THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF
CANADA'S NEW LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

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In November of 1989, the Canadian Government announced that it had conducted a review of Canadian foreign relations with the countries in the southern portion of the western hemisphere. As a result, a single cohesive foreign policy for the region based upon trade, development and closer multilateral relations was enunciated. The government moved quickly to join the Organization of American States and to undertake initiatives in Latin America. This approach to the region reversed almost 80 years of cautious and often indecisive Latin American relations. The Canadian Armed Forces have always been used as an instrument of national domestic and foreign policy. This paper outlines the new policy and the potential military implications of such an approach to the region.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROJECT

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In November of 1989, the Canadian Government announced that it had conducted a review of Canadian foreign relations with the countries in the southern portion of the western hemisphere. As a result, a single cohesive foreign policy for the region based upon trade, development and closer multilateral relations was enunciated. The government moved quickly to join the Organization of American States and to undertake initiatives in Latin America. This approach to the region reversed almost 80 years of cautious and often indecisive Latin American relations. The Canadian Armed Forces have always been used as an instrument of national domestic and foreign policy. This paper outlines the new policy and the potential military implications of such an approach to the region.
INTRODUCTION

In 1989 the Canadian government re-assessed its foreign policy pertaining to Latin America. For a number of months the Department of External Affairs studied the question of Canadian international relations within the Western Hemisphere. Economists, academics, activists, businessmen and Canadian and foreign politicians and diplomats were all consulted and invited to provide input for the Department's deliberations. The review encompassed the complete spectrum of issues including trade, economics, immigration, tourism, security and narcotics. At the end of its deliberations, the study recommended that Canada place a higher priority on its Latin American relations.¹

Accepting the review, the Canadian government instituted a number of steps to orient, both internally and externally, to the higher profile which Latin America was assuming in Canadian foreign policy. The most tangible and vigorous symbol of this new Canadian approach to
hemispheric relations was officially joining the Organization of American States in January 1990. This was followed by other initiatives in the areas of economics, development and trade.

Some scholars contend that the new policy is not really "new" at all but, rather, a continuation of the evolution of Canada as an actor in the Inter-American system. James Rochlin, a Research Assistant from the Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean at York University in Toronto, points out that Canada has been evolving a Latin American policy of sorts since the last century when trade and business links were first established between the British colonies in the Caribbean and Canada. In a recent article, he traces the various phases Canadian foreign policy for the region has followed. He notes the difficulties that Canada has had in establishing its own independent sphere of action from both Great Britain and the United States. Rochlin theorizes that, for a number of reasons, there has been a closer harmonization of United States and Canadian interests recently.\footnote{2}

On the other hand, some observers would say that
Canada has had no overall hemispheric policy until now. In the words of one academic, there was "...little effort to link interests with foreign policy objectives..." and this resulted in "...fragments of a hemispheric policy...". Most writings on the subject dwell upon the strong bilateral links which Canada cultured over the years in the region but note that any Canadian initiatives were always carried out in the shadow of the major trading and cultural partner to the south, the United States.

While these are valid historical observations, it must be primarily recognized that the newly-enunciated 1989 Canadian policy is founded upon the stark necessity of surviving in a changing world. In that regard, then, it is a policy for the times. No nation adopts a foreign policy from altruistic motives alone and Canada is no exception. Imperatives change periodically, must be re-assessed and policy adjusted. This, essentially, is what has happened over the past year in relation to Canadian Latin American policy. Issues covered in recent pronouncements and actions are those issues which affect Canadians today and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future.

Canada has often been described as an unmilitary
nation. Throughout the country's history, the Canadian Armed Forces have never been a determinant of policy. Canada has never viewed life through a "military lens". On the contrary, Canada has taken the concept of its Armed Forces as the servant of politics to the highest order of utilization. The Canadian government has used its military establishment for furthering economic, social and political aims in times of peace, as well as employing the Canadian Armed Forces in the more classic, Clausewitzian wartime role.

In turn, the military in Canada has been the provider of physical infrastructure, the missionary of law and order, the government's vanguard of bilingualism and the scapegoat of social legislation. In the area of economics, military considerations have always been considered to be quite secondary when trading links or diplomatic initiatives were being negotiated or forged. It is axiomatic, then, that Canada's military will be called upon to support the newly-stated Latin America policies of the government in some manner in the future. Exactly how that will be accomplished could be a matter for some debate.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the implications
for the Canadian Armed Forces of Canada's revised foreign policy toward Latin America.

