Special Forces Doctrine for Counternarcotics Operations

A Monograph by
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ABSTRACT

SPECIAL FORCES DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS by
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This monograph addresses the suitability of Special Forces doctrine for their primary wartime missions of Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and Foreign Internal Defense when considered for application in counternarcotics operations. This study is motivated by the continuing threat to national security presented by illegal drug trafficking and the increased role of the United States military requested by the people of the United States through their congressional representatives. A significant part of the military contribution to the so-called "war on drugs" is being provided by U. S. Army Special Forces.

This study begins with an analysis of the National Drug Control Strategy to derive what the tactical counternarcotics missions for Special Forces could be. The missions are related in terms of the primary wartime mission described by current U. S. Army doctrine for Special Forces Operations. The Army Counternarcotics Plan is analyzed to determine the constraints and restraints imposed on the mission by public laws and DoD resources. The capabilities for each mission are analyzed and then compared to an application in counternarcotics operations. The analysis of each mission evaluates how each mission recognizes political and diplomatic sensitivities, facilitates interagency activities in an affected country, and balances "security of operations" with the operational tenet of synchronization.

The study concludes that the doctrine for each mission is suitable when applied to counternarcotics operations only if law enforcement is not the purpose for interdiction. The study finds that each mission can accomplish the tasks required for counternarcotics operations, except when called upon to perform law enforcement duties. The study finds the application of Special Forces in a Foreign Internal Defense mission to be most suitable for defeating drug trafficking when it is viewed as an insurgency.
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INTRODUCTION

"Traffic in illicit drugs imposes exceptional costs on the economy of the United States, undermines our national values and institutions, and is directly responsible for the destruction and loss of many American lives. The international traffic in illicit drugs constitutes a major threat to our national security and to the security of other nations." [1]

Drug trafficking threatens national security. Accordingly, the President and the Congress of the United States of America have given a clear mandate to the Department of Defense to counter the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. The National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) describes how the United States of America will defend against its epidemic of illegal drug use. Specific departmental and agency guidelines for executing the strategy have evolved progressively. The National Command Authority (NCA) directed the Specified and Unified Commanders to prepare plans supporting the President's National Drug Control Strategy [2]. Several elements of these plans have reached the implementation stage. The Army Counternarcotics Plan [3] articulates the Army's support for the National Drug Control Strategy.

Numerous Commanders-in-Chief (CINC)s have designated US Army Special Forces Operational Detachments (see Appendix I, SFOD Organizational Chart) to fulfill important tasks supporting the interdiction of drugs flowing into the United States. The most significant plans for employment of Special Forces currently appear within the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Specifically, the Andean Ridge region is a focal point for combatting cocaine production and smuggling. [4] In compliance with the Army Plan, United States Army Special Forces must now organize to conduct counternarcotics operations.
There are three critical premises for this study of Special Forces Operational Detachments conducting counternarcotics operations. The first premise asserts that we will use Special Forces Detachments as long as the NCA's assessment of drug trafficking determines that a threat exists to the national security of the United States. This could change for several reasons. For example, future domestic political decisions could shift the United States' policy towards tolerance. A greater, more immediate military threat could present itself requiring a diversion of military resources from counterdrug operations. Optimally, drug trafficking will no longer threaten national security because the NDCS has succeeded. The second premise requires that employment of Special Forces Operational Detachments be part of a combined, multi-agency (Department of Defense and other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies) and conventional force supporting the National Drug Control Strategy. Special Forces alone are not capable of fulfilling all the support roles required for the Army. The third and final premise declares that Special Forces Operational Detachments must deploy outside the borders of the United States as described by public law. Counternarcotics Operations are inextricably woven into the business of law enforcement, so commanders must take great care to prevent Army elements from acting as law enforcement agents.

With these premises in mind, this study will examine the National Drug Control Strategy to discern what are the tactical counternarcotics missions for Special Forces units. The missions will be matched with a primary wartime mission of Special Forces which will establish a basis for comparing existing doctrine with requirements for counternarcotics operations. Then this study will examine whether current doctrine for
Special Forces operations is suitable for executing the tasks required in counternarcotics operations. Specifically, it will analyze the Army Special Operations Force's doctrine for the conduct of the Special Reconnaissance, the Foreign Internal Defense, and the Direct Action missions. These Special Forces wartime missions appear to have the most utility in counternarcotics operations for intelligence, interdiction and security assistance.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES**

(Fig 1-8, p1-22, FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations)

- Recognize Political Implications
- Facilitate Interagency Activities
- Engage a Threat Discriminately
- Consider Long-Term Effects
- Ensure Legitimacy & Credibility of SO Activities
- Anticipate & Control Psychological Effects
- Apply Capabilities Indirectly
- Develop Multiple Options
- Ensure Long-Term Sustainment
- Provide Sufficient Intelligence
- Balance Security and Synchronization

Fig. 1

Criteria derived from three key Special Operations Imperatives will be used to evaluate the doctrines for each mission (See Figure 1). I will examine the following questions. Does the doctrine recognize the political implications for counternarcotics operations described by United States Public Law (Posse Comitatus Act Title 18 United States Code 1385) and host nation diplomatic and political sensitivities? Does the doctrine facilitate interagency activities directed by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (The Drug Czar) and the Department of State activities in each affected country? Finally, does the doctrine balance "security of operations" with the operational tenet of synchronization? The conclusions drawn from answering these three questions will illustrate the
Implications for Special Forces Operational Detachments preparing to conduct counternarcotics operations both now and in the future.

**PART ONE:**
REQUIREMENTS OF THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

"...an issue of this sort concerns the extent to which force should be used, either by the police or by the Army." 

President George Bush first articulated the National Drug Control Strategy in September 1989. This strategy mobilized all the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the United States government to combat the threat to national security imposed by illegal drug use and trafficking. The task of coordinating the federal departments and agencies with drug reduction missions is the responsibility of the "Drug Czar" or Office of National Drug Control Policy.

The implementation of the NDCS is expensive. A budget authority of $10.6 billion for Fiscal Year 1991 represented an increase of 68% from 1989. In an era of constrained resources for government programs, the use of existing military resources appears prudent. Congress has carefully given permission to use military resources. In this regard, intense and continuous Congressional investigation of the NDCS reveals a national desire to balance two critical factors, what potential exists for usurpation by the military of law enforcement duties and what are the potential adverse effects on combat readiness?

Specific guidance on assistance given to civilian law enforcement agencies prohibits the Army from directly participating in law enforcement activities. Army personnel or equipment can only provide
operational support to civilian law enforcement agencies upon approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Understanding the Public Laws derived from the Posse Comitatus Act, Section 1385 of Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) United States Code, is crucial for any Army element's implementation of a counternarcotics program. The Act is short and concise:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

Congress created this Act in 1878 in reaction to the sometimes excessive use of military force during the occupation of the South's five military districts after the Civil War. Recognition of the separation of the United States Air Force from the Army and extension of the law to Alaska are the Act's only two modifications. The United States Navy, through SECNAVINST 5820.7, recognizes that Posse Comitatus also applies to its operations and those of the Marine Corps as well. SECNAVINST 5820.7 allows no Naval (or Marine Corps) involvement in civilian law enforcement actions whatsoever, without authorization from the Secretary of the Navy.

The Congress again clarified the military's relationship and responsibilities with civil law enforcement agencies in Section 908 of Public Law 97-86. Section 908 added a new chapter, Chapter 18 "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," to Part One (Organization and General Military Powers) to Subtitle A (General Military Law) to Title 10 United States Code. The law reaffirmed the
traditional prohibition against direct military involvement in law
enforcement (i.e., arrests, searches, seizures, etc.) and also provided the
Secretary of Defense with specific authority to use the armed forces for a
variety of indirect assistance roles.\textsuperscript{11}

DoD Directive 5255.5 explains the requirements for employing DoD
resources in support of any law enforcement activity. Enclosure 4 of DoD
Directive 5255.5 states that the following activities are not restricted by
the Posse Comitatus Act.

