The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

EUROPEAN SECURITY: CHANCES FOR A EUROPEAN DEFENSE ENTITY

BY

COLONEL PETER W. STRIK
Royal Netherlands Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1991

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
In the beginning of the fifties, a European defense community proved to be beyond realization. In 1989 Ian Gamble discussed the matter anew and concluded that the prospects for a European pillar or defense entity lay in external developments. The turn of this decade showed breathtaking changes in the area of security and European integration. Hence it was worthwhile to analyze the chances for a European defense entity. The study first analyzes the recent changes and how they influence the matter. Then it describes recent, current and future activities within NATO, the European Communities, the West European Union and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Based on the results it describes a possible scenario and the part the armed forces can play.
EUROPEAN SECURITY: CHANCES FOR A EUROPEAN DEFENSE ENTITY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Peter W. Strik
Royal Netherlands Army

Colonel Phillip W. Mock
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
12 April 1991

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Peter W. Strik, COL, Royal Netherlands Army

TITLE: European Security: Chances for a European Defense Entity

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 12 April 1991 PAGES: 38 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In the beginning of the fifties, a European defense community proved to be beyond realization. In 1989 Ian Gamble discussed the matter anew and concluded that the prospects for a European pillar or defense entity lay in external developments. The turn of this decade showed breathtaking changes in the area of security and European integration. Hence it was worthwhile to analyze the chances for a European defense entity. The study first analyzes the recent changes and how they influence the matter. Then it describes recent, current and future activities within NATO, the European Communities, the West European Union and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Based on the results it describes a possible scenario and the part the armed forces can play.
EUROPEAN SECURITY: CHANCES FOR A EUROPEAN DEFENSE ENTITY

INTRODUCTION

In 1952, six West European countries signed a treaty for a European Defense Community. Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which in itself was in a very early stage of development, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands (not the United Kingdom (UK)! ) were to create a European Army, under a supranational command structure, sharing a single uniform and integrated at the lowest level practicable. However, in 1953 the French parliament decided not to ratify this treaty and hence precluded a gigantic step forward towards European integration. In view of the experience with cooperation within NATO and other fora, and the recent developments in Europe, one wonders if such an integrated form of cooperation now would be more feasible. Sir Geoffrey Howe described this enhanced level of cooperation as "the arch supported by two pillars, one planted in North America, the other in Western Europe."¹ This subject has been studied by Ian Gambles for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He concluded that:

> Whether the traditional Atlantic system of West European security cooperation will in fact be a more independent cooperative West European system is not certain, and depends on the evolution of external variables.²

He continued that the likely scenario is the continuation of the current cooperation within NATO, either more loosely or under more West European management. Less likely, but still conceivable, were:

> Re-nationalization of West European security policies with a fragmented network of cooperative arrangements, or an increasing concertation of security policies under the management of the European Community. The actual course of events will be determined by broader political movements. . . .³
These trends have been apparent in recent years. Hence it is worthwhile to study the current possibilities for change towards a European defense entity. Such an entity might occur within a framework of a greater organization dealing with more facets of international relations, such as the European Community (EC), or in an organization focused principally on security.

This paper will analyze the possibilities for a European security entity. The European security environment will be outlined and noteworthy changes addressed. The prospects of the various European organizations will be analyzed with respect to security. Where necessary, the United States and Canada will be treated as parts of the European security environment. Based on this analysis a possible scenario will be depicted.

This paper reflects a European point of view with a Dutch perspective. For the purpose of this paper: "East Europe" will mean the area of the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.); "Central Europe" will refer generally to the area of the non-Soviet nations that once were members of the Warsaw Pact.

INFLUENCES AND OPTIONS

INFLUENCES

Security Policy

Security policy is that part of government or alliance policy that endeavors to create favorable conditions between and within nations for the implementation of policy priorities in other interest areas. This, however, is a rather "modern" definition.

Historically, since 1815, the security policy in Europe has been defined in terms of a (military) balance between Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France and Austria-Hungary. The balance was not stable as diplomacy continuously focused on efforts to gain relative importance or freedom of
action. This diplomacy repeatedly failed. The last failure resulted in World War II and depleted the strength of the European nations to such an extent that they became receptive to new forms of cooperation.

The first real attempts at multilateral cooperation were directed towards containing the Germans. Successes were made predominately in "soft" fields like industrialization, trade, commerce, agriculture, fishing-industry, etc. Cooperation in foreign policy and defense matters (the "hard" areas where national sovereignty is concerned) never exceeded the level of cooperation or action by unanimity.

The realization that security policy encompassed more than foreign policy and defense matters became especially evident in Europe when Japan became an economic world power without having a supporting military force. Economic strength now generally is considered to be a part of national or alliance power.

There is a trend to incorporate all "threats" in security policy. In this view "threats" are defined as all factors that destabilize society. Examples are abuses of the ecological environment, a lack of ethical values, public health problems (drugs), large gaps between the rich and the poor, intolerance of minorities and minority views, and the poor relations between some governments and their people, i.e., dictatorship. Armed forces are not meant to fight these kinds of threats, but they can contribute.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviet Union

The struggles of the U.S.S.R. with its restructuring process, its economic failure, and its problem with the ethnic minorities, have virtually halted the process of democratization. The question now is more how far Gorbachev will have to withdraw from the current situation to avoid the collapse and
The disintegration of the U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{9} The fact is that within the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Agreement restrictions, the U.S.S.R still will have 92 divisions west of the Urals,\textsuperscript{10} and that outside those set limits they reinforced considerably their naval component, their forces of the Ministry of the Interior and their Siberian forces.\textsuperscript{11} The reinforcement of their naval component especially is considered by the West and the Central European countries to be a violation of the CFE-Agreement and will considerably delay or even preclude its ratification. This certainly will play into the hands of the Soviet military as they consider the CFE already as too much of a concession to the West. Although not the adversary it was during the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. is also not likely to be the friend it seemed to be in the past few years. Relations between the U.S.S.R. and the West will remain cool and will not intensify as long as the internal economic and political problems in the U.S.S.R. remain as they are.

Central Europe

The various countries of Central Europe are in different stages of progress. In common with the U.S.S.R., they have economic and minorities problems. As they have departed from communism to greater or lesser degrees, their moves toward democracies and open-market economies are more advanced than those of the U.S.S.R. and carry more promises for the future, especially for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It might be because of the progress made so far that environmental problems and their consequences for the health of their respective populations are more poignantly felt in these nations. Although they look forward to joining the West, more close cooperation will require more sophistication within their nations first. Central Europe is more and more appearing as developing at two speeds. The burden of the slower developers contributes to the problems of nations that so far have been more
successful. Economic refugees could threaten their still weak economies. The possible disintegration of Yugoslavia, for example, might aggravate this problem. Although long-term prospects are hopeful, for the short-term this region must expect harsh times.

