NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

U.S. GROUND FORCES IN GERMANY:  
MISSIONS FOR A REDUCED FORCE  

by  
David A. Jones  
Major, United States Army

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personnel views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: [Signature]

21 June 1991

Paper directed by COL Theodore L. Gatchel  
Chairman, Department of Operations

Approved by:  

Faculty Research Advisor  
Date  

UNCLASSIFIED
This research paper is designed to define the operational mission and options available for employment of United States ground forces in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1991. Since late 1989, geopolitical events in Central Europe and South-west Asia have reshaped and redified the post-cold war world. Both conventional arms reductions and U.S. troop withdrawals have forced a reassessment of U.S. ground force employment in Central Europe (CENTAG). This paper will focus on the current geopolitical environment of Germany and how the reduced number of United States ground combat units may be employed at the operational level. Three operational plans for troop employments in Germany will be examined. I will conclude that even with the smaller number of available forces on hand, United States forces can still meet the defense requirements for NATO's central front.
Abstract of
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This research paper is designed to define the operational mission and options available for employment of United States ground forces in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1991. Since late 1989, geopolitical events in Central Europe and South-west Asia have reshaped and redefined the post cold war world. Both conventional arms reductions and U.S. troop redeployments have forced a reassessment of U.S. ground force employment in central Europe (CENTAG). This paper will focus on the current geopolitical environment of Germany and how the reduced number of United States ground combat units may be employed at the operational level. Three operational plans for troop employments in Germany will be examined. I will conclude that even with the smaller number of available forces on hand, United States forces can still meet the defense requirements for NATO's central front.
Details of United States and NATO war plans exceed the classification level of this paper. However, there is a large amount of material available from various non-classified sources which provided the input for this paper. Information for this paper came from official publications of the Department of Defense, books, reports, articles, and interviews. The information provided in this report will serve as a basis to frame the debate on the operational utilization of the remaining United States Army combat assets in Germany today.
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U.S. GROUND FORCES IN GERMANY: MISSIONS FOR A REDUCED FORCE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Forty years after its beginning members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) witnessed the victory of their defensive alliance in central Europe. This victory was not won on the plains of northern Germany but was accomplished through a combination of steadfast deterrence and the collapse of a fatally flawed political ideology.

Since 1989 successive communist regimes have fallen throughout the length and breadth of the once feared Warsaw Pact alliance. Most dynamic in the rate and importance of change was the jewel of the Warsaw Pact, the German Democratic Republic (DDR). Hailed as a communist success story, the DDR evaporated from the family of nations on 3 October 1990. The unification of the two German states back into one nation was the watershed event of 1990 and certainly spelled the end of the post World War II political order.

The last year and one half has also brought fundamental changes to both the Soviet Union and the United States. With the downfall of its empire in eastern Europe and with massive internal difficulties, the Soviet regime is facing what could be the greatest test to its survival since the Wehrmacht was at the gates of Moscow. Both political and economic challenges threaten to overwhelm the leaders in the Kremlin today.

The Soviets are not alone in facing massive challenges. After getting a "free ticket" during the first year in office the administration in Washington is now facing a double barreled challenge of both war and recession.
Cries on Capitol Hill are heard daily for peace dividends and a downsizing of the United States military capability. No matter what happens in the upcoming months in the Persian Gulf, smaller defense budgets are inevitable.

The world climate briefly outlined in the above paragraphs leaves the NATO alliance and the remaining United States ground forces stationed in Germany at a turning point. This paper examines the events leading to the "new order" in Europe. It will focus on what operational missions can be performed by the scaled down United States ground forces remaining in the new Germany of 1991. Focusing at the operational level I will propose several options for the effective application of those forces within the Federal Republic of Germany. These options outlined will reflect current force levels in the FRG and are based on the known political constraints that are in writing.

At the conclusion of this paper I will show that current United States ground forces in Germany can be employed operationally to provide an effective defense force within the framework of the new security environment in Europe today. Though imperfect, the operational missions outlined in this paper will provide an effective and less expensive deterrent to a potential aggressor in central Europe.
CHAPTER II

A REVOLUTION OF IDEAS: THE CHANGING THREAT

In order to understand the logic behind the proposals made in the later half of this paper the reader must understand the dynamics of the threat that the United States forces is facing. In this regard the last 24 months represent trauma for both east and western security assumptions in Central Europe. Not since the end of the second World War have we witnessed such change. Today the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact represent a completely changed threat to U.S. forces in Germany.

