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TOWARD THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

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TOWARD THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Toward the Defence of Australia

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Given the dilemma of long lead times in the face of constantly changing domestic, regional and international environments, the critical challenge of defence planning is to identify and build upon strategic assessment factors with a degree of permanency to permit the longterm realization of an effective national security policy. A further planning imperative is to integrate military doctrine, as shaped to reflect the realities of national defence policies, into the process to give definitive direction to force structure. Accordingly, in seeking to show the way ahead for the development of an effective Australian Defence Force (ADF) structure, the study places considerable emphasis upon these imperatives. Australia's geos strategic position and the nature of war faced in the future are thus the key to a self-reliant Australian defence posture to be pursued, within the framework of alliances, as part of a multidimensional national security policy. To underpin this policy of self reliance, the study rejects continental defence and prescribes a strategic reach sufficient to provide Australia with defence in depth. Doctrinal precepts relevant to the ADF exercising control over this area are examined for their impact on force structure to support this strategy. With final consideration to resource and geopolitical constraints, the way is then clear for the study to derive the ADF capability mix necessary to achieve an Australian national security policy of self-reliance through defence in depth.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Group Captain Brenton J. Espeland has been primarily involved in the area of flying instructional duties since he joined the RAAF in 1968. He is also experienced in tactical transport operations and has flown as both wingman and leader of the RAAF Aerobatic Team, the "Roulettes". In 1983 Group Captain Espeland became the first RAAF officer to hold the position of Military Secretary and Comptroller to the Governor-General of Australia. A graduate of Melbourne University (BSc), the RAAF Academy, and the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, he was appointed a member of the Military Division of the Order of Australia in 1989 for service to the RAAF as Commanding Officer of Central Flying School. He completed USAF Air War College in 1990.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is considerable evidence available to support the contention that the closing months of the 1980s were testament to perhaps the greatest upheaval in geopolitics the world has ever witnessed. Yet the underlying trend of flux in the international environment is not something new. Alliances are formed, treaties are abrogated, regimes are institutionalised, dynasties collapse, trade links are forged, tariffs are imposed, wars are declared, "peace breaks out"; this is the very stuff of mankind's recorded history.

Against this background of change the unavoidable reality of defence planning is the divorce, to the greatest extent possible, of strategic guidance and attendant force development, from contemporary or future political, economic or military considerations of an ephemeral nature. That is not to suggest that such considerations should be ignored. To the contrary, national security interests can only be effectively served by policies that embody all these elements in a coordinated and cohesive fashion. Nonetheless, given the dilemma of long lead times for force structure development in the face of constantly changing domestic, regional and international environments, the critical challenge of defence planning is to identify and build upon those strategic
assessment factors with a degree of permanency that will permit the longterm realization of an effective national security policy.

A further imperative of defence planning is the integration of military doctrine into the process. Derived from a synergy of fundamental principles and innovative ideas, military doctrine is a body of central beliefs that guides the application of power in combat. When shaped to reflect the realities of national defence policies, military doctrine gives definitive direction to force structure.

Accordingly, in seeking to show the way ahead for the development of an effective Australian Defence Force (ADF) structure for the future, this study places considerable emphasis upon these imperatives. Commencing with a regional and global strategic assessment (Chapter II) that clearly points to the primacy of Australia's strategic geography in the military strategy planning process and its linkage to national security policy formulation, the study then examines the nature of conflict facing Australia in the future (Chapter III). Such scrutiny allows consideration of how the general relationships between low and more substantial levels of conflict, warning times, mobilisation planning and expansion base needs impact on national security. Drawing upon this strategic assessment and conflict spectrum analysis, the study then adduces the need for a self-reliant Australian defence posture to be pursued, within the framework of alliances, as part of a multidimensional national security policy also
embodied diplomatic and economic elements (Chapter IV).

In developing a military strategy to achieve this policy of self-reliance the study rejects the concept of "continental" defence and defines an area -- a large one -- that encompasses a strategic reach sufficient to provide Australia with adequate defence in depth (Chapter V). Relevant joint and single service doctrinal precepts that will guide the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Australian Regular Army (ARA), and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in exercising control over this area are then examined for their impact on force structure to support this strategy (Chapter VI). With the final consideration of any constraints likely to be imposed for budgetary or geopolitic reasons (Chapter VII), the way is then clear for the study to derive the ADF capability mix necessary to achieve an Australian national security policy of self-reliance through defence in depth (Chapter VIII).
CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Notwithstanding the political pertubations that occur from time to time, Australia's bilateral relations with its major allies and with neighbouring countries are essentially sound. Moreover, apart from the United States, no country capable of playing a significant role in the region has, or will have in the foreseeable future, the range of maritime, air and logistic capabilities that would be needed to project and sustain substantial conventional forces against Australia. In short, the assessment of Australia's extant strategic situation is favourable.

Nonetheless recent and rapid changes in the external environment within which Australia seeks to pursue its vital interest of national security point to a fundamental realignment of the organizing principles of international relations. At the global level, communism's failure to cope with economic globalisation and the technological developments that underlie it, presages the demise of ideology-based alignments and the evolution of a more multi-polar world order. Yet despite the nascent emergence of Japan, the European Community, China and India as major influences, the Western association of nations is likely to remain in place and retain its utility as the dominant force in international life. In a
regional context, the pressures of these shifts in real
relativities may exacerbate international rifts or the inherent
instability of many nations.

Against this background there is no means of determining
if Australia will continue to enjoy a strategic situation as
favourable to its security interests as it does today. What
is discernible, however, is the inescapable conclusion that a
military threat to Australia would almost certainly be
prosecuted through the archipelago to the north. Moreover,
this geostrategic imperative has compelling relevance not only
for Australian defence strategy but also for the broader
national security policy aspects of social, economic, political
and military linkages with neighbouring countries and regional
associations -- a verity that starts to come into focus as
Australia's present bilateral relationships are examined.

Bilateral Relations

Over the last forty years, in a trend that has
more recently accelerated, the main threads of Australia's
bilateral relationships have been rewoven from Europe to Asia
and the Pacific. Substantial linkages to the "old countries"
still remain, of course. Whether in the form of the mutual
commemoration by Turkey and Australia of that fateful campaign
at Gallipoli some seventy odd years ago, Australia's
active participation in the Commonwealth of Nations, or the
reciprocity of landing rights for national air carriers:
bonds of culture and heritage with many European countries
continue to play a part in Australia's international dialogue.
Nonetheless, the pillars of Australia's current strategic position are the bilateral relationships the nation presently shares with its major ally, the United States, and with its neighbouring countries.

Across the spectrum of issues that shape the bilateral relationship between Australia and the United States, there are perhaps but two that reflect disparate policy. First, in view of what it regards as serious problems with provisions on deep seabed mining, the United States is disinclined to enter into a law-of-the-sea convention despite Australia's contention that such participation would serve the worldwide maritime interests of the two countries. Second, Australia remains concerned about the impact of US agricultural trade policies on its economy, a "running sore" that will require close attention in the near future.

These qualifications aside, Australian and United States policies reflect shared objectives in global and regional issues of mutual interest. Of significance, both countries are committed to the efficacy of the Australian, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) alliance, the positive momentum in East-West relationships, the thrust of chemical, nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations (including the 1990 Geneva chemical weapons plenum at which Australia will act as coordinator of the Western group), the continued US use of regional military facilities, the intensification of international efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian situation, the fostering of political stability
and economic security in the South Pacific region, and the revitalisation of the process of reform and modernisation in China. Together with accord expressed on further issues, these agreed common positions constitute a broad and solid foundation for an ongoing strong bilateral relationship between Australia and the United States.

There is a similar strength in Australia’s relationships with most of its neighbours, albeit built on different shared interests than those that underpin the alliance with the United States. Critical to these regional bilateral and multilateral associations, and more fundamental than any economic or security linkages, is Australia’s position at the forefront of international opinion on issues of racism, colonialism and human rights. Such policies are consistent with the understandable indigenous anti-colonial attitudes inherent to the region -- a direct legacy of the colonial period -- and have played a positive role in Australia’s regional acceptance.

Occasionally Australian representation on these issues, in particular human rights, has been counterproductive to favourable bilateral relationships, such as has occurred with Indonesia in recent years. Provided, however, that Australia continues to be sensitive to regional perceptions such rifts are likely to be transitory, as evidenced by the current constructive military dialogue that emanated from the recent visit to Australia of the Indonesian Armed Forces Chief, General Try Sustrino. This exchange followed an earlier
agreement between the Foreign Ministers of both countries to
establish a framework for regular talks and an Australian-
Indonesian Institute for cultural, business and other contacts.
A similar restrained approach by Australia towards Fiji will
likely ameliorate the current estrangement between Suva and
Canberra that has developed in the wake of the two coups since
1987, although the depth of resentment held by the Fijian army
for Australia should not be underestimated.

In essence, then, Australia's promotion of ethnic,
sovereign and human rights has been a two-edged sword: on the
one hand, fostering relationships with other countries in the
region and, on the other hand, a cause of friction. With
sensitive application it has been instrumental in developing
the sound regional bilateral relationships that, together with
the United States partnership, underpin the favourable
strategic situation that Australia presently enjoys.

Military Power

The other aspect that influences Australia's strategic
position is the degree of military power that can be brought
to bear in the region. Perhaps the issue is best broached by
consideration of the one time in the nation's history since
colonisation that Australia has faced an enemy on its doorstep
and the prospect of fighting on its own soil for survival.

