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MARITIME INTERDICTION: THE EVOLUTION OF A STRATEGY

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

On 19 January 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Allied commander for the war in the Persian Gulf, code named 'Operation Desert Storm', described the naval procedures for halting goods going to and from Iraq as a 'full blown maritime intercession regime', carefully avoiding the term 'blockade'. It is interesting that even after hostilities began, the resistance to calling these operations a blockade remained. However, this unprecedented international action represents much more than a mere battle with semantics. The current practice of maritime interdiction represents a growing tendency by strategic planners to pursue operations in an attempt to control escalation during an international crisis rather than contribute to it. Modern world politics has obscured the line between peace and war. The proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and the technology available to all nations have created a nearly universal acceptance of any method short of actual hostilities used during regional or world crisis.

A quarantine or blockade aimed against an enemy's commerce is a strong enticement to convince him to change a deleterious policy while concurrently promoting a military advantage by prohibiting him from continuing to build or sustain his forces in anticipation of any hostilities. It is, perhaps, necessary to acknowledge the contention of the international jurist, Phillip Jessup, that: 'there may be developing a state of intermediacy between peace and war, characterized by a condition

of hostility between opposing parties, arising from divisions too deep rooted to be capable of solution, but accompanied by an absence of intention or decision to go to war."¹

This paper introduces the strategy of trying to control an adversary by naval interdiction. The specific focus is the historical development of maritime intercession, followed by a review of the current application of these procedures against Iraq, and by a look at the future use of this activity as it relates to the military planner. Specific recommendations concerning the continuing development of this promising operation conclude the paper.

CHAPTER 2. BLOCKADES: EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY

Belligerents, from antiquity to modern times, have recognized the value of isolating an enemy from the outside world. Siege warfare was first recorded as a naval strategy when the Dutch blockaded Spanish Flanders in 1584 and again in 1630. Their actions were justified in the international forum by the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, who effectively tied the principle of siege warfare, a strategy previously confined to a land campaign, to the maritime arena by his assertion that a nation at war could be legally cut off from the rest of the world, although he failed to describe this action as a "blockade".²

This was a unique application of sea power that brought many international issues to the forefront. Such questions as non-belligerent rights to free trade, sovereignty of vessels on the high seas, contraband, and the rights and responsibilities of neutral vessels, now took on a new urgency. The novel approach used by the Dutch created an immediate conflict between an effective and desirable warfighting strategy and its incursion on the rights of neutral nations to maintain their economic status quo.

The practice was further refined when, in 1695, England and Holland, then at war with France, declared the entire French coast to be "blockaded". Since neither country could realistically enforce such a widespread action, this became known as a "paper blockade".³ This action was vigorously protested by Denmark and Sweden who saw it as a significant infringement on their rights of

trade as neutral nations. Therefore, a blockade by proclamation or "paper blockade" found disfavor with the international community whose collective will determined that a blockade had to be effective in order to be legal (and thus observed). Simply put, this meant that any State using a blockade as a tactic had to have the forces available effectively to physically blockade the enemy's port before his action could have any legal ramifications on other members of the international community.

During the Napoleonic Wars between Britain and France, the blockade was further refined and clarified by the first application of the "distant" blockade by Great Britain. With her mastery of the seas, England felt that it was not necessary that her ships be in sight of enemy or non-belligerent vessels to effect a blockade. Rather, it was her opinion that the sheer threat of her majestic navy's ability to control the seas and thereby enforce a blockade, coupled with France's inability to defend against such action, made her blockades effective in the legal sense. This contention was rejected by the United States and France and consequently the requirement that a belligerent dedicate enough forces to a blockade in order to ensure its effectiveness was further reinforced. This resistance was, of course, a natural outgrowth of the rising maritime interests of the United States and represented the fledgling nation's growing desire to protect her trading rights as a neutral to the seemingly perpetual struggles of Western Europe, with whom she was inextricably, financially bound.

