THE FUTURE OF FORWARD PRESENCE

BY

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The world has changed drastically in the past eighteen months. The United States won the Cold War and embarked on a hot one in the Middle East. National military strategy has been turned upside down by the rush of world events - the fall of the Berlin Wall and the public perception of a much reduced Soviet threat to Europe and NATO, the apparent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the near economic collapse of the Soviet Union, and a strong reminder of how regional instabilities can threaten world peace and American interests by Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and the subsequent "Desert Storm." The National Security Strategy of the United States states that forward presence has been and will continue to be a critical element of our defense posture into foreseeable future. The current forms of forward presence are surveyed in this study, and thoughts on the future structure of forward presence in a rapidly changing world are offered.
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The Future of Forward Presence

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"American leadership in the postwar world and our commitment to the forward defense of our interests and those of our allies have been underwritten by the forward presence of U.S. military forces. We have exerted this presence through forces permanently stationed abroad; through a network of bases, facilities and logistics arrangements; and through the operational presence provided by periodic patrols, exercises and visits of U.S. military units. Clearly, the mix of these elements will change as our perception of the threat changes, ... But our forward presence will remain a critical part of defense posture for the foreseeable future."

National Security Strategy of the United States (1990)

The United States (US) won the Cold War with the help of its allies after more than four decades of persevering in a consistent national strategy of containment of Soviet expansion. Forward defense through forward presence was the cornerstone of US conventional war deterrence, second in importance only to nuclear war deterrence in the national military strategy component of that successful national strategy of containment.

Some pundits have suggested that the US may have lost its strategic focus with the end of the Cold War and the perception of a receding Soviet threat. Some suggest that forward defense may be an outmoded concept. I believe that forward presence will continue to be part of our national strategy. Although there will be few if any new forms of forward presence, the current forms will continue to have utility. Despite constraints, we will be limited only by our creativity. Finally, I will offer some thoughts on the structure of forward presence into the next century.
ENDNOTES

CHAPTER II

PRESENCE DEFINED

Somewhere in the Army lexicon there is at least one definition and usually an associated acronym for every form of military activity. However, there is no textbook definition for forward presence, nor is it defined in the JCS Pub 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The many forms forward presence can take are defined, described and often discussed at greater length in military publications, but presence is not defined.

To establish a conceptual framework for this paper, I developed the following definition of forward presence within the context of national defense: the visible employment of US military personnel and/or military materiel as a deterrent outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) at any point along the operational continuum short of involving major US conventional forces in combat.

My simplistic definition could be subject to endless scholarly debate. It includes small unit combat operations of limited scope and duration and peacetime contingency operations such as Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia, but it excludes the subsequent combat operation designated Desert Storm. It includes our military activities in Alaska and Hawaii. It excludes any diplomatic, economic, social or psychological activities that do not have a military component.

The term "employment" in the definition could be criticized as denoting action or movement which could exclude what some may term passive measures such as storage of materiel or unmanned (i.e., automated) sites or systems. However, there is always some activity associated with these so-called passive
measures: e.g., maintenance, data collection, etc., and the term employment also encompasses emplacement.

A more controversial aspect of my definition lies in the terms "deterrent" and "visible." Deterrence is "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." Once major conventional forces are engaged in protracted combat operations, it is clear that deterrence, by definition, has failed.

Visibility is inextricably linked to deterrence. Visible to whom? To those we wish to deter! This is reminiscent of the old philosophical question, "If a tree falls deep in the forest and there is no one there to hear it, does it make a sound?" In the case of forward presence, the answer is "no."

Target audience is the key to the concept of visibility. A target audience may be the world at large, the senior leadership of a specific country or movement, the control cell of a terrorist organization or countless other possibilities. Therefore, forward presence, by definition, also includes covert activities using military personnel and/or materiel, as long as the activity is visible to the targeted audience and deters that group or individual from taking an undesired action. An invisible presence is both contradictory and serves no useful deterrent purpose, which goes to the heart of the issue. Deterrence is the ultimate purpose of forward presence.

The definition may not be scholastically airtight. It is only offered to provide a conceptual frame of reference for the study. So for the purpose of this study, let us accept that forward presence is the visible employment of US military personnel and/or military materiel as a deterrent outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) at any point along the operational continuum short of involving major US conventional forces in combat.
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CHAPTER III

THE SHAPE OF THE FUTURE

"Today ... the international landscape is marked by change that is breathtaking in its character, dimension and pace. The familiar moorings of postwar security policy are being loosened by developments that were barely imagined years or even months ago. Yet, our goals and interests remain constant. And, as we look forward -- and hope for -- a better tomorrow, we must look to those elements of our past policy that have played a major role in bringing us to where we are today."

We live in a time of great change. Within the past eighteen months, the Cold War ended, the Berlin Wall crumbled, Germany reunited, and a US-led coalition force of European and Arab allies has gone to war with Iraq with the blessing of the United Nations (UN). Few would have predicted these events as little as two years ago, let alone the rapidity with which they developed.

Other significant changes are in the offing both at home and abroad. The USSR appears to be on the verge of economic collapse. The Soviet "Union" may dissolve as, one after another, Socialist Republics attempt to secede or go their own way. As Soviet forces are withdrawn from the eastern European Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states, where will they go? Food and housing are in short supply in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) or Greater Russia. Will a hungry populace and a dissatisfied military result in a military coup? Will the apparent failure of his domestic policies to date lead Gorbachev to reverse his course and return the USSR to a "pre-thaw" status? Are glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) merely excuses to allow Gorbachev to broaden his powers until he is a virtual dictator?
Despite its economic and political woes, it would be foolish to forget the USSR is a potentially dangerous adversary. The USSR strategic nuclear arsenal is not yet still capable of destroying the US. The 200 Soviet divisions that will eventually all be based behind the Urals constitute a formidable conventional force still vastly larger than the NATO forces currently in being. Some even argue that these new formations are even more streamlined and effective. The Soviets have done nothing militarily that is not reversible. "There is no more insecure time in the life of an empire than when it is facing the devolution of its power: no more dangerous time in the life of a religion (communism being, after all, a secular religion) than when it has lost its inner faith but retains its outer power."  

At home, hundreds of Defense Management Review (DMR) initiatives are under way despite dire Service predictions about readiness impacts. Presumably driven by economic pressures and their perceived collapse of the Soviet threat, Congress has already moved to reduce the active duty Army strength from over 1.500,000 to 520,000. Though less dramatic than the Army reduction, the other Services are also being reduced significantly. Iraq's bloody annexation of Kuwait and the subsequent Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations have only delayed the process, not stopped it. How will remaining forces be structured to meet national security requirements? Where will the forces be stationed? In what strength? How many divisions will there be to meet the 47 different security obligations of the US? Some have proposed as few as seven active Army divisions and three active Marine divisions. Although more reasonable estimates hover around a 14 to 16 division Army, is the division still the most appropriate tactical building block? I support the proponents of the British model of lethal, relatively self-contained brigades grouped, when necessary, under small, tactical division headquarters.
The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks are currently deciding the size and structure of US forces to remain in Europe. There appears to be a growing German resentment of a major US presence in their country, not dissimilar to the mood among the youth of the Republic of Korea. Although estimates of the post-CFE force range from as low as zero US forces in central Europe by 1997, there is consensus that the ground forces will be greatly reduced from the four (+) division force now assigned and that tactical air forces will be proportionately reduced. Amid speculation that our total NATO commitment of "ten divisions in ten days" may be significantly reduced, "it has also been argued ... that the centrality of NATO requirements leads not only to U.S. weapons and forces less suitable for interventions elsewhere but to more expensive forces as well."

