OCONUS Counternarcotic Campaign Planning

A Monograph
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This monograph proposes that the similarities between counterinsurgency and counternarcotic operations are such that a counterinsurgency campaign planning framework can be adapted for counternarcotic campaign planning.

The study develops a counterinsurgency campaign planning framework based on historical example and FM 100-20. It proposes that a plan developed from this framework constitutes a supporting campaign plan even though it is usually designed for a single country as opposed to a theater of operations.

The paper then transitions to counternarcotics giving some background and adapting the counterinsurgency planning framework to counternarcotics operations.
The monograph concludes that the issue of convergence between counterinsurgency and counternarcotics is valid enough for adaptation of a counterinsurgency planning framework. It raises the doctrinal question of where responsibility lies for planning a campaign of U.S. civil-military operations for a given country. Finally, it concludes that until a solution is mandated, the development and implementation of a campaign plan (or "country plan") will be a function of the theater CINCs will and ability to cooperate with the other major players.
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ABSTRACT

OCONUS COUNTERNARCOTIC CAMPAIGN PLANNING by Major James A. Horris, USA, 49 pages.

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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the newest challenges to the theater operational planner is the development of the counternarcotic campaign plan. As the Army wrestles with conventional campaign planning, it is yet one more degree of difficulty to consider the programs—operations if you will—which comprise a counternarcotic campaign. The tenets of campaign planning as expressed in doctrinal literature apply with some modification. However, there are no tools for the operational planner. There is no model or framework available which addresses the types of operations which may apply in a counternarcotic situation. The purpose of this paper is to propose such a framework for counternarcotic campaign planning.

For the U.S. military, counternarcotic operations fall generally into two categories: CONUS and OCONUS. CONUS-based counternarcotic operations are essentially area denial and interdiction operations aimed at stopping the flow of foreign-produced drugs into the U.S. OCONUS operations are of a significantly different character. They not only include the myriad federal agencies involved in the CONUS anti-drug effort, but also must be integrated with the plans of host nations. The scope and types of operations required bear a strong resemblance to counter-insurgency operations.

Additionally, OCONUS operations have particular appeal. As part of the direct approach in fighting narcotrafficking, they
...are more effective than interdiction. Striking at the source of
drug production is far less complicated and costly than inter-
diction.\(^1\)

In order to develop an OCONUS planning framework, I will use
as a basis the premise that there are striking similarities be-
tween counternarcotics (CN) operations and counterinsurgency
(COIN) operations. The first step in the procedure will there-
fore be to develop a COIN campaign planning framework.

In the spring of 1989 Major Richard J. Macak published a
monograph asserting that the CORDS pacification program used
during the Vietnam War constituted an operational level campaign
plan for low-intensity conflict.\(^2\) In it, Macak develops the
theory that the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support (CORDS) program qualified as a legitimate campaign be-
cause of its scope, the presence of an operational leader
(Robert W. Komer), its long-term focus on strategic goals, its
flexibility, and its conduct of successive and simultaneous op-
erations.\(^3\)

Building on this, I propose that the CORDS program and other
successful counterinsurgencies possess common features. While a
planner should recognize that each insurgency is unique, there
are recognized _types_ of insurgencies.\(^4\) Just as the insurgencies
possess common features, so too do the countermeasures. Thus,
in a generic sense, an operational planner may use a planning
framework composed of a "menu" of programs, or operations, to be
implemented as required. Program design and sequencing remain
the art of the operational planner. I will propose such a menu based on the information presented in FM 100-20, and substantiated by historical example.

After developing the framework, I will discuss the qualifications of a COIN country plan as a legitimate campaign plan based primarily on tenets developed in the Army War College report on Campaign Planning. I will also briefly discuss the hierarchy of campaign plans as developed in the same report, and determine the appropriate place for a COIN country plan in this hierarchy.

Following this, I will transition to CN campaign planning by presenting briefly the nature and scope of the drug threat, particularly that coming from South America. Of more importance than the already well-documented statistics of drug production and trafficking will be a comparison of narcotrafficking activities and insurgency. This will be the fundamental premise for establishing the applicability of a COIN planning framework to CN campaign planning.

Section IV will modify the COIN campaign planning framework into a CN campaign framework. I will discuss the counter-narcotic-specific considerations which drive modification of the COIN model as well as integration with existing counter-insurgencies.
I will conclude the monograph with a summary and a discussion of the doctrinal implications of COIN and CN campaign planning, and a description of the SOUTHCOM campaign planning process.

II. COIN CAMPAIGN FRAMEWORK

... overall plan of campaign should not be regarded as an operational matter, but primarily a function of government.

- Frank Kitson

We have traditionally viewed a campaign as the sequencing of major military operations toward the achievement of a strategic goal. The objectives of these major operations have normally been tangible and easy to identify, as has the strategic goal. A counterinsurgency campaign is a departure from this. The military plays an integral though not necessarily a primary role in counterinsurgency. Thus a COIN campaign will involve the sequencing of major "operations" or programs, civil-military in nature, to achieve a strategic goal. In most cases, this goal is maintaining the legitimacy of the existing government.