German Reunification

For the next few years, Germany will need to focus its political and economic resources on the same environmental and economic infrastructure problems in the Eastern part of its country as the Central European countries. Although its economy is respected, Germany must generate those financial resources while contributing generously both to the economic development of the U.S.S.R. and to the war effort of the coalition forces in the Gulf. Everybody expects them to succeed in all these areas. It is no wonder that each of the other powers in the EC (France and the UK) fear for their own role as a political "heavyweight" within certain circles (like the EC, G-7 and the Security Council).

Some fear that Germany will go its own way, will become more independent from the West or even turn toward the East for its interests. There is, however, nothing in the political behavior of Germany that supports the notion of a more loose relationship with the West. On the contrary, Germany seems more determined than ever to remain linked with its Western allies. Hence, those fears arise more from a perception of a Germany that was, than of a Germany that is.

Other Developments

Major progress towards further European integration through the removal of the last obstacles for a real open inner-market (31 December 1992), adjustment of NATO according to the London Declaration of July 1990, and the signing of the Arms Control Agreements and the Charter of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in November 1990 have acted positively on cooperation. The outbreak of the war in the Gulf in general, and the lack of a coordinated response from the EC (more precisely the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which endeavors to coordinate the foreign policy of the EC members) have particularly detracted from the perception that the end of the Cold War was the beginning of a "new order" for the world and the notion of unity between the EC members. The outcome of this conflict will, to a very high degree, influence the frequency of "adventurism" in the future and the role that the United Nations (UN) will be able to play. For the EC nations it might be an experience that for the future they might be willing to prevent at all cost.

Threats

Based on these developments, three threats can be identified in Europe. First, (parts of) the current U.S.S.R. have yet unknown governments with (nuclear) weapons, while it is unknown whether the current conflict prevention institutions will work; second, there has been a resurgence of nationalism and/or irredentism of ethnic minorities and reactions of majorities and/or third parties, which destabilize areas such that they cannot be contained; and third, nationalism and/or fundamentalism threatens the Western world with advanced military arsenals and/or the refusal of national resources (oil).12

Compared with the bipolar world before 1989, with a high threat and a low risk, we now find ourselves in a world with a much lower threat, but also with a greater risk of conflict. Threats are also now more varied, without the bipolar factors which had a paralyzing effect on other potential sources of violence. Moreover, new sources of threat have developed. Some were already with us for some time, like terrorism and drugs. Others are (at least perceived) more recent, like environmental crimes.
Options

Future European security can generally be classified in five models: renationalization; adjustment and enlargement of NATO; Europeanization of security policy within the EC or the West European Union (WEU); collective security within the CSCE; and a pluralistic security community. The subsequent sections will analyze the various options.

RENATIONALIZATION

The U.S.S.R. is no longer our adversary, according to the London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance. The West European nations have become rich and prosperous. As it was the Soviet threat and the devastated economies that once linked the West European countries, some thought that these bonds would now become undone and restore the situation that existed after World War II. That was a situation of very different nations with different histories, global ties (colonies) and interests. The nations had fought each other and some had been occupied by their neighbors for many years. With the threat now gone and the nations more prosperous, those differences would become clear again. Renationalization could occur as national elements increasingly assert their own interests.

Although somewhat true it must also be understood that even before the threat developed and NATO was formed, the West European nations were convinced that the war had shattered a prewar modus vivendi. The view to do things differently led, inter alia, to the formation of the Benelux (a cooperation between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), to the WEU, and to support for the UN. NATO, the European Economic Community (EEC) and other initiatives arose in a fertile condition that favored further cooperation. This spirit has become stronger ever since, even though it had some drawbacks.
Economic development has become so intense, not only in the European environment but all over the world, that renationalization is not a realistic option. Greater separatism would undermine economic growth.

This trend is reinforced by the existence of economic power in corporations that are increasingly multinational. National power to govern a national economy is decreasing as factors such as the exchange rate, the price of resources, the technological base and the ability to compete are increasingly harder to influence by individual nations. This economic interdependence has developed itself on a par with cultural and other exchanges, like the tourism industry. The relation between security and economic power has already been discussed.

For the future security of Europe it must be stressed that the "new" threats are common threats. The future of the U.S.S.R. is questionable to all. Imbalance in Central Europe can affect all West European nations. So do terrorism, drugs, fundamentalism and ecological disasters (Chernobyl). Hence, security cooperation will be necessary for some time to come, and renationalization of defense policy, therefore, is not a realistic option.

A EUROPEAN DEFENSE ENTITY WITHIN NATO

Within a year, the feelings towards NATO changed a full 360 degrees. First it seemed to be as superfluous to the public as the Warsaw Pact. Then, again, it received widespread support from governments and the public. There are several reasons for this changing mode. NATO has shown the ability to adjust itself to the changed circumstances, as expressed in the "London Declaration." Furthermore, the threat has not disappeared, but has changed due to instability and unpredictability, resulting in a perceived
higher risk. NATO also contributes to internal cohesion between the member nations.16

Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether all these developments will keep NATO alive and well. Certainly, as long as the United States is the only power able to deter the U.S.S.R., there is no doubt that a trans-Atlantic link remains indispensable. The question is more whether NATO will be able to maintain much more than an absolute minimum form of collective defense, now that the various members plan to reduce the strength of their armed forces and their contributions to NATO.

We will see the accentuation of the political role for NATO. The exchange of views and interests may well have become NATO's major task.17 Representatives and liaisons of former adversaries are now regular visitors. There will also be the coordination of the follow-up effort for the CSCE (e.g., through new confidence building measures) and the CFE (through, for example, verification, the build-down and internal exchange of treaty limited equipment and the destruction of superfluous equipment). Moreover, there will be the preparations for the planned future arms control arrangements. NATO will continue to provide security for its members. NATO measures with regard to the Gulf crisis are an illustration: NATO forces were sent to Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, within NATO territory, as a precautionary measure to deter hostilities from spreading to Turkey.

