and beyond the town. We drove (in connection with the other brigades of the division) the enemy through the town and to the heights beyond it. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p. 593.)

Return to your vehicle. Proceed EAST out of the parking lot. As you start down, and just as you break the treeline on your left, there is a place on the right to pull off. Stop here.

To your left and rear along the treeline you see four guns. These guns represent the guns of Page's and Reese's batteries. Reese's battery was not actually located here. It was initially positioned 300-400 meters to the north and at the base of the ridge. Page's battery was positioned near the location where you are now.

Proceed to the stop sign at the next intersection. Cross the intersection and park in the lot next to the observation tower. Get out and climb to the top of the tower. Face EAST across the low ground.

STOP 4

To your right front on the horizon is the NATIONAL TOWER. CEMETERY HILL is the high ground just on each side just short of the NATIONAL TOWER. From the tower look left and see the large green storage tank. At a lesser distance and on a line just to the right of the large red brick building observe, the guns aligned along the road. These guns represent Dilger's battery. The road was not there during the battle. Follow the road to the left of Dilger's guns. It crosses CARLISLE ROAD just to the right of the large building with the four loading doors. Follow the road across CARLISLE ROAD until you see the rise of ground where the road loops back toward the town. This high ground also has several distinct monuments on it. This is BARLOW'S KNOLL. To the left of BARLOW'S KNOLL and at a greater distance you see a group of houses. Very near these houses is the position occupied by Jones' battalion.
The railroad tracks right in front of the tower were not there at the time of the battle. Follow these tracks to the left and where they start to enter the woodline at the base of Oak Hill. Look further out and see a large building. Between where the tracks enter the woodline and this building, 300-400 meters from Page's position on the hill, is where Reese initially occupied.


By the time this message reached me, General A.P. Hill had already been warmly engaged with a large body of the enemy in his front, and Carter's artillery battalion, of Rodes' division, had opened with fine effect on the flank of the same body, which was rapidly preparing to attack me, while fresh masses were moving into position in my front. It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up, and I determined to push the attack vigorously. General Rodes had drawn up his division, Iverson's brigade on the right, Rodes' (old) brigade (Colonel O'Neal's) in the center (these two on the ridge leading to the west of Gettysburg), and Doles on the left, in the plain. The Fifth Alabama was retained by General Rodes, to guard a wide gap left between O'Neal and Doles. Daniel and Ramseur were in reserve. He at once moved forward, and, after advancing for some distance in line, came in sight of the enemy, and O'Neal and Iverson were ordered to attack, Daniel advancing in line 200 yards in rear of Iverson's right, to protect that flank.

All of General Rodes' troops were now engaged. The enemy were moving large bodies of troops from the town against his left, and affairs were in a very critical
condition, when Major-General Early, coming up on the Heidlersburg road, opened a brisk artillery fire upon large columns moving against Doles' left, and ordered forward Gordon's brigade to the left of Doles', which, after an obstinate contest, broke Barlow's division, captured General (F. C.) Barlow, and drove the whole back on a second line, when they were halted, and General Early ordered up Hays' and Hokes' brigades on Gordon's left, and the three drove the enemy precipitately toward and through the town just as Ramseur broke those in his front. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p. 444-445.)


I have the honor to report...that on the morning of the 1st instant, I moved from Emmitsburg toward Gettysburg with the artillery of the corps, consisting of five batteries, and marched in the following order: Captain Dilger in advance with the Third Division, Lieutenant Wheeler with the First Division and in the center, the three remaining batteries following closely in rear of the center division.

I herewith enumerate the batteries of the command:
Battery G, Fourth U.S. Artillery, commanded by Lieut. B. Wilkeson, six light 12-pounders; Battery I, First Ohio Artillery, commanded by Capt. H. Dilger, six light 12-pounders; Battery K, First Ohio Artillery, commanded by

After moving 5 or 6 miles, I received notice from Major-General Howard that the First Corps was already engaged with the enemy at Gettysburg, and that I should move the artillery to the front as rapidly as possible.

A little after 10 a.m. the first battery (Dilger’s) reached the town, and was ordered by General Schurz to the front of and 300 yards beyond the town, where he took position, and at once became engaged with a rebel battery about 1,000 yards in its front. This battery was soon supported by another, when Captain Dilger was compelled to stand the fire from both until the arrival of Wheeler’s battery half an hour later, when I ordered Lieutenant Wheeler to report to Captain Dilger....

During the short struggle both batteries changed position several times, and did so with excellent results and in the best possible manner, Captain Dilger using much judgment in the selection of his several positions. They did not leave their immediate locality until the corps was ordered by the commanding general to fall back to Cemetery Hill.

About 11 a.m. Lieutenant Wilkeson reached the field, and was ordered to report to General Barlow, commanding the
First Division, which was engaged about three-fourths of a mile from the town and on the left of the York pike. The battery was assigned position by General Barlow, and when I reached the ground I found it unfortunately near the enemy's line of infantry, with which they were engaged, as well as two of his batteries, the concentrated fire of which no battery could withstand. Almost at the first fire, Lieutenant Wilkeson was mortally wounded, and carried from the field by 4 of his men. The command of the battery now devolved upon Lieutenant Bancroft. By changing position several times, the battery maintained its relative position until the division fell back to the town, when it retired to Cemetery Hill. During this engagement the battery was separated into sections or half batteries, and its struggle to maintain itself was very severe and persistent.

Captain Heckman was not ordered in until the corps had begun to fall back. He was then put into position, with a view of holding the enemy in check until the corps had time to retire through the town to the hill beyond, and though he worked his battery to the best of his ability, the enemy crowded upon it, and was within his battery before he attempted to retire. He was compelled to leave one gun in the hands of the enemy. I think no censure can be attached to this battery for the loss of the gun. The battery was so severely disabled otherwise that I was compelled to send it to the rear, thus losing the benefit of it during the fight of the second and third days.
Captain Wiedrich was assigned, on his arrival upon the field, to a position on the hill immediately in front of the cemetery entrance and overlooking the town. He was engaged several times during the day with the enemy's artillery at long range. He maintained the same position during the three days' fighting, but on this p.m. Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery First Corps, took command of his battery, with the artillery on that side of the Baltimore pike. The artillery of the corps ceased firing for the day, when the corps fell back to Cemetery Hill. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 747-748.)

Osborn describes several things in his report that are worth a closer look. The Dilger/Wheeler duel with the batteries of Page, Reese, and Carter is a fine description of a counterbattery fight. Reread Lieut. Col. Carter's report from the last stop. Imagine Carter and Reese coming down the hill to help Page who has been hit hard by Dilger and Wheeler. Visualize Dilger and Wheeler advancing under each other's protective fires. Imagine being Lieut. Bancroft and taking command after Wilkeson went down. He was under intense artillery fire from Jones' battalion and under heavy pressure from advancing infantry. He moved around by section to protect his guns, and his cannoneers stood by their guns. You get an even better feel for the job these battery commanders did by reading their reports.

Report of Capt. Hubert Dilger, U.S.A., Battery I, First Ohio Light Artillery, Artillery Brigade, Eleventh Corps, Army of
The battery arrived at Gettysburg at about 10 a.m. July 1, attached to the division of Maj. Gen. C. Schurz, commanded by Brig. Gen. A. Schimmelfennig, who ordered me to take a position between the Taneytown and Baltimore road, wherever I might find it necessary, to which order I complied by putting one section, Lieutenant (Clark) Scripture commanding, on the highest point of the field. A four-gun battery of the enemy immediately opened fire at about 1,400 yards on this section, and compelled me very soon to bring my whole battery into action. During this heavy artillery duel, the enemy had been re-enforced to eight pieces, of which two advanced (to within) 800 or 1,000 yards, but I finally succeeded in silencing them, with a loss of five carriages, which they had to leave on the ground, after several efforts to bring them to the rear with new horses.

Short time afterward, a rifled battery commenced to play on me, and you brought, at my request, Lieutenant Wheeler's battery to my support, and gave me the honor of taking charge of both batteries. I instantly advanced Lieutenant Weidman's section about 600 yards on our right, on the Baltimore and Harrisburg Road, and returned from there the other four pieces of my battery on the left, under protection of Lieutenant Wheeler's fire, about 400 yards.

In advancing, a ditch (5 feet wide and 4 feet deep, crossing the field in our front) had to be filled up, so as
to form at least a passage for a column by pieces which was executed under a very heavy fire. Lieutenant Wheeler followed as soon as my pieces were in position, and we remained here until the enemy's infantry commenced to mass on our right flank 100 yards, supported by about four batteries, which concentrated their fire on us, one of them enfilading our line completely, causing great damage to men and horses, and disabling one piece of mine and one of Wheeler's battery.

Our final retreat was executed in the same manner as the advance, and our infantry falling back toward the town, which could only be reached on one road, I sent all the pieces back excepting one section of each battery, commanding with them the entrance of the town as long as possible. The two rifled guns had to retire first, because I would not expose them too much at this short range, at which they commenced to become useless.

Our infantry having reached the town, I left my position, and was relieved on the Market road by two pieces of Battery G, Fourth U.S. Artillery.

The main road was completely blockaded by artillery, infantry, and ambulances, and I took the first road to the left, marched around the town, and rejoined my command on Cemetery Hill, having lost on this day 14 men, 24 horses, and 1 piece disabled.

During the whole engagement, three of my caissons were always employed to carry ammunition, and as slowly as I
directed the fire, we were twice nearly out of ammunition.

In regard to the ammunition, I must say that I was completely dissatisfied with the results observed of the fuses for 12-pounder shells and spherical case, on the explosion of which, by the most careful preparation, you cannot depend. The shell fuses, again, were remarkably less reliable than those for spherical case. The fuses for 3-inch ammunition caused a great many explosions in our right before the mouth of the guns, and it becomes very dangerous for another battery to advance in the fire of his batteries, which kind of advancing of smooth-bore batteries is of very great importance on the battlefield, and should be done without danger. I would, therefore, most respectfully recommend the use of percussion shells only.

The other three days, major, I had the honor to stay under your immediate command, and cannot report any fact of special importance, excepting the loss of 2 men and 4 horses more. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 754-755.)

Dilger was hit by Page's battery almost as soon as he got his first gun into position; and, despite the odds, he was successful in silencing these guns for a short time. He skillfully coordinated the actions of, not only his battery, but Wheeler's as well.

It is particularly interesting to read that he had to negotiate an obstacle during the middle of a fight. You never know when an obstacle will appear; and, just as Dilger was
resourceful in negotiating any obstacles, so must the modern artilleryman be resourceful.

Dilger husbanded his assets. Realizing his rifled guns were not effective at close ranges, he sent them back out of harm's way. This was a good decision on his part. Dilger kept three caissons on the road at all times carrying ammunition. He was managing his ammunition and had obviously developed a system.

Another example of Dilger's professionalism is that he, not only identified the problem with fuzes for three inch ammunition, he came up with a recommendation for a change in employment.


On July 1, I marched from Emmitsburg with the Second Division (General Steinwehr), but, when within about 5 miles of Gettysburg, I was ordered to move forward at double-quick, which I did, proceeding at a rapid trot, and losing a large amount of forage from the roughness of the road.

Upon arriving at Gettysburg, ...received orders to move through the town to the front, and to support Captain Dilger's battery....I took up my position on Captain Dilger's right, and as soon as my guns had got the range of the hostile battery, they responded to it with good effect. Under their cover, Captain Dilger moved several hundred yards forward into a wheat-field. As soon as he commenced firing, I limbered up and followed, again taking position on his right. A very heavy fire was opened on us here both in
front and upon the right flank, but we continued to hold the position.

The enemy then massed his infantry and threw them upon the troops on our right, who fell back after some severe fighting. I changed the direction of my right section, and fired into the advancing column of the enemy with canister, but did not succeed in checking them. I did not leave this position until the enemy was almost in rear of my battery. I then moved back to a point on the road near the town, and held this until the enemy were again nearly behind me, and the infantry supports had withdrawn....

I then moved through the town, and was assigned by you a position on Cemetery Hill, being on the left wing of the batteries of the corps. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 752-753.)


The battery, under the command of First Lieut. Bayard Wilkeson, Fourth U.S. Artillery, left camp, near Emmitsburg, Md., at 9 a.m. July 1, and marched to Gettysburg, Pa. When about 2 miles from the latter place, the order to trot was received, and, moving rapidly forward, the battery reached the town at 11 a.m.; passed directly through the village, and, turning to the right, in rear of our lines of batteries, moved about 1 mile through some fields, and immediately engaged the enemy. Leaving the left section, under Second Lieut. C. F. Merkle, on the south side of the
York road, near the poor-house, the right and center sections took position on the north side of the road, and some distance eastward of the poor-house.

At this point, Lieutenant Wilkeson was struck in the right leg by a shot from the enemy's artillery, and mortally wounded. After engaging two of the rebel batteries for about half an hour, these two sections retired a short distance, and a few minutes thereafter three of the pieces went into action on the left of their first position, to resist the advance of a line of the enemy's infantry, firing spherical case and canister, until, our infantry giving way in great disorder, the want of support compelled me to withdraw the guns. On entering the road leading into the village, I was joined by the left section, under Lieutenant Merkle, and assumed command of the whole. Halting to fill the ammunition chests of the gun limbers, the battery then retired slowly through Gettysburg, and took position in the cemetery, on the south side of the village, at 5 p.m., whence I fired a few shell and solid shot at the enemy, but without eliciting any reply. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 756.)


After resting in York one day, we marched back in the direction of Gettysburg, before which place we arrived on Wednesday, July 1. Here, finding the enemy heavily engaging General Rodes on our right, the major-general commanding
ordered me to put the batteries in position, so as to open fire. Acting under his orders, I immediately placed twelve guns in position, and opened fire with considerable effect on the enemy's artillery, and upon the flank of a column of troops that were being massed upon our right.

On the advance of General Gordon's brigade from our right, we directed our fire farther to the left, on the disordered masses of the enemy that were rapidly retreating before our troops. This was continued until the advance of our men rendered it dangerous to continue firing from that position. I immediately, by order of General Early, sent Captain Carrington's battery across the creek to take position in front of Gettysburg, but, moving with all rapidity, as it did, before it could reach any position the enemy had been driven through the town by Hays' brigade.

(O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p. 495.)

Again, Jones' initial positions were to the left of BARLOW'S KNOLL, near the group of houses in the distance. His battalion came upon the scene just at the right time. His report gives a good example of the artillery influencing the battle by shifting its fires at the proper time and place. This battalion kept up with the situation and supported accordingly.

At about the same time the 11th Corps was retreating through the town back towards Cemetery Hill, the 1st Corps was also being pushed off Seminary Ridge and beginning its retreat to Cemetery Hill.
Return to your vehicle. Proceed to the end of the parking lot and turn LEFT. The road loops back to a STOP sign at MUMMASBURG ROAD next to the railroad tracks. Turn RIGHT and proceed approximately .6 miles. Turn LEFT at the stop sign and then turn RIGHT at the first stop light.

At this intersection, notice the monument to Heckman's battery. This is the battery that fought the delaying action back through town.

You are now on U.S. Highway 15. Follow it through town. On the far side of town, U.S. 15 turns right and U.S. Highway 97 goes straight up the hill. Take U.S. 97 up the hill. Near the top of the hill pull off to the right and park. Get out and walk to the top of the hill. On the right side of the road, at the top, is the arched gate of the cemetery. STOP in front of this gate.

Face north and look across the road. The road is called the BALTIMORE PIKE in the reports. Walk across the road and stop.

STOP 5

The guns pointing down the hill towards town represent those of Stewart's battery. Look to your right front and see the road intersection that appears as an inverted "Y". From this intersection, follow the road easterly as it turns sharply to the left. Notice the monuments and gun positions. These mark the locations of Steven's battery. The road continues up the hill at the top of which is a pyramid topped observation tower. This is CULP'S HILL. Between your position and Steven's battery, about 75 meters from you, is Breck's (Reynolds') battery position. Up from Breck's position there is a stone wall. Starting at the left of this wall and extending up the hill to another stone wall, are the positions occupied by Cooper's and Rickett's batteries. Wiedrich's battery was located on the left side of this line of artillery.

Walk to the far side of the hill and stop near the gun position that is behind the equestrian statue and to the left of the monument with the cannon tube on top of it. Sight down the tube of this gun. It is pointing almost to the right side of BENNER'S HILL. Just to the left of the gun's line of fire, look for the white house. This house marks generally the right edge of BENNER'S HILL. The hill is easily seen in the winter, but in the summer foliage obscures it. In the winter you can easily see the cannons arrayed on the hill.

As you walk around Cemetery Hill, pay particular attention to the position locations. Notice the earthen works thrown up in front of them. Also notice those guns that had good level canister shots in front of them. Those of Wiedrich's and Rickett's batteries did not. They were almost overrun when
attacked from their left front.

Late in the afternoon of the first day, this entire hill was the focus of the battle. The Union Troops had retreated back to this position, and the corps of Ewell and A.P. Hill were closing in around it from the west and north.

Except for an occasional exchange of artillery from both sides, no major combat activity took place the remainder of the night. The artillery spent the night occupying and improving its positions and conducting reconnaissance. Ammunition resupply and getting guns back into service were the orders of business.
THURSDAY 2 JULY 1863


The batteries north of the Baltimore pike in front of the cemetery gate, under the command of Col. Wainwright, chief of artillery, First Corps, were posted as follows: Stewart's battery (B, Fourth United States, four light 12-pounders) across the road, so as to command the approaches from town; then Wiedrich's (I, First New York Artillery, four 3-inch), Cooper's (B, First Pennsylvania Artillery, four 3-inch), and Reynolds' (L, First New York Artillery, five 3-inch), in all thirteen 3-inch guns, along the north front, some of them in such a position that they could be turned to bear upon the town and the field of battle of the 1st. Steven's battery (Fifth Maine, six 12-pounders) was posted to the right and some 50 yards in front of this line, on a knoll, from whence they could obtain an oblique fire upon the hills in front of our line, and a flanking fire at close quarters upon any attacking columns. Each of the guns in these batteries had a small earthwork thrown up in its front, to afford a partial shelter from the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters. Osborn's batteries (Bancroft's, G, Fourth U.S. Artillery, six 12-pounders; Dilger's, I, First Ohio, six 12-pounders; Wheeler's, Thirteenth New York, three 3-inch), of the Eleventh Corps, with the exception of Wiedrich's, transferred to Colonel Wainwright. Heckman's, crippled and sent to the rear, and one gun of Wheeler's
dismounted, were placed in the cemetery grounds, to the north of the Baltimore road....

The batteries at the cemetery, under command of Colonel Wainwright, remained as already described, and Major Osborn, chief of artillery of the Eleventh Corps, was directed to take command on the south of the road. I re-enforced him with half of Hall's battery (Second Maine, three 3-inch) from the First Corps, the other half being disabled, and five batteries (Eakin's, H, First United States, six 12-pounders; Taft's, Fifth New York, six 20-pounders; Hill's, C, First West Virginia, four 10-pounders; Huntington's, H, First Ohio, six 3-inch, and Edgell's, First New Hampshire, six 3-inch) from the Artillery Reserve, thus placing at his disposal, including the three batteries (Bancroft's, G, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders; Dilger's, I, First Ohio, six 12-pounders, and Wheeler's, Thirteenth New York, three 3-inch) of his own corps remaining to him, six 20-pounder Parrots, twenty-two light rifles, and eighteen light 12-pounders. These were stationed as follows: On the right, resting next the Baltimore road and facing the Emmitsburg, Dilger; on his left, Bancroft; then, in the order named, Eakin, Wheeler, Hill, and Hall. These eighteen light 12-pounders and ten light rifles commanded the enemy's positions to the right of the town. In rear of Bancroft and perpendicular to him were Taft's six 20-pounder Parrots; on Taft's right and rear were Huntington's 3-inch guns; these batteries facing the north. This arrangement, in connection
with that of Wainwright, brought all the positions within range of the cemetery that the enemy could occupy with artillery under a commanding fire. The batteries were all brought into requisition at different periods of the battle....

At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy established a battery of ten guns (four 20-pounders and six 10-pounder Parrots) in a wheat-field to the north and a little to the east of the Cemetery Hill, and distant some 1,200 or 1,300 yards, and opened a remarkably accurate fire upon our batteries. We soon gained a decided advantage over them, and at the end of an hour or more compelled them to withdraw, drawing off two of their pieces by hand....

The enemy endeavored to re-establish his battery farther to his right, but as we could in this position bring a larger number of guns to bear than before, he was soon driven off. Cooper's battery (B, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch), which had suffered severely in this affair, was now relieved by Rickett's from the Artillery Reserve....

About the same hour, 3.30 p.m., as the enemy was seriously annoying the left of the Twelfth Corps, three guns of Knap's battery, under command of Lieutenant Geary, and Van Reed's section of K, Fifth U.S. Artillery, were placed in an eligible position, about 200 yards from the right of the First Corps. As soon as their presence (Knap's Pennsylvania Battery, 10-pounders, and Kinzie's, K, Fifth U.S. Artillery, light 12-pounders) was noticed, the enemy
turned his battery (eight guns) upon them, but after a spirited contest of thirty minutes, in which he had a caisson blown up, his guns were silenced....

About sunset the enemy again opened from a knoll in front of the cemetery, distant about 1,800 yards, and this was soon followed by a powerful infantry attack on the position by General... (Hays') brigade. As their columns moved out of the town, they came under the fire of Stevens' battery (Fifth Maine), at 800 yards distance. Wheeling into line, they pushed up the hill. As their line became unmasked, all the guns that could be brought to bear upon them, some twenty, were opened, first with shrapnel and then with canister, with excellent effect. The center and left were beaten back, but their right worked their way up under cover of the houses, and pushed completely through Wiedrich's battery (I, First New York, six 3-inch) into Ricketts' (F and G, First Pennsylvania, six 3-inch). The cannoneers of both batteries stood well to their guns, and when no longer able to hold them, fought with handspikes, rammers, and even stones, joining the infantry in driving them out, and capturing several prisoners. This attack... was mainly repelled by the artillery alone. The loss of the enemy was reported to be large by their wounded in the affair, who afterward fell under the care of our surgeons in Gettysburg. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 231-234.)

The position of Stevens' battery was key to the defense of
the heights of Cemetery Hill from attacks coming from the right side of the town and from the northeast around Culp's Hill. The left section of this battery was also able to range Benner's hill. If you want to take the time, walk down to Stevens' battery's position and stand behind his guns. It is easy to see that, with a minimum shift, he could cover almost the entire area to the northeast of Cemetery Hill. This position proved its worth during the attack on Cemetery Hill. The following report is that of Steven's battery. Stevens was wounded the morning of the 2d day and Lieut. Whittier took command.


On the morning of the 2d instant, on advice received from General Ames, the battery opened at 1,500 yards on columns of the enemy's infantry passing within range, and inflicted some considerable damage.

In the afternoon, engaged at extreme range the enemy's battery. At dusk opened with the whole battery at 1,200 yards on the enemy's line advancing from the edge of the town, and, by changing front and firing to the left, enfiladed their lines, at a distance of 800 yards, with spherical case and shell, and later with solid shot and canister, expending the entire contents of the limber chests, which contained upward of 46 rounds of canister repacked from caissons. The enemy having been driven back and the ammunition exhausted, the battery was withdrawn, the
caissons and limbers refilled, and the same position reoccupied at 10.30 p.m. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 361.)