The conclusion of this rationale is that while the major programs may have concrete objectives, the strategic objective, legitimacy, is perceptual. While the thought process one uses for conventional campaign planning will apply, as do most tenets, the reader must accept that a COIN campaign goes beyond purely military operations.
Field Manual 100-20 gives extensive detail on counter-insurgency, providing much information gleaned from the lessons of history. The concepts of Balanced Development, Security, Neutralization, and Mobilization are sound, as are the internal defense and development (IDAD) campaign objectives presented in Appendix E:

- To implement development programs
- To establish control in populated areas
- To neutralize the insurgent infrastructure and tactical forces
- To deny the use of insurgent bases
- To establish government strength and authority in selected areas.

However, the planner is still left without a menu or framework of programs (major operations) with which to construct his campaign. While FM 100-20 does, in fact, present most of the information needed, it is not in a facile format for planning. The purpose here is to provide a list of tools, or programs, to the planner for use as necessary in designing a COIN campaign.

As in designing other campaigns, the planner will look to national strategic guidance to determine the end states, or conditions he wishes to achieve in order to meet strategic goals. It is the next step, the sequencing of major operations, which uses the COIN planning framework.

Here, again, COIN campaign planning departs from conventional planning in that a theater planner must interact closely with the country team in developing a viable plan. I will discuss this more at the end of the chapter. Finally, the application of resources (money, troops, etc) may well be governed by
such constraints as security assistance funds, political accept-
ability of the use of U.S. combat forces, and other consider-
ations over which the theater commander has little control.

The components of the framework are:

  Command, Control, and Coordination
  Development
  Population and Resource Denial
  Intelligence and Infrastructure Neutralization
  Amnesty Program
  Psychological Operations
  Military/Police Security and Strike Operations

At first glance, the above looks like a simple repeat of the
types of operations described in FM 100-20 with some omissions.
This is not my intent. As I will describe, they represent na-
tional level programs - "major operations" - which incorporate
and combine the types of operations presented in FM 100-20.

Before describing each component, a discussion of threat
analysis is appropriate. Strategic goals are usually broadly
stated objectives. In order to provide more specific objectives
for the major operations of a COIN campaign, the planner must
have a detailed understanding of the nature of his enemies.
This then allows him to select and prioritize the appropriate
programs from the framework.

The mechanics of threat analysis for counterinsurgency are
presented in FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis and FM 34-130, In-
telligence Preparation of the Battlefield. However, the
orientation is toward a mass-oriented revolutionary insurgency. The planner should be familiar with the broader field of insurgencies. FM 100-20 lists four types of insurgencies and classifies them as organizational patterns. They are:

- Critical Cell
- Subversive
- Mass-oriented
- Traditional

In the book, *Insurgency in the Modern World*, Bard O'Neill also lists types of insurgencies: secessionist, reformist, revolutionary, restorational, reactionary, and conservative. More accurately, these are descriptions of the issues or purposes of insurgency and they dovetail with one or more of the types prescribed in FM 100-20. The point is that the planner must be able to discern the issues and conditions which will drive the selection of goals for national programs. He must go beyond what is presented in the manuals in order to accurately conduct a center of gravity/vulnerability analysis of both the insurgent and the host nation. It is this analysis which provides the focus for the programs, or major operations, he constructs. Once the threat analysis is completed, the planner then develops his desired end states. (At the strategic level, the objective—legitimacy of the government—does not change.) Selecting from the planning framework, he tailors programs to defeat the insurgency.
Command, Control and Coordination. Under this category, the planner should address two salient requirements: The first is the establishment of a national coordination mechanism; and the second is a plan for civilian oversight and grievance redress. FM 100-20 describes a dedicated COIN planning and coordination mechanism extending from the national to the local level. It prescribes the use of Area Coordination Centers (ACC) at subnational levels to ensure unity of effort. Frank Kitson discusses coordination as an essential part of the framework for a workable campaign. The organization should be as lean as possible since its mission is to coordinate not command. Civilian agencies, paramilitary and military units retain command of their own organizations. However they respond to the ACC. The national center and ACCs should not replace existing agencies or governments; rather they should focus civil-military efforts, help avoid redundancy and resolve conflicting initiatives. Additionally, the ACCs help ensure an "immediate coordinated response to operational requirements."

Civilian oversight of consolidation operations is essential. The campaign plan and law should provide for input by civil councils to each ACC in order to ensure feedback from the people. As a primary duty, these councils should provide a high priority conduit for citizen grievance resolution. The British instituted Public Review Boards in Malaya for these purposes.
Similarly, Ramon Magsaysay, the Philippine president who fought a successful counterinsurgency against the Huks during the 1950s, gained a significant moral victory when he instituted a system for redress of the people's complaints against government forces.