The concept of blockade took a profound evolutionary

turn in 1827 when the collective powers of Russia, France and Great Britain blockaded the Turkish fleet in Navarino in order to limit their participation in the Turkish/Greek conflict. This action became known as a 'pacific blockade' since it was taken without the blockading countries having formally declared a state of war with the Turks.* As a non-belligerent, collective activity, this action bears a relationship to current naval strategy addressed later in this paper.

In 1902, the United States recounted her position that she did not accept the legality of a pacific blockade. At that time, this question was being studied by the Naval War College. Professor Wilson of the War College sent a memorandum on this subject to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hay. In his response, Secretary Hay declared that 'insurgents not yet recognized as possessing the attributes of full belligerency could not establish a blockade according to the definition of international law.'⁵

Although this particular question related to insurgent operations in Latin American countries, the implication was that blockades were considered to be limited to declared wars in order to be recognized by the United States, who had by this time become the world's premier maritime trading power. This position was a reaffirmation of the U.S. position, first expounded in 1885, when she 'repeatedly announced that, according to the principles of international law, [she] cannot admit that a foreign government navy may lawfully close any ports in the hands of foreign belligerents or of insurgents unless such a closure takes the form of a blockade, fully proclaimed and maintained as such.'⁶

Thus, the pacific blockade as a strategy for control of conflict found disfavor with military and political planners. Pacific blockades, at the time, tended to cloud the issue of the rights and obligations of neutrals and belligerents. Therefore, although it proved to be an effective form of coercion in international crisis - providing action without necessarily incurring concurrent escalation - its confusing impact on the rights and responsibilities of non-involved nations clearly led to its international demise. It should be noted that this timeframe was prior to any efforts at collective security through international organizations such as the UN, and that collective actions such as a pacific blockade were not yet planted in the fertile soil of international cooperation.

In 1856, the Declaration of Paris was signed. This convention was the first codification of the law of maritime warfare and formally applied the rule of effectiveness to blockades. It was ratified by the world's major maritime powers and it sought to control the rights and responsibilities of belligerents and neutrals alike.

At the outbreak of the American Civil War, in 1861, President Lincoln declared the nearly 3,500 miles of Confederate coastline blockaded by the U.S. Navy.⁷ Putting aside the question of the then paltry American Navy's ability to truly effect such a blockade, the United States contributed the concept of the "continuous voyage" to the law of blockades. This concept allowed the U.S. to seize neutral vessels bound for neutral ports on the premise that her travel to a neutral port had the ulterior motive

of landing her goods in blockaded ports, either by eventually going there herself, or by transferring her cargo to smaller, faster, 'blockade runners'.⁹ The implication and impositions on the rights of neutrals of this concept brought much consternation within the international community. The culmination of this and other questions on the rights of neutrals and belligerents was the Declaration of London in February of 1909. This convention, although not formally ratified as international law, was the first, and currently existing basis for the comprehensive maritime laws of blockade, contraband, and the rights of neutrals.¹⁰

The law of blockades came to an evolutionary plateau after the 1909 codification and thus called for the following rules:

- A blockade must be effective to be legitimate. That is, it must be enforced by sufficient force to create a substantial risk of apprehension to any would be violators.
- It must be applied to all vessels, whether belligerent or neutral.
- It must commence with proper notification made by competent authority; and
- It must not bar access to neutral ports or coastlines.¹¹

Under a properly declared belligerent blockade, a neutral vessel encounters the following requirements:

- It must fly its national flag; and
- it must navigate so as not to interfere with blockading force.¹²

Thus, up to this point, the use of a belligerent force

effectively to blockade an adversary's ports in order to deprive him of the sinews of war was codified and recognized in the international forum as a viable and reasonable strategy during periods of declared hostilities. However, only five years later, the outset of World War One in 1914 demonstrated that the now accepted international law governing close-in blockades was outmoded by the modern technological achievements in weapons and warfare machinery that it antedated. Longer ranged, more powerful weapons could be brought to bear against an enemy's vessels close-in to shore and the advent of the aircraft and submarine as both offensive and defensive weapons, made the concept of blockading a port close-in very unattractive.