What is the shape of the future? How does one project even five years ahead let alone 20 to 50 years when so many significant changes are happening so fast?

The Multipolar World

"The international security environment is in the midst of changing from a bipolar balance to a multipolar one with polycentric dimensions ... . If we are to maintain our position as a world leader and protect our interests, we must be capable of and willing to protect our global interests. This requires that we maintain our capability to respond to likely regions of conflict ... we must maintain within our active force structure a credible military power projection capability with the flexibility to respond to conflict across the spectrum of violence throughout the globe ... we must have unimpeded access to (these economic) markets and to the resources needed to support our manufacturing requirements ... .
In the Middle East, it will remain in our interest to maintain stability for both economic and political reasons since many of our allies depend on the region for the majority of their oil supply.  

General A.M. Gray  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
14 March 1990

General Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, provided the above testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on 14 March 1990. In retrospect, his testimony was prophetic. I wonder if General Gray was surprised to see Iraq lend the weight of history to his words only a few short months later? If nothing else, the current Middle East crisis has underlined the instability of certain regions, the importance of regional power balances and stability to world peace and US ability and willingness to protect US interests abroad.

Although not a historian, I recognize the danger of allowing recent events to unduly influence one's view of the future. An in-depth look at the post-Desert Storm Total Army structure or that of any particular theater is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I believe that the lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield and the ongoing Operation Desert Storm will significantly influence the structure of the Army and of forward presence into the 21st century. Consistent comments from a variety of senior visitors to the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in recent weeks have only reinforced that belief.

Contingency Corps

"Regional conflicts, with the potential to spill over and directly involve U.S. military forces, are the principal threat to U.S. interests in our AOR."  

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf  
CINC, CENTCOM  
8 February 1990
Although the optimal size and mix of forces in the US-based contingency corps are also beyond the scope of this paper, it is most likely that any future contingency corps will be highly flexible with respect to force mix and be more self-contained. Some have even argued that as many as three corps are required to effectively respond to regional threats.\textsuperscript{12} A 520,000-man active force with two or more highly flexible contingency corps definitely argues for some tactical building block smaller than our current division structure.\textsuperscript{13} In any event, most recent senior visitors to the USAWC agree the force should be relatively self-supporting.

A self-contained contingency corps also has implications for the way the Total Army is structured. More combat service support forces must be "moved" from the reserve component (RC) into the active component (AC). The current integrated structure was created by General Creighton Abrams in the post-Vietnam years to ensure we never again went to war without mobilizing.\textsuperscript{14} Most recent senior USAWC visitors seem to favor a tiered Total Army structure which would allow an all-AC contingency corps to deal with regional contingencies or "small wars" without mobilizing the RC.

\textbf{War Reserve Stocks}

War Reserve Stocks (WRS) were insufficient. The objective of 60 days of supply was never achieved for any given commodity, to include ammunition, because it was never adequately funded. Program and item managers do the best they can with funds available, but WRS and authorized acquisition objectives (AAO) are almost always at the tail end of the program procurement due to other priorities, especially for ammunition.\textsuperscript{15}
Assuming there is an adequate industrial mobilization base, which many doubt, it is too slow and complex to respond to short term contingencies. There will be pressure to buy the full 60 days stockage of all munitions and critical assets, especially "smart" munitions, somehow against the next major contingency.

The afloat prepositioned force (APF), nine ships prepositioned with common-use WRS, water, rations, FOL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) and ammunition, was a great success. Stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the APF reached the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) within eight days of notification. Commanders in Chief (CINC) of Unified Commands will want more of these despite their vulnerability to a sea power.

**Force Projection**

The most prolific writers on the subject of force projection are Marines. Not surprisingly, many write that only the Marines are capable of forcible entry on an inhospitable shore due to their amphibious capability. Proponents of Army airborne forces will probably take issue with that point, but there is consensus that the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MFF) was a success.

The MFF consists of 13 specially configured roll-on-roll-off (RORO) ships divided into three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS). Each MPS carries the heavy equipment and 30 days of supply (DOS) for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The personnel and light equipment for this 16,500 person force of sailors and marines are airlifted to marry up with their MFF heavy equipment. These were the first relatively heavy forces in the CENTCOM AOR. Granted, the 82nd Airborne Division was there first, but each MEB has about 50 tanks (M60 vice M1), the rough equivalent of an Army armored battalion.
The MFF has no organic capability to project itself on a hostile shore. It must rely on amphibious and/or airborne forces to secure a port or beach for disembarcking its equipment. It is still the most responsive "heavy" force, and the Army may want a slice of the MFF pie in the future.

**Strategic Mobility**

We were unable to move the entire (i.e., close) originally designated Desert Shield contingency force within 30 days using all reasonably available air and sealift short of mobilization, a fact that did not escape the notice of the press and the general public.

Astute observers have bemoaned the shortfall of strategic airlift for over three decades. Currently, the Secretary of Defense claims that we are 25% short of the strategic airlift requirement of 66 million ton miles of cargo per day (MTM/D) to support a European war. Some observers feel that a more realistic requirement is at least 85 MTM/D and probably much more, perhaps as much as 150 MTM/D.

The strategic airlift fleet consists of only 250 C-141 and 110 C-5 aircraft in the total force. Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC, Retired, estimated that moving just one airborne division to the Middle East requires almost 900 C-141 sorties. It would require 500 C-141 sorties just to lift the 10,200 personnel and equipment, less vehicles, of a light division.

Passenger movement has not been a problem for Desert Shield or Desert Storm. The shortfall is in cargo. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) is doing a beautiful job; there just aren't enough assets. Congressional decisions to delay or stretch out the C-17 cargo aircraft procurement do not bode well for future strategic airlift capabilities.
CINC's will want more strategic airlift. As usual, the question will be who pays.

Doctrinally, approximately 95% of our equipment and resupply material must move by sea in any conflict, although the Desert Shield estimates seem to be between 80 and 85%. The Secretary of Defense has identified a sealift requirement of one million short tons in a single lift and a 20% shortfall in meeting that requirement. The US Merchant Marine is expected to carry a large portion of the sustainment burden for any conflict, yet it has been in a state of serious decline that is not expected to improve. In fact, no merchant ship has been built in an American shipyard since 1987.

The US does possess eight SL-7 fast (i.e., 35 knots) sealift ships (FSS), however it takes all of them to move just one heavy division in one lift. A $600 million appropriation for four more SL-7s last year (FY 90) went unused by the Department of Defense. A portion of the funds were diverted to other requirements, but $775 million was still lying idle at the end of the fiscal year.

CINC's are going to want more FSS.