Without going through a blow by blow account of recent history one needs to pinpoint some key events that have changed the dynamics of the threat. The first item is the internal change that has occurred within the Soviet Union. Whether one believes that these changes are permanent or not is irrelevant. During the last few years documented changes affecting Soviet doctrine and forces have taken place. The key points of this new doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency" are:

* War is no longer a means of achieving political objectives.
* The Soviet Union will never initiate military actions against any other state.
* The Soviet Union will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.
* The Soviet Union has no territorial claims against nor does it consider any other state to be its enemy.
* The Soviet Union seeks to preserve military parity as a decisive factor in averting war, but at much lower levels.
This new doctrine is backed by actions that on the surface make it far more believable. President Gorbachev's 1988 defanging of the military started Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. In December of the same year he announced unilateral withdrawals and reductions of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and Mongolia.

His tolerance of the development of alternative political systems in the Warsaw Pact lead to the collapse of all the Communist regimes in office. This disintegration of the Warsaw Pact forces had led to a net loss of over 715,000 personnel totalling some 20 divisions in the forward area of the Warsaw Pact. Early in 1990 Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia also announced massive internal force reductions. Reductions announced included "forces totalling 134,000 men, 2,150 tanks, 1,530 artillery pieces and 114 combat aircraft." Most meaningfully, he allowed the start of the Soviet puppet regimes, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), to fall apart and be swallowed up by the FRG. Soviet troops are pledged by treaty to be out of the former East German territory by the end of 1994. For all the skeptics who think the Soviets are footdragging about troop withdrawals they should examine the evidence from eastern Germany and Hungary. In Hungary "since March of last year, 60 percent of the 100,000 or so soldiers from the southern army troops, plus relatives, have left, including 80 percent of the combat units." Spokesman in Germany openly discussed the prospect of even faster Soviet withdrawals. At the very least, 1991 will see "100,000 soldiers and 50,000 civilians leave eastern Germany." This translates into about 30 percent of the forces in the five new laender.
The internal reform pillars of glasnost and perestroika produced electrifying changes internally. At the very least the fabric of the old Marxist society have severely unraveled. Various forces are now competing to determine the future course of Soviet foreign and domestic affairs.

Events unfolding in January of 1991 may provide us with a clue on who controls the levers of power in the U.S.S.R. and what direction the so-called reform movement is headed. Both glasnost and perestroika may have reached the end of their usefulness for the Soviet leadership. The violent repression of the independence movements in Lithuania and Latvia clearly signal a turn to old fashion communist repression by the government in Moscow. Examples of this new wave of terror include armed attacks by Soviet soldiers on key installations within both Latvia and Lithuania resulting in 14 deaths and over 230 injuries. 8

What is evident is that the threat and the very nature of the Soviet Union that existed in relationship to its European neighbors has changed radically in the past 24 months. No longer is NATO faced by a solid block of Warsaw Pact client states backed by an ideologically driven monolith. Today NATO faces a continent in change. A retrenching and fretful Soviet Union still posses the largest military threat in Europe today. Armed with over 114 divisions west of the Ural Mountains, the Soviet military presents an inherent threat to western security interests. 9 Ever threatening, the USSR has changed and has evolved into a new force. These transitions in the U.S.S.R. and those of its former client states are only part of the aspects that need to be reviewed before we proceed. Chapter II will show that 1990 was the year of Germany. A new and powerful player emerged that changed the face of Europe forever.
CHAPTER III

GERMANY: A NATION REBORN

As stated in the previous chapter, the most compelling story to emerge at the end of the last decade was the unification of Germany. Long thought as a "mission impossible" by almost everyone the rapid march to unification truly is a story in itself. The purpose of this chapter is not to write recent German history, but instead to establish the framework or the environment that the U.S. ground forces must operate in. The old framework and relationships of the pre-Cold War era are now changed forever.

