EUROPE'S FUTURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: BUILDING ON THE PAST OR A NEW EDIFICE?

BY

MR. MARK R. PERRY

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Europe's Future Security Architecture: Building on the Past or a New Edifice?

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and subsequently of Soviet hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe ended the Cold War, but also ended the predictability that East-West tensions ironically brought for some 45 years. The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and the Soviet threat diminished dramatically, but a host of new uncertainties has arisen. There is widespread agreement in the East and West that a new European security architecture will be needed but there also seems to be almost as many visions of that architecture as there are political leaders on the continent. The intent of this study is to provide a prognosis of what the security architecture will look like over the next decade. The paper is divided into three sections; a forecast of political, military, and economic developments in Europe through the year 2001; an historical review of Western European defense cooperation, which will be the heart of the new security framework; and a prognosis of the specific new architecture, as well as recommendations for U.S. policy towards Europe. A conclusion is made that the new
architecture will be built on existing organizations—especially NATO, the European Community, and the Western European Union—and will develop over a period far longer than the time frame of this paper.
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AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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EUROPE'S FUTURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: BUILDING ON THE PAST OR A NEW EDIFICE?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

We are facing a strategic transformation born of the success of our postwar policies. Yet, such fundamental political change will likely be turbulent. There may be setbacks and new sources of instability. Happy endings are never guaranteed. We can only be impressed by the uncertainties that remain as the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe, each in its own way, advance into historically unchartered waters.¹

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe shortly thereafter ended the Cold War for all intents and purposes. But at the same time this sequence of events also ended the predictability that East-West tensions brought to Europe from 1945 on. Former Western European Union (WEU) Secretary-General, Alfred Cahen, referred to this predictability as "doubtless not very constructive but nevertheless quite comfortable."² The Soviet threat has receded dramatically, but in its place is coming a multitude of new or long-dormant uncertainties. Most European and American leaders agree that the current European security architecture, built on the foundation of two military alliances, will be inadequate for handling these uncertainties, largely because one of those alliances--the Warsaw Pact--has been dissolved.

There are probably as many proposals for the new European security architecture as there are political party leaders, international security analysts, and military strategists in Europe. Moreover, the institutions forming the present security framework, most of which have sizable bureaucracies of their own, are suggesting different approaches to the new
order on the continent, each not surprisingly guaranteeing its own longevity. There is general agreement, however, that NATO must be preserved, for the foreseeable future, albeit transformed into a more "political" organization, and that the 34-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) must be institutionalized and given an important umbrella-like role in security deliberations. There are also indications of movement towards the view that the nine-member Western European Union should play an increasingly important role in Europe's security framework. At this early stage, however, there is disagreement whether this more active WEU should play such a role within NATO or the European Community (EC).

The primary purpose of this paper is to provide an estimate of the European security architecture likely to develop over the next ten years. An assessment of the probable security environment over the same period, especially in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, is a prerequisite for such an estimate as is a review of efforts since the end of World War II to forge increased European defense cooperation, which must be at the heart of any new security apparatus. This study also assesses likely U.S. interests and objectives in Europe into the 21st century and recommends policies to protect those interests and secure those objectives.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER II
POST-COLD WAR EUROPE: UNCERTAIN FORECAST

The future European security architecture will be affected considerably by the outcome of reform efforts in the Soviet Union and indeed by the shape and makeup of the USSR, which is already facing severe centrifugal forces. In addition, the success or failure of democratization in the former Soviet satellites, the nature of a unified Germany, and the results of the European Community's program to create a single, integrated market while gradually moving towards political union will also be key determinants of the new architecture. There is little agreement among scholars or government officials in trying to forecast any of these situations. Some observers fear that as U.S. and Soviet military forces withdraw from Europe the continent could revert to the sort of "state system that created powerful incentives for aggression in the past," a past plagued by nationalistic and ethnic strife that characterized Europe from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 until 1945. In this view the superpowers' presence embodied the Cold War bipolar distribution of power on the continent that was inherently more stable—and thus safer—than the multipolar system which will replace it once most or all U.S. and Soviet troops depart.2

Others take a less pessimistic view, arguing that a return to a multipolar distribution of power poses little risk and that the likelihood of a warlike Europe is low.3 Under this school of thought, factors working against this regression include the tempering by nuclear weapons of any would-be European military adventurism, greatly reduced militarism and hyper-nationalism, the spread of democracy, and the leveling of European societies.4
SOVIET UNION: POOR PROSPECTS

When one looks at the likely future of the Soviet Union and its former Eastern European allies, it is easy to adopt the more pessimistic outlook on Europe's prospects. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev might well not survive the next year or two.

He [Gorbachev] must save the Soviet Union from itself, from national aspirations that Communism repressed but never conquered, from ethnic and religious hatreds that have never healed and from the mounting chaos unleashed by his own halting reforms. If Gorbachev fails, if the economic collapse and ethnic strife that are tearing the nation apart cannot be reversed, the Soviet Union will either disintegrate into a loose confederation of independent states, explode into warring families and factions, or succumb to yet another cycle of repression. Time is running out, and Gorbachev's prospects for success seem . . . slim. . . .

Gorbachev's task is daunting. Public opinion surveys late last year indicated that only 2 percent of the Soviet people then had confidence in the future and a mere 14 percent trusted the government. Black marketeering is widespread. Despite bumper crops, there are food shortages of glaring proportions throughout the country, due largely to inadequate and inefficient transportation. Consumer goods are unavailable in most stores and a quarter of the Soviet population is living on the equivalent of $15 a month or less while inflation is above 20 percent. The country's health care system is crumbling at a time when diphtheria is widespread in Moscow, bubonic plague is appearing in the Central Asian republics, and the number of AIDS cases is growing throughout the country. Most importantly, all 15 Soviet Socialist Republics have declared their sovereignty except for Kirghiza, and independence movements have sprung up in the three Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghiza, and Kazakhstan.
Moscow's recent crackdown in Lithuania and Latvia may indicate a decision on Gorbachev's part that glasnost and perestroika have gone far enough for now, and that the threat to the unity of the country is so serious as to warrant a retreat into authoritarianism. Should this be the case, the President would likely be supported by the military and the KGB, support which is absolutely essential to his political survival. But such a move would probably exacerbate rather than solve the country's economic problems. Ultimately, perhaps towards the turn of the century, it is likely that what is now the Soviet Union will be a loose confederation of republics staying together because of economic interdependence but with a central government in Moscow controlling only defense and foreign policy.

Notwithstanding such a possibility, two truths will likely hold forth impacting on Europe's future security architecture: first, the Soviet Union—-even if reduced to the territory of the present Russian republic and even if there are further conventional force reductions—will retain the most potent single military force in Europe, almost certainly still armed with nuclear weapons; and second, the USSR, in whatever form, is unlikely to seek to restore military hegemony over its former Warsaw Pact allies during the next ten years. Moreover, regardless of the nature of the leadership in Moscow, the Soviets will probably become increasingly dependent on Western assistance to implement economic reform. Accordingly, the Soviets will strive to maintain at least "correct" relations with Western Europe, even if hardliners are in charge. Therefore, unlike the period of detente during the 1970s, the current thaw in East-West tensions will likely endure.
The likely impact of this "good news-bad news" outlook for the Soviet Union on the future European security architecture is threefold. Firstly, the Soviets' expected retention of impressive military forces will probably persuade Western European leaders to keep NATO or some similar Western European defense entity with a U.S. military presence. But at the same time, the dramatically reduced threat from the East will lead to rapid decreases in NATO defense expenditures and a reduction of the Alliance's overall military capability. Thirdly, the strong possibility of failure in Soviet economic and political reform efforts will complicate the integration of the USSR into an all-European security architecture,\(^8\) with a concomitant risk of a still militarily strong Russia being isolated—historically a prescription for serious continental instability.

**EASTERN EUROPE: EUPHORIA FADES**

The forecast is more mixed for Eastern Europe.* On the negative side, this region threatens to be as great a tinderbox of ethnic and nationalistic strife as the Soviet Union.

Communism practically stopped the clock in the East . . . In its death throes communism is revealing nationality problems after successfully concealing ethnic antagonisms and border disputes for many years . . . It is . . . possible . . . that national sentiments will destroy states and reopen old wounds.\(^9\)

* Some leaders of the former Warsaw Pact countries prefer that their region be referred to as "Central Europe" because they believe that "Eastern Europe" connotes the old period of Soviet domination. It would be geographically inaccurate, however, to refer to Bulgaria and Romania, for example, as "Central Europe." Therefore, for simplicity's sake, this study will use the old term, "Eastern Europe."
The euphoria surrounding the collapse of the Berlin Wall has already dissipated, for example, with reemerging intermittent tensions between Hungary and Romania over the latter's treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, a formerly Hungarian region. Civil war between Serbs and Croats is a distinct possibility in Yugoslavia, while Albania and Yugoslavia continue their long-running feud over Kosovo, a Yugoslav region inhabited by an Albanian majority. The Yugoslavs and Bulgarians also feud over Macedonia, while Turkey--a NATO member--has had strained ties with Bulgaria over Sofia's treatment of ethnic Turks.10

Eastern Europe also faces daunting obstacles in moving towards market economies. The fate of democratization will depend on whether economic reform is successful since "Western values are prevailing . . . as much because of their identification with economic success as because of a social logic that ineluctably links prosperity with liberal political principles."11 The West, led by the EC, has been quick to come to Eastern Europe's aid with emergency assistance, credits, know-how, and technology. With France in the vanguard, the Western Europeans established the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to provide the East with loans, credits, and technical assistance. Twenty-four of the world's leading liberal trade partners, including the United States and Japan, pledged over $12 billion for the EBRD. Individually or collectively the EC members have also pumped tons of food into the East.

