SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA: 
PARADOX AND DILEMMA

by

Robert M. Newnam
Major, U.S. Air Force

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

21 June 1991

Paper directed by Colonel T.L. Gatchel
Chairman, Department of Operations
SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA: PARADOX AND DILEMMA (UNCLASSIFIED)

MAJOR ROBERT M. NEWNAM, USAF

Current Security Assistance efforts in Latin America are hampered by a diffusion of effort caused by vague, often conflicting national policy. The operational result at the country level is a set of paradoxical situations: The conflicting demands of stability and democracy, subordination of regional concerns to country issues, the problem of nation building and military instruments, and an artificial separation of military and economic aid. This paper offers, as a partial solution, the suggestion of a rudimentary Security Assistance Decision Model to help refine and articulate concrete and attainable goals. This model would address specific questions from the country team and allow amplification by each succeeding command layer. The final document would provide a working tool at every level for operational implementation of broad policy goals.
Abstract of
SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA: PARADOX AND DILEMMA

Current Security Assistance efforts in Latin America are hampered by a diffusion of effort caused by vague, often conflicting national policy. The operational result at the country level is a set of paradoxical situations: The conflicting demands of stability and democracy, subordination of regional concerns to country issues, the problem of nation building and military instruments, and an artificial separation of military and economic aid. This paper offers, as a partial solution, the suggestion of a rudimentary Security Assistance Decision Model to help refine and articulate concrete and attainable military goals. This model would address specific questions from the country team and allow amplification by each succeeding command layer. The final document would provide a working tool at every level for operational implementation of broad policy goals.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II SECURITY ASSISTANCE DEFINED</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III DILEMMAS AND PARADOXES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicting Goals and Stability and Democracy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordination of Regional Concerns</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Building by Military Assistance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial Separation of Military from Economic Aid</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV SUGGESTION OF A MODEL TO FOCUS OPERATIONAL GOALS AND STRATEGY</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V CONCEPTUAL OBSTACLES TO MODEL IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State vs. Defense Turf Battles</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive vs. Legislative Control</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI CONCLUSION</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security Assistance programs, as foreign policy tools, have been extensively used by U.S. presidents since the inception of the Truman Doctrine. Individual Third World national programs have been nationally defined via broad brush East/West definitions of conflict. Consequently, operational direction for country specific situations has been left to individual ambassadors and theater commanders to define within wide latitudes. This latitude has made for policy paradox and lack of a pragmatic mechanism to unify regional Security Assistance into military campaign plans. This lack of focus has resulted in the frustration of Security Assistance efforts to simultaneously satisfy Ambassadors and Theater Commanders, obey congressional mandates, and satisfy presidential policy guidance.

This paper will describe the structural framework of Security Assistance in general, focus on its operational impacts in Latin America, articulate paradoxes and discontinuities of current policy and strategy as translated to operational directive in the Southern Command, and finally recommend a skeletal model for alleviating a large portion of the operational problems encountered at the Theater and country team level.
CHAPTER II

SECURITY ASSISTANCE DEFINED

Security Assistance is the suite of aid efforts extended by the United States to stabilize third world governments, counter terrorism, promote democracy, enhance regional stability, or maintain an overseas presence (1). The mechanism for extending this aid is outlined in the Foreign Assistance Act. The act specifically provides for economic, agricultural, medical, disaster relief, and security and defense packages at the request of friendly countries. The law designates the Secretary of State as the administrator of such programs and mandates cooperation with all DOD and civilian agencies involved (2).

The major military programs addressed are:

(1) Military Assistance Program (MAP)--authorizes the president to extend loans or grants for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and training or support packages.

(2) International Military Education and Training (IMET)-- to foster professionalization of friendly military organizations.

(3) Antiterrorism Assistance--provides aid to train police and intelligence personnel to control and deter terrorism.

At the country team level, Security Assistance in Latin America is a subset of military action that exhibits a confluence of policy/strategy/operational art/and tactical action; any given military action can have direct national policy consequences for economics, security policy, and political stability of alliances (3). To frame the
discussion, therefore, it is essential to start at the National Security strategy of the United States and trace the Security Assistance definitions and policy goals from the National Command Authorities, the implementation of this policy into strategy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Theater Commander in Southern Command, the operational goals in Latin America, and finally how the congressional oversight efforts in Security Assistance generally have modified the possible options.