CURRENT INVOLVEMENT

The Canadian military have little experience in the southern part of the Western Hemisphere. The Canadian fleet exercises annually in the Caribbean Sea, but normally alone or in conjunction with elements of the United States Navy only. Periodically, small military detachments have deployed for humanitarian aid missions. These have been mainly light or medium airlift operations delivering aid supplies during earthquake or tropical storm recovery operations. The army conducted a series of battalion-level exercises in Jamaica during the early 1970s but has had little experience in the area since then. Most of the training provided to Caribbean states has been in the para-military fields of communications, transport, coast guard and air traffic control operations.

To some degree, the argument could be made that Canada is already involved with hemispheric security, if not explicitly then implicitly, by being part of NATO, by being
a maritime trading nation, and by participating in the North American Aerospace Defence Command with the United States. Canadian geography has always been a major factor in Canada's foreign and defence policy. Depending upon the perceived threat to the hemisphere, Canada may be the keeper of the back door, the guardian of the northern flank or the contributor of forces to assist in protecting her sea lines of communication.

THE OAS AND IADB DILEMMA

Perhaps as the most publicized indication that she was serious about a change in her Latin American policy, Canada moved finally to join the Organization of American States. This had been a topic of debate in the country for almost 80 years. A number of factors traditionally were cited for not joining the regional union and caution always won out in the past.

The main perceived problems with Canadian membership in the OAS for many years had been two-fold: firstly, the status of Canada as a self-determining and independent nation prior to 1932 and then, national caution about finding Canadian interests at public cross-purposes to
those of the United States or other allies. Additionally, some observers saw the OAS as inefficient, debt-ridden and dominated by the United States. The problem of independent policy-making was solved in 1932 when the Statute of Westminster officially recognized an independent Canadian foreign policy capability. The Canadian government decided to join the OAS in 1989 with the mature recognition of the fact that Canadian, American and other allies' interests have diverged in the past on many occasions without catastrophic results. As well, there is now hope that new initiatives taken by the OAS, and proposed internal administrative reforms, can both reflect and encourage the new drive for democracy surfacing in Latin America.

As a reservation to joining the OAS, however, Canada declined to sign the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the so-called Rio Treaty). Articles 27 and 28 of this treaty provide for collective hemispheric security and pledge all members to go to the aid of an attacked state when called upon to do so. Concomitant with this, adherents to the Rio Treaty form the Inter-American Defence Board, an umbrella organization for a number of military activities among the signatory nations.
Canada's reluctance to join the Rio Pact was understandable. In the estimation of the Department of External Affairs the Rio Treaty was not a necessary document to sign to gain access to the OAS." It was noted that the provisions of the Rio Treaty had seldom been invoked and, when it was, it was done so in some circumstances which could be deemed questionable. There was concern about whether being a signatory might not develop at cross-purposes with Canada's traditional European links. As an example of the potential dilemma in which the signatory countries found themselves, it was noted that active support and aid was given by the United States to the United Kingdom during the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, despite the fact that the other belligerent, Argentina, was also a signatory of the Rio Treaty. The assessment in Ottawa was that membership in the Rio Pact in that case would have been potentially detrimental to long-standing Canadian links with the UK and that Canada wished not to be maneuvered into a similar position in the future. The Falklands/Malvinas War issue raised the very real question of whether the Rio Treaty was de facto unworkable.

Not signing the Rio Treaty, however, precludes
Canadian participation on the Inter-American Defence Board. While the IADB is not a binding and concrete defence agreement of the type found in NATO, it is a forum to discuss co-ordination of military procedures and to lay the groundwork for future military co-operation. In addition, it sponsors the Inter-American Defence College where senior officers of the military services of member states study together. Lately, the IADB has also turned its attention to the war on drugs and other current hemispheric problems.

Canada has investigated the possibility of observer status with the IADB. Under current rules, there is provision for a non-signatory nation to have such status for a period of three years. This does not currently allow the observer country to send students to the IADC. Officials of the IADB have indicated, however, that there is scope for a change of this rule. In addition, it has been estimated that "about 80 percent of the countries" would welcome some Canadian participation in IADB. National Defence Headquarters, until now, has been reluctant to assume observer status despite encouragement to do so from the Department of External Affairs.