With continued outside assistance, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (now known as the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic or CSFR), because of their relatively more advanced economies, are likely to enjoy success in liberalizing their economies by the mid-1990s, thus warranting optimism concerning the strength of their young democracies and the prospects for stability. Poland, with
deeper difficulties, is unlikely to establish economic stability until late in the decade. Economic prospects are more dubious in Romania and Bulgaria as are the chances for democratization and stability. Likely Hungarian, CSFR, and Polish political and economic progress will represent a positive contribution to Europe's future security. Such progress will facilitate these countries' integration into the new order on the continent and strengthen stability in Central Europe. In particular, stability in these countries will result in a secure buffer for Germany. Hungary and the CSFR probably will be granted some sort of associate membership in the EC by the late 1990s, with Poland not far behind.

UNITED GERMANY: CAUSE FOR FEAR?

Many of those with a pessimistic outlook for Europe's future are led to such a view because of their fear of a united Germany returning to the sort of behavior which resulted in two devastating wars during this century. Adherents of this outlook see the German national character as fatally flawed by aggressiveness which may resurface in an autonomous, economically powerful Germany once the superpowers have departed Europe. British Trade and Industry Minister Nicholas Ridley was fired from former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's cabinet in mid-July 1990 for expressing such fears out loud.

While the possibility of the Fourth Reich-type scenario in the distant future cannot be entirely ruled out, there are several factors making it highly unlikely. In the security sphere, the agreement signed on 1 October 1990 by the then two Germanies, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom—the "two-plus-four" agreement—will go far in ensuring that Germany will be a responsible neighbor. Its armed forces, including former East German troops, will be reduced by 200,000 men, to 370,000 by 1994,
reducing any German impulse towards military adventurism. Germany has renounced any intention to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and foresworn any claim to former German territory.\textsuperscript{12} The "two-plus-four" agreement further stipulates a complete Soviet troop withdrawal from former East German territory by late 1994, but prohibits the deployment there of any NATO-integrated forces until then. Nuclear-capable weapons are permanently prohibited from the same area. Although the agreement ended the four World War II allies' rights and responsibilities as occupiers of Germany, the three Western allies will maintain forces in Berlin as long as Soviet troops remain in eastern Germany and Berlin.\textsuperscript{13}

The "two-plus-four" agreement most importantly represented Moscow's explicit recognition of Germany's right to remain a full member of NATO. This step went far in ensuring that NATO will survive the rest of the decade. Without Germany, or with Germany only halfway in--the Soviets had suggested that Germany adopt the French model of political membership--NATO could not endure. Just as importantly, Germany's full NATO membership, as well as its continued avowal of fidelity to European economic and political integration through the EC, should help reassure those who fear Germany. The Germans' loyal and productive contribution for 36 years to NATO and for almost 34 years to the EC speak eloquently to Germany's rejection of its militaristic past and commitment to stability in Europe through collective defense and political and economic cooperation. "The West German successor to the Third Reich has proven a model ally and a model European . . . Cooperation between ancient enemies has been routinized within the expanding framework of the European Community . . . ."\textsuperscript{14} The "two-plus-four" agreement, along with continued full German involvement in NATO and the EC, will produce, in author Thomas
Mann's words, a "European Germany" rather than a "German Europe," one that threatens none of its neighbors but exercises its full sovereignty while retaining a sufficient defense capability.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: UNITED STATES OF EUROPE?

The final major determinant of Europe's future security architecture to be assessed in this paper is the issue of EC economic and political integration, specifically the prognosis for the Community's program (EC-92) to remove all internal barriers to the movement of goods, services, and people by 31 December 1992. Developments in Eastern Europe since 1989 have convinced most EC members to speed up the EC-92 process in part so that the Community can be in a stronger position to support the East. Therefore, nearly all EC-92 objectives will be reached by the deadline. However, the requirement that each of the 12 member-state parliaments ratify all of the EC-92 legislation probably guarantees that a few particularly controversial initiatives will be delayed perhaps until 1994.

Eventual economic integration, however, is a foregone conclusion. Only Britain at present opposes the establishment beginning in early 1994 of a European central banking system and the introduction three years later of a single European currency. The rest of the Community has stated that it will move forward on this front with or without the United Kingdom. London, for its own economic survival, will have no choice but to jump on the bandwagon sooner or later. John Major's taking up residence at 10 Downing Street after Margaret Thatcher's departure should make this jump happen sooner rather than later. Movement towards economic integration will ensure that by the mid-to-late 1990s the EC will be a formidable economic world power.
The key question for U.S. economic interests will be whether the EC economic colossus be a "Fortress Europe," championing free trade within Europe but erecting barriers to protect against non-European competition.\textsuperscript{15} There will be trade disputes between the Community and the United States, some at least as serious as those during the 1980s over meat and textiles. The collapse in December 1990 of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), due to bitter EC-U.S. disagreements over the former's extensive agricultural subsidies, points to the very real danger of future friction between Washington and its European allies that could seriously damage the defense relationship.

The considerable progress made on economic integration over the last three years and the great sense of urgency sparked by the dramatic developments of 1989 in Eastern Europe have given new impetus to the difficult process of EC political integration. This could be seen in the Community's December 1990 Rome summit announcement. That communique voiced support for altering the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the EC, so that the Community can eventually gain control of member-states' foreign and security policies--a critical prerequisite for full political union.\textsuperscript{16} The summit announcement was a direct result of a strong Franco-German initiative aimed at "strengthening the 'role' and 'missions' of the European Council and for developing a 'veritable policy of common security that will lead, in the long run, to a common defense.'"\textsuperscript{17}

Notwithstanding this important Franco-German initiative and EC agreement, a United States of Europe will remain an elusive target. The Franco-German proposal was clear but it offered no clear road map for achieving the objective, and economic integration is still a higher priority for most EC member states. Moreover, there are numerous formidable obstacles to political
union. First and foremost is nationalism. Britain, under Margaret Thatcher, often was depicted as the sole holdout to progress towards political integration. However, it is likely that other EC members have harbored doubts about some aspects of integration but have found London's recalcitrance convenient, allowing them to continue expressing fidelity to a united Europe rather than casting an unseemly negative vote. It is hard to imagine, for example, France relinquishing sovereignty over such foreign and defense areas as overseas arms sales, external deployment of French troops, and nuclear weapons strategy.

Structural hurdles will also slow movement towards integration. Either a new treaty must be passed or the 1957 Rome Treaty and the 1985 Single European Act, which launched the EC-92 program, would require amendment to allow EC involvement in security issues. Either step in turn would necessitate time-consuming ratification in each of the 12 member states. Moreover, while there is general agreement on granting more powers to the EC's central institutions, especially the European Parliament, accompanying measures to enhance those institutions' democratic accountability are largely absent. For example, there are no major plans to grant full legislative authority to the European Parliament or for a popularly elected European president. Ultimately, ongoing integrative initiatives most likely will lead to a very gradual absorption of foreign policy decisions and carefully regulated discussion of defense and security issues into the EC deliberative and decisionmaking apparatus. Although gradual and halting, such a process will nonetheless lead to the greatest degree of defense cooperation Europe has seen since World War II.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid.


6. Ibid., pp. 35-36.


8. Ibid., p. 224.


13. Ibid.


CHAPTER III
EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION: ELUSIVE GOAL

The Franco-German initiative to expand the European Community's authority is only the latest in a long series of largely abortive efforts since World War II to build closer intra-European defense cooperation. A review of the history of such efforts points to several factors which in most cases--European participation in NATO being the most important exception--led to the failures. Chapter IV of this study forecasts the European security framework which will be built over the coming years. An important segment of that prognosis is devoted to assessing whether the factors which led to past failures will be repeated in future attempts to forge closer defense cooperation.

With the sharp lessening of the Soviet threat, it might properly be asked whether increased defense cooperation in fact is needed among the Western Europeans and whether the U.S. government should care. The answer in both cases is yes. Regarding the first question, mention has already been made in this study of how the integration of European security and defense policies is an absolute prerequisite for political integration. Without it there would be either a "vacuum or . . . a dichotomy between common economic and foreign policies on the one hand and dispersed security and defense positions on the other."¹ At a more basic level, an economically, politically, and militarily integrated Europe would be the best possible protection for stability on the continent in what clearly will be a highly uncertain future, a future that could witness the USSR's breakup or a recrudescence of Soviet hardline aggressiveness, as well as ethnic strife in a host of European locations.
Unity is also important since an integrated Europe is "far more likely to have its views taken seriously than a Europe which speaks with a multitude of voices." Most importantly, significantly greater European defense cooperation will be required to ensure a continued American presence, albeit sharply reduced, in Europe. Such a presence, still with nuclear capability, will remain necessary even after a Soviet withdrawal from Central Europe since only the United States will be able to match the impressive residual Soviet military forces. A Europe that is in disarray and thus unable to identify, define, and apportion defense tasks and responsibilities among its own militaries will not be in a position to negotiate a new division of labor with the United States on European defense. The decades-long burdensharing debate would then be rejoined, but probably not for long. Domestic budget cuts, along with Congressional and U.S. public opinion pressure, would force a complete U.S. withdrawal and an end to the Atlantic Alliance. America's strategic stake in Western Europe, although diminished in relative importance since the 1950s, remains of the first order, and thereby warrants every effort by Washington to preserve the close ties which have existed since World War II. European defense cooperation and assumption of greater responsibility for their own defense, on the other hand, would help the U.S. administration "justify" to skeptics the maintenance of its own contribution to European defense.