President Bush, in the National Security Statement for 1990, outlined three policy goals of Security Assistance in the 90's: maintain stable regional balances, promote the growth of free and democratic political institutions, and aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercing, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking (4). He further subdivided the specific threats to the Latin American Third World to include the spread of high technology armaments and instability generated by poverty, social injustice, religious, and ethnic tensions. El Salvador is the only country singled out for individual mention at the national level. He declares support for the Salvadoran government's military and political efforts to defeat communism and articulates support for apolitical and professional militaries (5).

Secretary of State Baker, as the official charged by public law to oversee and unify the Security Assistance efforts, then modifies the policy statements found in the
National Security Directives. Secretary Baker defines the Security Assistance mission as action which seeks to consolidate the democratic revolution transforming the world today (6). As Department of Defense policy guidance for implementation Secretary Cheney then explicitly links Security Assistance to Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). LIC, says the Secretary, is the most likely form of future intervention to center threats to United States Security in Latin America (7). The LIC strategy explicitly addresses economic, security, civic action, and humanitarian assistance as legitimate spheres of influence for military operations to aid allies and maintain stable regimes in our southern flank (8). Under Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz calls Security Assistance a form of "military diplomacy" used to spread the U.S. ethos of democracy and professionally subordinates militaries (9).

From these broad National Command Authority policy statements Joint Chiefs guidance (JCS pub 3-07) for Security Assistance is articulated largely as insurgency/counterinsurgency efforts; and these efforts are generalized along regional themes via the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum. JCS guidance stresses the overriding importance of understanding the political, economic, and social causes of each specific assistance effort. Guidance focuses on insurgency/counterinsurgency elements to combat latent or incipient movements, guerrilla, and conventional phases of Security Assistance efforts. However, the subordinate role
of military action to the overall diplomatic efforts is also stressed. Explicitly, the role of DOD forces is to insure security of the supported regime to allow breathing space and time for reforms aimed at defusing the insurgency. Structural reform acts to alleviate the root economic, social, and military causes that energize the insurgent movements. The Joint Chiefs guidance makes passing mention of a crucial problem: there is no military entity to formally unify the country and regional efforts at the operational level to integrate the diplomatic, economic, and civil support processes with a realistic match of military means available (10). At the National Level, the Security Council Board for Low Intensity Conflict coordinates overall policy but no clear military command lines are designated (11). However, Congressional oversight initiatives, need to be addressed before theater issues are examined.

Secretary Baker, in congressional testimony, articulated the singlemost restricting congressional restraint issue: earmarked funding (12). Congress, in its efforts to maintain influence in foreign affairs, earmarks most Security Assistance funds. In the 1990 administration budget request the congress fixed 92% of the $5.02 billion foreign military finance appropriation (13). The vast majority of this aid was earmarked for Israel and Egypt. The undirected funds left $396 million remaining to cover $659 million in Foreign military assistance needs of current FMS, MAP, and IMET programs. The net result was a 30% drop in Latin American
programmatic funding. As the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee admonished Secretary Baker in committee hearing: "We've got to look at what's working, what's not working, and set some priorities...", he further pointed out that in constituent polls the foreign assistance funding was consistently questioned by the electorate as to propriety and cost effectiveness (14). The results of congressional efforts at control is continual committee examination of appropriations requests on a country by country basis with no real appreciation of realizable goals or possibilities beyond broad generalities. This congressional skepticism and funding instability currently impacts the operational planning and execution of CINCSOUTH's day to day business.

CINCSOUTH outlines the Southern Command theater operational goals as:

(1) Promote U.S. policy and contribute to the defense of North America.

(2) Foster stable, democratic, self-reliant governments in the region.

(3) Defeat/thwart destabilizing insurgencies (15).

To accomplish SOUTHCOM strategy and operational guidance the Security Assistance Officers (SAO) are directed to develop programs that support the CINC's strategy and regional plans. The SAO's are challenged to define near, mid, and long term goals and capabilities required; and to adjust priorities and requirements to fit the evolving situations.

At the operational level the theater plan and the country implementation are presented with broad national
goals to: safeguard and spread democracy concurrently with the practical demand to protect governments that repress democracy within their borders; SAO's are directed to enhance regional stability at the same time they train, equip, and streamline national military machines that include longstanding disputes with their neighbors as major concerns; they are ordered to "professionalize" military elites that traditionally (and violently) object to any incursion of their autonomy by civilian governments; and they are asked to do all this via long term strategy tied to short term congressional review and fluctuating funding limitations. These conflicting demands present dilemmas and paradoxes in Latin America.
CHAPTER III

DILEMMAS AND PARADOXES OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Vague policy statements combined with inconsistencies at the operational level present both the operational military commander and the SAO with a set of paradoxical situations.