**Development.** Development programs do not attack the insurgent directly but rather address the conditions which have caused disaffection with the government. Development will consist of a series of social, political, and economic initiatives based on informed analysis. Ill-advised initiatives will only lessen the legitimacy of the government. Program establishment is essentially an administrative function. Program funding, manning, and implementation are much larger obstacles in third world countries today. Many simply do not have the resources. And for such issues as land reform, an historically difficult problem, governmental will often is lacking.

Development planning realistically goes well beyond the purview of the military planner. However, the scope of development programs and their critical impact on the success of other operations in a COIN campaign make it a field in which the planner must be conversant. In Ramon Magsaysay's successful counterinsurgency in the 1950s, it was his strong-willed and unflagging efforts at aid and reform, his "left hand" effort, which negated early military abuses and solidified later military successes, his "right hand" effort. Magsaysay used
the left hand/right hand metaphors to illustrate the concept of concurrent operations aimed at both the root causes of the insurgency and the guerrillas themselves. Conversely, it is the Philippine government's failure to back up consolidation efforts with lasting reforms which is frustrating the counter-insurgency campaign there today.\textsuperscript{17}

Population and Resource Denial. Under this major operation are three separate programs: consolidation/counterorganizing operations; resettlement; and emergency legislation (known in FM 100-20 as population and resource control measures, or PRC).\textsuperscript{18} This program will be the heart of the COIN campaign particularly in a mass-based insurgency.

Consolidation operations, in particular, involve operations and assets from virtually every other program in the framework. Consolidation operations are a concentrated effort by the government at a single point, synchronizing the assets of many programs to separate the insurgent from the people. The government tailors its efforts to the community or area in which it is working based on economics, insurgent influence, and attitudes of the people. The tactical procedures used in consolidation are described in FM 100-20 and have been used throughout recent history.\textsuperscript{19} Putting it in terms of the IDAD concept: the government first secures an area, then follows it with development,
incorporating programs to neutralize the insurgent infrastructure and mobilize the people behind the government. The government orchestrates its programs to ensure the pursuit of these concepts over the long term. Mobilizing the people in a heavily insurgent-influenced community requires personnel specially trained in PSYOPS, public information, and social investigation skills. This is known as counterorganizing. 20

At the operational level, governments have sometimes adopted a single approach; the "oil-spot strategy" is perhaps the best known. 21 Coined by the French in Indochina the concept of the oil-spot strategy is to focus consolidation efforts initially on the most critical population centers. Once these areas have been secured, counterorganized, and mobilized behind the government, the government then presses its influence outward, repeating the process and leaving at the center a secure base. The Mekong River Delta could be considered such a strategic base. Once the insurgent has been forced away from these strategic bases into remote areas, the military conducts strike operations to eliminate the remaining guerrillas. The oil-spot strategy was the concept behind the CIA's Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program in the early 1960s in Vietnam, 22 and has been used with success by the Royal Thai government. 23

An alternate operational technique adopted by the Philippines is known as "gradual constriction." 24 Though it resembles a tactical cordon-and-search operation, it may be conducted at the operational level. It is essentially the oil-spot strategy
in reverse, consolidating an ever-closing ring of populated areas and forcing the remaining insurgents (in a front or fronts) into a central zone. The military can then conduct strike operations to destroy the remaining guerrillas. It remains to be seen whether this technique will be successful.

Resettlement of a portion of the population to deny access to the insurgent is a concept which has seen both spectacular success and striking failure in history. At the operational level, the planner must consider cultural acceptability (loss of ancestral lands) as well the impact on resources. Integration with land reform is yet another issue. Wherever the community is relocated, consolidation operations must be conducted and a follow-up of political, economic, and social development is imperative.

A successful resettlement program such as the British conducted in Malaya is enormously expensive. Some of these costs may qualify for non-military security assistance funds. For the planner, however, the cost of the program is secondary to appropriateness. Only if resettlement will achieve the desired effect of population denial, should the planner conduct a cost analysis.

Emergency legislation also plays an integral role in consolidation operations. FM 100-20 does not use this term, but rather "Populace and Resource Control."\textsuperscript{25} Whatever the name, the planner must approach emergency legislation carefully. While it can greatly enhance population denial and intelligence
operations, it is also an admission that a state of crisis exists and is fertile ground for potential abuse.

Abuse arises from the inability of a government to discipline itself. A government cannot ignore its own laws if it is to retain its legitimacy. It may however "initiate special laws, or change the way it enforces them." Emergency legislation has the potential to provide fodder for enemy propaganda and endanger civil liberties. The planner, therefore, must include in his analysis the ability of the government to discipline itself in the application of emergency legislation as well as have some mechanism for periodic review (and repeal if necessary). Emergency legislation impacts in several ways: Politically, any locally-elected body relinquishes some of its authority; the economy must accommodate new agencies, offices, and personnel; and personal freedoms are curtailed. Consequently, enforcement and psychological operations support must accompany emergency legislation. FM 100-20 lists nine examples of emergency legislation. Of these, the civilian registration (ID card) system and the use of checkpoints and searches have the greatest potential for yielding intelligence through link and pattern analysis.