THE POST-WORLD WAR II HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Efforts to build greater European defense cooperation have gone on since just after World War II came to an end, but there have been "more tombstones of failed European defense projects than of any other category of aborted
initiatives in the graveyard of postwar integration. The first step towards enhanced European defense cooperation came in March 1947 when France and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Dunkirk, a 50-year agreement by which each signatory pledged to come to the military aid of the other in the event of an attack. Although the Soviet threat was becoming more evident, the genesis for the Dunkirk Treaty was fear of eventual German military resurgence.

There is some debate over the motivations behind the next attempt at forging increased European defense cooperation, the Brussels Treaty of March 1946. That treaty created what was then called the Western Union or Brussels Treaty Organization and it provided for cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural fields, while stipulating that if one signatory was attacked, the others would provide "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." Most scholars believe that security considerations were paramount in the creation of this union. They point in particular to the USSR's establishment of the Cominform and its 1947 rejection of Eastern bloc participation in the Marshall Plan, Moscow's pressure on Greece and Turkey, and the Soviet-inspired Czechoslovak coup in February 1948 as factors behind the Brussels Treaty.

Other analysts see different, non-security factors as having been equally or more important. The United States made its Marshall Plan aid conditional upon just such joint institutional efforts among European recipients to resolve postwar reconstruction problems. Also in this regard, only a month after the Brussels Treaty was signed, 17 European nations initialled a convention creating the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), a forerunner of the EC. The ambiguity of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's original proposal in January 1948 for the Brussels Treaty organization
is also noted. He called for a "spiritual union" and did not present his plan as a means of opposing the Soviets nor did he single out any particular threat. Such vagueness allowed each interested country to emphasize those aspects of the Western Union that most appealed to it. For example, the Benelux nations strongly identified with the political and economic integrative features. Only the United States emphasized the military aspects.11

Who was right in this debate is moot since increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior in 1948, particularly the start of the Berlin Blockade in June, gave the new Western Union a decidedly strong security cast. The signatories quickly formed a defense organization highlighted by regular meetings of member-state defense ministers, by the setting up of a permanent committee of civil servants to draft defense plans, and by the establishment in the autumn of 1948 of a military headquarters at Fontainebleau, France with Field-Marshall Lord Montgomery as the first commander-in-chief.12 The key Western Union members--France and the United Kingdom--clearly recognized that the new organization was a hollow shell militarily without U.S. participation. Accordingly, the Western Union's permanent secretariat prepared a preliminary draft agreement which eventually led to the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 establishing NATO, with Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal joining the five Brussels Treaty signatories and the United States as charter members. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, followed by West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. With the establishment of NATO and the OEEC, the Western Union became dormant, its military functions absorbed into the former and economic functions into the latter.
Two major factors led to the next European defense cooperation initiative, the Pleven Plan of October 1950, named after French Prime Minister Rene Pleven. These factors were the Soviet explosion in September 1949 of their first atomic bomb and the outbreak of the Korean War the following fall. The Soviet Union's ending of America's nuclear monopoly raised in Europe the specter of Moscow engaging in nuclear blackmail against Western Europe. Without nuclear weapons of their own, the Europeans recognized that an American military presence and nuclear guarantee was the only possible deterrent to such blackmail. But they also recognized that Washington would agree to a commitment only if Europe did more for its own defense. The outbreak of the Korean War added to this U.S. pressure for increased European defense cooperation since Washington was even more sure that the Soviet threat was worldwide in scope and that this threat ultimately was aimed at Western Europe. They felt that the Europeans' military weakness might be too tempting to Moscow.

The Europeans also recognized that they had to do more militarily to ensure continued U.S. support. They further agreed--grudgingly--that to do so would necessitate ending the Allied occupation of Germany, bringing that country into NATO, and allowing it to rearm. Only five years after the end of history's most devastating war, the thought of the nation that caused that war rearming raised natural fears throughout Europe, but especially in France. Accordingly, Pleven unveiled his proposal in a speech in October 1950. He called for the formation of a European Army within a European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC, in turn, would be placed within NATO, with the Alliance having full control of the European Army in wartime. German units would be integrated within this army, thus solving for Paris the problem of a rearmed Germany "on the loose" again in Europe. One French observer described
the EDC as "a compromise between the hostility of the French government and Parliament towards the remilitarization of Germany and the external pressure (mainly American) for it." 13

The United States and NATO quickly applauded the Pleven Plan, and Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg immediately agreed to join France in providing forces for the new army. The Netherlands agreed, but almost a year later, reflecting its reluctance to move forward without British participation.14 The United Kingdom pledged that it would cooperate closely with the EDC but rejected membership, largely because it would not relinquish national sovereignty in the defense area. When negotiations to set up the EDC began in February 1951, London thus participated only as an observer.15

The negotiations eventually culminated in a treaty in May 1952 which France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg signed, subject to ratification by their national parliaments. Ratification was relatively quick in Germany, which was anxious to achieve full sovereignty, and in the Benelux countries which saw the EDC as an important vehicle for achieving their primary foreign policy goal, i.e., European political and economic integration. International events, however, altered the environment in which the French legislature considered the EDC. The death in March 1953 of Josef Stalin and the armistice in Korea four months later reduced fears in Europe of Soviet aggression and made the French at least more resistant to U.S. pressure for a greater European defense effort. Paris became concerned that the EDC would undermine chances for improvement in East-West ties in the post-Stalin era.16 In addition, the political situation was changing in France. Pleven was out of office by June 1954, replaced by Pierre Mendes-France's Radical-Gaullist government, of which the Gaullist faction was strongly opposed to the EDC. In August 1954, the French Assembly rejected
ratification of the EDC Treaty, ending what had been—and what would be until now—the most far-reaching attempt at European defense cooperation in the post-World War II era.

Ironically, Britain—so staunch an opponent of the EDC—came to the rescue in the immediate aftermath of the EDC’s demise. It did so in large part because of Washington’s highly negative reaction to the EDC debate. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had warned even before the French rejection that the United States would undertake an “agonizing reappraisal” of its policy towards Europe.17 Only a month after the French Assembly refused to ratify the EDC Treaty, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden launched an initiative to find a substitute for the failed Community that would be acceptable to all European participants, especially France, and would assuage American concerns. He won quick acknowledgment that such a solution had to have as its foundation Germany’s entry into NATO and its rearmament. It became equally clear that Britain had to participate fully in whatever system was devised to readmit Germany to the European “club.”

Remarkably, in six days in London—from 28 September through 3 October 1954—the seven countries involved in the EDC fiasco reached agreement on three major decisions: through modifications to the March 1948 Brussels Treaty, West Germany and Italy would enter an expanded Brussels Treaty Organization, which henceforth would be called the Western European Union; the occupation of West Germany would end and that country would enter NATO; and the British, Canadians, and Americans made explicit declarations of support for European unity, including London’s commitment to maintain four divisions and a tactical air force in Europe. Foreign ministers from the seven EDC countries and from the United States and Canada met three weeks later in Paris.
to sign the formal agreements embodying the London decisions. Ratification by 
national parliaments was swift—six months—and, except for France, 
overwhelming.18

The Paris Agreements, at first glance, seemed to promise in many ways an 
organization of major import and one representing as great a degree of 
cooperation as the EDC. The signatories retained the tough defense guarantee 
from the Brussels Treaty, which is far more explicit than that of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty obligates the members only to 
take "individually and in concert with the other parties such action as it 
seems necessary, including the use of armed force" should another member be 
attacked.19 The Paris Agreements, moreover, established an infrastructure 
for the new WEU. The Brussels Treaty's Council of Foreign Ministers— 
rechristened the Council of the Western European Union—remained the primary 
governing body and was authorized to set up whatever subsidiary bodies it 
seemed necessary. It was tasked to report annually to a new parliamentary 
Assembly "composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe."20 The Council was to meet 
in London at the Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative (the members'
ambassadors to Great Britain) level. The WEU Secretary-General and his staff 
would be based there as well. The WEU Assembly was to be located in Paris.

The Paris Agreements also established Europe's first post-World War II 
arms control organization, the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA). The 
ACA was tasked "to monitor the observance of certain arms production 
limitations imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany and of certain 
obligations accepted by all the WEU member states, particularly with regard to 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."21 In addition, only seven
months after the Paris Agreements were signed, the WEU Council established a Standing Armaments Committee to promote joint weapons production—the first such body in the post-World War II era.  

The apparent significance of the WEU and degree of defense cooperation engendered by that new body proved illusory. Current Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, an ardent and longtime champion of European integration, once described the WEU in its first 30 years as an organization whose "tasks were of a subsidiary nature, being no more than routine and carried out with little enthusiasm," [which] "drifted into a state of mediocrity" [and the participation in which] "was considered more as a tiresome chore than a real necessity." The WEU over those 30 years could point to only three major successes: its use as a vehicle for rearming West Germany and bringing the Germans into NATO; its contribution as a forum for discussions between the United Kingdom and the other WEU members during the difficult period encompassing the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 and British admission to the Community in 1973; and its fundamental role in the successful settlement of the Saar dispute in 1955 between France and West Germany.

The WEU's performance during its first 30 years was unimpressive largely because its key members wanted it that way. The Benelux countries and Italy undoubtedly viewed the organization as another important ingredient, along with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the EEC, in Europe's eventual political, economic, and military integration. The United Kingdom, however, long cool to integration, never saw the WEU that way, but rather viewed it only as a means of getting Germany rearmed and into NATO, thereby ensuring a continued U.S. commitment to Europe. France, although long a strong supporter of European economic union, did not feel the same about
military integration and therefore took a disinterested view towards the WEU until the 1980s. West Germany long took a cautious approach, fearing that an embrace of the WEU would arouse suspicion in Washington of an attempt by Bonn to undermine NATO.