About 4 o'clock the following morning, July 2, Major Latimer, having carefully examined the ground, had selected the only eligible position in his front. The ground offered very few advantages, and the major found great difficulty in sheltering his horses and caissons. The hill which he elected brought him directly in front of the wooded mountain and a little to the left of the Cemetery Hill. All the guns excepting two long-range guns had to be crowded on this small hill, which was not in our favor.

About 4 o'clock, Major Latimer received orders from yourself, as also from General Johnson, to take position and open on the enemy. Fourteen guns of the battalion were then planted on this hill above mentioned. The two remaining guns (20-pounder Parrott's) were placed on an eminence in rear of the battalion, with Captain Graham's battery. Captain Brown's battery occupied the right, Captain Carpenter's occupied the center, while Captain Dement and Captain Raine, the latter with one section of his battery, took the left. As soon as the major opened, the enemy replied with a well-directed fire from a superior number of guns, causing many casualties among officers, men, and horses. This unequal contest was sustained by both the
officers and men with great fortitude until near night.

The enemy in the meantime planted some guns on the left, which partially enfiladed our batteries, which caused Captain Carpenter to suffer very severely. By this time, two of Captain Dement's pieces had expended all their ammunition and one caisson had been blown up. Captain Brown had a piece disabled, and his detachment so reduced that he could work only two guns, and Captain Brown had been shot down at this juncture, the enemy pouring a destructive fire on them.

Major Latimer sent his sergeant-major to General Johnson to say that, owing to the exhausted state of his men and ammunition and the severe fire of the enemy, he was unable to hold his position any longer. General Johnson sent him word to withdraw the battalion, if he thought proper. Most of the guns were then withdrawn, leaving four guns on the hill to repel any advance of the enemy's infantry.

Soon after this, Major Latimer again opened on the enemy with the four guns left in position to cover the advance of our infantry, which drew a terrible fire on him, and it was here that the accomplished and gallant Latimer was severely wounded in the arm, of which wound he has since died. The command then devolved upon Captain Raine, the senior captain of the battalion. Night coming on, Captain Raine, at Major Latimer's suggestion, withdrew the battalion
in the way and, in those days, the artillery fired canister up until the last possible moment. As a result of this, when a battery was overrun, the cannoneers picked up whatever was available to defend themselves. This was often handspikes, sticks, or rocks.

Return to your vehicle. Now the tough part is finding a place to turn around. The best thing to do is to proceed EAST on BALTIMORE PIKE and, at the bottom of the hill, turn around. Once turned around, proceed back over the hill towards Gettysburg. As you come down off the hill on the Gettysburg side, turn LEFT (south) at the first light. This is U.S. Highway 15 (EMMITSBURG ROAD). About .8 miles from the light there is a place to pull off on the right side of the road. Stop here, but do not get out. The woodline to your right from the seminary to the large statue of Lee, at about your 2 o'clock direction, and from the statue across the field to the vicinity of the Peach Orchard was the Confederate artillery line on the 2d and 3d days' fight. To your left, extending from CEMETERY HILL down to LITTLE ROUND TOP, was the Union artillery line. As you look left, notice the needle shaped monument. Just to its left is a clump of trees. This is the area of the ANGLE and the focus of the Confederate attack on the 3d day of fighting.

Proceed and travel about 1.7 miles from here and turn RIGHT at the PEACH ORCHARD. The turn is just past a large red barn on the right side of the road. The PEACH ORCHARD is easily identified by 3 large monuments and several guns displayed at its corner.

Proceed to the next intersection and turn LEFT onto CONFEDERATE AVENUE. STOP at the observation tower just after this turn. Get out and step across the stonewall and through the thin line of trees. The PEACH ORCHARD is in front of you.

Alexander's battalion was located in this vicinity, and Cabell's battalion was on Alexander's right stretching to the intersection of CONFEDERATE AVENUE and EMMITSBURG ROAD.

STOP 6

From here, the battalions of Alexander and Cabell fired into the PEACH ORCHARD and achieved telling results on the Union forces. Later in the afternoon, these guns would charge forward to positions in front of the PEACH ORCHARD and engage the withdrawing Union forces.
a short distance, and encamped for the night. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p. 543-544.)

The position Col. Andrews described is Benner's Hill. By the end of the day, the artillery of Latimer, except for one battery, was driven from this hill. The Union artillerymen on Cemetery Hill and in front of the arch were able to construct earthen breastworks and these, along with the relatively confined space with steep slants on three sides, made it hard to hit. The Confederate artillerymen had to put their fires on top of this hill to be effective against the batteries positioned on this side of the Baltimore Pike. These batteries were being fired upon by Latimer's battalion on Benner's Hill and the guns of Colonel Brown's battalion located near the seminary. Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery, 1st U.S. Army Corps, states in his report that the fires from Benner's Hill were the most accurate fires he had ever witnessed from their artillery. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 358.) Any shots by Latimer from Benner's Hill that fell short either hit down in the ranks of the infantry or in unoccupied areas. Those that overshot hit in the positions of the artillery and infantry on the opposite side of the pike. The artillery firing from the area of the seminary that overshot did a great deal of damage to units that were overline of Cemetery Hill. Lieutenant Muhlenberg, commander of the Artillery Brigade of the Twelfth Corps, reported that two of his batteries were directly exposed to these overshots. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 871.)

About dusk they again opened from a knoll on our left and front, distant 1,800 yards, which fire was followed by a strong attack upon our position by General Rodes' Louisiana (?) brigade. As their column filed out of the town they came under the fire of the Fifth Maine Battery at about 800 yards. Wheeling into line, they swung around, their right resting on the town, and pushed up the hill, which is quite steep at this corner. As their line became fully unmasked, all the guns which could be brought to bear were opened on them, at first with shrapnel and afterward with canister, making a total of fifteen guns in their front and six on their left flank. Their center and left never mounted the hill at all, but their right worked its way up under cover of the houses, and pushed completely through Wiedrich's battery into Ricketts'. The cannoneers of both these batteries stood well to their guns, driving the enemy off with fence-rails and stones and capturing a few prisoners. I believe it may be claimed that this attack was almost entirely repelled by the artillery. My surgeon, who was in the town and dressed many of their wounded that night, tell me that they reported their loss in this attack as very great. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 358.)

It was very seldom that cannoneers carried or used rifles. Their usual weapons were short swords and revolvers. Rifles got
in the way; and, in those days the artillery fired canister up until the last possible moment. As a result of this, when a battery was overrun, the cannoneers picked up whatever was available to defend themselves. This was often handspikes, sticks, or rocks.

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Shortly after our arrival, I was directed by General Longstreet to accompany with my battalion the divisions of Major-Generals McLaws and Hood in the attack upon the left. The march into position was performed with these divisions, and about 4 p.m. I placed four batteries...the whole commanded by Maj. Frank Huger, I having been ordered to control also the other battalions of artillery on the field in action against a heavy artillery and infantry force of the enemy, about 500 yards distant, in a peach orchard on the Emmitsburg pike.

After a spirited engagement of a half hour, assisted by Cabell's battalion from a short distance on our right, the enemy's guns were silenced, and the position was immediately carried by the infantry, and the enemy fell back to his position on the mountain, where our infantry gallantly pursued him.

Just before the enemy ceased his fire, annoyed by his obstinacy, I had ordered up my two remaining batteries....These arriving on the ground just as the infantry charge was made, joined in it, under the immediate command of Maj. James Dearing, who had volunteered his services to me. Major Huger also followed with the four batteries under his control as soon as the teams could be disencumbered of killed and wounded animals (for his loss
had been serious), and occupied the enemy's original position, in time to seriously annoy their retreat to the mountain, and to assist the infantry in causing them to abandon several guns at its foot. From this new position a spirited duel now ensued with their new line, which our infantry attacked in vain, and was kept up till dark, shortly before which our infantry fell back, and the enemy, who attempted to pursue, were checked and driven back by our fire. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p. 429-430)


The Federal artillery was ready for us and in their usual full force and good practice. The ground at Cabell's position gave little protection, and he suffered rapidly in both men and horses. To help him I ran up Huger with 18 guns of my own 26, to Warfield's house, within 500 yards of the Peach Orchard, and opened upon it. This made fifty-four guns in action, and I hoped they would crush that part of the enemy's line in a very short time, but the fight was longer and hotter than I expected. So accurate was the enemy's fire, that two of my guns were fairly dismounted, and the loss of men was so great that I had to ask General Barksdale, whose brigade was lying down close behind in the wood, for help to handle the heavy 24-pounder howitzers of Moody's battery. He gave me permission to call for volunteers and in a minute I had eight good fellows, of whom, alas! we buried two that night, and sent to the
hospital three others mortally or severely wounded. At last I sent for my other two batteries, but before they arrived McDowell's division charged past our guns, and the enemy deserted their line in confusion. Then I believed that Providence was indeed "taking the proper view," and that the war was very nearly over. Every battery was limbered to the front, and the two batteries from the rear coming up, all six charged in line across the plain and went into action again at the position the enemy had deserted. I can recall no more splendid sight, on a small scale,—and certainly no more inspiriting moment during the war,—than that of the charge of these six batteries. An artillerist's heaven is to follow the routed enemy, after a tough resistance, and throw shells and canister into his disorganized and fleeing masses. Then the explosions of the guns sound louder and more powerful, and the very shouts of the gunners, ordering "Fire!" in rapid succession, thrill one's very soul. There is no excitement on earth like it. It is far prettier shooting than at a compact, narrow line of battle, or at another battery. Now we saw our heaven just in front, and were already breathing the very air of victory. Now we would have our revenge, and make them sorry they had staid so long. Everything was in a rush. The ground was generally good, and pieces and caissons went at a gallop, some cannoneers mounted, and some running by the sides—not in regular line, but a general race and scramble to get there first.
But we only had a moderately good time with Sickles's retreating corps after all. They fell back upon fresh troops in what seemed a strong position extending along the ridge north of Round Top. Hood's troops under Law gained the slope of Little Round Top, but were driven back to its base. Our infantry lines had become disjointed in the advance, and the fighting became a number of isolated combats between brigades. The artillery took part wherever it could, firing at everything in sight, and a sort of pell-mell fighting lasted until darkness covered the field and the fuses of the flying shells looked like little meteors in the air. But then both musketry and artillery slackened off, and by 9 o'clock the field was silent. ...(E.P. Alexander, "The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg, in " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. by Ned Bradford, 1989, p.p. 392-393.)


About 4 p.m. I was ordered into position within 500 yards of the enemy's batteries, and to dislodge them, if possible, from a commanding position which they held. I opened upon the batteries with my four Napoleons, firing canister and spherical case until our infantry, who were resent, began their charge. I then ceased firing, limbered to the front, and advanced some 800 or 1,000 yards, and took another position, which I held till after dark, though
several attempts were made by the enemy, both with infantry and artillery, to drive me from it. (O.R., Part 2, p. 472.)

In this same report Capt. Osmond tells the story of the death of one of his best gunners. His dying words were those of a truly dedicated field artilleryman who had a deep conviction to his cause and his guns. His last words were, "You can do me no good: I am killed: follow your piece."


On July 1, we encamped a few miles from Gettysburg, and, on July 2, moved up with the division. When we commenced to ascend the road leading to the crest of the hill, where the battle was subsequently fought, my battalion moved to the head of the column. Near the crest of the hill, I turned to the right, and placed the battalion in position on the edge of the wood, the right resting near the road leading from Gettysburg to Emmitsburg... On our right, and slightly in front, the enemy occupied a rocky mountain with several batteries, and directly in front, about 600 or 700 yards distant, were a large number of batteries, occupying a peach orchard. Receiving orders, we opened a most effective fire upon these batteries. Exposed ourselves to a flanking fire from the enemy's mountain batteries, our position gave us a similar advantage in firing upon a large
part of his line, which was drawn up nearly parallel with
the Emmitsburg road. The battalion, being first to open
fire, received for a short time a concentrated fire from the
enemy's batteries. The fire from our lines and from the
enemy became incessant, rendering it necessary for us
sometimes to pause and allow the smoke to clear away, in
order to enable the gunners to take aim. During the same
time, two guns were ordered to play upon the batteries on
the stony mountain--I have reason to believe with great
effect.

The loss of my battalion was very heavy during this
cannonading....

The batteries in the peach orchard were driven off, and
our fire was suspended to allow the infantry to advance.
The guns on the right continued to fire on the enemy's
batteries on the mountain as soon as the infantry had
charged.(O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p. 375.)

After this engagement, one of Cabell's battery commanders,
Capt. McCarthy (First Richmond Howitzers), wrote that "this was
one of the most severe artillery fires that they had been
subjected to during the war".(O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p. 379.)

Report of Lieut. W.J. Furlong, C.S.A., Pulaski (Georgia)
Artillery, Cabell's Battalion, McLaws' Division,
Longstreet's Corps Army of Northern Virginia.

On the 2d, the battery was placed in position on the
right of the battalion, behind a loose rock fence. The
battery was in position a short time before the order was given to commence firing. At the command, the battery opened fire from four guns (two 10-pounder Parrotts and two 3-inch rifled guns) on some light batteries of the enemy which had taken a position on our left. The firing at first was rapid, but soon became slow and cautious, the gunners firing slow, evidently making each shot tell with effect on the enemy's batteries.

In the meantime, the enemy replied with spirit, their fire being incessant, severe, and well directed. After being engaged about an hour, Capt. J.C. Fraser, commanding, fell, dangerously wounded. I then took command of the battery, using but two guns; our loss being so great, both in cannoneers and drivers, I could muster but two detachments. Immediately after I took command, the enemy's fire began to slacken, and finally stopped altogether, with the exception of one piece, which was in position a little to the left of my right piece, and was annoying us considerably. I opened fire on it with one piece, and, after firing half a dozen rounds, silenced it for a short time; but it soon began to play on us again. (C.R., XXVII, Part 2, p. 382.)


The battery...took position the morning of the 2d instant with the battalion on the right of the___road.
fronting the enemy's position on the mountain: the section of Parrott guns occupying a position behind the stone fence between Captains Manly's and McCarthy's batteries: section of 12-pounder howitzers on the left of the battalion.

About 3 o'clock, Captain Carlton ordered a fire from the Parrotts to be opened on the enemy, who were endeavoring to place a battery in position on the left, near the orchard, assisting in successfully driving them back. (O.R., XXVII. Part 2, p. 384.)

Proceed along CONFEDERATE AVENUE until you come to a stop sign. Go straight across the intersection, and just past the first farm road on the LEFT, there is a marker standing between two guns. This marker represents Henry's battalion and Bachman's battery. Pull off in this area for a moment and orient yourself to the terrain.

These guns are pointing to LITTLE ROUND TOP. Down below LITTLE ROUND TOP and on line with this position is the DEVIL'S DEN. You cannot see it from here because of the trees; but, at the time of the battle, soldiers could see each other from these two positions. Look to your left front and locate the NATIONAL TOWER. To the left of the NATIONAL TOWER and at a lesser distance is a stone house with blue shutters. This is the ROSE HOUSE. To the left of the ROSE HOUSE there is a barn with a white roof. Just to the right of the barn and at a greater distance you can see the PEACH ORCHARD.

Proceed along CONFEDERATE AVENUE. Not far down this road, you will make a hard turn to the left and start down a slope. The turn marks the beginning of Reilly's battery. As you start down the slope, look to your right front about 30 meters off the road: and, on a little piece of elevated ground, you will see a marker flanked by guns. This is the extreme right of Reilly's battery, and, also the extreme right of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Continue until you come to the first intersection and proceed straight through it. Go to the top of the hill and park. This is LITTLE ROUND TOP. Walk to the Crest of the hill.

STOP 7

When you walk to the top of LITTLE ROUND TOP, stand in front of the 91st PA. Monument which is in front of Hazlett's guns.
Look down to your left front into the low ground; and just to the left of the "T" intersection, you will see a group of large boulders. This is the DEVIL'S DEN. On line with the DEVIL'S DEN and at a greater distance there is a distinct break in the treeline on the ridge. This marks the intersection of the EMMITSBURG ROAD and CONFEDERATE AVENUE. To the left of this break, the guns of Henry's battalion were positioned. To the right of the break, starting at the EMMITSBURG ROAD and continuing generally west were the battalions of Cabell and Alexander. The remaining Confederate artillery units occupied the woodline extending west until they were moved forward late in the afternoon of the 2d day and early morning on the 3d day. Focus back on the "T" intersection and follow the road north (right) from it. About 150-200 meters from the intersection and on the far side of the road, there are two guns pointing south. These mark the location of two of Smith's guns. Continue following the road to the right until you see an intersection. Look along the road that goes left at this intersection. There is a monument near the left side of the road. Look into the clearing to the left of this monument. This is the WHEATFIELD. The PEACH ORCHARD (hard to see in the summer) is on the other side of the woods on the ridge about equidistant from the last mentioned monument and the prominent observation tower in the far treeline to the left. Look north (right) and see the large monument with the domed top. This is the Pennsylvania Monument. To the left of the monument and at a greater distance you see the needle shaped monument near the ANGLE.

Smith's battery arrived at the DEVIL'S DEN early in the afternoon. Hazlett and Gibbs arrived later in the afternoon just about the time the DEVIL'S DEN position was being overrun.

LITTLE ROUND TOP was a key piece of terrain. At the end of the 2d day's fight, the artillery positioned on it had played a major role in keeping it in Union hands.


On the 2d instant, about 4.30 p.m., Battery D, Fifth U.S. Artillery, was moved to the left of the First Division about three-quarters of a mile, and posted on an eminence known as Rock Hill (Little Round Top), forming a line nearly
perpendicular to that of the First Division. Immediately upon taking up the position, the battery opened upon the enemy, who was engaging the First Division, completely enfilading the enemy's lines with marked effect. The battery kept up a continuous fire until dark....

Battery L, First Ohio Artillery, Capt. F.C. Gibbs, moved up to the field in rear of the Second Division. One section, commanded by First Lieutenant Guthrie, was posted on the slope of the hill known as Rock Hill (Little Round Top), to the right of Battery D, Fifth U.S. Artillery. Another section, under command of First Lieutenant Walworth, was posted at the base of the hill, commanding the ravine in front of Rock Hill (Little Round Top). The remaining section was held in reserve. The two sections posted in front opened upon the enemy, when he advanced upon our lines, with spherical case and canister, doing good service in checking the advance of the enemy. (O.R., XXVII. Part 1, p.p. 659-661.)

Gibbs placed a section on the north slope of this hill. The terrain was such that the section was rolled up by hand. If you are adventurous, you can walk to this site by going behind the statue of Brig. Gen. Warren and cutting behind the large rocks just past the statue. Continue towards the monument that has a man standing on top of it (155th PA. Infantry), and continue about 50 meters down the slope to a monument with a pile of cannon balls on top. This is the location of Gibbs' section.

The easier way to get to this position is to walk down the park road until you get to the monument to the 121st N.Y. Infantry. It also has a rifleman standing on top. Turn off the road to your left and cross the rail fence which is about 30 meters to your front. Look to your left front and see the monument to Gibbs' battery.
From this position, it is easy to see what a command of the gorge the section had. It's canister and case must have been very effective from here. Positioning of the guns was as important then as it is now.


The rocky nature of the ground compelled us to unhitch our horses and place our guns in position by hand: the left section, in charge of Lieut. H.F. Guthrie, on the left of a road leading from the valley, and on the right slope of Little Round Top (Weed's Hill); the center and right sections, in charge of Lieuts. James Gildea and William Walworth, on the right of said road. We had hardly placed our guns in position when the Fifth Corps was forced back by a terrific charge of Longstreet's corps, and came rushing through us, but began rallying on us as soon as they understood matters. Our front was hardly clear when the irregular, yelling line of the enemy put in his appearance, and we received him with double charges of canister, which were used so effectively as to compel him to retire. So rapidly were the guns worked that they became too hot to lay the hand on. But for the position of the battery, and the gallantry with which it was handled by the men, I have no doubt the enemy would have accomplished his purpose of breaking our lines at this point, and possibly changed the
Timing is everything, and timing was certainly good for the arrival of both Gibbs' and Hazlett's batteries. As they arrived, the Confederates were pushing through the Wheatfield and around the Devil's Den, headed for Little Round Top. Gibbs, by virtue of his position on the side of the hill, was able to fire down into the low area in front of Little Round Top and behind the high ground that ran between the Devil's Den and the Wheatfield. Hazlett's battery was not able to depress its tubes low enough to fire into this area. Instead, it poured a whithering fire into follow-on units in front of the Devil's Den, the Wheatfield, and the area around the Peach Orchard. Confederate snipers in and around the Devil's Den were taking a severe toll of the Union troops on top of Little Round Top. Brig. Gen. Weed, the former commander of Hazlett's battery, was killed by a sniper; and, as Hazlett was bending over Weed, he too was fatally struck by a sniper's minie ball.

Hazlett's men had to haul their guns over very rough terrain. They, unlike Gibbs' battery, used their horses to haul them up. Even using horses, it took the muscle of all cannoneers and some assistance from the infantry to get the guns in place. Physical strength is not only involved here but, certainly, a mental toughness and an attitude of mission accomplishment. These same characteristics are necessary in today's soldiers.

The rifled guns of Hazlett's battery were able to range into the Confederates' line during the famous attack on the 3rd of
July. The deadly effects of this fire were reported by Major Charles S. Peyton of the Nineteenth Virginia Infantry in his report. (C.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.385.)

Return to your vehicle and proceed down the hill. Turn LEFT at the first intersection, travel down the hill, and turn LEFT at the next intersection. This puts you on the road between LITTLE ROUND TOP and DEVIL'S DEN. As you pass the section of Smith's battery, imagine yourself as a Confederate infantryman having to face this section as you tried to sweep up the gorge. Look back at Gibbs' section on the hill, and you can visualize the effects of the combined fires of Smith's and Gibbs' sections.

As you approach DEVIL'S DEN, pull off and park in the lot on the left. There is a comfort station across the bridge you may want to take advantage of before you continue. Walk to the top of DEVIL'S DEN and out in front of the guns about 30 meters.

STOP 9

This is the probable location that Smith's guns initially occupied. In a conversation with Brig. Gen. Hunt after the war, Smith remarked that the position of the monument and the guns were not accurate.

From where you are now, the cannoneers could see over the crest and down into the low ground. They could not have seen this from the position where the guns are presently located. At the time of the battle, the trees were not as high (probably 20 feet at the most). You could see from here the guns of Henry's and Cabell's battalions. Hazlett's battery on Little Round Top could not fire into the low ground behind this position, but it was very effective against units out in front of here. The WHEATFIELD is several hundred meters to your north (right). This was where Winslow's battery was positioned.
Between 1 and 2 p.m. Major-General Sickles notified me that he was about to change his line, throwing his right forward to the high ground, running his line from Little Round Top Mountain, on the left, to a peach orchard on the Emmitsburg road, and thence along the road toward Gettysburg to a second orchard. This new disposition seemed to me, notwithstanding the sharp angle in our line made necessary by the formation of the ground, to be a much more desirable one. I placed Smith's battery near the extreme left, between Round Top Mountain and the woods, on a rocky hill commanding a long valley running toward Emmitsburg. On the right of Smith's, after passing a belt of woods, was an opening, in which I placed Winslow's battery of light 12-pounders. This position was surrounded by woods, but, in my opinion, the line was materially strengthened by this battery of short-range guns. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 581-582.)