Despite the reluctance or inability of the Canadian
Forces to get involved in Latin America generally or with the OAS in particular, there is no doubt that the Canadian Forces must look southward as such external relations develop. Shifting perspectives in the world will force Canada to play a different role than the traditional, Eurocentric one of the past. In turn, the Canadian Forces will have to orient some of its attention to Latin America. The IADB provides a convenient, inexpensive and useful window on the Southern Hemisphere.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Canadian economic interests in Latin America have had a strong, if somewhat selective, history. Canadian involvement in the area actually has been accomplished mainly by private, not governmental means. Both the Caribbean Basin and Central America have had strong traditional economic links with Canada. The economic well-being of Latin America is of great concern to Canada, perhaps more so than most Canadians understand.

Canada has been actively involved in the economic structure of the Caribbean and Latin America for almost a century. Indeed, Canadian economic interests were active
in the southern reaches of Canada's trading sphere before similar moves were made at home. For instance, Canadian banks opened branch offices in Havana and Kingston, Jamaica before they established themselves in Toronto in the last decade of the nineteenth century.¹¹ A large and flowing trade had been conducted between the Canadian Maritime Provinces and the Caribbean throughout the two centuries previous to that.

The interest by Canadian business has continued. Major investments have been made and large segments of Canadian trade are dependent upon the region. In 1990, Latin America was Canada's third largest market.¹² Canadian exports to the region total about $2.9 billion currently. Since 1983, over 50% of the trade exports to the region have been manufactured goods and items from the high technology sector, not raw materials.¹³ With the recent interest in free trade with Mexico, the volume is expected to increase. If the new United States "Enterprises for the Americas Initiative" comes to fruition, trade figures will undoubtedly spiral upwards.

Canadian banks have invested heavily in both the Caribbean and Latin America. Of the total Latin America
debt owed externally, a large percentage of it is held by Canadian banks. Fully 72% of loans outstanding to Canadian banks in "lesser-developed countries" is held by Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, three "high-risk" debtor nations. Although efforts over the past years by Canadian banks to cover these loans by reserves have improved the situation domestically, there is still great cause for concern in international and Canadian monetary circles.

There appears, on surface, to be little that the Canadian Forces can do to participate in the economic development of the Latin America countries. Indeed, the point is carefully made by government officials that the thrust of Canadian aid to the region is specifically not of the military variety. Canada has not given military assistance to any but a handful of Caribbean states, and then it was mainly in the form of agreements for individual training and small-unit reciprocal training exercises.

Economic benefits, however, will flow for all with an expansion of trade in the area or with the introduction of any future free trade structure. The more developed countries of Latin America have industries which are comparable to those in Canada: industrial and technology
sectors capable of moderate and high technology but which lack capital and markets. There may be scope for ultimate co-operation among such companies. In any accounting of industries, there will inevitably be defence contractors or sub-contractors.

As an example of the sort of mutually-beneficial arrangements possible in Latin America in future, the present United States-Canadian accords concerning defence production may serve as a model. Over the past decades, there have been tremendous benefits for, and contributions made by, Canadian industry under United States-Canada Defence Production Sharing Agreements. Depending upon the need of the defence sector at any given time, Canadian companies have been net suppliers, in some measure or other, for the United States military, or have contributed technology for use by the American armed services. Cases in point are the large quantities of supplies of ammunition, spare parts and other military equipment manufactured in Canada during the Vietnam War. Conversely, United States products are used extensively by the Canadian Forces, technology has been transferred and trade has been stimulated. The Agreements have been valuable to both nations.
It is possible to envisage similar industrial connections with various Latin American firms, particularly if free trade arrangements are negotiated. Markets for such products may be tighter in the future. Defence industries are no different from other industries. They require economies of scale and are subject to the same need for markets and for investment. It is not difficult to imagine defence production sharing agreements which could capitalize on emerging free trade blocs. The defence sector will be an important area for market opportunities. Military technological co-production agreements, modelled upon existing Canada-US arrangements, could contribute to technology transfer, economic development and trade balances to the benefit of all parties. Canadian participation in the United States-Mexico free trade talks has begun and defence industrial agreements will inevitably be included.  