By the southern autumn of 1942, the Japanese advance had
carved deep and wide into the Pacific; from the west, where a
threat to India was developing in the wake of the British
retreat from Rangoon, to the east, where the Solomons, New
Britain and New Ireland had been occupied, an arc of Japanese control inexorably pressed down upon Australia. For many Australians who did not experience the anxiety of those times, the postwar revelation that the Japanese had decided against invading Australia is seen as an ironical and belated testament to the fact that the island continent is indeed "too vast to conquer." The truth is that the Japanese never subscribed to that position. With the bulk of their forces committed in China and Manchuria, Imperial General Headquarters acknowledged that the Japanese army did not then have sufficient resources to invade Australia and thus, alternatively, approved operations to isolate the island continent. The Japanese had learnt the hard way the degree of military power needed to successfully prosecute strategically offensive operations from a distance against an insular nation, a lesson that remains valid today despite the availability of improved combat power projection and sustainment capabilities through advanced technology.

Any contemporary determination of the degree of conventional military power needed to threaten Australia is clearly scenario dependent, but in general the following prescribes the range of maritime, air and logistical capabilities necessary to project and sustain substantial conventional forces against the nation: a maritime force that can provide, without recourse to land-based air, protection and support during the passage and employment of substantial initial strike and follow-on forces in the face of surface,
sub-surface and air threats; an amphibious force with the doctrine, training and equipment to project significant combat power across Australian shores; force elements capable of rapid insertion from beyond the visible and missile horizons to achieve tactical surprise; mechanized follow-on forces to provide the mobility and firepower dictated by the Australian battlefield; and a sealift infrastructure with capacity for deployment and sustainment commensurate with the forces employed, but, more importantly, with the sophisticated equipment necessary for over-the-shore disembarkation. Moreover, it is axiomatic that the degree of military power required to project and sustain the necessary conventional forces increases disproportionately the farther the protagonist is from Australia.

Against these criteria, an examination of military forces in being clearly points to the fact that, apart from the United States, there is no country present in or capable of playing a significant role in the region with the capacity to project and sustain major military action against Australia. Nonetheless, some countries present in the region have recently embarked on military modernization and expansion programs that include the procurement of power-projection-capable equipment based on advance technology. The Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force is extending its sea-lines-of-communication coverage out to 1,000 miles, Indonesia has taken delivery of four Harpoon-equipped frigates, by the early 1990s the Indian Navy will be capable of projecting a limited degree
of power against the Indian Ocean littoral as well as protecting sea lines of communication within that region, while Malaysia has purchased eight Tornado strike-capable aircraft. None of this, however, portends a fundamental shift in the regional military balance away from the current favourable situation.

**Future Influences**

At present, Australia's sound bilateral relationships and the limited capacity of nations to project military power concomitantly prescribe a favourable strategic situation for the country to enjoy. However, fundamental changes -- some already under way; others as yet still latent -- in the external environment in which Australia seeks to pursue its vital interest of national security warrant examination for their future influence on this strategic situation.

**Global**

A direct and enduring legacy of the extraordinary and accelerating changes in science and technology, particularly in the related fields of computer science, electronics and communications, is the visible globalisation of the world economy. Economic issues now vie with more traditional political concerns on the international agenda to the point where a substantial number of Americans think the economic threat from Japan is much more important than the military threat from the Soviet Union. The other legacy of these changes, as yet incomplete in manifestation, is the demise of the ideological conflict between capitalism and communism.
As testament to the inherent inflexibility of a closed society with a centrally-planned economy, communism has failed to take advantage of the economic opportunities offered by scientific and technological advances in the same way as more open, free-market societies have. Naturally enough, this is not exactly the view of the Soviets. While acknowledging that the USSR has experienced "stagnation...at a time when scientific and technological revolution opened up new prospects for economic and social progress", Mikhail Gorbachev has cited as causal the distortion of socialist ethics and turned to perestroika and glasnost, as a revitalisation of Lenin's dialectics, for the remedy. Rhetoric aside, though, the means of translating Gorbachev's agenda for economic reform into reality is the removal of the ideological wedge from international relations to promote economic linkages and technology transfer. The demise of ideology as the predominant organizing principle of international relations portends significant adjustments in East-West alignments and the evolution of a more multi-polar World order.

It would be a mistake, however, to extend this thesis by pointing to a concomitant decline of US influence through "imperial overstretch" and then look to one or more of the emergent powers such as the European Community, China, Japan or India to exert a dominant influence in the political, military, economic, and other spheres. Reports of the passing on of US power and influence would appear somewhat premature given the fact that recent average annual growth rates of the country
have matched or exceeded those of Japan and the European Community respectively, while inherent problems of the nascent powers will perforce limit their potential for influence both regionally and globally. As France’s President Francois Mitterand noted in a recent, largely extemporaneous lecture to the Institute for Higher Defence Studies, there is a considerable gap between European rhetoric and European reality on regional cooperation that is unlikely to be closed even after economic unity in 1992. In China’s case, there appears little prospect of the leadership integrating economic and political reforms in the foreseeable future. Japan, for all its scientific and technological achievements, will continue to be constrained by its limited land, resources and population base, and, in the near term, by a political system struggling to come to grips with the changing values of the Japanese people. Finally, India will continue to be preoccupied with its adjoining neighbours, Pakistan and China. In this context there are thus politic grounds for the retention of the Western association of nations and its continued utility as a dominant force in international life.

South Pacific

As the Pacific rim area has grown in political and economic importance so too have the South Pacific island states and become the focus of attention of regional and global powers. France, with vested interests in nickel deposits in New Caledonia and nuclear test sites in French Polynesia; the Soviet Union, with a myriad of open and covert ties to the
region that at once reinforce and belie its professed sympathies for the South Pacific people; Australia and New Zealand, with their concern for what they consider to be US insensitivity to the regional erosion of goodwill to the West; Libya, with an increasing diplomatic presence in the region amidst accusations of providing financial and paramilitary training support to militants therein -- all these nations have actively sought to extend their influence in the South Pacific over the course of the last decade. Although they will likely be joined in the future by other external players, particularly from South-East Asia, thereby increasing the prospects of friction, the real threat to regional stability comes from within.

Endemic to the region are fundamental internal problems with the potential to rupture the stability of several countries. At the heart of these problems are land disputes and demographics, issues that are unfortunately often overlooked by Western policymakers.

The South Pacific region is primarily comprised of countries that have gained their independence recently. Most newly independent nations, whether their path to self determination was traumatic or not, undergo what can be a long period of adjustment before stabilizing. Nonetheless the expectation is often otherwise. Western strategists, analysts and others involved in the national security decision-making process, tend to overlook the fact that even nations such as the United States suffered internal stress such as the
threat of a coup d'état, the suppression of indigenous minorities and ultimately civil war during the post-decolonization period. Furthermore, when the transition to self determination is accomplished with minimal upheaval, the misperception of a stable nascent nation is often reinforced, thereby tending to obscure any inherent instability.

Such was the case in the South Pacific region to the extent that the overthrow of the Fijian Government by coup d'état in 1988 came as a complete surprise to most Western strategic analysts. The veneer of ideology and politics clouded the external perspective of the real issue which was essentially ethnic: the indigenous Fijian population was losing economic and political control to Indian immigrants.

In many respects the ongoing political strife in New Caledonia mirrors that of Fiji, although the results have been more violent. Like the Melanesian Fijians, the indigenous Kanaks have become a minority in their own country.

South-East Asia

The ongoing power struggle for control of Kampuchea, at first glance, would appear to be close to resolution. Such an analysis unfortunately belies the intensity of fear and hatred held by the Kampucheans, Vietnamese and Thais alike for the Khmer Rouge. Accordingly, the very existence of the Khmer Rouge as a military force with the real or potential power to threaten the security of Vietnam's western and Thailand's southeastern borders is a source of regional instability. In the long term, despite the concerted efforts
of other nations to resolve the situation through negotiation to compromise and consensus, Bangkok and Hanoi may feel it necessary to translate into action their perceived political need for violently disarming the Khmer Rouge.

Elsewhere in the region there are very positive signs of a continuation of the cooperative and constructive dialogue between nations that has been fostered by participation in and with the Association Of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). An illustration of the strength of this trend is afforded by a recent combined exercise in which Malaysian Army units relieved the Jakarta garrison of the Indonesian Army, which was then sent on a counterinsurgency exercise into the countryside. One would need strong evidence to the contrary to doubt the implied notion that there is an agreement between the two countries that Malaysia would assist Indonesia in the event of a serious insurgency threat.

**Papua New Guinea**

Although sometimes regarded as a South Pacific nation and at other times as a country on the fringe of South-East Asia, it is not for this reason alone that Papua New Guinea (PNG) warrants separate consideration within this strategic assessment. More to the point, there are two Papua New Guinean issues that have wider implications for regional stability and thus Australian national security concerns. First, in Papua New Guinea constitutional order is straining under civil lawlessness, institutional fragility and, more recently, secessionist tendencies in Bougainville. Second,
the integrity of the border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, the only land frontier in the South Pacific region, is a sensitive matter to both countries. Indonesian sensitivities reflect a wider concern for the cohesion of a nation which is geographically dispersed and inhabited by heterogeneous peoples, while PNG sensitivities combine the determination of a newer and weaker state to maintain its sovereignty with a strong element of empathy for the ethically related Melanesian people on the other side of the border. Given PNG’s past and prospective links with Australia, and the strategic juxtaposition of the two countries, the course of these two issues has significant implications for Australian national security.

