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RESEARCH REPORT

AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS WARTIME PLANNING

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AIR WAR COLLEGE
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AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS WARTIME PLANNING

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Journalists have been a part of the battlefield environment since wars began. Their role, especially in a democratic society, has been to report the action of the day to the citizens of the warring nations. Whether we like it or not, their actions contribute to the development of national will which is one of the necessities for victory.

The Department of Defense has established procedures to work media concerns in wartime. Events of the 1980s, Urgent Fury in Grenada and Just Cause in Panama have caused debate about these procedures. Most public debate surrounds the workings of the DoD Media Pool and the military services' ability to get the media to the battlefield early.

However, in reviewing these events, in the context of evolving military-media relations since World War II, a broader problem comes to light. Public Affairs practitioners as a whole may not be trained sufficiently to understand and provide logical input to the Defense wartime planning process.

Following a review of current Public Affairs officer training for wartime planning in the Air Force context, this study recommends inclusion of Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) procedures in a new mid-level joint Public Affairs course being established at the Defense Information School.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Press correspondents who wish to follow the Army are required to make application . . . together with a sketch of their life record, and a document of personal guarantee signed by the proprietor of the newspaper to which they belong. . . . The authorities, when they consider it necessary, may have one person selected to act as joint-correspondent for several newspapers. . . . Correspondents . . . shall always observe the rules and orders issued by the "Head-Quarters". . . . In case they disregard the above rules and orders, the Authorities of the "Head-Quarters" may refuse to allow them to accompany the . . . forces.

--Notification No. 3 of the Japanese War Department Issued Feb. 10, 1904.
[1:299-300]

Journalists have been recognized as a necessary element of the battlefield for many years. Soldiers and commanders have learned over time (but still have difficulty accepting) that it is better in the long run to have the journalist close at hand, getting accurate information and being able to ask the tough questions of military leaders, than to have them removed, operating on rumor and writing their own answers to those tough questions. Recognizing that, the military services of many nations have developed processes for dealing with and supporting the role of the journalist on the battlefield.
Are United States Air Force wartime planning procedures sufficient to prepare the field public affairs officer to do his job as defined by the theater commander? This paper will attempt to examine that question.

The Air Force officially recognizes the importance of the public affairs function in wartime. The 1986 U.S. Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP-1), Vol. 1, Annex Q, "Public Affairs" (U), states that:

With the requirement to rapidly inform the public of the progress of a contingency or general war, the intensity of activities of Public Affairs offices will increase. There will be an increased requirement to produce and distribute visual information products in support of Public Affairs requirements. If the contingency or general war should last for an extended period, it is anticipated that there will be a requirement to expand all public affairs functions. [2:para 1b(3)]

Higher level U.S. Joint Service Planning Directives set forth some rather specific guidelines for considering how to deal with the expanding public affairs challenge. The major warfighting commands have followed this guidance by including public affairs planning actions in their war plans and contingency plans. In turn, the Air Force has done the same.

Theoretically, these plans should flow in such a way that public affairs officers (PAs) assigned to different theaters can talk intelligently to each other and with operations and logistics officers about their requirements.
This will enable a logistics officer who is developing flow charts and directives to support such plans understand them, and the commander involved can readily understand what the FA is planning to do and can change requirements if need be. Also, the stateside public affairs officer with a mobility requirement must understand his tasks, and the FA on the receiving end of the deployment, if any, needs to understand what he is getting. In other words, there should be a common thread.

Through this paper, I will attempt to compare the guidance provided by the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) with the plans that are established by the warfighting Commanders-In-Chief, and with complementing plans prepared by Air Force elements. I will also review the challenges presented by technological advances available to journalists that may complicate future planning. Finally, there will be a proposal for better preparing the Air Force Public Affairs manpower pool to meet the challenges of the '90s. We begin with a review of U.S. military-media relations since the beginning of World War II.
CHAPTER II

MEDIA ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD

This is a people's war, and to win it the people should know as much about it as they can.

--Elmer Davis, Director
Office of War Information, 1941

World War II was a time of national mobilization. Save those few who disagreed, a given in democratic systems, the majority of the American public supported the war effort. People on the home front learned new trades, worked longer hours and made sacrifices in personal quality of life to ensure their boys had the means to destroy the enemy.