The long distance blockade once again was seen as the only truly viable strategy. Thus, it was used extensively during both World Wars, since at the same time the increasing interdependence of national economies on international trade made economic warfare, as practiced by the act of a blockade, a much preferred action. And even though the 1909 Declaration of London was not ratified, its precepts were accepted as the international law, albeit applied in a somewhat arbitrary manner as it best suited the particular national interests, especially by Great Britain and the United States.¹⁷ Thus, the two world wars fathered the concept of total economic warfare in which the tactic of blockade played a major role in spite of the variances with actual practice, as James McNulty points out in his paper on blockades:

Despite the failure of the Declaration to be formally adopted by the international community, and despite the almost universal rejection of its key principles during the major wars of this century, the terms of the Declara-

tion are yet considered to be an acceptable expression of the developed law of maritime warfare.¹⁴

Post World War Two saw little change in the world's approach to the law of blockades. Few strategists yet realized that the comprehensive nature of international relations had changed the face of maritime warfare forever. Increasing advances in weapons technology and sophistication, as well as the growth and maturity of international organizations, relegated the antiquated notions of maritime siege warfare to the backwaters of military strategy and brought to the fore much more complex methods of coercion in State relationships.

The first post war test that continued the evolutionary growth occurred in October of 1962 during what has become known as the "Cuban Missile Crisis". On 22 October, President Kennedy ordered the Navy to conduct a "quarantine" around the island of Cuba in order to interdict Soviet strategic nuclear missiles that were being installed there. The legality of this action is still under debate, but it is worth noting that this was a new and novel way to "blockade" an adversary without becoming embroiled in the rules governing belligerents and neutrals inherent in a blockade. It represented a natural broadening of the precepts of the Declaration of London, given the modern nature of international conflict and weaponry. The specific differences between a blockade and the Cuban quarantine are outlined in Mr. William O. Miller's paper, "Law of Naval Warfare":

The Quarantine differed from a blockade in that it:
-Sought to ban only certain items of contraband goods rather than all maritime intercourse.
-Used as methods of enforcement only visit, search, and

diversion and did not employ destruction without warning.
-sought to avoid the consequences of a formal state of
war.¹⁰

This foreshadowed future maritime action in this arena.
It had two significant features that mark it as the watershed
of current naval interdiction practices.

First, there was the stated limitations that represented
a clear departure from previous practices of interdiction
on the high seas. By limiting the contraband to a specific
list, the Kennedy Administration successfully adopted a
strategy that changed an adversary's policy without reverting
to armed conflict. This was not a plan of economic isolation
as accomplished by a true blockade, yet its ultimate goal
was the same; to affect the policies of another government
and thereby coerce him to adopt an attitude more favorable
to our political will. Thus, the Kennedy administration invoked
a creative disguise to a well tested and proven wartime strategy
in order to manifest its desired peacetime policy.

Secondly, The Administration justified this extraordinary
action by invoking article 51(1) of the United Nations Charter and
article 6 of the RIO Pact claiming that the quarantine was an
act of "collective security". For the first time in history, an
act heretofore considered as a provocation for war was justified
as an international sanction under the auspices of an inter-
national organization. Thus, the conditions were finally right for
the maturation of the pacific blockade first invoked by Russia,
France and England against the Turks. The quarantine succeeded
and although detractors point to the requirement for the Security

Council's approval under article 53(1) which was never given, customary practice indicates that this method of collective security will find favor in future military contingencies as evidenced by current U.S. Navy writings:

That action [the quarantine], formally ratified by the Organization of American States (OAS), has been widely approved as a legitimate exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in article 51 of the United Nations Charter.^{1*}

The final significant act relating to the evolution of blockades prior to the current activity in the Persian Gulf occurred in 1966 when the United Nations took the unusual step of authorizing British warships to interdict oil tankers bound for Rhodesia during the insurgency there. This action was also justified under the clause of collective security.

With this background, we approach the Persian Gulf crisis that began on 2 August 1990, when President Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded his neighbor, Kuwait, garnering transnational derision and prompting swift, decisive action by the international community.