**WAR ON DRUGS**

The Canadian government has pledged to participate in the war on drugs currently being waged in the world. Most
counter-narcotic activity is now done in routine cooperation with the United States. This is likely to continue and, as the circumstance arises, it is not inconceivable that the Canadian military may find itself continuing to act upon information originating with Latin America sources in the future. Some intelligence contacts have been established but these are currently on the police level and are conducted bilaterally. In addition, Canada has made gifts of needed equipment to Latin America drug enforcement agencies.¹

Under Canadian law, the Canadian Forces may be called upon to assist the civil power. The federal government has made it clear that it will make personnel and equipment available for the interdiction of narcotics importation operations. In the past few years, Canadian destroyers have acted in a backup capacity for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to intercept drug shipments on both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Air surveillance radars, part of the North American Aerospace Defence Command, have monitored aircraft movements into remote areas where police units have seized imported cargoes of illicit substances. There are no legal provisions to employ the Canadian Forces outside Canada in support of domestic police activity.
There is little likelihood of any Canadian military direct-action involvement in Latin America in the war on drugs. More likely is continued co-operation with the United States and agencies in other countries in the police intelligence network with the Canadian Forces continuing to act, only in Canada and in Canadian territorial waters, in their traditional role of support to civilian authorities.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Canada has increased its general monetary and technical development assistance to Latin America in recent years. During the period 1982-87, Canadian aid went from a negligible level to $167 million. By 1988 it had climbed to $200 million and it is targetted to reach $300 million in 1996. While these may not be huge figures in global terms, the rate of increase has been dramatic and the sums are not inconsequential considering the current Canadian debt crisis.¹⁴

Much of Canadian development aid for Latin America, as is the case with other worldwide assistance, has been channelled via non-governmental organizations. In some
cases, the Canadian government has used the Canadian International Development Agency and direct governmental contacts to provide personnel and technical assistance. In other cases, Canada has forgiven loans to countries unable to repay. In 1989, a number of Caribbean states were major recipients of this form of aid.

There has never been any Canadian military aid given to Latin America. Minimal training assistance has been provided to selected Caribbean countries and almost all of this has been at the individual level. It would be very difficult for the Canadian Forces to assist in any way in physical developmental assistance in the region. The Canadian Forces are small and lack the type of specialized units necessary for civic action or nation-building programs. Few units could be found (and, if found, spared) of the type now employed in the United States Army's Task Force Bravo in Honduras.

In any event, this may not be a desirable way for Canada to contribute to the development of the region. There is concern being expressed in some quarters about whether or not the employment of military units is the correct way to deliver development assistance to nations.
which are, in many cases, in the process of divesting themselves of military governments. Ethical questions are being articulated now about what sort of message is being sent to the population of a country who, on the one hand, are being encouraged to divest themselves of military junta rule when, on the other hand, the harbingers of the democratic, free way ahead are uniformed military personnel.

It is doubtful that Canada will be faced with the dilemma. Canadian Forces units and personnel will be in short supply and, if development is deemed to be a legitimate tasking, there are more than enough projects for them to accomplish in their home country.

**SOME POSSIBILITIES**

There are a number of ways, however, in which the Canadian Forces may participate in the new Latin American initiative. Indeed, there may be ways in which the Canadian Forces will be *required* to support government policy. Given that the governments of the present and the past have shown no reluctance to use the Canadian Forces in the pursuit of any and all goals, it is feasible to assume
that the military establishment in Canada will be asked to contribute its share, and perhaps more, to the new policy. It behooves military planners, then, to consider the best ways in which the Canadian Forces can participate.

DIPLOMATIC

Firstly, there are no Canadian Forces Defence Attaches presently deployed south of Washington. The attache in Washington and his staff have no responsibility whatsoever for anything south of the United States-Mexico border.\(^1\) Given the sheer land mass and economic potential of the southern hemisphere this is an area needing early improvement. The Department of National Defence is not completely to blame for this state of affairs. External Affairs closed down some missions in Latin America a number of years ago as an expense-cutting measure. However, major embassies in countries such as Brazil and Argentina have not had Canadian Forces attache representation for many years.

In 1991 Canada will put a military attache into Mexico City.\(^2\) There was concern that this is not the correct placement for the officer and his small staff. The
suggestion that a mission should be located further south has been advanced. Buenos Aires, Brasilia or Caracas were cited as potential alternates. Officially, the decision on Mexico City was made in order that travel would be facilitated and that access to Cuba would be easier. One suspects that impending free trade talks with Mexico and the United States may also have had some bearing upon the decision. Officials indicate that further attaches will be located in other capitals as relations develop and as circumstance permits.

