OVERLAND COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE:
A REAL FIX TO AN OLD PROBLEM

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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An historical analysis of overland combat search and rescue (CSAR) reveals many trends that persist today. U.S. warfighting commanders still face severe limitations in CSAR organization, capabilities and procedures because of a flawed doctrine. Moreover, the newly adopted CSAR doctrine (JCS Publication 3-50.2) doomed the CSAR effort by assigning primary CSAR responsibilities to individual Services rather than a joint agency. That resulted in a doctrine counter to the principles of unified action, an undesirable duplication of effort and the misallocation of resources. A combat-coded and mobility-capable joint CSAR Unit under the Commander of SOCOM would solve current problems by redressing the key issues of common doctrine, centralized direction, unity of effort and interoperability at the joint level. Operational control of the Joint CSAR unit would be passed to the theater Joint Force Commander in wartime which would guarantee him a minimum acceptable overland CSAR capability. That thought process has precedent in many concepts like the Unified Command structure, the establishment of a Joint Forces

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Overland combat search and rescue (CSAR) has always played a role in armed conflict, particularly since World War II with the increased importance of aerial combat. The role, however, was always a tertiary one, often times totally ignored in the peaceful periods between wars. That relegation to a tertiary role in war and peacetime inattention led to many problems that persist today. Moreover, while the current system is functional, it is clearly far from optimum. But there is a fix—a Joint CSAR Unit designed to redress both historical and present day problems. In this paper, I will examine the history of overland CSAR since World War II and identify significant historical trends as one means of evaluating the current system. I will then describe why the current system is flawed and examine how a Joint CSAR Unit would optimize overland CSAR capabilities.
CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF CSAR SINCE WWII AND HISTORICAL TRENDS

The extensive use of combat aircraft in WWII provided the impetus for development of contemporary CSAR organizations and capabilities. Several factors contributed to the need for CSAR. One factor was the use of combat aircraft to penetrate deep within enemy territory which brought with it the associated risk of losing military personnel well behind enemy lines where it was difficult to extract them. Another factor, perhaps the most important, was the reason behind doing CSAR at all. Military leaders quickly recognized a serious need not only to preserve human life, but to protect the country's investment (in terms of training of aircrews), and deny the enemy a potential source of vital intelligence. Furthermore, they sought to insure their airman would fly and fight more aggressively and effectively knowing that every possible effort would be made to rescue them. This thought process, brought on by the great strides in aerial warfare, drove military leaders towards the development of the organization, doctrine, training and technology required for effective CSAR operations.

The first military rescue service was formed by Germany at Kiel in 1936. It was equipped only modestly until three years later when the rescue service acquired fourteen seaplanes which were specifically modified for air-sea rescue. Later, as the Germans swept across Europe in 1940, the need for combat rescue increased and detachments of the Luftwaffe-run Seenotdienst (Naval Emergency Service) were formed. These detachments provided combat rescue support for downed aircrews in the English Channel, North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, they were among
the first to develop specialized rescue equipment not only for themselves, but for other combat aircraft as well. Combat aircraft of all types were soon outfitted with inflatable rubber dinghies and packets of bright green fluorescent marking dye at the behest of these ingenious rescuers.¹

The British began WWII with essentially no CSAR capability and it showed early on. Within the first few months of the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force lost over a quarter of its trained pilots, mostly over the English Channel. The recovery rate was nearly zero. That horrific experience drove the British to make CSAR a national priority, and by the end of August 1940 the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy established a joint combat rescue organization in which their Air Force had clear responsibility for searches while their Navy conducted the actual rescues. The effect of this new organization was immediate, as over the next few months over a quarter of the downed crews were rescued, and the success rate continued to improve as the war progressed.²

The United States also began the war in Europe with little or no CSAR capability, but learned quickly from their allies' mistakes. In fact, the initial CSAR doctrine was essentially patterned after the British, and the Americans even chose to use British made rescue equipment in the European theater. The results were good, as ninety percent of American aircrews shot down at sea were successfully rescued.³