CHAPTER 3. TODAY: IRAQ VERSUS THE WORLD

Not since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 has the idea of interdicting the maritime traffic of another state reached such widespread attention, both militarily and historically, as it has since Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The invasion seems to have fertilized the maritime garden allowing the strategy of interdicting trade at sea to blossom into a viable and legal method of international coercion.

On 6 August 1990, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 661 which affirmed Kuwait's "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter."¹⁷ Additionally, the Security Council imposed an "embargo" by paragraph 3 which reads in part: "[d]ecides that all States shall prevent: a) the import into their territory of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; b)... and any dealings by their nationals or flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq after the date of the present resolution."¹⁸

Thus we see a metamorphosis of unilateral maritime siege warfare, born in 1584, become an action of collective will. The international community sought, under article VII of the UN Charter, to coerce one of its members to accede to its will by a

total and complete economic embargo of Iraq's lifeline to the outside world. This, then, is what siege warfare has become in the modern sense, fully supported by the international community. Again, the fundamentals of the strategy of blockade would play a critical role.

Initially the press utilized various terms to announce this action. The New York Times headlines for 7 August 1990 used the term 'boycott' and 'blockade'¹⁹ and further into the article stated: 'only if non-military initiatives fail and Iraq succeeds in maintaining trade despite the United Nations sanctions will the Administration and allies like Britain and France opt for a blockade.'²⁰

The legality of this action appears undisputable. Sanctioned by the UN as a measure of collective security, it has gained world-wide international acceptance. Additionally, it fulfills the precepts of the London Declaration in that it was clearly announced with a starting date promulgated by competent authority, the UN; it is applied to all vessels; it does not bar access to neutral ports and; by including a united coalition to enforce it, it is undoubtedly effective. Yet it was not legally termed a blockade in order to avoid any escalatory connotation of an act of war. Also, the Administration avoided the term in order to: 'sidestep the question of whether the United States needs a new vote by the United Nations Security Council...'²¹

In a report by the Washington Post, Secretary of State, Mr. James A. Baker III called the action against Iraq an 'interdiction policy' and further stipulated: 'the Administration is avoiding

the words 'blockade' and 'quarantine' because under international law those terms can be interpreted as acts of war.²² President Bush's reaction was: 'There is no point in getting into all the semantics. The main thing is that we stop the oil from coming out of there. That's what we are doing.'²³

Thus, we have an international economic action taken under the coercive powers granted to the UN Security Council under article VII and in accordance with the right of collective security granted under article 51 of the Charter, utilizing actions that in years past were reserved for belligerent nations engaged in declared wars. The maturation of this action demonstrates the continuing evolution of an international law that brings the old concept of a pacific blockade under the umbrella of collective security, thereby answering many of the objections of neutral trading rights and responsibilities. This policy has become both legal and effective without necessarily being escalatory or provocative. These features make it extremely attractive as a military option in low level and regional conflicts.

The remaining question as of 14 August 1990 was whether or not countries implementing the interdiction action could legitimately use force to stop violators. This was the question that the U.S. was trying to avert by avoiding the term blockade. It was the U.S. position that force was authorized under the mandate of collective security granted by article 51 and resolution 661. Detractors of this position argued that any military action required a vote by the Security Council under article 42 in order to authorize the use of force.

The U.S persisted in her position and announced on 16 August that American warships would "use only the minimum force needed to halt any shipments of embargoed cargo."²⁴ This position was countered by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar when he stated: "Any intervention, whatever the country, would not be in accordance with either the letter or the spirit of the United Nations Charter."²⁵

These juxtaposed positions were put to the international test on 18 August 1990, when United States warships began shadowing two Iraqi oil tankers that refused to stop after shots were fired across their bows. It should be noted that some people considered these warning shots as an unjustified act of force. However, this is an accepted international signal by which a warship tells a merchant vessel to stop; therefore, it should be considered neither illegal nor provocative.²⁶

The United States Navy took no further actions without international authorization and the question was made moot when on 25 August the Security Council passed resolution 665 which authorized the United States: "to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary...to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations."²⁷ In response to this international pressure, President Saddam Hussein ordered his ships not to oppose the interdiction operations.²⁸ Thus was born the first internationally sanctioned "full blown maritime intercession regime" ever used in an attempt to diffuse an international crisis and return to the status quo.