I placed two sections of my battery on a hill (near the Devil's Cave) on the left of General Birney's line, leaving one section, together with caissons and horses, 150 yards in the rear. The Fourth Maine Regiment was detailed as support, forming line in rear under cover of a hill. On
my left, extending half way to the Emmitsburg road, was a thick wood, in which I requested Lieutenant Leigh, aide-de-camp to General Ward, to place supports. He informed me that a brigade had already been placed there, but this must have been a mistake.

About 2.30 p.m. the enemy opened fire on my right and front from several guns, directing a portion of their fire upon my position. I was ordered by one of General Ward's aides to return their fire, which order I complied with. Twenty minutes later I discovered the enemy was endeavoring to get a section of light 12-pounder guns in position on my left and front, in order to enfilade this part of our line, but I succeeded in driving them off before they had an opportunity to open fire. Soon after, a battery of six light 12-pounders marched from the woods near the Emmitsburg road, and went in battery in the field in front, about 1,400 yards distant. A spirited duel immediately began between this battery and my own, lasting nearly twenty minutes, when Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, Longstreet's corps (rebel), charged upon us. The rebel battery then left the field, and I directed my fire upon the infantry.

At this time I requested the officer in command of the Fourth Maine Regiment to place his regiment in the woods on my left, telling him I could take care of my front, but my request was not complied with. I used case shot upon the advancing column until it entered the woods, when I fired shell until they emerged from the woods on my left flank, in
line of battle 300 yards distant; then I used canister with little effect, owing to numerous large rocks, which afforded excellent protection to their sharpshooters. I saw it would be impossible for me to hold my position without assistance, and therefore called upon my supports, who gallantly advanced up the hill and engaged the enemy. Fighting became so close that I ordered my men to cease firing, as many of the Fourth Maine had already advanced in front of the guns. I then went to the rear, and opened that section of guns, firing obliquely through the gully, doing good execution.

At this time the Sixth New Jersey Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Gilkyson commanding, and Fortieth New York Regiment, Colonel Egan commanding, came to our support. These regiments marched down the gully, fighting like tigers, exposed to a terrific fire of musketry, and, when within 100 yards of the rebel line, the Fourth Maine, which still held the hill, were forced to retreat. Very soon afterward the Fortieth New York and Sixth New Jersey Regiments were compelled to follow. I then ordered my remaining guns to the rear.

When I left three guns on the hill (one having been sent to the rear disabled), I was under the impression we would be able to hold that position, but, if forced to retreat, I expected my supports would save the guns, which, however, they failed to do. I could have run my guns to the rear, but expecting to use them at any moment, and the position difficult of access, I thought best to leave them.
for awhile. Again, I feared if I removed them the infantry might mistake the movement for a retreat. In my opinion, had supports been placed in the woods, as I wished, the hill could not have been taken.

I conducted my command to a field near the Baltimore turnpike, three-quarters of a mile from Third Corps headquarters, and encamped for the night, reporting three guns for service next morning to Captain Clark, acting chief of artillery.

I regret to report the loss of 2 brave men, viz, Corpl. John A. Thompson and Private Isaiah Smith, and the wounding of 10 privates, many severely. Eleven horses were killed and disabled. Three 10-pounder Parrott guns and gun-carriages (supposed to have been taken from the field by the Twelfth Corps) were lost.

The non-commissioned officers and privates conducted themselves throughout the day with commendable bravery.

Total amount of ammunition expended, 240 rounds.

I trust no blame will be attached to me for the loss of my guns. I did that which in my judgement I thought best.

(O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 588-589.)


In the order of attack, Longstreet's corps was assigned to the right, and Hood's division occupied the right of the corps. Benning's brigade, in the order of battle, supported,
at the distance of 400 yards. Law's whose position was on
the extreme right. In the brigade formation, the Twentieth
Regiment occupied the left center. Before reaching the
point from which to make the attack, it was necessary to
move by the right flank a distance of nearly 3 miles. The
enemy's guns commanded a considerable portion of this
distance, and opened heavy fire of shell upon us for more
than a mile of the way.

About 5 p.m., having reached the intended point, we
advanced in line of battle to the assault, the regiment
moving in excellent order and spirit. We had not advanced
far before it was ascertained that there was a considerable
space intervening between Law's and Robertson's brigades,
unoccupied by any Confederate troops save very few belonging
to the First Texas Regiment. Near to the center of this
comparatively unoccupied ground, upon a steep, rocky, rugged
hill, the enemy had posted a battery of six guns, from which
a destructive and vigorous fire was poured into our ranks.


brigade, Hood's Division, Longstreet's Corps, Army of
Northern Virginia.

In order to get to the place they assigned me, in the
rear of General Law, it was necessary to move the brigade
500 or 600 yards farther to the right. Having done this, I
advanced in line of battle. A wood intervened between us
and the enemy, which, though it did not prevent their shells
from reaching us and producing some casualties, yet completely hid them from our view. On emerging from the woods, their position became visible. Before us, at the distance of 600 or 800 yards, was an oblong mountain peak, or spur, presenting to us a steep face, much roughened by rocks. To the right, 400 or 500 yards from the peak, was the main mountain itself, with a side that looked almost perpendicular. Its summit overlooked the peak just sufficiently to command it well. On the summit of the peak were three pieces of artillery, and a little in advance of them, on a sort of uneven, irregular shelf, were three others. To the right and left of the battery, as well as immediately in its rear, were lines of infantry, as we afterward ascertained. This formed the enemy's first line of battle.

On the top of the mountain itself, and a little to the right of the peak, were five other guns. These commanded our approaches to the peak, for nearly the whole way. To the right and left of these guns extended the enemy's second line of infantry. Where that line crossed the gorge running between the peak and the mountain, a point 500 or 600 yards in the rear of the peak, were two other guns. This we ascertained when the right of the brigade reached the gorge, by the terrible fire from them which swept down the gorge.

Thus, what we had to encounter were thirteen guns, and two, if not more, lines of infantry posted on mountain heights. The intervening spur over which we had to march to
reach the first line was nearly all open. Our own first line also became visible advancing about 400 yards in our front. The part of it in our front I took to be Law's brigade, and so I followed it. In truth, it was Robertson's, Law's being farther to the right. This I did not discover until late in the fight, a wood on the right concealing from me most of Law's brigade. My line continued to follow the first line, halting once or twice to preserve its interval. At length I saw that the first line would not be able alone to carry the peak, so I advanced without halting again.

When my line reached the foot of the peak, I found there a part of the First Texas, struggling to make the ascent, the rest of the brigade having gone to the right and left—the Fourth and Fifth Texas to the right, and the Third Arkansas to the left. The part of the First Texas referred to falling in with my brigade, the whole line commenced ascending the rugged steep and (on the right) crossing the gorge. The ground was difficult—rocks in many places presenting, by their precipitous sides, insurmountable obstacles, while the fire of the enemy was very heavy and very deadly. The progress was, therefore, not very rapid, but it was regular and uninterrupted. After awhile the enemy were driven from their three front guns. The advance continued, and at length they were driven completely from the peak, but they carried with them the three rear guns on its summit, its sudden descent on the other side favoring
the operation, so that we captured only the three front guns. These were 10-pounder Parrots. A number of prisoners also were taken—more, I suppose, than 100.

The peak being thus taken and the enemy's first line driven behind his second, I made my dispositions to hold the ground gained, which was all that I could do, as I was then much in advance of every other part of our line of battle, and the second line of the enemy on the mountain itself was in a position which seemed to me almost impregnable to any merely front attack even with fresh men. Indeed, to hold the ground we had appeared a difficult task. The shells of the enemy from the adjacent mountain were incessantly bursting along the summit of the peak, and every head that showed itself was the target for a minie ball. Several attempts by flank movements were made to dislodge us, but by the gallantry of the regiments on the right and left they all failed. We held the position until late next day, when we were ordered back to the crest from which we first saw the enemy on the day before.

Our loss was heavy, not less than 400 killed, wounded, and missing. Of this number, an unusually large proportion were killed and badly wounded....Colonel Harris was farther to the right, where he and his regiment were exposed to the terrible fire of the two pieces which swept the gorge, as well as to the infantry fire of the enemy's left. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p.414-415.)
Perry's brigade came across the front of Smith's battery and turned left with its left fronting the battery and its right extending to nearly the base of LITTLE ROUND TOP. It then attacked up the gorge towards Smith's section of two guns.


When at a short distance from the stone fence near the base of the mountain, General Law informed me that he expected my regiment to take a battery which had been playing on our line from the moment the advance began. This battery was situated, not on the mountain itself, but on a rugged cliff which formed the abrupt termination of a ridge that proceeded from the mountain, and ran in a direction somewhat parallel with it, leaving a valley destitute of trees and filled with immense boulders between them. This valley, not more than 300 paces in breadth, and the cliff on which their artillery was stationed, were occupied by two regiments of the enemy's infantry.

The direction of the regiment after crossing the stone fence was such that a march to the front would have carried it to the right of the enemy's position. It was, therefore, wheeled to the left, so as to confront that position, its left opposite the battery, and its right extending toward the base of the mountain. This movement was executed under fire, and within 200 yards of the enemy. The forward movement was immediately ordered, and was responded to with
an alacrity and courage seldom, if ever, excelled on the battle-field. As the men emerged from the forest into the valley before mentioned, they received a deadly volley at short range, which in a few seconds killed or disabled one-fourth their number. Halting without an order from me, and availing themselves of the shelter which the rocks afforded, they returned the fire. Such was their extreme exhaustion—having marched without interruption 24 miles to reach the battle-field, and advanced at a double-quick step fully a mile to engage the enemy—that I hesitated for an instant to order them immediately forward. Perceiving very soon, however, that the enemy were giving way, I rushed forward, shouting to them to advance. It was with the greatest difficulty that I could make myself heard or understood above the din of battle. The order was, however, extended along the line, and was promptly obeyed. The men sprang forward over the rocks, swept the position, and took possession of the heights, capturing 40 or 50 prisoners around the battery and among the cliffs.

Meanwhile the enemy had put a battery in position on a terrace of the mountain to our right, which opened upon us an enfilading fire of grape and spherical case shot. A sharp fire of small-arms was also opened from the same direction. This was not destructive, however, owing to the protection afforded by the rocks. Soon the enemy appeared moving down upon our front in heavy force. At this critical moment, General Benning's brigade of Georgians advanced
gallantly into action. His extreme right, lapping upon my left, swarmed over the cliffs and mingled with my men. It was now past 5 p.m. The conflict continued to rage with great fury until dark. Again and again the enemy in great force attempted to dislodge us from the position and retake the battery, in each case with signal failure and heavy loss. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p. 393-394.)

For several first hand accounts of Smith's battery's fight, turn to Appendix V.

Return to your vehicle. Proceed south and follow the road up and in front of the guns of Smith. Continue along this road for several hundred meters until you break out of the woodline. The WHEATFIELD will be on your right. Park on the right side of the road in front of the marker. Get out and walk to the monument in the center of the field flanked by the guns. These guns mark the vicinity of the positions held by Winslow's battery the afternoon of the 2d day.

STOP 10


The attack on the left of our line involved Winslow's battery. From the position of the battery and of the infantry supporting, it was deemed best for a time to fire solid shot into the woods over our troops, who were fighting in front under protection of a stone wall. This fire was very effective (as such use of solid shot always is when troops are engaged in woods, the moral effect being at least equal to the physical), and was continued till our troops in
front fell back of his battery, when Captain Winslow used case shot, 1 and 1½ second fuse, ending with canister.

When the enemy had gained two sides of the woods, and the position was no longer tenable, Captain Winslow, by command of General Birney, retired handsomely by piece, losing heavily during the movement. The position of Captain Winslow's battery did not seem to be very good, owing to the nearness of the woods on all sides, but the result proved that the battery was able to do good service, and Captain Winslow deserves credit, not only for the good working of his battery, but for the handsome manner in which he withdrew under trying circumstances. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.583.)


The position assigned my battery was near the left of the line, in a small wheat-field near the base of Round Top hill.

A battery of the enemy posted nearly in my front opened between 3 and 4 p.m. upon our lines. I could only see the smoke of their guns as it rose above the tree tops, but, by command of General Hunt, fired a few rounds of solid shot in that direction, probably with no effect, as it was evidently beyond the range of my guns. Soon after the two lines of infantry became hotly engaged, but I was unable from my obscure position to observe the movements of the troops, and
was compelled to estimate distances and regulate my fire by
the reports of our own and the enemy's musketry.

By direction of Major-General Birney, I opened with
solid shot, giving but sufficient elevation to clear our own
troops in front, and firing in the direction of the heaviest
musketry, lessening the range as our troops fell back and
the enemy advanced. Our line of skirmishers fell back on
their supports at the edge of the woods, little, if any,
more than 400 yards from the front of my guns. This line
was a weak one and soon fell back, but by using shell and
case shot at about one degree elevation, and from 1 to 1½
second fuse, I kept the enemy from advancing from the cover
of the woods. Having been just directed by General Birney,
through an aide, to closely watch the movements and look for
a route upon which I might withdraw in case it became
necessary, I rode through the woods on my left, perhaps 200
yards in width, and found our line there formed
perpendicular to my own, instead of parallel, as I had
supposed, facing from me and closely pressed by the enemy.
This line soon fell back irregularly, but slowly, passing in
front of and masking my guns. A portion of Smith's battery,
on my left, also withdrew by my rear.

The enemy's advance being within 25 yards of my left,
and covered by woods and rocks, I ordered my left section
limbered, with a view of moving it a short distance to the
left and rear. Before this was accomplished, the enemy had
advanced under cover of the woods upon my right, and was
cutting down my men and horses. Having no supports in rear, and being exposed to a heavy fire of musketry in front and upon both flanks, I deemed it necessary to withdraw in order to save my guns, which was done by piece in succession from the left, continuing to fire until the right and last piece was limbered. Several horses were killed and disabled before moving 25 yards. In one instance it became necessary to use the limber of a caisson to secure the piece. By impressing 2 passing horses of Captain Smith's, not in use, the former was secured. Meeting Major-General Sickles and Captain Randolph immediately after leaving the field, I was ordered by them to move my battery to the rear, and refit as far as possible. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 587.)

This was another tough fight and a case of artillerymen sticking to their guns until the last moment. Notice how the various shell and fuse combinations were used. Also, notice Randolph's statement that solid shot is effective in woods. The solid shot achieved secondary effects by creating fragments out of the trees it tore through. Today, we use high explosive shell with fuse quick in woodlines to achieve the same effects.

Accroding to the artillery tables for a 12-pound Napoleon, a range of about 600 yards is achieved with a fuse setting of 1 to 1½ seconds.

In his report, Winslow states that he estimated distances by the reports of musketry. Adjusting by sound is something we all should know how to do, but rarely ever practice. You never know
when you may need to use this technique.

Pay particular attention to the situation Winslow describes when he went looking for a route. He describes in detail the action that was occurring around Smith's two guns. Notice how the lines were formed.

This is an example of a good report. The importance of a good report cannot be overemphasized. A good report is of value, not only to historians, but as a valuable tool in reconstructing lessons learned and improving the way we do business.

Return to your vehicle and proceed straight into the woods to your front. As you top the hill, look to your left front.

The guns you see mark the locations of the batteries of Maj. McGilvery's reserve battalion. They played a significant part in the fights on the 2d and 3d days. From there, they engaged the guns of Henry's, Cabell's, and Alexander's battalions. They also had a devastating effect on the infantry of Brig. Gen. Kershaw's brigade.

Continue to the stop sign and turn LEFT. Travel about 150 meters, then pull off and stop in front of the first monument and set of guns on the right.

STOP 11

Bigelow's battery was located in this area. Face south (across the road from the guns) and identify the ROSE HOUSE. The TROSTLE HOUSE is the white house to your rear (north) that appears just over the crest of the high ground. The PEACH ORCHARD is located west along the road you are near and at the crest of the hill just before the intersection with the EMMITSBURG ROAD. Notice how the ground in front of this position rises to a small crest then falls off towards the south. This allowed the Confederate infantrymen to approach, undetected, to
positions near the battery and deliver withering fire into the batteries of Bigelow and Phillips.


My brigade—Battery F and C, consolidated Pennsylvania artillery, Captain Thompson; Ninth and Fifth Massachusetts Batteries, Captains Bigelow and Phillips; Fifteenth New York Independent Battery, Captain Hart—being in park at a central position near our line of battle, at about 3.30 p.m. on July 2, I received an order from yourself to report to General Sickles with one light 12-pounder and one rifled battery.

The Fifth Massachusetts Battery, Captain Phillips, and Ninth Massachusetts Battery, Captain Bigelow, were marched immediately to a position occupied by General Sickles, near a belt of oak woods, considerable in front of the prolongation of the natural line of defenses of our army, on the left center, in which General Sickles' command was then engaged with the enemy. By General Sickles' order, I made an examination of the grounds, and placed the two Massachusetts batteries in a position that commanded most of the open country between the woods held by our troops on the left center and high ground occupied by the enemy on their right. A New Jersey battery immediately on the right of the two Massachusetts batteries was receiving the most of the fire of two or more rebel batteries. Hart's Fifteenth New York Independent Battery reporting at that time, I placed it in position in a peach orchard on the right and a little in
front of the New Jersey battery.

The four batteries already mentioned presented a front nearly at right angles with the position occupied by our troops, facing toward our left, the fire of which I concentrated on single rebel batteries, and five or more were driven in succession from their positions. Captain Thompson's battery (F and C, consolidated Pennsylvania artillery), of my brigade, took position on the right of the Fifteenth New York Battery, two sections of which battery fronted and fired in the direction of those heretofore mentioned, and the right section fronted to the right, and opened fire on a section or more of rebel artillery posted in the woods, at canister range, immediately on the right of the batteries under my command, the enfilade fire of which was inflicting serious damage through the whole line of my command.

At about 5 o'clock a heavy column of rebel infantry made its appearance in a grain-field about 850 yards in front, moving at quick time toward the woods on our left, where the infantry fighting was then going on. A well-directed fire from all the batteries was brought to bear upon them, which destroyed the order of their march and drove many back into the woods on their right, though the main portion of the column succeeded in reaching the point for which they started, and sheltered themselves from the artillery fire.

In a few minutes another and larger column appeared at
about 750 yards, presenting a slight left flank to our position. I immediately trained the entire line of our guns upon them, and opened with various kinds of ammunition. The column continued to move on at double-quick until its head reached a barn and farm-house immediately in front of my left battery, about 450 yards distant, when it came to a halt. I gave them canister and solid shot with such good effect that I am sure that several hundred were put hors de combat in a short space of time. The column was broken—part fled in the direction from whence it came; part pushed on into the woods on our left; the remainder endeavored to shelter themselves in masses around the house and barn.

After the battle, I visited the position where this column in its confusion massed up around the house and barn herefores mentioned, and found 120 odd dead, belonging to three South Carolina regiments. This mortality was no doubt from the effect of the artillery fire. The asperities of the ground in front of my batteries were such as to enable the enemy's sharpshooters in large numbers to cover themselves within very short range.

At about a quarter to 6 o'clock the enemy's infantry gained possession of the woods immediately on the left of my line of batteries, and our infantry fell back both on our right and left, when great disorder ensued on both flanks of the line of batteries. At this period of the action, all of the batteries were exposed to a warm infantry fire from both flanks and front, whereupon I ordered them to retire 250
yards and renew their fire. The New Jersey battery mentioned, being out of ammunition, retired to the rear. The Fifteenth New York Battery also retired from the field. Captains Bigelow and Phillips, who were under my observation about all the time, evinced great coolness and skill in retiring their batteries. Captain Phillips, Lieutenant Scott, and 4 men hauled one of his pieces off by hand, every horse in the limbers having been shot down, at which work Lieutenant Scott received a serious wound in the face, and it is a mystery to me that they were not all hit by the enemy's fire, as they were surrounded and fired upon from almost every direction. Captain Bigelow retired by prolonge, firing canister, which, with Captains Phillips and Thompson firing on his right in their new position, effectually checked the enemy in his advance for a short time. Captain Thompson, having all his horses belonging to one of the limbers of one of his pieces killed while retiring, was compelled to leave the piece, which fell into the hands of the enemy.

A prolonge is a long piece of rope with rings on one end and a ring or bar on the other. It was an authorized piece of section equipment with each gun section. When a section retired by prolonge it was probably an emergency, as in this case. The hooks were attached to the trail of the gun, and the gun could be pulled off rapidly without attaching it to the caisson or limber. This also allowed the gun to be fired quickly to cover the
withdrawal. The prolonge was also used for non-emergency purposes such as crossing very wide ditches or whenever a strong rope was needed.

The crisis of the engagement had now arrived. I gave Captain Bigelow orders to hold his position as long as possible at all hazards, in order to give me time to form a new line of artillery, and justice demands that I should state Captain Bigelow did hold his position and execute his firing with a deliberation and destructive effect upon the enemy in a manner such as only a brave and skillful officer could until—one officer killed and the others wounded, and more than half his men either killed or wounded, and his horses all shot down at the limbers—he was forced to leave four guns and retire. Two guns under command of Lieutenant Milton were taken safely to the rear. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 881-882.)

McGilvery's comment that he concentrated the fire of his four batteries on single rebel batteries is a good example of massing fires to increase results. He was orchestrating the fires of his batteries and, obviously, had great effect on the enemy.

McGilvery's second line of artillery, for which Bigelow bought time, was one of the keys to the second day's fight. The Confederates could not be sure that the woodline behind the batteries was not full of Union infantry. In fact, they
probably thought it was, because in those days artillery was, as a general rule, always supported by infantry. This fact in itself probably slowed the rebel attack or, at least, had them thinking of infantry.

The following report, written by Lieut. Milton, describes the actions of Bigelow's battery. Bigelow was wounded in this battle and did not submit an official report. This was the first time this battery had been involved in combat. Prior to Gettysburg, the battery was assigned to duty in the defense of Washington, D.C. The battery departed Washington in April 1863. (A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion, by Fredrick H. Dyer, New York, Thomas Yoseloff, 1959, p. 1246.) The accomplishments of this battery, in its first fight, speak well of its training, leadership, and men. Another account of this battle is found in a letter at Appendix VI. This letter provides an account of the first man killed in the battery. It is very interesting to read how Bigelow handled the situation and how the men reacted to it.


Remained in park until 4 p.m., when ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel McGilvery to move to the left to the support of General Sickles' corps. Went in battery in line with batteries of the Third Corps, on extreme left of the line, our left being within 50 yards of a dense woods; opened fire upon the enemy's batteries, about 1,600 yards in
front of us, under cover of some buildings and a grove of woods.