Actions that are taken for the primary purpose of furthering a
military or foreign affairs function of the United States, regard less of incidental benefits to civilian authorities. This
provision must be used with caution, and does not include actions
taken for the primary purpose of aiding civilian law enforcement
officials or otherwise serving as a subterfuge to avoid the
restrictions of reference (v) \textsuperscript{[Posse Comitatus]} Actions under this
provision may include the following, depending on the nature of the
DoD interest and the authority governing the specific action in
question:

(1) Investigations and other actions related to the
enforcement of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)

(5) Protection of DoD personnel, DoD equipment, and
official guests of the Department of Defense.

(6) Such other actions that are undertaken primarily for a
military or foreign affair's purpose.\textsuperscript{12}

In summary, both the DoD Directive and public laws serve to keep
the military out of the law enforcement business inside the borders of the
United States.

Regardless, the question of military involvement in drug
enforcement operations outside the borders of the United States remains
unanswered. Nevertheless, a precedent of sorts has been established
during Operation JUST CAUSE when agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency
arrested Manuel Noriega. This provides a clear example of cooperation with civilian law enforcement activities (in this case the Drug Enforcement Agency) operating outside the borders of the United States. Clearly, until the laws or policies change, the military can be applied directly outside the borders of the United States to support counternarcotics operations as long as they do not attempt to enforce civilian laws. This will occur only when a host nation requests our assistance. No unilateral counternarcotics operations are authorized or implied by any U. S. policy.13

Secretary Richard B. Cheney announced in September 1989 the Department of Defense policy for implementing support for the NDCS. The Secretary described the role of the armed forces as follows:

We (The United States Armed Forces) will work on the drug program at every phase—at the source, in the delivery pipeline and to further support federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. In countries where the plants are grown and the raw materials are converted into drugs, we (The United States Armed Forces) can provide economic and security assistance, training and operational support for host country forces and assistance to law enforcement agencies of those countries in stopping the export of drugs. Deploying appropriate elements of the armed forces with the primary mission to cut off the flow of drugs, should, over time help reduce the flow of drugs into the country.

We need also to make clear that the Department of Defense is not a law enforcement agency. We do not enforce domestic criminal laws, nor can we solve society’s demand problem. But there is much we can do without usurping the police role.14

This statement provided the start point for DoD implementation of counternarcotics programs. In response, DoD agencies and designated Unified and Specified commanders (CINCs) prepared specific mechanisms to support the NDCS. (See Appendix 2, Organization of DoD for
Counternarcotics Operations—Chart) The CINC’s took various actions including the formation of Joint Task Forces.

Joint Task Force (JTF) 4 (commanded by a Coast Guard Vice Admiral) was formed in Key West, Florida to coordinate counternarcotics detection and monitoring operations for the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). Commanded by a Coast Guard Rear Admiral in Alameda, California, JTF 5 performs similar functions for the Pacific Command (PACOM). JTF 6 (commanded by an Army Major General) in El Paso, Texas coordinates Army and regional law enforcement agencies along the southwestern United States border with Mexico. In addition to the foundation of JTF’s, several of the CINC’s increased the deployment of mobile training teams (MTTs) to host countries including Peru, Bolivia, and Thailand. The Director of the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) established the Counterdrug Telecommunications Integration Office. The role of the DCA is to lead DoD in coordinating the exchange of intelligence between the different operating “cultures” found in law enforcement agencies and the military. All of these actions provided the foundation for a command and control infrastructure within the DoD to support counternarcotics operations.

In March 1990, Stephen M. Duncan, DoD coordinator for drug enforcement policy and support, further clarified the role of DoD in drug reduction. Mr. Duncan described interdiction operations, operational support, and Mobile Training Teams missions and capabilities. Although lengthy, these descriptions are vital to understanding the philosophy of the U. S. Army Counternarcotics Plan.
Interdiction Operations

...'Interdiction' involves several phases, including detection, sorting of probable drug traffickers from all other aircraft or surface vessels that have been detected, interception (directing ships or aircraft to the target for identification), tracking and monitoring (following a target until it can be "handed off" to a law enforcement agency); and apprehension, search, seizure and arrest by a law enforcement agency. Often these phases overlap.

Interdiction can take place in the air, at sea or on land. Thus, Interdiction is a multiphase, multienvironment and multiagency activity in which the DoD has significant responsibilities.16

Operational Support

The DoD is assisting in the attack on the supply of drugs in source countries through assistance for nation building, operational support to host country forces and cooperation with host country forces to prevent drug exports. ...U.S. military personnel are authorized to accompany host nation forces during authorized training and administrative activities within areas which have been previously designated by the U.S. military group commander in each country and approved by the CINC, but they do not accompany host government forces on actual field operations.

The operational support takes various forms, e.g., planning, communications, medical and logistics support, but U.S. military personnel do not serve as field advisors or replace agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration on coca eradication operations.17

Mobile Training Teams (MTTs)

The MTTs have been sent to the region (Andean) to provide training in individual and small unit tactics, leadership and airmobile and riverine operations. Advice is being given on the procurement and architecture of command, control and communications and intelligence facilities. Medical and engineering support and civic action are being provided along with air mobility assets which enhance the capability of the source countries to insert their own counternarcotics forces to remote regions where cocaine is grown, processed or transported.

The DoD has not, and does not intend to, substitute U.S. programs for those which the host countries must implement for themselves. U.S. military personnel will not replace or augment host country military personnel who are engaged in counternarcotics operations.18

Having articulated these components of counternarcotics operations, the United States Army in April 1990 distributed its Counternarcotics Plan19 for supporting the CINCs counternarcotics strategies. This
memorandum of instruction (M.O.I.) issued by the Secretary of the Army, Michael P. W. Stone and Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, charged the Army with two principal missions. First, the Army will provide forces to combatant commanders and assist them in developing and executing plans to effectively employ the unique capabilities of Army forces. Second, the Army will provide operational support, equipment training, and personnel to other U. S. Government Agencies and (through security assistance) selected foreign governments to counter drug production, trafficking, and use. All specified and implied tasks will be derived from these primary missions.  

The concept of the operation in the M.O.I. also states three key imperatives for providing Army forces. The first imperative requires that their employment should be consistent with existing Army doctrine. Second, Army forces will be placed under direct military command. Finally, the concept recognizes that units or individuals may face an armed adversary. As a consequence, they should be prepared for actions related to combat, even when conducting training, deterrence, surveillance or other non-combat operations. 

The last imperative leads directly to subsequent guidance about development of rules of engagement (ROE) and rules on the use of force (RUF). Ensuring protection of soldiers is the key concern for commanders. Army forces and personnel will conduct counternarcotics operations in accordance with peacetime ROE and RUF as directed by supported CINCs  

Ideally, the Army plan directs that thorough familiarity with the ROE and RUF will preclude a mission from being hindered by uncertainty about permissible statutory actions and responses.
In addition to these concerns for employment, the Army Counternarcotics Plan specifically addresses unit readiness and training for wartime priorities. Any degradation of readiness attributed to counternarcotics taskings or operations will be identified specifically in the commander's comments of Unit Status Reports. Training in units continues as prescribed in FM 25-100, Training the Force. Employment of the "battle focus" concept will resolve conflicts with wartime missions that are unrelated to any requirements for counternarcotics operations. Cancelling of National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center rotations and outside CONUS joint and combined exercises are to be avoided, but are not prohibited.