In the Pacific theater, the U.S. Navy was the major player, as most CSAR operations there occurred over water in conjunction with amphibious assaults and long-range bombing missions. The Navy's organization, equipment, training and doctrine necessarily focused on water recovery and around the capabilities of the PBY Catalina (affectionately called
"Dumbo") with its slow cruising speed which facilitated careful searches. But the Catalina's limited range of 600-800 miles proved inadequate for longer range CSAR efforts, so the Navy introduced both the B-17 Flying Fortress and B-29 Super Fortress. Those aircraft were modified to carry life rafts and other rescue equipment, and followed long range bombers to and from target areas, dropped life rafts or boats to aircrews, reported their locations and provided limited protection from enemy aircraft or surface vessels. Submarines were also incorporated into the CSAR effort by mid-1943. They were positioned around target areas and air routes to be ready to rescue downed aircrews. The sea, however was not the only environment where extensive CSAR operations were undertaken.

The China-Burma-India theater presented a challenge of a different kind--overland CSAR over the highest mountains in the world (the Himalayas) where violent winds and weather, high altitude and long flight routes over enemy territory complicated the search and rescue problem significantly. Early on, downed aircrews were forced to fend for themselves, or were helped by parachute rescue and land rescue teams who were dropped by C-46's, C-47's or B-25's. But that effort alone proved inadequate, hence the introduction of the helicopter as a CSAR asset. The first unit to use helicopters in overland CSAR was the 8th Emergency Rescue Squadron (ERS) formed in China in May 1945. The 8th ERS flew the Sikorsky R-6 and had as its sole mission the combat rescue of aircrews downed on land. Its contribution was reflected in the statistics compiled over the first six months of operations--110 land rescue attempts resulting in saving 43 airmen. Significantly, the contribution of the helicopter in CSAR operations did not go unnoticed.
The fundamentals of CSAR operations were well established by the end of WWII and each service had its own organizations, doctrine, training programs and equipment. Furthermore, the U.S. armed forces generally had a fairly well coordinated effort in both the joint and combined arenas in terms of avoiding overlap in mission areas. The reorganization of the Army's Air Transport Command rescue units into the Air Rescue Service in March 1946 seemed to assure that the coordinated aspect of CSAR operations would remain. In fact, the Air Rescue Service soon proved its worth in the Korean War. Specifically, CSAR forces of the Air Rescue Service began a long tradition of "saves" on 4 September 1950. On that day, an H-5 helicopter (the replacement for the aging Sikorsky R-6 of WWII fame) conducted the first successful rescue of a pilot from behind enemy lines while covered by fighter combat air patrol (CAP), marking the first of many coordinated CSAR efforts facing hostile fire in that war. The H-5 and larger H-19 helicopters became the mainstay of the overland CSAR effort and accounted for the recovery of virtually hundreds of downed airmen and soldiers from the Korean combat zones. The U.S. Navy experienced similar successes in their CSAR operations at sea, employing the newly acquired SA-16 Albatross aircraft equipped with airdroppable boats. The close of the Korean War, however, with its concomitant decrease in the defense budget, brought a general decline in CSAR programs and portended a downward trend in capability until the Vietnam era.

Just as in the previous two major wars, U.S. forces began the Vietnam War ill prepared for CSAR operations. Rapidly increasing numbers of air and ground operations, difficult and varied terrain and the increased threat from the ground (anti-aircraft weapons, surface-to-air
missiles and barrage fire from enemy ground personnel) and air (enemy aircraft) made the CSAR effort particularly difficult. In short, the CSAR problem was magnified exponentially because of the increasing threat. By 1965, however, major doctrinal problems were solved with the adoption of the combat rescue task force which institutionalized the technique of employing a combination of command and control, rescue, and fighter combat air patrol aircraft on CSAR missions. The combat rescue task force technique addressed the new obstacles and proved very successful. Significant improvements in rescue equipment such as the jungle penetrator device also contributed to CSAR mission successes.