The WEU was ineffective because all of its members, even those strongly supportive of European integration, saw NATO as paramount in the area of military affairs. In fact, it was clear that they intended from the outset that the WEU would serve NATO. This could be seen by the Paris Agreements' revision of the Brussels Treaty adding a stipulation that the Union would "work in close cooperation" with NATO and "rely on the appropriate authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters." The WEU's value as a forum for debate and consultation on security matters was decreased with the establishment in 1968 of the EUROGROUP, an informal organization of all European NATO members, except France, whose goal was to coordinate their defense efforts and harmonize European views on key defense issues within the Alliance. In addition, the WEU's Standing Armaments Committee enjoyed little success over the years in its goal of promoting greater European cooperation in weapons production and was rendered virtually superfluous by the founding in 1976 of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which has subsequently become an important forum for such endeavors. Finally, the Agency for the Control of Armaments floundered because of key WEU members' unwillingness to cooperate. France and Italy refused to ratify a 1957 agreement aimed at enhancing the ACA's status.

With the establishment in 1958 of the EEC, Europe's attention from the late 1950s until the mid-1960s has focused more on economic cooperation than on defense cooperation. For instance, the WEU Council met only 15 times from May 1955 to January 1961 and a decreasing number of those meetings were at the
With the defeat of the EDC, the conventional wisdom was that European integration had to be achieved step by step, starting with economic cooperation and saving defense integration for last.

The only attempts of any consequence to enhance European defense cooperation from 1955 until the establishment of the EUROGROUP in 1968 were the so-called Fouchet Plans, named after the French representative to the EEC, Christian Fouchet. The first Fouchet Plan, in the fall of 1961, followed a proposal in September 1960 by Charles de Gaulle to establish a political union between the six EEC members (France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg). The plan aimed at the establishment of a common foreign and defense policy on an intergovernmental basis. French motives and objectives were ill-concealed. Still smarting over the strong U.S. opposition to the French-British-Israeli invasion of Egypt in the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, the French hoped to undermine U.S. domination over Europe in the defense sphere while avoiding any supranationalism which would constrain their freedom of maneuver. German and Benelux opposition, primarily based on their fear that NATO would be undercut, doomed the first Fouchet Plan. France itself killed the second Fouchet Plan in January 1962. The other EEC members had insisted on including stipulations that any European defense policy cooperation mechanism be placed within the context of NATO or identified clearly as a contribution to strengthening the Alliance. DeGaulle found that insertion unacceptable.
The formation of EUROGROUP in 1968 grew from a British initiative aimed at demonstrating their fidelity to European cooperation in hopes of winning EC acceptance of London's second application (France had vetoed the first one in 1963). Supported by West Germany, Britain also hoped to show Washington that the Europeans could do more for their own defense in the wake of France's withdrawal two years earlier from NATO's military command structure. Domestic U.S. tensions over the Vietnam War were contributing to a clamor in the United States, especially in Congress, to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Europe.

EUROGROUP has remained quite active since its founding but has had only modest success in forging greater European defense cooperation. French refusal to participate fully has limited the organization's effectiveness. EUROGROUP's most notable success was the European Defense Improvement Program agreed to in 1970, under which the members spent $1 billion over five years on military force and infrastructure improvements. It also established numerous working groups aimed at making improvements in such defense areas as communications, logistics, medical capabilities, training, and procurement. EUROGROUP is strongly supported by the European allies for the same reason France refused to join it: the organization supports and complements NATO.

Another attempt of note in 1968 to improve European defense cooperation was initiated by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel who proposed formal cooperation within the WEU framework between the seven WEU members in the area of foreign policy, defense, technology, and currencies. Although the proposal mirrored the earlier Fouchet Plans, France alone among the seven opposed.

*There is often confusion over the terms European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community (EC). In July 1967, the separate councils and commissions of the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community were merged into the European Community, and it has generally been referred to as the EC rather than EEC ever since.
Harmel's initiative, ensuring its doom. Paris did so because it saw Harmel's suggestion as an attempt to sneak Britain into the EEC through a back door.29

Although it had nothing directly to do with purely defense issues at the time, the initiation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process by the EC members in 1969 should also be examined briefly since some Europeans have suggested over the years that defense matters be added to the EPC's consultations which initially were limited to nonmilitary foreign policy areas. Sharply divided over Middle East policy and transatlantic relations during its first two years, the EPC process has prospered since then, spawning numerous working groups to cover such diverse subjects as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, Central America, and Southwest Asia. Most notably, the EPC has been highly active in the CSCE process since the mid-1970s, which clearly brought it into the security arena. While EPC has not produced anything remotely resembling a common European foreign policy, it has taken steps "towards a common perspective on major international issues distinct from that of the United States,"30 and significantly improved the coordination policy among EC members.

The next initiative on European defense cooperation came in November 1973 and was launched by the French. In a speech to the WEU Assembly, French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert proposed that the WEU be revived and built up as a European forum for defense cooperation. The initiative was a direct response to U.S. behavior during the previous month's Middle East war. Washington had placed U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe on alert without prior consultation with host governments, and had used German and Dutch facilities for resupplying Israel, which divided those countries' governments politically. Many European leaders thus felt a need to distance
Europe from the United States in the foreign policy area to demonstrate a European "identity." The French also feared West Germany's new attempts (Ostpolitik) to improve relations with the East which Paris believed might come at the expense of Western interests. Despite general European pique over U.S. actions, most Allies--especially the West Germans--viewed Jobert's proposal as too anti-American, and it quickly faded from view.  

The period 1973 to 1984 saw little activity in the area of European defense cooperation. The WEU Council did not meet at the ministerial level during this entire time, and the post of WEU Secretary-General was vacant from 1974 to 1977. Then Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans prepared a report on European unity in December 1975 at the request of the EC in which he warned that European union would remain incomplete without a common defense policy. However, in the next nine years, before a major effort in 1984 to reactivate the WEU, few steps were made in the direction urged by Tindemans. The most prominent was the creation of the Independent European Programme Group in 1976. During its first eight years of existence, the IEPG served as a "talking shop for armament officials" from all European NATO member states except Iceland, which has no military or arms industries. Beginning in 1984 the body was upgraded to ministerial level and since then has concentrated on facilitating armaments cooperation, both in production and procurement, promoting defense technological cooperation (particularly in the research and development area), and making European defense industries more efficient and competitive. The IEPG's record over its nearly 15 years in existence is mixed largely due to the chronic unwillingness or inability of most member states to subordinate their perceived national interests--in many cases unproductive and inefficient national arms industries--to the larger cause of European cooperation.
The only other moves towards greater European defense cooperation from 1973 to 1984 occurred in the EC arena. During their presidency of the European Council, in late 1981 the British urged that the EPC process include more extensive security considerations. However, opposition to this proposal led to a watered-down agreement that EPC consultations could address only "the political" aspects of security. By mid-1983, economic aspects of security had been added.3b

The slow pace of integration in the security sphere during the 1970s and early 1980s at a time of meaningful progress in economic integration made the Europeans susceptible to a new defense cooperation initiative. France took the lead, and starting in 1982 launched a multidimensional effort. French motivations, however, went well beyond the narrow focus of European integration. Their long-neld doubts concerning the dependability of the U.S. commitment to Europe's defense had reached serious levels in the early 1980s. Paris perceived that the East-West military balance had shifted in the East's favor, especially with the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missile systems. Equally important, traditional French fears of West German neutralism had increased because of vociferous German public opposition to the deployment of U.S. ground-launched cruise missile systems and PERSHING intermediate-range missile launchers. Finally, French leaders also recognized the need for a stronger European pillar within NATO, a pillar that in Paris' eyes could only be led by France. The French, along with most European leaders, viewed President Reagan's announcement in early 1983 of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program as further rationale for a stronger European pillar since the SDI initiative was seen as potentially decoupling the United States from Europe's defense.

29
France's first move was to strengthen its defense ties with West Germany. It did so by opening up a defense dialogue in February 1982. This in turn led to the establishment of bilateral Franco-German commissions to study strategic issues, military cooperation, and arms collaboration. Paris also suggested trilateral security collaboration with West Germany and Britain, but Italian protests over Rome's exclusion scuttled that proposal. Paris then concentrated on using the WEU to fortify Germany's ties to the West. The French recognized the value of ending the few remaining WEU Paris Agreement constraints on German arms production, which Bonn had long demanded. At the same time, they saw the benefits of including other key European NATO members in this expansion of cooperation with West Germany without the Alliance's "weak sisters," Denmark, Greece, and Turkey, who were not WEU members.