**The Future**

What is the shape of the future? The entire defense community is eagerly awaiting the Special Operations Forces Command (SOFCOM) Net Assessment which purportedly will tell us what our regional concerns should be for the next 15 to 20 years. This suggests that no one, with the possible exception of SOFCOM within its relatively limited frame of reference, has a clear view of the future.
To a great extent, the National Security Strategy describes the shape of the future, the ends to which our national means - economic, political, socio-psychological, and military power - will be applied. "We have always sought to protect the safety of the nation, its citizens, and its way of life. We have also contributed to an international environment of peace, freedom, and progress within which our democracy - and other free nations - can flourish."30

The National Security Strategy also cites the four continuing military components of America's grand strategy: deterrence, strong alliances, forward defense, and force projection. This strategy pronouncement further dictates we will achieve "forward defense through forward presence,"31 a cornerstone of conventional war deterrence.

Regional conflict, not general war, seems to be the greatest threat on the horizon. Authorities generally agree that US security interests and the US economy are best served by a strong and growing international economy.32 Regional stability and world peace are required for the growth of that international economy. If the US is to enhance regional stability through its 47 current security agreements, it seems intuitively obvious that some forms of forward presence will be required.

No matter how well the economy fares, it seems clear that we are embarking on at least a decade of austere defense budgets. If proportionately larger slices of that budget are allocated, as I suspect, for more strategic lift and/or prepositioning, the AC forces must be smaller, more flexible, and perhaps, reorganized around a smaller tactical base than the division. Our forward presence must be the most cost-effective we can devise, and, to a great extent, that effectiveness will be a function of the effectiveness of our psychological operations.

2. Primary Chlaes, "Elena Bonner's Warning to the West," Wall Street Journal, 23 December 1990. Elena Bonner, the widow of Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov (d. 1989), eloquently expressed the fears of several analysts interviewed in the various media in recent weeks.


4. Ibid., p. 52. Callaghan is quoting James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress and author of a history of Russian culture, The Icon and the Axe.


7. David E. Shaver, COL, Justifying the Army, p. 2.


13. Ibid., p. 11.
ENDNOTES


23 Ibid.


29 Schmitt, "Pentagon."


31 Ibid., p. 23 and 25.

32 Gary C. Hufbauer and Kimberly A. Elliot, "The International
ENDNOTES

CHAPTER IV

A SURVEY OF FORWARD PRESENCE

'There will be a requirement for a variety of forces to include amphibious forces, land- and sea-based prepositioned forces, and airborne and airmobile forces. The challenge will be to determine the correct mix based on need and affordability.'

Deterrence is the primary purpose of forward presence. Yet, just as there are political, economic, social, psychological and military elements of national power, there are political, economic, social, and psychological dimensions to every military activity. While I will show that deterrence is either the primary or underlying purpose of all forms of forward presence, it is not always the highest priority. In many instances, there are other, higher priorities even though the purpose of deterrence is ultimately served.

Visibility is the common thread that runs through all forms of forward presence. How do we achieve that visibility? In the past, visibility has been too often serendipitous. The US would take the action(s) deemed appropriate and await (or perhaps predicated upon) the response of the media and, subsequently, world opinion. Our efforts in the future must be more focused by emphasizing an often neglected component of all types of operations, psychological operations.

Psychological operations are "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives."
While the concept of psychological operations has a decidedly military flavor, it is part of the larger fabric of perception management. Perception management is defined as actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indications to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originators objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.  

Effective perception management is critical for visibility and the subsequent effectiveness of forward presence as a deterrent.

Initially, I surveyed the current forms of forward presence and attempted to group them doctrinally. I further subdivided the doctrinal groupings into two broad categories of deterrence, direct and indirect, although they could be more accurately characterized as "more direct" and "less direct." The indirect category contains those forms of forward presence in which purposes other than deterrence are the highest priority.

Based upon my earlier assessment of the future, each form of forward presence is evaluated for its future utility using the criteria of visibility, cost-effectiveness, and credibility. Visibility, as discussed earlier, is the ability to send a message(s) to a target audience(s). Credibility is the believability of that message, and cost-effectiveness is, as always, "bang for the buck."
Indirect Deterrence Forms

Nation Building

Nation building encompasses a broad range of often overlapping missions, functions and activities that contribute to the strengthening of the fabric of a host nation (HN). Any form of forward presence that contributes to the HN infrastructure, acceptance or legitimacy is nation building and concurrently generates good will for the US and enhances acceptability of a US military presence.

Nation building includes such activities as civil affairs (CA), support to JS and foreign civil authorities, foreign internal defense (FID), and security assistance.

Civil Affairs (CA)

Civil affairs are "those phases of the activities of a commander which embraces the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when (U.S.) military forces are present." In the case of an occupying force, CA would also include military government such as the US military government in Japan following World War II.

The utility of CA was demonstrated in Panama following Operation Just Cause. CA elements were instrumental in reestablishing civilian control of the country. Presuming a successful outcome to Operation Desert Storm, a similar effort is anticipated in Kuwait. If our view of the future holds true, we can expect more regional conflicts and more requirements for CA.
CA is visible to the civilian populace and, just as importantly, to the HN government. It contributes to the legitimacy of the HN government at a minimal cost. Most CA assets are in the Reserve Component (RC), although SOFCOM is attempting to build a slightly larger AC CA structure.

**Counternarcotics**

**Doctrine.** Counternarcotics is support to US civil authorities as a peacetime contingency operation within the context of low intensity conflict (LIC), the "political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states." Military forces may be involved in a variety of actions taken to detect, disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, materiel, and distribution systems) of illicit drug trafficking entities."5

**U.S. SOUTHCOM** forces are actively engaged in counternarcotics with an emphasis on the Andean region of South America. The total counternarcotic effort is a mix of activities which includes training of HN military and civilian (police) forces under security assistance cases which contributes to foreign internal defense which I will address below.

**Counternarcotics efforts are visible to the HN government and to the drug traffickers. With appropriate PSYOP, the effort will be visible to the HN populace to good effect. There will be a continuing need for this type of cooperation into the foreseeable future, and the effort is relatively cost-effective. There is a direct training benefit or value for the US forces involved, and the flow of drugs into the US is reduced. This appears to be another "win-win" form of forward presence with no significant disadvantages for the future as long as there are no military casualties.**
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Foreign Internal defense (FID) is the "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."

Although FID as LIC doctrine encompasses a wider range of activities than my narrow definition of forward presence, it does include a number of programs that are forms of forward presence found in other categories. Counternarcotics programs and security assistance programs are but two examples. In fact, I can identify no form of forward presence that is unique to FID (i.e., without application to other program categories).

The "nation building" benefits of FID programs are HN government and societal stability. The visible employment of US personnel and materiel in these efforts sends a strong signal of US support and commitment to the HN and to any potential disruptors of that stability. These programs promise to be particularly effective in the future as we shift to a more north-south focus.

Security Assistance

Security assistance is "groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives."

Security assistance includes a much broader array of programs, but the Department of Defense administers the Military Assistance Program (MAP), International Military Educational and Training Program (IMETP), and Foreign
Military sales (FMS). Some of the manifestations of this security assistance are Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAG), mobile training teams (MTTs), and military civic actions (MCA).