Using these concerns identified by the Army Counternarcotics Plan, let us now examine how the NDCS translates into tactical operation for Special Forces. When translating the NDCS into specific tactical missions, the Army accepts the premise that counternarcotics is low intensity conflict. This provides a doctrinal framework for developing how to support the NDCS. The NDCS stipulates interdiction of drug trafficking as the focus for counternarcotics operations for land forces. The requirements for accomplishing this are intelligence collection; interdiction at a source of production, enroute to and at critical distribution points; and training of host nation law enforcement and military personnel in techniques, tactics and procedures that support their own counternarcotics programs.

Army doctrine for low intensity conflict specifies that intelligence operations are critical before organizing successful employment of military forces. Army leaders recognize that developing intelligence is
the first task in counternarcotics operations. The tasks required for intelligence collection in the drug production and trafficking cycle range from the employment of highly sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment to simple foot-mobile reconnaissance. These intelligence collection tasks fall within the description of "Special Reconnaissance" for Special Forces. Using cocaine as an example, several places exist where collection targets appear (see figure 2). Locating any of the "low technology" processing and

**Cocaine: Production to Sales**

![Diagram of Cocaine Production to Sales](image)

Figure 2

manufacture sites in the rural areas of most undeveloped countries and the routes connecting them would require human intelligence (HUMINT) in the form of reconnaissance patrols. As the drug moves farther down the pipeline, the smuggler's security measures for each site become more technologically extensive and thus detectable by technological collection.
means. By using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, an intelligence estimate and analysis of the battlefield area will be prepared to assist in depicting the drug trafficking network.

After identifying the drug trafficking network, there are two ways a military unit can interdict a drug trafficking system. It could destroy critical facilities or it could intercept shipments. Conventional military raiding techniques accomplish the destruction strategy. This study recognizes that Direct Action of this type is not authorized for military units by any agency of the United States. However, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents and national police organizations trained and supported by Special Forces Detachments will conduct this mission. Special Forces Detachments can support drug interception operations by acting as part of a "real time" reconnaissance and security force to identify times and locations of drug shipment functions.

The farther along a drug processing system you are able to penetrate and then interdict, the more substantial the loss to the trafficker (see Fig. 2). The best "payoff" for interdiction takes place when interception of the actual drug in shipment occurs because the smuggler has committed all his manufacturing resources and cannot recover them. His shipping system is also disrupted and assets are removed from further use. This has been a primary focus of CONUS based forces, particularly the Air Force and Navy working together to vector the Coast Guard to make actual seizures and arrests. Another lucrative target for interception are the processing chemicals produced at commercial chemical production facilities. Monitoring purchases of these "legitimate" chemicals affords an opportunity to identify drug traffickers and cut off their "controlled" chemical
purchases. If nothing else, the drug traffickers must expend more resources to protect and reestablish facilities and smuggling systems.28

Additionally, unified commander's must consider rescue operations as part of their counternarcotics plans. Drug Enforcement Agents, military personnel operating intelligence gathering equipment, and mobile training teams threatened in the performance of training missions are likely targets for capture by drug traffickers. A responsibility specified in the Army Counternarcotics Plan is the protection of soldiers facing an armed adversary.29 This requirement implies the development of plans to recover soldiers and sophisticated intelligence equipment.

Finally, the most extensive role for Special Forces units will be their cooperating with law enforcement agencies in the conduct of security assistance operations. If the United States expects cooperation from foreign nations in the form of their own drug reduction programs, then the United States must provide the training and equipment to assist these programs to succeed. The training national police forces need to implement their own counterdrug programs has been identified: individual and small unit tactics, leadership, airmobile and riverine operations, advice on the architecture of command, control and communications and intelligence facilities, medical and engineering training and civic action. Keep in mind that many countries national police forces are organized as paramilitary forces or military forces thus understanding of a host nation's political sensitivities and institutions will be critical. For the most part this training mission appears to be satisfied by the "Foreign Internal Defense" mission for Special Forces.30
In summary, Special Reconnaissance employing HUMINT and sophisticated intelligence collection equipment; Direct Action to interdict drug trafficking systems, rescue and equipment recovery; and security assistance are tactical missions identified for use in counternarcotics operations. None of these tasks appear to violate public law because they do not require the military to act as a law enforcement agent. They also specifically direct the support of the NDCS to be directed outside the borders of the United States of America. The question concerning the Army now is, "Is the doctrine for each Special Forces mission suitable for the counternarcotics environment?"

PART TWO:
ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS RELATED TASKS WITH THE PRIMARY MISSIONS FOR SPECIAL FORCES

"The function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem," from a lecture titled "The Profession of Arms" given by LTG Sir John Winthrop Hackett, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.31

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

The Special Forces operational detachment trains to conduct Special Reconnaissance (SR) as one of its primary wartime missions (See Appendix 3, SR mission functional diagram). Under the following circumstances theater commanders employ Special Forces to perform SR. Special Reconnaissance is conducted when "normal" battlefield reconnaissance methods are impractical. The reasons for this are various. The area of interest for a commander may be in an inaccessible area. There could be a requirement for real-time intelligence in a denied area. Also, clandestine reconnaissance may be ordered which normally employs assets (equipment and personnel) available to the U. S. intelligence
community. Special Forces employed on clandestine reconnaissance may be controlled directly by the U.S. intelligence community and require Congressional oversight coordination. Any of these various situations can provide a reason to conduct SR.

The simplified Special Reconnaissance mission execution cycle is preinfiltration activities, infiltration, conduct of the reconnaissance, exfiltration, and debriefing. ARTEP 31-807-31-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Special Forces Detachment describes all of these tasks in detail. Preinfiltration activities are critical to any Special Forces mission. The crucial events during preinfiltration are: isolation, preparation for the mission, debriefing an “asset,” and presenting a briefback.

Isolation occurs at the beginning of all Special Forces missions and provides operations security for the team. In addition, it serves to keep the missions’ employment status (covert or clandestine) plausible. Mission preparation in isolation includes detailed planning to coordinate all the participating support agencies with the identified mission tasks. The coordinations of the specific methods for controlling the deployed detachment are also made. This preparation permits a precise mission execution that is normally restrained in conventional operations because of time. An “asset” debriefed during isolation can be protected as a future source. “Assets” provide detailed information or instructions required to perform some critical aspect of the mission. Examples include: linking up with a foreign agent, the location of a cache site, or a description of a specific route to an objective. Regardless, preinfiltration activities conclude in isolation with the SF mission briefback.
The detachment's briefback is a detailed presentation to the immediate and other concerned commanders; it may be given to the CINC himself. The latter is normally represented by a deputy and responsible staff action officers. The purpose of the briefback (See Appendix 4 - SF Mission Briefback Format) is to demonstrate a thorough understanding of the assigned mission to include its implications and the intent. The briefback details the required coordination and serves as a final check for everything that must occur to guarantee mission accomplishment.

After making an infiltration, the Special Forces Detachment may establish contact with an "asset" who will assist in the reconnaissance task. If not, the detachment moves in the denied area to the objective area and establishes a mission support site. From this site, the detachment conducts its reconnaissance task. Reconnaissance activities may involve the deployment of sophisticated technological devices to assist in the task. For example, these devices may include communications equipment designed to relay immediate intelligence data. Once the reconnaissance task is complete the detachment moves to another mission or conducts exfiltration operations.

Other critical tasks in the mission training and evaluation outline are: employment of active countermeasures, maintenance of OPSEC, and battle drills for reacting to contact or ambushes and breaking contact. These tasks function primarily to protect the detachment members and safeguard from compromise the deployment status (clandestine-covert-overt) of the mission.
A detachment could conduct the Special Reconnaissance mission to support the NDCS in a variety of ways. Gathering intelligence data to confirm or deny data gathered from another source to provide redundancy of collection means is just one example. Upon request of a host nation or United States law enforcement agency, the detachment can also collect data from a physically denied area. Perhaps the best payoff for the Special Reconnaissance mission occurs when it supports an interdiction operation by providing "real time" data on drug shipments.