Properly constituted and employed, military attache staffs in countries which are emerging from decades of military rule may be a key element in the communication with, and understanding the factors internal to, such a country. A properly placed and well-connected military attache can be a very useful adjunct to an ambassador's staff in countries whose ruling and privileged class roots are still firmly entrenched in the military strata of society.

DIRECT CONTACT

Routine contacts with Latin America will be necessary
on the military plane. At present, the Canadian understanding of the military establishment and capabilities of Latin American forces is rudimentary at best. There is a vague impression that many have some sort of American interoperability, but the full extent of their size, operations and spheres of influence in society is not well understood. There is much scope for basic data gathering and assessment to increase the Canadian knowledge level of each country. This can improve only with regular contact and professional military exchanges.

One immediate reaction may be that there is little in common between the Canadian Forces and any given Latin America military force. In some areas this is so: in other areas, this is less true. While the Central American jungle is a far cry from the Canadian Arctic, the Argentinian Antarctic is not. The plains of Argentina and the mountains of Chile and Peru are similar to those of Canada. Ocean patrols, the problems of vast coastal defence operations and the techniques for control of sea lanes of communication are the same. Air operations in remote areas and long distance deployments to frontier areas call for the same skills. Therefore, there is fertile ground for the exchange of doctrine and techniques.
For years, the maritime forces of Canada have been dedicated to the premise that a major task in the event of war will be the protection of shipping between North America and Europe. To this end, the Commander in Chief of NATO's Western Atlantic area is in Halifax and will work in wartime under NATO control. However, any future world economic arrangements could see threats remain static or even decline against east-west sea traffic and possibly mount against newly-forged trading links with the Caribbean and Latin America. Canadian naval units would probably still be expected to operate in conjunction with the United States Navy but might also find themselves working in close proximity with a number of South American navies. While this may seem an implausible scenario now, it must be remembered that no one expected Canada to deploy ships to the Persian Gulf on short notice in 1990. Greater plausibility can be found today for naval deployments to secure control of maritime shipping routes southward to the Caribbean, Mexico or the oil fields of Venezuela.

Speaking at a 1985 seminar in Toronto, Rear Admiral W.T. Pendley of the United States Navy highlighted the
importance of the Caribbean Basin at that time. He noted that sixty percent of imported oil to the United States and many other raw minerals pass through it. United States Gulf ports handle almost fifty percent of American trade. In the case of deployment of military forces overseas, plans call for at least one-half of European bound supplies to come from these ports and through Caribbean waters. In fact, a large proportion of the troops and shipping for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the deployment of United States troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990, came from these very Gulf ports. Considered in conjunction with the importance of access to the Panama Canal, it is doubtful whether any other area of confluence of shipping lanes has the same strategic importance for the United States and its allies. Canada, too, relies upon Venezuela for an overwhelming proportion of its imported oil supplies. With the advent of more intensive hemispheric trade, the importance of this area for all countries can only grow.

Conceptual plans do exist for the control of shipping within Latin America waters and along the coasts of North America. While all operational plans are not final, there is general agreement on the methods of operation. As well, some thought is now being given to the problems of
interoperability and tactical control among the South American navies. A hypothesis has been postulated which would see the present nationalistic and territorial water responsibilities for sea control being replaced with a more centralized and rational co-operative plan for the control of American ocean areas, much like those which now exist in NATO. Canada, a maritime-dependent nation, must have a broad understanding of what neighbouring navies are doing, or plan to do, in times of hostility. Therefore, direct naval contacts should be encouraged to the degree necessary to attain this.

In much the same vein, similar scenarios could be sketched for air operations. These, however, should be less of a problem given the relative commonality of aircraft types used and the technical requirements of air force operations which are, perhaps, more standardized than those of other services. Notwithstanding that, and for the same reasons applicable to naval operations outlined above, the possibility of co-operative tactical aviation operations could be every bit as high as that for maritime operations in the southern hemisphere, taking into account the flexibility and range of equipments involved.

If trade routes shift to become more north-south, the
possibility of maritime air co-operation, particularly in the Caribbean, could increase. Air transport support operations could be of importance if there is a commitment of Canadian or other friendly nation ground forces for any reason to the Caribbean Basin or to points in the southern hemisphere.