**Indian Ocean**

Another region with issues of significant implication for Australian national security is the Indian Ocean. Lying at the intersection of three continents, the surface waterways of the Indian Ocean carry the strategic raw materials and trade products of much of the industrialised world. In Australia's case the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication account for 40 percent of all shipping movements, and 51 percent of tonnage shipped to and from the country.

Pivotal to Australian security concerns is India's role in the region, which for many of the last five years subsequent to the appointment of General Krishnasami Sundarji as Chief of the Army Staff has been based on the the show or use of force to achieve political objectives. However, more recently
India has reverted to emphasizing diplomacy with its neighbours, as witnessed by Rajiv Gandhi during the early part of 1989 -- a trend to continue under the newly elected government.

Antarctica

Military use of Antarctica is prohibited under the terms of the Antarctica Treaty, although Australia, like other signatories to the agreement, uses its defence forces to logistically support its national effort there. At present, the region offers no threat to the security of Australia.

For the future, although growing international interest in the exploitation of continental and off-shore resources may presage challenges to the Treaty, any economic disputes would be settled by political means. The absence of any vital interests in jeopardy coupled with the extreme difficulty in prosecuting a remote military action in those latitudes, as evidenced by the Falklands War, would preclude consideration of a military option to resolve such disputes. Accordingly, there is no extant or forecast strategic threat to Australian national security interests associated with Antarctica.

The Prospective Situation?

What, then, are the likely dynamics of these future influences on Australia's strategic situation? The pressures of the shifts in global power relativities as generated by economic globalisation and the trend away from ideological based international alignments may exacerbate the regional rifts and instabilities described. Accordingly, against
this background there is no means of determining if Australia will continue to enjoy a strategic situation as favourable to its security interests as it does today. Hardly an assessment with the perspicacity to build national security policy upon! Then, again, such a nugatory assessment begs the question of what is discernible for planning purposes.

When, in the early years of the nineteenth century Napoleon read a book by one of his army which compared him favourably with Frederick the Great, he called for the author to meet him at Mainz. During the subsequent discussion Napoleon was startled when the author asked if he might join his Emperor four days hence in Bamberg, the supposedly secret objective of the Grand Armee's imminent maneuver. When challenged for the source of his information, the author replied, "The map of Germany, Sire and your campaign of Marengo and Ulm." Antoine Henri Jomini's fortunes rose rapidly thereafter.

It is not necessarily a quantum leap in time and distance to transport the utility of this anecdote to contemporary Australia, for its relevance remains undiminished. The careful analysis of geography and historical precedence can provide intrinsic imperatives for defence planning. In an Australia context, the inescapable conclusion is that a military threat to the nation would almost certainly be prosecuted through the archipelago to the north. Additionally, it is important to note at this stage that the relevance of this geo-strategic imperative is not limited to
Australian defence strategy planning. It also provides a focus for the coordinated and cohesive application of the broader national security policy aspects of social, economic, political and military linkages with other nations and international associations.

NOTES

1. Australia-United States Ministerial Talks, Sydney, 3-4 November 1989, Joint Communique.
8. The United States Department of Defense Sealift Study has identified this particular requirement to project a large, balanced force into environments like those found in Australia. See 1989 Joint Military Net Assessment, Washington, DC, pp. 10-8.


11. Ibid., p. 4.


13. The term "imperial overstretch" is taken from one of the more influential declinist works currently about, i.e. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).


18. It was only through timely and forceful action by George Washington that the threat of a coup by the Continental Army was averted in 1783. See Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 32.
19. The Kanaks make up about 43 percent of the population but live on just 15 percent of the land. "Regional Survey: South Pacific," p. 36.

CHAPTER III

THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Given the limited utility of the foregoing strategic assessment, careful scrutiny must be made of the other apolitical factor that shapes Australia's national security policy formulation -- namely, the nature of conflict facing the nation in the future. Reinforcing the necessity for close examination is the fact that the spectrum, or nature, of conflict facing a nation is an aspect of national security planning as much bruited about as it is imperfectly understood and inappropriately applied.

For example, concepts illustrating the conflict spectrum as an escalating level of violence with a corresponding probability of occurrence are particularly malapropos. Such concepts overlook the type of low-intensity conflict which typically manifests itself as politico-military confrontation below the level of conventional operations, but, more significantly, obscure the fundamental relationships between low and more substantial levels of conflict, warning times, mobilisation planning and expansion capability. These are the issues that transcend the study of the conflict spectrum facing a nation, and whose implications we must begin to consider in advance of national security policy formulation.
The study thus puts forward, as a means of focusing on these issues, a spectrum of conflict concept that envisages the linkages in time and military effort between four generic levels of conflict -- from a base line of low-level conflict, through escalated conflict to substantial conflict, which, like the lower levels, can be either limited in its objectives or, alternatively, aimed at the conquest of a nation.

In Australia's case, application of this concept provides several implications for defence planning. As a nation of limited demographic resources, the expansion capability of its defence force is necessarily restricted to a point short of being able to unilaterally handle such substantial levels of conflict as would threaten the survival of the nation. Below this level of conflict, in the part of the spectrum where an adversary would seek to achieve more limited objectives, a further issue -- the verity of war that escalation of conflict is often rapid -- also has compelling relevance to the nation's defence planning. Thus, in the absence of an existing or foreseeable capability to prosecute substantial conflict against Australia, the key to the development of a capable and credible Australian defence posture becomes the ability of forces-in-being to handle an escalated level of conflict. It further follows that such forces must be capable of expanding to handle conflict of a substantial nature should this become necessary in the future.

The Misguided Missive

Without such considerations, any subsequent
ratiocination in the Australian policy or defence planning process is likely flawed. A similar accusation of dialectical shortcomings is often leveled at use of the US maritime strategy as the rationale for maritime-force-structure determination in that country. However, I have not focused on the maritime strategy to pursue that polemic but as an illustration of how misguided its concept of the conflict spectrum can be in application — a missile too easily deflected from the real target of the linkages between levels of conflict, warning times and expansion capabilities.

Initially codified in classified internal documents in 1982 and then gradually released into the open forum through Congressional testimony and public articles, the US maritime strategy provides a framework for considering all uses of maritime power. To underpin the relevance of sea power across the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime presence through crisis response to war fighting, advocates of the maritime strategy often use a depiction of the probability of various levels of violence occurring as per Figure 1.

![Figure 1: The Spectrum of Conflict](image1.png)
Insofar as it vividly "draws attention to the importance of the lower levels of violence where navies are often the key actors", the concept has valid effect. Unfortunately, the concept itself tends to be afforded a degree of permanence akin to the basic maritime power tenet that it has just illustrated. Yet the concept merely reflects the strategic situation faced by a nation, in this case the US, at any particular time. Accordingly, while of considerable benefit in providing a "snapshot" overview of a current strategic situation, the concept has limited utility in any long term defence planning.

Variation on the Theme

Despite such disparagement, though, the concept nevertheless has a modification with considerable potential to facilitate the formulation of a coherent national security policy. By varying the vertical and horizontal axes so as to plot representative levels of military activity required to combat the various threats to a nation across the spectrum of conflict, it is possible to readily integrate the dimension missing from the US maritime strategy concept -- time -- into any subsequent analysis. As a consequence, it quickly becomes apparent how the general relationships between low and more substantial levels of conflict, warning times, mobilisation planning and expansion base needs impact on national security. Figure 2 (and its attendant verities) illustrates the way in which this "varied" concept of the conflict spectrum applies to Australia's situation.
Figure 2: The Spectrum of Conflict (As Varied)

The concept envisages four generic levels of conflict in a conventional warfare sense: (a) low-level conflict where an adversary seeks to gain political objectives through the use of force while seeking to avoid engaging the ADF, (b) escalated conflict where the adversary is prepared to engage the ADF directly, (c) limited substantial conflict where the adversary seeks to project and maintain substantial conventional forces against Australia for political objectives short of the subjugation of the nation, and, finally, (d) unlimited substantial conflict where an adversary would seek to threaten the very survival of Australia. At each of these levels a representative degree of military effort is needed to handle a protagonist; however, these steps are not the predominant focus.

At each of these levels a representative degree of military effort is needed to handle a protagonist; however, these steps are not the predominant focus.
of the concept. Its true utility lies in consideration of the dynamics of moving from one level of conflict to another. For, although the steps delineating such a spectrum of conflict are in themselves somewhat arbitrary, the strides needed to negotiate them are far more germane.

**Low to Escalated Conflict**

With few exceptions, the very decision to use military power as the means of achieving political objectives carries with it a commitment to any necessary escalation. Moreover, a policy of graduated response notwithstanding, the vituperative nature of war also invites a natural progression to a higher level of conflict on the part of those who are threatened. The rate of escalation from low to higher levels of conflict can therefore be quite rapid, as historical example has often demonstrated. Given, then, that substantial conflict against Australia is beyond the capability of any country (apart from the US) for the present or foreseeable future, it thus becomes necessary to select the escalated level of conflict as the base line for the development of a credible defence posture capable of timely response.

While the just adduced planning imperative should not be interpreted as assuming a unilateral Australian defence posture (Chapter IV will address this issue), the restricted degree of defence preparedness thus prescribed still begs the question of whether the required defence posture could incorporate militia-type reserves. Certainly such an option would be desirable
in light of Australia's current economic situation. However, arguments in support of a citizen militia as a pillar of a reactive defence posture are hard pressed to deny the need for high levels of combat proficiency and readiness as realities of modern warfare. In other words, any credible Australian defence posture capable of handling conflict at the escalated level must rely upon forces-in-being, comprising either active duty or highly trained reserve units.