In October 1984, at the 30th anniversary session of the WEU Council, the assembled foreign and defense ministers pledged to coordinate more closely on a wide variety of matters, including defense policy, arms control and disarmament, the effects of developments in East-West relations on Europe's security, Europe's role in strengthening NATO, cooperation in arms standardization, and closer consultation on crises beyond NATO's borders. The meeting ended on a note of considerable euphoria. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proclaimed that the rejuvenation of the WEU would add a "'new and important dimension to the process of European unification." WEU foreign ministers reaffirmed the importance of these commitments in a follow-up meeting in April 1985, while administrative and organizational reforms within the WEU were implemented.
Nonetheless, the apparent ardor of late 1984 for European defense cooperation within the WEU cooled quickly, primarily because the fears and concerns that prompted the WEU reactivation eased considerably. The crisis of confidence within NATO over deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) passed with the decision to deploy the missiles while seeking an INF agreement with Moscow. This particularly lessened French concern over German neutralism and U.S. dependability. The Reagan administration's military buildup in the United States further eased French fears. Little more than a year after the much-ballyhooed WEU anniversary session, which France had orchestrated, French Defense Minister Charles Hernu was quoted as dismissing the WEU as a "talking shop." 42

As has been the case throughout most of post-World War II history, U.S. actions—particularly in the East-West arena—have served as a catalyst for attempts at increasing European defense cooperation. This was certainly the case in 1987 which witnessed two highly important events impacting significantly on European defense cooperation and the WEU. The first was the WEU's coordination of a European naval response to attacks against Persian Gulf oil tankers spawned by the Iran-Iraq war. The second was the WEU's October 1987 "Platform on European Security Interests." The unstated but clear motivating force behind both actions was the Europeans' shock over the October 1986 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. Their impression that President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev had come close to an agreement for the gradual elimination of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons frightened and angered the European leaders who could not believe that Washington would consider such a move without consulting them beforehand. The Europeans subsequently moved to enhance security cooperation in both word and deed.
In response to the mine warfare threat to commercial shipping growing out of the Iran-Iraq war, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the Netherlands deployed ships to the area from 1987 to late 1988. Luxembourg contributed money to support the other Benelux countries' deployments, while Germany, claiming its constitution barred any Gulf deployment, reassigned ships to the NATO standby force in the Mediterranean instead. The WEU loosely coordinated this effort, the first successful coordination by any European political organization of a non-regional security policy issue. This endeavor was also aimed at showing American critics that the Europeans could do more to protect Western interests outside NATO Treaty geographic limits.

Two months after the Reykjavik summit French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, in a speech to the WEU Assembly, proposed that because the superpowers were making momentous decisions affecting vital European interests without European participation there was a clear need for the Allies to agree upon and articulate a position on principal security questions. The result was the 27 October 1987 WEU "Platform." The nine months between Chirac's speech and the adoption of the "Platform" reflected the major difficulty of reconciling the foreign policies of seven different WEU countries. The final document served as a strong exposition of European security interests. It noted that European integration would remain incomplete without a security dimension but that such integration, along with improvements in European conventional and British and French nuclear forces, would strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The document went to considerable lengths to characterize U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe as "irreplaceable" to European
defense, citing the criticality of combining conventional and nuclear capabilities to assure a credible European security policy. The Platform reaffirmed the integral nature of arms control and disarmament policy within the overall Western security policy.44

The Platform was widely praised, including by the United States. President Reagan termed it "an impressive declaration" which "we welcome."45 This reaction was not surprising considering the document's emphasis on a continuing U.S. military presence, on the need for a proper mix of conventional and nuclear forces, and on the necessity of an increased European defense effort.

Developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and--more recently--the Persian Gulf have kept the WEU busy since the "Platform" was issued. Meanwhile, the topic of European defense cooperation has risen near the top of Western Europe's agenda, with the approach of the Single Market and the continuing search for a new security architecture. The WEU has been active on several fronts. Arrangements have been made, for instance, for cooperation within the WEU framework on the verification of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Specialist working groups subordinate to the WEU Council are studying a program of trial inspections between member states, multinational participation in national inspection teams, and inspector training. WEU experts are also assessing the possibility of a European space-based observation satellite system, with a WEU agency for exploitation of the imagery. The WEU also set up the WEU Institute for Security Studies in July 1990, and this think-tank is focusing on East-West relations and Europe's future security.46
With Spain and Portugal as new members since March 1990, the WEU has repeated its coordinating role during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. When Arab states requested support after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, consultation and coordination procedures similar to those set up by the WEU in 1967 were adopted. On 21 August, WEU foreign and defense ministers meeting in Paris instructed "an ad hoc group of Foreign and Defense Ministry representatives to ensure the most effective coordination in capitals and in the [Gulf] region, including areas of operation, sharing of tasks, logistical support, and exchange of intelligence." 47 Also under WEU auspices, the Chiefs of Defense Staff of the member states met on 27 August, along with several Chiefs of Naval Staff—the first such meeting in the organization's history. Gulf cooperation procedures were further defined but on paper went well beyond those used in 1987 including guidelines, among other things, for definition and performance of missions, definition of areas of actions, coordination of deployments and logistical and operational support. 48

In reality, however, the WEU's role in coordinating member-state naval deployments to the Gulf was limited and, according to the WEU Assembly itself, the organization was incapable of establishing an effective command-and-control structure. What cooperation was attained among the various NATO navies during the 'Desert Shield/Desert Storm' contingency came as a result more of NATO practice and experience than anything the WEU did. 49
ENDNOTES


5. Howe, p. 9.


12. Ibid., p. 37, Chatham House Study Group, p. 8, Stein, p. 9, and Bernard Burrows and Christopher Irwin, The Security of Western Europe: Towards a Common Defence Policy, p. 31.


15. Chatham House Study Group, p. 29.


25. Burrows and Irwin, p. 42.


40. Quoted in Wells, p. 162.


42. Quoted in Garnnam, p. 118.

43. Ibid., p. 119.


47. van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 525.


49. Thomas-Durell Young, Preparing the Western Alliance for the Next Out-of-Area Campaign: Linking NATO and the WEU, (Draft manuscript), pp. 11-14.
CHAPTER IV

THE LIKELY NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND RECOMMENDED U.S. POLICY

History does not repeat itself and the lessons of the past cannot necessarily be tied to the future. However, the foregoing review of 45 years of post-World War II efforts to forge increased European defense cooperation can be instructive for any attempt to predict what Europe's new security apparatus will be. This review reveals certain trends that have been constant and therefore may facilitate an educated prognosis. Specifically, this review indicates factors that have almost always worked against defense cooperation. Matching these factors up against a forecast of Europe's future over the next decade (Chapter III) will better enable us to speculate on the type and success of integrative efforts in the defense sector into the next century.

And make no mistake about it, significantly increased European defense cooperation will be at the heart of the continent's future security architecture. The extent of such cooperation will determine the success or failure of that architecture. U.S. force reductions resulting from the CFE Treaty and possible follow-ons, along with the U.S. budget deficit, will ensure that European defense cooperation is paramount. The Europeans already recognize that they must compensate through such cooperation for what will be a sharply reduced U.S. military presence in Europe. Also, certain economic integration by the mid-to-late 1990s will add momentum for progress towards political integration and thus greater defense cooperation. All Europeans, be they supporters or opponents of a United States of Europe, admit that political integration requires a high degree of security and defense policy integration.
TRENDS IN DEFENSE COOPERATION

By far the biggest obstacle to European defense cooperation from the beginning has been the unwillingness of most countries to relinquish sovereignty and there is little doubt that this will continue. Economic integration, as noted before, will add considerable impetus to political integration, which in turn will encourage some progress towards cooperation on security and defense matters. However, there will be limits to such progress at least over the next 10-15 years. For example, France is will not cede any meaningful control over its nuclear weapons doctrine to a supranational authority.

An important degree of defense cooperation can only come when all of the players recognize that the common interest of the whole group outweighs individual interests that clash. And, success in this effort will come only when the individual country whose interest is subordinated doesn't feel exploited. The difficulty of vaulting this hurdle cannot be exaggerated.

Noted analyst Josef Joffe has remarked that:

integration's progress grinds to a halt before the ramparts of national sovereignty. . . In Europe there is not one sovereign; there are twelve. These sovereigns do not obey the call of 'Europe' but listen to the voice of the national interest as articulated by the chorus of their domestic politics. And this is why the nation-state is still alive and well in Western Europe - ready to yield some prerogatives to a supranational bureaucracy in Brussels and the European Parliament in Strasbourg, but loathe to relinquish control over either institution. . . There is nothing - certainly no hegemonic unifier to force the West European nation-state into liquidation. Nor is there any incentive potent enough to lure the states into self-abandonment.

A somewhat related obstacle to European defense cooperation in the past has been a tendency by the bigger powers to exploit European institutions in order to gain advantage over each other. The Fouchet Plans of the early
The 1960s, by which France tried to maximize its own position at the expense of Great Britain and, indirectly, the United States, are good examples. Such actions frequently made European leaders, particularly in the smaller countries, overly wary of any integrative measure, even if well-intentioned.

Throughout the history of attempts to enhance defense cooperation, but especially since the mid-1970s, Europe has probably been hurt by the multitude of organizations and institutions, each with different memberships and often overlapping activities, which have some involvement in the security and defense field. There are 16 NATO members, 9 WEU members, 12 EC members, 15 IEPG members, 15 EUROGROUP members, and 12 states which participate in the EPC process. The CSCE has 34 members—all of Europe, except Albania, along with the United States and Canada. Greece, Turkey, and Norway belong to NATO but not the EC, while the reverse is true for Ireland. Greece, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland belong to NATO but not the WEU, while France participates in the IEPG and not EUROGROUP nor, most importantly, in NATO’s integrated military command structure. NATO, WEU, and IEPG all have some involvement in arms standardization efforts, while the WEU, EUROGROUP, EPC, and NATO serve as forums for general debate on security matters. NATO, the CSCE, and the WEU are both involved in some arms control activities or discussions.