NATO will also provide its concept for a new allied strategy this summer that will do away with forward defense, but will continue to employ conventional and nuclear forces. The discussions around the implementation, in particular, will indicate whether allied commitment will exceed lip service.
There is likely to be an increasing role for dual forces. Forces allocated, assigned or earmarked for NATO may receive alternative roles and missions nationally or within other organizations like the UN or the WEU. In this way it will be possible to maximize the utility of a limited number of forces.18

Some changes will be too hard to be accepted by all the NATO members. One example is the possible incorporation of former Warsaw Pact countries within NATO. Czechoslovakia and Hungary indicated openly that they wanted to join NATO in due time.19 Through the various reactions it has become clear that this is not an option.20 Three objections exist: The U.S.S.R. would be alienated. Also the West European nations fear involvement in the unstable Central European situation. Historical precedents are not favorable. (World War I started with a minor incident in the Balkans and grew beyond control as allies felt obliged to interfere.) And finally, as long as the United States dominates NATO, West Europe fears too big a role for the United States in the European environment.

Also, the incorporation of out-of-area operations will be unacceptable. European nations do not want to get involved automatically in what they could regard as someone else's problem. They feel much more comfortable with the current solution in which they judge participation on a case-by-case basis.21 The proposal of Secretary General Manfred Woerner for the passive acceptance of the use of NATO facilities on behalf of the out-of-area operations of one or more members will also be declined.22

The United States has "apparently realized that Europeans would do far more if they could act independently as part of building Europe, rather than if they were seen as American satellites."23
NATO has been an alliance of necessity, now it may be an alliance of convenience. What will serve the purpose of the nations will be retained and everything that looks like an extension of national commitment will be reduced. The common denominator will fall to a lower level. How much lower might be deduced from the current labor on the formation of the new NATO strategy, where the United States "... wants to decrease its military responsibilities in Europe ... without relinquishing political influence." Problems have to be solved like the formation of multinational corps, stationing of foreign forces without "singularizing" Germany, the allocation of major command positions over the participating nations, the role of France inside or outside the military structure of NATO, and the role of nuclear forces in general. The special position France currently holds within NATO gives her more prestige and status, and provides her with more options than does "normal" membership. Why should she give this up? What would she gain?

It must be feared that these negotiations will clearly show a decreasing degree of agreement, as France wants to restrict NATO to the role of military counterweight to the U.S.S.R. Gradually then, forces and commitments of member nations will be reduced, possibly towards other multinational organizations (WEU). NATO then will resemble a safety net, provided through a trans-Atlantic nuclear guarantee.

The speed with which this will happen depends on outside developments, especially the developments within the U.S.S.R. Hence, Secretary General Woerner's view of NATO as the "Motor der Veraenderung in Europa" (engine of change in Europe) is difficult to understand.

In this volatile, unclear and complex environment, the bureaucratic institutions of NATO are not likely to be capable of adequately responding to
the changing demands of the future. Such is not an organization in which the idea of a European defense entity or European pillar will flourish.

A EUROPEAN DEFENSE ENTITY WITHIN THE EC

Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome excluded military equipment from the scope of the former European Economic Community. Defense industry is, hence, not part of the common market process. The EC in itself is an amalgamation of three organizations. Their areas used to be restricted to the economic and technical fields. In these organizations some national sovereignty was transferred to supranational institutions. Other forms of cooperation developed, like the meetings of the political heads-of-state (the European Council), the meetings of the ministers for foreign affairs (European Political Cooperation, EPC) and the European Monetary Union (EMU). Technically, these institutions are outside the EC. The single European Act of 1987 linked the EPC to the EC, and efforts are being undertaken to further institutionalize the European Council and the EMU.

The Single European Act devotes Article 30(6) to security matters. It does not refer to the military component of security. In fact, it specifically avoids getting in the way of NATO or the WEU.

Whether defense matters will be included depends considerably on what currently is on the agenda. One hot item is the choice between "deepening" and "widening," i.e., the intensification of the ties between the members, or the acceptance of more members. The last admission of new members enlarged the diversity between the EC nations, thereby making it harder to reach agreement. The ensuing collective development of these relatively weaker economies drained the resources of the communities. Therefore, the communities decided to prioritize "deepening" the links between the current
Candidate members had to wait. The EC, however, is now under pressure to revise its position as the profile of Central Europe changes. These nations move toward an open market economy, depend on economic aid, look for closer ties with the West and hence opt for (provisional) membership in the EC, in whatever form. The United States supports their application as they see it as a way of stabilizing the area. The EC will probably provide for some special relations.

A second item on the agenda of the EC is the creation of the Single Market for 1992. By the implementation of nearly 300 individual and detailed measures the EC seeks to remove, in one strike, the last obstacles to a genuine open market within the boundaries of its member nations. The completion is scheduled for 31 December 1992. This will result in a free flow of goods which will save approximately $250 billion per year and bring more dynamics.

Next on the agenda of the EC is the development of the EMU. The EMU should be achieved in three phases: The first phase has already started on 1 July 1990. In the second phase, to start in January 1994, national financial policies should be aligned and the European Central Bank (ECB) should be founded. The third step would entail fixed exchange rates for the European currencies and the creation of a common currency, at a time to be determined. But there is a considerable disagreement on the approach, as the formation of the ECB prior to alignment of national budget policies creates room for a basic dispute on the role and independence of the national banks. In Europe this means long enduring conflicts.

Also on the agenda is the formation of the European Political Union (EPU). The EC did cover affairs on foreign economic policy. Lines are not always easy to draw, so cooperation on foreign affairs became more intense and the
EPC was institutionalized.\textsuperscript{35} As unanimity was required it had a slow start. However, agreements now take less time and achieve a higher level of agreement.

The idea of a EPU, that would cover all fields of cooperation, including foreign affairs and defense, is not new but until recently it lacked wide support. The concept now has gained momentum, based on the developments in Europe and the Gulf, and has even been supported by a proposal of President Miterrand and Bundeskanzler Kohl.\textsuperscript{36} This proposal, amongst others, seeks to incorporate the WEU as the defense pillar under EC political control. Decision making would remain on the basis of consensus and would have political, but not legal status. The Treaty of Brussels, the basis of the WEU, ends in 1998.\textsuperscript{37} The UK and the Netherlands were quick to oppose the proposal. The UK fears that decisions on defense issues ultimately could be taken without her consent. The Netherlands fears the weakening of NATO. This was also the opinion of Mr. William Taft, the United States' Ambassador to NATO.\textsuperscript{38}

In fact, there has been a bombardment of new proposals. These proposals can equally be seen as a panacea for the problems facing the nations in Europe: German reunification and the inherent shift of gravity, the development of European positions regarding out-of-area conflicts (like the Gulf crisis) and more generally, the relations vis-a-vis the United States.\textsuperscript{39} So many problems and differences between the member nations on security issues already do exist that drastic acceleration of a very slow process cannot be expected in the near future. Examples of the problems facing an EC defense entity are France's position on military participation in NATO, the disagreement over federacy or confederacy and the role of nuclear
weapons. Hence, a political union with a European defense entity is no option yet, despite all rhetoric.