After an hour's slow firing, the batteries fell back, and the enemy advanced in two lines of battle directly across our front, the Third Corps having fallen back, leaving us without support. At this time, having covered the withdrawal of the batteries upon our right, and receiving orders to retire, prolonges were fixed, and, firing at skirmishers on our left and the approaching line of battle on our right, we retired 300 yards, until we reached a position near which two stone walls met at an obtuse angle. This position, without infantry support and under an enfilading artillery fire, we were ordered to hold at all hazards. The rebel line of battle could not be checked, although its center was badly broken by our canister fire. Its flanks closing in on either side of us, obtained a cross-fire, which silenced the four pieces on my right, and prevented their withdrawal from loss of officers, men, and horses.

Having succeeded in retiring my section, I found myself in command of the battery. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 886.)

The actions of Bigelow's battery had a significant impact on the outcome of the 2nd day's battle. Its determined stand at the Trostle House bought the time for McGilvery to set up the artillery and stop a determined attack by Barksdale. Years later, Bigelow provided his written recollections of this fight.
On the morning of the 2d July, 1863, after a march of 17 miles, the 9th Mass. Battery, belonging to Major McGilvery's Vol. Brig. Art'y Reserves, arrived near Gettysburg about 10 o'clock a.m. and was parked at the foot and in the rear of Cemetery Hill.

There was some firing along the lines at the time, but this soon became silent and as the day was oppressively warm all enjoyed a noon-tide nap. About 2:30 p.m. Lieut. Chamberlin, then on Gen. Tyler's staff came to Major McGilvery with orders to send two batteries to reinforce Gen. Sickles. Phillips 5th Mass., and my own (9th Mass.) were ordered out. We halted for half an hour near Trostle's house. Gen. Sickles was standing under a small tree near the corner of a stone-wall close by the house. The battery that I accompanied was first placed in position, after which Major McGilvery and myself reconnoitered the position, and it was decided to place the 9th Battery on the left of Gen. Sickles line of batteries, facing obliquely across and down the Emmitsburg road.

While going into position, the enemy opened from a battery in our front with spherical case shot, that killed one and wounded several of my men. Lieut. Erickson was struck by a spent bullet and was temporarily disabled, but soon returned and took command of his section. The 9th Battery first engaged and silenced the Battery that was
doing it so much damage. This was hardly accomplished, before Major McGilvery came to me and called my attention to the fact that the enemy were collecting near a house in my front, evidently with the intention of charging, and directed me to shell them.

My battery opened on them with spherical case, not withstanding which, they formed their line and prepared to charge. Just before they advanced, they were distinctly seen to halt, evidently having lost their commanding officer; notwithstanding which, they soon moved forward. My battery had a fine enfilading fire on their line, and used double shotted canister with such good effect, that, with the other Batteries on its right, it succeeded in breaking the enemies (Wrights' Div. Longstreet's Corps, I think) battle-formation; but I did not check them from gaining the woods in their front and on our battery's left as a confused crowd. (At this time I saw some Federal troops in good order move out of these very woods the enemy had gained, and marched to the rear, I know not where.) These I had always thought were Sillers' Brigade. Just at this time, the batteries on my right began to withdraw; the enemy had opened with a Battery that enfiladed my front (from the right) with canister. The enemy, that I have spoken of as gaining the woods, came up on my left front as skirmishers, pouring in a heavy fire and killing and wounding a number of my men in Lieut. Milton's section, while the Battery in my front that I had previously silenced, again opened from a
new position with redoubled fury. Again I had my guns turned on it and with such good effect that it was soon silenced. Immediately that I had accomplished which Major McGilvery came to me and directed me to withdraw. (John Bigelow, 9th Massachusetts Battery, letter to John B. Bachelder, undated, p.p. 377-378, Bachelder Papers, U.S. Army War College Military History Institute.)


At 4 o'clock I was ordered into action, and took position on the right of Captain Bigelow and left of Captain Hart. The enemy soon opened a heavy artillery fire on our front and right, one battery on my right, which I could not see, giving us a very hot enfilading fire.

Toward 5 o'clock the enemy succeeded in forcing back our lines on our right and left, and the battery was subjected to a heavy musketry fire on both flanks. Accordingly, upon receiving the order from you, I limbered to the rear and retired. The horses on the left piece were shot before limbering, and we were obliged to bring the piece off by hand, leaving the limber. This was, however, brought off on the 4th....

After about 1,000 yards, I came into battery by the side of the Sixth Maine Battery, Lieutenant Dow commanding, and remained until my ammunition was expended, when I
marched to the rear and went into park for the night. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 385.)

After the war, Phillips' correspondence reveals more about this battle.


The Artillery Reserve, left Taneytown early on the morning of July 2d and I think arrived at Gettysburg between 3 and 10. We parked in a field between the Taneytown road and the Baltimore pike and remained here several hours. I went up to the front about 4 o'clock. I am not quite certain in what order McGilvery's brigade went into action. My impression is that Bigelow and Hart started off first, but I do not know whether that was in position before I was. About 20 minutes after Bigelow had left I was ordered by one of General Tyler's staff to move up to the front. I started at once leaving the caissons and moved at a trot across the Taneytown road by a cart path, and came into position on Bigelow's right. Bigelow was at the time engaged briskly with a battery in his front. I don't recollect at what time Thompson's battery went into position. I exchanged shots with the rebel batteries in the woods in our front for some time, firing slowly and sometimes stopping entirely. As I came up, I formed "into battery right oblique", which placed my leading piece on the left next to Bigelow's battery.
This left piece drove over the remains of a rail-fence and unplumed in the little private road along which our line was formed. The other pieces did not quite come to the road. As soon as the battery was in position the guidon took his position on the right, and the first shot was apparently directed at the flag and killed two horses on the right piece. This was from a battery in our front, but these batteries gave us no serious trouble and were generally silenced after firing a short time. We were most annoyed by a battery on our right, hidden from us by the rising ground and the Peach orchard which enfiladed our line and distributed very liberally amongst us the shells intended for Thompson's battery, so that we were kept busy changing horses.

About five, a rebel column (a division or brigade) appeared to our right and front and moved towards the woods on our left held by the 5th Corps. We did them as much damage as possible but they reached the woods in pretty fair order. As soon as they entered the woods, we fired into them trying to hit the rebels without injuring our own troops. While doing this a second body of troops appeared and we opened on them. They reached the house in our front and then became disordered and we fired into them with the effect stated in Col. McGilvery's report. Part of them moved from there towards us until concealed in a little hollow running parallel to our front. I had canister prepared expecting them to attack us, but I presume they
followed the hollow down to the woods on the left. Fighting was going on all this time on our right, but we were too busy to pay much attention to it until I happened to see our infantry falling back in the Peach orchard and a skirmish line coming in, in front of the right of our line of batteries. At the same time Hart's battery fell back and I noticed a confusion and retreating stragglers on our right. Suspecting what was the matter I ordered Lieut. Lull who commanded my right section to reverse his limbers and be ready to retire to a little knoll about half way to Trostle's house and go in battery there until the rest of the battery could retire. I also gave corresponding orders to the others intending to "fire retiring by section." Had this maneuver been carried out I am confident it would have diverted a great of fire from Bigelow without endangering my own guns. While in this position Col. McGilvery rode down from the right and ordered me to retire which I did at once. The right section being all ready got off ahead and the rest of the battery followed. The enemy had by this time, got through the Peach orchard and were coming in our direction though not in very good order. The horses on the left piece were shot and the men fixed the prolonge to it and started it to the rear. I was at the time mounted. Lieut. Scott was on foot. We had carried the gun a few feet when seeing the men needed a little help, I dismounted and seized the end of the prolonge throwing it over my shoulder. I recollect my horse being loose as I seized the rope, and one of the men
catching him. Just as I seized the rope I saw Lieut. Scott fall. He was 5 or 6 feet behind the gun following it along on foot when he was shot through the face, and fell but recovered himself in a moment. Somebody brought him his horse and helped him to mount and he started to the rear slowly. Meanwhile we kept the gun moving as fast as we could; at first we went over plowed ground until we noticed smooth turf just on our right when we right obliqued. As soon as the horses were shot I had dispatched the Sergeant to bring up a limber. When we got about half way to Trostle's house considering the gun safe, I mounted my horse and started after the rest of the battery, meeting the Sergeant bringing up a limber. I also met Lieut. Lull and found he had halted the battery near Trostle's house to close up and let the batteries gunner in the hollow ahead of us get through. But unfortunately although he left them there all right they were noticed by Capt. Hart, who forthwith took the responsibility of ordering them to follow him and carried off two of my pieces. This will explain why I did not bring the whole battery into action alongside of Lieut. Dow. The names of the men who brought off the left piece are, Corporals Graham and Shackley, Privates Barry, Kay, Wells, Hayden. (Charles A. Phillips, Battery E, Massachusetts Light Artillery, letter to John B. Bachelder, undated, Bachelder Papers, p.p. 369-373, U.S. Army War College Military History Institute)
Return to your vehicle and proceed towards the PEACH ORCHARD. Pull off and park on the left side of the road just before you reach the PEACH ORCHARD.

STOP 11A

As you look back from Bigelow's position, the batteries in order from Bigelow's were Phillips', Clark's (set back from the road), and Hart's.


On the 2d instant...I was ordered by Major McGilvery to go to the front with him, to take a position in the line of battle....According to Major McGilvery's orders, I formed my battery into line, and was proceeding to take position when I met General Hunt, chief of artillery, who ordered me to take a position on the left of the peach orchard. I immediately obeyed the general's orders, and came into battery as directed. I then directed the fire of my battery on one of the enemy's batteries, which was doing heavy execution on our line of battle. This battery was to my right and front, and distant about 900 yards. I used solid shot and shell with such effect that the enemy was compelled to withdraw their battery. They then brought a battery still farther to my right. They poured a tremendous cross-fire into me, killing 3 of my men and wounding 5, also killing 13 horses.

At this time my attention was drawn to a heavy column of infantry advancing on our line. I directed my fire with shrapnel on this column to good effect. I then changed to
canister, repulsing the attack made on my battery. At this
time the batteries on my right were abandoned, with the
exception of Captain Ames', which retired in good order to
the rear.

After the first repulse of the enemy, they reformed and
advanced on me a second time, and were repulsed. At this
very moment I saw a very heavy column of the enemy advancing
on the left of the barn and through a wheat-field, distant
about 400 yards. I directed the fire of the left piece of
my battery with canister upon this column, which did
excellent execution, the enemy breaking in confusion. At
this time the enemy were advancing in heavy force on me. I
fired my last round of canister at this column before I
retired. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p. 887.)

Walk towards the PEACH ORCHARD. Stop at the first set of
guns. These mark Thompson's position.

STOP 11B

Report of Capt. James Thompson, Batteries C and F,
Pennsylvania Light Artillery, McGilvery's First Volunteer
Brigade, Artillery Reserve, Army of the Potomac.

At 11 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, . . . . Having
reported, I was ordered to move forward and shelter the
battery behind the piece of woods on the Emmitsburg road,
near the stone barn. I remained there until 3 p.m., when
Captain Randolph, chief of artillery Third Army Corps,
ordered me to move forward about 800 yards, take position in
a thick peach orchard, and engage the enemy's batteries at a
distance of 350 yards. I immediately moved forward, and, while crossing a cleared field, the enemy opened fire from one of their batteries. They got an excellent range of my battery, nearly all of their shot striking in my battery, but fortunately they did no other damage than killing 2 horses.

Before gaining the position assigned me, I was obliged to halt in plain sight of the enemy, to clear away two fences which the supporting infantry had failed to throw down as they had been ordered to do. As soon as I could come into battery, I opened upon the battery in my front with spherical case and shell, and, after firing about thirty minutes, the enemy's fire greatly slackened, and in a few moments more it nearly ceased; but before I had time to congratulate myself or men upon our success with this battery, a four-gun battery of light 12-pounders opened upon my right from a grove 500 yards distant, and at the same time a new battery opened on my front. I immediately ordered Lieutenant McClellan, commanding the right section, to turn his two pieces upon the flank battery, while Lieutenants Hazelton and Goff kept up their fire upon the battery in front, and for a short time I had as sharp an artillery fight as I ever witnessed. I was soon pleased to see one piece of the flank battery dismounted, and the cannoneers of another either killed or wounded, when the other two pieces were taken from the field. I then turned my whole attention upon the batteries in front, but was
obliged to fire very slowly, as my ammunition was getting exhausted, having but a few rounds of spherical case left, with a small supply of solid shot and canister.

About this time the rebel infantry advanced in line of battle across the wheat-field to my left and front. Lieutenant Hazelton opened upon them with spherical case—he having collected all there was in the battery—with great success as long as that kind of ammunition lasted. He then ceased firing, and ordered his cannoneers to shelter themselves until the enemy advanced within canister range, when he purposed to drive them back with the unwelcome messenger—grape and canister—Lieutenants McClellan and Goff meanwhile keeping up a steady, slow fire with solid shot upon the batteries in front. After having been engaged for two and a half hours, at 5.30 p.m. I was relieved by Battery I, Fifth U.S. Artillery.

My loss during the two and a half hours' fighting was 7 men wounded, 1 mortally and 2 seriously; also a loss of 11 horses killed. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 900-901.)

Walk to the intersection and turn LEFT. Stop at the guns of Ames.

STOP 11C


At 11 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, I received
orders from headquarters Artillery Reserve to report with my battery to Major-General Sickles, commanding Third Army Corps. Having reported, I was ordered to move forward and shelter the battery behind the piece of woods on the Emmitsburg road, near the stone barn. I remained there until 3 p.m., when Captain Randolph, chief of artillery Third Army Corps, ordered me to move forward about 800 yards, take position in a thick peach orchard, and engage the enemy's batteries at a distance of 850 yards. I immediately moved forward, and, while crossing a cleared field, the enemy opened fire from one of their batteries. They got an excellent range of my battery, nearly all of their shot striking in my battery, but fortunately they did no other damage than killing 2 horses.

Before gaining the position assigned me, I was obliged to halt in plain sight of the enemy, to clear away two fences which the supporting infantry had failed to throw down as they had been ordered to do. As soon as I could come into battery, I opened upon the battery in my front with spherical case and shell, and, after firing about thirty minutes, the enemy's fire greatly slackened, and in a few moments more it nearly ceased; but before I had time to congratulate myself or men upon our success with this battery, a four-gun battery of light 12-pounders opened upon my right from a grove 500 yards distant, and at the same time a new battery opened on my front. I immediately ordered Lieutenant McClellan, commanding the right section,
to turn his two pieces upon the flank battery, while Lieutenant Hazelton and Goff kept up their fire upon the battery in front, and for a short time I had as sharp an artillery fight as I ever witnessed. I was soon pleased to see one piece of the flank battery dismounted, and the cannoneers of another either killed or wounded, when the other two pieces were taken from the field. I then turned my whole attention upon the batteries in front, but was obliged to fire very slowly, as my ammunition was getting exhausted, having but a few rounds of spherical case left, with a small supply of solid shot and canister.

About this time the rebel infantry advanced in line of battle across the wheat-field to my left and front. Lieutenant Hazelton opened upon them with spherical case—he having collected all there was in the battery—with great success long as that kind of ammunition lasted. He then ceased firing, and ordered his cannoneers to shelter themselves until the enemy advanced within canister range, when he purposed to drive them back with the unwelcome messenger—grape and canister—Lieutenants McClellan and Goff meanwhile keeping up a steady, slow fire with solid shot upon the batteries in front. After having been engaged for two and a half hours, at 5.30 p.m. I was relieved by Battery I, Fifth U.S. Artillery.

My loss during the two and a half hours' fighting was 7 men wounded, 1 mortally and 2 seriously: also a loss of 11 horses killed.
Moving to the rear upon being relieved, I parked the battery near the ammunition train of the Artillery Reserve. (C.R., XXVII, Part I, p.p. 900-901.)

The battery that relieved Ames' and Thompson's batteries was, later in this fight, overrun at a position further back. This was a tough fight for all the units in this portion of the battlefield. The batteries were in constant motion engaging in counter-battery fires, repelling infantry attacks, and moving. To conduct these type actions requires good leadership and well-trained soldiers. Each man had to know the other's job. Cross training was a key to success here, just as it is in most tough tight. Thompson's battery had to take down fences that the infantry was supposed to have dropped. This showed flexibility and a determination to accomplish the mission. The importance of good, tough training and leadership is just as important today as it was then. Tough smart leaders and tough motivated soldiers make very effective units.

As the Union soldiers were being driven from the Peach Orchard and pushed to the bottom of Little Round Top, Alexander was moving his artillery forward. His artillery occupied the field to the north between here and the Trostle House. From there they were able to put a very effective fire on McGilvery's second line just past the Trostle House. These Confederate batteries remained here until the day's action ended, then repositioned in this general area for the 3d day of the battle.
Return to your vehicle. Proceed to the EMMITSBURG ROAD intersection, turn RIGHT at the stop sign and go 2.5 mile and turn RIGHT onto UNITED STATES AVENUE. Just after you turn, pull off to the RIGHT and stop.

The field to your right is the one which Alexander's battalion charged forward to from its initial positions near the observation tower on CONFEDERATE AVENUE. To your left front and at a distance of 700-800 meters is the ridge where McGilvery set up his second line.

Proceed to the vicinity of the white house on the left side of the road. This is the TROSTLE HOUSE. If traffic permits, stop and read the next two accounts by Phillips and Bigelow. If you cannot stop, continue to travel along the road and, just past the Park Service tour sign numbered 14, there is a place on the right side next to the rail fence at which you can pull off and stop. You may want to walk back to TROSTLE HOUSE and read these accounts of this fight. It is worth the walk to be able to see the terrain about which you are reading.

STOP 12

Bigelow's recollections describe in great detail the withdrawal of the batteries. You can imagine the furious battle that took place in this area. From the description in the letter, the break in the fence near the Trostle House was the only way out of this field for the Union batteries. It must have been a scene of mass confusion. Cool heads, good leaders, and disciplined soldiers can overcome confusion in most cases. This was the case here.

Below is a continuation of Bigelow's narrative. It describes the action at the Trostle House. Remember that he has been pushed from his first position back to this position. This part of the narrative begins at the first position across the field near the Peach Orchard at the time he was ordered to retire.
Narrative of Capt. John Bigelow, commanding Ninth Massachusetts Battery, First Volunteer Brigade, Artillery Reserve, Army of the Potomac.

At my request I did so 'by prolonge.' This was a necessity for the skirmishers on my left front were pressing me very hard, while Wilcox's rebel division was marching down in line of battle on my right front. I say my battery retired by prolonge, I should perhaps more properly say by the recoil of its guns, for the prolonges were only used to straighten the alignment and for keeping an effective front, to both skirmishers as line of Battle. After retiring thus for quarter of a mile without any troops near it, protecting itself from most determined skirmishers by canister, and damaging as much as possible the approaching line of battle with spherical case shot, it reached the corner of the stonewall near Trostle's house. (There was only one exit through the wall, and that was on the side facing Trostle's house.) It was my purpose to gain the high ground in my rear, and on the natural prolongation of the line held by the A.P., for a slight knoll in my front rendering my fire less effective than was necessary at the emergency; besides remaining longer would cut it off from all assistance that might be extended it. While giving the necessary orders for the movement, (for my late firing had sufficiently checked the enemy to give me time) Major McGilvery came to me and said that "for 4 or 500 yards in my rear there were no troops and for heaven's sake hold that line (Wilcox) in check at all hazards until he could get some other batteries in
position to cover my own". I told him I would try to do so. The task seemed superhuman, for the knoll already spoken of allowed the enemy to approach as it were under cover within 50 yards of my front, while I was very much cramped for room and my ammunition was greatly reduced. During the few moments, since I had determined to get through the stone-wall, my battery had stopped firing, I ordered it to commence again firing solid shot low, for a ricochet over the knoll into Wilcox’s infantry and that all the ammunition should be taken out and laid beside the pieces. This was soon done, the moments seemed hours; not a moment too soon, however, for almost immediately the enemy appeared over the knoll. Waiting till they were breast high, my battery was discharged at them every gun loaded to the muzzle with double shoted canister and solid shot, after which through the smoke they caught a glimpse of the enemy, they were torn and broken, but still advancing. again gun after gun was fired as fast as possible and enfilading their line when it could. The enemy opened a fearful musketry fire, men and horses were falling like hail, every discharge from the recoil of my guns, more and more cramped my position. Lieut. Milton’s section was crowded on the stone-wall and I told him to get out if he could. The enemy crowded to the very muzzles of Lieut. Erickson and Whitaker’s sections, but were blown away by the canister. Sergeant after Sergt., was struck down, horses were plunging and laying about all around, bullets now came in on all sides for the enemy had
turned my flanks. The air was dark with smoke. A rebel battery had opened on our position and their shells were going over among us. The enemy were yelling like demons, yet my men kept up a rapid fire, with their guns each time loaded to the muzzle. Notwithstanding their insane, reckless efforts not an enemy came into their battery from its front. At this time I was shot from my horse, two of my men hurried to me and raised me up, when I found my men still firing, with the enemy (some that had got in on the flanks), standing on the limber chests, and shooting down cannoneers that were handling the pieces, but found best of all that Major McGilvery had got some guns in position where they were so much needed. Longer delay was impossible. Lieut. Milton with wonderful coolness, among a storm of bullets, after cutting out horse after horse that had been disabled or killed, and righting his pieces several times overturned by dead animals, succeeded in getting his section off. Not a horse was left in either Whitaker's or Erickson's sections. Not a Sergt., remained. Poor Erickson, bold, gallant and patriotic an officer was killed. Nothing was left except for a few rounds of ammunition and these the handful of my men, at the pieces were busily and effectively expending. Having thus accomplished what was required of my command, I gave them orders to fall back moving off towards the right. This they did, and almost immediately the batteries in my rear opened a heavy fire, covering my guns (4) left in the hands of the enemy so
effectively, that they could not be removed. The enemy told me some of my men that they were determined to get their brass guns but could not muster courage to continue their charge, on a second line of artillery. When I was taken to the rear, the four guns gotten into position by Major McGilvery, without a single infantry man as far as I could see on their right or left as supports, were all the troops that were holding our lines. Though when I approached the Taneytown road, I met infantry (Williams' I think) coming in. Need hardly tell you, just at dark my guns were retaken. There let me speak of Lieut. Whitaker. He fought with the most unflinching bravery throughout, and finally on that hard fought day more faithful and promising than seems. He receiving orders to, retire, while taking his few men left, through the enemy in his rear, was shot by them through the kneec, received a wound that afterwards proved fatal. The service lost no better man. (John Bigelow, 9th Massachusetts Battery, letter to John B. Bachelder, undated, Bachelder Papers, p.p. 378-382, U.S. Army War College Military History Institute.)

The Confederates were pushing the Union forces back. In his report, Brig. Gen. Wilcox describes the terrain across which his brigade attacked. This was just to the north of the Trostle House about 500-600 meters. He was on Barksdale's left. The description of the ground is essentially the same for both brigades. The stream he mentions is the one you just crossed.
near the Trostle House.


This forward movement was made in an open field, the ground rising slightly to the turnpike, 250 yards distant. Before reaching this road, a line of the enemy's skirmishers along a fence parallel to the road were encountered and dispersed. The fence being crossed, my men advanced to the road, in which infantry in line of battle were formed. A brisk musketry fight for a few minutes followed, when the enemy gave way; not, however, till all save two pieces of a battery that was in the road had been removed. These fell into our hands, the horses having been killed.