The War Department saw the need to include media representatives (correspondents) on the battlefield and even in preplanning, both for support of media requirements and for understanding the strategy and tactics employed. Correspondents donned military uniforms (minus rank and insignia), travelled with the troops and in some cases were actually treated by some commanders as quasi-staff members. Censorship was invoked, but communication from individual soldiers also went through censors. Operations Security was important, and correspondents for the most part respected requirements. Not everything was perfect for either the military or correspondents. There were some significant disagreements on access to and the ability to transmit
information. [4:27-45] In general however, the military-media relationship was cooperative and mutually supportive.

This relationship changed during the Korean War. The war began with support at home, but rapidly changed. As politicians became more critical, so did the press. Initially, there were few correspondents in theater. During the war, the number rose to 270, but fewer than 70 were ever at the front at any one time. Few chose to remain with the troops to cover day-to-day activities. Military headquarters units inherited the responsibility of providing logistical support, housing, transportation, communications, satisfying personal needs, as well as providing the latest battlefield information. [4:50]

At the same time, the availability of improved but extremely limited commercial communications, i.e. long distance telephone, cable, telegraph and radio, eliminated the total reliance of the media on military support. Competition between correspondents for the "play" in newspapers at home caused some of them to dig for stories and be less sensitive to security issues. This increased antagonism between military and media. When censorship was finally invoked, procedures were easily circumvented by those who chose to do so. Antagonism continued to grow and by the end of the war, the press was even making accusations against the military of deliberate misinformation concerning the truce talks in Panmunjom. [5:398]
In general, though, the military-media relationship worked. The overall complaint from correspondents continued to concern the lack of communications and transportation in theater. However, because these are also primary requirements of the warriors, there will always be competition for these limited resources. Some level of complaint from the media in this area is probably unavoidable.

In Vietnam, the relationship fell apart. This seems odd in that the press were better treated in Vietnam than any previous war. They had access to all of the same perquisites as rear echelon military officers, were afforded transportation to scenes of action on helicopters and jeeps, were continuously invited to accompany small units on operations and there were daily briefings in Saigon for up to 130 correspondents (in all there were more than 400 accredited newsmen in Vietnam by 1965.) The logistics system for supporting these people was well oiled. Antagonism grew for a different reason. As with Korea, initially Americans supported the effort, but as the war became more unpopular at home, media coverage turned to be more critical. Sensitivity to this criticism began at the top and was conveyed down the chain of command. For example, from 1965-67 the Johnson administration insisted that the military be active in "countering 'negative' news stories." Military actions to not tell all or to mislead caused greater distrust on the part of media
representatives so they began to dig deeper, question harder, challenge information, as represented in the Wall Street Journal on April 23, 1965:

Time after time high-ranking representatives of government—-in Washington and Saigon—have obscured, confused, or distorted news from Vietnam, or have made fatuously erroneous evaluations about the course of the war, for public consumption. . . .[4:62]

This antagonistic situation led to greater and greater distrust on both sides. By the end of the war in Vietnam, the adversarial relationship was so entrenched among military leaders and journalists alike that it set the tone for a long siege.

Public opinion remained generally anti-military for the next decade, and the media mirrored the public attitude. The military became seen as big business. Media challenges of the military way of doing business led to stories of over priced coffee pots, toilet seats and tools that, although basically factual, emphasized the mistakes that were being made and shed little light on what was being done to correct. The mistrust continued on both sides. Although attempts were made to reestablish credibility at the working level on both sides, strong skepticism remained in the relationship.

The antagonism reached its peak with the U.S. involvement in Grenada in 1983. Initially, media access to operations was totally denied. Public affairs officers were not included in the planning the actions and therefore could
give no advice on press workings. Even when media were allowed
access to the island, there were no support systems,
communications, transportation, feeding or housing facilities,
or even briefing facilities or briefing officers available to
respond to media questions. Confusion reigned, with the media
criticizing nearly everything and spending weeks after the
events reporting more on the lack of support provided to them
than on the event itself. [4:109]

Recognizing that something had to be done, Army General
John W. Vessey, Jr, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
established a panel headed by retired Army General Winant Sidle
to review the military-media relationship. The results of the
study made some major adjustments to military public affairs
thinking.