Intelligence and Infrastructure Neutralization. An intelligence system aimed at ferreting out the insurgent's political and civil infrastructure is the key to defeating the insurgency. If the infrastructure is not attacked directly, the insurgency may
be suppressed in an area, but not destroyed. Identifying and eliminating insurgent infrastructure is an integral part of consolidation operations.

In the past, successful intelligence operations in COIN have been national level systems. They were all-source programs which were centralized for dissemination but decentralized for collection and analysis. The intelligence system should function through the existing national coordination mechanism down through the Area Coordination Centers (ACC), to the local level. Because of the similarity between infrastructure and organized crime, a police intelligence organization may best provide the basis for this system.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) will always be the keystone of intelligence collection in a counterinsurgency, but the potential for contribution by U.S. strategic assets must not be overlooked. The elimination of parochialism by different collection agencies should be part of the intelligence system's charter.

Such an intelligence system can pose a threat to a government. Highly centralized control therefore is important. Unfortunately, once an insurgency has spread, the intelligence organization must grow with it and become decentralized. To compensate for growth, the intelligence system should include a fusion center in each ACC. This not only ensures government control, but also dissemination. Fused intelligence may then be passed to the appropriate agency (police or military) for neutralization of infrastructure targets.
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Like the intelligence system, the PSYOPS organization must be national in scope and have representatives at every level of government. This is fully a government program, not just a military program. Kitson, in Bunch of Five, recommends the assignment of special staff advisers to policy-making groups to keep them apprised of the consequences of their actions. Overarching PSYOPS themes are cleared at the national level and PSYOPS personnel in ACCs ensure that local themes dovetail with the national PSYOPS program. PSYOPS serve multiple functions: to mobilize the people behind the government, to counter foreign assistance to the insurgents, to counter insurgent propaganda, to bolster the morale of government forces, and to ease the burden of Emergency Legislation.

For the planner, the final requirement in establishing a PSYOPS program is to provide for oversight. As Kitson states, "An information system represents the erosion of a basic freedom." The consistent provision of ill-selected information can produce unforeseen consequences and prove a danger in the long run.

Amnesty Program. An amnesty program adheres to Sun Tzu's principle of leaving the enemy a way out. It is a powerful psychological tool which allows the government to recruit insurgents away from their cause. Amnesty programs were used
effectively by Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines, by the British in Malaya, and by the U.S. in Vietnam (Chieu Hoi Program). It also is an essential support to the intelligence system's efforts to neutralize insurgent infrastructure by rallying disgruntled members. (After exploitation by intelligence and PSYOPS units, the insurgent passes into the amnesty program for resettlement.)

An amnesty program requires a separate administrative organization. Though not on the scale of other programs, its scope is also national and must have the authority, manning, and funding to pay rewards or bounties, and to reeducate/resettle the insurgents who surrender.

Military and Police Operations: Security and Strike. This is not necessarily a program but rather the security and strike operations of police and military units beyond consolidation requirements. Particularly in non-rural areas there is a need for installation or facility security. This is a simple guard function, but requires manning and coordination. Strike forces are usually military or paramilitary units. They may be tasked to respond as a relief/reaction force for consolidation operations, or they may be used to strike at insurgent bases in remote areas. The ACC coordinates the assignment of missions. At the operational level, the planner must determine the amount of force structure needed and the state of training.
Campaign Plan Qualification

The questions to be satisfied here are: Does a national (host nation) counterinsurgency plan constitute operational level planning? Is it a campaign plan? In discussing this I will use the following tenets:

- Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment to achieve strategic [military] objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations; the basis for all other planning

- Orients on the enemy's center of gravity

- Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships.

- U.S. Army War College Report on Campaign Planning

Additionally I will use James Schneider's concept of orchestrating simultaneous and successive major operations.35

Before going on, I would ask the reader to recognize two points: First, the question of whether a COIN country plan is a campaign plan or not is strictly an academic issue. The answer to this will not change the scope of the plan nor the types of programs required. The second point is that counterinsurgency is a fundamentally different kind of conflict than conventional war. Therefore, the view that a campaign is composed strictly of military operations does not apply.

A COIN campaign plan will provide a broad concept of operation by virtue of the manner in which it incorporates the programs described. Additionally, campaign plan guidance provides long-range goals for the programs thus establishing a basis for planning.
At the operational level, the insurgent center of gravity is usually the infrastructure. By providing the means to neutralize it, the plan orients on the center of gravity. Arguably, in a mass-based insurgency which has entered phase III and is fielding large Main Force guerilla units, the center of gravity may be the guerrilla combat units. Otherwise the infrastructure remains the center of gravity. Population and Resource Denial addresses the problem indirectly while Intelligence and Infrastructure Neutralization attack it directly.