This should not be construed as suggesting that militia-type reserve forces have no role to play in planning for the defence of Australia. On the contrary, the use of such reserve forces for the defence of Australia is a logical extension of considering the next gap between the conflict levels.

**Escalated to Limited Substantial Conflict**

Although a cause for dispute that may give rise to an adversary's wishing to launch substantial hostilities against Australia could develop in the medium term, the major force development required to prosecute such operations would have to take place over a considerably longer period -- namely, a significant number of years. Any policy decisions for Australia to match nascent changes in external military postures would clearly not be predicated on the fact of a build-up alone; nevertheless, it would be less than politic for Australia not to have planning procedures in place --inclusive of drawing upon militia forces -- to allow its defence posture to expand and be capable of combatting a protagonist at the
higher (substantial) levels of conflict.

Limited to Unlimited Substantial Conflict

However, such planning procedures, and indeed security policy formulation itself, must take cognizance of the fact that Australia's demographic limitations preclude the nation from unilaterally handling an escalation from limited to unlimited substantial conflict. A small, slowly growing population of less than 17 million with an increasing average age is unable to provide the manpower base necessary to field combat forces that could alone guarantee national survival if this was the nature of war Australia faced.

The Planning Imperatives

As adapted, the graphic representation of the conflict spectrum has helped to distill the defence planning imperatives that the nature of war facing a nation, in this case Australia, prescribes. It is clear that an Australian defence posture with capabilities confined to those relevant to only low-level conflict would be ineffective; the development of a capable and credible posture, whether based solely on the ADF or not, depends upon the ability of forces-in-being to handle an escalated level of conflict. Furthermore, to take account of a change in strategic circumstances that would portend substantial conflict, planning procedures must be in place to allow those forces to expand and handle conflict at higher levels of this sort. These imperatives all have compelling relevance for Australian defence planning, but, in the first instance, it is Australia's inability to unilaterally handle
such substantial levels of conflict as would threaten the survival of the nation that warrants close scrutiny in the process of adducing an Australian national security policy.

NOTES

1. The most expansive, and influential, of the many public articles then released to describe the US maritime strategy was written by Admiral James D. Watkins USN, as "The Maritime Strategy," Parameters, January 1986.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ibid.
4. The first two levels of the conflict spectrum are similar to those described by Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, in Australia’s Regional Security, Ministerial Statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, December 1989, p. 16.
In turning now to adduce a national security policy consistent with the imperatives set forth in the preceding two chapters, considerable care needs to be taken to ensure all reasoning continues to be apolitical in nature. Failure to do so may be tantamount to rendering those imperatives nugatory as a basis for synthesizing a security policy with any degree of longevity.

Arguments that propound an Australian defence policy of self-reliance as the nation-building antithesis or historical alternative to “forward defence,” whereby Australia would join powerful allies to fight adversaries far afield from the Island Continent, can be seen as having such political overtones. Having said that, though, it is nonetheless clear that, in terms of the defence planning imperatives derived from the strategic assessment and spectrum of conflict analysis, self-reliance is indeed the best cornerstone for Australia’s national security policy.

Commencing with the need for an alliance umbrella because of Australia’s inability to unilaterally handle such levels of conflict as would threaten the nation, this chapter then acknowledges the inherent dangers associated with being
overdependent upon allies. In this context, then, it is in Australia's vital interest to pursue a self-reliant defence posture within the framework of alliances. As previously noted such a posture must, to be credible, be based upon an ADF that is both capable of handling an escalated level of conflict with its forces-in-being and of expanding to combat conflict of a substantial nature should this become necessary in the future.

Given economic globalisation and the axiom of war as "a true political instrument...carried on with other means", it is impossible to disengage economic, cultural, and diplomatic instruments from Australia's military posture. Self-reliance needs to be pursued, not just within the framework of alliances, but also as part of a national security policy that embodies economic, cultural, diplomatic, and indeed even non-alliance military elements in a cohesive fashion. To adopt less than such a multi-dimensional national security policy would place Australia at risk of undermining the favourable strategic situation the nation presently enjoys by alienating other countries in the region or, more fundamentally, of being over- or underdependent on allies for the security of the nation.

**The Alliance Balance**

At first glance, this issue of a balanced dependency on allies may seem somewhat enigmatic. On the one hand, there is a need for strong dependency, because Australia's demographic base precludes the ADF from unilaterally ensuring
the survival of the nation if so threatened; on the other hand, there is a need for self-reliance because Australia cannot expect support in time of conflict without having demonstrated real commitment in providing for its own self defence within the limits of its resources.

Indeed, this is how the United States, Australia, New Zealand Tripartite Security Pact of 1951 (ANZUS Treaty) should be interpreted in light of the Guam Doctrine. By declaring "publicly...their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific area," the ANZUS signatories have undertaken to "co-ordinate their efforts for collective defence" and to "consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately...in the event of any form of armed attack externally organized or supported."

Far from abrogating this treaty in an absolute statement of US intentions never to be involved in another war in Asia, the thrust of the Guam Doctrine in fact represents a conditional reinforcement of the ANZUS alliance. An Australian defence policy of self-reliance clearly satisfies that condition, and, as a result, promotes a higher level of confidence that the US would approach consultations with a more favourable attitude were its ally hard-pressed for survival in the face of an aggressor. There are no guarantees -- none was, is, or should be expected -- but there is increased assurance in the wake of the Guam Doctrine for a partner that
will demonstrate the development of an independent and self-sufficient national defence capability as "a strong foundation for...fulfillment of its alliance responsibility."

Moreover, although considerations of self-reliance and dependency carry the most weight in balancing out the alliance platform, there are other issues that also come into play. Again, we can look to the ANZUS treaty to provide an illustration of the importance of these further considerations that flow from an alliance based on defence self-reliance and prospective assistance. The benefits of such an alliance are not limited to deterring a potential adversary from conflict against Australia by the prospect of US assistance, but, in a practical sense, also include combined training and exercises, logistic support arrangements, preferred customer access to advanced weapons systems, and extensive cooperation in the fields of intelligence, industry and science.

A Self-Reliant Defence Posture

Taken overall, then, it is clearly in Australia’s vital interest to adopt a national security policy that is based on a self-reliant defence posture, in other words one provided primarily by the ADF. This in turn begs several questions related to specific aspects of that posture. What degree of preparedness should the ADF possess? Should reserve forces be an integral part of that preparedness? What expansion capability should the ADF have? What military strategy would best serve Australia’s situation?

Whereas the final question requires further analysis and
will be addressed in detail later in this study, the other queries have essentially been answered by the preceding chapter's examination of the nature of conflict facing Australia in the future. In the context of a policy of self-reliance, the previously adduced key to the development of a capable and credible Australian defence posture lies in the ADF. Thus, it is the ADF itself that must have active duty or highly trained reserve units, as forces-in-being, that are capable of handling conflict at the escalated level, and of expanding to deal with conflict of a substantial nature should this become necessary in the future.

**A Multi-Dimensional National Security Policy**

The instruments of national power that protect Australia's security interests go well beyond the development of a credible military posture, though. National security policy instruments at the disposition of the government include diplomacy, economic links, development assistance, military cooperation, and cultural exchanges. Diplomatic skills of persuasion can be used to dilute, contain or dissolve international frictions, often through an accommodation of interests to achieve mutual benefits. Economic linkages can create substantial and mutually beneficial interdependencies. Development assistance can promote economic and social progress, thereby reducing the likelihood of political disaffection and instability. Military cooperation programmes can provide a considerable degree of resilience to regional security. Cultural exchanges can underpin increased
understanding and acceptance of differences in national make-up. When cohesively interwoven, these policy instruments constitute, in synergy with a credible defence posture, the most effective means of protecting Australia's security.

A signal example of an approach that makes good use of the multi-dimensional nature of national security policy is afforded by the Pacific Patrol Boat Project. This high profile defence cooperation programme, whereby Australia provides a package of multi-purpose vessels, spares, and training to allow participating South Pacific countries to undertake their own surveillance and enforcement of national economic zones, has been particularly successful. Not only is it perceived as promoting a sense of regional community, but through permitting a number of arrests of foreign fishing vessels, the project has also had real economic significance. In addition, the boats strengthen the fragile institutions of these nascent nations by performing a wide range of civil functions, especially in emergencies. And then again, there are direct and immediate benefits to Australia that emanate from this programme. The islanders feel relaxed about the presence of ADF personnel, while the RAN is able to simultaneously develop corporate knowledge of reefs and channels and act as a source of information about other nations' involvement in the region.

A Further Dimension?

A critical aspect of the Pacific Patrol Boat Project has been the sensitivity of its application. Australia has been
careful to avoid any paternalistic overtones to the assistance, and the broad success of the programme can be seen as testament to the virtue of avoiding the use of moral and political example as an element of national power.

US national security strategy promotes this element amongst its array of instruments of national power -- citing its use as representing "a potent leverage in international relations". This perception may gain more credibility in the wake of fundamental changes to the course of many countries recently. In any event, though, a national security policy redolent of either a paternalistic or messianic role is usually counterproductive. It is one thing for a nation to demonstrate how its moral and political ideology has enriched the lives of its citizens in spirit and prosperity; it is another matter entirely "to spread this message in an organized...way."