A last point to be discussed is the relations between the EC and the United States. The United States wants them intensified. Europe fears the United States' influence if it were represented while topics of foreign policy are discussed. This concern, as so often occurs, resulted in a declaration. The "Trans-Atlantic Declaration" provides for more periodic meetings between the highest representatives of both sides.60

The EC is now preoccupied with measures to complete the inner market of 1992. Its second priority is its relationship towards Central and East Europe for which it founded the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are especially urgent. On top of this it has to advance towards the EMU. Policy coordination and consultation within the EPC will continue and intensify throughout this period. The EC seems not to have the time to concentrate on a defense entity within its organization. Besides, the EC in itself is still underdeveloped. The various positions on transfer of authority preclude a quick resolution of differences. Moreover, the powers endowed to the Commission and the European Parliament are such that the democratic quality vis-a-vis that of the member nations are still very limited.

The picture of the future of Europe is far too unclear to decide between NATO, the EC and the WEU. The magnitude of the plans in the EC blocks a quick resolution of this problem. On the other hand, as of 1998, the prospects for the EC to control the WEU will be brighter, assuming it has established the inner market and the EMU according to schedule. The next years will prove to be decisive.
The WEU was established in 1948 as a security arrangement against German rearmament. The commitment of its members toward each other is farther reaching than that within NATO. With the admission of Germany to NATO in 1955, the WEU changed its focus towards a more general political defense platform and lost its significance. The inability of NATO to conduct out-of-area operations revived the WEU as a European coordinating body in the Gulf in 1987 and again in 1990. With the developments in East and Central Europe, it found itself, to its own amazement, in the central focus of future European defense integration. Even the United States confirmed this role. Less clear is whether the WEU is to serve as the European pillar within NATO (as the UK, the Netherlands and the United States want to see), or within the EC (as is the view from France and Italy), or on its own, as van Eekelen sees it. In the meantime, the WEU contributes through initiatives and studies.

The outcome is unclear. In favor of the WEU is its lack of commitment so far. Detrimental to the WEU, as a European defense entity within NATO, is that it does not include Norway, Denmark, Turkey and Greece. Furthermore, NATO has a reduced appeal as has already been described. A similar situation exists with regard to the role of the WEU in the EC, as Denmark, Ireland and Greece are not members of the WEU. The future of the EC, however, is much brighter than that of NATO. It will be easier for nations to join the WEU if it is associated with the EC rather than NATO. Neutrality within Europe, with the end of the Cold War, is likely to have a reduced political significance. Former neutral nations are more likely to turn towards the EC rather than apply for membership in NATO. Membership in NATO could be seen as favoring or supporting an institution associated with the past, the Cold War and the
Atlantic connection. The EC, however, could be identified with the future and Europe proper. Moreover, the development of economies towards the EC model will be imperative anyway for now neutral nations, if they want their economies to grow. Hence, it is more likely for the WEU to drive towards the EC than to become a part of NATO.

This does not mean that incorporation within NATO is impossible. The current state of affairs, however, does make it unlikely. The ultimate choice between the two organizations by the European nations will be based on three factors: the developments regarding security in East and Central Europe; the perceived need to assure United States' participation through conventional forces and a nuclear guarantee; and the need to retain the right balance of relations towards the United States (committed, but not too close). Only when developments are "positive," i.e., there is a high enough level of stability within and outside the European theater, will the WEU turn towards the EC. But if there is not enough transparency and predictability, and the need for the United States' guarantee remains obvious, then NATO might receive the priority.

Hence, the choice will be postponed. The WEU itself wants it that way. The WEU as a part of the EC is then a possibility for the post-1998 period.

A EUROPEAN DEFENSE ENTITY WITHIN THE CSCE

The Helsinki Conference of 1975 on CSCE resulted in three major baskets. The first basket dealt with interstate behavior, human rights and the use of force. It refers to the "broader" definition of security, adding the relations of the government towards its subjects and the interaction between internal and external factors of national security to the generally accepted
notion of security as the result of the quality of military relations between nations. It also confirmed the national boundaries.

The second basket referred to economic, technological and environmental cooperation. This recommendation has not been highly implemented, as the Eastern and Central European economies were unable to put the Western credits into productive uses.49

The third basket elaborated on the subject of human rights. Initially it was used to defend the rights of individuals (Sacharov). In a later phase it was applied more extensively to the rule of law and the collective freedom of rights (religion, opinion, press, political parties, etc.).

The signing of the CSCE Charter of Paris, together with the CFE-1 Agreement last November entails an incredible step forward for the security of Europe. The CSCE "Charter of Paris for a new Europe" proceeds on the result of Helsinki in 1975 as it stresses democracy, achieved through free and honest elections. The charter describes the rights of the subjects of the participating countries.50 All European nations except Albania (present as an observer) and the United States and Canada signed the document.

Although the results are impressive, some comments need to be made. The CSCE process served to confirm a bipolar world. But the world is no longer bipolar. The U.S.S.R., once a superpower able to decidedly influence measures, is preoccupied with its internal problems and less a predictable factor. Central Europe does not follow the U.S.S.R. line any more. Their current orientation is more to the West or nationalist than to the East. Moreover, conflicts now may result from ethnic minorities within one or more countries and a nationalistic counteraction (pogroms), rather than from a confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the West. The CSCE, however, addresses the resolution of violent conflicts between nations rather than those within
the nations. Although those problems can be discussed as well, every nation will be able to block actions as the CSCE is not legally binding, consensus is required and no regulation exists to enforce measures.