On the far side of the pike the ground was descending for some 600 or 700 yards. At the bottom of this descent was a narrow valley, through which ran a ravine or stream, fringed with small trees or undergrowth bushes. Beyond this, the ground rose rapidly for some 200 yards, and upon this ridge were numerous batteries of the enemy. This ridge to my right rose into a succession of higher ridges or spurs of mountains, increasing in height to the right, but to the left gradually descending. When my command crossed the pike and began to descend the slope, they were exposed to an artillery fire from numerous pieces, both from the front and from either flank.

Before reaching the ravine at the foot of the slope,
two lines of infantry were met and broken, and driven pell-mell across the ravine. A second battery of six pieces here fell into our hands. From the batteries on the ridge above referred to, grape and canister were poured into our ranks. This stronghold of the enemy, together with his batteries, were almost won, when still another line of infantry descended the slope in our front at a double-quick, to the support of their fleeing comrades and for the defense of the batteries.

Seeing this contest so unequal, I dispatched my adjutant-general to the division commander, to ask that support be sent to my men, but no support came. Three several times did this last of the enemy's lines attempt to drive my men back, and were as often repulsed. This struggle at the foot of the hill on which were the enemy's batteries, though so unequal, was continued for some thirty minutes. With a second supporting line, the heights could have been carried. Without support on either my right or left, my men were withdrawn, to prevent their entire destruction or capture. The enemy did not pursue, but my men retired under a heavy artillery fire, and returned to their original position in line, and bivouacked for the night, pickets being left on the pike. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p. 618.)

If you have pulled off just past the Tour Stop 14 sign as previously mentioned, look in the field on your left and see
the monument with the gun beside it. This is the vicinity where Battery I, Fifth U.S. Artillery was overrun. This battery was the one that relieved Ames' battery. Also, this battery and Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery were the two batteries assigned to Fifth Army Corps that were taken by Sickles' Corps and put into line with Third Corps. Brig. Gen. Hunt states that it was not necessary for anyone from Sickles' Corps to put these two units in Sickles' line because there was enough artillery already there. He states that by doing this the Fifth Corps was deprived of its batteries without the knowledge of the corps commander and much to his inconvenience. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 235.) Battery I was overrun and then retaken. Its commander was wounded, and no reports were submitted. The story behind its capture and subsequent recapture became a great debate after the battle. Several New York Infantry regiments claimed to have been the one that recaptured the battery. The following report is from one of these units. Pay attention to how heavy the fighting was in this area.


During the movement to the right, we were under a heavy fire of shell and canister from the batteries of the enemy, commingled with the bullets of a triumphant horde of rebels who had forced their way up to the position previously held by others of our Union forces, who had been compelled to give way before their attack, with the loss of four of our
cannon.

At the command, the regiment with the brigade—not a man in the whole line faltering or hesitating for an instant—nurled themselves upon the advancing foe. The rebel ranks were broken through, and, as they hurriedly retreated, volley after volley was poured into them by our still advancing regiment. The ground over which the first of the charge was made was a sort of swale, covered with rocks, thickly interspersed with bushes, scrub oaks, and trees. Beyond was open ground, ascending toward the west. As we emerged upon the open ground, we were met by a terrible storm of grape and canister. Without an instant's hesitation the regiment still advanced until they had driven the enemy from the possession of the four cannon previously captured by the rebels. The Thirty-ninth New York Volunteers afterward brought in those guns. In obedience to the order of Colonel Willard, the regiment then came to the right-about, and at quick time, the rebel fire of shell and canister continuing, moved back to the position it held before charging. Skirmishers were thrown out to the front, and, after about half an hour, the regiment moved back to its original position.

Some idea of the fire under which the regiment passed during the charge may be formed from the fact that the right company (A) lost 33 men killed and wounded; the next two companies to the left lost 27, killed and wounded. (*O.R.*, XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 475-476.)
Proceed to the next intersection and turn LEFT. Stop on the right as you approach the statue of Reverend Corby.

STOP 13

After McGilvery left Bigelow's position near the TROSTLE HOUSE, he returned to here and set up a new line of artillery.


In the meantime I formed a new line of artillery about 400 yards to the rear, close under the woods, and covering the opening which led into the Gettysburg and Taneytown road, of the following batteries and parts of batteries: Battery I, Fifth Regular, and a volunteer battery which I have never been able to learn the name of; three guns of the Fifth Massachusetts and two of Captain Thompson's Pennsylvania battery, and commenced firing on the enemy's line of infantry and artillery which had formed in the open field only about 700 or 800 yards in our front. A brook, running through low bushed parallel to our front, midway between ours and the enemy's lines, was occupied by rebel sharpshooters. As soon as the Sixth Maine Battery reported, which was just before sundown, I rendered canister to be used on the low bushes in front, which compelled them to retire. About this time Pettit's New York battery reported, and changed position on the right of the Sixth Maine.

At this time the enemy's artillery fire was very heavy and rapid. The unknown volunteer battery, heretofore
mentioned, left the field; the guns of Battery I, Fifth Regulars, were abandoned; Captain Thompson's guns, being out of ammunition, were sent to the rear; Pettit's First New York Battery (B) remained only a few minutes, and left while I was directing the fire of the Sixth Maine and a section of the Fifth Massachusetts. Captain Phillips, Lieutenant Dow, with the Sixth Maine and one section of the Fifth Massachusetts, Captain Phillips, remained in position, and kept up a well-directed fire upon the enemy's lines until they had ceased firing, which was about 8 o'clock. I then placed Captain Seeley's regular battery, Lieutenant James, in position near Lieutenant Dow's battery, with instructions to watch the enemy closely and fire upon any advancing column, or reply to any artillery that might be opened upon us. Here ended the engagement of July 2. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 882-883.)

At one time, McGilvery had only about a battery's worth of guns firing from these positions. This was due to the capturing of pieces, enemy fire, and lack of ammunition. About this time, Willard's Third Brigade of the II Corps attacked the 21st Mississippi causing them to withdraw. As they withdrew, McGilvery's guns fired into them as they crossed the ridge near the Emmitsburg Road. As the 21st Mississippi fell back, Wilcox's brigade pushed farther until it was stopped by the 1st Minnesota, supported by the artillery from Cemetery Ridge.

Heavily involved in this fight were the batteries of the
Second Corps Artillery Brigade. These batteries were located in the vicinity of the Angle, which would be the focus of the next day's Confederate attack. The positions here were also occupied and played a critical part in the next day's fight when they fired into the flank of Pickett's men as they attacked towards the Union center.

The next report is included, not only to describe the action here on this line, but to reinforce the fact that the artillery located along Cemetery Ridge near the Angle was also heavily involved in this day's fight.


Upon the crest of the hill, Major McGilvery formed a new line with the guns which he could collect, being reinforced by Lieutenant Dow with his battery (Sixth Maine), and the farther advance of the enemy was checked by the fire of artillery almost unaided by infantry.

The reserve batteries lost very heavily on this occasion in horses and men, so that several guns were necessarily left upon the field, but, after dark, parties were sent out and all but one gun, belonging to Captain Thompson's battery (C and F, Pennsylvania), were returned to the command to which they belonged. The gun in question was left behind much nearer the new position than many others which were regained, and it is not improbable that it was brought in by troops of some of the corps. I would respectfully call attention to Major McGilvery's report of
When the action became general, I ordered Captain Ransom's Regular Brigade (C, Fourth U.S. Artillery; C, Fifth U.S. Artillery; F and K, Third U.S. Artillery; H, First U.S. Artillery) to form line of battle on the crest of the hill near General Meade's headquarters. Soon two batteries--Lieutenant Turnbull's (F and K, Third U.S. Artillery) and Captain Ransom's (C, Fifth U.S. Artillery)--were ordered forward to General Humphrey's, and occupied a much exposed position near the right center when the enemy's advance was made. Lieutenant Turnbull... was compelled to retire.... four guns were left on the field but were afterward brought off by the infantry.... Lieutenant Eakin (H, First U.S. Artillery) was ordered to Cemetery Hill.... Lieutenant Thomas, with his battery (C, Fourth U.S. Artillery), held the crest of the hill and did excellent service in repelling the attack on our center. Captain Huntington's brigade (H, First Ohio Artillery; F and G, First Pennsylvania Artillery; A, First New Hampshire Artillery; C, First West Virginia) and Captain Taft's battery (Fifth New York) of twenty-pounders were ordered to report to Major-General Howard, commanding the Eleventh Corps, and by him placed in position in the vicinity of the Cemetery where they engaged the enemy's batteries opposite, firing beyond bodies of troops as they appeared in force until daylight was ended by the darkness.

During the charge upon our right center, two of the guns belonging to Captain Ricketts' battery (F and G, First
Pennsylvania Artillery), of this brigade, were captured, and one of them spiked, but the enemy was held in check by the cannoneers with pistols, handspikes, &c., and afterward driven back by a brigade of the Second Corps, and the guns recaptured.

Lieutenant Gillett, First Connecticut Artillery, ordnance officer of this command, was engaged the entire night in issuing ammunition to the batteries of the several corps, as well as those of the Artillery Reserve. Seventy wagons were unloaded, which were sent to the rear on the morning of the 3rd. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 872-873.)


I had not gone far when Major McGilvery ordered me into position in rear of the first line, remarking that he had charge of the artillery of the Third Corps. On going into position, my battery was under a heavy fire from two batteries of the enemy, situated some 1,000 yards in my front. I replied to them with solid shot and shell until the enemy's line of skirmishers and sharpshooters came out of the woods to the left front of my position and poured a continual stream of bullets at us. I soon discovered a battle line of the enemy coming through the wood about 600 yards distant, evidently with a design to drive through and take possession of the road to Taneytown, directly in my rear. I immediately opened upon them with spherical case.
and canister, and assisted by a section of Captain Phillips' (Fifth Massachusetts) battery, drove them back into the woods. Their artillery, to which we paid no attention, had gotten our exact range, and gave us a warm greeting.

We continued to shell the woods after their infantry retired, and upon visiting the spot the same night, about 9 o'clock, found many rebels dead and wounded. It was evidently their intention, after capturing the Ninth Massachusetts Battery and Company I, Fifth Regulars, to have charged right through our lines to the Taneytown road, isolating our left wing and dividing our army; but owing to the prompt and skillful action of Maj. Freeman McGilvery, in forming this second line as soon as he found the first line lost, their plan was foiled, for they no doubt thought the woods in our rear were filled with infantry in support of the batteries, when the fact is we had no support at all. At this crisis my orders from Major McGilvery were to hold my position at all hazards until he could re-enforce the position and relieve me. It was about 7 o'clock when the enemy retired, and I was in action altogether about one hour and a half.

At 7.30 p.m. I was relieved by Major McGilvery, who placed Seeley's battery, under command of Lieutenant James, in my position, and I retired into the edge of the woods. Lieutenant Rogers, of this battery, in reconnoitering found the enemy had retired from the field in haste, and had not
taken the captured guns with them, nor even spiked them. He
immediately reported the fact to me, and as many men as I
could spare were sent under his charge to bring them off the
field. With the aid of the Garibaldi Guard, of New York, he
brought off, under a fire from the enemy's sharpshooters,
four 3-inch rifled guns and two limbers belonging to Company
I, Fifth Regulars, which we immediately limbered on our
caissons and ran to the rear.

I was then ordered by Major McGilvery to go to the
front and see if any other public property was on the field,
which order I obeyed, and discovered four light 12-pounder
guns and a limber of the Ninth Massachusetts Battery. The
remnant of the One hundred and fiftieth New York Regiment,
although tired and weary, took hold of the guns and ran them
up to Lieutenant James' position, where I turned them over
to Lieutenant James, not having force sufficient to bring
them off the field. Lieutenant James brought the guns off,
and I understood, turned them over to the Ninth
Massachusetts Battery.

By order of Major McGilvery, I reported to Generals
Tyler and Hunt what we had done. General Hunt ordered me to
go to the rear near the reserve train with the guns. I did
so, and next morning had the satisfaction of returning the
guns of Company I, Fifth Regulars, to their commanding

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After passing Trostle's house I found Dow's battery in position and came into battery on his right. It was growing dusk and there was considerable confusion. In our rear troops were moving down the Taneytown road to reinforce the 5th Corps, and on our right troops were moving to help the 3d Corps. The rebel batteries had by this time moved up to the Peach orchard and opened a very heavy fire on us. In our front was a hollow, with low bushes, held where it was held at all, by rebels. In our front a gap of a quarter of a mile wide was left without any infantry. As soon as we were fairly in position, Dow moved to the front and I followed him taking position so as to sweep the hollow in our front when we opened with canister on the rebel skirmishers while I attended to the rebel battery in the Peach orchard. I had three guns at this time, but only two limbers. We soon cleared the bushes in our front, and drove the rebel artillery out of the Peach orchard. After we made this last forward movement, I think Dow and I were the only batteries in the field. Had the rebels known what a gap there was in our lines they could undoubtedly have broken through; but of course they supposed it was held by infantry as well as Artillery. Dow's left was held very near the woods and Watson's battery (I, 5th U.S.) was I think in the woods or on its edge, not a great distance from Dow. Trostle's house was in our front. After the first half hour
we began to feel secure in our position and about eight o'clock, my ammunition running low, (we had ceased firing) I went across the Taneytown road, and found Seeley's battery, which by Major McGilvery's orders I brought up to relieve mine and retired to the rear and assembled the battery and filled up the chests, which was done soon after midnight.

Early the next morning by Major McGilvery's orders I occupied the position laid down on your map where I remained all that day and night. The forenoon was quiet and spent building breastworks which though slight proved sufficient. During the foolish cannonade we fired a few shots as stated in my report, but did not open in earnest until Longstreet's Corps, appeared: when we did as much execution as we could.

When Longstreet reached our lines, the bushes and trees on our right concealed his troops from us so that we could not fire with very good effect, but this was merely during the last 50 yards or so of his charge. During the greater portion of it he was entirely exposed to our fire. (Charles A. Phillips, Battery E, Massachusetts Light Artillery, letter to John B. Bachelder, undated, p.p. 372-374, Bachelder Papers, U.S. Army War College Military History Institute.)

The fighting essentially ended here for the day. A lesson to be learned by all is that you never know when you will be put in charge, so you must be ready at all times. Many lieutenants on both sides took command this day when their battery commanders were killed or wounded.
FRIDAY 3 JULY 1863

Return to your vehicle and proceed towards the Pennsylvania Monument. Take the RIGHT FORK in the road and go behind the monument to the stop sign. Turn RIGHT and proceed to the next stop sign, which is at the intersection of TANEYTOWN ROAD. Turn RIGHT and go .2 mile and turn left. Be careful - the road you turn on is unmarked and hard to see. It can be easily recognized by the monument flanked by two guns that is on the right side of TANEYTOWN ROAD directly opposite the turn. Proceed .6 mile.
The open fields on your right along this section of the road were where the Army of the Potomac's Artillery Reserve was located. At the .6 mile mark on the right there is a small gray house with a wooden rail around its porch. After you pass this house, and just before you reach the intersection, slow down and, if traffic permits, pull over and stop. Do not get out. Look to your left rear and see the hill with the monument on it. This is Powers Hill.

Two batteries of Union artillery were located on this hill and fired in support of the Union attack to regain portions of CULP'S HILL on the morning of 3 July. There are monuments to these units on the hill but the area has not been cared for in a number of years.

Continue on this road to the left around the curve at the intersection and go to the stop sign. This is the intersection with Highway 97, BALTIMORE PIKE. At the stop sign, turn LEFT and go .2 mile, then take the first RIGHT turn. Follow the sign pointing to SPÄNGLER'S SPRING. Follow this road for about .3 mile until you come to a fork in the road marked with ONE WAY signs. Follow the signs and continue on this road towards SPÄNGLER'S SPRING.

As you approach Spangler's Spring, visualize yourself attacking across the low ground towards the hills to your front and left front. Notice the flat open areas leading to the hill. Remember this at your next stop when this area is again mentioned.

Pass the DO NOT ENTER signs of the one way road entering the area from your right. Follow the left fork at the junction just beyond. This is GEARY AVENUE. It swings west while the
other road goes straight up the hill. Follow Geary Avenue for about .2 mile until you come to another open field. Pull off and STOP on the right side as you enter the open area.

STOP 14

During the battle of the second day, elements of the XII Corps had been called out of their line near CULP’S HILL to support the left side of the Union lines. When these troops left their positions, the Confederates of Brig. Gen. Steuart’s brigade pushed its way into the vacated Union positions at the stone wall that you see on your right at the far end of this field. With no knowledge of the terrain and in the middle of the enemy, Steuart consolidated his forces to participate in the next morning’s attack by the Confederates. The following account by Brig. Gen. Geary describes an attack by the Union. This attack was another pivotal point in the battle of Gettysburg because it took the initiative away from the Confederates and prevented Ewell’s corps from making its attack to support the attack of Longstreet on the Union’s center. This allowed Meade to concentrate his forces at his center, the point of the Confederates main attack.

As you read this report, notice that the plan to retake these positions involved a coordinated fire plan. The Union batteries located on POWER’S HILL and on the south side of BALTIMORE PIKE across from Spangler’s farm opened an intense cannonade on these positions just at daylight.

The brigades of Wooster, Candy, and Powell were ordered to advance under this fire and attack the enemy.

By your order, Lieut. E.D. Muhlenberg, chief of artillery of the corps, reported with fourteen pieces of artillery. These were posted on a hill west of the turnpike and about 500 yards in rear of the intrenchments gained by the enemy, and I trained them so as to command the enemy's position without injury to our own troops. To Knap's (Pennsylvania) battery, which was in position on the hill near corps headquarters, I gave similar directions regarding their line of fire.

Everything being thus in readiness, at 3:30 a.m. (early dawn) a simultaneous attack was made by artillery and the infantry of the Second and Third Brigades. This attack was most furious, but was stubbornly met. Our artillery fire continued, by previous arrangement, for ten minutes. This tremendous assault at first staggered the enemy, by whom it was seemingly unexpected; but, rallying as my troops charged at the close of the artillery fire, Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, followed by Rodes', and that supported by Early's, each division massed in three lines, advanced, charging heavily upon our front and right, and yelling in their peculiar style. They were met at every point by the unswerving lines and deadly fire of my Second and Third Brigades, our men cheering loudly and yielding not an inch of ground. Line after line of the enemy broke under this steady fire, but the pressing masses from behind rushed
forward to take their places.

After a lapse of twenty minutes, I directed the artillery fire again to open, having myself sighted the pieces so as to bear directly upon the masses of the enemy in the woods. This artillery fire lasted about fifteen minutes. A part of it being directed to the valley of Rock Creek, where the enemy's left rested, prevented them from flanking the troops of the First Division, which were engaging the enemy in front. This flank movement the enemy made repeated attempts to effect, but they were driven back by well-directed shells from our artillery.

At 5:45 a.m. the Sixty-sixth Ohio was ordered to advance outside of Greene's intrenchments and perpendicular to them, in order to harass the enemy by a raking fire. This they accomplished with great gallantry, driving the enemy and holding the ground until recalled by an order at 11 a.m. Although exposed without shelter to the enemy's fire from front and flank, so eager was their attack that a few of their men advanced too far, and fell by our own artillery fire. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 828-829.)


The rebel artillery having ceased firing, no infantry making its appearance, and the corps having been ordered to the left of the army, to support it, if necessary, these guns were withdrawn from the above position, and Knap's
Independent Pennsylvania Battery, Lieut. Charles A. Atwell commanding, was placed on a knob situated southwest of the pike 100 yards from it, and known on that day as Slocum's Hill. Battery M, First New York Artillery, Lieutenant Kneispel commanding, on a second elevation, a quarter of a mile distant, and nearly due east from the first mentioned, both overlooking and commanding the ground just vacated by the corps. These two batteries retained these positions during the whole engagement and did excellent service. Battery F, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and Battery K, Fifth U.S. Artillery, remained in park at base of the Slocum's Hill, ready for a move to the left, if called upon.

After the return of the corps from the left, it found the greater portion of its intrenchments already in possession of the enemy, supposed to be a portion of General Ewell's corps, variously estimated from 5,000 to 8,000 strong.

On the morning of the 3d, at 1 a.m., Batteries F, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and K, Fifth U.S. Artillery, were placed in position parallel to and on the southwest side of the Baltimore pike, almost directly opposite the center of the line formed by the Twelfth, and controlling the approach of the enemy along the ravine formed by the stream known as Pock Creek.

At 4.30 a.m. the two rifle batteries (ten guns) and the two light 12-pounder batteries (ten guns) opened, and fired for fifteen minutes without intermission at a range of from...
600 to 800 yards: ceased firing, and allowed infantry to take part. Commenced at 5.30 a.m., and continued firing at intervals until 10 a.m., at which hour the enemy had retreated and the infantry of the corps had regained their works. The artillery was of essential service, and did excellent execution at this part of the field, and no doubt contributed greatly in preventing the enemy from establishing himself in so desirable a position, whence he could either have held the pike or have moved his force along the southeast slope and occupied a sufficiency of Cemetery Hill to annoy, if not to entirely control, the position held by the army. The marks on the trees and immense boulders contiguous to the line of intrenchments prove conclusively that the practice of the artillery was excellent and splendidly accurate.

Batteries F, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and K, Fifth U.S. Artillery, remaining in the position just mentioned, were exposed to a most terrific fire during the afternoon of the 3d, the enemy opening with all his artillery upon the left and center of the army. The direction of their lines of fire was such that almost every projectile passing over Cemetery Hill found its bed within the battery line of these two batteries. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p.870-871.)

These reports described a good example of a coordinated fire plan. The infantry and artillery knew what each other was doing. The infantry moved forward during the artillery fire; and, as it
closed with enemy, the artillery was shifted farther away. The artillery fire in this engagement played a significant role in this particular fight. Make note of the artillery hitting positions in Geary's report.

The 21st Connecticut attacked this hill from the Spangler's Spring side. Remember how flat and open the approach to this hill is from that side. Two batteries that were supporting the Union attack were firing from directly behind the attacking force, and two were located directly to the left of the direction of attack.


At daylight our artillery commenced shelling the woods, breast-works, and locality of the wall formerly held by us, then occupied by the rebels.

A little after 5 a.m. my regiment advanced under orders into the edge of the woods. From this position a heavy force of skirmishers proceeded but a few rods to the brow of the hill before they engaged the enemy. From this time for over five hours parts of my regiment were unceasingly engaged with the enemy, the advanced line being frequently relieved from my main line. The enemy were endeavoring to advance through the woods, so as to turn the right flank of the Second Division, and were met and successfully resisted by my regiment. In this position I was enabled to repeatedly communicate to the colonel commanding the brigade.
and the general commanding the division the movements of the 
enemy in our immediate front, thereby enabling our artillery 
to more accurately obtain the range of the enemy and to 
greatly increase the effectiveness of our shells. (O.R., 
XXVII, Part 1, p. 793.)

and twenty-third New York Infantry, commanding First 
Brigade, First Division, Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac.