One of the major recommendations of the Sidle Panel was
to establish a Media Pool to be on standby for deployment with
forces on short notice, when:

"polling provides the only feasible means of
furnishing the media with early access to an
operation, planning should provide for the largest
possible press pool that is practical and minimize
the length of time the pool will be necessary before
"full coverage" is feasible. [6:4]

The Pool idea was reluctantly accepted by both sides.
It was exercised several times between 1985 and 1989. There
was a bumpy start with leaks about activation on the press
side, and poor coordination of support on the military side.
but things got better each time. By the Fall of 1987, the Pool seemed to be workable and the relationship appeared to be growing more cooperative but not yet fully trusting. [3:60]

The most recent activation of the Media Pool came with the U.S. invasion of Panama, "Just Cause," in December 1989. Initial reports indicate there were problems. Senior Air Force Times writer P.J. Budahn concluded that pool reporters and some senior Pentagon public affairs officers agree that the pool did not work as it should have. Although a media pool of 15 correspondents was formed and on the ground four hours after the first troop landings, they experienced problems getting to the action and filing stories and visuals to Stateside media headquarters. Within 24 hours an L-1011 chartered by the media landed at Howard AFB with 220 correspondents and 30,000 pounds of press gear aboard. All they asked for from the military, says Budahn:

was transportation to the fighting, escorts to explain what had happened, security teams if necessary, food, lodging and, above all else, reliable and plentiful telephones so they could communicate with their bosses in the States. [7:46]

This was no small task for the Southern Command and its Public Affairs staff. Details of successes and failures are still coming to light.
Media as well as internal criticism of military-media relations actions during "Just Cause" brought Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Pete Williams, to commission a new study. Led by Fred Hoffman, an experienced reporter who also served on the DoD Public Affairs staff for a period, the study set out to review more than the Pool. It was to include the education responsibilities of the military to the media.

Hoffman's report, released in mid-March 1990, stated that the Pool was called out too late to be effective in "Just Cause" and laid the blame for the delay on senior civilian officials in DoD, not the military. Among the 17 recommendations of this study was a proposal that all JCS war plans have an annex "spelling out measures to insure that the pool will move with the lead elements of U.S. forces and cover the earliest stages of operations." [8:22]

This and other Hoffman study recommendations looking at the Pool process are under study by DoD at this writing. It remains to be seen what effects will result. Whatever the outcome, it does appear that Public Affairs officers will have to become more deeply involved in the war planning process.
CHAPTER III

NEXT STEP FOR THE MEDIA?

It is not likely that the media will suddenly turn to sole reliance on military or other government sources for information. It is not in their basic nature to rely on one source or set of sources. The pervasiveness of the media in the world still will give them the ability to be first on scene, to check "official reports" against eyewitness accounts and even to provide actual eyewitness accounts on a real-time or near real-time basis.

The commercial nature of the media (the real bottom line of their ability to report news is the number of viewers they provide to a sponsor or the number of copies sold) and the American audience’s desire for unusual stories will continue to drive competition and showmanship into reporting. Examples of this are the actions of network news anchors in November and December 1989 to rush around the world to host live evening news broadcasts from the site of breaking events instead of allowing competent, experienced reporters already on scene file the same reports. The world found ABC’s Peter Jennings on scene at the opening of Berlin Wall and Dan Rather of CBS at the Wall and then in Czechoslovakia. Rather had been in Beijing earlier in the summer covering events leading to the debacle of Tienanmen Square.
Even more significant is the world-wide CNN organization. Formed in 1980, this information gathering and reporting network has grown to include nine bureaus and 210 television affiliates in the United States, and 18 overseas bureaus along with several other international news organizations around the world. The organization claims an output of information to 53 percent of American television households and to 75 other countries worldwide.

CNN claims to provide "the most objective news to be found, live and around the clock." This might be better stated as the most available, unfiltered information as evidenced by reporting during the December '89 Panama invasion when initial reports consisted of telephone calls from unidentified people in Panama who responded to a CNN over-the-air request for anyone to call in and talk. Later, as video became available, tape was aired unedited, without prior review by the news readers in Atlanta--everyone was seeing it for the first time--and without benefit of any on-scene reporters providing voice-over interpretation or description of the video. No one really knew how representative any pictures were or what bearing they had on anything.

Television, because of its ability to provide immediate information, becomes the leader in the industry in news coverage of breaking stories. The print media quickly follow,
looking for more in-depth reports, searching for the news angle that will sell their stories to readers.