Conflicting Goals of Stability and Democracy.

Security Assistance efforts are often launched in countries that are in the throes of structural or cultural crisis brought on by the efforts of entrenched elites or military efforts to repress social or economic changes (16). These governments typically request U.S. aid to halt the further erosion of traditional power bases—they do not request aid to restructure their society. U.S. Security Assistance forces are enjoined by LIC doctrine to engage in "nation building." Consequently, there often is no intersection between U.S. goals and the goals of the host nation other than immediate stabilization of the regime's power in place through military assistance. This results in many cases in "their" war becoming identified as a U.S. conflict as we strive to press our concept of goals and doctrine on an unwilling client. When presented with a volatile military situation the SAO's often opt simply to escalate visible U.S. support to meet escalating local conflict, with no long term vision of consequences or end game strategy beyond sustainment of an ever larger,
dependent, and more complex force structure for a Third World military machine (17). The results at the operational level for U.S. military commanders are unfocused efforts that react to host nation definition of crisis rather than constructing coherent long term regional strategy. This is not a failure of U.S. military assistance. It is a failure of policy to define realistic, prioritized, and implementable goals in unstable regions. When pressed for reform, under SAO threat of military aid cut off, the common reactions of host nation ruling elites are to adopt cosmetic reform that simulates democratic process or strike pacts among ruling factions to insure democratic agendas that are limited; and that effective veto powers over substantive structural reform are maintained.

Subordination of Regional Concerns to Single Country Issues.

Goldwater-Nichols DOD reform Act reinforces the statutory basis for regional military responsibility vested in the person of the Theater Commander in Chief of the Unified Command (18). The CINC's are regionally divided by the Joint Chief's Unified Command Plan. In Latin America the Southern Command is charged with prosecuting a coherent set of goals and campaign plans to ensure regional emphasis and to: orchestrate individual efforts in the constituent countries, defend U.S. interests, and wage war as required to insure defense of the nation (19). Yet two major
discontinuities immediately surface at the practical operational level: there is no direct chain of command that spans from the CINC down to country team Security Assistance Officers (20); and individual country funding is tied to annually changing budget resolutions and earmarking levels (21).

Public law vests the administration of Security Assistance in the Office of the Secretary of State. This translates to independent ambassadorial control of each separate SAO (22). The JCS memorandum directs the SAO and Theater CINC to coordinate their efforts. However, the coordination is often ad hoc and crisis driven rather than part of an orchestrated plan. Regional operational concerns of asymmetrical arms build-up or military regeneration of one nation over another are largely relegated to adjunct considerations, with the major voice to the practical implementation of country programs driven by ambassadorial prerogative and earmarked congressional funding (23). The country funding is often defined by crisis requirements, dictated by limited annual funding appropriations, and ultimately decided by perceptions of congressional committee members on the status of the political issue of the moment in the Third World (24).

These statutory and funding concerns distill down, at best, to a lack of control by the regional commander of theater assets assigned and limited voice in a prioritization based on coherent strategy. At their worst the relationships
are typified by the situation between CINCSOUTH and the Ambassador to El Salvador in the early 80's. Because of a disagreement between the two officials over the operational conduct of the effort in El Salvador, the Ambassador effectively cut off the CINC's access to the country team by denying country clearance to the commander. The CINC was isolated from direct operational control in a country that was both volatile internally, and held potential for expanded conflict with theater wide consequences (25). The person in the middle was the Chief of the SAO. As a military officer he is directed by JCS regulation to coordinate his effort with the region war fighting CINC to insure a coherent strategy pursuit; yet he can be officially forbidden by his legal superior (the Ambassador) from cooperating.

This vague chain of association contributes to fragmentation of effort and lack of coherence on a regional basis. The CINC is the official responsible to the NCA for combined arms action in his area of responsibility, yet arm's build-up and end game strategy in any specific country may be beyond his ability to influence.

Nation Building by Military Assistance.

By its nature a Security Assistance effort in Latin America is usually mounted to shore up a faltering power structure (26). Often the regime is faltering (as in El Salvador) because of repression of large segments of its society, economic collapse, or capture of a civil conflict by
an ideological outside party. The collapse is usually accompanied by graft and corruption in government, military opposition to change in an effort to preserve control, and a catastrophic deterioration of infrastructure. Low Intensity Conflict doctrine attempts to address these constituent issues under the rubric of "national building."