Doctrine still stipulated that each Service develop its own CSAR capability. Moreover, there was never a single unified rescue command that controlled CSAR operations, training and equipment development. But that doctrine of decentralized execution apparently did little to hamper joint efforts to rescue airmen in need. For example, on one occasion in 1969, Naval and Air Force aircraft flew 336 sorties over a three day period to rescue a single aviator.\(^7\) That type of cooperation also extended to other areas--communications equipment compatibility, extraction techniques and new technologies in the areas of helicopter, escort aircraft and weapons. As the Vietnam War came to an end and the need for CSAR dwindled, so too did the cooperation and Service interest. CSAR was relegated to second-class status in the scheme of Service priorities in the post-Vietnam era. It became the "military stepchild," as there was no perceived immediate need. Despite the numerous low intensity conflict scenarios and peacetime contingency operations from 1973 to present, the CSAR mission was given only token attention. Some attempts to bolster a dying capability were made, but they were
essentially bureaucratically motivated. For example, the U.S. Air Force dissolved the Air Rescue and Recovery Service in 1983 and shifted CSAR responsibility to the Air Force special operations forces of the 23rd Air Force. Later, in 1989, after significant resistance from the 23rd Air Force and the Special Operations Command, the Air Force passed the responsibility to the newly formed Headquarters Air Rescue Service under the USAF's Military Airlift Command.\textsuperscript{8} In short, the CSAR "hot potato" was passed around and atrophied in the process.

The history of CSAR since WWII is only as good as the lessons gleaned from it. In that vein, I offer the following observations pertaining to the U.S. experience from 1941-present:

1. CSAR capabilities generally atrophied during peacetime, but received some priority when war started.

2. CSAR operations were initially disorganized and ill-equipped at the outbreak of war, and resulted in unacceptable recovery rates early on.

3. Initial organizational schemes after initiation of hostilities focused on the division of responsibilities along Service lines, and each Service developed its own organization, doctrine, equipment and procedures.

4. Overland CSAR was generally more challenging due to the higher threat environment and necessitated a well coordinated, multifaceted approach that required unique equipment.

These observations provide a framework for critically examining current doctrine, organization and capabilities.
CHAPTER III
CURRENT DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES
AND OVERLAND CSAR CAPABILITIES

Although CSAR has been around for many years, joint CSAR doctrine is very new. In fact, the initial draft of Joint Publication 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (October 1990), was just recently approved and is awaiting printing and distribution. This document formalizes all U.S. military CSAR actions and provides the joint focus that was previously missing. It describes CSAR responsibilities, procedures, C³, planning, intelligence requirements, support requirements and Service capabilities in great detail. To understand the gist of CSAR doctrine, one must first focus on the responsibilities and authority given to the Joint Force Commanders, the Component Commanders, the Services and the joint rescue coordination centers. Comprehending the organizational structure and basic CSAR procedures is also critical.

Joint Publication 3-50.2 states that Joint Force Commanders (JFC's) have primary authority and responsibility for CSAR in support of U.S. forces within their areas of responsibility. It also delineates the following: 1) JFC's may delegate CSAR authority to subordinate commanders, 2) JFC's will establish a joint rescue coordination center (JRCC) to coordinate all committed CSAR forces, 3) JFC's will exercise control of all forces committed to a joint CSAR incident, normally through the component commander to which the participating forces are assigned, and 4) JFC's will ensure that all joint force components support CSAR operations of the other components to the fullest extent practicable. In short, the Joint Force Commander has total control and
has the latitude within JCS Publication 3-50.2 to do what he thinks is necessary to get the job done.

Component Commanders have similar authority and responsibilities within their own operations as a logical extension of those given the JFC. JCS Publication 3-50.2 states here that Component Commanders of a joint force: 1) have primary authority and responsibility to plan and conduct CSAR in support of their own operations, 2) will establish a rescue coordination center (RCC) to coordinate all component CSAR activities, 3) will provide mutual support to CSAR operations of the other components to the greatest extent possible, 4) will provide an equitable share of qualified personnel to man the JRCC, 5) will ensure that all subordinate units are familiar with CSAR tactics, techniques and procedures, and 6) will maintain current unit and personnel evasion plans of action, and maintain properly authenticated isolated personnel reports (ISOREP's). 10 Clearly, the Component Commander's plate is full, as he is the person responsible for planning and conducting the CSAR operations and ensuring that all supporting actions are accomplished. He is where "the rubber meets the road."