Policy Focus

Despite its rejection as an integral part of an Australian national security policy, the considered use of moral and political example as an instrument of power for security concerns provides ample illustration of the breadth of the social, economic, political and military elements intrinsic to policy formulation. However, in seeking to decide exactly where to apply those policy instruments in support of Australian national security, there is a need to narrow the focus somewhat, given Australia's geostrategic situation.
In view, then, of the defence planning imperative previously stated that a military threat to Australia would almost certainly be prosecuted through the archipelago to the north, the first focus for policy application -- alliance solidarity aside -- is the arc encompassing Indonesia, PNG, and the nations of the South West Pacific. This is not to suggest that other regional or wider linkages should be ignored, but it is clear where the priority for Australia's security concerns should lie.

The Remaining Question

By drawing on the strategic assessment and conflict spectrum analysis, then, the definition and focus of an effective Australian national security policy has been adduced. A self-reliant defence posture is what needs to be pursued, within the framework of alliances, as part of a multi-dimensional policy that makes cohesive and directed use of the cultural, economic, military and diplomatic instruments of national power available to Australia. This in turn has pointed to an ADF comprising forces-in-being capable of handling escalated conflict, and of expanding to combat substantial conflict if necessary. What remains unanswered, of course, is the question relating to the development of a military strategy to achieve this policy of self-reliance.
NOTES


5. Australia-United States Ministerial Talks, Sydney 3-4 November 1989, Joint Communique.


8. Ibid.
CHAPTER V

MILITARY STRATEGY

There is some disagreement as to whether General Douglas
MacArthur ever subscribed to a continental strategy for the
defence of Australia on taking up his post in 1942 as Commander
in Chief of Allied Forces in the South West Pacific Area
(CINCSWPA), but it is clear that, soon thereafter, his strategy
was one of defence in depth through forward deployment.
Believing that to concentrate forces in a static defence of the
populous southeastern part of the continent was unsound in the
geostrategic circumstances, he sought to deploy enough of his
now reinforced forces forward to regain control of Papua and
New Guinea, and thus restrict the Japanese lines of approach to
Australia. Over the course of the next eight months
MacArthur’s strategic approaches were to undergo considerable
evolution because of both necessity and innovation, but in
essence his military strategy for the Papuan Campaign was
maritime and aerospace in nature, incorporating the sequential,
often pre-emptive, application of concentrated force to secure
vital objectives.

Some may be tempted to adopt a parallel strategic
concept in a contemporary setting to underpin the just adduced
Australian defence policy of self-reliance -- even to the point

1
of regarding the strategy as self-evident and thus in no need of substantiation. That would be a mistake. For, in contrast to the paucity of national security policy options capable of serving Australia’s interests, there are a wide range and combination of useful military strategies that warrant examination. More to the point, it is essential to consider these options in the context of determining what broadest possible conceptual span of strategies has enough flexibility to permit Australia to cope with any conflict situation that it may face.

It is true that this span of strategies could conceivably encompass concepts that raise questions of provocation, escalation, or unconscionable action. Such issues are important, and not to be taken lightly; however, given that they are not absolute in nature, it is somewhat moot to take a stance against a strategy on the grounds of their prospective existence. The questions are more properly left to be resolved in the context of a particular situation when it arises.

Having said that, though, there is a special utility in looking now at the underlying theme of those issues. Therein lies a pointer to the core strategy in the defence of Australia.

**Disproportionate Response**

Pivotal to any concerns of provocation and escalation is the apparent paradox of offensive operations within the framework of a defensive strategy. The real rub for those
who would apply this illusion to automatically equate any
defensive capability with provocation is "that the
2
counterstroke is the soul of defence". That verity presumes
an ability to maintain or gain control of the threat
environment while conducting defence -- to the point where "the
State which is compelled to take up arms against a superior foe
3
( allows) that foe no breathing space...."

The key to threat control is the core strategy of
disproportionate response. Causing a potential adversary to
respond disproportionately in terms of the cost of materiel,
casualties, or time in order to gain the advantage enhances
both deterrence and defence. Specifically, this control is
achieved by the following strategic approaches: first, by
refusing to fight on the enemy's own terms; second, by
depriving him of rapid victory; and, third, by forcing him to
conduct a protracted and expensive campaign.

Continental Strategy

In any examination of strategic concepts against these
criteria, it is important to keep in mind that, in general
terms, there are five schools of military strategy --
continental, maritime, aerospace, nuclear, and revolutionary.
Of these schools, though, only the first two have relevance to
Australian defence planning. Perhaps this judgement may
raise an eyebrow or two in a silent accusation of ignoring the
role air power has to play in the defence of Australia, or of
overlooking the use of space to support Australian military
activities, but neither of these is my intention. Air power
is likely to be the dominant factor in any conflict facing Australia, and due accord will be given that verity in this and subsequent chapters. The technological opportunities of space will be similarly addressed. What will be ignored is any connotation of an independent air campaign, and the study will thus draw upon the continental and maritime schools, as well as examining the unconventional use of non-military resistance, to focus on strategic concepts relevant to Australia's situation.

Turning first, then, to continental defence; it is essentially concerned with the complexities of land warfare strategies, which need to take into account such diverse factors as terrain, urbanization, the level of conflict, and of course the various forms of defensive and offensive maneuver. These complexities are best rationalised into discrete, but often overlapping concepts, as a means of facilitating the study of land warfare.

**Mobile Defence**

The first of these concepts with relevance to Australia's situation to be considered is mobile defence. This approach appears to have been adopted by Sweden. In the event of an attack, Swedish forces aim to delay the enemy, extend and then cut his lines of communication, weaken him, and finally destroy him. The concept lends itself to the use of large numbers of well-trained, dispersed but coordinated units employing advanced-technology weapons systems with heavy attrition potential. Significantly, in Sweden's case, it
requires an ability to mobilise an army of some 800,000 personnel in 72 hours.

Guerrilla Defence

A second concept with possible relevance to Australia -- the use of guerrillas -- is best illustrated by the Finnish example. Local forces, organised as independent battalions (more than 100 in number), have a two-fold task. In the vicinity of the border area, they carry out guerrilla operations against the enemy's rear and his lines of communication. In the rest of the country, they initially protect vital installations, but then disperse to revert to guerrilla operations when the enemy reaches their area. Their activities are coordinated, with the overall objective of weakening the enemy prior to committing the Finnish general forces in decisive battle.

Containment Defence

In this, the third concept of possible relevance to Australia, containment forces are deployed rapidly to an area of enemy incursion or lodgment. If they cannot defeat the enemy, then a delaying defence based on either static or mobile operations, is used until sufficient forces can be mobilised and deployed to mount a counterattack.

A high state of readiness and mobility on the part of the containment forces is integral to this concept. But, unlike mobile defence and perhaps guerrilla defence, containment defence does not rely upon the rapid mobilisation of a large segment of the population.
Application to Australia

In the abstract, both mobile defence and guerrilla defence render the core strategy of disproportionate response signally effective. Moreover, the combination of these component concepts provides both diversity and redundancy in continental-type defence capabilities. Structuring a force around "large numbers of well-trained, dispersed, but coordinated small units" that possess medium-level combat power capabilities achieves an effective synergy of these two concepts in the form of territorial defence.

In essence, then, territorial defence systems combine the guerrilla-type ability to survive and to strike almost continuously from any direction with the capacity to perform frontal-type defensive operations for short periods of time. Equipped with advanced technology weapons systems based on versatile platform vehicles suitable to the terrain, territorial defence units can constitute a sound deterrent and tactical defensive capability.

There are, however, several major difficulties in applying the concept of a territorial defence system to Australia -- not the least of which is public acceptance of the wide involvement of civil society in war fighting within the nation's borders. Territorial defence is not cost-free; there would invariably be great suffering at the higher levels of conflict. Nor is it likely to lead to a swift victory; implicit in the nature of territorial defence is a protracted struggle. It is therefore not surprising that territorial
defence systems are more likely 'to be most readily accepted and entrenched in those countries that have suffered the ravages of invasion and have a history of mounting protracted partisan resistance.'

There is a further obvious drawback that emerges from the experiences of such nations. Of those countries that adopted the concept of territorial defence in World War II, the three that proved to be most adept at it -- Yugoslavia, Albania, and Finland -- were relatively underdeveloped and not heavily urbanized. The point here is that the urbanization of societies invariably undermines the utility of territorial defence by making large portions of the population accessible and susceptible to enemy reprisals and terror campaigns. A territorial defence system in Australia would be similarly vulnerable, given the very high concentration of the nation's population in urban areas.

Another potential difficulty in applying the concept of territorial defence to Australia relates to the inherent lack of strategic mobility. In a country the size of Australia, territorial defence forces are unlikely to be able rapidly to mount conventional ground-force counteroffensives against an enemy lodgment or assault in the many remote areas of the country. Thus, while able to provide considerable deterrent and defensive capacity against major conflict, an Australian territorial defence system would be somewhat limited in its flexibility to be applied in any situation the nation may face.

The formidable difficulties associated with the
application of territorial defence -- or, for that matter, the underlying concepts of mobile and guerrilla defence -- thus point to a reliance on containment as the best land warfare strategy for the defence of Australia. Its emphasis on conventional military structures promotes public acceptance; its high-visibility major equipment items enhance deterrence; and its forces are operationally flexible to respond against a wide range of enemy forces.