In a LIC situation the U.S. forces involved are urged (both by policy and doctrine) to address the root causes of the insurgency via stabilization of the situation, training of host nation troops and security forces, establishment of an intelligence function, civic action to win hearts and minds, and professionalization of the host military to nurture subordination to civil authority (27). These theoretical demands often exceed the reality of the situation.

In immediate stabilization of the insurgency, whether by the injection of U.S. combat power or the training and equipping of the in place forces, the actions necessary are largely firepower and large unit action (28). Paradoxically, this large unit action needed for stabilization must then be changed to the small unit, counterguerrilla tactics required for long term change (29). This is a difficult transition to force upon host nation armed forces. A relatively massive influx of firepower (ground or air) often convinces the supported nation military commanders to put faith in firepower. Where LIC focuses on the follow up measures required to change the internal situation structurally, the
hosts view the goal from the opposite perception: they are engaged in eliminating an immediate military threat and to reimpose the control they require to maintain a static system (30). We fight a limited focused action for a narrow goal; the host nation forces, conversely, are fighting an unlimited war to preserve their system.

The training of troops and local security forces in control of the support base of the insurgency is key to LIC doctrine (31). The civilian support base of the insurgency provides logistical resources, recruits, intelligence, and refuge. Insurgencies require this broad support base as a mechanism to prosecute the political aims of the movement (32). The counterinsurgency, if it is to defuse the support base, requires substantive systemic change to alleviate the social, economic, or structural reason for discontent. The government, in short, must present a more attractive option than the insurgent's agenda of reform (33).

In operational practice, LIC emphasizes the necessity of population control to isolate insurgents from their support base. The host nation forces implementing the nation building demands of the Security Assistance advisors, however, are the very forces that are mistrusted, and often hated, by the society in question. The Latin American populations tend to view military forces as tools of repression for ruling elites rather than altruistic nation builders. The net result is often an identification of U.S.
forces with the system of repression extant in the host
nation (34).

Subordination of military hierarchies to civil authority
is not embedded in the cultural ethics of most Latin
countries. The military councils typically hold themselves
above the civil authorities and carefully guard their
autonomy and de facto veto authority (35). U.S. pressure to
professionalize (subordinate and depoliticize) Latin
militaries is not often successful (36). When directly
pressured via funding cuts Latin military leaders do
sometimes refrain from direct overt intervention. Yet as a
Salvadoran officer stated (on condition of anonymity)--"U.S.
attempts to force your culture on our officers will not work.
If I operated in my country as you teach me to I would either
be eliminated or exiled" (37).

Artificial Separation of Military From Economic Aid.

Public law for execution of Economic Support Fund
expenditure and administration mandates that economic support
funds may only be used for economic and infrastructure
purposes and may not be expended for military or paramilitary
projects (38). Agency for International Development (AID)
funding is administered by U.S. State Department officials
until release to the host nation economic agencies. Once
transferred, the funds are then spent on national priorities
determined by the local government (39). From U.S.
perspectives the separation between the military and civilian
funding is a sharp and decisive demarcation line; in practice the line is diffuse in most cases and fictional in some.

In a society that is dominated by the requirement to maintain control, as is the case in most Latin American countries, the only effective AID disbursing entity is the military, as an adjunct to LIC nation building efforts. This affords military access to economic assistance dollars (40). The result is often diversion of economic AID monies to fulfill military infrastructure requirements. Defocused efforts and graft exacerbate military control of the in country assistance effort. Additionally, the graft and corruption extant in the funding channels creates the perception of unworthiness in the U.S. Congress that translates to reduced funding, and in turn results in efforts to control and earmark dollars.
CHAPTER IV

SUGGESTION OF A MODEL TO FOCUS OPERATIONAL GOALS AND STRATEGY

The foregoing discussion of problems with current implementation of Security Assistance in Latin America is not intended to postulate that U.S. efforts are foreordained failures. There are legitimate goals and aims for operational commanders in areas that encompass Third World instability and insurgency. The critical U.S. failure is the definition of goals in terms of broad and diffuse abstractions that are often in conflict. The United States Southern Command is still charged with overriding specific military requirements to: safeguard lines of communication, preserve access to future raw materials, maintain regional balances to preserve stability in his area of responsibility, support regional alliances and regimes as specified by NCA, and respond to threats to U.S. property and citizens (41). These relatively clear cut goals, however, are superimposed upon diffuse Security Assistance concepts of democracy and stability, professionalizing Latin military ethos, and supporting congressionally mandated funding allocations in a system with no clear lines of authority. The key problem is how to focus the individual country SAO's to contribute to a coherent regional game plan that addresses realizable ends from the means available. This is crucial in programs that can, by tactical action, have far reaching policy
reverberations. One possible avenue to gain a measure of focus and control is to investigate an area that exhibits surprising commonality with Security Assistance—Central Intelligence Agency covert operations, and the process that the NCA uses to justify action to a critical congressional audience.