Service responsibilities for CSAR are succinct and reinforce the primary role of the Component Commander. JCS Publication 3-50.2 simply states that "each Service is responsible for providing forces capable of performing CSAR in support of its own operations, in accordance with its assigned functions"11 and that "each Service will take into account the availability/capability of SAR forces of other Services."12 While taking other Service capabilities into account implies some degree of jointness, the onus is clearly on each Service to provide its own CSAR capability.
The Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC), the first of two key organizational nodes, is the focal point of all CSAR coordination. Normally, the JRCC is a staff element of the joint operations directorate and is given commensurate tasking authority as the single manager for CSAR operations within the joint operations area. Although control of forces committed to a joint CSAR rescue is normally exercised through the component commander to which the participating forces are assigned, the Joint Force Commander may grant his JRCC control of such forces when the situation so warrants. The JRCC also has the authority to coordinate operations at all levels of command and to cross-task designated CSAR forces when required.\(^{13}\) The JRCC also has the authority to: 1) develop and promulgate joint force CSAR standard operating procedures, 2) develop joint force CSAR communications plans and reporting requirements, 3) monitor all CSAR incidents prosecuted within the JOA, 4) review all CSAR annexes and appendices to component operations plans/orders, and 5) establish interfaces with other joint force staff elements.\(^{14}\) The second key organizational node is the Component Rescue Coordination Center. It varies in size, composition and location from component to component, but generally mirrors the JRCC in that it is normally a staff element of the air operations section. Its functions are nearly identical to those of the JRCC, except that they are performed at the component vice joint level. The basic organizational scheme and interrelationships between the JRCC and Component RCC are shown at figure 1.

Basic CSAR procedures naturally reflect doctrinal thinking. As soon as a unit receives a distress indication from any of a myriad of sources, the unit requesting CSAR support notifies the component RCC. The
FIGURE 1, TYPICAL CSAR COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
component RCC then notifies the JRCC and initiates CSAR planning. The component RCC also accesses intelligence information to determine the area threats and obtains all personal data from the unit. The component RCC then informs the JRCC upon initiating the rescue (if done with component assets only). If assets outside the component are required, the JRCC becomes more involved. It generally mirrors the component RCC in function, but has the additional responsibility of directly tasking joint force CSAR assets not available from within the component. More specifically, it coordinates the development of the search and rescue task force (SARTF) and the use of special forces (if applicable), and alerts evasion and recovery nets and all other forces in the operating area. Once those actions are accomplished, the JRCC and component RCC coordinate the assignment of the SAR mission coordinator who confirms the distress call and isolated personnel authentication data, and plans the CSAR mission. After confirmation and authentication of the isolated personnel, the SAR mission coordinator prosecutes the CSAR mission. Finally, after rescue, intelligence personnel debrief the recovered personnel. All in all, the procedures revolve around the joint and component RCC's, and require a great deal of coordination in the execution of even the most benign CSAR operations.

Individual Service capabilities are extremely important, as they directly impact the success or failure of any CSAR operation. Moreover, Component Commanders are particularly sensitive to Service capabilities, given each Service's responsibility to provide the CSAR forces in support of the Component Commander's operations. Joint Force Commanders are concerned too, since combined Service capabilities determine a JFC's overall capacity to conduct CSAR when the demands exceed the assets of a
single component. A JFC conducting a land campaign is particularly concerned with the generic capabilities of the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force and Special Operations component.

The U.S. Army has no dedicated CSAR units or aircraft, but does assign CSAR missions as secondary missions for units tasked by the JFC. Aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC) units provide an excellent example. They are equipped and trained in air crash rescue support, extraction of personnel from crashed aircraft and emergency aid, but are not considered dedicated CSAR assets per se. Army resources currently available for the secondary mission of CSAR include all rotary-wing aviation units, SOF, long-range surveillance units, MEDEVAC units, all watercraft units and all available maneuver forces.  