The worldwide FY 89 security assistance bill was approximately 11.5 billion dollars. There is a continuing trend of fewer security assistance dollars each year, but those dollars spent in the poorer third world countries have a much greater impact than dollars spent elsewhere.

These programs will continue to have a direct and significant impact on friendly third world HNs and reap great benefits for the US out of all proportion to our investment.

Military Assistance Program (MAP)

MAP is "that portion of the US security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which provides defense articles and services to recipients on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis." The worldwide FY 89 MAP was approximately 466.5 million dollars with almost 73% of that total going to American (Central and South) Republics. Although the lion's share went to El Salvador, there were 16 other beneficiaries of this "grant aid."

International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP)

IMETP is "formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds."
Employment of US military forces OCONUS to execute IMETP is a very effective form of forward presence. Mobile training teams discussed later are one way of accomplishing this. Another is US Military Services Funded Foreign Training ("Training which is provided to foreign nationals in US military Service schools and installations under authority other than the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961."\(^{12}\)) when it is conducted on OCONUS installations.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

FMS is "that portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the MAP and IMETF in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred."\(^{13}\)

In FY 89, approximately 10.9 billion dollars worth of Defense materiel, training and other services were sold to "friendly" nations.\(^{14}\) Less than two billion dollars of that went to Europe and Canada. Most of it reinforced our shift in focus to north-south.

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)

The MAAG is "a joint service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country."\(^{15}\)

Often, the MAAG is the most visible US military element in the administration of security assistance programs. The most significant exception to this is in the realm of military civic actions which are discussed below.
Mobile Training Teams (MTT)

A MTT is "a team consisting of one or more US personnel drawn from Service resources and sent on temporary duty to a foreign nation to give instruction. The mission of the team is to provide, by training instructor personnel, a military Service of the foreign nation with a self-training capability in a particular skill."16

Such a team recently handed over responsibility for a successful program to the Bolivian government to train its own military and civilian police counternarcotics forces. Much less glamorous but just as necessary to nation building, I have personally dispatched maintenance training teams to Portugal and to Egypt. On any given day, each TRADOC technical school will have at least one MTT deployed to a foreign country.

Military civic action (MCA)

Military civic action (MCA) is "the use of preponderantly indigenous forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)"17

MCA is tremendously effective in poorer third world countries where even small investments of US dollars, materiel, and manpower reap great results in improving the human condition and enhancing the image of the US. "Not since the formal recognition of MCA (Military Civic Action) as a tool in U.S.
military strategy 50 years ago has there been such an opportunity for using
MCA."

MCA may be the most influential tool in accomplishing the shift in focus from east
west to north-south. Specifically, De Fauw sees MCA as a major
collection in support of LIC, since it addresses itself to improving economic
and sociological conditions, in effect, preempting two major causes of
dissatisfaction often leading to insurgency or LIC.

The Africa Civic Action (ACA) program has been a great success despite very
few dollars invested ($12,650,000 for all of 1985 through 1989). Primarily, it
has been a security assistance program (MAP) with the Corps of Engineers
providing technical advice and assistance. The ACA "recognizes that the United
States has a major interest in promoting political stability in Africa and that
poverty is a chief cause of African political instability, and seeks to
encourage military participation in social and economic development."

"Although modestly funded, the ACA program has made solid contributions to
its objectives. Infrastructure that saves lives, promotes economic and social
development and provides enhanced foreign exchange to the governments is in
place and operating. ... Because of its emphasis on nation-building projects
and development, it successfully addresses some of the major preconditions for
insurgency and low intensity conflict development and may be viewed as playing
an indirect role by reducing their likelihood."

Reserve Component (RC) forces have played a major role in the success of
the programs in Latin America. "During Fuertes Caminos '88, the task force
constructed three school houses, basketball courts and soccer fields, and
painted and cleaned a church." Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETS)
in 1989 included "providing medical assistance to 8,000 Hondurans, treating
8,000 animals and performing some 5,000 tooth extractions."
Although most nations find the road building and repair the most valuable, the Bolivian Foreign Minister recently informed CINC, SOUTHCOM, that the medical aid programs contributed the most to his country's welfare. SOUTHCOM plans for 1991 include 123 exercises, 48 new clinics, 87 new schools, 80 kilometers of new roads, and seven new water wells.

The training value of these exercises for RC units conducting them in austere environments is tremendous. The host nation (HN) gains in infrastructure and quality of life. Tremendous good will is generated by the employment of US forces in these programs. The level of effort and dedication and the attendant benefits are evident (i.e., visible) throughout the region. Everyone wins, and the cost is negligible.

Humanitarian Activities

In a perfect world, humanitarian programs would be pursued solely because they benefit humanity. I would like to believe that the US and most of its allies pursue those programs because we really do wish to help alleviate suffering in the world. Pragmatically, there are some significant benefits or positive by-products of employing US military forces in humanitarian efforts.

In terms of world opinion, humanitarian programs are highly visible yet non-threatening. A force can showcase its ability to rapidly deploy and rapidly attack a problem without anyone feeling militarily threatened. Natural disasters provide an exceptional opportunity to demonstrate one's capability for quick reaction. Through effective PSYOP or perception management, everyone can see what a strong, good and responsive friend the US can be. Yet, subtly there is the message that we can apply those same skills to the employment of combat power as easily as aid. Is it not better to be a friend?
For all of these reasons, I consider the humanitarian activities described below to be indirect forms of deterrence.

**Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.**

Humanitarian assistance is the “assistance provided by DOD forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property.” Disaster relief is part of LIC doctrine and, as such, is considered a peacetime contingency operation.

Despite propaganda to the contrary, much of the world still sees the US as the “good guys.” We want to help. We want to be liked, sometimes too much. We will continue to help whenever anyone will let us whether it’s in the aftermath of earthquakes in northern Italy or another Chernobyl. Even if our motives are more complicated than that, why not take advantage of the good press? Compared to the cost of a military operation, the cost of disaster relief is negligible, and there is a training benefit to be derived from every situation.

**Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).**

NEO “relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign or host nation.” Although these are normally U.S. civilians, host nation or third nation civilians could also be evacuated.

NEO presents another opportunity for US forces to exercise strategic deployment and operational skills. The Marines’ recent NEO in Liberia is an excellent example. If we are to assume the future holds more regional
conflicts, it is inevitable that US citizens will be threatened and that NEO will be part of our future.

NEO are highly visible operations. Conducted with skill and style, they are indicators of other, more ominous, capabilities of the forces involved. Therefore, NEO have an indirect deterrent value that can be successfully exploited through FSYOF and perception management.

Search and rescue (SAR).

Search and rescue is "the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea." Combat SAR differs only in that it occurs only during wartime or contingency operations.28

Although even one human life is precious, the payoff for SAR is not as great as NEO or disaster relief. The most common operations are those conducted at sea for missing airmen or ships. The operations are also highly visible and, relative to the number of victims usually involved, quite costly. There are opportunities for FSYOF and perception management exploitation of the efforts of the US forces in these operations.