The forecast changes in the American military Unified Command Plan may affect the deployment plans of all North and South Atlantic navies. If speculation is correct, there could be only one major unified command which will encompass all of the Atlantic Ocean and Europe. This would remove the arbitrary and restrictive delineation of boundaries between the present US Southern Command and US Atlantic Command. Planning in such a new and large command could naturally lead to greater integration of all interested military, and particularly naval, forces which border upon the Ocean. Thus, the way to more thorough and easier international planning may be facilitated by the US re-organization. The Canadian military should be aware of this opportunity and seize the chance to participate on a wider geographic scale than it now does.

Direct contact between the forces of Canada and Latin
American nations may have one other important side-effect. Because of the history of the military in some of the Latin American countries, there is a perception among many that military unrest and right wing takeovers are inevitable. In some measure, because of the traditional use of the military in cultural, national integration and national cohesiveness tasks, this is true. However, by seeing the example of another diverse and successful nation and the place its military occupies in the social strata, there may be some contribution which can be made by the Canadian military in subtly educating military officers of Latin American armies about the place of the military in a free and democratic society. One cannot make too much of this aspect of direct contact, other than to acknowledge that some subtle knowledge may be transferred by osmosis. It would be a mistake, however, to state this as a goal. Canadian officers can hardly be expected to change the cultural norms of generations during the course of one assignment.

PEACEKEEPING

A commitment to the Southern Hemisphere of Canadian ground forces, including tactical aviation, is not so
far-fetched as it may appear at first glance. The recent UN/OAS operation, ONUCA, which supervised the 1989 peace settlement between the Nicaraguan Sandinista government and the U.S.-supported Contras was the first of what could be a number of international dispute settlement mechanisms in the region. In the move to democratic rule in Latin America, the road will not be easy and there will be instances of border disputes, internal factionalism and security questions to solve. The OAS and the UN may find their services are requested more frequently for peacekeeping.

Recent initiatives by both the OAS and the UN marked a turning point in the use of such mechanisms in this area of the world. The Secretaries-General of both organizations have seized new initiatives and, by combining their powers, have created a powerful synergism which may be useful in application to other long-standing conflicts in the region. Whether this will herald a new, more active OAS or whether such initiatives will come from the UN is a moot point. The possibility of further peacekeeping actions is high. After the ONUCA success of disarming and returning over 22,000 combatants to peaceful pursuits, it will be hard not to attempt to emulate that feat in other areas.
In the Hemisphere, Canada is an acknowledged and experienced participant in peacekeeping operations. Politically more acceptable than the Americans and with an interest in the stability of the region, Canada may be called upon to lend expertise and personnel to the formation of such peacekeeping forces as are, from time to time, needed. For example, a group of Canadian military and civilian experts was deployed to Haiti in late 1990 to assist in election supervision. Peaceful resolution of conflicts is becoming more and more the norm now that superpower relationships appear to be taking a new, more benign tack. Canadian Forces may be deployed more frequently as formal peacekeeping operations become an acknowledged and effective way of international co-operation in some troubled areas of the Western Hemisphere.

AN INTERMEDIARY ROLE

In terms of classic hemispheric power politics, an old fear is beginning to creep into the minds of many. Concerns exist about the possibility of a reversal of United States diplomacy to that of the gunboat variety.
With the demise of the bogeyman of the international Communist movement, some old and ingrained nervousness has surfaced about a regression to Big Stick diplomacy. The waning of the Cold War, so the theory goes, will lift any inhibitions on interventionism which may have been felt by the United States and allow the northern giant to dictate again by force. The December 1989, Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, extra-territorial actions by American law enforcement agencies in their enthusiasm to combat drug criminals in Mexico, the 1990 unilateral and ill-considered decision to place a US Navy aircraft carrier into Colombian waters, the deployment of increased numbers of US Army Special Forces to Peru and the shelling of a Cuban ship in international waters by the United States Coast Guard are seen as ominous portents by Latin Americans. A Canadian presence within a multilateral approach to hemispheric problems (within or outside of the OAS) may provide a calming counterweight for Latin American and US interests. In some instances, Canadian military participation may assist the US in accomplishing its negotiated goals.
CONCLUSION

It appears that the period of benign neglect on the part of Canada toward Latin America is coming to an end. Whether this is because of greater harmonization of United States-Canadian interests or whether there has been a genuine re-assessment of Canadian policy in the light of shifting political and economic in the world is unimportant. The fact remains that there will be, according to all indications, more attention diverted toward the southern hemisphere in general during the future.