On 3 October 1990 the world saw the spectacle of German reunification. The changes that had occurred since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 were dizzying. As the East German state rapidly imploded, both the west and the east attempted to adjust and set up a framework for a stable central Europe.

Germany has indeed been at the forefront of history in the 20th century. Certainly the "great and terrible range of European volcanoes, the German question has proven to be the most active and the most explosive". 10 Germany once again stands as a major player on the stage of European events. With reunification the essential character of the country has changed. Walter Russell Mead in his article The Once and Future Reich points out that Germany is effected by three basic elements. These are geography (a central European location), its leading nation status, and the outsider status that Germans feel.
Reunification has brought Germany back in its role as a bridge between east and west. "Culturally and psychologically, Germany finds itself between East and West". Its interest of all types, including security, are not exclusively tied to the west any longer. "Mitteleuropa" or Central Europe, will serve as the vehicle to drive a wedge between old western relationships that prospered in the past.

Germany now is the foremost nation on the continent. "Given the Soviet retreat in Eastern Europe, it means a return to German hegemony in this part of the world". The economic and political decisions emerging from Berlin are now watched closely in the capitals of Eastern Europe.

The last and most important point of all is that Germany is the loner or outsider. Due to its history and guilt from the last war the Germans are unsure of themselves. Burdened by losing two wars within 30 years, Germany has been frozen out of the inner councils of the west. "Even today, the NATO alliance is meant to keep Germany under the control of its 'allies', while Germany is less trusted with atomic weaponry than countries like India and Israel". The outsider status that Germans feel serve as another weapon to distance the new Germany from NATO.

As 1991 unfolds, what can we expect from this new German state? More critically to this research will it have a direct effect on the operational missions of United States ground forces in the Central region of NATO? From a macro sense we need to look at recent history. In 1989 and 1990 Germany "pursued a line of policy independent of its Western allies and seized the initiative in European affairs." Additionally, this independence will continue to gradually grow. "In the short term, Germany has one overriding interest in its diplomacy: to end the Soviet occupation of the eastern third of
the country." These foreign policy interests tie directly to a change we will see in the area of security. The 35 member CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe) represents the vehicle to which Germany will increasingly turn in the coming years. NATO though, not abandoned by any means, is no longer the only show in town. During 1991 dissatisfaction "with NATO will increase as the security problems of its Eastern neighbors command more attention, and as the anti-German character of NATO becomes harder to ignore." Only recently in the German city of Baden have reports of real feelings of Germans toward foreigners started surfacing. As the French Army begins its withdrawal local Germans feel excited and ready for their departure. "Suddenly, the local folks do not seem to be able to wait another day." 17

Unquestionably the rules of the game have changed and have changed radically. The Cold War security relationships of yesteryear are gone forever. In the near term what does this mean for our relationship? I believe the following new rules now apply to United States forces operating in the Central Region of NATO in 1991:

1) A reduced ground troop strength and visibility
2) A reduced reliance on tactical nuclear weapons
3) Creation of smaller multinational units

With the creation of new political realities for the 1990's United States ground commanders must adjust old plans and tactics employed during the Cold War years. New operational schemes must be designed to meet the challenges of a new era and a new decade. A new political dynamics have swept Germany into leadership in Central Europe and deflated the threat from the U.S.S.R. If NATO is to survive and be useful in the coming years the operational missions
that U.S. forces employ must be realistic and smart. We must do more with less to meet the challenges that face us in the dawn of this "new world order" of 1991.
CHAPTER IV

U.S. GROUND FORCES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The contrast between the Cold War world and the post Cold War era is no better highlighted than in the central region of NATO. Racked by changed, U.S. operational commanders have struggled to cope with fast paced developments on the international scene. Operational plans that existed for years evaporated within days. Before going further a review of the situation as it was before the great upheavals of the last 24 months took place is in order. Specifically, where were and what were the missions of the Corps level and separate U.S. ground forces in the FRG?

Table 1 in this paper provides a complete listing of the U.S. ground forces stationed in the Federal Republic and Berlin in 1988. Organizationally, the forces were broken into one Army (7th U.S.) and two subordinate Corps (VI and VII). Located for the most part in central and southern Germany, this force comprised the make up that is the Central Army Group or CENTAG.