Direct Deterrence Forms

Forward based forces and aircraft and naval unit visits are probably the best known and understood forms of forward presence. These forms offer a clear example of deterrence, a highly visible employment of military personnel and materiel directly to the point or region to be "influenced." In all cases, an activity in this category represents a visible commitment, strengthens alliances and directly contributes to deterrence.
The direct deterrence forms of forward presence include a wide array of peacetime contingency operations, counterterrorism operations, space control activities, forward based or forward deployed forces and prepositioned forces. While each of these fits within my conceptual framework of forward presence, the list is not all inclusive.

Peacetime Contingency Operations

"Peacetime contingency operations are politically sensitive military activities normally characterized by short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war.\textsuperscript{25} These operations constitute a category of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) which includes shows of force and demonstrations, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), rescue and recovery operations, strikes and raids, peacemaking, unconventional warfare, disaster relief, security assistance surges, and support to US civil authorities. LIC ranges from a point on the operational continuum just above "routine, peaceful competition among states" to a point just short of conventional war, a very broad range of activity.

NEO, disaster relief, and support to US civil authorities have already been discussed as indirect deterrent forms of forward presence, and unconventional warfare falls outside my definition of forward presence. The remaining types of peacetime contingency operations are valid forms of forward presence and bear some scrutiny due to their direct deterrent value.

The key distinction between peacetime and wartime contingency operations is that in peacetime the military efforts complement political and informational efforts and objectives instead of purely military objectives. Peacetime contingency operations are characterized by tailored forces, short duration operations, joint/combined scope and, normally, rapid projection of forces.
Peacetime contingency operations, by their very definition and nature, will serve as well as a form of forward presence in the future. These operations are conducted "as required" by our political leaders as world events unfold. We can, in effect, pick and chose our targets. Peacetime contingency operations provide the opportunity to demonstrate to a "target audience" our military prowess short of war, our support for our friends, our wrath for our enemies, and our commitment to alliances in relatively short, economic bursts. The underlying deterrent value of these operations is that potential adversaries must recognize that we can and will project military power.

Shows of force and demonstrations

"Forces deployed abroad lend credibility to a nation's promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force as an instrument of national power. ... These operations can influence another government or political-military organization to respect U.S. interests or to enforce international law." Doctrinally, shows of force and demonstrations include all forward deployments of forces, combined training exercises, aircraft and ship visits, and the introduction or build-up of military forces in a region.

Forward deployment of forces and Introduction or build-up of military forces in a region

The definitional line between forward deployment of forces and the introduction or buildup of forces is easily blurred. One could successfully argue that Desert Shield be categorized as either form of peacetime contingency operation. The objectives are the same. Ground forces, air forces, naval forces or some combination may be employed. Each has its advantages.
Bleichman and Kaplan studied 215 incidents between 1946 and 1975 in which the US employed armed forces for political purposes. The analyses showed that for strategically employed land and sea forces, more frequently associated with positive outcomes than were air forces which can be withdrawn almost as easily as they can be moved to the disturbed area. The movement of land-based forces, on the other hand, involves both real economic costs and a certain psychological commitment that are difficult to reverse, at least in the short term.27

Lasswell ably argued that presence is still a viable naval mission and will continue to be so.28 "Gunboat diplomacy", though wielded more subtly than in Teddy Roosevelt's day, continues to have a role. In fact, Lasswell makes a good case for the Navy to be the arm of choice in a time of constrained resources.

Training exercises

Joint and/or combined ground forces training exercises such as REFORGER in Europe and BRIGHT STAR in Egypt present excellent opportunities to strengthen alliances and to exercise and demonstrate our collective security capabilities in many regions of the world. The "deterrent" value of these exercises is much greater in regions where there is no permanent US presence of any significant size such as Central Africa or Southwest Asia.

Unfortunately, such exercises are expensive and likely to be less frequent during a period of austere defense budgets. Exercises in densely populated, industrialized nations (i.e., REFORGER) are also less popular in the HN than they were five years ago or even last year before the Berlin Wall came tumbling down.
Air and sea exercises have training value for the forces involved, but much less visibility. They present a greater PSYOP challenge to target the addoppositeaudience. Certain specialized naval operations such as 'freedom of navigation' exercises are designed to send a very specific message - the limits of ones territorial waters.

Aircraft and ship visits

A relatively recent example occurred in 1986. "The World War II, newly refurbished U.S.S. Missouri paid highly publicized port calls in Turkey to commemorate its visit in 1946 and to underscore 40 years of U.S.-Turkish friendship. Other, perhaps less well publicized, events occur almost daily.

Aircraft and ship visits are merely variations of the gunboat diplomacy theme. "Naval forces can be used more subtly to support foreign policy initiatives -- to underscore threats, warnings, promises, or commitments -- than can land-based units, and they can do so without inalterably tying the President's hand." Referring back to Blechman and Kaplan's study of 215 incidents, "positive outcomes were particularly frequent when land-based combat aircraft were involved in an incident. This would suggest... that the Air Force might be used more frequently in political-military operations than has been the case in the past."
Rescue and recovery operations

Rescue and recovery operations usually involve special units in the rescue of friendly national personnel or the recovery of sensitive equipment or items critical to US national security. Operation Urgent Fury conducted in Grenada, ostensibly to rescue US students, could be argued as a recent example of a rescue and recovery operation.

The principal difference between this and NEO is that NEO normally involves a cooperative MN while rescue and recovery normally (but not always) involves a hostile country. The differences are inconsequential. The important point is that each permits the demonstration of a capability to rapidly insert significant, if not overwhelming, combat power, accomplish a mission, and withdraw. A capability that should bolster our friends and prove a bane to any potential adversaries.

Peacemaking operations

Peacemaking operations are intended "to stop a violent conflict and to force a return to political and diplomatic methods." One of the rare US peacemaking operations occurred in 1988, Operation Golden Pheasant, when a US composite brigade intervened in Honduras at the request of the Honduran government.

Peacemaking may be construed as a form of intervention, but "interdependence" that marks our future infers a certain amount of intervention. Intervention in general and specifically peacemaking are rather more likely in the future than less likely. The key is once more the rapid projection of power, quick, effective mission execution, and a speedy withdrawal or hand-off to a peacekeeping force.
Peacekeeping operations tend to be highly visible and relatively economical, a high payoff operation.

**Strikes and raids**

A strike is "an attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective." A raid is "an operation, usually small in scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission."

Operation Just Cause (Panama, 1989) could be argued as an example of this type of activity. Special purpose forces, general purpose forces or a combination of both, as in Just Cause, may be used.

Such operations can be as visible as desired, and forces can be tailored to the objective and the circumstances, true cost-effectiveness.

**Security assistance surges**

Doctrinally, a security assistance surge is still security assistance which I addressed as one of the less direct forms of forward presence. A surge is essentially an acceleration of assistance when an ally is in imminent danger or need. FM 100-23/AFP 3-20 illustrates this point with two historical examples, Chad in the early 1980s and Israel in 1973. A much more current example was just effected in El Salvador where six UH-1M gunships and three A-7 aircraft were delivered in January 1991, less than 60 days from the time the requirement was identified.
While the airlift to Israel was probably the most dramatic and the most costly (i.e., it took five tons of fuel to air deliver one ton of ammo), the message in each instance was clear - the US supports its friends "regardless of the cost". The US can be a good friend and a bad enemy. The visibility and the level of support can also be "tailored" for a surge.