Information gathering and relaying techniques are moving fast as we approach the 21st Century. Perhaps more significance should be placed on the ability of Chinese students to convey information into and out of China about the student demonstrations in Beijing during the summer of 1989 using telefax machines when media satellite communications were shut down by the Chinese government. Computer messages, too, containing much more information than any telephone conversation were used at this time to exchange data between Chinese students in San Francisco and Moscow. [11]

Space technology too is becoming a tool for information gathering. Not just instantaneous satellite relay of signals from point to point on earth, but now actual information gathering by satellites themselves. The French SPOT Image company launched a remote-sensing satellite in 1986, with 10 and 20 meter resolution and capable of producing three-dimensional imagery. [12:90]

In addition, U.S. commercial remote-sensing satellites of the LANDSAT series have been providing imagery since 1972. According to Mark Brender, ABC News producer in Washington, since 1985 there have been 28 instances of news organization use of such satellite imagery, 13 of them directly related to
military or international political stories such as the January 5, 1989 ABC news use of 10 meter resolution imagery of the chemical weapons plant 40 miles southwest of Tripoli, Libya. [12:94-95]

The potential for further development and use of such commercial systems is obvious. Already the Radio-Television News Directors Association has established a Remote-Sensing Task Force and the debate has begun over First Amendment concerns, i.e. the right of the press to gather news using remote-sensing imagery. [12:89,92]

What does all this mean for the military public affairs community? It means that although there may be a growing cooperation and credibility between the military and the media, there are still plenty of sources of information about military actions, accurate or not, outside of the military spokesman. The future of U.S. military operations in the world is predicted to be more likely in the low- to mid-intensity conflicts. [3:50] Deploying forces, even with a media pool accompanying them, may find journalists already on scene or using sophisticated news gathering tools upon arrival. Military public affairs professionals and commanders must be prepared to act in this new environment. Theoretical situations must be thought through and allowances made for decision making, policy guidance, communications, personnel,
equipment and transportation before crises arise. This must be done ahead of time so public affairs specialists can concentrate on providing timely, accurate information to media with as little interference in conduct of the operational mission as possible. Does a system exist to do this?
"Too often, deployment is designed solely to rapidly place forces on the battlefield with no regard for what they will have to do when they arrive. Moreover, when deployment is conditioned by expected operational requirements, these are often expressed solely in terms of the opening engagements rather than of the campaign as a whole."

The Grenada operation, its media backlash, and the final Sidle Report mentioned earlier also resulted in changes in thinking outside of the public affairs community. Not only was the media pool established and practiced, but in fact the number one recommendation by the Panel was for public affairs officers to become prime players in the formal planning process. This was reinforced by Hoffman's study of "Just Cause."

The Sidle Panel called for "procedures in the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) for PA planning and guidance to begin in the warning-order stage of the process." Included in those recommendations were:

- Public Affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operations adequately.
Planners should carefully consider media communications requirements to assure the earliest feasible availability. However, these communications must not interfere with combat and combat support operations. If necessary and feasible, plans should include communications facilities dedicated to the news media.

Planning factors should include provision for intra- and inter-theater transportation support of the media.

[6:5]

Guidance

JOPS is the result. This program is based in several volumes of guidance published at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. While generic in nature, these volumes provide special area guidance for all military elements. The public affairs portions are amazingly specific and easily understood. Volume I (JCS Pub 5-02.1), "Deliberate Planning Procedures" lays out the basic philosophy and need for deliberate planning along with a framework for writing, coordinating and publishing plans to implement JCS directed operations. Volume II (JCS Pub 5-02.2), "OPLAN Formats and Guidance" contains exactly what it says.* It has a significant amount of detail in both the guidance sections and the sample public affairs annex on what

*Note that while this volume has had an overall classification in the past, the Public Affairs section was unclassified. This is being changed to provide an unclassified basic volume with classified portions of the current volume being rewritten or moved into a classified annex. The following references are made to the unclassified draft Volume II which is all but ready for approval and distribution at the time of this writing.
should be considered in planning for wartime operations. For example, the Planning Guidance ranges from CINC
responsibilities in Public Affairs matters, "The CINCs (not the PA) are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for public
information and community relations," [14:II-457] to
relationships between the CINCS and the DoD, "The channels of
communication for direction and guidance in public affairs
matters shall be directly between the CINCs and the ASD (PA)
keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed on operational
matters," [14:II-460] to CINC authority to issue instructions,
provide policy guidance, coordinate with other government
departments, to "Man, train and equip mobile public affairs
teams (PAT) to carry out field PA responsibilities..." and
to "Identify communications and transportation assets to
support PA programs...for subsequent deployment during joint
military operations." [14:II-463]