In the past this network of entities with intertwined competencies has allowed individual European governments to pick its preferred organization, "fueling a kind of internecine institutional war with no clear winners." Moreover, most of these organizations or groupings have bureaucracies with a vested interest in adding to their pensions. Prospects for enhanced defense cooperation would be improved with a decrease in the number of these organizations or groupings.
historically both a curse and a boon for European defense cooperation, the status of East-West relations has been a key determinant. Cooperation has fared well during periods of heightened superpower tensions and gotten short shrift as tensions eased. Soviet aggressiveness prompted movement towards the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the formation of NATO a year later. The Soviet nuclear breakthrough and North Korean aggression led to increased U.S. pressure on Europe which in turn resulted in the abortive EDC initiative. As tensions eased with Stalin's death and the Korean armistice, only a U.S. threat to reconsider its commitment kept the Allies focused on cooperation, leading to the establishment of the WEU. The period of detente in the early to mid-1970s not surprisingly witnessed no significant successful moves towards greater European defense cooperation. On the other hand, the French-led reactivation of the WEU in 1984 was a response in part to a perception of a military imbalance in the Soviets' favor and not just President Reagan's SDI initiative. But the reactivation had only minor success to a degree because of the U.S. military buildup during the 1980s which restored the balance. The WEU's successes of 1987 resulted, in the case of the Gulf deployment coordination, from the perceived threat to European oil supplies, and, in the case of the "Platform on European Security Interests," from fear in the aftermath of Reykjavik of a superpower nuclear condominium.

The dramatic lessening of the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat since 1989, based on these trends, would lead an observer to the conclusion that the prospects are poor for increased defense cooperation among our European allies. However, there is another very evident trend throughout the history of European cooperative endeavors which may offset the impact of this seemingly reduced threat. European impulses toward greater defense cooperation more often than not have come about as much in reaction to U.S. actions or pressure
as to Soviet contrariness. U.S. threats or cajoling or European fears of a U.S. decoupling were instrumental in such integrative steps as the Brussels Treaty, the EDC, the WEU, the WEU's reactivation in 1984 as well as its "Platform" in 1987. There is certainly an element of this trend operating today. Despite U.S. pledges of continuing fidelity to NATO and European defense, American troops--with or without a CFE Treaty--are coming out of Europe in large numbers. While Europeans applaud the new era of East-West harmony that has led to this U.S. military exodus, they may fear that the exodus may go too far too fast. Most European leaders believe that a residual, nuclear-armed U.S. presence must remain as a hedge against any Soviet turnabout or against some crisis in Eastern Europe getting out of control. But, fear that U.S. budget considerations might eventually drive Washington below an acceptable troop level will likely give European defense cooperation a boost over the next few years.

A review of post-World War II European defense cooperation also reveals some positive trends in relation to future integrative efforts. First and foremost is the unparalleled success of collective defense and of NATO in particular. This bodes well not only for NATO's survival but also for the Europeans' pulling together in and out of NATO as the United States reduces its presence. On a lesser scale, the efficacy of European cooperation has been demonstrated by EUROGROUP for 22 years and the IEPO for 14.

Looking back on European defense cooperation since 1945 one can also see that movement towards economic and, to a lesser extent, political integration frequently gave momentum to military cooperation. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was very much a political and economic document. Its preamble contains a pledge by the signatories to strengthen... the economic, social, and cultural ties by which they are already united... [and]... to promote
the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe."4 The signature of the European Defense Community Treaty in 1952 was preceded by the accord establishing the ECSC in April 1951. More recently, the EU's increased activism since 1984 can be attributed in part to the economic activism surrounding the negotiation and implementation of the Single European Act, which launched the EC's Single Market integration program. The EC-92 process will succeed and will eventually impact on defense industries which are now excluded. Many of the major conglomerates, which are deeply involved in non-military aspects of the EC-92 program, have military subsidiaries and a synergistic effect will be impossible to avoid. This will likely lead naturally to some greater degree of defense cooperation.

The EC-92 program will do far more. The demolition of artificial barriers such as tariffs, border controls and passports, and eventually national currencies and a common monetary policy will gradually create a Europe where the Spaniard, Belgian, and Italian will also proclaim himself a European. EC Commission President Jacques Delors calls this a "European model of society that is accepted by the vast majority in the community ... distinct from - not necessarily better than but different from - the American and Japanese models."5 Well into the future, almost certainly beyond the 10-year scope of this study, this European "melting pot" will likely lead to a full-fledged European political and defense entity. In the meantime the homogenization process will gradually facilitate a greater degree of increased defense cooperation.
FORECAST: NEW STRUCTURE BUILT ON OLD FOUNDATION

Wanted: architect to design house for 35 dissimilar residents. Foundations unstable - house has collapsed twice this century. Richest tenant enlarging penthouse without consulting others. Two outsiders, one of whom wants to move in, will look over architect's shoulder. Urgent!

Most of the "dissimilar residents" have a fair idea of what they would like to see comprising the new European security architecture. The difficulty in predicting what that framework will look like in the year 2001 comes from the fact that there is only limited consensus, particularly between East and West, among these diverse national visions.

The British are the most ardent supporters of retaining most of the current structure, especially NATO, but are less ardent about European integration. The Poles as well as the Czechs and Slovaks want a system that will ensure that they remain free of any revival of German militarism or of Soviet control. The Soviets want enormous amounts of aid and technology from the West, but no interference from the same direction in how they handle their internal affairs. Above all, in Soviet eyes, NATO must not try to take advantage of the myriad difficulties facing the USSR. France wants to channel German economic power into the EC to serve as the "locomotive" to transport the Community into economic superpower status, while keeping the Germans from dominating the political side as well. Paris, as always, however, wants to retain sovereignty over key security and foreign policy decisionmaking. The United States seeks peace and stability in the region through "reconciliation, security, and democracy in a Europe whole and free." Washington shares London's desire to keep much of the old security structure, while hoping to retain significant influence among the allies despite a diminishing U.S. military presence.
This assessment's estimate of the security architecture emerging from this disarray will be based on the previously reviewed historical trends and on ongoing developments outlined in Chapter II, particularly the Franco-German initiative eventually to give the EC a major say in member-states' foreign, security and defense policymaking. In hazarding such a prediction, it would be wise to remember the words of German philosopher Karl Jaspers, who said, "In a world that has become doubtful in every aspect, we seek direction through philosophizing without knowing the final goal."  

The first task in this difficult prognosticating effort is to identify common European objectives and assumptions which will help set out the boundaries of this new security structure. These objectives and assumptions were outlined in general in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which was signed by the 32 participating European countries, the United States, and Canada during the 19-21 November 1990 CSCE Summit, as well as the Joint Declaration of Twenty-two States (all NATO and Warsaw Pact members) signed at the same time. In the security sphere, both documents but especially the Charter--a sweeping, grandiloquent road map for a democratic, economically prosperous, peaceful and unified Europe--obligate the CSCE members, among other things, to refrain from the threat or use of force, settle disputes by peaceful means, pursue further conventional force reductions and confidence-and security-building measures, reach agreement on a comprehensive and global chemical weapons ban, and establish a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna.

The new overall security framework will have to include both Western and Eastern Europe but it will have components largely relevant only to the West or the East. The focus in this paper will be more on the former. From the perspective of the West, U.S. Secretary of State Baker's Berlin speech in December 1989, citing the need for a "new architecture for a new era,"
included two agreed objectives: overcoming the division of Europe while maintaining the link between the political, military, and economic security of Europe and that of the United States.¹¹

Further common objectives would include free and unfettered trade, the free flow of ideas and information, international cooperation (especially through regional and global multilateral institutions), and “a high degree of mutual interdependence between free and democratically organized polities”—a recipe pioneered by Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II.¹² Three more specific critical and difficult objectives will be containing potential instabilities in Eastern Europe that could undermine Eastern and Western security interests, integrating the USSR into a structure that counterbalances Soviet power on the continent without threatening Soviet security interests, and constraining united Germany’s power without detracting from its sovereignty or isolating the country.¹³

Envisioning Europe’s new security architecture requires stating certain assumptions. Firstly, most Western European leaders will continue to perceive the USSR as a threat, albeit significantly reduced with its loss of control in Eastern Europe. The Europeans will remain especially cognizant of the Soviets’ formidable nuclear arsenal as well as concerned over the danger of conflict erupting from ethnic and nationalistic hostility in Eastern Europe and the USSR. This leads to the second assumption, that the European leadership will want to maintain an adequate defense, particularly through a still robust NATO anchored by a reduced but strong and nuclear-armed U.S. military presence. The third assumption, however, is that with few exceptions the European governments will remain unwilling to increase spending on defense
during what is likely to be a period of East-West accord. There will be no public support for such spending, and with economic difficulties common throughout Europe, military spending probably will not keep up with inflation.

The fourth assumption, nonetheless, is that despite increasingly dwindling support for strong defenses, the European allies will expect and demand a more equal and autonomous status vis-a-vis the United States within NATO. At the same time, however, the allies will take great care in staking out this equality and autonomy since they will not want to risk the loss of U.S. troops. But, the Europeans—and this is the fifth assumption—will remain suspicious that a complete U.S. withdrawal is in the cards. The final assumption, previously discussed, is that the EC will continue the integration process in the economic sector, reaching the goal of a single market by 1994 or 1995 and a European monetary system with central bank by the late 1990s. Political integration will be slower but there will be a gradual convergence on foreign policy throughout the 1990s.

These assumptions aside, the great uncertainty in Europe, both over future developments and the new security structure, is introducing a strong element of caution into the deliberations over the new architecture. This is true notwithstanding occasional rhetorical flourishes about the imminent coming of a new order. Absent a totally unexpected, truly cataclysmic event such as a violent breakup of the Soviet Union, this caution will almost certainly make the process of building the new security edifice a gradual, step-by-step, incremental process that will take years and probably decades to evolve. Founded in 1949, NATO gained its key European member, Germany, six years later, and it might be argued didn't become an effective organization for another ten years. Founded in 1957, the EC did not function effectively for more than 20 years.
This caution and the likely step-by-step approach will probably also result in the architects designing their new framework on a foundation of existing institutions. Only the CSCE, which has no bureaucracy but which is developing one, will take on the character of a "new" institution. This is not to say that the old organizations won't be changed. They will, although gradually.