The doctrine for SR recognizes the political implications for counternarcotics operations described by United States Public Law and host nation diplomatic and political sensitivities. It does this by two methods, one direct and one indirect.

Directly, in preinfiltration isolation the detachment conducts a mission analysis. Specified in the Army Counternarcotics Plan is the requirement for "...a properly executed memorandum of understanding or other agreement (that) will specify the responsibility and authority of both Army commanders and the civilian agency personnel in a supervisory position over Army forces." CINCs are also required to establish ROE or RUF. DoD Directive 5525.5 combined with these specifications and the detachment's mission statement (in the concerned Special Operations Commander's mission tasking letter), provides the detachment with the necessary guidance to address any political implications of the mission. The briefback, prior to mission execution, verifies the detachment's understanding of responsibility and authority. All concerned commanders can validate the detachment's understanding by placing specific questions
or topics in the SF mission briefback sequence for each mission as stated in FM 31-20, Appendix E, SF Mission Briefback.

Because FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, lists counternarcotics operations as a peacetime contingency, the detachment must consider the Imperatives of political dominance and legitimacy. The imperative of political dominance requires adoption of courses of action which are legally supportable.\(^{36}\) Legitimacy, while not tangible or easily quantifiable, is very susceptible to misperception when inappropriately applying force.\(^{37}\) These Imperatives, when applied to the SR mission, require the detachment to adopt carefully courses of action which protect all concerned political entities. For example, a host nation may reluctantly agree to allow a Special Reconnaissance mission within its borders only if it is kept from the host nation's public knowledge.

Indirectly, the detachment recognizes political implications by the tasks of employing countermeasures, safeguarding of "assets", and OPSEC techniques. Countermeasures can range from the employment of classified technological devices to subtle cover and deception operations conducted concurrently with in-country security assistance activities. Handling of "assets" includes not only protecting the identity of the individual, but preventing disclosure of who or why the individual is helping. OPSEC measures are sound tactics for any military unit. Primarily, OPSEC means sterilization of any site a detachment occupied during the mission that could provide evidence that a reconnaissance took place. Special Forces detachments routinely practice site-sterilization techniques. This action is extremely valuable for retaining the capability to conduct future reconnaissance.
The doctrine surrounding the Special Reconnaissance mission facilitates interagency activities directed by the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the State Department activities in each country affected. By its very nature, counternarcotics operations will require input from agencies directed by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (The Drug Czar) and support from Department of State activities in an affected country. Special Forces Detachments are familiar with procedures for working in support of non-military agencies, predominantly the Department of State through their participation in "country-teams." The Army Counternarcotics Plan specifies that, "...forces will always be under direct military command." Once again, the detachment will demonstrate in the SF Mission Briefback how well it has coordinated required supporting agencies.

Furthermore, the capability for Special Forces Detachments to operate in a multitude of communications modes is particularly useful to law enforcement agencies. This is critical for a Special Reconnaissance mission because the data collected will often be time sensitive. Time sensitivity may in fact be the reason for directing a Special Reconnaissance mission in the first place. Once again, the basic SF mission briefback by the detachment operations sergeant will demonstrate just how the information requested transmits to the "asking" agency.

Finally, the problem of balancing "security of operations" with the operational tenet of synchronization will always trouble the Special Forces commander. The commander must resolve the conflict between who "needs to know" and OPSEC for mission execution. The doctrine addresses this problem because it also exists in "conventional" wartime applications of
Special Reconnaissance. The number and variety of non-military agencies involved further complicates counterdrug efforts. The employment status of the mission now becomes a factor, particularly when attempting a covert operation. However, the mission training plan for Special Reconnaissance treats security of the operation and data reporting as co-equal, critical tasks. When issuing the Special Reconnaissance mission, the relative importance of the data to be gathered versus the level of operational security required must be clearly identified. This will guide the detachment during their course of action development.

DIRECT ACTION

The Special Reconnaissance mission very often leads directly to the conduct of a Direct Action mission. The Special Forces Detachment conducting the Direct Action mission provides the Theater Commander with the capability to conduct combat operations beyond the range of tactical weapon's systems or the area of influence of conventional military forces. In addition to attacking designated "high payoff" targets and critical nodes of a designated target system, the detachment performs capture, rescue and recovery operations. Objectives for these operations may encompass: selected hostile personnel and equipment; U. S. or Allied prisoners, both military and political; downed aircrews; nuclear or chemical weapons; downed satellites; classified documents or equipment; or other sensitive items of material. The Direct Action mission is a direct application of military power and does not rely on a foreign power.
Special Forces detachments conduct Direct Action operations under
the direction and control of a Special Operations headquarters.
Detachments execute DA operations in four modes:

- Unilaterally, with Special Forces qualified personnel only.
- Unilaterally, with a mix of SF, other SOF, and conventional forces.
- As a combined operation, with SF-led foreign teams.
- As a combined operation, with SF-trained and directed foreign
teams.\(^4^2\)

The theater commander controls Direct Action operations by
providing the theater special operations commander a combination of
mission-type orders, specific mission taskings, rules of engagement, and
other mission guidance. In situations short of war, the National Command
Authority (NCA) directs the appropriate regional unified commander to
plan and execute contingency DA operations. If the NCA desires more
positive control, it may direct United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) to plan and direct the operation. The NCA may also direct
USSOCOM to establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)
reporting directly to the NCA or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS).\(^4^3\)

The simplified Direct Action mission execution cycle includes:
preinfiltration activities, infiltration, interdiction of a target system or
recovery, exfiltration, and debriefing (See Appendix 5, Direct Action
mission functional diagram). The size of a detachment conducting a Direct
Action mission can range from a two-man team conducting a clandestine
sabotage to a reinforced Special Forces company conducting an overt raid.
Examples of U. S. Direct Action missions are the recovery of S13
prisoners of war from Cabanatuan, Luzon by the 6th Ranger Battalion in January 1945 and the attempt to recover American prisoners from a prison camp in North Vietnam in November 1970.

In their target selection process for Direct Action missions, Special Forces Detachments use the CARVER factors. The factors are criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect-on-population, and recognizability. Special Forces detachments use the CARVER factors when analyzing any target for any mission. The CARVER factors should aid in determining what the precise Direct Action mission tasking should be.

Criticality describes the relative importance of a target system or subsystem to an enemy’s ability to make or sustain war or drug production and shipment. Four rules judge a target’s criticality. The first is determining the location and number of targets in the system. When will the effects of the target’s interdiction be felt is a second consideration. The third is: what is the reduction in total output for the whole system caused by the levels of possible target damage? Finally, are their substitutes or alternatives available to continue output in spite of any damage caused?

Accessibility describes the relative ease an action element will have to strike a target. Elements involved in setting the accessibility calculation are infiltration and exfiltration techniques; survival and evasion and escape potential in the operational area; the security situation enroute to and from the target; and whether the target is within range of direct or indirect weapons' fire.
Recuperability relates to criticality. It measures the time required to replace, repair or by-pass the damage. The evaluation of recuperability includes an estimate of economic capability and technical resources available to the enemy.

Vulnerability is different from accessibility because it considers how to damage a target. The attack means and expertise of an action element establish the calculation of damage possible. The calculation considers the following. What are the nature and construction of the target? What is the amount of damage required and what systems will cause that amount? Who has the expertise to transport and employ each of the destruction systems.

Effect-on-the-population refers to public reaction in the target area and the domestic and international reaction to the target's destruction. Consideration of public reaction must answer several key questions. Will reprisals against friendly forces occur? What effect will target destruction have on national PSYOP's themes? Will the exfiltration or evasion potential in the area be helped or hurt? Will target destruction alienate or reinforce the enemy population with its government?