The 47-page sample format for the annex is extremely
well detailed for PA planners. In reality, it is not a format
but a complete annex where only task units and special terms
need be added or changed and the operational environments
determined (geography, general weather patterns, economic or
industrial development of the area for which the plan is
designed will have a bearing on requirements.) For example, in
preparing for and establishing public affairs operations in a
military action, the guidance states:
In order to facilitate PA coverage, the supported CINC should activate a JIB (Joint Information Bureau) in the AO in proximity to the OSC. PA matters outside the AO will be coordinated by OASD(PA) or the supported CINC as appropriate. The supported CINC and his PAT or JIB staff will control the PA activities in the AO in coordination with the OSC. (emphasis added) [14:II-470]

A further example comes from the AudioVisual and Visual Information section:

Until specific PA AV and VI guidance is received from the PAT or JIB, the service or component PA AV and VI teams will provide pre-edited videotapes (in areas of extreme heat, a 16-mm camera will be used as a backup for video cameras) and still, black and white, and color, unclassified photography. . (emphasis added) [14:II-493]

In preparing subordinate plans, only those areas underlined need be rewritten for the specific situation being planned. In fact, the JOFS Volume II guidance is so detailed that it contains the statement:

Since standard and proven methods of carrying out PA activities and plans are detailed throughout this Annex, drafters of CINC, component commands, and other supporting command PA plans are not required to repeat each section of this Annex in supporting plans unless desired for emphasis or clarity or where a nonstandard PA practice is used. Instead they may reference this Annex and make required additions and deletions. [14:II-499]

It is only in the appendices to the Annex: (personnel and equipment requirements for JIBs) that the areas become gray. It is stated that "requirements will vary with the situation and assets available." [14:II-501] However, the
tasks that a JIB or Sub-JIB must be prepared to meet are lined out in general terms, giving the public affairs planner the ability to develop a base case for his plan and work from there. As shall be pointed out, some PA planners chose to use the above quotation as the entire requirements planning statement in their plan when they should be reading it as the JOPS staff can't detail everything for you, think it through yourself, talk to your commander, your operations and logistics counterparts and then develop legitimate requirements for your specific plan so that you can accomplish the following...

This author attributes the difference to a lack of understanding of the planning process. Attention is needed to training public affairs personnel in the business of formal planning, i.e. training in Deliberate Planning Procedures. The inconsistency in interpretation and planning can be clearly seen when one compares operations plans prepared by planning staffs in Europe, the U.S. and the Pacific.

**Interpretations**

The Public Affairs Annex (Annex F) to the U.S. European Command Operations Plan 4102-90 is an example of a thorough effort. The annex is nearly a carbon copy of the JOPS sample with the appropriate changes made to coincide with the European organization and environment. Although the plan does include the statement that "...requirements will vary with the situation and assets available," [15:F-1-1] the two appendixes,
left open in the JOFS sample, proceed to establish three different levels of activity that could be anticipated under the basic plan and prescribe requirements for those levels of activities. These requirements include locations for JIB establishment, organization wiring diagrams for operation, and a list of requirements for 57 to 378 personnel by grade, service and specialty to support these JIBs and Sub-JIBs. The equipment annex is so detailed it states how many square meters of floor space will be required by the JIB and what types of furniture, communications, photographic and administrative equipment as well as vehicles will be required. [15:F-1-1 - F-2-4]

Stepping down to the Public Affairs Annex of U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) OPaln 4102 (the component command support) the basic annex is less detailed. However, the Appendix for personnel requirements further tasks the bases within USAFE to provide the specific specialty and grade of public affairs personnel to specific JIB and Sub-JIB locations [16:F-1-1]

These planning actions are thorough and provide the necessary information for operations and logistics planners to include public affairs requirements in equipment, transportation, and billeting packages for deployment. Because of the details of this plan, USAFE public affairs officers should be able to confidently discuss mobility support with
logisticians and mission support with the operators. Upon arrival, deploying public affairs personnel will face challenges, but most of their attention can be applied to mission support, where it should be, and not to basic needs that should have been determined long before.

Tactical Air Command (TAC) is another good example of a solid planning effort. With requirements to support a varied deployment mission, TAC has mirrored the JOPS document in its basic Annex F, making necessary identification changes and adding some helpful appendices such as how to prepare invitational travel orders for civilian journalists. While not readily available in the plan, requirements for personnel to support the plan as implemented are referenced to the Unit Type Codes (UTC) in the TPFDL (Time Phased Force Deployment List) for the plan. Logisticians should have this information readily available to them for developing deployment packages.