The U.S. Marine Corps also views CSAR as a secondary mission and emphasizes the need to ensure that CSAR does not detract from primary functions. The Corps conducts both self-supporting CSAR operations and external CSAR support through a concept known as "tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel" (TRAP). TRAP emphasizes detailed planning and the use of "assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue (SAR) assets from responding and when survivors and their locations have been confirmed." Marine Corps assets available for use in the CSAR role include all fixed and rotary-wing assets, ground maneuver forces and other portions of the MEU (SOC) that the JFC chooses to employ.  

In contrast to the Army and Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force has much more invested in dedicated rescue and recovery assets, and many of those assets are deployed to conflict areas in tailored packages in
support of the CSAR mission. These dedicated assets include the HH-3E and MH-60G helicopters, the HC-130 P/N fixed-wing aircraft, and personnel specially trained for RCC controller, pararescue and SAR liaison duties. Additionally, on a case-by-case basis, the Air Force makes tactical fighters and command and control aircraft available to enhance the capability of the primary rescue assets listed above.\(^\text{17}\)

The MH-60G Pavehawk helicopter is now becoming the primary USAF rescue and recovery platform as it replaces the older HH-3E in both active duty and reserve units. Its missions include formation or single-ship sorties with day or night low-level operations in low to medium threat scenarios. Moreover, it is capable of the full spectrum of CSAR operations and employs radio silence techniques, deceptive course changes and preplanned avoidance of enemy air or ground defenses and populated areas to enhance mission success. Just as importantly, the Pavehawk has passive radar warning systems, infrared countermeasures and chaff dispensers for self-protection.\(^\text{18}\)

Fixed-wing platforms also play a critical role in U.S. Air Force CSAR capabilities. The dedicated HC-130 conducts aerial refueling for helicopters and pararescue team insertion, and serves as an airborne command and control platform when necessary. Other non-dedicated fixed-wing assets may augment the CSAR effort at the direction of the JFC. Those assets include rescue escort (RESCORT) OA-10's, fighters and gunships for air superiority and close air support, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC).\(^\text{19}\)
USAF pararescue forces, specially trained controllers assigned to Tactical Air Control Centers and Allied Tactical Operations Centers, and training for all aircrews round out the U.S. Air Force CSAR capabilities.

Joint Publication 3-50.2 says this about Special Operations CSAR capabilities, responsibilities, and command and control.

The commander of the theater SOC has some CSAR capabilities that are inherent in his forces' equipment and training although his forces are not trained or equipped for CSAR. Specific implementing legislation make SOF responsible for CSAR only as it relates to special operations, not SOF themselves. It is therefore appropriate that SOF necessarily rescue their own forces when operating in environments which demand SOF capability. This should not, however, be misconstrued to mean that SOF will always rescue their own forces, especially when the use of conventional CSAR forces is more appropriate.

The document goes on to stipulate the following.

SOF should not be routinely tasked to perform conventional CSAR. In some circumstances, SOF may be the only resource capable of recovering isolated personnel from hostile, denied, or politically-sensitive territory. Tasking SOF to conduct CSAR is appropriate when:

(1) The operating environment requires the special capabilities of SOF; and/or

(2) The priority for recovery of isolated personnel is sufficiently high to warrant a special operation.21

Furthermore, JCS Publication 3-50.2 states "the SOC should not be assigned overall CSAR responsibility. Further, SOF units should not normally be assigned the dual mission of both special operations and CSAR nor should SOF air assets be routinely placed on standing alert to meet short-notice CSAR requirements."22 Clearly, the SOF has successfully divorced itself from any direct doctrinal tie to CSAR for conventional forces.