The seven programs will apply to virtually every insurgency. The planner must determine the relative scope of each program according to the nature of the threat. These programs are the major operations of a COIN campaign, thus the planner's art is to determine the complexion of each program, and to phase them simultaneously or in succession as appropriate. He must allocate military forces and plan support by police and civil agencies.

The planner must also provide for the design of the national COIN coordination organization. The stature of the Director of the National COIN Coordination Center must be that of an operational leader. Sir Robert Thompson recommends the status of a Cabinet Minister. Certainly the Director must possess operational vision and the authority to act decisively. The first Deputy for the CORDS program (DEPCORDS), Robert W. Komer, held four-star ambassadorial rank.
The remaining question is where in U.S. campaign planning doctrine does a COIN campaign plan reside. According to Mendel/Banks, "campaign planning is appropriate for a theater of war and supporting campaign plans are appropriate for theaters of operations."38 A counterinsurgency plan would normally be applicable only to a specific country and thus would be subordinate to the plan for a theater of operations. I consider it a supporting campaign plan also.

Theater of War
Campaign Plan

\[\text{Theater of Opns} \rightarrow \text{Supporting Campaign Plan}\]

\[\text{Country} \rightarrow \text{Supporting Campaign Plan}\]

Just as a campaign plan is written in coordination with subordinate component headquarters so too would a country supporting campaign plan be written. In addition, the U.S. Country Team would play an integral role in developing the country plan.

III. OCONUS COUNTERNARCOTIC OPERATIONS

In September 1989, the Bush administration published its National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) document. It puts forth the U.S. stand on the drug war: domestic, international, supply and demand. Since this paper is examining theater campaign
planning, I will limit the focus on the NDCS to that portion addressing international priorities of the administration, and objectives applicable to an OCONUS CINC.

In truth, OCONUS counternarcotic campaign planning can only be done in SOUTHCOM against the cocaine and marijuana producing nations of the Andean Ridge and Central America. The U.S. possesses the same "compelling influence" neither in the major opium-producing countries of the world, \(^{39}\) nor in Europe (though European nations are quickly coming to grasp the gravity of the cocaine problem). Counternarcotic efforts in these other areas consist chiefly of foreign policy initiatives and enlistment in international efforts.

Nevertheless, the administration's priorities are: disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking organizations, reduced cocaine, heroin and marijuana supply; elevation of drugs as a foreign policy issue; support for the U.S. foreign aid certification process; and bilateral/multilateral efforts against international money laundering activities. \(^{40}\) The NDCS document makes clear that the enemy is the multinational criminal organizations which traffic dangerous drugs and that disruption of the transportation/trafficking process at the source is preferable to interdiction operations. \(^{41}\)

Specifically with regard to cocaine producing nations, the administration states the following objectives: \(^{42}\)

Isolation of major coca-growing areas in Peru and Bolivia.

Interdiction within these countries of the delivery of essential chemicals used for cocaine processing.
Destruction of cocaine hydrochloride processing facilities.
Dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations.
Eradication of the coca crop when it can be made an effective strategy.
In addition, it states, the U.S. civil-military-law enforcement effort is to be made with a "minimum of direct involvement by U.S. personnel."\(^{43}\)

Given these tasks, the missions implied, and those dictated in the National Military Strategy, the planner develops theater strategic goals, concepts, and campaign objectives. Integral to this process is a threat evaluation.

The drug threat is well-documented. Marijuana and cocaine are the principal drugs coming out of the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR), with cocaine being the most dangerous. Of at least equal interest to the planner as the statistics of production is the role that drug production plays in the region known as the Andean Ridge (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru).

Coca is part of the regional culture, and has been for several thousand years.\(^{44}\) Wages are paid in coca leaves.\(^{45}\) It is a part of life and a means of making a living. Its economic value as a cash crop is enormous. According to one source, it is "what keeps the Bolivian economy afloat."\(^{46}\) For many it is a ticket from grinding rural poverty to the middle class. And for the multinational narco-traffickers, it is the source of immense power and wealth.
The production and trafficking infrastructure is the heart of the drug industry, its center of gravity. It is extensive and diversified. While most coca is grown in Peru, most cocaine is produced in Colombia. Thus there are cultivation-transportation-production-trafficking infrastructures which cross international boundaries. They form a well-financed, well-equipped organized crime cartel. Corollary activities include the smuggling of precursor chemicals, international money laundering, and occasional alliances (of convenience) with insurgents.

It is key to note the striking similarities between such an organized crime network and an insurgency. The infrastructures of both are highly compartmented and seek penetration of local, regional, and national governments. Both try to co-opt the populace; one through ideology and coercion, the other through greed and coercion. Both regard intelligence as paramount, and both resort to armed terror when profitable. Cocaine-production bases, like guerilla bases, are usually in remote areas, highly mobile, and well-camouflaged. In addition, because of their wealth, the narco-traffickers are able to use state-of-the-art transportation and communications in conducting their business.