Peacekeeping operations (PKO)

Peacekeeping is not defined in JCS Pub 1-02, but FM 100-20, AFF 3-50 describes it as "military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution." Peacekeeping operations (PKO) may include such operations as withdrawal and disengagement, cease-fire, prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange, arms control, and demilitarization and demobilization.

The definition used by the International Peace Academy better captures the international or UN flavor of PKO. "Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace." 36

Colonel David J. Lofgren, AWC '90, makes a strong case for the increasing importance of PKO in a decentralized, multipolar world and for the US assumption of a greater role, even a leadership role, in UN peacekeeping. 36 Although he stops short of proposing US special units for peacekeeping during a period of constrained defense resources, Lofgren does support contingency plans and tailored forces for those contingencies within the context of UN
responsibility. Lofgren even sees this as a means to gain international support (and thereby legitimacy) for other US operations (i.e., forms of presence) such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

While the US has contributed personnel to only two UN peacekeeping efforts, we have participated in at least five unilateral or multinational peacekeeping efforts. An example of the fuzzy definitional lines of LIC doctrine is the 1983 invasion of Grenada which Lofgren successfully argues was a PKO. I argued earlier that Grenada was a good example of a rescue operation. Perhaps it was both. In any event, there are valid arguments for US participation in and perhaps leadership of UN (and perhaps other then UN) PKO.

PKO are highly visible and relatively economical in that operational costs are normally shared among a multinational force. The forces projected are a credible deterrent to disruption of the peace. There is considerable evidence and argument that PKO will become even more necessary in the future. PKO satisfies the criteria for consideration as a future form of forward presence.

**Military-to-military contacts**

Military-to-military contacts between US and friendly or allied forces occur on a daily basis and may be our most underrated form of forward presence. Any contact between military personnel, official, semi-official or social, qualifies as a military-to-military contact. Most of us regard these contacts as merely part of doing business in a larger context such as NATO and overlook the potential of these contacts.

William L. Carwile successfully argues that the WESTCOM Expanded Relations Program (ERP), an organized, focused application of military-to-military contacts, is an effective model of forward presence in an economy of force AOR.
with significant potential for the future. The ERF has grown to routinized interactions between WESTCOM and more than 70 countries that include staff visits, senior officer visits, conferences, seminars, and small staff exercises. Some of these contacts have grown into other forms of forward presence such as reciprocal individual and small unit training (i.e., less than battalion size) and major joint and combined training exercises such as the annual Tiger Balm (Singapore and New Zealand) and Cobra Gold (Thailand) exercises.

While Carwile described the Army program in the Pacific, the principles can be applied by all services. Carwile argued that the program effectively maintained the Army's influence (credibility) and visibility in an economy of force theater, an extremely cost effective form of forward presence. Since the entire OCONUS world will become, in effect, an economy of force theater during a period of austere defense budgets, the value of such a program in the future cannot be overemphasized.

Counterterrorism (CT)

Counterterrorism is "offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism." The US bombing raid on Libya may arguably be our best known and most effective counterterrorism effort. It was rapid; it was proportionate; it displayed US combat power, precisely applied, to the world at large and specifically to the terrorist world; and thus it was cost-effective.

In the multipolar, decentralized world of the future, regional conflict is more likely than general war, and terrorism is more likely than regional conflict and will certainly accompany regional conflict. Terrorism is a fact in our future. We should accept, plan for, and welcome the opportunities to
precisely apply military power "to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism" in the future.

Counter-terrorism satisfies all of the criteria for consideration as a future form of forward presence, visibility, credibility, and cost-effectiveness. The quality of our intelligence will determine how effectively we can use it.

Space Control Forces

Since the days of the Soviet Sputnik and President John F. Kennedy's identification of space as a vital US interest, there followed an amazing 30 years of a space race to occupy what has been termed the "ultimate high ground." To date, the principal players in space have been the US and the USSR, but other nations are gaining fast. A commercial European consortium is already offering to place satellites in orbit for anyone with the right price.

Both the US and the USSR have systems or forces deployed in space. US systems consist of communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, weather, environmental mapping, and navigation/positioning. In addition to all of these, the USSR has an offensive anti-satellite capability. Space is becoming quite crowded and just as important to the next war as the air, sea and land components.

That we have significant space capabilities is just as important to our friends and allies as it is to our potential adversaries. It is important for deterrence that potential adversaries be aware that certain capabilities exist. It is no longer classified that satellites can read license plates on automobiles from an altitude of 22,000 feet or by extension that a CINC can see deep into a potential adversary's rear area. The open discussion of the
Space Defense Initiative (SDI) was enough to send the Soviets scurrying to the arms control negotiating table.

The importance attached to space by DOD was highlighted by the creation of the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), a unified command, which has already published its doctrine for space control forces. The details of USSPACECOMF 2-1 space control doctrine are less critical to this study than the fact that space control forces are recognized as terrestrial force enhancers and that they will only become more critical in the future.

Space control forces are terribly expensive, but their information acquisition and handling capabilities are worth the price. The systems in use represent a proven, credible capability. They are also readily "visible" to any agency with even a rudimentary scientific capability.

Space will only grow in importance in the coming century. The military systems we place there will be just as effective a forward presence as the ground, sea and air forces we forward base.

**Forward Based Forces**

"Hence the location of forces abroad can sometimes support a nation's policies more directly and effectively than can a force of equal capability which is kept at home, even when provisions are made to move the latter force quickly and effectively when needed. The key is that when the force is not located in the region of concern, the deploying nation has greater flexibility in identifying those events requiring force, and thus its commitments are perceived as somewhat less certain."

40
The strength and structure of US forward based forces will probably be the most hotly debated defense issue in the 1990s, eclipsing even the debate of the structure of the Total Army. That the Department of Defense (DOD) will be required to reduce forces and facilities is not at issue, only how much and how soon.

As of the end of FY89, DOD operated 504 OCONUS military installations. The Army was operating 212 installations in Germany alone.42 The reported 30 September 1987 combined US presence (military, civilians, and dependents) in NATO was a staggering 765,917 slightly more than 75% of which (577,097) was in West Germany (including West Berlin).43

Significant reductions have been proposed for Europe and elsewhere. As I mentioned earlier, some have suggested that all US forces will leave central Europe by 1995. I do not share that view. Possibly lacking a consensus, there is still strong support for a continuing NATO and a continuing US presence in NATO.44

The greatest commitment the US can make to a collective security arrangement is the deployment of permanently based forces to the region to be defended. The very permanence of the facilities lends credibility as well as visibility to the forces and to the nation's commitment. Once so emplaced, forward based forces are not easily withdrawn, nor can they be blooded without the possibility of invoking the full wrath or commitment of the nation to that region. For these reasons, military, political and psychological. I believe that we will continue to have US forces in every AOR that we now have forces based, only in reduced strength.