July 3.--An attack was made in the morning upon the 
enemy in our intrenchments both by infantry and artillery. 
The Twentieth Connecticut Volunteers were advanced into the 
woods in front of our troops, where the enemy had posted 
himself, and to which point was evidently advancing more 
forces. Lieutenant-Colonel Wooster, who was in command of 
this regiment, had a difficult and responsible duty to 
perform. He was not only required to keep the enemy in 
check, but encountered great difficulty, while resisting the 
enemy, in protecting himself against the fire of our own 
artillery, aimed partly over his command at the enemy in and 
near our intrenchments. His greatest embarrassment was, the 
farther he pushed the enemy the more directly he was placed 
under the fire of our own guns. Some of his men became 
severely wounded by our artillery fire.

For several hours this regiment occupied a most 
important position in these woods south of our line of 
intrenchments in preventing the enemy getting around the 
right of General Geary's forces in the intrenchments on our
left, and holding the enemy back so that our artillery could have free play upon his columns without destroying our own troops.

Later in the day, Kinzie's Battery K, Fifth New York was moved to a position to support First Corps and helped rout the Confederates. (O.R., XXVII, Part I, p.375.)

Col. McDougall describes fratricide on the 20th Connecticut which its commander, Lieut. Col. Wooster, does not mention in his report. Fratricide is a fact of life today, just as it was then. Today's artillerymen must all be extremely conscious of the friendly situation and do their best to reduce fratricide.

Col. McDougall also mentions that the 20th Connecticut held back the enemy so that the artillery could have free play. The artillery was positioned so that it commanded the low ground approaches the Confederates had to take when, not only attacking the Union lines, but when withdrawing. Also, it was this area that the artillery in this action was most effective. The Confederates were caught in the open.

This was a very important part of the battle because the Union success in holding back Ewell's attack on its right enabled Meade to concentrate his efforts towards his center, the point of the main Confederate attack.

These Union units were also subjected to intense Confederate artillery fire which was meant for Cemetery Hill but overshot its intended target and landed in their areas.
Proceed up the hill and turn LEFT at the intersection. Follow the road to the RIGHT up to CULP'S HILL. Sections from two batteries were placed here on the 2d day to fire at BENNER'S HILL and then returned to participate in the fight just described.

Continue around the hill and start down it. As you approach the bottom, you will see Stevens' battery's position on your left. You may want to stop and walk around the battery position to see what a command he had over the approaches to CEMETERY HILL from the north and from out of the town.

Take the road to the LEFT, just below Stevens' battery, and at the stop sign turn LEFT onto Highway 97 (BALTIMORE PIKE). Go .4 mile, then turn RIGHT immediately past the car dealership. About 100 meters after you turn, you will see two monuments, one on each side of the road. These mark the general locations of F Battery, 4th U.S. Artillery and K Battery, 5th U.S. Artillery. These were two of the batteries that fired in support of the action just described. They also received overshots of CEMETERY HILL.

Continue along HUNT AVENUE for about .4 mile until you come to a stop sign at a "T" intersection. Turn LEFT onto TANEYTOWN ROAD and go about .5 mile and turn RIGHT onto PLEASONTON AVENUE. Proceed to the next stop sign and turn RIGHT. Go to the vicinity of the clump of trees and pull off and stop. Get out and walk to the right side of the trees to Cushing's battery location. You are now standing very near to what is referred to as "the high water mark of the Confederacy". Straight in front of you and across the field in the woodline is the monument to General Lee.

STOP 15

The Union artillery that occupied this terrain was initially that of the Second Corps Artillery Brigade. It was on these batteries that the Confederates concentrated their fire. They took a terrific pounding yet some withstood the cannonade and remained to play an important role in the fight. Woodruff's battery was positioned the farthest to your right, then stretching south along the line were the batteries of Arnold, Cushing, Brown, and Rorty. The batteries of Brown and Rorty had received a very severe pounding in the afternoon's fight of the day prior. These two, along with the remaining three batteries, had been heavily engaged during this fight and would undergo a
very long and not day here on the 3d of July.


On the left of the cemetery the batteries of the Second Corps were in line on the crest occupied by their corps in the following order, from right to left: Woodruff's (I, First United States, six 12-pounders), Arnold's (A, First Rhode Island, six 3-inch), Cushing's (A, Fourth United States, six 3-inch), Brown's (B, First Rhode Island, four 12-pounders), and Rorty's (B, First New York, four 10-pounders), all under command of Captain Hazard, chief of artillery.

Next on the left of the artillery of the Second Corps were stationed Thomas' battery (C, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders), and on his left Major McGilvery's command, consisting of Thompson's (C and F, Pennsylvania, five 3-inch), Phillips' (Fifth Massachusetts, six 3-inch), Hart's (Fifteenth New York, four 12-pounders), Sterling's (Second Connecticut, four James and two howitzers), Rank's section (two 3-inch), Dow's (Sixth Maine, four 12-pounders), and Ames' (G, First New York, six 12-pounders), all of the Artillery Reserve, to which was added, soon after the cannonade commenced, Cooper's battery (B, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch), of the First Corps.

On our extreme left, occupying the position of the day before, were Gibbs' (L, First Ohio, six 12-pounders) and
Rittenhouse's (late Hazlett's, D. Fifth United States, six 12-pounders) batteries. Gibbs' was, however, too distant from the enemy's position for 12-pounders, and was not used during the day, although under fire. Rittenhouse was in an excellent position for the service of his rifled guns, on the top of Round Top. We had thus on the western crest line seventy-five guns, which could be aided by a few of those on Cemetery Hill. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.238.)

The batteries under the command of Col. Wainwright on Cemetery Hill, north of the Baltimore Road, and those of Maj. Osborn on Cemetery Hill, stretching from the Baltimore road south of the cemetery, remained in essentially the same positions as the previous day. Some of these guns participated in this part of the battle. Brig. Gen. Hunt later states in his report that, by 10 a.m., he had inspected the artillery, and it was in good condition. The Union gunners were set.

The next report, Brig. Gen. Pendleton's, gives a good description of how the Confederate artillery was initially positioned prior to the attack. It describes the ammunition expenditure and resupply problems encountered and the resulting failure of the Confederate artillery to provide the much needed close support for the attacking infantry.


By direction of the commanding general, the artillery along our entire line was to be prepared for opening, as
early as possible on the morning of the 3d, a concentrated and destructive fire, consequent upon which a general advance was to be made. The right, especially, was, if practicable, to sweep the enemy from his stronghold on that flank. Visiting the lines at a very early hour toward securing readiness for this great attempt, I found much (by Colonel Alexander's energy) already accomplished on the right. Henry's battalion held about its original position on the flank. Alexander's was next, in front of the peach orchard. Then came the Washington Artillery Battalion, under Major Eshleman, and Dearing's battalion on his left, these two having arrived since dusk of the day before; and beyond Dearing, Cabell's battalion had been arranged, making nearly sixty guns for that wing, all well advanced in a sweeping curve of about a mile. In the posting of these there appeared little room for improvement, so judiciously had they been adjusted. To Colonel Alexander, placed here in charge by General Longstreet, the wishes of the commanders were also cautioned how to fire so as to waste as little ammunition as possible. To the Third Corps artillery attention was also given. Major Poague's battalion had been advanced to the line of the right wing, and was not far from its left. His guns also were well posted. Proper directions were also given to him and his officers. The other battalions of this corps, a portion of Garnett's, under Major (Charles) Richardson, being in reserve, held their positions of the day before, as did those of the
Second Corps, each group having specific instructions from its chief. Care was also given to the convenient posting of ordnance trains, especially for the right, as most distant from the main depot, and due notice given of their position.

From some cause, the expected attack was delayed several hours. Meanwhile the enemy threw against our extreme right a considerable force, which was met with energy, Henry's battalion rendering, in its repulse, efficient service.

At length, about 1 p.m., on the concerted signal, our guns in position, nearly one hundred and fifty, opened fire along the entire line from right to left, salvos by battery being much practiced, as directed, to secure greater deliberation and power. The enemy replied with their full force. So mightily an artillery contest has perhaps never been waged, estimating together the number and character of guns and the duration of the conflict. The average distance between contestants was about 1,400 yards, and the effect was necessarily serious on both sides. With the enemy, there was advantage of elevation and protection from earthworks; but his fire was unavoidably more or less divergent, while ours was convergent. His troops were massed, ours diffused. We, therefore, suffered apparently much less. Great commotion was produced in his ranks, and his batteries were to such extent driven off or silenced as to have insured his defeat but for the extraordinary strength of his position.
Proceeding again to the right, to see about the anticipated advance of the artillery, delayed beyond expectation, I found, among other difficulties, many batteries getting out of or low in ammunition, and the all-important question of supply received my earnest attention. Frequent shell endangering the First Corps ordnance train in the convenient locality I had assigned it, it had been removed farther back. This necessitated longer time for refilling caissons. What was worse, the train itself was very limited, so that its stock was soon exhausted, rendering requisite demand upon the reserve train, farther off. The whole amount was thus being rapidly reduced. With our means, to keep up supply at the rate required for such a conflict proved practically impossible. There had to be, therefore, some relaxation of the protracted fire, and some lack of support for the deferred and attempted advance. But if this and other causes prevented our sweeping the enemy from his position, he was so crippled as to be incapable of any formidable movement. Night closed upon our guns in their advanced position. And had our resources allowed ammunition for the artillery to play another day, the tremendous part it had performed on this his stronghold could scarcely have sufficed to save the enemy from rout and ruin. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p. 351-353.)

Some Confederate batteries on the east side of Emmitsburg Road advanced as far as the Codori farm. This farm can be
identified by the large red barn you see to your left and close
in. Ammunition problems forced them, in many cases, to fire only
solid shot over their infantry. This was but one of the
ammunition problems with which the Confederates had to contend on
this day. Not only was their fused ammunition unreliable, but
there was a shortage of artillery ammunition throughout the Army
of Northern Virginia. The Union batteries positioned along
McGilvery's line also did much damage to them on this day.

Light Artillery, commanding Artillery Brigade, Second Army
Corps, Army of the Potomac.

The morning of July 3 was quiet until about 8 o'clock,
when the enemy suddenly opened fire upon our position,
exploding three limbers of Battery A, Fourth U.S. Artillery,
but otherwise causing little loss. Little reply was made
save by Light Company I, First U.S. Artillery, which battery
during the forenoon had eight separate engagements with the
enemy.

At 1 p.m. the artillery of the enemy opened along the
whole line, and for an hour and a quarter we were subjected
to a very warm artillery fire. The batteries did not at
first reply, till the fire of the enemy becoming too
terrible, they returned it till all their ammunition,
excepting canister, had been expended; they then waited for
the anticipated infantry attack of the enemy. Battery B,
First New York Artillery, was entirely exhausted; its
ammunition expended; its horses and men killed and disabled:
the commanding officer, Capt. J. M. Rorty, killed, and senior
First Lieut. A. S. Sheldon severely wounded. The other
batteries were in similar condition; still, they bided the
attack. The rebel lines advanced slowly but surely; half
the valley had been passed over by them before the guns
dared expend a round of the precious ammunition remaining on
hand. The enemy steadily approached, and, when within
death range, canister was thrown with terrible effect into
their ranks. Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery,
had expended every round, and the lines of the enemy still
advanced. Cushing was killed; Milne had fallen, mortally
wounded; their battery was exhausted, their ammunition gone,
and it was feared the guns would be lost if not withdrawn.

At this trying moment the two batteries were taken
away; but Woodruff still remained in the grove, and poured
death and destruction into the rebel lines. They had gained
the crest, and but few shots remained. All seemed lost, and
the enemy, exultant, rushed on. But on reaching the crest
they found our infantry, fresh and waiting on the opposite
side. The tide turned; backward and downward rushed the
rebel line, shattered and broken, and the victory was
gained. Woodruff, who had gallantly commanded the battery
through the action of July 2 and 3, fell, mortally wounded,
at the very moment of victory. The command of the battery
devolved upon Second Lieut. Tully McCrea, First U.S.
Artillery.

Batteries from the Artillery Reserve of the army
immediately occupied the positions vacated by the exhausted batteries of the brigade, and immediate efforts were made to recuperate and restore them to serviceable condition. So great was the loss in officers, men, and horses, that it was found necessary to consolidate Light Company I, First U.S. Artillery, Battery A, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and Batteries A and B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, thus reducing the five batteries that entered the fight to three. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p.478-480.)

These batteries bore the brunt of the Confederates' efforts this day. This was exceptionally tough fighting for the second day in a row for Hazard's batteries. Battery B, First New York Artillery and Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery had received a severe pounding the previous day. These two, as well as the rest of the artillery, had spent the night reorganizing, refitting, resupplying, and fixing to be able to meet this assault.

When it was over, the Confederates had been repulsed, but at a great cost to the Union. Hazard had started off the morning with five batteries; but by the end of this fight, he barely had three left. He had lost three battery commanders: Rorty, Woodruff, and Cushing. He states in his report that he lost one third of his officers and men.

One of the keys to the Union’s success was its ability to shift its artillery assets in the line to replace batteries that had no ammunition or had been severely crippled by enemy fire.

Early on the morning of the 3d, I received orders from you to report with my battery to General Newton, commanding the First Corps. Guided by an aide of that general, I reached the front about 10 a.m. General Newton being at the moment absent, I moved forward and reported to General Doubleday, who decided that no more batteries were then required, and directed me to park near by. I parked a short distance from the front, and General Newton having returned, I rode forward and pointed out my position, which was less than 100 yards distant. Here I remained till about noon, when the rebels suddenly opened a heavy artillery fire on our lines. The shells, passing over our line, struck with much accuracy in and about the spot where I was parked, and my horses were suffering, when I received orders from General Newton to move up my battery as quickly as possible.

I advanced at a brisk trot, and, leaving my caissons in rear, came into position with General Doubleday's division, and opened fire on the enemy's batteries in my front, firing slowly and with much accuracy. The enemy had excellent range of my position. I held this position for over an hour, and then received orders to move to the crest farther to my right, with General Webb's brigade, as the enemy was advancing. I moved up at a gallop, and came into position, several other batteries being on my right and left. The rebel skirmishers had just commenced firing, and their
second line was advancing from the woods. The artillery fire was quite accurate and did much execution; still, the rebel line advanced in a most splendid manner. I commenced firing canister at 200 yards, and the effect was greater that I could have anticipated. My last charge (a double-header) literally swept the enemy from my front, being fired at less than 20 yards. The infantry in front of five of my pieces, and posted behind a slight defense of rails, some 10 yards distant, turned and broke, but were rallied, and drawn off to the right of my battery by General Webl in a most gallant manner. It was then I fired my last charge of canister, many of the rebels being over the defenses and within less than 10 yards of my pieces. They broke and fled in confusion. My battery was the only remaining one on this part of the hill.

The cannoneers being driven from ten pieces on my right, and the batteries on my left having retired, the enemy now advanced several smooth-bore batteries to within 1,300 yards, and opened on the part of the line which I occupied. I concentrated my fire on a single battery, and exploded four of its limbers in rapid succession, driving it from the field. Another 3-inch battery came up on my left, and also opened on them.

After about an hour, there was but one section of the enemy's batteries firing, and it soon limbered up. As it was retiring at a gallop, a shell from my right piece exploded one of its limbers. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p. 690.)
This was certainly a flexible battery. It moved twice under heavy fire and was able to fight its way out each time. Its last position was right behind you. The batteries to the right of Cowan which he described were those of Cushing and Arnold whose cannoneers were driven away. The two batteries to his left that were retired were Brown's and Rorty's.

In 1866, Cowan wrote a letter which recollected his memories of this fight. The following excerpt from this letter begins during the cannonade just before he was ordered forward by Gen. Webb. With this description and the artillery markers placed in your general vicinity, you should be able to get a good picture of Cowan's fight. This narrative also gives another account of Brig. Gen. Hunt being in the thick of the fight.

**Narrative of Capt. Andrew Cowan, U.S.A., First New York Battery Artillery Brigade, Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac.**

During the hottest of the fire, an aide galloped through my battery and cried to me "to reserve all my fire for the infantry". The field in front of me was so smoky I could not see far and scarcely knew what the orders meant, and as the enemy was hurting us badly I was about to commence firing again, when another aide galloped down from the right and ordered me to report to Gen. Webb. I was under the orders of Gen. Doubleday and hardly knew if I ought to obey Gen. Webb, whom I did not know. While doubting for an instant, I looked toward the higher grounds
and...saw a Gen. waving his hat to me. I at once determined to risk disobeying orders, as I must be needed there, and at once limbered to the rear and moved by the left flank at a gallop. My cannoneers were mostly stripped to the shirt, and as I gave the command "by the left flank", they sprang, with loud cheers, upon the limber chests and upon the guns, their implements which they had not time to replace, still in their hands, we galloped into position, where Brown's Battery, I believe, is represented...it having been completely disabled under the artillery fire. General Webb, pointed towards the front and I saw at once what was meant by "reserving my fire for the infantry". The enemy's skirmishers were advancing, firing as they ran. While back of them and not yet uncovered from the wood, was their lines of battle. We opened at once and continued pouring shell upon them till they came within canister range. Then came the severe struggle. Our infantry which was a half dozen yards in front of my guns lying down, all at once became panic stricken and broke in confusion. The enemy rushed forward with wild cheers, pouring in their volleys and planted their colors upon the guns of the Regular Battery, just on my right, the Captain of which was killed and also gained the 4th Gun Battery on the right of it "Pettitt's N.Y. Battery" I believe fired canister low, and my last charge, two rounds in each of the six guns was fired when the advance of the enemy in my front was but ten yards distant, and while they had possession of our guns on my
right. My last officer was shot away at my side just as I was directing my men how to act when we had fired this last charge. Gen. Webb and his officers were gallant, rallying the infantry and just in rear of the Regular Battery, had the colors of six or seven regiments and some few score of men fighting around them. I venture to say, on no field at no time during the war, was more individual gallantry shown than on this occasion. As soon as my last charge was fired, my men pulled their guns by hand, rapidly as they could, back under the crest, and I moved quickly to a crest 50 yards or less farther back and opened fire with percussion shell again. Here I first saw Col. Hazzard who came up with Gen. Hunt, to command my course in taking this position. At the moment the smoke lifted and showed the remnants of the enemy's line retreating, I rapidly moved up again and from my old position engaged their batteries, which they had advanced from their front to cover the retreat.

Fitzhugh was on my left when I went into position and was there after the fight. It may be an interesting fact that Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army, was in my battery when the enemy was closest, and while mounted on his black horse was shooting the Rebels with his revolver, till his horse was shot under him, and I then remounted him on one of my Sergeant's horses. I was the only officer who went into the fight with my guns, who was left after the fight, unharmed. (Andrew Cowan, letter to John B. Bachelder, 20 Aug. 1866, Bachelder Papers, p.p. 365-368, U.S. Army War
While this fight was going on, the batteries of Maj. Osborn located in the Cemetery Hill area were not idle. In addition to counterbattery fire, they were also firing on the flanks of the Confederate infantry advancing on the Second Corps at the Angle.


About 2 p.m. they opened along our whole front with an unbroken line of artillery, and also heavily on our right flank, apparently using every description of missiles and field artillery. The crest which the enemy occupied varied from 1,000 to 1,900 yards distance, and afforded an excellent protection. I judge that the guns of not less than one-half mile of this front were concentrated on our position, besides several batteries on our right, which enfiladed our position, excepting Captains Taft's and Huntington's batteries.

Our artillery endured this fire with surprising coolness and determination. No battery even showed a disposition to retire, and several times during the cannonading we silenced several of their batteries, but at a moment's cessation on our part they would reopen upon us. The fire was extremely galling, and by comparing the rapidity with which the shells fell among and passed by our guns with the rapidity with which our guns replied, the
number of guns playing on the hill was very much greater than the number in position there; probably double.

Our guns were worked with great coolness, energy, and judgment, but as no satisfactory results were obtained, I rendered all our guns to cease firing, and the men to lie down to await developments. At the same time the artillery of our entire front ceased firing, and a few moments later the infantry of the enemy broke over the crest from where their artillery had been playing, and made their grand charge across the plain upon our lines. The left of the charging column rested on a line perpendicular to our front, then stretching away to the right beyond our view, thus offering an excellent front for our artillery fire. We used, according to distance, all descriptions of projectiles. The whole force of our artillery was brought to bear upon this column, and the havoc produced upon their ranks was truly surprising.

The enemy's advance was most splendid, and for a considerable distance the only hindrance offered it was by the artillery, which broke their lines fearfully, as every moment showed that their advance under this concentrated artillery fire was most difficult; and though they made desperate efforts to advance in good order, were unable to do so, and I am convinced that the fire from the hill was one of the main auxiliaries in breaking the force of this grand charge. But while the enemy was advancing, and after having been repulsed, I insisted that the artillery fire
should be turned intensely upon the infantry, and no notice whatever was to be taken of their artillery. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.750.)

Col. Lowrance took command of the brigade when Brig. Gen. Scales was wounded. On 3 July, this brigade formed up just behind Maj. Poague's artillery battalion which was positioned just to the right of Gen. Lee's monument as you look at it from here. This report gives a very graphic description of the effects the Union artillery had on his men as they attacked across the field.


We advanced upon the enemy's line, which was in full view, at a distance of 1 mile. Now their whole line of artillery was playing upon us, which was on an eminence in our front strongly fortified and supported by infantry. While we were thus advancing, many fell, but I saw but few in that most hazardous hour who even tried to shirk duty. All went forward with a cool and steady step, but when we had advanced over two-thirds of the way, troops from the front came tearing through our ranks, which caused many of our men to break, but with the remaining few we went forward until the right of the brigade touched the enemy's line of breastworks, as we marched in rather an oblique line. Now the pieces in our front were all silenced. Here many were
shot down, being then exposed to a heavy fire of grape and musketry upon our right flank. Now all apparently had forsaken us. The two brigades (now reduced to mere squads, not numbering in all 800 guns) were the only line to be seen upon that vast field, and no support in view. The natural inquiry was, What shall we do? and none to answer. The men answered for themselves, and, without orders, the brigade retreated, leaving many on the field unable to get off, and some, I fear, unwilling to undertake the hazardous retreat. The brigade was then rallied on the same line where it was first formed. (O.R., XXVII, Part 1, p.p. 671-672.)


Colonel Walton was ordered to open the batteries. The signal guns were fired and all the batteries opened very handsomely and apparently with effective fire. The guns on the hill at the enemy's left were soon silenced. Those at the Cemetery Hill combated us, however, very obstinately. Many of them were driven off, but fresh ones were brought up to replace them. Colonel Alexander was ordered to a point where he could best observe the effect of our fire, and to give notice of the most opportune moment for our attack.