In comparing narco-trafficking to insurgency, it is critical also to note some differences. Insurgents rely on the populace for intelligence and sustainment. At the tactical level, sustainment usually equates to taxes in the form of food. At
higher levels this equates to cash or negotiable commodities to finance the party mechanisms. The insurgent will defend his access to the people, and therefore population denial is a major part of COIN.

Narco-traffickers also rely on the people for intelligence, but not for sustainment in the usual sense. They rely on the production of coca leaves. Because they have made it so lucrative, however, the drug cartel has little problem in maintaining a steady supply of coca. The top-down financing of drug trafficking contrasts with an insurgency which is usually financed from the bottom up. Drug trafficking has also fostered the development of narco-controlled distribution and processing infrastructures which can then stifle independent coca production if necessary. In short, the narco-traffickers are not seeking sustenance from the people but rather a commodity for which they pay well. Population denial in this case does not prevent exploitation of the people, but rather inhibits drug production. If improperly done, it may deprive many people of their livelihood.

This brings on the next issue of ideology versus greed. An insurgent ostensibly offers a better option through acceptance of an alternative socioeconomic way-of-life. It seeks to establish a shadow government which can operate more effectively than the incumbent government. If philosophy and propaganda do not work, then coercion usually does (at least in the short run).
The narco-traffickers offer nothing so lofty... only money. For those few not easily attracted or corrupted, the pressure of armed terror mixed with huge bribes usually suffices.

A final point is that of an internal market versus an external market. An insurgency seeks to secede from, alter or replace a government. Its product is ideology and its market is the population. Narco-trafficking views any government (other than a passive one) as an obstacle but has no philosophy other than capitalism. There is a limited market for drugs within the Andean Ridge; the wealth-producing market is clearly in the U.S. Thus the root cause of narco-trafficking, the "demand", does not exist within the drug-producing countries, but rather far to the north.

IV. COUNTERNARCOTIC CAMPAIGN PLANNING

Before embarking on a modification of COIN framework, an ends-ways-means-risk analysis is useful in putting the task in perspective. For a theater planner, determining the desired end state is the hardest part of the analysis. This is supply-side warfare. With the extraordinary power of high demand coming from outside the theater, attacking the infrastructure and production of drugs at the source is the most direct, but also a short-term solution. Regeneration of any part of the infrastructure is assured as long as the demand exists.
The planner thus faces a protracted effort, a war of exhaustion. Does he use national strategy objectives as his campaign goals? If so, does he seek complete in-country interdiction of precursor chemicals? Complete destruction of cocaine processing facilities? Complete dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations? Or does he seek a percentage of accomplishment? In a war of exhaustion, success may not be couched in terms of military victory but rather achieved political/economic/social conditions. As with the planning, the designation of the end-state must be made in conjunction with the country team and host nation.

For means, the theater planner has his assigned forces plus those he can request. Operational ways merit some further consideration. Even though the President has given the Department of Defense the mandate to take the lead in the drug war, a very strong case can be made that this is primarily a law enforcement operation, not a military operation. As such, the planner must determine how his operations and capabilities will dovetail with host nation efforts and other U.S. agencies to achieve desired results.

The planner's perspective on risk is also different than in conventional operations. The risk of military defeat for the U.S. does not exist. Rather, the realm of risk in counter-narcotic operations is primarily politico-economic. The immediate risk is to the host nation government, with secondary
political risks to the U.S. Other, lesser risk lays in retaliation by drug kingpins.

In concert with an ends-ways-means analysis, the planner must make a center of gravity/vulnerability analysis. As in insurgency, infrastructure is the center of gravity at the tactical and operational levels. As for the host nation government, the vulnerabilities and decisive points for narco-traffickers will vary by country and region.

FRAMEWORK

Like COIN, working through the framework helps the planner determine the ways-and-means answers to his CN questions. It also establishes the applicability of the COIN framework to CN operations.

Command, Control, and Coordination. Narcotrafficking is organized crime. Much expertise exists within U.S. law enforcement agencies in organized crime task force operations. Most of this expertise is rightfully in police organizations rather than the military, and particularly so in regard to HUMINT collection and analysis.

A military planner thus has a particular challenge in designing or assessing counternarcotic organizations. Police must play a salient role; however, Andean Ridge narcotrafficking goes well beyond a typical urban organized crime syndicate. The the scope of intelligence and strike operations, the transport and
firepower required, all tend to place counternarcotic operations on the plate of the military. There is an obvious need for a mix of both civil and military capabilities and, as in counterinsurgency, unity of effort must be achieved. Therefore a national coordination mechanism must be established through which command and control is exercised. A type-organization was described in the previous chapter on counterinsurgency. A similar type organization could be used here.

Currently, both the military and paramilitary (national police) of Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia are engaged in counternarcotic operations. Each country has its own mechanisms for controlling and coordinating operations. The litmus test for these mechanisms is their effectiveness in bringing together the other programs in the model as well as incorporating aid and assistance from developed nations—"... secure computer systems, communications interception equipment and techniques to protect judges and witnesses, and better police investigative means, mobility, firepower, and communications." 