Economic development, the second basket, is now undertaken by the EC. The CSCE is not a factor of influence in this sphere. Hence, although the CSCE is said to be the beginning of a new order, it could also easily be described as the end of an old world, as it was set up for a bipolar world.\textsuperscript{51}

The CFE Treaty is not part of the CSCE. Nevertheless, it is very much related to the CSCE, as negotiations took place at the same time, at the same place, and sometimes with the same persons as the negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures, which are part of the CSCE. The CFE Treaty should result in reduced force levels in main weapon systems, parity between the blocs, and procedures for verification and further confidence building. Faithful implementation of the CFE in itself is a confidence building measure and, as such, in line with the CSCE. The situation now is such that ratification by all parliaments is not to be expected, now the figures of equipment to be destroyed by the U.S.S.R. seem to be less than expected.\textsuperscript{52,53} In itself this is not the greatest problem as the Treaty includes arrangements for the situation that ratification has not yet taken place. The use of perceived "loopholes," however, is not confidence building and will be counterproductive. Moreover, the struggle for independence of some Soviet Republics, and for unity by President Gorbachev, are likely to introduce measures that are not in line with the human and democratic rights as expressed in the CSCE Charter.\textsuperscript{54}

Hence, the CSCE document is still very weak. Plans are being made for further development. For the CSCE it will suffice to consolidate the results now achieved. For now, it is enough to conclude that the CSCE in the near
future in no way will be able to provide for or be a substitute to a truly European defense entity.

EVALUATION AND FUTURE

NATO can be seen as a safety net. The ongoing adjustments to this organization refer to the retention of capabilities rather than to a drastic change towards a future security situation, and even less towards the formation of a European pillar, 55

Within the EC, Europeanization is a realistic possibility, though not for the near future. The WEU could become the defense entity within the EC, but it is likely to remain on its own for at least the next five years. So far, it does not have any forces on an institutionalized basis. As it is unclear when the decreasing importance of NATO will start to show, and with current NATO efforts still oriented on providing forces for a new strategy, the WEU is not expected to be assigned forces other than on a case-by-case basis within the next five years.

Collective security, enforced through military means, within the CSCE will also be a solution for the long-term. It requires the consolidation of CSCE, including CFE, and further institutionalization towards a regional security organization. This will take at least ten years. Hence, Europe will remain a pluralistic security community until well after the change of the millennium.

The question might be raised whether we must be satisfied with this situation or not. Certainly, those who favor the simplicity of a United States of Europe with one integrated army might be disappointed. On the other hand, a pluralistic security environment is capable of reflecting and absorbing differences in the points of views of participating nations without stigmatizing them for different stances. Indeed, integration this way will be
a very slow process, but the cooperation of all involved is required, if
success is ever to be expected. The lack of success of the League of Nations
and the United Nations have made that abundantly clear. Hence, the task of
integration will be completed successfully only by the next generation or
their children.

Another aspect complicates the issue. Security has been enforced
traditionally by politics, diplomacy, and the use or threat of use of military
force. An emerging general opinion is that the military factor now has
reduced influence, as the idea of the threat changes and less (financial)
resources are made available. The economic factor is assumed to have an
increased role. However, the ability of nations to control their economies is
progressively being challenged by the growth of international corporations,
with substantial interests in their competitors overseas. The ability of
nations to enforce economic measures will be limited as they will find it hard
to identify who and what can be held accountable. The growth in exchange of
information, and the ensuing ability to quickly react to changes in situations
will be largely beyond the control of individual nations.

The development of the concept of security has already been discussed, and
that process is still not finalized. New areas of threat may be
introduced. A discussion will grow on what segment of society should be
allocated to future security, and on the role of the military in the process.
The current incorporation of military forces and equipment within the war on
drugs in the Americas and missions like noncombatant evacuation operations,
peacemaking, peacekeeping and assistance programs (e.g., drilling of water
wells, construction of roads and bridges, education, medical care, the
transporting of supplies and equipment) are excellent examples of the evolving
complexity in societal relations and the contributions the military can make
to the changing needs of their society. This requires a reorientation of the role of military forces in a post-modern society, to which tasks should be taken on and which missions should not be continued.

This interdependence of military aspects with other aspects of security favors the incorporation of military policy making in organizations that cover the broad scope of security. So far, only the EC and the CSCE provide the beginnings of such a platform. Hence, these organizations hold the most for the future with regard to security. This argument is reinforced by the fact that, although one might consider that progress in Europe has the speed of growing grass, it cannot be denied that recent changes, compared to the situation ten or even five years ago within the European environment, are remarkable. Thus, although momentum might be lost temporarily, European growth toward assimilation between nations and further integration, for the benefit of all, cannot be reversed.

The question remains how such a European platform for security can be developed. A first requirement is that Europe will feel free to move away from its traditional security institutions, like NATO. This, in turn, will require stability and predictability. These factors can be assured when the UN remains in control of overall world order and this necessitates a U.S.S.R. that remains cooperative on a global basis (security council) and regionally (arms control and disarmament). When these requirements are sufficiently met, it will be possible to establish subregions within the European region, based on degree of assimilation and common interest: the whole of Europe, including the United States and Canada (conform to the CSCE plus Albania); the whole of Europe proper, i.e., without the United States and Canada; West and Central Europe; West Europe and North America; and West Europe. In the process, West and Central Europe and West Europe and North America might change order. Of
course, it is possible to devise more and different subgroups, like cooperation within Central Europe, or that of the pentagonal group (Italy, Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, i.e., the former Austria-Hungarian monarchy). However, these have not yet been institutionalized and hence lack a sufficient degree of assimilation.

So, some degree of subdivision will remain, as the European nations vary too much to disregard differences. For example, the inclusion of the U.S.S.R. in the EC would dwarf the other members and create an imbalance. Hence, the subregion of Europe proper is meaningless unless the U.S.S.R. is balanced by another major power (as in the CSCE). Following that thought, a subdivision of the CSCE area in three subregions would be preferable: North America, Europe without the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. (from Minsk to Wladiwostok).

This will have consequences for organizations like NATO, where imbalances also occur. The first imbalance is external towards the U.S.S.R., the other one is internal between either side of the Atlantic Ocean, as NATO is still dominated by the United States. These imbalances were accepted in 1949, when Europe was neither an entity nor a power. However, nowadays this has changed, except for the fact that Europe is not able to deter the U.S.S.R. on the nuclear level.

The largest entity, the CSCE, should incorporate as many security arrangements as can be agreed. Currently, there is enough on the agenda to keep politicians and diplomats busy for the next few years. The main weakness of CSCE is that it is not a treaty. Before it can have the force of a treaty, provisions are needed for the use of sanctions and peacekeeping forces for the control of violence between the nations. It would even be better served as violence within the nations (minorities) could be controlled.
West and Central Europe should cooperate more intensively. The EC should provide for political (e.g., association) and economic assimilation. The WEU could contribute by offering a military extension to especially a Central European Union. This would require a new specification with regard to the military commitment resulting from Article V of the revised Brussels Treaty. Thus assimilated, the EC might then be able to adopt these nations as members in the next century.