For at least the next five years and almost certainly ten, NATO will endure as history's most successful experiment in collective defense. In the euphoria emanating from the collapse of the Berlin Wall and its aftermath, there was a tendency among many Western Europeans to equate NATO and the Warsaw Pact and argue that the disintegration of the latter would spell the death knell for the former soon thereafter. Instability in the Soviet Union, particularly the fighting in Azerbaijan and Georgia and more recently Moscow's crackdown in the Baltics, has served as an unwanted antidote for the euphoria. It has convinced most Western European leaders and a few in the East that NATO must stay in place for the foreseeable future as a hedge against this potential instability.

NATO will undergo change, however. Secretary of State Baker in his Berlin speech pledged that NATO's political component would be enhanced and its military emphasis lessened. NATO heads of state at the London summit on July 5 and 6, 1990 gave Baker's words some flesh, not a surprising development since the communique, which became known as the London Declaration, was crafted beforehand largely by Washington. Most notably, NATO leaders held out to the East a previously unmatched level of cooperation by offering a nonaggression pact to the member states of the Warsaw Pact, inviting Gorbachev
and other Eastern leaders to address the North Atlantic Council and to open up regular diplomatic liaison with NATO, and pledging closer military-to-military contacts with Pact members.14

Deemphasis of the Alliance's military component was also reflected in the London Declaration's arms control proposals, which included an offer to eliminate nuclear artillery shells from Europe if the USSR agreed to do the same as part of wider short-range nuclear forces (SNF) negotiations which were to have begun after the CFE Treaty was signed. More importantly, the Alliance declared that with total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and with implementation of the CFE Treaty, NATO could adopt a strategy making nuclear weapons "truly weapons of last resort." NATO leaders also pledged that under the same conditions the Alliance would change its force structure and strategy. More dependent on mobilization, NATO would field smaller and more mobile active forces that would rely on multinational corps, while active-duty readiness, training requirements, and exercises would be cut back. The Alliance's forward defense strategy would obviously be adjusted.15

Lastly, NATO leaders placed considerable stress on the CSCE. They suggested that more CSCE heads-of-state and ministerial meetings be held, with increased follow-up of such meetings, a regular schedule of biennial CSCE review conferences be established, and a small secretariat be created to coordinate these meetings. They also called for a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections, a conflict resolution center, and a CSCE parliamentary body based on the Council of Europe Assembly.16 In fact, the East agreed to all of these proposals in signing the Charter of Paris the following November.

With implementation of the CFE Treaty, which is likely despite current concerns over Soviet circumvention, and of the "two-plus-four" agreement, NATO and Europe in the year 2001 will look far different than they do today. There
will be far fewer soldiers and airmen on the continent. The United States and Germany will take the biggest manpower cuts on the NATO side, perhaps 225,000 and 275,000, respectively. A U.S. presence of between 50,000 and 100,000, with nuclear weapons, will remain as a counter to any possible resurgent Soviet threat. But, nuclear weapons will continue to be controversial. It had been expected that SNF negotiations would begin in 1991, but problems with CFE Treaty implementation may delay those talks further. Nonetheless, it is likely that an SNF pact will eventually be agreed to. The United States will probably end up with only tactical air-to-surface nuclear missiles and perhaps gravity bombs in Europe--based in the United Kingdom--to complement French and British nuclear systems by the mid-1990s.

Remaining NATO ground forces will be lighter, more mobile, and more dispersed. Ongoing Alliance planning for establishing multinational units at the corps level will fit in well with such dispersion, perhaps leading to such units being stationed in Germany, the Benelux countries, and Britain.17 Strategy will change along lines indicated by the NATO leaders at the London summit.

The new NATO will represent one component of the new architecture. Another will be strictly European, and that is the goal of the Franco-German-led European Community initiative of last December to eventually give the EC a major role in security policymaking, along with WEU Secretary-General Willem van Eekelen's proposal for a European army. At first glance these proposals would appear to clash with the previous optimistic prediction of NATO's survival over the next ten years. All EC members, even including longtime holdout Great Britain, last December agreed that the Community had to move into the area of security policy in order to have any hope of forming a politically integrated polity. However, they emphasized that any EC security
role would come "without prejudice to member states' existing obligations in this area, bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening ties within the Atlantic Alliance." 

In addition, this EC proposal will likely take several years to implement. EC Commission President Delors has predicted the Community could take a decade to reach consensus on policy to make military decisions. Consensus seems to be building among key EC member states to base this security initiative on the WEU and this could be one reason behind Delors' lengthy timetable. Several obstacles immediately come to mind with the WEU vehicle. As noted in Chapter II, the EC's movement into an area of policy not within its legal competency will require a new treaty or amendment of the 1957 Treaty of Rome and perhaps the 1985 Single European Act. The 12 member states would need to agree on the appropriate enabling language and then each state's parliament would be required to ratify the document. Moreover, if the WEU is the chosen vehicle for this initiative, the 1948 Brussels Treaty would require amendment and ratification by nine countries or a new treaty agreed to and ratified by the nine when the 1948 document expires in 1998.

The differing EC and WEU memberships will complicate this process as well. All WEU members are in the EC but Common Market countries Greece, Denmark, and Ireland are not in the Western European Union. To add to the complexity, Ireland is neutral and thus loathe to join an organization currently advertising itself as the European arm of NATO. Moreover, Austria—another neutral—has applied for membership in the EC, while Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Sweden (the latter two are also neutrals) will likely try to join. These accessions would probably occur from the mid-to-late 1990s, in all probability adding more time to the defense initiative's implementation.
There is also a strong possibility of CSFR, Hungarian, and Polish membership in the late 1990s, which would be a further complicating factor in the security sphere.

Security experts in the EC capitals will be wrestling with other serious obstacles presented by this proposal. Most notably, the EC has an even worse record than NATO on making controversial decisions. How could the Community reach a decision on a potentially controversial deployment of forces? Changes would be required in the current voting procedures which are now done either by unanimous vote or by a "qualified" majority giving major nations more weight than small members. Timeliness, an absolute requirement in dispatching troops in a crisis, would also be a difficulty. In addition, little if any thought has apparently been given to the command structure or costs of an all-European force.20

Looming over all of these obstacles is the nuclear question. Assuming the Soviets, as expected, retain nuclear weapons, the Europeans will rely on the U.S. nuclear guarantee and to a lesser extent on French and British nuclear forces. London and Paris have increased their cooperation in the area of nuclear weapons, but there are limits to such cooperation as the British would not want to risk their special relationship with the United States and the French would not relinquish any sovereignty in this area. A fully independent European defense entity, assuming no U.S. military presence would require a "Europeanizing" of French and British nuclear systems to serve as any sort of deterrent. The "Europeanizing" clearly should include Germany, but all—including the Germans—agree that Germany should not possess nuclear weapons. In any event, the Brussels Treaty and the 1990 "two-plus-four" agreement prohibit German nuclear weapons possession.
Notwithstanding these formidable obstacles, the EEC will eventually come to play a key role in security and defense policymaking and have an army. But this is not likely to occur until well after the time frame of this paper.

The late European security affairs expert, Jonathan Alford, noted that:

Whatever the route towards greater European defense cooperation . . . ultimately there would seem to be no avoidance of recognition that it is the EC that must play an important role as a legitimizing authority for greater defence cooperation in Europe. Other groupings can perhaps provide the motor for change . . . but it is hard for some to imagine any major security initiative by Europe without the endorsement of the EC. Indeed it is hard to imagine any effective and durable European defence cooperation taking place without the sustained political endorsement of the Community.21

Building the all-European component of the new security architecture will also be a step-by-step process and will have two primary and complementary starting points: the gradual absorption of the WEU into the EC and increasing Franco-German defense cooperation. Obstacles hindering the former track have been outlined earlier in this chapter. In what is likely to be the decade-long interim period before full EC absorption of the WEU's defense responsibilities there will probably be more of an overlap of WEU, EC, and NATO functions and missions. Rather than representing a true European "pillar," such an evolutionary process and increasing inter-organizational overlap will result more and more in three strongly tied bodies with closer "interface between the EC and IEPG, between the WEU and EC but also between the WEU and IEPG and WEU and NATO."22 But the WEU will continue to be the dominant multilateral all-European setting for discussing broad issues of European security cooperation during this interim period. More specialized groupings such as the IEPG will continue to conduct important but narrowly and technically focused business.23
Franco-German defense cooperation will increase over the next ten years because it is clearly in both countries' interests. For France, such cooperation will be seen as another mechanism, along with European economic and political integration and the retention of NATO, to keep a unified Germany firmly tied to the West. Moreover, in an unstable military environment of rapid change in the East and sharp troop and equipment reductions on both sides, Paris will view increased defense cooperation with Bonn as a decided plus for its own national security posture. For the Germans, this bilateral cooperation offers the hope of tying the French closer to European defenses, links Germany to an independent nuclear deterrent, and represents another means of demonstrating to all Europeans the new Germany's fidelity to Europe and escrowing of potentially destabilizing neutralism.