Although the U.S. military has a certain advantage in some fields, particularly strategic intelligence means, the FBI may in fact be better equipped to evaluate a national coordinating agency.

Development: This plays much the same role as in counterinsurgency. U.S. assistance to host nation law enforcement agencies is particularly important. Again Development programs must complement Population and Resource Denial. Eradication
efforts must be accompanied by either compensation or
government-subsidized crop substitution.\(^{55}\) For example, the
government may propose citrus as a substitute crop. If police
have suppressed or eliminated the narcotics production in an
area, then the marketing and distribution system has also been
suppressed or eliminated. Crop substitution therefore has
greater implications than just replacement. A new infrastruc-
ture for moving and marketing produce at a price comparable to
the return on coca is necessary.

Population and Resource Control. Under counterinsurgency, I ad-
dressed three principle programs: consolidation, resettlement
and emergency legislation. Of these, emergency legislation re-
mains prominent. In counternarcotics, however, several other
issues surface.

One of these is eradication. Eradication is a controversial
concept which has been tried with mixed results.\(^{56}\)

Eradication is likely to work best where there is
little... resistance from the host government, where
enforcement efforts have broken the back of traffick-
ing networks and crop profits have been driven down,
where the possibility of crop displacement... is
limited, and where strong employment alternatives ex-
ist or can be... created.\(^{57}\)

This is a difficult order to fill, however, and eradication
programs have shown limited success. Bolivia will not allow the
aerial spraying of herbicides (nor will the U.S. for that mat-
ter) to eliminate coca and marijuana. Peru on the other hand is
experimenting with some manually applied chemicals: aerial
application may follow. Compared to the environmental damage caused by coca production, some Peruvian environmentalists prefer herbicides but as yet there is no widespread use.58

Intercepting internationally smuggled processing chemicals is another program necessary within the campaign. Known as precursor chemicals, these are used in extracting cocaine base from coca leaves and in refining it for sale on the street. These chemicals include acid and ether among others, and are very expensive. Precursor chemicals are a high value commodity which must be brought in from outside the Andean Ridge, often from the U.S.59

Emergency legislation, as the third program, is perhaps not the most appropriate term. Also population control is not necessarily the emphasis here so much as criminalization of all aspects of the drug trade. The U.S. also urges other governments to ratify extradition treaties and anti-money laundering laws.

There is no consolidation program, as such. However, where the infrastructure has been suppressed or there is crop substitution, the government must maintain a credible presence and institute reforms augmented with public information/education initiatives.

**Intelligence and Infrastructure Neutralization.** The program used here is virtually identical to the program discussed for COIN. The structure and requirements of the program require little change in application to counternarcotics.
The need still exists for a national all-source collection and fusion system. Coordination and dissemination may be accomplished through a national system of Area Coordination Centers (ACC) or through existing police intelligence channels. If the existing police intelligence system is used, the planner must examine its structure and capabilities for analysis and information sharing. As in COIN, HUMINT is indispensable and will provide most of the usable intelligence.

Host nation police or military should neutralize the infrastructure once identified. Strikes may be coordinated or individual, depending on the target(s). Police best fit into the law enforcement role and are more suited to operations anticipating legal action against those captured. The planner should ensure that there is a competent agency tasking the conduct of arrests and strikes.

The ordered, expedient passing of intelligence from analysts to operators must be a predetermined process. Again, ACCs can serve to facilitate this as well as fusion from multiple agencies and centralized storage.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Again, as in COIN, a national level program is needed. If the host nation is concurrently conducting a counterinsurgency, it will be particularly important to deconflict themes.

PSYOPS will play a significant role in educating the people and convincing them to side with the government. It will be key
in the popular acceptance of eradication, crop substitution, or resettlement. Once again, the enemy is not ideology but greed. Thus the challenge is greater. Convincing people to forego lucrative coca production or transport for the moral high ground or a promise of comparable income can not be done without immediate follow-through by the government. Such themes ring shallow.

**Amnesty.** An amnesty program will have less appeal than in counterinsurgency. Because the narcotics trade provides income, there is not the hunger and deprivation which often drives the insurgent to an amnesty program. In this case, there may only be the danger of arrest or death from the police or, in some cases, by the traffickers themselves.

If resettlement has become a government program then an amnesty program is necessary. If a system of bounties or rewards is offered for the narcotraffickers then the amnesty program may also handle this. In any event, all incomers to the amnesty program must be screened by intelligence analysts immediately. This should be coordinated at the lowest possible ACC (or its equivalent) to ensure timeliness as well as dissemination.