Operationally the two Corps stood side by side blocking traditional invasion routes such as the Fulda Gap, the Hof Corridor, and the Cham Gap. Utilizing "Forward Defense" or defending as close as possible to the Inter German Border (IGB), these two Corps could defend against an enemy in depth. Using both air and ground reconnaissance forces the U.S. forces would first find and fix the incoming enemy forces in the Covering Force Area. The Armored Cavalry Regiments in each Corps were superbly tailored for this Covering Force mission. Once this mission was completed the ACR's along with their supporting units would conduct a "battle hand-off" to the Mechanized and Armored
units in what is known as the "main battle area." Here as the name implies the main defensive attrition of enemy forces would occur. Utilizing the compartmentalized and urbanized terrain that characterizes the area of operations the mission of the MBA forces would be to wear down, delay, and if possible stop the enemy in time to allow reinforcing forces from the United States to arrive. Armed with the relatively new "air-land" doctrine planners expected to employ deep air strikes to inhibit and slow enemy follow on forces. Meanwhile fast moving M1 main battle tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting vehicles would be in a position to seize the initiative locally through attrition of enemy forces and counterattacking in sector.

As 1988 came to a close, U.S. forces in CENTAG were in a good position. Though outnumbered by their Warsaw Pact foes time and technology were working in their favor. The Air-Land warfighting doctrine was tailor made for the environment of NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG). U.S. forces were on the cutting edge of a long term modernization plan. During the past few years, new systems such as the M1A1 MBT and the M2/3 BFV had been completely fielded. Other smaller modernization programs had come along to compliment these "big ticket items." NATO's "layer cake" defense plan had successfully stopped the threat for nearly 40 years. The forces of 7th Army and Centag had been a major contributor to this peace.

As we have already seen the year 1989 brought about extraordinary changes for Europe and for the United States forces stationed there. As the year unfolded and political events transpired, a tidal wave of change would engulf U.S. forces stationed in the FRG.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989, budget pressures, and the unstoppable move toward glasnost on the part of the Soviet leadership started to impact the debate on how to use U.S. forces in the FRG. The two events that have had the greatest influence though are the unification of Germany and Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

Unification immediately lowered the looming threat posed by the East German NVA (National Peoples Army) from 6 Army Divisions to none. Additionally, Soviet forces stationed in the former territory of the DDR are operating under severe handicaps. Morale is at an all time low. "The German weekly Der Spiegel has reported that more than 200 soldiers deserted in only one week in November." In addition, the Bundeswehr has moved east and set up its new command Bundeswehr Command East. This German Army presence in and around Soviet garrisons gives the west immediate intelligence on Soviet activities and restricts their readiness further. U.S. forces no longer have to fret about what exactly is on the other side of the IGB and how prepared it is to fight. Unification has brought a quantifiable and visible decrease in the ability of the threat to attack CENTAG. Threat forces are restricted in their ability to train and conduct operations. Real time warning is up while threat readiness is down. These developments can only be welcomed by U.S. forces that are outnumbered and outgunned.

The other major factor affecting U.S. forces in the central region is operation Desert Shield/Storm. Based on political decisions directed last fall, an entire U.S. Corps (+) has been transferred from the FRG to Saudi Arabia. This movement of U.S. ground forces out of theater clearly signals the importance of operations in Saudi Arabia and the decline of the threat in
CENTAG. The exact listing of units transferred is provided in Table 2. Table 3 provides a listing of forces that remain as combat assets. Further complicating matters is that some of the units remaining in CENTAG now were originally scheduled for deactivation or transfer in the early part of this year. How operation Desert Storm will effect those plans is unknown now.

Based on these two recent events and the considerable dynamics of change occurring in Europe the old plans for Forward Defense should be modified. The time is now right for a new mission and operational plans to be placed into effect. Based on the outcome of conventional arms negotiations last Fall and the unknown of how long VII Corps assets will be out of country, three (3) different options will be outlined for evaluation. The plans discussed will be known simply as options 1, 2, and 3. These plans rest on the assumption that U.S. forces will remain in the FRG for this calendar year and will be configured as outlined in Table 3 (1 Corps).