CHAPTER 4. THE MILITARY PLANNER AND THE COERCIVE BLOCKADE

Collective military action short of armed conflict will entail many tactics that require innovative and creative planning. The international nature of national economies makes the introduction of a maritime, coercive blockade, applied in varying degrees, a viable strategic option in an attempt to return an errant member of the world body back to the international fold. As President Bush indicated, the name we give to this action is irrelevant. An international convention meeting to codify the law governing these coercive activities is well warranted after the current crisis is resolved. However, for the purpose of this analysis, I am coining the term "coercive blockade" to refer to a maritime interdiction, fully sanctioned by an international forum.

The current raging world crisis has demonstrated that the power and prestige of the United States will put us in the role as the leader in many of these actions. Therefore, U.S. military planners will be faced with many significant problems in developing the correct courses of action. Since these tactics will undoubtedly be used during periods of tense world crisis, the criticality of precise planning and clear command and control cannot be overstated.

It can be assumed that short of actual war, any collective quarantine or blockade will be authorized under

the UN charter giving this action a clear international flavor. The theater commander can expect to integrate navies from many varied countries and cultures, as well as significant joint service interaction within our own armed forces. It can also be assumed that a coercive blockade will be implemented in varying stages, each increasingly more escalatory in order to enforce the collective international will. This chapter focuses on several of the major planning considerations these operations may encounter.

The first major consideration for the operational planner will be the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Recent operations of this nature demonstrate that this is not always a clear cut factor. Specific rules will need to be promulgated in order to assure that unit and element commanders clearly understand what actions are permissible and/or required within the scope of the operation. In order to be effective, the ROE should be promulgated by the Military Staff of the UN, if that body has been activated to oversee the operation. If not, the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should put forth specific rules similar to their wartime ROE to lessen the chance of ambiguity by the theater commanders. The intensive nature of these operations will be best served if all personnel are clearly trained in the applicable ROE and the international law pertaining to search and seizure on the high seas. Unlike normal U.S. ROE, which tend to restrict combat operations more so than international law²⁰, planners can assume that international law will be the

ultimate guidance for action and the use of force. The bottom line is that an internationally sanctioned ROE, clearly spelled out and understood by all levels of command will be critical for the success of this type of operation.

The second major consideration will be the use of forces available to effect a coercive blockade. Because of the nature of this operation, which will be designed to avoid the outbreak of hostilities, certain tactics will undoubtedly be inappropriate unless the situation deteriorates beyond peacetime coercion. For example, surface ships and aircraft will probably be the units of choice for this strategy. Because of their requirement for stealth and general threat of hostility, submarines are unlikely candidates as participants. The questions surrounding the use of submarine operating areas in limited international coercive actions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it seems clear that by her very nature, a submarine operating to enforce a blockade is far too provocative for the limited goals of such an operation. If, on the other hand, the situation should deteriorate to declared belligerency, then the submarine's role in sea control and commerce interdiction will prove to be a vital tool in the theater planners repertoire.

Another technique formally used in belligerent blockades that will be unlikely to gain acceptance in a coercive blockade would be the use of mines to channel shipping or block harbors. As with the submarine, mines tend to be more provocative in nature than is likely to be acceptable in this

situation. Mining, of course, would be a viable method for shipping control and harbor blockades in the event of hostilities.

This then points to the surface navy and air assets as the forces of choice in planning this type of action. A large, well balanced, visible force would provide a clear political as well as military statement; a show of force that can send a powerful message of controlled, yet determined response.

The third major consideration for the military planner will be command and control (C2). The multinational force will present some unique C2 problems for the planning and implementation of these operations. A close study of the C2 procedures used during Operation Desert Storm will prove invaluable in helping establish standard operating procedures in correlating the activity of transnational forces.