In the meantime, the EC has to develop itself along the lines depicted earlier. Of most importance will be to develop the democratic structure of the EC. This will be a tougher nut to crack than the completion of the inner market, the forming of the EMU and the beginning of the EPU.

With regard to the armed forces, a transition could occur along the following lines: initially, the various national forces would be reorganized. This would incorporate the implementation of reduction plans and the formation of more mobile and flexible forces. The majority of these forces will be made available to NATO and employed as guard forces, main forces in mechanized formations, and mobilizable reinforcements. Some nations will also contribute to the rapid deployment force. Part of these forces will be dual role, i.e., made available to NATO and, if need be, temporarily to the UN, the WEU, the CSCE or other collective security arrangements.

In a following period, after the dust on the current changes has settled and further arrangements seem to be justified by the developments in the international situation, more and more forces might be transferred from NATO to other roles. These roles might be national: the allocation of new missions that will result from a further development and analysis of security issues. But these forces might also be redirected towards the UN, and on a more permanent basis, towards the European defense entities.
Then, in a further development, more and more forces will be part of a European integrated force structure. The center of gravity for West European Defense will shift towards the EC. In this situation, NATO's role will be limited to a political alliance, to which American and European forces will be assigned as necessary. These conditions will remain as long as the American nuclear guarantee remains indispensable for European survival.

Collective security will then be maintained in a more loose relationship between the United States and a united Europe. Certainly, conflicts between the two parties will occur as they do nowadays. But they still do share more common interests with each other than with any other entity. Hence, it will be likely that eventual global crises then will be solved as they are solved now: with the peoples and the forces of the United States and Europe together on the same side.

Ultimately, we are most likely to see the WEU incorporated in an EC that is a healthy and vibrant alliance supported by its population in which all aspects of politics and life are covered. Once the peoples of Europe grow accustomed to this situation, they will feel themselves more European than members of a nation state. At this point, a true United States of Europe will have become a reality.

CONCLUSIONS

This monograph has explored whether, due to the changes that have occurred in recent years, the chances for forming a European pillar, within NATO or otherwise, have improved.

With regard to the changes, the concept of security has evolved and grown in complexity. In the area of international developments, the end of the Cold War has included a more internationally cooperative U.S.S.R., but also a
U.S.S.R. that is somewhat regressing as it is unable to do away with communism. As a consequence, the economy is worse than ever, democratization has come to a halt, republics try to break away and conservative powers seem to strengthen. The best we can expect from the U.S.S.R. is nonopposition to Western initiatives, as it is preoccupied with its internal problems. In Central Europe, nations have been able to make the change towards democratization and open market economies in varying degrees. They cannot be dealt with as one entity. In the meantime, there is a power vacuum in which ethnic problems may become violent. Western politics in this area must balance between support of the Central European nations without rebuffing the U.S.S.R., and making available financial resources while coping with economic problems at home. In the meantime the West has tried to adjust to the developing situation through new integration efforts in West Europe. In this changed environment, the threats have changed as well.

NATO was quick to adjust. It is doubtful, however, whether it will be able to do more than represent the Trans-Atlantic link and provide for the ultimate nuclear guarantee, in view of the range and scale of differences on nearly every issue. NATO is not the institution to provide for a European defense pillar.

The EC faces a formidable program towards further integration. Furthermore, its internal democratic institutions are still very weak. Moreover, there is a continuing disagreement between decision making through unanimity or majority rule. Notwithstanding the difficulty, there is a real fervor to overcome all these problems on even the highest political levels. The main reasons are that the peoples of the nations aspire, even ahead of their politicians, that a united Europe will be much better equipped to keep up the competition with the other major powers, and that it will bring clear
and substantial economic benefits. Ultimately, when progress continues, security policy will be part of the European Political Union and probably through the West European Union, as was proposed by Kohl and Miterrand. However, it will take much time to overcome the inherent problems. In the meantime, assuming the Treaty of Brussels is valid until 1998, the WEU will be able to provide for ad hoc solutions to international conflicts.

The CSCE will, pending the resolution of the problems in the U.S.S.R., have enough on its agenda to consolidate the agreements and commitments agreed so far. It will, through its sheer size, young history and consensus arrangements, not be able to replace any other organization in the foreseeable future.

Hence, the European security environment will remain a pluralistic one, able to adjust itself to the nuanced requirements of the situation. There is no doubt, however, that the EC will mature to be the major organization in the area, and in the far future will include a real European Defense Entity. Major problems will have to be overcome. But as the economic conditions require adjustment of national economies to the integration process of the EC, be they members or not, ultimately nations will not want to be left out and isolated. Eventually, reluctance will be overcome as the younger generations will grow to be more and more Europe conscious and will push their governments. It will be clear then that we will have distinctly passed into the next millennium. For now, we must clear the path.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

4. For this purpose, papers have been consulted from the Netherlands' Institute for International Relations "Clingendael" and from other Dutch writers.

5. This paper will not address in detail the possible dissolution of the U.S.S.R., nor its possible desovietization. Whether it will be a greater Soviet Union or just the Russian Federacy is not of overall importance to the outcome of this paper as the latter will remain a major power.

6. I would rather provide my own definition as I disagree with, e.g., Sarkesian (Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security, p. 9), who restricts himself to the United States' environment and overstresses the military component. The aim of security policy should be to provide stability, transparency and predictability. This admits that the threat can be defined in terms other than the traditional military, e.g., unrest from ethnic minorities, drug addiction and trafficking, environment. This idea concurs with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 that states: "The participating states recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation among themselves as among all states."

7. The first cooperative initiatives had a military objective: The Western European Union was specifically formed to keep German rearmament under control; the Marshall Program brought a necessity for economic cooperation. The European Community for coal and steel was nothing but an attempt of the French to stem the redevelopment of the German industry. The novelty was that, in the process, institutions were created that were endowed with supranational powers. A military equivalent with supranational powers failed: The European Defense Community. The NATO later showed some advance in this respect with transfer of authority in wartime, times of crisis, and even in peacetime, e.g., the Netherlands' Air Forces are transferred to Commander TWOATAF).