Equipment requirements are much more vague than the European plans, but do address the need for transportation and communications for FA personnel. Again, specific requirements are referenced to the TPFDL for the plan. [17:F-5]

The key to success of the TAC plan will be that TAC unit public affairs personnel know what the TPFDL document is, what it contains and are prepared to meet these requirements. More importantly, the receiving (augmented) public affairs unit, if there is one, in a deployment must in some way be
aware what is coming in order to plan support and identify shortfalls and limiting factors.

On the other end of the scale, the public affairs annexes to Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) plans are short, extremely vague and rote duplications of each other. Some philosophical material has filtered down from the JOPS system, but tasking for PACAF subordinate units is loose, "Be prepared to assist with the implementation of the tasks above," [18:F-2] where a typical example of the tasks above is that Headquarters PACAF/PA will "Be prepared to assist US CINCPAC in the establishment, manning, and operation of JIBs and, if directed, assist in implementing Field Press WISP." [18:F-2] (It is interesting to note here that Field Press WISP was cancelled as an Air Force program in 1987.) These plans appear to be a result of an old enemy of the PA, lack of time and training to meet a requirement resulting in satisfying a suspense by perpetuating what was accepted last time.

Delving further into the PACAF example by looking at Annex F to the exercise plan for Team Spirit in Korea, (CINCPACAF EXPLAN C-140 {undated}), tasking for in-country public affairs offices are more detailed, but no detail is provided about how many public affairs specialists and related equipment might be deployed to Korea to augment in-country resources. This results in last minute preparation by those being deployed as augmentees and a surprise for the in-country
public affairs unit that must suddenly begin trying to find billeting, administrative and transportation support for those who unexpectedly arrive. [19:3]

Is this variance in depth of public affairs planning a function of individuals? I think not. It is a system problem. In Europe and in the U.S. there are generally more people assigned to public affairs offices for longer periods than those in the Pacific. These people have time to see problems, provide feedback, refine the plans, and learn on-the-job from each other.

The real problem is systemic. The vast majority of Public Affairs personnel are not formally trained to plan for such actions. Although very sensitive to the needs of commanders and media in crisis situations, they are not taught the mechanics of supporting those needs through formal planning. The result is inconsistent planning effort because too many other things take the PA's attention.
CHAPTER V
CURRENT TRAINING

Formal Public Affairs training for all military services is conducted at the Defense Information School (DINFOS), Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. All Air Force officers newly chosen for public affairs duties must attend the basic Public Affairs Officer Course [20: A17-6]. Other services also send new PAs to this 10-week course. The school offers second officer level course for field grade officers only, the week-long Senior Public Affairs Officer Course (SPAOC). The SPAOC focuses on timely, special themes and is not mandatory. While the basic course runs almost continuously, the SPAOC is held only twice a year. [21]

The basic course is a fire hose of training ranging from how to write a news release, to appearing in a television interview, to conducting tours for visitors or community leaders, to publishing the base or post newspaper. Along the way, there is some very limited exposure to joint operations, contingency planning and the JOPS system. [22:27-4]

This is broken into two separated blocks of instruction, two periods each. The first is an introduction to joint service operations. Its objectives are to familiarize students with the command structure of joint military systems from the National Command Authority through the unified and
specified commands to the unit level. There is an overview of the unified and specified command missions and areas of responsibility. Finally, definitions of the jargon used in joint public affairs operations are explained. The JOPS system is included on the last of eight viewgraphs in the presentation. [23]

In the second block, which comes near the very end of the course, the PAs cover the role of public affairs in contingency operations. The joint planning system is again addressed, but only in a relatively short block of instruction, two periods. This block also includes discussion of the conflict continuum from the level of a raid to low- to mid- to high-intensity conflict, review of the public affairs process and communications planning (identifying objectives, methods, audience, available media, evaluating effectiveness, etc.) as it applies to wartime or contingency operations. The second period concludes with a review of media issues affecting the modern battlefield including the history and events leading to the Sidle Panel recommendations. The brief presentation about a public affairs annex to an operations plan points out that there should be one and what it should generally address. [24] In the allotted time, the instructor cannot provide depth. The pressing public affairs concern in a wartime or contingency effort is the communications process and objective, not JOPS planning.
Once an Air Force public affairs officer leaves the basic school, learning is by experience, from others on-the-job, or not at all. The problem is that the new FA is not often in a situation that allows thoughtful learning. For example, as of 31 Jan. 1990, the Air Force had 180 per cent of its need for lieutenants and 114 per cent of its required captains in the public affairs career field. However, there were only 48 per cent and 77 per cent respectively of the required majors and lieutenant colonels. Only 71 of the 145 major (0-4) positions were filled by majors, the rest filled mainly by captains. Because the captains had moved up, many of their jobs were being filled by lieutenants. [25]