Before launching into the discussion on these three options, the knowledge of what exactly the German Armed Forces have in the 5 new laender of the former DDR should be addressed briefly. As of January 1991 the Bundeswehr Command East consisted of 82,000 personnel. Ground forces within these numbers consisted of 2 Divisions or 6 fighting Brigades. These units are now undergoing transition training into the Bundeswehr structure. Major weapons systems integration will include the Leopard II Main Battle Tank during 1991. Infantry units will continue to operate with the BMF-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles during this calendar year. The Bundeswehr Command East does not fall under the NATO command structure.
What then is the mission of U.S. forces in the Central Region of NATO?

Anthony Cordesman in his work *NATO's Central Region Forces* defines it this way:

The primary objective of NATO's Central Region forces is to keep the peace: to deter a Warsaw Pact attack and to ensure that NATO can resist political pressure and military intimidation from the Soviet Union. Their secondary objective is to defend in an actual war: to conduct the forward defense of Germany, to limit any Soviet gains from military attack, and to limit escalation of a conflict to the lowest possible level that will allow NATO to defend.

Deterrence and actual defense are the main points that Cordesman drives home. Has this mission changed in the past year? A resounding no! In a Europe that is racked by political and economic instability, NATO's Central Region forces provide the elements for stability. United States ground forces then should be looked at with this test in mind: do they deter and contribute to the defense of the central region? This will be the test applied to measure the effectiveness of the three options provided.

The first option provided represents the most radical option for the current employment of United States ground forces in Germany. The current "layer cake" approach to NATO military deployment represents cold war strategy founded years ago. "A retention of the layer cake in these conditions would not only be militarily inefficient, but would also offer the wrong political signals." The time may now be right for the integration of NATO's national Corps level units into multi-national Corps. These Corps would be smaller than a traditional German or American Corps. They would be highly mobile units capable of responding across a wide defensive sector. This idea formally surfaced in July of 1990 at the NATO's London conference. This light multinational Corps structure would defend in sector but would also be agile and
lethal enough to rapidly move against the threat. In addition, Corps level Cavalry would serve in their traditional role as a guarding or advanced warning force.

Ideally, the 8th Infantry Division (m) could be chopped to III German Corps to the north. III German would chop an Armored Division to the U.S. Vth Corps. U.S. forces would operate in roughly the area formally allocated to the VII and V Corps respectively. Their mixed force of one armor and one infantry division are ideally suited for the compartmentalized terrain that is associated with this area of operations. Equipped with Leopard II, Abrams Main Battle Tanks, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles this small mobile Corps would have the ability to move laterally throughout sector and the lethality to conduct offensive operations in sector and beyond.

This is just one example of the realignment that could occur within the NATO Corps structure. What are the operational pluses and minuses of this multinational Corps plan? Listed below are some of the positive and negative points:

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<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
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<td>Keeps U.S. units in their current areas of operation.</td>
<td>Difficulty in providing logistics support in both peace and war.</td>
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<td>Lowers profile of U.S. forces through complete NATO integration.</td>
<td>Language difficulties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains control and further integrates German units in the NATO structure.</td>
<td>Doctrine and tactical inconsistency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improves interoperability.</td>
<td>Possible political unwillingness on the part of Congress to subornate U.S. forces to foreign control.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Does not immediate contribute to the mission of deterrence or defense because of the above listed problems.</td>
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Although not inclusive, the above points suggest there are serious obstacles to the immediate integration of U.S. forces. Because of the lack of the ability to integrate forces, this plan does not meet the tests of deterrence and the ability to defend in sector that Mr. Cordesman outlined.

The second option (2) is much more simple and offers ease in its ability to be immediately implemented. Option 2 is the consolidation of the old V and VII Corps sectors into one large Corps operating area. In this plan the 11th ACR along with the divisional Cavalry Squadrons would become the Corps advanced guard force. This highly mobile and agile force would have the assets to provide advance warning and the ability to inflict considerable pain on any attacking force. This reinforced Cavalry force would also have the ability to conduct limited offensive operations. The two main divisions in the Corps could best be described as linebackers. These mobile but heavy forces would have to move laterally throughout the battle area plugging holes in the line and counterattacking where possible. A great reliance on both external and internal air assets is required using this scenario. Air superiority within the battle area would be essential for success.

Does this operational framework meet the tests of deterrence and defense?