Franco-German defense cooperation has enjoyed a remarkable expansion since October 1982 when French President Francois Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed to implement the defense portions of the Elysee Treaty of 1963 between the two countries. Highlights of this cooperation have included: establishment in late 1982 of the bilateral Commission on Security and Defense which brings the two defense and foreign ministers together three or four times per year to discuss key defense issues; large-scale bilateral maneuvers such as "Bold Sparrow" in 1987; improved logistics cooperation; the formation in 1988 of the bilateral Defense and Security Council which is made up of the two heads of government, the foreign and defense ministers, and a small permanent support secretariat and which, among other things, coordinates national policies concerning European security; and especially the formation of the Franco-German brigade.
Franco-German defense cooperation will not only increase in the 1990s but will almost certainly be emulated by others. Anglo-German cooperation, while not as extensive and prominent as Franco-German cooperation, has grown steadily over the past ten years and will likely continue to do so. Moreover, it is likely that there will be an expansion, at least on a project-by-project basis, of the Franco-German cooperative relationship to include Britain and perhaps Italy. Mitterrand has in fact called the increased Franco-German cooperation an "embryo" for a European Defense Community. Thus, while gradual incremental progress is being made in absorbing the WEU into the EC to give the Community an organizational defense arm, bilateral and multilateral European defense cooperation will be increasing, especially among key WEU members France, Germany, and Great Britain, giving Western Europe a boost materially in the defense area.

The final major component of the new European security architecture and one which will be increasingly important throughout the decade is the CSCE. Again though, the CSCE's assumption of influence will be a gradual step-by-step process. Moreover, although some politicians in the euphoria immediately following the collapse of the Berlin Wall called for the CSCE to replace NATO, the CSCE will not be able to substitute for NATO as a defense alliance in the foreseeable future nor as the most effective political vehicle for transatlantic coordination between Europe and North America. But with the complete demise of the Warsaw Pact the CSCE will be vital in providing opportunities for the East to establish contact with the West and vice versa. The CSCE will also give the European neutral and nonaligned states a say in Europe's future, while serving a similar role for the United States and the
Soviet Union. Unstated by the governments but strongly felt by some is a belief that a strongly supported CSCE could act as a brake in the unlikely event Germany returns to its old ways.

With the proper structure and clearly delineated--and agreed to by all 31 nations--responsibilities, the CSCE over the long term (probably beyond ten years) could provide answers to new or resurfacing security issues such as nationalistic or ethnic strife, border disputes, and ecological disasters which NATO and the EC might have difficulty responding to. The CSCE might even serve in a United Nations-type capacity, controlling peacekeeping forces for any flare-up of conflict in Europe. Current voting procedures, whereby one nation can veto the work of the others, would need to be changed.

Agreement in Paris last November to establish a small CSCE bureaucracy and a CSCE Conflict Prevention Center, as well as to hold more meetings at higher levels, was a step in the direction of full institutionalization and a stronger security role. Entrusting tasks of this nature to the CSCE will not undermine NATO or the U.S. presence but perhaps strengthen both. "NATO's burden of establishing its singular ability to defend Western interests throughout Europe would be eased considerably and the Alliance would have the much easier task of proving its viability for the long-term defense of its members." 27

U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE AND RECOMMENDED POLICIES

In his 1990 *National Security Strategy of the United States* report to Congress, President Bush applauded the policy of containment of Soviet expansionism for fostering the reemergence of independent centers of power in Europe and Asia and for allowing friends of the United States to build up their strength. Nonetheless, he reminded readers that basic U.S. values
remain and, as the world’s most powerful democracy, the United States is "inescapably the leader, the connecting link in a global alliance of democracies," with a "pivotal responsibility for ensuring the stability of the international balance."  

As our basic values endure so do broad U.S. national interests. Nor will these interests change. President Bush articulated these as follows:

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.

3. A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.

4. Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

In articulating national objectives aimed at protecting these national interests, the President referred specifically to Western Europe twice. He indicated that his administration’s objective was to support "greater economic, political, and defense integration in Western Europe and a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community." In addition, he promised to work with the NATO allies and use fully the CSCE processes to "bring about reconciliation, security, and democracy in a Europe whole and free." Other general national objectives with particular applicability to Europe included the President's stated intention:

1. To deter any aggression that could threaten [U.S.] security...
2. To improve strategic stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing technologies for strategic defense, and strengthening our conventional capabilities;

3. To promote a strong, prosperous, and competitive U.S. economy;

4. To ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space; and

5. To promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions, as the surest guarantee of both human rights and economic and social progress.31

Stability in Europe is the primary objective for the United States as well as for all Europeans. Since the stunning events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, U.S. policy for obtaining that stability has been widely applauded. For example, while most of our allies and certainly our former Warsaw Pact adversaries cringed at the thought of German unification, Washington was out in front in supporting West German Chancellor Kohl's rapid moves in that direction. This support should pay dividends in the future. The United States was also energetic from the outset in recognizing the need for a new security architecture, particularly a changed NATO. Secretary of State Baker's Berlin speech only a month after the Berlin Wall's collapse was a good illustration of this pro-active stance.

U.S. policy over the next decade should be an evolution of the policy pursued thus far. A high priority must be the continued support for retaining NATO for as long as possible while at the same time working with our allies to adapt the alliance for the new era. Making NATO more "political" is only a small part of this task since the alliance has been very much a political institution from its birth.
NATO must be kept militarily meaningful in this dawning age or, in other words, sold once again to 16 publics. This will involve new strategies and functions, and this effort is already well underway. Selling a "new and improved" NATO to the American public in the continuing Gramm-Rudman-Hollings era will require a clear demonstration that the Europeans are doing far more for themselves. This will be very tough at a time when our allies are cutting back as well. However, the United States can go far in this "selling" job if it increases its policy support for European defense cooperation, which is the only way in the foreseeable future the allies will be able to increase their collective capabilities. Washington should applaud the Franco-German initiative to give the EC a security and defense role, while at the same time continuing efforts to forge a closer U.S.-EC relationship for that day many years down the road when there is a federal European government in Brussels making military decisions.

A closer U.S.-EC relationship will also be critical for our economic interests. Washington--specifically the U.S. Mission to the EC--should continue to be extremely watchful over the EC-92 process for any signs that economic conditions in Europe are giving rise to protectionism. Should we see such signs, our first response, as in the past, should be diplomatic, in the form of intensified high-level trade talks in various forums, especially the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the GATT talks. Every effort should be made in this diplomatic arena but in the end, in the event diplomacy fails, the United States should not hesitate to use its economic retaliatory weapons. The U.S. market will remain extremely important to the EC.
In addition to seeking NATO's retention, increased European defense cooperation, and a closer relationship with the EC, the United States must work with its allies and with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to build up the CSCE. Washington in the past has tended to see any movement to strengthen the CSCE and especially to give it a security role as certain to undermine NATO. Only in June 1990, at the U.S.-Soviet summit, did this position seem to shift, focusing the superpowers' attention more on the USSR's future in Europe. Like it or not, Europe East and West see the CSCE as a vital cog in the continent's future security architecture. Thus, it would be wise for the United States to be as closely involved as possible in the process of erecting and strengthening the CSCE institutionally in order to guard against the undermining of NATO that Washington so fears.

As part of the new security framework, and in fact to bolster it, the United States should continue to pursue "equitable and verifiable arms control agreements." However, in light of apparent Soviet attempts to circumvent the CFE Treaty, emphasis should be on "verifiable." The United States should continue to work closely with its NATO allies to construct effective and efficient verification mechanisms, preferably with the Alliance at the center for coordination purposes but giving the WEU some role, that will give the West as strong a measure of confidence as possible in the implementation of this treaty and any follow-on agreements. To add to this confidence, Washington should continue pushing hard for agreement on new Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) with the East. Such measures will add a degree of transparency and openness never available before which would go far in ensuring peace and stability in Europe.
In conclusion, the end of the 45-year-long Cold War represents a seminal event in world history, comparable in the 20th century only to the two world wars. A new world order is evolving but its final shape is far from clear beyond its multipolarity rather than bipolarity. The Pacific Rim countries will be increasingly important in this new order, but Europe will remain a critical foundation for that order, especially with its greater economic influence resulting from the EC-92 program. How Europe develops as it emerges from the long period of East-West tensions will be a key determinant of how effective the new order will be in promoting and maintaining stability.

With the Cold War's end and in the aftermath of the "Desert Storm" operation, there will be a natural tendency for the United States to look inward at its own economic and social problems. This raises the prospect of the United States unintentionally slipping into a new age of isolationism. But how the new world order evolves and particularly what shape Europe takes within that order will be critical for the United States. The global communications revolution and the rapid increase in world economic interdependence make any U.S. move towards isolationism—if one were possible—ill-advised. On the contrary, these developments make it imperative that the United States be highly activist diplomatically in helping shape the kind of new world order that will be conducive to the achievement of U.S. security objectives. Washington's emphasis must continue to be on time-tested components of the old order such as NATO, the EC, and the United Nations. Admittedly, U.S. activism must be carefully modulated to avoid any appearance in European eyes of a U.S. "bull" in a European "china shop." The absence of such balanced U.S. diplomatic activism would leave the field open for other architects whose new world order might not serve U.S. interests. Could the
United States secure its national interests in a new Europe built along the lines of Gorbachev’s "Common European Home" or in a Europe whose dominant security organization was the CSCE.


7. Bush, p. 3.

8. Quoted in Krause and Schmidt, p. 80.


11. Ibid.


16. Ibid., p. 4.


18. Lewis, p. 15.

19. Ibid.


23. Garnham, p. 133.


27. Flynn and Scheffer, p. 90.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 3.

31. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

32. Flynn and Scheffer, pp. 86-87.

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