Forward based forces may not be the most cost-effective form of forward presence, but it is effective. Was it not effective in maintaining over 40 years of peace in central Europe? Has it not maintained the (somewhat uneasy
at times, peace on the Korean peninsula for more than 50 years? Does any other form of forward presence have the credibility or convey the depth of commitment of forward-based forces? I think not. Its cost is high, but its effectiveness is proven.

Forward-based forces will be necessary into the next century. In fact, as the size of the deployed forces decrease, we may see an increase in the scope of their employment – greater numbers of smaller forces to help stabilize a decentralized world.

Prepositioned Forces

Prepositioning, a critical element of US NATO strategy for three decades, will continue to be an important element of military strategy with even broader application well into the next century. Although it has some significant disadvantages, prepositioning, both land- and sea-based, may be the second most cost-effective element of military strategy in an uncertain future.

Traditionally, prepositioning is portrayed as the third leg of the strategic mobility triad complementing strategic airlift and strategic sealift. However, prepositioning is not an exciting subject. The Army’s FY 91 budget estimate only mentions the word twice, once in a figure depicting the "Mobility Triad" and once in a sentence in which prepositioning is not even the subject. More space is devoted to the Army’s support of other Service programs such as the C-17 and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Even the Army’s pronouncement of strategic imperatives devotes more space to the airlift and sealift component shortfalls than to prepositioning.
To cope with these critical strategic mobility shortfalls, the US developed a land-based prepositioning strategy for Europe and a sea-based prepositioning strategy for other worldwide contingencies.

**Land-based prepositioning**

The concept of prepositioning in support of NATO was the subject of at least four early RAND studies, 1958, 1963, 1964, and 1966. Although the specifics of these reports may be somewhat dated, the general observations and conclusions about shortfalls in strategic airlift and sealift and the viability of prepositioning are as valid today as they were then. There was and is no way to provide the "ten divisions in ten days" committed to NATO without prepositioning.

The bulk of the prepositioned materiel in Europe is stored in prepositioned materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS). Technically, "POMCUS is MTOE (Modified Tables of Equipment) and other equipment and supplies stored in unit sets, which are prepositioned in a potential combat theater to reduce response time in the event of deployment." The items found in POMCUS are normally "key wartime materiel, ERC A (Equipment Readiness Code A) items, and weight intensive items." The specific items in POMCUS are based on the M+10 (Mobilization plus ten days) Essential Force and approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The POMCUS assets are actually part of the War Reserve Materiel Requirement (WRMR) portion of the budget and specifically authorized in the annual Defense Guidance which dictates what portion of the WRMR will be prepositioned.
The first two divisions of equipment were placed in POMCUS in 1981 following the Berlin crisis. Prior to redistributions to support Desert Storm, it held the equipment for six divisions, an armored cavalry regiment, mobilization Day (M-Day) shortfall, and supporting combat service support units in special POMCUS sites in Europe. The "...800,000 pieces of equipment valued at $6 billion..." were maintained and constantly modernized by the four battalions and 17 companies of the Combat Equipment Group, Europe (CEGE).

Most "Cold War" scenarios envisioned flying the units' soldiers and light and/or special equipment from CONUS, marrying them up with their heavy equipment on the ground, and moving them out to their general deployment positions (GDP) along the Inter-German Border (IGB). POMCUS "...combines the key elements of rapid strategic reinforcement/force readiness, CONUS transportation, intertheater movement, theater reception facilities, an intratheater transportation system, and...meet time-phased force deployment requirements." The strategic lift advantages to prepositioning and POMCUS are obvious. According to National Security Council estimates, a single mechanized division weighs in at 100,000 short tons, a very conservative estimate. Since that same mechanized division can be expected to consume about 1,000 short tons of supplies and ammunition per day in combat, every such division prepositioned frees strategic lift to deliver 100 days of supply or follow-on forces.

As its detractors are quick to point out, the disadvantages of prepositioning are just as obvious: a caretaker force and expensive facilities are required; large, fixed sites are vulnerable to sabotage and "preemptive" or early conventional, nuclear and chemical attack; and such sites represent a relatively inflexible position, a long-term commitment both politically and militarily. I see some of these "disadvantages" as "strengths."
The current validity of land-based prepositioning which had its genesis three decades ago could be debated here endlessly. Perhaps the most compelling argument for the concept is that in 1990 the Marine Corps completed the execution of a land-based prepositioning strategy in central Norway in support of a 1981 bilateral agreement between Norway and the US. The supplies and equipment for a fully equipped, modern Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB) are now in place to help defend NATO's north flank. Apparently, decision makers were convinced that, in this case, the benefits outweighed the costs.

It is difficult to imagine a more visible, physical evidence of our commitment to an alliance in a given theater than forward-based forces backed by a strong FOMCUS such as we have in NATO. Would our commitment, our national resolve, to support that alliance be perceived by our allies and our potential adversaries to be as strong if there were no FOMCUS even if we had sufficient strategic lift capability? I think not.

The US made a significant political, economic, and military investment in NATO, and the FOMCUS in Central Europe and Norway are tangible proof of that commitment. (Although my discussion has focused on the large, existing FOMCUS investment in NATO, it is not unreasonable to speculate that if the US made a similar commitment to Southwest Asia (SWA) a HN may absorb all or part of the facilities and materiel costs associated with that commitment.)

**Sea-based prepositioning**

Sea-based prepositioning, or maritime prepositioning as the Navy prefers to term it, had its genesis in the mid-1960s. Considering our preoccupation with the Vietnam conflict, it is understandable that no serious feasibility study of maritime prepositioning was conducted until 1979. Yet, as early as 1974, a
USAWC student thesis proposed a Seamobile Air Cavalry for strategic force
projection in the 1980s.\footnote{1}

The sea-based concept was proven workable by the Near Term Prepositioning
Force (NTPF) which was stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean in the
mid-1980s. Heavy equipment and supplies to support Air Force and Army elements
as well as a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) were loaded (sea-based) on
Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships of the NTPF.

The initial success of the NTPF concept has evolved into today’s force of
thirteen ships distributed among three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MFS),
each of which carries all of the supplies and equipment necessary to field a
16,500-person force of marines and sailors for approximately 30 days.\footnote{2} Each
MFS carries approximately 53 tanks and 109 assault amphibious tracked vehicles
(amtracs).\footnote{3}

The employment scenario for the sea-based prepositioned force is
essentially the same as for land-based. The personnel and aircraft for the MEB
are air landed and/or flown in to a secure site and married up with the
material. The principal differences between MFS and POMCUS are intuitively
obvious. The MFS force is lighter, mobile, and applicable to a wide range of
contingencies. MFS allows us to tailor a conventional response to the threat
or provocation in an infinite number of scenarios. It is not necessary to
compare and contrast MFS and POMCUS to select a "winner", both are needed now
and both will become even more critical in an uncertain future.

Sea-based prepositioning may have reached its economic, operational, and
tactical limits based on its very nature. MFS forces are still relatively
light (e.g., one armored battalion has more tanks than an MFS MAB); they are
now manned by Marines whose numbers are limited; ships are expensive to
acquire, man and operate; and any expansion of their capabilities would
probably lead to more debate on roles and missions of the Marine Corps and the Army. The Army leadership may want a piece of the MPS action.