As always, the Canadian Forces can be expected to be required to contribute to Canadian national aims in whatever way they can. Given the fiscal problems of the military and the government, the tasks for the military will have to be carefully framed to extract maximum benefit for all concerned.

RECOMMENDED COURSES

The deployment of more attaches to Central and South
America would allow the Government of Canada to have another dimension of information available to policy-makers. For a modest investment, a substantial initiative can be started which will pay dividends later.

Next, Canada should seek observer status at the Inter-American Defence Board. Notwithstanding that such status may have to be terminated at some time in the future, initial contacts with southern neighbors can be established and the information gleaned from this source can be factored into future governmental policy for the region.

Both the above measures, in military terms, could be considered to be deployment of reconnaissance forces. The time will come, however, when actual missions will have to be assigned to the Canadian Armed Forces. In this area, the military maxim of reinforcing success should be followed. For the Canadian Forces, that means capitalizing upon its experience in peacekeeping operations to allow the settlement of disputes by negotiation. It is reasonable to assume that the success of the 1989-90 ONUCA operation will lead to similar missions. This, of course, is dependent upon political will being exhibited by the major power.
player (the United States) and participants of disputes themselves. The recent initiatives in the area on the part of the OAS and governments concerned bode well for this activity to continue.

Additionally, the Canadian Forces should develop contacts at various levels on a bilateral or multilateral basis with a number of countries. These may be as simple as visits and staff talks or as intricate as reciprocal training exercises. However, caution must be exercised in these contacts. Neither the Canadian public nor the Canadian Forces have the same perception of the place of the military in society as do many Latin American military establishments. Some degree of contact will be necessary, however, and the Inter-American Defence Board referred to above may be the proper umbrella organization in which to approach this aspect of relations.

Lastly, Canadian military actions in Latin America must not be merely a desire on the part of the military to fulfill some false destiny. Charges will be raised, inevitably, that the Canadian Forces are looking for work as a result of a perceived demise of the European threat. Actions undertaken must be clearly identified to be in
support of Canadian Latin American policy. In this vein, it is important that current military capabilities be matched to commitment. Never again should the military in Canada allow the government of the day to maneuver it into a situation, like that of the northern NATO commitment, when forces available were clearly incapable of being raised and deployed to fulfill a political goal. In the case of Latin America, this probably means not deploying units on nation-building tasks but, rather, continuing to engage in short-term humanitarian aid or peacekeeping for finite periods of time.

The implications of the new Canadian Latin American policy for the Canadian Forces are unlikely to be great and overwhelming. However, it is incumbent upon the military staff to ensure that the military commitment is handled in a rational way, commensurate with the capabilities of the military establishment of the nation.
ENDNOTES


3. Robert Jackson, "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere," in *Governance in the Western Hemisphere*, ed. by Viron P. Vaky, p.120.


5. John D. Harbron, "Is There a Canadian Role in Regional Security?", *Canada. The Caribbean and Central America*, Proceedings of Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Toronto, Fall 1985. pp. 118-136. It should be noted that the Canadian Coast Guard is a much different and less-military organization than the USCG. Normally, Canadian vessels are not armed and are employed mainly upon search and rescue missions, maritime safety measures and routine maintenance of navigational aids. Therefore, there is no military implication of the training given, as far as Canada is concerned.


7. Government of Canada, House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada. "Briefing Note: OAS Membership" 26 October 1989. The position of the Canadian Government on the question of Articles 27 and 28 was based upon legal advice given by the counsel of the Department of External Affairs, Canada.

8. Exchange of Letters, Canadian Ambassador to the

10. Letter from Director, Defense Relations Division of External Affairs and International Trade Canada to Director, International Policy, Department of National Defense, Ottawa, Canada, 22 January, 1990. See also the facsimile covering the subject (circa 1 February, 1990) from External Affairs to National Defense indicating that the former department favors observer status on the IADB.


15. Joe Clark, "Canadian Policy Towards Latin America", Address to University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, 1 February 1990.


22. Ibid


27. Interview with Brigadier General Ian Douglas, former Deputy Chief Military Observer and Chief of Staff, ONUCA. Ottawa, Canada, 23 November 1990.

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