Covert action, or secret political intervention, is intrusion into the affairs of a foreign government that, by its nature, entails major policy results from tactical or operational actions. Because of the possible repercussions to policy, the NCA is required by statute to render a Presidential Finding to the Congressional Oversight Committees for Intelligence for each planned covert operation. This requirement forces policy to be articulated in terms of budget demands, specific goals, size of the action intended and the scope of operations, lines of authority, time required for results, and criteria of success. The rendering of a finding is the first step in the implementation of any covert operation and precedes action.

There are clear parallels between a CIA Covert Operational Finding and the requirements for a coherent Security Assistance effort. Both represent operational level action that results in policy and strategy ramification and therefore require NCA oversight. Both require clear goals to effect change, and need to be articulated in terms of what is possible within the constraints posed by the situation and country in question. Both require explicit funding
authorization levels to implement. Both operations transcend normal command lines of authority and require special consideration to be effective. Finally both types of action have the possibility to escalate beyond the bounds of the desired level of support if not guided by clear and measurable success criteria. Given these common characteristics there remains the task of articulating a model to implement the concept within the legal framework that exists for Security Assistance.

A frequent lament from Security Assistance personnel is that they operate on a practical level with no guidance (42). They lack a clear vision of the ends toward which they work. The Model we will strive for, called from now on for our purpose the Security Assistance Decision Model (SADM), should strive to maintain focus as a practical working document at each coordination level. Each level should add to, but subtract from, the preceding level. This additive approach would insure that dissenting opinions are aired.

Through the Goldwater-Nichols DOD reorganization the Unified Commander is given broad power within his area of responsibility (43). As the war fighting CINC responsible, he is charged with maintaining control over all assets in his purview. This statutory mandate opens command avenues both up to the NCA (through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and down to his lowest echelons. As a military authority the SAO should enjoy uninhibited access to the warfighting CINC responsible for his country.
As with a Presidential Covert Action Finding the SADM should be amenable to initiation at any level. At the lowest level, the SAO could react to a perceived policy inconsistency, a changing situation, or a major realignment of in-country reality. CINCSOUTH might react to a regional shift of power, a new threat to stability that requires potential Security Assistance funding to counter, or a shift in strategy driven by emerging balances external to his AOR. The SADM would generate a national level document that would serve a number of uses at every level. The JCS could use it as a vehicle to coordinate regional requirements and exercise oversight mandates, as well as a method to voice military concerns to the NCA over goals, funding, and potential policy dilemmas.

For any level of initiation the routing of the SADM should remain the same; from the country team to the NCA. A ground-up route would insure that valid concerns at the implementation levels are not coordinated out of existence. A process that starts at the bottom and allows each succeeding command level to add on but not subtract from the substance of the document would serve to articulate local issues, allow for dissenting opinions and interpretations (i.e. military vs. state department), and give each higher echelon the perspectives from the field. The final document would allow the Theater CINC, JCS, and NCA a window on how policy/strategy are operationalized, allow net assessments of
effectiveness, and a check on how policy is being implemented.

The SADM should explicitly and specifically address:

1. What are the specific vital U.S. interests at stake in the country?

2. What concrete operational goals are being pursued to further U.S. interests?

3. What level of support (FMS, IMET, etc.) is required to support the stated goals?

4. How long will support be required?

5. What are the measures of success used to evaluate the effectiveness of support programs?

6. What are the theater relationships and how are they affected by the support?

7. Are there conflicting tradeoffs in policy or strategy?

8. What are the specific limits to military action in the support effort?

Once accomplished, the compiled document would give each command level: a positive articulation of the operational problems of each Assistance effort; the goals and policy/strategy match in a coherent and country specific context, yet with Theater perspectives voiced; and an assessment that would enable the NCA to prioritize by region and country for funding and Congressional oversight issues.
CHAPTER V

CONCEPTUAL OBSTACLES TO MODEL IMPLEMENTATION

State vs. Defense Turf Battles.