8. The progress made on the CFE and CSCE negotiations came almost to a standstill after the spring of 1990. On the one hand, the U.S.S.R. began to realize the implications for an eliminated "cordon sanitaire" and started stressing their own minimal security requirements, on the other hand, the process of disintegration of the former bipolar system gave room for some nations in both blocs to take individual views. This process was shown clearly during the Second Session on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in June 1990 in Copenhagen. See: Rob Zaagman, "De CVSE in Kopenhagen: onderhandelen over een 'nieuwe Europese grondwet,'" pp. 618-624. (Negotiations on a "new
9. Andrew Rosenthal, "As Liberalization Falters in Moscow, U.S. Worries About Future Relations," The New York Times, 7 January 1991. It seems that Shevardnadze's resignation and the current crackdown in Lithuania are a clear signal of a recourse to conventional and conservative policy. See also Lothar Ruehl, "Wofuer die vielen Geschuetze?," Die Welt, 28 December 1990. He described the worries over the relative losses in status and popularity of the Soviet military and concluded that the military were concerned about the concessions made by their politicians, especially their former secretary of state. ("Vor allem dieses Zugestaendnis vom 16. Juli dieses Jahres scheint den Konflikt mit der politischen Fuehrung, insbesondere mit dem Aussenminister, beschleunigt zu haben.")

10. The Military Balance 1990-1991, p. 231. (The figure may be exaggerated. With an average of 350 tanks per division, and with the 13,300 allowed tanks, some 40 divisions could be equipped.)

11. Lothar Ruehl, Ibid. The U.S.S.R. is, in accordance with the CFE, authorized to have 13,000 plus artillery systems. According to Western accounts it had 42,000. Hence, some 29,000 had to be destroyed. After transport of those systems to beyond the Urals only 670 would await destruction. See also George Leopold, "Clouds Swiftly Gather Over Future of Arms Talks," Defense News, 21 January 1991, p. 3.


13. J.J.C. Voorhoeve, "Span een veilige en warme lappendeken over heel Europa," NRC/Handelsblad (Rotterdam, The Netherlands), 17 December 1990. The liberal translation is: "Provide Europe with a secure and warm cover." Voorhoeve was Vice Prime Minister in the Netherlands until November 1989. He is now the Director of the Netherlands' Institute for Foreign Relations "Clingendael." NRC/Handelsblad is the leading Dutch opinion newspaper, comparable with The Washington Post and The New York Times.

14. The NATO Press Service, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 5 July 1990, p. 2. See point 5: "The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship."

15. Ibid, p. 4.

16. Examples are the tensions between Greece and Turkey, the "cod-war" between Iceland and the UK, and the ability to accommodate France's special relationship.

18. David Buchan, "Debate over European Defense set to intensify," Financial Times, 18 February 1991. The article describes WEU Secretary General van Eekelens' proposal for "double hatting" of senior European commanders in NATO's military structure. For purely WEU operations these commanders would wear a European "hat." The United States is said to oppose this proposal, disliking "anything resembling smacking of a European cabal within NATO." If this proposal seems to go too far, it will be much easier to accept the dual role of forces.

19. John Palmer, "NATO may reject Eastern Europe, warns WEU chief," The Guardian, 16 February 1991. The WEU's Secretary General is quoted as stating: "It is not possible to imagine NATO could extend the same guarantees of mutual defense to Eastern Europe that the existing members of NATO offer to each other."


22. "Woerner: ruimer gebruik van NAVO," NRC/Handelsblad, 29 November 1990. See also: Theresa Hitchens, Ibid, p. 36. Woerner referred in this proposal to the use of allied air fields and other facilities similar to the use displayed during the Gulf crisis, albeit not negotiated with every ally independently, but collectively through the NATO Headquarters.


26. "NATO-Reform sieht weniger nukleare Streitkrafte vor," Die Welt, 8 December 1990. (NATO reorganization envisions fewer nuclear forces.) See also: "Die NATO sucht nach einem neuen streitkrafte," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5 December 1990. The problem both arises from the conventional and the nuclear side of the French forces and from what their relation will be to the NATO forces from the other nations.

28. See: Robert Mauthner, "NATO 'Should be Progressively Dissolved'," Financial Times, 13 December 1990, and: Hella Pick, "Admiral calls for dissolution of NATO," The Guardian, 13 December 1990. Both articles quote Admiral Sir James Eberle from his farewell speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He stated that, although in the short-term NATO should be retained, in the long-term there would be insufficient public support to retain NATO. Other institutions should take its place.


30. Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome reads:

"1. The provision of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules. . . .

b. Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes. . . ." Quoted from Ian Gambles, "Prospects for West European Security Cooperation," p. 78.

31. This Article reads:

"a. The High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security;

b. The High Contracting Parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions for their security. They shall work to that end both at national level and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies;

c. Nothing in this title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security between certain of the High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance." Ibid, p. 13.

32. See W. H. Weenink, "De schone schijn van veiligheid en eenheid in Europa," NRC/Handelsblad (Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 14 July 1990. (The deceptive appearance of security and unity in Europe.)


34. Ibid. Other foreseen results include:

- An extra economic growth in five to six years of 4.5-7 percent;
- Two million more jobs;
o A price reduction of 6 percent;
o A total product growth of 1 percent;
o Free economic trade within the whole of the EC;
o Harmonization of product requirements;
o Liberalization of transport through the abolition of permits and licenses;
o Open competition for government orders;
o Free flow of capital; and
o Free flow of the labor force.

35. Its main aspects are:

o The obligation to discuss foreign policy in order to coordinate points of view and, if possible, operate through and with one voice;
o The obligation to discuss national points of view on subjects of foreign policy of general importance; and
o Decisionmaking by consensus.

Hence, it is not based on the Treaty of Rome, but complementary to the EC. The European Commission attends the EPC meetings and the EPC informs the European Parliament. Cooperation includes work in international fora and Third Countries. Examples are the CSCE Conference, the Middle East, South Africa and human rights.

36. See Ian Davidson, "View from Europe: Building New Security Structures," Europe, January/February 1991, p. 10-12. Also: John Palmer, "Defending the Indefensible," The Guardian, 29 January 1991, and Jan M. Bik, "Frans-Duits initiatief voor Politieke Unie," NRC/Handelsblad, 8 December 1990. An elaborated description of the topics currently being discussed can be found in: "European Union 'aims to realize the aspirations of its citizens'," Financial Times, 17 December 1990: "...as regards common security, the gradual extension of the union's role in this area should be considered, ...initially, to issues debated in international organizations: Arms control, disarmament and related issues; CSCE matters; ...peacekeeping operations. ... Furthermore, the European Council ...a role for the union in defense matters should be considered, ...bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening the ties within the Atlantic alliance...".


38. Ibid. He spoke on 8 February to the Institute for International and Strategic Studies.


41. Article IV of the Brussels Treaty (in 1954 revised into Article V) states: "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."