Despite the strong doctrinal influences, the SOC has many assets capable of enhancing CSAR. The Air Force SOF has all the resources
listed previously, as well as the MH-53J helicopter which has excellent night and adverse weather capabilities used to support SOF ground forces. Army SOF assets include Special Forces, Rangers and special operations aviation units. These aviation units are particularly good in the long-range insertion and extraction roles owing to their high-speed, low-level, night and adverse weather capabilities. Navy SOF resources include SEAL Teams, swimmer delivery vehicle teams and special boat squadrons, all of which can have overland applications. Although SOF is doctrinally not a prime player, it can bring to bear some viable capabilities in a CSAR scenario.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION: WHY THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS NOT OPTIMUM

CSAR successes from WWII to present have received much attention, and that attention might falsely lead observers to conclude that all is well. The old adage "if it isn't broken, don't fix it" might naturally follow. But all is not well. While the CSAR system is functional, it is clearly not anywhere near optimum. Specifically, the current CSAR system is flawed because it ignores historical trends, it does not fully apply the intent of basic joint principles and it ignores several significant operational considerations.

Historical trends suggest that CSAR capabilities quickly atrophy in post-war periods because there is no single joint agency overseeing CSAR, and because CSAR is generally left to the individual Services to cope with. Moreover, individual Services rarely rank CSAR high on their priority list in peacetime which inevitably leads to a decrease in acquisition of equipment, training and general support. Without a single joint agency to ensure support, CSAR is doomed. Currently, there is no joint agency--only separate Service staff officers who manage individual Service issues based on their Service's priorities. This problem also contributes to separately organized CSAR wartime efforts (along Service lines) within a joint force unless the JFC specifically chooses to change the organization. If he chooses to do so, it takes valuable time, people, training and money to develop the organization and procedures required to assure some minimum level of joint CSAR capability--time, people, training and money that could have been allocated elsewhere. Making CSAR primarily a Service responsibility, rather than a joint
agency responsibility, condemns CSAR to atrophy in peacetime and to separate, generally less coordinated efforts in wartime. That is clearly not optimum.

JCS Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) states the following about principles governing unified direction of forces.

The mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained in accomplishment of the mission are the two most fundamental considerations in the establishment of command organization. Sound command organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized direction, decentralized execution, common doctrine, and interoperability. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. Common doctrines are essential for mutual understanding and confidence between a commander and assigned subordinates, and among the subordinates themselves, so that timely and effective action will be taken by all concerned in the absence of specific instructions. Command emphasis on interoperability will result in enhanced joint warfighting capabilities through improved joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

While our decentralized execution meets the above intent, our common doctrine, centralized direction, unity of effort and interoperability fail to meet the standard. Joint CSAR doctrine basically says that each Service will do its own thing and, if necessary, a Joint Rescue Coordination Center will provide coordination if the assets of the component are inadequate. Centralized direction is marginal in wartime unless the JFC fixes the problem, for the JRCC does not control any assets, it only coordinates the assets of the separate components. Unity of effort suffers for the same reason, resulting in less effective operations. Moreover, interoperability issues discussed in Joint Publication 3-50.2, Appendix G, CSAR Interoperability Requirements, directly state "Methods of operation and operational procedures are not
normally interoperability issues.\textsuperscript{25} If Service methods and procedures are not meshed into an overall joint effort, how can the CSAR mission be considered optimum--regardless of success or failure. But lack of joint methods and procedures are not the only operational flaws.

Duplication of effort on the part of the JRCC and component RCC's wastes valuable time and effort. Fully one third of the items on the JRCC and component RCC checklists for prosecuting a CSAR mission are duplicative and not only cause inefficiency, but unnecessary delays.

Also, the distribution of Service CSAR assets to CONUS and overseas locations can seriously effect a given theater of operations. For example, while the U.S. Air Force Air Rescue Service maintains combat-coded CSAR assets in Korea, Japan, Iceland, Europe and the United States, there are none specifically allocated for basing in Latin America or the Middle East.\textsuperscript{26} Clearly, that presents a dilemma for the operational commander.
CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS: THE JOINT CSAR UNIT

Enhancing CSAR capabilities requires redressing the basic concept of how CSAR is conducted at the joint level. Joint doctrine must really be joint, not Service oriented; furthermore, the organization, procedures and capabilities must reflect a truly joint flavor. These necessities suggest the need for a core Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR) unit whose concept and composition are built on the principles governing unified direction of forces found in JCS Publication 0-2 (UNAAF).