The final CARVER factor is recognizability. This factor assesses the physical effects of weather, light, terrain, target size, and distinctive target signature. This assessment then compares the ability of an action element to identify the target in the operational area.

The targeting process employing the CARVER factors can easily analyze a drug trafficking system like cocaine (see Figure 2). Because the design of the targeting process focuses at the theater level, it naturally
incorporates implications for not just military power but all elements of national power. As a result it does not matter if a Special Forces detachment or some other agency (U. S. or host nation) provides the action element for Interdiction. Most importantly, the target analysis process serves to identify the best place to strike.

As seen in the analysis of the Special Reconnaissance mission, the detachment briefback prior to mission execution will satisfy many key questions raised by the special operations imperatives. Those answers are also true for the Direct Action mission. The SF mission briefback format includes a section on target analysis using the CARVER factors which demonstrates the detachment's understanding of the target's role in the drug trafficking system.

However, the Direct Action mission of interdiction does not recognize the political implications for counternarcotics operations. The crucial political implication not recognized concerns the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act. While the doctrine may have great potential for aiding law enforcement agencies in analyzing targets for interdiction, the doctrine does not contain any specifications for arrests, searches and seizures. These are activities reserved specifically to law enforcement personnel and not authorized for military personnel. Military personnel can assist by "tracking" a target and then handing it off to an authorized agent for legal "due process."

The doctrine is also valid in recognizing host nation diplomatic and political sensitivities. If the National Command Authority authorizes Interdiction, with or without host nation support, it would fall within
one of the four normal operating modes for a Direct Action mission. Nevertheless, it would only be valid in this circumstance if the detachment personnel perform no legal "due process" activities.

The Direct Action mission of rescue or recovery does recognize the political implications for counternarcotics operations and host nation political and diplomatic sensitivities. There are two ingredients which combine to allow this recognition: the rescue or recovery operation and the modes of operation.

The first ingredient, the rescue or recovery operation, does not require any law enforcement activity by military personnel and the Army Counternarcotics Plan specifies "protection of soldiers" as primary concern for commanders. The capability to perform rescue and recovery operations will be an essential element of any plan to provide protection to military personnel and other agency personnel. This is particularly important in those areas where political considerations for development of ROE and RUF may require acceptance of risk. For example, a detachment deploys at the request of a host nation to provide operational support to a drug eradication program. The host nation desires to downplay the military assistance given by the United States. Accordingly, the detachment is allowed to carry only personal sidearms and remain inside the remote base camp. In response, the drug traffickers arrange for a local insurgent movement to attack the base camp.

The four operating modes for Direct Action missions supply the final ingredient allowing the recognition of host nation political and diplomatic sensitivities. Upon NCA approval, with or without host nation
sanction, a regional CINC can conduct recovery or rescue operations with assigned Special Forces detachments. Each of the four modes can be adopted to conform to the status of host nation participation.

The doctrine for both Direct Action missions facilitates interagency activities between the Drug Czar and the State Department activities in each target country. By doctrine, a Direct Action mission is under the control of the Theater Special Operations Command or a JSOTF established by USSOCOM by NCA direction. This places responsibility for the mission on a senior military officer. This officer coordinates directly with the Department of State military attaché and the concerned law enforcement agency. Under the provisions of the Army Counternarcotics Plan, this officer will also ensure compliance with any memorandum of understanding governing the employment of the military personnel.

The doctrine for Direct Action recognizes the balance between "security of operations" and the tenet of synchronization. The employment of Direct Action missions against specific targets for interdiction will have the best chance for optimizing the balance. The isolated planning time and preparation prior to mission execution will safeguard the mission's deployment status and support OPSEC. The time in isolation will also allow detailed information sharing and its incorporation into the mission's concept of execution.

A problem with the doctrine and trying to balance OPSEC with synchronization occurs when attempting a rescue or recovery operation. In the counterdrug environment there will exist a plethora of agents and activities operating both overtly and clandestinely in the area of
operations. By its very nature, a rescue or recovery mission is a rapid response operation. Because of the many agencies that may operate in an area and the short time available to conduct the recovery or rescue, the information available to the detachment may only come from the organization requesting the mission. The level where law enforcement agencies, the Department of State, and the military chain of command link will govern effective response to required information, simultaneously effecting OPSEC and the certainty of successful mission execution.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

The Foreign Internal Defense mission is not exclusively a Special Forces mission. It is a joint and interagency activity of the United States government. The primary tasks for a Special Forces detachment on a Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission are to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military and paramilitary forces. Ideally, by improving the host nation tactical and technical proficiency, an insurgency can be defeated without direct U.S. involvement. According to the Army's doctrine for FID, detachments conduct the following types of operations: training assistance, advisory assistance, intelligence operations, PSYOP, CA operations, populace and resource control operations, and tactical combat operations. A brief synopsis of operational doctrine follows.

Training assistance operations in a host nation permit the rapid development of specific individual skills or the preparation of units to defeat an insurgent. The military assistance effort begun for El Salvador in the early 1980's with its weapons, tactics, and junior leadership by elements of the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is an example.
Training assistance increases the overall host nation force capability by making untapped host nation resources available for use against insurgents. This supports the U.S. doctrine for Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) by focusing on building viable host nation military institutions that respond to the needs of society. Training assistance also reduces the requirement for U.S. resources.

Special Forces provides advisory assistance in the form of operational advice and assistance to specific host nation and paramilitary organizations. The advisory assistance is provided under the operational control (OPCON) of the in-country U.S. defense representative, usually the Chief of Security Assistance Operations. Activities of the detachment may intersect jurisdictional boundaries or responsibilities of other Country Team members (See figure 3). The detachment anticipates potential conflicts and coordinates working agreements through its military chain of command and the military organization working for the ambassador in the country. Additionally, the Special Forces advisers coordinate their portion of the overall FID effort with each member of the country team.
For a variety of reasons, host nations may refuse U. S. advisers. At the same time, that host nation may request and receive U. S. mobility and fire support assets to combat a potent insurgent. Special Forces are capable of coordinating all types of heliborne, tactical airlift, close air support and gunship operations. Special Forces detachments, as liaison teams, can coordinate this support to ensure its proper tactical employment.

The Special Forces adviser must balance four critical conditions of the host nation environment. First, he must always act as a representative of the United States. Problems must be resolved by means appropriate to the host nation without violating U. S. laws and policies. A second condition for successful advisory assistance is understanding cross-cultural communications while building close personal relationships. This is especially difficult because host nation counterparts normally act within the context of their own sociopolitical experience. Host nation leaders may tolerate advice only to obtain material and training assistance. To safeguard both the U. S. interests and the adviser's, specific ROE exist to keep the adviser an adviser. This is the third condition under which an adviser operates. The fourth condition incorporates the first three. Simply stated, it is that political objectives and constraints, rather than military capabilities, often dictate the organization and force development of host nation military and paramilitary forces.

Three pre-eminent resources: language qualification, the area study\textsuperscript{51}, and the SF mission briefback make the Special Forces adviser especially suited for the FID mission. Special Forces headquarters orient their teams to specific global regions. Accordingly, this orientation
focuses language proficiency requirements for training. Each team prepares a specific area study incorporating its language proficiency. This study is kept current and continuously updated. It is further updated with additional, specific deployment area information prior to deployment. The briefback demonstrates the adviser's understanding of the relationship of the RUF/ROE with the area of operations.

The Special Forces detachment conducts comprehensive and detailed Intelligence operations as part of FID to assist the host nation in using its own superior (relative to the insurgents) resources to perforate an insurgent security system. The detachment concentrates not only on military significant information, but on assisting the host nation in conducting operations designed to destroy or neutralize the insurgent's political and intelligence infrastructure.