Joint operational C2 within the U.S. armed forces will also be a critical consideration. Continued joint training as well as international exercises will help validate C2 techniques already developed and contribute to a better understanding of future interservice and international operability.

A final major consideration that deals with boarding and inspection procedures. The list of contraband in coercive blockades may range from limited items, such as those targeted during the Cuban Quarantine in 1962, all the way to the extensive prohibitions applicable to the action taken against Iraq in 1990. Search procedures will also vary a great deal, ranging from asking a few

simple questions over VHF radio, to boarding parties for onboard inspection of a merchant vessel's holds. Training for navy commanders and their crew are generally less than optimal for these types of activity. Aside from insuring that a thorough pre-operation indoctrination course is conducted for all participants, planners will want to continue to use the ready assets of the U.S. Coast Guard as detachments aboard blockading vessels. The Coast Guard detachment is a well trained, competent force that can skillfully handle interdiction duties in a legal and fully professional manner.

In summary, a clear ROE, coupled with a well structured, visible surface force comprised of multinational units, will provide a competent force to be reckoned with in enforcing an internationally sanctioned action of coercion. The value of this strategy for future use points to a need for continued training in command, control, communication, and service interoperability. Careful planning will ensure this action will either positively affect the limited goals or aid in the overall preparation for the next echelon of military action.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

At the time of this writing, the Gulf War rages and the ultimate allied victory remains to be consummated. The fact that hostilities erupted, however, should not obfuscate the possible success of future uses of maritime interdiction as an effective strategy in curbing the purveyors of world disorder. It provides an effective means to attempt to coerce an errant world leader into rejoining the international fold, while concurrently eliminating many of his opportunities to succor his war machine should the use of force ultimately become necessary. The complex intermingling of national economies at the international level gives far greater credence to economic warfare as a viable and bloodless tactic to maintain world order by international organizations.

As President Bush's assertion, previously stated, tells us, semantics in this matter are largely irrelevant as long as the outcome is the bending to the collective international will. When the dust settles from Operation Desert Storm, a careful study of the practices of international and joint cooperation employed is well warranted. The strong showing of the United Nations in the current international conflict points to the value of "collective security". A blockade initiated under the auspices of the United Nations can be a second echelon step in tightening sanctions against errant nations. A critical step in this process will be the rekindling of the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council as provided for under article VII of the Charter. This would clearly reinforce the international

nature and character of the operations and avoid the appearance of unilateral action. Whether this goal is altruistic in today's world is of course debatable. In any case, use of a 'coercive blockade' mandated by, and conducted under the guidance of the UN Security Council would be a major step forward toward true collective security and provide another effective weapon in trying to avoid a catastrophic use of force in today's tenuous political climate.

ENDNOTES

1. Phillip Jessup, quoted in Wolfgang Freidman, The Changing Structure of International Law, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) p.271.
2. James F. McNulty, "Blockade: Evolution and Expectation", U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies V.62., (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1980) p.174.
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6. Ibid., p. 12.
7. McNulty, Op. Cit., p.179.
8. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 6th ed., (New York: Appleton-Century- Crafts Inc., 1958) pp. 117-118. Note: The concept of Continuous Voyage was first applied to maritime trade by the British Lords Commissioners of Appeals in 1805 in the *Essex* case. This ship was continuing to trade with Spain during the Napoleonic Wars by carrying cargo from Spain to Spanish Cuba by way of Salem, Massachusetts. The Court held that this practice violated the Rule of 1756, which stated that trade not open in the time of peace could not legally be opened in time of war. By the *Essex* ruling, Britain was applying the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage to her interdiction of continental trade during her wars with France. However, a true belligerent blockade did not exist at the time. Thus, it was the U.S. who first applied the Doctrine to a true blockade.
9. Hyde, Op. Cit., pp.23-24.
10. McNulty, Op. Cit., p. 182
11. William O. Miller, "Law of Naval Warfare", U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies V. 62. (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1980) p.265.
12. Ibid.
13. W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, V.1., (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952) pp. 9-11.

14. McNulty Op. Cit., p.183.
15. Miller, Op. Cit., p. 269.
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