The foregoing should not be construed as a complete rejection of territorial, mobile, or guerrilla defence. Doctrinally, the concepts have much to offer. They point to a number of principles that should guide the ADF in exercising control in a continental-type defence. Land forces need to be highly mobile, to be capable of dispersed operations, and to have the ability to protect military installations, infrastructure, and civilian population, particularly in the north of the country. Territorial defence doctrine also points to the use of tactically mobile special forces in depth as an adjunct to more conventional operations and, in a lateral sense, to consideration of a parallel concept in non-military defence -- civilian resistance.

Civilian Resistance

Ranging from non-cooperation through active non-violence to, in its most extreme form, organized destruction, civilian resistance is far from pacifist in nature. Its brings with it a commitment to a protracted and dangerous struggle against an adversary that is, in essence, the same type of universal
national commitment sought for territorial defence. In the case of civilian resistance, though, the public is more directly and actively involved in its planning and training process -- and thus even less likely to accept its employment.

Yet civilian resistance campaigns, especially in this century following the proliferation of nationalism, have contributed significantly to reducing the control of occupying powers. The non-cooperation that Norwegian teachers displayed to prevent the introduction of Nazi ideology into their schools and the problems encountered by the French during their occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 are good examples of the contribution civilian resistance can provide.

Although a substantial deterrent effect would accrue from announcing in advance that similar, perhaps more violent measures, would be taken in the event of occupation, such a stance would likely be impractical. To develop a civilian resistance structure during peacetime probably requires a public government admission that more conventional national security options may be inadequate -- the type of politically unpalatable statement about which national leaders are invariably taciturn. Consistent with historical experience, civilian resistance should be reactive rather than proactive.

The Strategy Widens

So far, the study has considered the defence of Australia in terms of continental-type defence of the nation. A military strategy tied to the employment of conventional forces in a containment-type defence but inclusive of elements
of territorial defence doctrine has been adduced as most applicable to Australia's situation.

"It would be the height of foolishness [,though, ] if Australia were to adopt a military posture which did not give priority to holding, and preferably destroying, an invading force on the high seas or in the air before reaching Australia." This is the layered strategy of denial, to include a continental-type defence strategy under the umbrella of a maritime-type strategy to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and air gap.

A strategy of denial thus emphasises the need for sound intelligence and surveillance capabilities in support of air and naval forces capable of operating effectively in the air and sea gap approaches to Australia. Therein lies the key to the efficacy of a denial strategy in relation to one based only on land warfare strategies. Operations in the environment of the air and sea gap provide a significant increase in opportunities to impose unacceptable costs on enemy forces, thereby allowing the core strategy of disproportionate response to provide far better deterrence and defence.

However, the strategy of denial fails to hang together in theory when consideration is given to the wider implications it brings -- to the point where, in practice, it would fall short of the task of protecting Australia. There are three major problems with it.

**Enemy Sanctuary**

First, such a strategy fails to deny sanctuary to an
enemy. As a result, the enemy would be able to dictate the momentum of battle, and Australia would forfeit control of her threat environment in direct contradiction of the precept that guided its military strategy formulation from the outset.

The inference that Australia thus needs to employ a far wider strategic reach should not be interpreted as an unqualified advocacy of targeting an enemy homeland. Unless denied the opportunity, an aggressor can find sanctuary elsewhere beyond the Australian approaches, whether on the high seas or on arrogated land. On the other hand, the option of targeting an enemy homeland as part of Australia's response to an attack should not be summarily dismissed. As argued previously, such questions involving escalation, provocation, and unconscionable action are properly left to be resolved in the context of a particular situation when it arises.

The exception to deferring consideration of these issues involves an extension of the provocation question. Would not the peacetime existence of an offensive capability with strategic reach have an adverse impact on Australia's bilateral relations with her neighbours? Perhaps the answer is best found in reviewing the criteria for the degree of military power needed to threaten Australia that were adduced in Chapter II. An insular neighbour's analysis of threat in terms of generic military power would probably be similar; an autarkic neighbour might reach different conclusions, but not in relation to threats from insular countries. In any case, an ADF offensive capability, provided it does not approach
these force projection criteria, will not render Australia's defence posture aggressively provocative in the eyes of others -- an assessment already borne out by experience.

Vulnerability to Disproportionate Response

A further difficulty of employing a denial strategy concerns the concept of disproportionate response. Although not previously noted, it is axiomatic that such a concept points to the need to ensure that Australian defence policies are not themselves vulnerable to a disproportionate response strategy.

Australia would be particularly vulnerable to being forced to react disproportionately in operations within the Australian approaches. A conscious application by an enemy of the concept of disproportionate response in the face of a strategy of denial would translate into a series of feints or traps aimed at wearing down Australia's air and sea gap defences. Ultimately, Australia would be faced with the prospect of its maritime-type strategy umbrella folding, and being forced to revert to the stand-alone strategy of containment, with all that strategy's limitations. The alternative, of course, is to reduce Australia's vulnerability to the mechanisms of disproportionality by incorporating the flexibility to respond with a far wider strategic reach.

Cumulative and Sequential Strategies

The third, and most important, drawback to a strategy of denial stems from the need for Australia to mix the two general operational patterns of strategy that underpin the conduct of
war. When wars or campaigns are planned, like the German drive to Russia during World War II, as a "series of visible, discrete steps, each dependent upon the one that proceeded it," a sequential strategy is employed. But there is another way to prosecute a war -- by the accumulation of operations "piling one on top of the other until at some unknown point the mass of accumulated actions may be large enough to be critical." This approach reflects the use of a cumulative strategy, such as was employed with the submarine campaigns of the Atlantic in both World Wars.

While there is no major instance in which a cumulative strategy has been unilaterally successful, the strategies are not mutually exclusive, and there have been signal examples -- the Peninsula Campaign in Portugal and the US Civil War are but two -- where a comparatively weak strategy achieved victory by virtue of the strength of the cumulative strategy behind it. Two points, then, come quickly to mind. First, a cumulative strategy has long been a characteristic of war at sea, and is arguably a characteristic of air warfare. Second, "comparatively weak" closely describes the type of sequential strategy that Australia's limited resources would permit it to employ. There is thus considerable concern that restricting the scope of naval and air warfare to the air and sea gap around Australia, as prescribed by a strategy of denial, would preclude the development of an enabling cumulative strategy.

The destruction of central position is one illustration of how this concern may translate into reality. Similar in
concept to the use of interior lines in land strategy, where the ability to transfer forces from one front to another quickly can provide significant strategic advantage, central position looks to narrow channels in a maritime context to confer the same advantages. Australia's regional environs are well suited to the effective employment of this concept to underpin a cumulative strategy; however, the concept of central position would have limited utility were ADF forces restricted to the sea and air gap approaches under a strategy of denial.

**Defence In Depth**

At this point, then, we have come up against the judgement that the span of strategies examined fails to adequately encompass the strategic approaches critical to threat control -- to the extent that Australia would be forced to fight on terms so impropitious as to presage defeat. A strategy of denial facilitates enemy sanctuary, places Australia at risk of disproportionate response, and, perhaps most important, prejudices the likely efficacy of campaign strategy. During consideration of these difficulties, one impression has become exceedingly strong -- that the span of strategies needs to be extended to permit operations in an area that encompasses a strategic reach sufficient for Australia to maintain control of the threat environment.

From a core concept of disproportionate response, then, the span of strategies has expanded outwards, in a concentric fashion somewhat similar to the strategic reach therein prescribed, to encompass further concepts necessary for
Australia's defence. At the first level, the concept of containment defence emphasises mobile conventional military structures for the continental defence of Australia, while at the same time advocating the use of applicable territorial defence doctrine. At the second conceptual level, denial strategy emphasises the need for air and naval forces capable of denying the air and sea gap approaches to an enemy. At the third, and final, level, the concept of strategic reach emphasises the need for air and naval forces capable of operating beyond those approaches to ensure that control of the threat environment is not lost to the enemy. The levels are not layers, but describe mutually inclusive conceptual circles, that, taken together, constitute the broad strategy of defence in depth. It is a strategy that raises an enemy's costs and risks to the highest possible level, and that has the flexibility to permit Australia to cope with any conflict situation (short of a threat to national survival) it may face.

Just what strategic reach is needed to underpin this strategy of defence in depth need not be defined precisely within the context of this study. Indeed, it may be ill-advised to promote any interpretation of a precise geostrategic sphere of influence, as witnessed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson's drawing of a line of US interests in Asia that excluded Korea in his speech to the National Press Club in Washington in January 1950. A generic description of "large" will suffice to permit examination of relevant joint and
single service doctrinal precepts that will guide the ADF in exercising control over this area and hence shape force structure requirements.

NOTES

1. MacArthur implied in a press statement on 18 March 1943, and categorically stated in a subsequent letter to the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin, that "it was never my intention to defend Australia on the main land of Australia." For a contrary position, see Dudley McCarthy, South West Pacific Area - First Year, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1959), p. 112, which notes CINCSWPA's first directive relating to a general plan dated 25 April 1942 as proposing no changes to the existing disposition of forces then concentrated on a mainland defence.


3. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. 50.

8. Ibid., p. 166.


14. The accuracy of the assessment was reflected in the July 1989 remarks of the Indonesian Defence Minister to his nation's parliament that Australia's defence posture, which currently includes a limited range of offensive weapons systems, in no way constitutes a threat to Indonesia. See Kim C. Beazley, Australian Minister for Defence, *Hermann Black Forum Lecture*, 13 September 1989.