Some time after our batteries opened fire, I rode to Major (James) Dearing's batteries. It appeared that the enemy put in fresh batteries about as rapidly as others were driven off. I concluded, therefore, that we must attack very soon, if we hoped to accomplish anything before night.
I gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests, and to be prepared to follow up the advance of the infantry. Upon riding over to Colonel Alexander's position, I found that he had advised General Pickett that the time had arrived for the attack, and I gave the order to General Pickett to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen. The order for this attack, which I could not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked had I felt that I had that privilege. The advance was made in very handsome style, all the troops keeping their lines accurately, and taking the fire of the batteries with great coolness and deliberation. About half way between our position and that of the enemy, a ravine partially sheltered our troops from the enemy's fires, where a short halt was made for rest. The advance was resumed after a moment's pause, all still in good order. The enemy's batteries soon opened upon our lines with canister, and the left seemed to stagger under it, but the advance was resumed, and with some degree of steadiness. Pickett's troops did not appear to be checked by the batteries, and only halted to deliver a fire when close under musket-range. Major-General Anderson's division was ordered forward to support and assist the wavering columns of Pettigrew and Trimble. Pickett's troops, after delivering fire, advanced to the charge, and entered the enemy's lines, capturing some of his batteries, and gained his works. About the same moment, the troops
that had before hesitated, broke their ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the enemy's fire in retiring than while they were attacking. This gave the enemy time to throw his entire force upon Pickett, with a strong prospect of being able to break up his lines or destroy him before Anderson's division could reach him, which would, in its turn, have greatly exposed Anderson. He was, therefore, ordered to halt. In a few moments the enemy, marching against both flanks and the front of Pickett's division, overpowered it and drove it back, capturing about half of those of it who were not killed or wounded. General Wright, of Anderson's division, with all of the officers, was ordered to rally and collect the scattered troops behind Anderson's division, and many of my staff officers were sent to assist in the same service. Expecting an attack from the enemy, I rode to the front of our batteries, to reconnoiter and superintend their operations. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p.359-361.)


When the signal guns were fired, I at once brought my battalion in battery to the front, and commenced firing slowly and deliberately. To insure more accuracy and to guard against the waste of ammunition, I fired by battery. The firing on the part of my battalion was very good, and most of the shell and shrapnel burst well. My fire was
directed at the batteries immediately in my front and which occupied the heights charged by Pickett's division. Three salvoes were seen by myself to blow up, and I saw several batteries of the enemy leave the field. At one time, just before General Pickett's division advanced, the batteries of the enemy in our front had nearly all ceased firing; only a few scattering batteries here and there could be seen to fire.

About this time my ammunition became completely exhausted, excepting a few rounds in my rifled guns, which were used upon a column of infantry which advanced on General Pickett's right flank. I had sent back my caissons an hour and a half before for a fresh supply, but they could not get it. Two of my batteries and a part of Captain (G.V.) Moody's battery, of Colonel Alexander's battalion, under command of Captain Moody, remained under a very heavy fire for upward of an hour without being able to fire a single shot. My own batteries remained on the field after every round of ammunition was exhausted and until I could receive some fresh batteries which Colonel Alexander sent to me. (O.R., XXVII, Part 2, p.p.388-389.)

Bearing is one of several Confederate artillery battalion commanders to mention the fact that they instructed their batteries to fire slowly and deliberately to keep from wasting ammunition. These commanders also state the fact that their units ran out of ammunition. Running out of ammunition has to be
one of the greatest fears of any artilleryman. The ammunition expenditure must be closely monitored and resupply effectively handled. For whatever reason, the Confederate artillery on this third day of battle was not able to resupply; and, therefore, many units ran out of ammunition and were forced to sit in position and not fire.

The Union artillery was very successful in helping repulse this attack because it was able to bring essentially its entire line of guns to bear on each Confederate attack, because the Confederate attacks were not coordinated. Brig. Gen. Hunt mentioned this as a significant contributing factor to the Union's success. This was two days in succession that the Army of Northern Virginia failed to make a coordinated attack and instead piecemealed its units into the attack. Each time it paid a heavy price.

This day's fight ended with the great losses on both sides. The Confederates were pulling back and the Union Army was wondering whether to take the initiative and pursue or remain in position and reconsolidate. The Battle of Gettysburg essentially ended at this spot. Therefore, this an ideal place for this terrain walk to end.

Hopefully, you have learned from this day's artillery walk. Many of the lessons learned during this battle are applicable to your profession today. It seems that we make a habit of relearning old lessons learned. Keep your powder dry!
APPENDIX I

ARTILLERY ORDER OF BATTLE

UNITED STATES ARMY
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, BRIG. GEN. HENRY J. HUNT

Artillery Brigade First Army Corps
Col. Charles S. Wainwright

Maine Light, 2d Battery (B), Capt. James A. Hall
Maine Light, 5th Battery (E):
  Capt. Greenleaf R. Stevens
  Lieut. Edward N. Whittier
1st New York Light, Battery L:
  Capt. Gilbert H. Reynolds
  Lieut. George Breck
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B, Capt. James H. Cooper
4th United States, Battery B, Lieut. James Stewart

Artillery Brigade Second Army Corps
Capt. John G. Hazard

1st New York Light, Battery B:
  Lieut. Albert S. Sheldon
  Capt. James McKay Rotty
  Lieut. Robert E. Rogers
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A, Capt. William A. Arnold
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B:
  Lieut. T. Fred Brown
  Lieut. Walter S. Perrin
1st United States, Battery I:
  Lieut. George A. Woodruff
  Lieut. Tully McCrea
4th United States, Battery A:
  Lieut. Alonzo H. Cushing
  Sergt. Frederick Fuger
Artillery Brigade, Third Army Corps  
Capt. George E. Randolph  
Capt. A. Judson Clark

1st New Jersey Light, 2d Battery:  
Capt. A. Judson Clark  
Lieut. Robert Sims

1st New York Light, Battery D, Capt. George B. Winslow

New York Light, 4th Battery, Capt. James E. Smith

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E:  
Lieut. John K. Bucklyn  
Lieut. Benjamin Freeborn

4th United States, Battery K:  
Lieut. Francis W. Seeley  
Lieut. Robert James

Artillery Brigade, Fifth Army Corps  
Capt. Augustus P. Martin

Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C), Lieut. Aaron F. Walcott

1st New York Light, Battery C, Capt. Almont Barnes

1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Capt. Frank C. Gibbs

5th United States, Battery D:  
Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett  
Lieut. Benjamin F. Rittenhouse

5th United States, Battery I:  
Lieut. Malborne F. Watson  
Lieut. Charles C. MacConnell

Artillery Brigade, Sixth Army Corps  
Col. Charles H. Tompkins

Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A), Capt. William H. McCartney

New York Light, 1st Battery, Capt. Andrew Cowan

New York Light, 3d Battery, Capt. William A. Harn

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C, Capt. Richard Waterman

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Capt. George W. Adams

2d United States, Battery D, Lieut. Edward B. Williston

2d United States, Battery G, Lieut. John H. Butler

5th United States, Battery F, Lieut. Leonard Martin

Artillery Brigade, Eleventh Army Corps  
Maj. Thomas W. Osborn

1st New York Light, Battery I, Capt. Michael Wiedrich

New York Light, 13th Battery, Lieut. William Wheeler

1st Ohio Light, Battery I, Capt. Hubert Dilger

1st Ohio Light, Battery K, Capt. Lewis Heckman

4th United States, Battery G:  
Lieut. Bayard Wilkeson  
Lieut. Eugene A. Bancroft
**Artillery Brigade, Twelfth Army Corps**

*Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg*

1st New York Light, Battery M, Lieut. Charles E. Winogar
Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Lieut. Charles A. Atwell
4th United States, Battery F, Lieut. Sylvanus T. Rugg
5th United States, Battery K, Lieut. David H. Kinzie

**Horse Artillery, Cavalry Corps**

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<td>Capt. John C. Tidball</td>
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<td>2d United States, Battery M, Lieut. A.C.M. Pennington, Jr.</td>
<td>3d United States, Battery C, Lieut. William D. Fuller</td>
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<td>4th United States, Battery E, Lieut. Samuel S. Elder</td>
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**Artillery Reserve**

*Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler*

*Capt. James M. Robertson*

**Headquarters Guard**

32d Massachusetts Infantry, Company C, Capt. Josiah C. Fuller

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<td>1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery</td>
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<td>W. Capt. Franklin A. Pratt</td>
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<td>Connecticut Light, 2d Battery, Capt. John W. Sterling</td>
<td>New York Light, 5th Battery, Capt. Elijah D. Taft</td>
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**Fourth Volunteer Brigade**

| Maine Light, 6th Battery (F), Lieut. Edwin B. Dow |
| Maryland Light, Battery A, Capt. James H. Rigby |
| New Jersey Light, 1st Battery, Lieut. Augustin N. Parsons |
| 1st New York Light, Battery K, Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh |
CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, BRIG. GEN. W.N. PENDLETON

FIRST ARMY CORPS

McLaw's Division

Chief of Artillery, Col. H.C. Cabell
1st North Carolina Artillery, Battery A, Capt. B.C. Manly
Pulaski (Ga.) Artillery:
    Capt. J.C. Fraser
    Lieut. W.J. Furlong
1st Richmond Howitzers, Capt. E.S. McCarthy
Troup (Ga.) Artillery:
    Capt. H.H. Carlton
    Lieut. C.W. Motes

Pickett's Division

Chief of Artillery, Maj. James Dearing
Fauquier (Va.) Artillery, Capt. R.M. Stribling
Hampden (Va.) Artillery, Capt. W.H. Caskie
Richmond Fayette Artillery, Capt. M.C. Macon
Virginia Battery, Capt. Joseph G. Blount

Hood's Division

Chief of Artillery, Maj. M.W. Henry
Branch (N.C.) Artillery, Capt. A.C. Latham
German (S.C.) Artillery, Capt. William K. Bachman
Palmetto (S.C.) Light Artillery, Capt. Hugh R. Garden
Rowan (N.C.) Artillery, Capt. James Reilly
First Corps Artillery Reserve  
Col. J.B. Walton

**Alexander's Battalion**  
Col. E.P. Alexander

Artland (Va.) Artillery:  
Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr.  
Lieut. James Woolfolk

Bedford (Va.) Artillery,  
Capt. T.C. Jordan

Brouks (S.C.) Artillery,  
Capt. S.C. Gilbert

Madison (La.) Light Artillery, Capt. George V. Moody

Virginia Battery, Capt. W.W. Parker

Virginia Battery, Capt. O.B. Taylor

Washington (Louisiana) Artillery  
Maj. B.F. Eshleman

First Company, Capt. C.W. Squires
Second Company, Capt. J.B. Richardson
Third Company, Capt. M.B. Miller
Fourth Company:  
Capt. Joe Norcom  
Lieut. H.A. Battles

SECOND ARMY CORPS

**Early's Division**

Chief of Artillery, Lieut. Col. H.P. Jones

Charlottesville (Va.) Artillery, Capt. James McD. Carrington
Courtney (Va.) Artillery, Capt. W.A. Tanner
Louisiana Guard Artillery, Capt. C.A. Green
Staunton (Va.) Artillery, Capt. A.W. Garber

**Johnson's Division**

Chiefs of Artillery, Maj. J.W. Latimer and Capt. C.I. Raine

1st Maryland Battery, Capt. William F. Dement
Alleghany (Va.) Artillery, Capt. J.C. Carpenter
Chesapeake (Md.) Artillery, Capt. William D. Brown
Lee (Va.) Battery:  
Capt. C.I. Raine  
Lieut. William W. Hardwicke
Rodes' Division

Chief of Artillery, Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Carter

Jeff Davis (Ala.) Artillery, Capt. W.J. Reese
King William (Va.) Artillery, Capt. W.P. Carter
Morris (Va.) Artillery, Capt. R.C.M. Page
Orange (Va.) Artillery, Capt. C.W. Fry

Second Corps Artillery Reserve
Col. J. Thompson Brown

First Virginia Artillery
Capt. Willis J. Dance

Nelson's Battalion
Lieut. Col. William Nelson

2d Richmond (Va.) Howitzers,
Capt. David Watson

Amherst (Va.) Artillery,
Capt. T.J. Kirkpatrick

3d Richmond (Va.) Howitzers,
Capt. B.H. Smith, Jr.

Fluvanna (Va.) Artillery,
Capt. J.L. Massie

Powhatan (Va.) Artillery
Lieut. John M.

Georgia Battery, Capt. John
Cunningham

Rockbridge (Va.) Artillery,
Capt. A. Graham

Salem (Va.) Artillery
Lieut. C.B. Griffin

Third Army Corps

Anderson's Division

Chief of Artillery, Maj. John Lane

Company A, Capt. Hugh M. Ross
Company B, Capt. George M. Patterson
Company C, Capt. John T. Wingfield

Heth's Division

Chief of Artillery, Lieut. Col. John J. Garnett

Donaldsonville (La.) Artillery, Capt. V. Maurin
Huger (Va.) Artillery, Capt. Joseph D. Moore
Lewis (Va.) Artillery, Capt. John W. Lewis
Norfolk Light Artillery Blues, Capt. C.R. Grandy
Pender's Division

Chief of Artillery, Maj. William T. Poague

Albemarle (Va.) Artillery, Capt. James W. Wyatt
Charlotte (N.C.) Artillery, Capt. Joseph Graham
Madison (Miss.) Light Artillery, Capt. George Ward
Virginia Battery, Capt. J.V. Brooke

Third Corps Artillery Reserve, Col. R. Lindsay Walker

McIntosh's Battalion
Maj. D.G. McIntosh

Pegram's Battalion
Maj. W.J. Pegram
Capt. E.B. Brunson

Danville (Va.) Artillery, Capt. R.S. Rice
Hardaway (Ala.) Artillery, Capt. W.B. Hurt
2d Rockbridge (Va.) Artillery
Lieut. Samuel Wallace
Virginia Battery, Capt. M. Johnson

Crenshaw (Va.) Battery
Fredericksburg (Va.) Artillery
Capt. E.A. Marye
Letcher (Va.) Artillery, Capt. T. A. Brander
PeeDee (S.C.) Artillery, Lieut. William E. Zimmerman
Purcell (Va.) Artillery, Capt. Joseph McGraw

CAVALRY

Stuart's Division

Stuart Horse Artillery, Maj. R.F. Beckham

Breathed's (Va.) Battery, Capt. James Breathed
Chew's (Va.) Battery, Capt. R.P. Chew
Griffin's (Md.) Battery, Capt. W.H. Griffin
Hart's (S.C.) Battery, Capt. J.F. Hart
McGregor's (Va.) Battery, Capt. W.M. McGregor
Moorman's (Va.) Battery, Capt. M.N. Moorman

Iaboden's Command

Virginia Battery, Capt. J.H. McClanahan

APPENDIX II

MANUAL OF THE PIECE
(Field Artillery Tactics, 1864)

73. The instructor should bear in mind that, in every change of numbers at the gun, each recruit has to learn different duties, and to handle different implements from those he was previously engaged with; and these again, vary with the several natures of ordnance and machines which an artilleryman must use. It is impossible that such a variety of exercises can be well executed, or even remembered, unless the recruit is made to comprehend the object of the various duties he is called upon to perform.

For the purpose of instructing the recruit, each detachment is to be formed in front of the piece, unlimbered, and the different numbers are to be called upon, successively, to perform their respective duties in detail while the rest of the detachment look on and observe their motions. When it is found difficult to make the recruit sensible of the defect of his position, etc., the instructor will place himself, or another recruit, in the correct position.

94. Nine men, including the gunner, are necessary for the service of a field-piece. When, from necessity, the detachment consists of less than nine, the higher numbers are struck out, and additional duties are imposed upon those remaining.

95. The gunner is at the end of the trail handspike; Nos. 1 and 2 are about 2 feet outside the wheels, No. 1 on the right, and No. 2 on the left; with howitzers, rather in rear of the muzzle; with guns, in line with the front part of the wheels; Nos. 3 and 4 are in line with the knob of the cascabel, covering Nos. 1 and 2; No. 5 is 5 yards in rear of the left wheel; No. 6 in rear of the limber, and No. 7 on his left, covering No. 5; No. 8, the chief of the caisson, is 4 yards in rear of the limber, and on its left; all face to the front.

The chief of the piece is opposite the middle of the trail handspike, outside and near the left cannoneers. In actual firing he takes his place on the right or left, where he can best observe the effect of the shot.

LOADING AND FIRING

96. The piece is taken at the drill ground, unlimbered, and prepared for action; the limber in position behind the piece, and facing towards it; the end of the pole 6 yards from the end of the trail handspike.

97. COMMANDING AND POINTING.

The gunner gives all executive commands in action. He is answerable that all the numbers perform their duties correctly. He communicates the orders which he receives for the kind of ammunition to be fired; sending to No. 6 the time or distance for each round, when firing shells or spherical case shot. He should, when the firing is slow, see that each fuze is properly prepared, and make such corrections as are
necessary: for this purpose he, as well as No.6, should be provided with a fuze-gouge.

On receiving the command or signal to commence firing, he gives the command \textit{LOAD}; takes hold of the handspike at the end with his right hand, and at the centre with his left; places his left knee against the left hand, bending over it, the right knee being slightly bent; looks over the top of the piece, and gives the direction. He then steps to the breech to give the elevation, which he does by placing the hausse on its seat: taking hold of a handle of the elevating screw, drawing back his right foot, bending over his left knee, and sighting through the slit in the hausse. In the drill of recruits, the gunner should be made to name the elevation and range before stepping up to the breech.

When the piece is loaded and pointed, he removes the hausse, gives the command \textit{READY}, and, stepping clear of the wheel to that side where he can best observe the effect of his shot, gives the command \textit{FIRE}. As soon as the piece has been fired, he causes it to be run up to its former place, if necessary.

When the instructor, instead of giving the command \textit{COMMENCE FIRING}, gives that of \textit{LOAD}, the gunner repeats it, and performs the same duties as before, except that he does not command \textit{FIRE} until the firing is ordered to commence. After the command \textit{COMMENCE FIRING} is given, the action is continued by the gunner, without further commands from the instructor, until the firing is ordered to cease. When the commands are all given by the instructor, as in \textit{loading by detail}, the gunner performs the same duties, but without repeating the commands.

98. The detachment being formed in front of and facing the piece, the instructor commences by giving the following explanations:

The term \textit{CANNON} embraces all kinds of heavy ordnance. \textit{GUNS} \textit{HOWITZERS}, \textit{MORTARS}: each is mounted on a \textit{carriage}, and each field carriage has a \textit{limber}.

The term \textit{PIECE} is applied to the \textit{cannon}, and is also used to designate it in union with its carriage, with or without the limber attached.

The \textit{front} of a piece, when \textit{limbered}, or prepared for moving, is the direction in which the \textit{pole} points; when \textit{unlimbered}, or prepared for action, it is the direction in which the gun points; the \textit{right} and \textit{left} are in each case determined accordingly.

He then repeats the names of the following objects, indicating each of them.


The \textit{GUN-CARRIAGE}: \textit{handspike}, \textit{pointing rings}, \textit{elevating screw}, \textit{handles}, \textit{sponge-hook}.

The \textit{GUN} or \textit{HOWITZER}, giving explanations of the parts:

The \textit{bore} is the interior hollow cylinder, which receives the charge.

The \textit{muzzle} is the entrance of the bore.

The \textit{face} is the front plane terminating the piece.

The \textit{vent} is the hole through which fire is communicated to the charge.

The \textit{trunnions} are the projecting cylinders which support the gun.

The instructor then calls No.1 to the right side of the piece, and indicates the
following parts with his hand, after naming them. The SPONGE and RAMMER: staff, sponge, rammer-head; ferrules. Staff, bore, muzzle, face, vent. He then commands:

**FIVE PACE**

99. SPONGING AND RAMMING.—Under the command LOAD, No.1 stands square to the front, in line with the front part of the wheels, holding the sponge about the middle of the staff in his right hand, and trailing it an angle of 45°, sponge-head up. The instructor commands:

**SPONGE**

By detail LOAD

3 pauses: 4 motions

At this command No.1 faces to the left, steps obliquely to the right with his right foot, without moving his left, and at the same time brings the sponge smartly to a perpendicular position by drawing his right hand up in line with the elbow. The sponge is grasped firmly in the hand, and the rammer-head kept just over the right toe, the elbow close to the side.

Two. He steps obliquely to the left with his left foot, planting it about half-way between the piece and the wheel, and opposite the muzzle: bringing the sponge at the same time across his body to the left, so that his right hand may be opposite the middle of the body, the sponge-staff being inclined at an angle of 45° across the front of it.

Three. He takes a side step to the right of 30 inches, and bending his right knee, brings the sponge to a horizontal position, extending the hands to the ends of the staff, the sponge-head to the left, the back of his right hand up, and that of his left down, the sponge-head against the face of the piece.

Four. He inserts the sponge-head, drops his left hand behind his thigh, shoulders square, feet equally turned out, straightens the right knee, and, bending over the left, forces the sponge home.

**SPONGE**

3 pauses; 4 motions

100. At this command No.1 fixes his eye on the vent to see that it is closed, gives two turns to the sponge, taking great care to press it at the same time against the bottom of the bore.

Two. He draws out the sponge, at the same time straightening his left knee, and bending his right, seizes the staff near the sponge-head with his left hand, back of the hand down, and places the sponge against the face of the piece.

Three. He turns the sponge by bringing his hands together in the middle of the staff, giving it a cant with each hand, throwing the sponge-head over, at the same time turning his wrist, which brings the staff horizontal, and extending his hands to the ends of the staff, back of the left up, that of the other down.

During the whole time of sponging, No.1 keeps his eye on the vent. If at any time it is not closed, he will discontinue the manoeuvre, and command STOP VENT.

Four. He introduces the rammer-head into the muzzle as soon as No.2 has inserted the charge, and joins his left hand to his right, casting his eyes to the front.

**RAM**

2 pauses: 3 motions
101. At this command No.1 rams home, throwing the weight of his body with the rammer; bending over his left knee, and passing his left arm, with the elbow slightly bent, and back of the hand up, in a horizontal position over the piece, until it points in the direction of the left trunnion; the right shoulder thrown back, and the eyes cast toward the front until the cartridge is home.

Two. He jerks the sponge out with his right hand, allowing it to slide through the hand as far as the middle of the staff, when he grasps it firmly, and seizing it close to the rammer-head with the left hand, back of the hand up, places the rammer-head against the face of the piece: both knees straight; eyes to his own front.

Three. He then draws the sponge close to his body, and immediately steps back outside the wheel, first with the right, then with the left foot, so that when the right foot is brought to it, the right hip may be on a line with the front of the wheel. In drawing the right foot to the left, he gives the sponge a cant with his left hand, at the same time quitting it, and brings the sponge to a perpendicular position in the right hand, the rammer-head resting on the right toe.

102. READY.-At this command, which is given as soon as the piece is loaded, or the firing about to commence, No.1 breaks well off to his left with the left foot, bending the left knee, and straightening the right leg, drops the end of the sponge-staff into the left hand, back of the hand down, and fixes his eyes on the muzzle.

The heels should be parallel to the wheel, the body erect on the haunches, and the sponge and rammer held in both hands in a horizontal position, sponge-head to the left.

The piece having been fired, No.1 rises on his right knee, and returns to his position, as in the third motion of RAM.

At the command L'A, he steps in and performs his duties in the same manner as before.

103. When the loading is not by detail, No.1 goes through all his duties at the command LOAD: returns to his position outside the wheel, as given in the third motion of RAM: breaks off at the command READY, and at the flash of the gun rises, steps in and performs his duties in the same manner as before. This he continues until the command CEASE FIRING is given, at which command he resumes the position: To YOUR POSTS. If the sponging has been commenced when the command CEASE FIRING is given, it is completed before No.1 resumes his post.