Positioning may not be the "big gun" of strategic deterrence, but it does play a significant role. Assets generated by the Army "build-down" and the end of the Cold War may have created some unique opportunities for land-based and sea-based prepositioning in the future.

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3 Ibid., p. 275.
4 Ibid., p. 67.
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14 "International Relationships," Defense 90, p. 44.
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16 Ibid., p. 236.
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23 FM 100-20/AFP J-20, p. 5-7.

24 JCS Pub 1-02, p. 324 and 75.

25 FM 100-20/AFP J-20, p. 5-1.

26 Ibid., p. 5-6.

27 Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War, p. 527.


30 Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, pp. 529-530.

31 FM 100-20/AFP J-20, p. 5-9.

32 Ibid., p. 5-11.

33 Ibid., p. 351 and 301.

34 FM 100-20/AFP J-20, p. 4-1.


36 Lofgren, Peacekeeping and the Army, p. 47.
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59 Arthur T. Estrada, COL, Space Support for the CINC, p. 3.

60 Department of Defense, U.S. Space Command, USSPACECOM Pamphlet 1-1 (hereafter referred to as USSPACECOM 1-1).

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62 Defense, pp. 51-52.


68 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 710-1, paragraphs 6-42b, 6-42a(1), and 6-42a (hereafter referred to as AR 710-1).

69 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 11-11.


71 "Combat Equipment Group, U.S. Army Europe," 1990 Ordnance Yearbook. Although this article was submitted and accepted for publication, the yearbook was not published in 1990 due to financial difficulties. The article will probably be published in a future edition of Ordnance.

72 AR 710-1, para. 6-42b.


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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

As we move into a more decentralized, multipolar world, it becomes increasingly clear that forward presence is the key to the four continuing military components of America's grand strategy: deterrence, strong alliances, forward defense and force projection. Each of the current forms of forward presence surveyed can be useful through the 1990s and into the following century, and each can contribute to one or more of the military strategy components.

If there are any guiding principles to be followed in the use of the various forms of forward presence in an uncertain future, those principles are focus and balance. Focus on the objective and the target audience, and apply a balanced solution. PSYOP or perception management must be thoroughly integrated into each activity to ensure the targeted audience receives the intended message and that every effort generates the maximum benefit.

Humanitarian activities and peacetime contingency operations are generally short term or event driven forms of forward presence. Each of these operations has a role to play. The US will continue to support humanitarian operations because it is a genuinely caring nation. Peacetime contingencies will continue to be a necessary part of the CINC's repertoire of regional plans.

The challenge for the US military strategist is to develop a balanced, long term program using the longer term activities such as nation building, peacekeeping, military-to-military contacts, counterterrorism, space control forces, forward based forces, and prepositioning. Nation building activities combined with military-to-military contacts accommodate the shift from an
east-west to a north-south focus and offer the greatest potential for
strengthened alliances with our current and future third world friends and
allies.

Counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations should build an international
constituency in the future, while space forces have a "universal" application.
Forward based and prepositioned forces have been associated more with our
east-west focus in the past, but it is now time to balance our forces with our
commitments in the current OCONUS AORs.

Just as food for thought, consider the following alternative forward
presence scenarios in some relatively well-known AORs.

NATO

Several senior leaders visiting the U.S. Army War College have suggested
that a likely post-CFE US force structure is a two-division corps. As a
minimum, two heavy divisions and numerous smaller elements would be withdrawn
from Europe. Consider a possible alternative.

Consider a force of two Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR), a skeletal corps
headquarters, a tailored corps support command (COSCOM) and a POMCUS containing
materiel for two to four heavy divisions, another ACR, the remainder of the
COSCOM, corps artillery, special troops and Air Force support equipment. Would
this not accomplish all of our political, military and economic objectives in
NATO?

(1) The active force is small (i.e., less than the size of one
division), lethal, task organized by design and doctrine (i.e., with organic
artillery), and as "visible" as we want it to be. (Similarly organized
separate heavy brigades (armor or mechanized) could be substituted for the ACRs.

1. The force is capable of only limited offensive operations without support (non-threatening), yet it can defend, and, most importantly, delay if necessary while the remainder of the corps is airlanded on its equipment.

2. The U.S. military presence or profile is drastically reduced.

3. The FOMCUS is reduced from current levels, but not drastically.

4. The defense burden is shifted onto the European alliance partners who may even be persuaded to pay a larger proportion of our much reduced defense costs in Europe (i.e., host nation support).

5. The FOMCUS is tangible evidence of our commitment to support the alliance without flaunting American military power. It can even be tailored (i.e., reduced or increased) to the perception of the threat or desired perception of commitment.

Southwest Asia

Several opportunities await us in Southwest Asia. Assuming that the Kuwaiti government is restored along with something close to normal relations in the region, what level of continuing US presence would be tolerated in that region and where? Consider a separate armored brigade and a FOMCUS with the materiel for two heavy divisions and associated combat support and combat service support elements. Would such a force be both sufficient and politically acceptable?

1. Based on the European FOMCUS model, one combat equipment company can support stored materiel for approximately a brigade (+) with only about 20 US personnel and the remainder of the unit comprised of local nationals.
results in a lower US profile and an employment opportunity in whatever region a site is located.

As in NATO, the POMCUS would be tangible evidence of our resolve to maintain stability in the region as well as access to valuable resources for us and our allies.

If found to be politically acceptable and advantageous, one or more oil-rich nations may underwrite most if not all capital expenditures for facilities and operations as "host nation support costs."

Dr. Vogelahr, a Columbia University professor of Theology, and an old Middle East "hand" with 23 years experience in the region, has opined that there may not be as much Arab resistance to a continued US presence as many have predicted. True, during the holy days in June of each year, any "infidel" forces "might" be required to maintain an extra-low profile, but reasonable prudence and caution would allow a relatively compact, disciplined force to remain indefinitely.

A separate armor brigade is a relatively compact, lethal, self-contained force capable of only limited offensive operations without support but very capable to defend, delay, and more importantly in this scenario, defend POMCUS sites if necessary. (As in the NATO scenario, an ACR could be substituted.)

NATO Southern Flank

If Saudi Arabia is deemed too politically sensitive or Kuwait too unstable or too close to the Iraq border, there are other options. Consider for a moment the implications of an armor brigade and POMCUS site(s) in Turkey astride the Iraq pipeline or within striking distance of the borders of Iraq,
Iran and the USSR. What of our existing facilities and more solid relations in Iran? Egypt may even consider becoming a partner in such a venture.

Korea

We could apply the above NATO scenario equally well to Korea and perhaps even Japan. An ACR (armored cavalry regiment), a proportionately sized air force, and an appropriately sized POMCUS could satisfy our objectives there for the same reasons. A FOMCUS-only or FOMCUS plus Air Force approach might be appropriate for Japan if it were to become a military partner instead of a dependent. Anything is possible.

Prescription for the Future

There is no single military instrument that will satisfy every threat, contingency or strategic objective. A balanced mix of forces and strategies is required to meet the future, and all of the necessary tools are available today. The creative military strategist who can strike the proper balance of nation building and alliance strengthening instruments of military power will contribute immeasurably to the stability of the future.

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