Closely related to Intelligence operations are PSYOP operations. Psychological operations target the host nation populace's perceptions about their government's interests and goals in order to gain their support or at least deny it to an insurgent. The Special Forces detachment assists host nation forces to accomplish the following objectives with support from PSYOP elements:

- Assisting the host nation in gaining or retaining the support of its people.
- Assisting the host nation in defeating the insurgents.
- Establishing a favorable U. S. image in the host nation.
- Favorably presenting U. S. actions and intentions to neutral groups and the international community.
- Assisting the host nation in supporting defector rehabilitation programs.
- Providing close and continuous support to increase the effect of Civil Affairs operations.
The ultimate goal of the U. S. military is to help the host nation in developing its own PSYOP program\textsuperscript{52}.

When the Special Forces detachment conducts civil affairs (CA) operations in FID, its primary mission is to help host nation forces to effectively use its resources to mobilize the people to support the host nation government against an insurgent. Civil Affairs elements work closely with the detachment to coordinate the detachment operations with host nation, U. S. Mission, and international agencies. This coordination aims at providing host nation civil assistance programs to the people. Civil assistance programs improve the capabilities of host nation authorities to deal with the political, economic, and social aspects of IDAD. Special Forces detachments participate in military civic action projects that enhance host nation economic and social development. These programs function to gain the active support of the population by emphasizing the host nation's role.

PSYOP and Civil Affairs operations are critical to the Special Forces detachment when assisting a host nation in population and resources control operations (PRC). The detachment normally limits their participation to advice, training, and indirect support of PRC. Nevertheless, they must convey to the people that they are supporting a host nation program, not implementing a U. S.-directed program. In that regard, the host nation must persuade the people of the following essential tenets\textsuperscript{53}:

- The insurgents, not the host nation government, are to blame for the inconvenience of the PRC measures.
- The government acts for the long range benefit of the people.
- The insurgents activities are harmful to the people and require the imposition of the PRC measures.
Insurgents are the enemy of the people and must be denied support and supplies.
Loyal citizens must declare their support of the government with full and voluntary compliance with the PRC programs.
The government will reduce and eliminate the PRC programs as the insurgent threat decreases.

When the United States decides to participate in a host nation IDAD strategy that includes combat operations, a detachment may conduct five types of tactical combat operations described for FID: consolidation, strike, remote area, border, and urban. Tactical operations are not independent actions to destroy insurgent forces and bases. Each operation should be synchronized to gain a broader regional or national objective. It is the detachment commander's task to convince his counterpart to integrate intelligence, CA, and PSYOP into every tactical operation along with the minimum use of violence. The IDAD principle of minimum use of violence is vital to success and the ultimate elimination of an insurgency.

The first type of combat operation in FID is Consolidation. Consolidation operations are long-term population security operations conducted in areas generally under government control. They aim at providing security to free the people from fear of insurgent reprisals. This is accomplished by isolating the insurgent, protecting the populace and neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure. Some techniques to accomplish this are population resettlement or "strategic hamlet" programs like those used in Malaysia and the Republic of Vietnam.

Second are strike operations. Strike operations are short-duration operations conducted in contested or insurgent controlled areas. They are designed to destroy, isolate, and interdict insurgent forces, their bases,
and their lines of support. They are offensive operations that are not decisive by themselves. They can support consolidation operations by preventing insurgents from contesting host nation pacification efforts. Special Forces advisers must advise against strike operations that overshadow and dominate the nonmilitary aspects of counterinsurgency.

Another type of FID combat operation are remote area operations. Remote area operations are undertaken in insurgent controlled or contested areas to establish "islands of popular support" for the host nation government and deny support to the insurgents. PSYOP and Civil Affairs programs can best assist in obtaining local support for remote area operations when significant segments already support the host nation programs and the host nation recruits local personnel for service in the paramilitary or irregular force for that remote area. Special Forces detachments support remote area operations to interdict, destroy base areas, collect and report intelligence, and demonstrate host nation support for the remote area.

The final types of tactical combat operations in FID are border operations and urban operations. Both are the responsibility of host nation police, customs or paramilitary security forces. They also involve extensive application of population and resource control measures. The goal of border operations is to interdict insurgent forces and support. Urban area operations are concerned primarily with combatting terrorism, sabotage, and destruction of the insurgent infrastructure. PSYOP and Civil Affairs support are again crucial for gaining and maintaining popular support during these operations.
The doctrine for executing the FID mission by Special Forces calls for the creation of a security assistance force (See Appendix 6). The security assistance force (SAF) is similar to a conventional, combined arms task force. A Special Forces detachment can be the nucleus of a SAF. The Special Forces led SAF is normally augmented with Civil Affairs, PSYOP, medical, engineer, military police, military intelligence, communications and other combat, combat support and combat service support elements as required. The SAF must be capable of supporting all potential FID operations. When an area coordination center (ACC) is established, the SAF has the capability to integrate and coordinate all of its activities with combined (U. S./host nation) civil-military headquarters within the jurisdiction of the appropriate area commander.

The doctrine for the Special Forces mission of Foreign Internal Defense recognizes the political implications for counternarcotics operations described by United States Public Law. The FID doctrine stipulates that the Special Forces adviser must solve problems without violating U. S. laws and policies. The Special Forces mission briefback is a fundamental device for verifying that deploying detachments understand their duties and the restrictions imposed under these laws. During their briefback, the detachment describes the Rules of Engagement (and or Rules on the Use of Force) for their FID mission. The ROE or RUF serve as the CINC's means to keep the detachment from breaking any law or policy.

The doctrine clearly recognizes host nation diplomatic and political sensitivities. The doctrine actually describes the specific employment of military personnel in an internal defense and development role as described in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.
The Army recognizes the close linkage between drug trafficking and insurgency. The doctrine for the FID mission describes how to win against an insurgency. By simply substituting the word "drug-trafficker" for "insurgent" you can apply the doctrine. For example, this can be particularly useful when contending with the problem of how to convince the local populace to cease raising drug crops (or support an insurgent).

The doctrine facilitates the interagency activities directed by the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the Department of State activities in each affected country. The employment of a SAF working under a memorandum of agreement with the Drug Enforcement Agency automatically puts the security assistance office of an embassy, the Drug Enforcement Agency representative, and the detachment commander in a coordination group. The establishment of an area coordination center offers a way to include the host nation in the counternarcotics effort.

Finally, the doctrine balances security of operations with the tenet of synchronization. Implicit in all FID missions is the requirement to protect the populace from the insurgent (or in this case the drug trafficker) and to provide a safe environment for national development. Combining this with the emphasis in every FID operation to integrate intelligence, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs to win government support by the people, produces a spiraling effect where the drug trafficker becomes less secure as the populace becomes more secure. This is a result of the host nation supporting those who oppose the drug trade.
CONCLUSIONS

"It is the business of armed services to furnish a constituted authority, a government, in situations where force is, or might be, used the greatest possible number of options," from a lecture titled "The Profession of Arms" given by LTG Sir John Winthrop Hackett, K.C.B.; C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.E.56

If the threat to the national security of the United States presented by drug trafficking is viewed as an external insurgency, then the current doctrine for the Special Forces missions of Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and Foreign Internal Defense is suitable for conducting counternarcotics operations outside the borders of the United States. When the drug trafficking threat is viewed as a problem of domestic law enforcement, then the doctrine for the Special Forces missions is not suitable for counternarcotics operations.

There are three fundamental components which cause the doctrine to be suitable for application in counternarcotics operations. Each of these components satisfies the criteria for this study established by the imperatives for special operations. Consequently, Special Forces is a primary tool available for interdicting drug trafficking outside the borders of the United States.