Listed below is a comparison:

**Positive**

Knowledge of terrain.

Common equipment, language, weapons, operating procedures.

Units are organizationally suited to fight on the terrain.

**Negative**

Delays multinational integration.

Long march forward to the battle area by one division.
Positive attributes (cont)        Negative (cont)

Ease of adapting to new plan on short notice.        Maintains visibility of U.S. forces in a crowd area.

Decline of threat from "democratic Czechoslovakia" increases the ability to concentrate forces in vicinity of the old IGB.

Maintains reliance on the "layer cake" approach.

Unit support structures are in place to provide a sound logistical base with the area of operations.

On balance this plan meets the test outlined by Mr. Cordesman. It keeps a significant and visible U.S. presence in the area opposite to the main Soviet force concentration in the laenders of Thuringia and Saxony. The goal of deterrence is met through visibility. The secondary goal of defense is achieved by placing a reinforced Armored Cavalry Regiment forward as a guard force with two modern and fast heavy divisions prepared to respond on a moments notice. The terrain favors the defender and the defender's organization gives him the ability to strike at the potential aggressor if the opportunity should arise.

The third option (3) examined is more complicated to implement but offers far more flexibility and offensive potential. This option would surrender the forward portions of the U.S. V and VII Corps areas of operations to the German II and III Corps. Additionally, the U.S. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment would become attached to the German III Corps performing its traditional role of advanced guard with other potential offensive missions. The U.S. Corps would be stationed immediately behind the German III Corps. This positioning would
offer the U.S. Corps the ability to respond on three main axis to assist NORTHAG, 3rd or 2d German Corps. Essentially the U.S. Corps could serve as a force to fill gaps created by threat units or as a counterattacking force to strike into the flanks of extended enemy columns. Under this plan 3 NATO Corps could be easily and readily influenced by this one U.S. Corps. Additionally, the 11th ACR would provide early warning and greatly attrite advance threat units as they arrived in the III German Corps area. The 11th ACR also has the ability once reconstituted to serve as a Corps level counterattacking force.

How does this plan meet our tests of deterrence and defense? Once again listed below are the positive and negative points of this plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
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<td>Flexible/offensive</td>
<td>Requires the movement of one division size element within the FRG.</td>
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<td>Consolidates U.S. forces for training and administration.</td>
<td>Assigns completely new areas of operations to several Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does &quot;more with less&quot;.</td>
<td>Maintains reliance on a modified &quot;layer cake&quot; approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creates a quasi-multinational unit by adding the 11th ACR to III German Corps.</td>
<td>Fails to move rapidly to multinational units.</td>
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<td>Lowers overall visibility of U.S. forces in the FRG.</td>
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Again with this option the tests of deterrence and defense are met. The United States remains visible and committed to NATO’s Central Region. An U.S. unit under German control "shows the flag" right in front of the 8th Guards Army. Defensively this option gives the commander a "hammer" to use against a threat invasion. It provides him with a great deal of flexibility and potential for counterattacking into the enemies' flanks. In sum this option promises the maximum return in the short term. However, the logistical obstacles
standing in the way of its immediate implementation are severe. The restation-
ing of U.S. forces presents complicated and sometimes thorny political problems that would have to be overcome. This in itself might be reason enough not to immediately adapt this plan.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Despite the monumental changes that have occurred in Europe during the past 24 months one constant remains: the threat. Even with the fall of the Soviet client states and the emergence of democracy in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union still remains forward deployed and fully combat ready. Recent events within the U.S.S.R. further drive home the unstable geopolitical situation that Europe is facing.

Inspite of these unknowns the fact remains that it would be extremely difficult for the Soviets to roll back the loss of their imperial clients. The unification treaty signed between the FRG and the U.S.S.R. and the recent treaty concluded on conventional arms reductions all represent rollbacks for Soviet power and greater warning time for NATO’s forces. Furthermore, in spite of the recent cooling of relations between Washington and Moscow, the political climate in the U.S. and Europe still demands a change in the operational strategies of the cold war era.