Implementation of a working document designed to articulate goals and elevate specific problems across command lines and prerogatives is likely to be resisted on principle. Resistance to implementation of the SADM may result from one of the same causes as the diffusion of effort--parallel and overlapping command lines in Defense and State. The State Department, by law, views security assistance as a total effort integrating economic, political, and military action. Yet the Defense Department often finds itself responsible for specific military action, administration of finite resources, and maintenance of regional stability in the context of amorphous goals. The requirement, demanded by the SADM, to clearly articulate goals and to match ends with means (from a U.S. perspective) would force an in-country assessment, under ambassadorial signature, that would be applicable in both State and Defense command chains. The document would require the country team to formally address general policy guidance and arrive at defensible concrete objectives and measures of success. The SADM would allow both the ambassadorial and CINC views to be explicitly aired and evaluated and differing interpretations of NCA guidance would then be aired in open forum for clarification.
Executive vs. Legislative Control.

Legislative oversight of foreign policy has always been regarded by the executive as an overstepping of authority. The implementation of an operationally oriented document that addresses shortfalls in military policy or strategy articulation/implementation may be resisted by both the State and Defense Departments as a potential weapon that the congressional funding committees will use as a lever to extend prioritization of country efforts by more extensive earmarking and funding restrictions. Care would need to be exercised in both the implementation and use of a working document such as a SADM to insure that its integrity as a management tool for operational control of politically sensitive military action is retained. As a working document, the SADM would remain under the purview of the military chain of command, much as an operational campaign plan. Its use must remain clear: as a mechanism for military leaders and managers to oversee operations; not as a criticism of policy.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Security assistance efforts are the results of general U.S. policy goals in the Third World. The policy goals are often very broadly stated at all command levels and result in specific operational decisions being relegated down to the SAO's of the individual country teams. The SAO is often presented with a set of dilemmas that are unresolved and must be prioritized at the country team level for practical implementation.

The broad goals of stability and democracy, while linked in U.S. standards of ethics are mutually exclusive concepts in many Third World areas. Traditional powerful elites in some countries do not see deep division of capital and human rights as subjects of concern. The broad goals and individual country team implementation requires the theater CINC's to subordinate regional long range strategies to short term crisis management that reacts to country rather than regional concerns.

Nation building by military forces also runs into difficulty. Use of military machines geared to population control and overseen by corrupt officials affords insurgency groups to both take advantage of perceptions of unworthiness in the host country forces, and identify U.S. forces with the local regime. The perception is fostered by the tendency to use the military as mechanism to distribute USAID funding.
This distribution allows military access to civilian economic monies and often results in well oiled graft machinery.

The problems inherent in the Security Assistance System stem primarily from the efforts to implement broad statements of values (democracy, stability) into concrete country programs with no unifying regional campaign plan. The SADM would necessarily address eight specific questions:

(1) What are the vital U.S. interests at stake in the country?

(2) What concrete operational goals are being pursued to further U.S. interests?

(3) What level of support is required to meet the goals?

(4) How long will support be required?

(5) What are the measures of success to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs?

(6) What are the theater relationships and how are they affected?

(7) Are there conflicting trade off's in policy or strategy?

(8) What are the limits on military action?

This document would give commanders and managers the tool required to balance the reality of individual country situations to allow operational decisions made at the SAO level to interweave into a coherent theater wide campaign strategy to further U.S. interests in an emerging Third World.
NOTES

Chapter II


2 Ibid., p. 59.


5 Ibid., p. 12.


8 Ibid., p. 42.


11 Ibid., p. 24.

12 Baker, p. 68.

13 Ibid., p. 67.


Chapter III


18 USSOUTHCOM, p. 1.

19 Ibid.

20 Bacevich, et al., p. 11.

21 Cheney, p. 7.

22 Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict, p. 29.

23 Bacevich, et al., p. 10.


25 Bacevich, et al., p. 11.


27 Waghelstein, p. 49.


29 Ibid., p. 25.


31 Waghelstein, p. 53.

32 Joaquin Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution in El Salvador." Foreign Policy, Spring 1989, p. 120.

33 Waghelstein, p. 49.


35 Hagopian, p. 147.

37 Private telephone conversation with a field grade Salvadoran Army Officer, November 1990.

38 Gimlin, p. 468.

39 Bacevich, et al., p. 45.

40 Felton, p. 1418.

Chapter IV


42 Bacevich, et al., p. 19.

43 USSOUTHCOM, p. 1.


Lowenthal, Abraham F. "Rediscovering Latin America." Foreign Affairs, Fall 1990, pp. 22-46.


Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict.