CHAPTER VI

THE IMPACT OF DOCTRINE ON FORCE STRUCTURE

The evolution of armed services in the 20th Century has been characterised by two trends: increased interservice cooperation and growing single-service specialization. With these trends has come a search for a consensus within the profession of arms as to the best employment of naval, land and air forces in war. Yet, despite considerable iterative effort, there is still some way to go in this regard -- as lingering interservice acrimony attests to.

To some extent the obstacle to closure is a semantic difficulty. One service may enunciate strategic concepts to guide the application of military power in combat; another may put forward a more eclectic body of central beliefs -- a doctrine -- for the proper use of forces; and a third may mix the two approaches to really blur the issue. Then, again, there are the very real difficulties in reaching agreement as to validity, applicability, or utility at one or more of the levels of war.

It is therefore not surprising that defence planners are disinclined to incorporate doctrinal considerations into the force structure development process, with the result that there is often a discontinuity between roles assigned to
military forces and their capabilities. Obviously, the omission of this fundamental linkage can critically prejudice national security.

Notwithstanding, then, the difficulties of disparity in meaning and substance it may bring, doctrine must be integrated into force structure planning to provide definitive direction and establish the link between mission and capability. There is a caveat, though, to this verity. Although military doctrine contains what cynics -- particularly those of the fourth estate -- would see as uncommonly common sense, it is not a fool’s guide, and it requires considerable judgement in its use.

In Australia’s case, a national security policy of self-reliance through defence in depth further shapes the use of military doctrine in the force development process. The concomitant realities of a small-sized ADF and the need to exercise control within a wide area of strategic reach, point clearly to the relevance of two broad precepts of military doctrine -- force multiplication and attrition control.

Both tenets represent a signal synergy of innovations based on recent technological advancements with enduring principles of warfare. Force multiplication looks to high grade, real-time intelligence capabilities, precision munitions, and disproportionate-response weapon systems to optimize the efficacy of ADF firepower. Attrition control is aimed at increased sustainability through reliability, maintainability, and firepower suppression.
From the outset, it should be evident that there is some overlap in the employment of these doctrinal precepts. For example, the use of precision munitions can be linked to attrition control; conversely, the use of reliable and easily maintained weapon systems enhances combat capability, including firepower generation. This combined effect can be significant and certainly warrants scrutiny in the context of an actual force development process, but the thrust of force multiplication and attrition control as planning maxims can be just as readily appreciated by elaborating upon them separately.

Force Multiplication

Turning, then, to the use of force multipliers, is not so much a mechanism to "extract from a (nation's) existing resources a greater level of firepower" as it is one to increase the impact of the limited assets that are, or may be, available.

Precision Weapons

The most striking feature of the force multiplier principle is the employment of precision weapons. However, in the past their utility has been tempered significantly by considerations of cost and target acquisition. For the future, though, there is evidence of widespread technological developments that would overcome those difficulties.

Breakthroughs in the communication fields of fiber-optics and frequency-agile techniques offer high security and high data transmission rates at greatly reduced cost. This,
in turn, is leading to the availability of weapons systems capable of guiding a remotely launched munition to a visually identified target without risk to high-value launch platforms, friendly forces, or noncombatants. On another level, the concept of pinpointing fixed targets using the Global Positioning System (GPS) appears to offer the prospect of low-cost, unguided precision weapons.

**Intelligence Capabilities**

Space-based systems also hold considerable potential as force multipliers because of their ability to effectively concentrate the employment of force-multiplier weapon systems, although, of course, such capabilities are also offered by air-breathing systems. In any case, intelligence gathering by surveillance, matched by a sophisticated interpretation and analysis capability, is critical to the doctrine of force multiplication.

Given, then, Australia’s wide area of military interest, these surveillance systems should be sufficiently broad to provide evidence of both strategic and tactical developments. For the present, however, available broad surveillance systems are limited in either coverage or data resolution — or both — to the point where some degree of augmentation is needed to bring force multiplier munitions effectively to bear against an airborne threat.

**Disproportionate Response Weapon Systems**

The final aspect of force multiplication to be explored is the employment of weapon systems aimed at producing
a disproportionate response on the part of an enemy. This concept has already been discussed at length in adducing a military strategy to underpin an Australian self-reliant defence posture, but the task now is to cite doctrinal mechanisms of disproportionality so that they may be subsequently translated into force structure recommendations.

These doctrinal mechanisms are best described as a hierarchy of disproportionate response campaigns, the key to which lies in employing those types of weapon systems with the maximum potential to produce disproportionate response in Australia's geostrategic situation. For example, the expanse of the sea and air gap points to a maritime strike campaign (surface, sub-surface, air), and the choke points in the sea approaches, to a maritime mining campaign.

From several viewpoints, mining is perhaps the campaign least appreciated for its potential. For example, during the Korean War, at Wonson, a mixed defensive field of 300 mines sank three of the minesweepers trying to clear the field and delayed the UN amphibious assault by 15 days. Some of the mines were remnants of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. This and other Korean War experiences of mining operations led a senior US Navy commander to state: "It is a basic fact that any small maritime nation, with only elementary transportation facilities, little technical experience, and a minimum of improvised equipment, can deny the use of its ports and the shallow waters along its coast to a large, modern naval force at little cost to itself by the extensive laying of even
elementary types of mines."

**Attrition Control**

Force multiplier doctrine is clearly of fundamental importance, but no more so than attrition control. In fact, for a small force the size of the ADF, failure to properly apply attrition control to sustain forces in combat will invariably render the use of force multipliers nugatory.

**Firepower Suppression**

In the face of the type of advanced technology that has been previously cited as responsible for greatly increasing the lethality of modern weapons, the key to sustaining operations lies in increased survivability. This verity, in turn, emphasises the need for a considerable degree of electronic countermeasure, all-weather, and hand-off target acquisition capability across the force.

**Reliability and Maintainability**

Some strategists have pointed to what they term passive attrition -- in other words, the degraded availability of a weapon system -- as a major consequence of using complex, high-maintenance defensive fits to reduce the rate of active attrition on the battlefield. While this may have been the case in the past, it is unlikely to be so in the future. The solution to passive attrition lies in the implementation of reliability and maintainability as primary goals in the design and manufacture of weapon systems.

Reliable weapon systems reduce life-cycle costs, require fewer spares and less manpower, and result in higher
availability. Similarly, maintainable weapons require fewer people and lower skill levels. Taken together, then, increased reliability and maintainability translates directly into increased sustainability for combat operations.

The technology to field these systems has been available for some years now. What remains is the need to accept this doctrinal precept and to translate it into reality.

**The Shape Firms**

These doctrinal precepts help to give firmer shape to the required capability mix for the ADF to carry out a strategy of defence in depth. A credible Australian defence posture, it has been argued, must entail mobile conventional military forces for continental defence, and air and naval forces capable of a wide strategic reach to deny an enemy control of the threat environment in the strategic approaches to Australia and beyond. When this skeletal shape is "fleshed out" in light of the doctrinal considerations addressed in this chapter, these forces need to be supported by high-grade intelligence capabilities, and to be able to employ readily sustainable weapon systems (precision and otherwise) in the effective prosecution of disproportionate-response-type campaigns.

The combined guidance of these considerations thus gives considerable direction to ADF force structure requirements for a strategy of defence in depth. However, prior to the final derivation of a generic-type capability mix for the ADF, cognizance needs to be taken of any constraints to force
structure development that are likely to be imposed for budgetary or geopolitical reasons.

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CHAPTER VII

BUDGETARY AND GEOPOLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

During the course of this study there have been several instances when constraints on Australia's national security policy have been considered. For example, the limit on Australia's available manpower was the key to the need for an alliance umbrella, and the fundamental importance of being sensitive to the perceptions of neighbouring countries in both the making and implementing of policy has been stressed a number of times.

In his book *Rethinking Australia's Defence*, Ross Babbage examined at length these and other constraints that he saw as crucial in the shaping of Australian national security policy. Amongst the further constraints that he cited there are three -- domestic industry support, budgetary limits, and geopolitical influences -- that could have a direct impact on ADF force structure options, and thus bear scrutiny now.

**Domestic Industry**

In looking at the first of these factors, it is interesting to note one thing at the outset. Ten years ago, when cited by Ross Babbage as a significant constraint on the ADF, the capacity of Australia's secondary industry to produce weapon or support systems within acceptable time and cost
parameters was very restricted. To a large degree, this deficiency could be traced to the rapid growth in the Australian mining sector. This had raised the domestic costs of labour and capital to the point where many manufacturing processes previously carried out within the country had been transferred offshore or replaced by those overseas.

Since that time, however, substantial and systemic changes in Australian industry, as well as the large-scale restructuring and rationalisation of the government-owned defence manufacturing infrastructure, has turned that trend around. There is still some way to go in this regard, but the more competitive environment for Australian industry has already seen the average level of local content in ADF acquisitions rise to an estimated 70 percent, particularly as a result of the F/A-18, new submarine, and ANZAC frigate projects.

Budgetary Considerations

The restructuring of Australia's manufacturing industry has been part of a wider government strategy to revitalise the national economy. Unfortunately, many of the financial measures adopted have yet to produce the desired results. Despite currency deregulation and high interest rates to attract overseas investment, Australia's foreign debt remains at destabilising levels.

Australia is thus likely to see continued fiscal restraint for the foreseeable future, with little prospect, therefore, of any real growth in its defence budget. In
fact, should economic indicators reflect even the slightest downturn, there is every likelihood that future defence budgets could fall below the current funding level, which has been set at 2.3 percent of GNP for financial year 1989/90. Moreover, even if the economy improves, it is probable that the benefits of any resultant easing of monetary policy will flow first to those public sectors, in particular social security, which have borne a fair measure of recent constraints.