**Military and Police Operations: Security and Strike.**

Under the COIN model, I discussed primarily installation security, or force-against-force operations against large guerrilla formations. There is carryover into counternarcotics but
with some change in form. Security operations must include a heavy emphasis on protection of judges, attorneys, and others involved in the prosecution of narcotraffickers. Politicians have also been prime targets as the drug kingpins retaliate against the war on drugs. Strike operations may be large in scope as police strike simultaneously at drug processing labs, but probably will be decentralized in execution and will not involve large single formations. The success of such operations, of course, will rely upon infrastructure identification and a functioning coordination hierarchy.

So far, this paper has addressed the issue of campaign planning as if a U.S. military planner were constructing the entire campaign without regard to host nation or country team plans. This will not be the case although the framework provides a reasonable basis for analysis as well as planning. This analysis helps a planner determine exactly where the combatant command's roles lie.

Counterdrug campaign planning is an interactive process and includes, above all, the host nation. U.S. players are the ambassador and his country team, the theater unified command, and some of the nearly thirty U.S. agencies involved in the drug war. Currently, Southern Command uses the following process for determining its missions: First, it develops a theater of war campaign plan. From this an OPLAN is written which addresses three sub-regions: The Andean Ridge, the Southern Cone,
and Latin America. Planners develop supporting campaign plans, known as sub-region plans, for each of these areas. Each sub-region plan provides the guidance for two further classes of planning. One is OPORDERS to service components for unilateral operations and training missions. The second is country plans for each individual nation in the sub-region. Country plans, when finalized are joint, combined, and multi-agency.

As a final consideration, the presence of insurgencies in the Andean Ridge nations exacerbates planning to no small degree. While there appear to be marriages of convenience between insurgents and narco-traffickers, fundamental ideological contradictions will prevent any long term alliances. Nonetheless,
the planner must acknowledge existence of two distinct threats. None of the host nations can afford, nor need there be, separate force structures or coordination networks for combatting each threat. The programs established must be designed to accommodate and distinguish between the two enemies. While the drug threat has a much higher profile in this country, the insurgencies may well, in fact, present a graver threat to the existence of these nations. A campaign plan must provide the flexibility to prioritize effort as needed.

V. SUMMARY, DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

By development of a COIN campaign planning framework, and assessment of its applicability to CN planning, we have seen that the tenets of conventional campaign planning apply to counterinsurgency and counternarcotics warfare. One must accept the civil-military nature of such a campaign vice the purely military nature of a conventional campaign. That done, the criteria match relatively well with the product. These are different kinds of wars and they require different solutions. The acceptance of civil-military programs as simultaneous or successive major operations is essential to the academic qualification as a campaign.

The Department of Defense has been charged to take the lead in select areas in the war on drugs. This is not universally accepted. "The United States and other nations have experience
with large-scale criminal organizations, but Latin American nations have little. Help from the Justice Department, especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may be more valuable than help from the DOD.  

Nevertheless, the U.S. military is involved. Although superficially attractive, to some, military intervention with U.S. combat troops is one of the least desirable options. This would be politically destabilizing to a host nation and to surrounding nations as well. Use of U.S. DEA agents provides one avenue of U.S. involvement without the connotation of military intervention. There are others. Yet the military has a significant capability for contributing to OCONUS counternarcotic operations which planners should utilize. This is particularly true in the realms of capital equipment, technology, and training.

This all poses a significant doctrinal question, namely: Whose responsibility is it to plan a campaign of U.S. civil-military operations for a country or theater of operations?

As shown in the SOUTHCOM example, the finalization of country plans are the result of much cooperative interaction between the key players. Each country plan is itself just a part of the ambassador's (and State Department's) "scheme of maneuver" for that nation. This, in turn, presumably becomes part of a host nation's campaign plan for counternarcotics operations.

A doctrinal discrepancy also exists in determining roles and missions when a conflict arises among the three regional U.S.
activities (the military, law enforcement, and State Department). If coordination and cooperation break down as each respective agency develops its plans, there is no overarching authority to clarify roles.

As a solution, a recent article proposes the institution of a regional ambassador. He would outrank all country ambassadors and have authority over the three regional U.S. activities. The regional ambassador could then ensure that country plans/programs do not diverge from broader regional issues. Until this or another solution is reached, the implementation of a campaign plan (or country plan) will be a function of the CINC's will and his ability to influence and cooperate with the other players.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 35-36.


15. FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, p. 2-22.


37


19. Ibid., p. E-8 to E-12.


21. Ibid., p. 196.


27. Ibid., p. 285.


29. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 288.


32. Ibid.


38


40. Ibid., p. 60.

41. Ibid., p. 61, 62.

42. Ibid., p. 63.

43. Ibid., p. 65.


46. Ibid., p. 39.

47. Ibid.


49. Ibid.


51. Maxwell Thurman, GEN, CINCSO, Statement made during visit to School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December 1989.


54. Ibid.
56. Ibid. Also Kolton, "Combatting the Columbian Drug Cartels," p. 53.
64. William W. Hartzog, BG, SOUTHCOM J3, Briefing delivered to School of Advanced Military Studies, 2 March 1990.
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