In sponging and ramming, if the length of the piece requires it, the sponge and rammer are to be pressed home in two motions, No.1 extending his right hand to the end of the staff as soon as it reaches the muzzle.

In sponging howitzers, No.1 presses the sponge to the bottom of the chamber, which should be well sponged out. He wipes the bore by rubbing its whole surface, without allowing the sponge to turn in his hands.

REMARKS ON THE DUTIES OF NO.1

104. The position of the left foot will not be considered as absolute; it is given as the usual one, and may be modified according to the caliber of the piece and height of the man. The
same remarks will apply to the
distance between the feet. They
will be placed in such position,
and at such distance from each
other, as will enable the man to
perform his duties with the most
ease and steadiness, and at the
same time exert his full
strength, which will always be
required after firing a few
rounds, especially when a new
sponge is used.

On object of joining the
left hand to the right, and
casting the eyes to the front
whilst ramming, is to refuse the
right shoulder, and to secure
this object the left hand, when
it passes over the piece, is not
carried further back than the
direction indicated. This will
keep the shoulders in a line
parallel with their position at
the commencement of the
movement, until the cartridge is
set home, and thus guard against
fatal results in case of a
premature discharge.

106. LOADING. The
instructor places No.2 on the
left of the piece, repeats the
nomenclature as for No.1,
indicates the following named
objects, and explains their uses:
STRAPPED SHOT: cartridge, ball,
sabot: CANISTER SHOT: cartridge,
CANISTER: SHELL or SPHERICAL CASE
SHOT: cartridge, case shot, or
shell, fuze. He then commands:

TO YOUR POSTS

Until the command LOAD is
given, as for No.1, No.2 remains
in his position. On this command
being given, he faces to his
right, and by two oblique steps,
corresponding to those of No.1,
the first with the left, the
second at the command TWO. with
the right foot, he places himself
near the muzzle of the piece. At
the command THREE, he brings up
his left foot to the side of the
right, and faces to his right,
bringing his hands together to
receive the ammunition from
No.5, the cartridge in the right,
the shot in the left hand. As
soon as the sponge is withdrawn,
he faces to his left, and puts
the ammunition into the muzzle.
Taking care that the seam of the
cartridge does not come under the
vent, and then steps back,
commencing with his left foot, to
his position outside the wheel.
in the same manner that No.1
does.

At the command READY. He
breaks off to his right with the
right foot, bending the right
knee, and straightening the left
leg, the body erect on the
haunches, and fixes his eyes on
the muzzle.

The piece having been
fired, No.2 rises on his left
leg, remains facing the piece
until he hears the command LOAD,
or observes the flash of the gun,
then steps in and performs his
duty as before. At the command
CEASE FIRING he takes his position
outside the wheel and faces to
the front.

With the howitzer, No.2
puts in the charge so that the
fuze may rest against the rammer-
head, and No.1 sets it home
carefully.

106. SERVING THE VENT.—The
instructor places No.3 on the
right of the piece, indicates the
following objects, and explains
their uses:

TO YOUR POSTS

TUBE-POUCH; THUMBSTALL;
PRIMING WIRE; GUNNER'S GIMLET;
FRICITION PRIMER; LANYARD; lanyard
hook; VENT; vent field; BREACH;
cascabel, knob, and neck of
cascabel. He then commands:

No.3 stands in line with
the knob of the cascabel,
covering No.1, the priming wire
in his right hand, thumb through the ring, the thumbstall on the left thumb, the tube-pouch fastened to the waist.

LAD.-At this command, No.4 inserts the lanyard hook into the ring of a primer, and stands fast.

READY.-At this command, he steps in with the right foot, drops the tube in the vent, takes the lanyard in his right hand, moves to the rear so as to keep the lanyard slack, but capable of being stretched, without altering his position, which should be clear of the wheel, left foot broken to the left and rear.

FIRE.-As soon as No.3 is clear of the wheel, No.4 pulls the lanyard briskly and firmly, passing the hand, back up, in a downward direction to the rear, so as to keep the lanyard hook from flying back in the direction to the face. Should the tube fail to explode the charge, the gunner immediately commands, Don't advance, the primer has failed. Upon which No.2 steps inside the wheel, close to the axletree, receives from No.3 over the wheel a priming wire, and from No.4 a prepared primer, pricks, primes, and resumes his post. At the command CEASE FIRING, No.4 secures his lanyards.

108. No.3, as well as No.4, should be equipped with a tube-pouch, furnished with friction primers and lanyards. In the absence of No.4, immediately after pricking the cartridge, he prepares and inserts a tube, steps to his post, faces the vent, breaks to his rear with the left foot, and at the command FIRE, discharges the piece. He then resumes his post, and tends the vent as before.

109. SERVING AMMUNITION.-The instructor stations No.5, covering the left wheel, 5 yards in rear of it, and No.7 in rear of
and near the left limber wheel: No. 5 is stationed in rear of the limber chest, and issues the ammunition. He is provided with a fuze-gouge, and prepares the shell and spherical case shot according to the distance or time ordered, before delivering it to No. 3.

TO ATTACH THE FUZE.—Place the projectile between the knees, fuze uppermost, and support it with the left hand. Holding the fuze-gouge in the right hand, place the left corner of its edge close to, and on the right of, the graduated mark indicating the time desired; then cut away gradually until the composition is exposed for a length about equal to the width of the gouge. Great care must be taken not to expose the composition to the left of the proper graduation mark, and, to this end, particularly avoid commencing to cut too close to the desired mark: for after the composition is once exposed it is very easy to pare away to the left, if the time has not been accurately cut. When time permits, it is well to expose the composition fully, either by cutting the opening larger, towards the right, or with shells only) by cutting another opening to the right of the first. It is in all cases better to enlarge the first opening, and always by extending it towards the right.

Care must be taken not to cut the fuzes more rapidly than the demand for shells and shrapnel shot requires.

At the command Load, No. 5 runs to the ammunition chest, receives from No. 7 or No. 6 a single round, the shot in the right hand, the cartridge in his left; takes it to the piece and delivers it to No. 2; returns immediately for another round, and then waits at his post until the piece is fired. In firing shells or spherical case, he exhibits the fuze to the gunner before delivering the charge to No. 2.

When ammunition pouches are used they are worn by Nos. 5 and 7, hung from the left shoulder to the right side; the round is placed in the pouch by No. 6 or No. 7, so that the cartridge will be to the front. When it is brought up No. 5 holds open the pouch, and No. 2 takes out the round with both hands. In rapid firing with round shot and canister, Nos. 5 and 7 may alternate in delivering the charges to No. 2, especially when the ammunition is issued direct from the caisson. At the command CEASE FIRING, No. 5 carries the round back to No. 6.

No. 6 will be careful not to raise the lid unnecessarily. It should be kept closed when possible. In firing shells and spherical case, he prepares each fuze as directed, assisted, when necessary, by No. 7. He gives No. 5 the time or distance of the fuze with each round issued, who reports to the gunner before delivering it to No. 2. At the command CEASE FIRING, he carefully replaces the ammunition in the chest and secures the lid.

110. LOADING BY DETAIL.—For the instruction of recruits united for the service of the gun, the exercise is conducted by detail, the instructor giving all the commands. His commands are: Load by detail—LOAD; TWO, THREE, FOUR; SPONGE; TWO, THREE, FOUR; RAM; TWO, THREE, READY; FIRE; CEASE FIRING.

When the men are sufficiently instructed to go through the manual without detail, the commands of the instructor for that purpose are: Load: COMMENCE FIRING; CEASE FIRING:
or simply Double Firing and Cease.

After the command Cease is given, the action is continued until the command Cease is given, which is repeated by the chief of the piece and the gunner. F. F. Downey. The Guns at Gettysburg, 1937. p.p. 238-241.
Artillery ammunition used during the Civil War was not very reliable. There was a high rate of duds and improperly functioning fuses. Many official reports note the unsatisfactory performance of the ammunition. The Confederate artillery firing over Pickett's troops used mostly solid shot for fear of fuze malfunctions. During the attack, artillery was positioned to protect the flanks of the attacking troops, as well as, to lessen the requirement to shoot over their heads. There were four primary types of ammunition available. They were as follows:

SOLID SHOT - This is what is commonly called a cannonball. It was a solid iron ball that was employed at ranges usually greater than 350 yards. The weapons derived their names from the weight of the solid shot they fired. A cannon that fired a 10 pound solid shot was called a 10-pounder. Solid shot was very effective when fired into treelines and against material targets. It was also very effective against massed of infantry. A solid shot could be expected to go through half a dozen men with lethal effects.

SHELL - This was a hollow fused powder filled projectile. It was used mainly against artillery and fortifications.

CASE SHOT - This type ammunition was commonly called shrapnel and was filled with many iron balls, which, were hurled forward with deadly effect when the shell burst. Case shot was effective against troops at ranges from 400-1000 yards. A gun crew could fire 2 case shots per minute from a field gun.
CANISTER - This was the equivalent of today's "Beehive" rounds used in the 105mm howitzers. It was a tin can filled with iron or lead balls and strapped to a wooden block. It was used against troops at ranges of less than 400 yards. It was most effective at ranges out to 200 yards. A gun crew could fire 3-4 canister rounds per minute.
## APPENDIX IV

### WEAPONS' RANGES

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(Joseph Roberts, Handbook of Artillery, 1863, p. 73, 166, 171.)
APPENDIX V

The extracts from the following letters provide a first hand account of the fight Smith's battery had. They are taken from the book he wrote entitled A Famous Battery. These accounts are by infantrymen who fought in this fight. Their descriptions give us a few more details of the conditions and events which comprised this fight.

One such detail is the confirmation of the inter-visibility between Smith's battery and the positions of Alexander's, Cabell's, and Henry's battalions. The ground is the same, only the trees are taller now.

Johnston's letter describes the officer in command of the two guns positioned in the area between the ridge on which Devil's Den sits and Little Round Top. The logical assumption is that this was Smith, since he had left his other position to go to these two guns. A significant point is the effect of the smoke. Many other accounts relate to artillery having to cease firing and wait for the smoke to clear. Depending on which side you were on and the situation, the smoke was either a relief or a hindrance. The same is true today. Johnston's letter also attests to the good timing of the arrival of Hazlett's battery and its effectiveness. The accounts follow:

A letter written by Major Thomas W. Bradley, 124th New York Volunteers and published in the National Tribune, February 4, 1866:

Smith's Battery has not received in history full credit for the heroic and valuable work done by its members at
Gettysburg. I was at that time 1st sergeant of Company "H," 124th New York. I saw the battery come down Rock Run Glen. The guns were unlimbered at the foot of Rock Ridge and hauled up the steep acclivity into position amid the rocks on its crest, and the Battery was soon engaged in a hot duel with the rebel batteries on the heights beyond the "peach orchard." Under cover of the Confederate fire, Longstreet's Corps, massed in battle lines eight or ten deep, moved in confident, rapid attack on our position. The Battery changed from shell to canister, and, working as I never saw gunners work before or since, tore gap after gap through the ranks of the advancing foe. All this time the men were exposed to the direct fire of Longstreet's sharpshooters, and his front line. Every round of ammunition had to be carried from the foot of the ridge, the Battery keeping up a well-directed fire until the enemy was at the base of the heights and the guns could no longer be depressed to reach him. Then knowing that greatly superior force would overwhelm us and capture the guns unless checked, Colonel Ellis of the 124th, after a few rapid words with Major Cromwell, ordered a charge. It was immediately responded to and as quickly repulsed. It was again made in the face of a withering fire that left killed and wounded two-fifths of the regiment. Flanked at the Devil's Den by the turning of our line at that point, we were swept from the position, and the crest and guns were for a brief time in possession of the enemy. Meanwhile Captain Smith had removed horses,
caissons and ammunition, rendering the guns useless to the enemy, whose hold on the position was so short that he could not remove them. Longstreet's determined charge, now so famous in history, was so dauntlessly met by our single line of battle on the crest of Rock Ridge, his force so terribly broken by the merciless fire of Smith's canister and the fierce grapple amid the rocks of Devil's Den.

A letter written by Wm. J. Johnston, 44th N.Y., 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, 5th U.S. Corps.

In the afternoon General Sykes in command of the Corps was ordered to protect the left of the line, and about 4 p.m. we were moved rapidly to the left, where Sickles was engaged with the Third Corps in meeting and repelling the assault of Longstreet. When we reached the wheat-field we were halted and formed in line of battle. At this time General Warren, who was then a member of General Meade's staff, rode up and urged the necessity of seizing "Little Round Top," a rocky hill to the left and rear of our then line of battle. General Sykes, appreciating the importance of Warren's suggestion, immediately detached the Third Brigade of the First Division, consisting of the 83d Pennsylvania, 20th Maine, 16th Michigan, and 44th New York, to which latter regiment I had the honor to belong; and we were at once turned over to General Warren and double-quicked to the rear of Little Round Top, fronted and moved over the crest in the line of battle to a position a little more than half way down the slope, the 16th Michigan
occupying the right, the 44th New York and 83d Pennsylvania
the centre, and the 20th Maine the left. In front of Little
Round Top was a wood, beyond which was a wide, open space of
field, on the further edge of which appeared another piece
of woods. As we moved forward over the crest of Little
Round Top, I noticed three heavy lines of battle of the
enemy emerging from the farther woods and advancing on our
front. At the foot of Little Round Top, and extending
around our right, was a ravine or gorge leading out of the
woods in our front and to our right and rear, beyond which
was a rocky ridge or spur occupied by a battery then in
action, apparently forming the left of the Union line prior
to our occupancy of Little Round Top.

"We had hardly obtained our position in line of battle,
when our skirmishers were rapidly driven in by the advancing
enemy, and a heavy assault was made by them on the centre of
our line by Hood's division of Texans, belonging to
Longstreet's Corps, and the battle for a time raged with
terrific ferocity, neither side giving an inch. Suddenly
about this time we heard the whirr of grape, canister and
shell over our heads, and learned that Hazlett's Battery
"D," 5th Regular Artillery, had been hauled up by hand and
placed in position on the crest of Little Round Top, in our
rear. The combined fire from our line and from this battery
caused the rebel line in our front to recoil and surge
toward the right, and we were relieved from anxiety as to
our immediate front, and enabled to turn our attention to
the right, where our line had apparently given away and the Rebels were surging over the rocky ridge beyond the ravine occupied by the battery already mentioned as in action at the time we took the position. At this time I noticed in the ravine at the foot of the hill, immediately on our right, two guns, apparently without any support, being rapidly loaded and fired into a column of rebels advancing up the ravine, in the direction of the guns, without regular formation, but in a heavy mass composed of several regiments, judging from the number of stands of colors in close proximity, and apparently intent on capturing the guns. From the more elevated position occupied by our line we were better enabled to see this advancing force than the officer in command of the guns, and believing he was not fully aware of his perilous position, I felt much anxiety for the safety of the guns, and my special attention was attracted by the gallant manner in which they were handled and fought; the rapidity with which they were loaded and fired, and the terrible execution wrought by their charges of grape and canister on the head of the advancing column of the enemy. More especially was my attention attracted to the officer in command, who immediately after each discharge rushed out beyond the volume of smoke from his guns for the purpose of observing the effect of the shot, and the positions and proximity of the enemy, when he would rush back, seize the trail of a gun, slew it around for the purpose of directing the fire a little to the right or left.
and send another charge of canister down the ravine to his front. Meantime we were delivering a galling fire into the flank of this rebel column, which apparently paid little attention to us, being intent on capturing the guns and turning our flank. From the effect of our fire and the terrible storm of grape and canister poured into the head of the column at close range from the two guns in the ravine, they went down in scores; at times two or three stands of colors seemed to go to the ground at once, but they were immediately picked up, and the column, or more properly, mass of rebels, for they had lost all regular formation, surged steadily forward until they were enveloped by the smoke of the last discharge of these two guns in their very faces. At the same time the guns were enveloped from the right and flank by the rebel line that rushed over the rocky ridge on the right, and the gunners were compelled to abandon the guns and were forced back through the opening in our line to our right and rear.

(James E. Smith, A Famous Battery, p.p. 141-144.)
APPENDIX VI

The following narrative is an excerpt from another letter written by John Bigelow to John Bachelder. It is an account of the initial fight at the Peach Orchard and the events that followed. It is written in the 3rd person except for the incidents he describes which are written in the 1st person.

The description of this battle provides more details on what was obviously a very tough fight. Notice the mention of the battery being "christened by fire" and the effect the first man killed had on the battery. This was a previously untested battery which proved itself on this day.

Narrative of Capt. John Bigelow, commanding Ninth Massachusetts Battery, First Volunteer Brigade, Artillery Reserve, Army of the Potomac.

The morning of July 2d, 1863, Gen. Sickles advanced the 3d Corps, from its position in our line of battle on the ridge connecting Round Top and the Cemetery fully 1,000 or 2,000 yards to some rising ground at the Peach Orchard on the Emmitsburg road. Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades of the 5th Corps were also advanced to cover his left flank, but with the instructions, if hard pressed to fall back to Round Top, the national line of defense. The enemy were quick to take advantage of the opportunities offered them and early in the afternoon, Longstreet attacked with great vigor. Sweitzer strove hard to check the advance of the right of Longstreet's line, but was overpowered and pressed
back to Round Top.

The left of his column of attack was directed towards the Peach Orchard the key to Sickle's position. Its attack and defense were maintained with great vigor and determination. The batteries of Thompson, Hart, Phillips and Bigelow of the Reserve Artillery, commanded by Major McGilvery, together with Graham's brigade reinforced by several additional regiments were successively moved up for defense.

The enemy, whose batteries were frequently silenced eventually brought the Washington (New Orleans) Artillery into a protected position from which our line, was completely enfiladed. Barksdale's brigade advanced under cover of its fire and carried the position. Gen. Graham was severely wounded, had two horses shot under him and finally fell a prisoner into the hands of the enemy. We were compelled to retreat. Bigelow's (9th Mass.) Battery though this day christened by fire and unsupported by infantry was the 1st to fall back, and, though left alone on the field, retired before the enemy's advancing lines with "fixed prolonge": keeping the skirmishers from their left front by a steady fire of canister and checking Barksdale's advancing on their right front with solid shot and shell, while the recoil and prolonge slowly retired the guns until they became entangled among the stone-fences at Trostle's house. They there had barely time to have limbered up and fall-on back to Cemetery Ridge in their rear, where the 3d Corps
should have rallied: but Major McGilvery, his horse during
his approach being riddled with bullets, came to Capt.
Bigelow and begged of him to "hold his position at all
hazards for Cemetery Ridge was entirely undefended in his
rear for eight hundred yards, towards which the enemy in his
front were pressing, and he (McGilvery) would try to get
some batteries in position to fill the gap" In other words
the sacrifice of the command was asked in order to save the
line. The enemy were now within 150 yards but protected by
a swell of the ground. The battery was again prepared for
action: its guns loaded to the muzzle with shot and
canister, while the ammunition was taken from the chests and
laid by the guns for quick firing. The stone-wall made
retreat impossible.

When the enemy appeared breast high above the swell of
ground they were within 50 yards; and in close ranks. They
attacked furiously: but the battery men double shotted every
gun and swept them back. Again and again they rallied, and
at times approached within a few yards of the guns. Not one
of the enemy, however, broke through the Battery front. The
rapid fire recoiled the guns into the corner of the stone-
wall. Milton's section (2 guns) finally could not be served
and Captain Bigelow directed him to take it out. This he
succeeded in doing, under cover of the fire of the rest of
the Battery, with the greatest gallantry, the most of his
horses and men having been killed helping to drag off his
last piece himself. aimed a storm of bullets. The contest
however continued, until finally, the enemy discovering there was no infantry on the flanks, closed on either side of the four remaining guns, that were still heavily engaged with the enemy, in their front; they poured in a withering cross fire by which Captain Bigelow received two serious wounds and his horse was shot under him. Lieut. Erickson already wounded, was killed. Lieut. Whitaker was mortally wounded. Six out of seven sergeants were killed or wounded and a third of the men. So out of eighty-eight horses taken on the field were placed hors du combat: they rushed in and mounting the limber chests in the rear of the guns, from there shot down the cannoneers that were still serving their pieces against the (their) center. Not even then did the batterymen cease their fire, though they were surrounded until Capt. Bigelow, having noticed that McGilvery had got his guns in the position desired, ordered them to fall back, few however were able to escape, two were taken prisoners, and the rest either killed or badly wounded. Usually in an engagement a few rounds of canister will repel a charge. This battery besides shot and shell fired 92 out of 96 rounds of canister they on the field and mostly into close ranks of men. The enemy suffered so severely, they charged no further, (mistake. It was the 21st Miss. which continued to advance, and captured Battery "I" 5th U.S. Artillery.) though for half an hour afterwards the gap was only held by the heavy and well directed fire of Phillips (Mass) and Dows (Me.) batteries.
Had the enemy broken through, the attack on Round Top might have proved a success and the issue of the battle been entirely changed.

Incidents.

First Man killed: My battery went into its first position on the road connecting the Peach orchard and Round Top under a heavy fire of artillery from several batteries on the ridge in its front about 1,200 yards. While I was attending to the removal of Lieut. Whitaker's section from the left to the right of my position in order to open up its range of fire, before a gun had been fired, a cannoneer of the center section was wounded by a shell. His comrades collected about him, each vying with the other in kind attentions. Wondering why the section did not commence firing, I spurred up to the group; they opened and I saw Fenn stretched on the ground they asked me, seemingly regardless of the shells exploding about themselves, if they could not take him to the rear. The poor fellow however was unconscious and dying; I saw there was no hope and answered them "No! but back to your guns and give as good as you have received. This was the first of their comrades killed. They returned to their pieces; seemingly horrified at my heartlessness, but the day before it ended initiated them thoroughly in the horrors of war.

Lieut. Erickson: A few moments after the above, Lieut. Erickson came to me, with his hand pressing his breast and reported that he was wounded. I ordered him to the rear to
have his wounds dressed; but he quickly returned and took charge of his section. He fought his guns the balance of the afternoon, though he had been shot through the lungs, and could not speak above a whisper, (which I have since learned.) until finally just as the fight was about over, he was pierced by five bullets and instantly killed.

He was an excellent officer, capable and energetic, and ambitious only for the well being and good conduct of his men.

Lieut. Whitakker: His section held the right and fired the last guns. He was mortally wounded while trying to throw his right piece and fire a parting shot at a body of the enemy coming in on his flank. As he was finally escaping, notwithstanding his injuries and the heavy musketry fire about us, mindful of others rather than himself, he rode up to me as I was being carried to the rear; and offered to render me assistance, if needed.

Lieut. Milton: He was the only officer who escaped uninjured though his position on the left made him the mark of the enemy's skirmishers and sharpshooters and he lost many of his men. Finally as he was taking his guns out as ordered, the last piece was overturned in the opening of the Stone wall. He immediately dismounted from his horse and aimed a storm of bullets, helped to right his piece and draw it out by hand. (John Bigelow letter to John B. Bachelder, undated, Bachelder Papers, p.p. 382-387, U.S. Army War
College Military History Institute
APPENDIX VII
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The books listed below are excellent sources from which to learn about the Civil War and its artillery. They also provide the reader with specific information about the Battle of Gettysburg. I found them very interesting and helpful and suggest them to you as additional reading.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