43. Jo Wijnen, "NAVO: Eenheid maar weinig toekomst," De Stem (Breda, the Netherlands), 19 December 1990. ("NATO: Unity but little future"; De Stem is a Dutch regional daily.) Baker is quoted as having stated: "The WEU is to form the core of a European defense system" (my translation).

44. Wijnen, Ibid, the view of Secretary General van Eekelen is shown in: Wolf J. Bell, "Die WEU und Europas künftige sicherheitsstruktur," General Anzeiger (Bonn), 10 December 1990.

45. For example through "The Platform of The Hague" of 27 October 1987, where it was decided to move towards a European security dimension through the study of conditions, criteria and the European responsibility within NATO, and through the foundation of the WEU Institute for Security Research.

46. Examples are:

- The Colloquium on pan-European security from 25 to 28 March 1991 in Palermo;

- The study for a rapid deployment force. See: Financial Times, 24 November 1990. The study describes the implications for Europe as a consequence of the Gulf crisis;

- How to cooperate with the East European Nations. See Jan Gerritsen, "Nederland: Dialoog WEU/Oost-Europa," NRC/Handelsblad, 20 November 1990. The referred to nations are Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The study should address the balance between those nations towards the West on the one hand and the political sensitivities of the Soviet Union on the other hand; and

- The consequences of the CSCE for a European security cooperation. See: "WEU soll Vorschläge ausarbeiten," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 7 December 1990.

47. Dr. W. F. van Eekelen, "De West Europese Unie op weg naar Europa, Carre, July/August 1990, p. 14, "The WEU on its Way to Europe." Van Eekelen states that the main reason for the choice for NATO has been the lack of
interest from the EC and the EPC in matters of European security. This very argument has now been contradicted by the recent developments.

48. "WEU gegen Integration in die EG," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5 December 1990. "...van Eekelen warned against too quick changes within the current European and Atlantic Institutions. The early "widening" of EC and WEU should be avoided.) An Italian proposal for association between the EC and WEU was rejected, as well as a proposal from the European Parliament to halt the reactivation of the WEU as it would complicate the future integration with the EC. Both rejections were motivated by the belief that adoption of the WEU within the EC would weaken NATO. In this way, van Eekelen retains a more influential role for the WEU than when it would submit itself as a subcontractor to either organization.

49. The CSCE is a voluntary commitment of all participating states rather than a treaty as it then would need ratification by the national parliaments.

50. See for example Wolf J. Bell, "Bindung der USA und Kanadas an die Entwicklung in Europa," General-Anzeiger (Bonn), 19 November 1990, (linking the United States and Canada to the development in Europe), and Herman Amelink, "Handvest voor een nieuw Europa," NRC/Handelsblad, 21 November 1990. (Charter for a new Europe.) The latter source provides the best concise information I have found:

- Chapter 1, welcomes the CFE Treaty;
- Chapter 2, "Guidelines for the Future," announces meetings to be held:
  - On democratic institutions, Oslo;
  - On minorities, Geneva;
  - On open skies, if realizable;
  - On peaceful conflict resolution, Malta;
  - On cooperation in the economic field;
  - On the combat on environmental toxication;
  - On cultural exchange; and
  - On the rights of migrating laborers in their host nation.
- Chapter 3, on agreed actions:
  - To reconvene in March 1992 in Helsinki (the political heads of state will convene biannually);
  - To reconvene in Berlin on 19 and 20 June with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (they will meet annually);
  - To form committees to prepare future meetings;
  - To set up a secretariat in Prague;
  - To set up a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna;
  - To set up a bureau for free elections in Warsaw; and
  - To order the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to discuss the foundation of a parliamentary assembly.


53. Lothar Ruehl, "Wofuer die Vielen Geschuetze?," Die Welt, 28 December 1990. Of the about 42,000 artillery pieces, about 13,000 may be retained. So, some 29,000 should be destroyed. The last figures given, however, provide only for 670 artillery pieces to be destroyed. It was however known and accepted that equipment was rushed behind the Ural's. "Der Western glaubte das hinnehmen zu koennen, weil sich, . . .wegen der raeumlichen Entfernungen auch die Vorwarnzeiten um ein Vielfaches verlaengerten und die Begrenzung der sowjetischen Angriffsaefigkeit daher in jedem Fall sichergestellt sei." Werner Adam, "Zwischen Atlantik und Ural werden die militaerischen Arsenale abgebaut," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19 November 1990.


55. The Dutch Minister of Defense reported to Parliament that the formation of multinational corps served against renationalization and was not to be the start of the formation of a European Army. "Geen Europese krijgsmacht," Defensiekrant, 13 December 1990. (No European armed forces.)


57. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are considering establishing a Central European Union to safeguard their positions within the current power vacuum. Rumania and Bulgaria are yet too dissimilar to participate in such a union and would endanger the ability of the other nations to meet WEU criteria for cooperation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Bell, Wolf J. "Bindung der USA und Kanadas an die Entwicklung in Europa." General-Anzeiger (Bonn), 19 November 1990.


Bik, Jan M. "Frans-Duits initiatief voor Politieke Unie." NRC/Handelsblad (Rotterdam), 8 December 1990.


"Die NATO sucht nach einen neuen Strategie." Frankfurter Allgemeine (Frankfurt), 5 December 1990.

"Die NATO will in Europa ein 'Motor der Veraenderung' sein." Frankfurter Allgemeine (Frankfurt), 8 December 1990.

"Die NATO wirbt um Frankreichs militärischen Mitarbeit." General-Anzeiger (Bonn), 7 December 1990.


"European Union 'Aims to realize the Aspirations of its Citizens'." Financial Times (London), 17 December 1990.

Feldmeyer, Karl. "Die Neue NATO." Frankfurter Allgemeine (Frankfurt), 19 November 1990.


"NATO-Reform sieht weniger nukleare Streitkraefte vor." **Die Welt** (Bonn), 8 December 1990.


Voorhoeve, Joris J.C. "Span een veilige en warme lappendeken over heel Europa." NRC/Handelsblad (Rotterdam), 17 December 1990.


"WEU gegen Integration in die EG." Frankfurter Allgemeine (Frankfurt), 5 December 1990.

"WEU soll Vorschlaege ausarbeiten." Frankfurter Allgemeine (Frankfurt), 7 December 1990.


"Woerner: ruimer gebruik van NAVO." NRC/Handelsblad (Rotterdam), 29 November 1990.