**Geopolitical Constraints**

There are two dimensions to the way external factors may constrain ADF force structure. First, international disarmament agreements may formally limit the acquisition and use of particular types of weapons. Second, prohibitive restrictions on the transfer of advanced technology may be applied.

For some time now, international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the General Assembly of the United Nations have sponsored major conferences with the long-term aim of prohibiting a wide range of weaponry that are seen as an indiscriminate, treacherous, or cruel, and thus in alleged contravention of accepted protocols or conventions. Systems under scrutiny include blast-fragmentation, time-delay, incendiary, and small-calibre projectile weapon systems. To foresee the type of agreement that might be reached is extremely difficult, but it may be politic to consider this possibility in looking at the potential for collateral damage of a weapon system sought for
the ADF.

The effect of the other aspect of geopolitical constraint is not so obtuse. While the strength of the bilateral relationship between Australia and the US is a matter of record, the ADF continues to experience difficulties in obtaining enough technical information (including performance and evaluation data) to support acquisition submissions for major defence systems and the modification of existing systems. The problem stems from, on the one hand, an Australian misunderstanding of US release procedures, and, on the other hand, increased US sensitivity about safeguarding more effectively its military technology. Having said that, though, it is not a problem of unmanageable proportions. Recent Australian policy developments in this area reflect an understanding that the key to resolution of the problem lies in arguing each technology transfer or data release case on its merits. In the past, there had been a minimal degree of justification that only served to risk access at the appropriate level.

The Critical Constraint

It is evident then, that for the foreseeable future the major constraint confronting the ADF will be defence budget limits. In the absence of an obvious threat, the economic and political realities associated with providing funds for the ADF at this time preclude consideration of a force structure that would necessitate funding in excess of current levels. Moreover, the budgetary limits also mean that the ADF force
structure required to underpin a military strategy of defence in depth will need to include an order of priority for the acquisition of high-cost items.

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2. Ibid., p. 116.
CHAPTER VIII

AN EFFECTIVE FORCE STRUCTURE CAPABILITY MIX

On the surface, there would appear to be considerable utility in employing a military capability matrix to assist in determining force structure requirements. With this force structure planning tool, military needs would be represented by the matrix's vertical components, each of which generally would require a mix of systems to fulfill (for example, anti-tank, air defence, anti-surface ship), and individual system capabilities would provide the horizontal components. Force planners could thus look for systems with the flexibility to afford a multi-role capability and so enhance resilience or reduce costs. Because budget limits are the critical constraint to ADF force development for the foreseeable future, this mechanism would appear particularly well suited to use in an Australian context.

There are, however, several drawbacks associated with employing this approach to determine what force structure best serves Australia's -- or for that matter, any other country's -- national security. The considerable difficulties and hidden costs involved in maintaining multi-role proficiency are one set of limitations. Cost increases in gross disproportion to incremental increases in capability can be
another disadvantage.

But, the major objection to be raised against the use of the capability matrix is its tendency to disengage force development from the whole process of defence planning. Filling out the matrix can readily become an end, rather than a means, of the process. The result is little more than a list aimed at overcoming perceived deficiencies in existing equipment -- to be dusted off when it comes time to replace that equipment through age, or, alternatively, if a potential enemy modernizes its comparable weapon systems.

Still, as we have seen in tracing the path from strategic assessment to constraining realities over the course of this study, the development of force structure requirements is an integral part of defence planning. In almost continuous fashion, consideration of the linkages between military power, international relationships, security policy, military strategy, and doctrine must shape the ADF capability mix to permit Australia to cope with any future conflict.

At the outset, the strategic assessment of Australia's situation led to the conclusion that forces defending the nation need to be structured to cope with a military threat prosecuted through the archipelago to the north. This was followed by evidence that the development of a capable and credible defence posture depends upon those forces having the ability to handle an escalated level of conflict, and of being able to expand to cope with higher levels of conflict should that become necessary.
Moreover, it was Australia's inability to unilaterally support the expansion of those forces to the point where they could handle such a level of conflict as would threaten the survival of the nation that dictated the need for an alliance umbrella. In turn, the cornerstone of this alliance was cited as self-reliance, and in this context, the previously adduced key to the development of a credible Australian defence posture lies in the ADF.

To then determine a military strategy to underpin this self-reliant defence posture, considerations of public acceptance, resource limitations, conceptual incompatibilities, population vulnerability, and flexibility were closely examined. In the final analysis, a broad strategy of defence in depth was cited as necessary to ensure an effective response to the full range of potential pressures and threats against the nation.

Air and Sea Lift

To carry out this strategy of defence in depth, it was argued, the ADF structure must encompass mobile conventional military forces for continental defence. At this point, then, we can look to a requirement for strategic air and sea lift to move forces rapidly to an area of threat, and then to the use of tactical air and land mobility to close with the enemy. A rotary-wing capability would obviously be an essential part of this tactical mobility, but given the likely budgetary constraints on force development, it may be necessary to limit the amount of heavy lift capacity. A further
compromise to budgetary constraints would probably involve the use of C130-type aircraft in both the tactical and strategic airlift role. The distances involved in the continental defence of Australia lend themselves to this arrangement. Yet it is also important to note in this context that armour would need to be deployed by rail or sea.

**Maritime Strike**

Defence in depth calls as well for an ADF with air and naval forces capable of a wide strategic reach in the approaches to Australia and beyond. An air defence and coastal surveillance system that emphasises the defence of northern Australia would be the foundation of this strategic reach, but, of significance, the efficacy of ADF forces operating beyond those approaches would depend upon adherence to the doctrinal considerations that apply to small forces like the ADF. In particular, these forces should be able to conduct disproportionate-response-type campaigns effectively using readily sustainable (precision and otherwise) weapon systems.

**Submarines**

Submarines represent a singularly effective weapon system to conduct such a campaign. Nuclear-powered submarines provide a considerable advantage over conventional vessels in terms of range and submersible loiter time. But their cost is prohibitive, and they are not well suited to inshore operations. The ADF would thus place considerable importance on the use of conventional submarines to control the
immediate approaches as well as the more distant sea lines of communication.

Air-to-Air Refueling

The other platforms of this maritime strike capability -- air and surface -- could suffer to a varying degree from vulnerability to air attack or insufficient range when undertaking some taskings. The flexibility needed to conduct other than sub-surface maritime strike operations at considerable distance from Australia is dependent upon what air-to-air refueling capability is available for both fighter and strike aircraft.

Intelligence Capabilities

Given Australia's wide area of military interest, ADF surveillance systems need to be capable of furnishing intelligence of both strategic and tactical developments. One such broad surveillance system is Over The Horizon Radar (OTHR). However, its coverage and data resolution, as well as its reliability in all atmospheric conditions, is limited. Unfortunately, the current technology available to augment this broad surveillance system is extremely expensive. Yet, without recourse to Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, the chances of bringing force multiplier weapons to bear against an airborne threat are greatly reduced. Perhaps emerging technology in space will hold the key to providing another alternative to augmenting broad systems like OTHR, but then again, space-based systems are also likely to be expensive, at least initially.
Maritime Mining

As previously noted, maritime mining is a prime example of the type of disproportionate-response campaign that is well suited to Australia's environs. The mines could be laid in a number of ways, including the use of long-range strike aircraft. Insofar as any inference of using indiscriminate weapons is concerned, it is unlikely that such an accusation would be leveled at this type of weapon, notwithstanding any delayed fusing that might be employed. "Torpedoes" have been a characteristic of naval war for many years now, and the criticism of delayed-fusing weapons usually relates to their direct use against people rather than a weapons platform.

Force Structure Priorities

Of overriding importance in determining guidelines to prioritise force structure acquisitions would be the question of attrition control. For a force the size of the ADF to do otherwise would rapidly and inevitably prejudice its defence and deterrence posture. Accordingly, priority needs to be given to the acquisition of defensive fits such as point defence for surface naval vessels, electronic countermeasures equipment to protect weapon platforms, radiation-homing weapons to suppress controlled fire by the enemy, and the means to protect intelligence assets.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

It is evident, then, that the chapters of this study are not episodic. Indeed, there is a path for the weary reader to follow that hopefully promotes an understanding of how force structure is inextricably linked to the various aspects of defence planning, including policy, strategy and doctrine.

Having said that, though, it is just as important to note that many readers would disagree with one or more of the contentions put forward in the study. For example, the need for the ADF to possess a maritime strike capability is not accepted by all who share an interest in Australian defence studies. In another example, there are many within the defence milieu who would be disinclined to place the same emphasis on the use of precision weapons as this study has.

At this stage it bears emphasis that the last few years have been testament to a burgeoning of interest in Australian defence matters. More than ever, then, there is a fundamental need to ensure that some form of a cohesive rationale underpins all dialogue on defence and policy planning for Australia. Failure to do so invariably results in a circular discussion as people talk around the issues, grappling
to find common points to anchor their theses on.

Hopefully, this study can help in this regard. For, although there would be many readers not in agreement with where the path of the study has led them, they would, however, recognize where they had been to get there. The path of the study thus represents the type of framework needed to underpin dialogue on Australian national security policy and the wide range of military, political, diplomatic, and economic issues that shape it. Use of the study in this way renders it of wider applicability to the evolving Australian defence debate.
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