The three options presented in Chapter IV all represent a movement away from the outdated strategies of the cold war era. Reflecting the political movement to a smaller less visible American force, these three plans all rely on the one U.S. Corps currently in country to perform the mission of deterrence and defense in NATO’s Central Region. Although affected by Operation Desert Storm, the long term use of one Corps size element will integrate well into NATO’s defense structure.
For the immediate needs of NATO's Central Region option 2 is the best near term plan to implement. It offers the least amount of disruption to current NATO defensive doctrine and quickly readjusts defensive boundaries caused by the loss of one Corps sized element.

This is not a long term solution. The move away from the old "layer cake" approach to defending the west will have to be pursued. Moreover, the goal of multinational troop integration will bring great political as well as long term military benefits. For the moment adjusting current forces within known boundaries is the best solution to meet the problems of 1991.

One other point must be made before concluding. The two issues not addressed, due to lack of space, are the twin pillars of rapid reinforcement and air power. NATO's Central Region will rely more than ever on the control of the air by friendly air forces. Without this element, the thinner line of units that are called for could be steam rolled by an invading eastern horde. Secondly, the reinforcement of current NATO forces from CONUS remains critical. The sealift of forces to Operation Desert Storm illustrates that this system will not meet established reinforcement goals that were previously set. Despite the expected gain in warning time, rapid reinforcement remains important to both deterrence and defense in the central region.

Today NATO's Central Region stands at a crossroads in history. The strength, character, and intelligence of the alliance will be tested. The challenge for operational leaders is clear; to lead the way in finding the solutions that confront the alliance today.
NOTES

Chapter II


Chapter III


(11) Ibid., p. 598.

(12) Ibid., p. 603.

(13) Ibid., p. 606.

(14) Ibid., p. 610.

(15) Ibid., p. 611.

(16) Ibid., p. 617.


Chapter IV


(20) Ibid., p. 337.

(21) Ibid., p. 337.

(22) Ibid., p. 325.


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"German Views on Troop Withdrawal From German." Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2 November 1990, p. 3.


Figure 1
European Political Boundaries

Source: Mastering Harvard Graphics
Figure 2
Germany – 1991 Boundaries

Source: Mastering Harvard Graphics
(Alameda:1990), p. 425
Figure 3
Pre 1991 Corps Boundaries

Figure 4
Defensive Deployment Option 1

Source: Jones, David A., Major, U.S.A.
Figure 5
Defensive Deployment Option 2

Source: Jones, David A., Major, U.S.A.
Figure 6
Defensive Deployment Option 3

Source: Jones, David A., Major, U.S.A.
Figure 7
The THREAT

Source: NATO'S CENTRAL REGION FORCES
### Table 1
U.S. Army Combat Units Central Region - 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Designation and Type</th>
<th>Location in FRG</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th U.S. Army</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Forces Detachment</td>
<td>Bad Tolz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Brigade</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D AD (FWD)</td>
<td>Garstedt</td>
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<td>59th FA BDE</td>
<td>Schwabisch-Gmund</td>
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<td>VTH Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd AD</td>
<td>Frankfurt-am-Main</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th ID(m)</td>
<td>Bad Kreuznach</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>Fulda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vth Corps Artillery</td>
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<td>Babenhausen</td>
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<td>42d FA BDE</td>
<td>Gissen</td>
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<td>12th CBT AVN GRP</td>
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<td>130th EN BDE</td>
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Source: NATO'S CENTRAL REGION
# Table 1 (Continued)
## U.S. Army Combat Units Central Region – 1989

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<th>Unit Designation and Type</th>
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<td>Ansbach</td>
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<td>Wursburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st ID (Fwd)</td>
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<td>2d ACR</td>
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<td>VIith Corps Artillery</td>
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<td>11th CBT AVN GRP</td>
<td>Schwabisch Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th ENB BDE</td>
<td>Kornwestheim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [NATO's Central Region](#)  
Table 2
USAREUR units deployed to Saudi Arabia

VII Corps Headquarters
1st Armored Division
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment
2d Corps Support Command
3rd Armored Division
2d Armored Division(Fwd)

Source: Roth, Margaret. The Army Times.
Table 3
Remaining USAREUR Combat Units

V Corps Headquarters
8th Infantry Division (M)
3d Infantry Division (M)
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
1st Infantry Division (Fwd)

Source: Jones, David A., Major, USA