The first component that demonstrates suitability is the pre-mission isolation process that culminates in a formal briefback from the executing detachment to the commander directing the mission. This briefing clarifies exactly what is to be done and the conditions under which the mission will occur. This is critical for protecting the military from committing to an operation that could violate the provisions imposed by Posse Comitatus. The briefing also clarifies what safeguards and
provisions are being made to prevent any undue or unwarranted acts of force. This clearly provides recognition of the political implications for counternarcotics operations described by United States Public Law (Posse Comitatus Act Title 18 United States Code 1385) and host nation diplomatic and political sensitivities.

The second component is the inherent capability of Special Forces to coordinate any of these missions as part of a combined, multi-agency (Department of Defense and other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies) and conventional force. This will be Indispensable to any counternarcotics effort coordinated by the ONDCP that involves United States and host nation law enforcement agencies, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. The key factor in making this work is the experience and training that Special Forces commanders have in working in combined, multi-agency environments. This is plainly the criteria of facilitating interagency activities directed by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (The Drug Czar) and the Department of State activities in each affected country.

The third component is the application of the tenets of Low Intensity Conflict and Internal Defense and Development. The concept of a military force concentrating on the winning of popular support (to stop the flow of drugs) rather than the physical destruction of an enemy force, will be essential to assisting host nations in implementing lasting counterdrug programs. Essential to this concept are the requirements for intelligence and security as described in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Synchronizing the security of the force, the security of the host nation populace we will be attempting to dissuade from drug
trafficking, and intelligence activity leading to interdiction efforts is particularly inherent in the doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense. Thus the last criteria, balancing "security of operations" with the operational tenet of synchronization, is met.

On the other hand, a single criterion renders all the doctrine unsuitable when applying the doctrine to conduct counternarcotics operations with the objective of domestic law enforcement. None of the doctrine is able to comply with the provisions in the public laws and regulations which are derived from Posse Comitatus. While it is implicit in the doctrine that the detachment will not violate any law in the execution of its mission, there are no provisions for the detachment to act as law enforcement agents. No training plan exists for the missions to enable the detachment to become capable of affecting searches, seizures, or arrests for the purposes of bringing individuals to justice in a civilian criminal court. If bringing criminals trafficking drugs outside the United States to justice is the focus of U.S. strategy, then the Special Forces detachment is not an appropriate tool.

If the Office of National Drug Control Policy pursues a strategy for interdicting drugs into the United States that does not require Special Forces detachments to act in a law enforcement manner; in other words, just stop the flow, then detachments can be employed as an effective tool to stop that flow. If the United States of America wants to pursue a strategy where host nations assume the greater part of the responsibility for stopping the flow of drugs with lasting host nation counterdrug programs; then Special Forces deployed on a Foreign Internal Defense Mission as part of a combined, multi-agency (Department of Defense and other U.S. and
host nation governmental agencies) and conventional force that supports
the host nations' economic and political development of those lasting
counterdrug programs, is the most suitable application of Special Forces
Doctrine.


3. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army Memorandum, Army Counternarcotics Plan, April 17, 1990. (Hereinafter referred to as Army Counternarcotics Plan.)


7. Ibid., page 100.

8. Posse Comitatus Act, United States Code, Section 1385 of Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure)


16. Ibid., page 3.
17. Ibid., page 6.
18. Ibid., page 7.
19. Army Counternarcotics Plan. Distribution was made to all major commands of the Army (MACOM).
20. Ibid., page 3.
22. Ibid., page 17.
23. Army Symposium., pages 1, 4, and 23. Page 23 contains notes from a briefing given by COL Thomas E. Swain, Commander, Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. The briefing described the relationship of counternarcotics to Low Intensity Conflict.
25. Army Symposium., pages 4 and 29. Page 29 contains notes from a seminar on Intelligence Support to Counternarcotics led by BG John F. Stewart, Jr., Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
28. Ibid., pages v-vii.
30. FM 31-20, page 10-1.
32. FM 31-20., page 12-1.
33. Ibid., Glossary page 6. “Assets” are defined as individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations in place or which can be placed in position to accomplish specific tasks. These assets may be covert or overt depending on the nature of their activity. The must be responsible to U. S. control and committable in support of U. S. objectives.

34. Army Counternarcotics Plan, page 17.

35. FM 31–20, appendix E provides an example of a Special Operations Command Mission Letter.

36. FM 100–20, page 1–8.

37. Ibid., page 1–9.


40. Ibid., page 11–1.

41. Ibid., page 11–2.

42. Ibid., page 11–2.

43. Ibid., page 11–3.


45. FM 31–20, paragraph 11–2a.

46. Army Counternarcotics Plan, page 17.

47. FM 31–20, page 10–1.

48. Ibid., page 10–2.

49. Ibid., pages 10–2 through 10–7.


51. FM 31–20, annex I contains a recommended general outline format for systematically organizing information in an area of operations.

52. Ibid., page 10–3.

53. Ibid., page 10–4.

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I. Special Forces Company Organization Chart

### Company Headquarters (B Detachment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company Commander</td>
<td>MAJ 18A00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>CPT 18A00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations/Administrative Officer</td>
<td>WO 18A00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment NCO</td>
<td>SGM 18250</td>
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<td>MSG 18250</td>
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<td>Communications NCO</td>
<td>SFC 18E40</td>
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<td>Assistant Operations and Intelligence NCO</td>
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<td>Medical NCO</td>
<td>SFC 18D40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply NCO</td>
<td>SFC 76Y4P</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications NCO</td>
<td>SSG 18E30</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC NCO</td>
<td>SGT 54B2P</td>
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### Operational Detachment (OD) A

**4 ODA**
- 1 ODA Military Free-Fall Qualified
- 1 ODA Scuba Qualified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>CPT 18A00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment Technician</td>
<td>WO 18A00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations NCO</td>
<td>MSG 18250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications NCO</td>
<td>SFC 18E40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer NCO</td>
<td>SFC 18E40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical NCO</td>
<td>SFC 18D40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons NCO</td>
<td>SFC 18B40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Operations and Intelligence NCO</td>
<td>SFC 18F40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications NCO</td>
<td>SSG 18E30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer NCO</td>
<td>SSG 18E30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical NCO</td>
<td>SSG 18D30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons NCO</td>
<td>SSG 18B30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3 Mission Training Plan - Special Reconnaissance
(Artep 31-007-31 MTP Special Forces Company, Direct Action page 3-4 through 3-14)

CONDUCT POSTMISSION ACTIVITIES
PARTICIPATE IN DEBRIEFING
TASK NO. 31-5-0124

EXFILTRATE THE OPERATIONAL AREA
MOVE IN A DENIED AREA
31-5-0107
CONDUCT EXFILTRATION BY LAND: 31-5-0121
WATERBORNE: 31-5-0122
AIR OPERATIONS: 31-5-0123

CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES
SEND INFORMATION BY RADIO
31-5-0112
MAINTAIN A RECONNAISSANCE LOG
31-5-0111
ESTABLISH A SURVEILLANCE SITE
31-5-0110
ESTABLISH A MISSION SUPPORT SITE
31-5-0108

CONDUCT AREA INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION OPERATIONS
(S) EMPLOY CLANDESTINE DOCUMENT AND EQUIPMENT EXFILTRATION SYSTEMS (U)
31-5-0118
(S) ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS (U)
31-5-0117
(S) OPERATE IN OBJECTIVE AREA OR COUNTRY (U)
31-5-0116
(S) USE SAFE HOUSES OR SAFE SITES (U)
31-5-0114
(S) USE SURVEILLANCE METHODS (U)
31-5-0115

INFILTRATE THE OPERATIONAL AREA
INFILTRATE BY LAND
31-5-0102
MOVE IN A DENIED AREA
31-5-0107
(S) INFILTRATE BY COVERED MEANS (U)
31-5-0048
ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH AN ASSET
31-5-0104
CONDUCT ASSEMBLY
31-5-0010
INFILTRATE BY AIR OPERATIONS
31-5-0006
INFILTRATE BY WATERBORNE OPERATIONS
31-5-0009

CONDUCT PREINFILTRATION ACTIVITIES
(ISOLATE)
PRESENT BRIEFBACK
31-5-0005
PREPARE FOR THE MISSION
31-5-0101
DEBRIEF AN ASSET
31-5-0004
PREPARE THE ISOLATION AREA
31-5-0001
SF MISSION BRIEFBACK FORMAT

This appendix provides an outline format for an SF mission briefback. It can also be used by a group or battalion staff to prepare an initial mission briefing. The format provides a systematic means for presenting information concerning a specific SF mission. Although the basic outline is general, it is flexible enough to be used for any doctrinal SF mission. The user must modify the outline by deleting those portions that do not apply.