This kind of situation forces a lieutenant, who should be learning, to set aside the tasks of education and plunge deeply into the daily activities of his organization at the level of his staff peers—lieutenant colonels and colonels. In most cases, the lieutenant will never regain the time to learn the details of the deliberate planning system, other than under the fire of the IG who has found the FA plan lacking, or worse yet under the guns of the commander because the Air Force has just been "burned" through poor support of media relations requirements. These are not the kind of experiences young officers need if we expect them to be with us long. Perhaps this might be one contributor to the current low manning the field grade billets. What is to be done?
The Air Force needs a public affairs force smarter in the planning system. On the surface, the solution is simple -- train all PAs in the Deliberate Planning Process. It should not be necessary to cover the entire JOPS system, only the public affairs/JOPS interface including vocabulary, timing and understanding of what goes into the logistics and operations portions. This will not be as simple as it may seem. Such training should not be an expansion of time in the DINFOS basic public affairs course. The fire hose is on full already. Rather, a follow-on course is needed after public affairs officers become more seasoned in their profession.

Recommendation

There is currently an Advanced Public Affairs Officer (APAC) course under consideration and design by the school. [21] This course, aimed at PAs with five to seven years field experience, would be an ideal place to incorporate training in terminology, processes and coordination for the JOPS system. It is a joint school, a natural for learning about interface with the other services. Certainly a discussion of media relations operations will be in the course, training in JOPS would dovetail nicely.
Graduates would return to the force better able to write plans and guide others who support their effort and train those junior in PA.

Currently, the Air Force conducts a detailed JOPS training course, the Contingency/Wartime Planning Course, run by the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. According to CADRE staff, the other service schools do not at this time provide the depth in JOPS planning that this school provides. Currently, this is an Air Force only school, but there has been working level discussion of expanding to include attendance by all services.

This should be the course that DINFOS instructors attend and then base their lesson plans upon. The point is to give the instructor the background and credibility to make a knowledgeable connection between JOPS and PA.

As an interim action until such time as the DINFOS program is underway, Air Force major commands (MAJCOM) should take direct advantage of the Maxwell school. Each MAJCOM PA appoints at least one individual who is responsible for public affairs planning in the command. Be it an officer or NCO, that person has the lead for making sure plans and annexes down to the unit level are adequate. Those people should attend the Maxwell course. They will then be able to provide better
evaluation and guidance to field units, and to provide assistance with logistics and operations staffs when necessary.

Conclusion

Air Force public affairs planning guidance for sustained wartime action is adequate. Plans from the top down provide many details and directions for thinking that will help field public affairs officers prepare to carry out effective media relations programs. However there is one weakness.

Concern needs to be focused on the ability of our junior officers who will be asked to prepare and implement operating level support plans, to ensure requirements can be met. The Air Force currently has training systems to improve knowledge of the Deliberate Planning Process among its public affairs officers. By incorporating similar training in a course provided to all service PAs at the DoD school, all services will benefit.

Building this expertise within the public affairs career force is critical. As the threat changes in the 90s, many predict that third-world crises will cause our forces to be structured for greater mobility and more operations in a bare base environment. Media interest will not decrease. To serve the mission, the PA must be equipped with knowledge of how to effectively package activity for sustained operations. When he or she arrives on-scene, it will be time to work the
tough media relations issues. That effort must not be preempted by concern for where is my desk, telephone, truck, latrine.

We must demand more of ourselves before the shortcomings are highlighted and the media demand more from us. Lack of recognition of media requirements and planning for them is an avoidable error. The recommendations stated will go a long way to providing a professional solution to an important problem.

No matter that some level of antagonistic feelings may exist between journalists and warriors in the future. In the American system, those warriors owe accurate, timely reports of their actions to the citizens of their nation. Supporting media interests and requirements, helping them get the information they need will ensure that their reports focus on the essential issues of warfighting, not the secondary issues of military-media relationships.
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