Command and control of the JCSAR would be simple, yet effective. In peacetime, JCSAR would report directly to USCINCSOC as a combat-coded and mobility-capable subordinate unit composed of an O-6 Commander, a minimal staff and physical assets (much like JSOC). The J-1 through J-7 functional areas on the SOCOM staff (obviously already familiar with SOCOM procedures) would absorb JCSAR issues, including budget responsibilities. In wartime, operational control of the JCSAR would pass to the warfighting Commander-in-Chief. This concept would: 1) assure a truly joint orientation, 2) help streamline Service CSAR involvement by centralizing control in joint circles, and 3) guarantee the warfighting CINC a minimum CSAR capability that could respond quickly.

Operationally, the JCSAR would consolidate CSAR assets from all services giving it the full range of capabilities in CSAR scenarios. In peacetime, JCSAR would conduct local and large exercise training (e.g. Red Flag, Team Spirit, etc.) to ensure maximum capability and interoperability. In wartime, the JCSAR, after deployment, would
coordinate directly with the JRCC in the prosecution of a CSAR mission. Eliminating the Component RCC as the middleman would streamline procedures, resulting in faster and more efficient responses. Additionally, operational considerations would require that all JCSAR personnel be active duty, as the mobility commitment would preclude delays required to process and mobilize reservists or guardsmen.

The composition of the core JCSAR force would be designed to support approximately twenty-five CSAR events per month (based on the U.S. experience in the Middle East to date) across the spectrum of overland CSAR scenarios. Its assets would nominally include the following:

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<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>HC-130</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircrews and Maintenance Personnel</td>
<td>Per minimum manning requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pararescue Teams</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Special Forces A-Team</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Commander and Staff</td>
<td>Per minimum manning requirements</td>
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Generally, these assets would assure the JFC a minimum ability to get the necessary rescue personnel to the scene in nearly all flying conditions and at long ranges. It would also assure the ability to secure the area with ground and air firepower, extract the isolated personnel and return to safety. Obviously, it would always be subject to modification by individual JFC needs. While this capability would be commendable, it would certainly not be free.

The Unified Commanders, as the primary beneficiary of Joint CSAR Unit capabilities, would clearly have to rally support to secure Service
Chief endorsements for such a change. They would request Service funding for assets included in the core unit based on the arguments previously discussed in Chapter IV, Conclusions: Why the Present System is not Optimum. Those arguments combined with the current necessity to streamline and consolidate would forge a forceful argument for the development of the Joint CSAR Unit. But there is more.

There are many precedents for establishing this type of organization. The development of the basic Unified Command structure and the establishment of a theater Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) are two examples. The birth of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is another. They were all formed, among other reasons, to maximize operational effectiveness through the application of the principles of unified action. While those changes were not cheap or painless for all Services, they clearly enhanced overall capabilities.

Previous resistance to a CSAR mission for SOCOM would largely become irrelevant. Heretofore, SOCOM argued that the mission could not be done because of a lack of financing, appropriate training and CSAR-unique assets. But Service subsidies and transfer of assets, and unit training would address these areas, thus rendering the previous arguments invalid.

The present CSAR system works—the Commanders will see to that—but it is not optimum by any means. Analyses of historical lessons and current doctrine, organization, procedures and capabilities prove it is flawed. The fix is a Joint CSAR Unit. Primary responsibility for CSAR must shift from the Services to a joint agency where the concept of operations will truly employ the principles of unified action. It would not be easy, but it would certainly be worth it!
NOTES


2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. xiii. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 

8 Telephone conversation with Colonel Stevens, HQ ARS/DO, McClellan AFB, CA. 27 December 1990.


10 Ibid., p. III-4. 
11 Ibid., p. I-1. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., p. III-1. 
14 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., pp. C 2-3. 
17 Ibid., p. D 1. 
18 Ibid., pp. D 1-2. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. F 1. 
21 Ibid., p. F 4. 
22 Ibid., p. F 5. 
23 Ibid., pp. F 1-2. 

23


Telephone conversation with Colonel Stevens, HQ ARS/DO, McClellan AFB, CA. 27 December 1990.

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