**COMMANDER**

a. Purpose of briefing
b. Mission as stated in the OPORD
c. Higher Commander's Intent
d. Detachment Commander's Intent
e. Organization of Detachment Chain of Command and Assigned Responsibility
f. Attachments and Detachments

**S2 or INTELLIGENCE SERGEANT**

a. Description of the JSOR
b. IPB
   1. Threat Evaluation
      a) Threat identification
      b) Additions to the initial threat database
   c) Determination of current order of battle (overlay)
      d) Disposition, composition, and strength of committed forces and reinforcements (identify each unit by category)
   e) Hostile force capabilities, intentions, and activities (air, ground, water, NBC)
      f) Hostile population and resource control measures
   2. Civilian population
   3. Capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions, and activities of supported indigenous force
   4. The effects of terrain and weather on both friendly and hostile forces in the JSOR. (Use terrain overlays as appropriate.)
   5. Threat integration and probable course of hostile action
b. PIR and IR
c. Detachment Intelligence Activities in the JSOR (Include defensive CI Activities)

**S3 or OPERATIONS SERGEANT**

a. Concept of the operation
b. Rules of engagement/Rules on the Use of Force
c. Infiltration Plan
   1. Route
   2. Point of no return (PONR)
   3. Contingency Plan
      a) In-flight abort plan (include recall procedures)
      b) Crash and/or forced landing
      1) Before PONR
      2) After PONR
   4. Primary and alternate points of entry
   5. Contingency plan at entry points
   6. Assembly plan
      a) On primary and alternate points of entry
      b) Disposition of excess items (SCUBA or AIR ITEMS)

**S1 or DETACHMENT TECHNICIAN**

a. Personnel status
   1. Assigned strength
   2. Shortage by MOS
   3. Cross-trained personnel
b. Discipline, Law and Order
   1. Court-martial and Article 15 jurisdiction
      on exception to SOP
      2. Known indigenous force policy
      concerning discipline and law and order
   3. Legal status of the team in the JSOR
c. Disposition of PUs in JSOR
   1. US Personnel
   2. Indigenous personnel (state local customs)
   3. Morale and personnel services (If other than SOP)
      1. Personnel records check
      2. Mail handling
      3. Promotions
      4. Comfort Items
      5. Replacements and augmentations
      6. Pay and allowances
   f. Operational fund

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*Appendix 4 - Special Forces Mission Briefback Format (FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, App H, page H-1 through H-2)*
# Appendix 4 - Special Forces Mission Briefback Formal
*(FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, App H)*

## S1 or DETACHMENT TECHNICIAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Indigenous force strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Processing of the indigenous force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Oath of allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Records to be kept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Miscellaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Identification photographs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## S2 or SUPPLY SERGEANT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Supplies and equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Disposition of equipment and personal items not accompanying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Special mission equipment issued to the detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cross-load plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Resupply plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Automatic resupply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Drop zone data/or delivery means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Recovery plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. On-call resupply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Drop zone data/or delivery means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Recovery plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Emergency resupply and conditions for implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Existing logistical nets in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Indigenous logistical plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## S5 or CIVIL AFFAIRS NCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Politico-military implications of the mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Status of local government in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Status of the shadow resistance government in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Requirements for interagency coordination in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Plans to minimize civilian interference with the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Plans to protect cultural properties in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Plans to develop the Auxiliary in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Plans to develop Civil Defense Groups in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Humanitarian and civil assistance plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Military Civic action plans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PSYOP OFFICER or NCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Target audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Uncommitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hostile sympathizers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hostile military forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Resistance sympathizers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Approved themes and messages for each target audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Themes and messages to be avoided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Media production and dissemination means available in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. PSYOP material to accompany detachment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## COMMUNICATIONS SERGEANT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Signal equipment and supplies to accompany detachment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Status of equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cross-load plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Communications plan and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Scheduled contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mandatory reports to SFOD or FOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Alternate encryption system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emergency communications system and procedures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## MEDICAL SERGEANT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Health status of detachment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Medical supplies and equipment to accompany detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cross-load plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual medical equipment and supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Estimate of the medical situation in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Indigenous force health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Preventive medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Health hazards in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Food and nutrition in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Indigenous medical personnel and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Medical logistical plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Medical training plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Indigenous individual soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Indigenous medics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clandestine treatment center personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ENGINEER SERGEANT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Engineer equipment and supplies to accompany detachment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Status of equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cross-load plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Estimate of area potential to support demolitions and engineer requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Mission planning folder (CARVER overlay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. CARVER Analysis of potential targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Availability of supplies in the JSOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Engineer training plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## WEAPONS SERGEANT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Weapons and tactical equipment to accompany detachment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Status of weapons and tactical equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Basic load of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cross-load Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Estimate of area potential to provide additional weapons, ammunition, and tactical equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Assembly area (if not SOP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Contact areas (if not SOP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tentative base camp security plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Weapons and tactics training plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## COMMANDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. CLOSING STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. READINESS POSTURE OF DETACHMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. UNRESOLVED ISSUES OR CONCERNS (IF NONE, SO STATE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Questions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 5  Mission Training Plan - Direct Action
(ARTEP 31-007-32 MTP Special Forces Company, Direct Action page 3-5 through 3-14)
Appendix 6 - Security Assistance Force (SAF)
(FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, page 10-8)

SAF

SF

MP

CA

MI

SPT  SVC

56
## Appendix 7 - Counternarcotics Mission Analysis for Special Forces Missions

*(Prepared by author from analysis of the Army Counternarcotics Plan)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTRAINTS (MUST DO'S)</th>
<th>RESTRAINTS (CAN'T DO'S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NDCS</strong></td>
<td><strong>NDCS (Posses Comitatus)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Interdict drug into United States</td>
<td>- No arrests, seizures, searches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CINC prepare counternarcotics plans</td>
<td>- No military use inside U.S. borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ONDCP coordinates U.S. efforts</td>
<td>- No operational support to law enforcement agencies without O.S.D. approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MILITARY PROVIDES OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ONLY WITH O.S.D. APPROVAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Collect intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Interdict at the source, enroute, and distribution points</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Train host nations to enable them to establish their own counterdrug programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Army Counternarcotics Plan - DOD

- Combined/Interagency effort (premise)
- Counternarcotics is L.I.C. (premise)
- Attack at the source
- D.C.A. coordinates exchange of intel
- Military pursues foreign affairs
- Army provides forces to CINC's and SAO
- Army forces employed under military command
- Army counternarcotics forces prepared for combat
- CINC's provide R.O.E. & R.U.F.
- Training I.A.W. FM 25-100
- Protect soldiers (rescue/recovery implied)