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THE INDIAN WARS AND AMERICAN MILITARY THOUGHT
1865-1890

BY

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AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The period 1865-1890 represents the final years of Indian warfare conducted by the United States Army. The Army fought over 900 separate engagements during these years against foes who used unconventional tactics. Although this was a significant period in its history, the Army did not develop or record a useful unconventional war doctrine. This study explores several significant reasons the Army continued its emphasis on a philosophy of total, conventional war. The increased isolation of the Army after the Civil War caused its leaders to realize that a new mission was required to insure its survival as an institution. Most importantly, this realization, combined with the transient and minor nature of the Indian threat and the emergence of a trend towards professionalism in society, led the Army to see its future as a force dedicated to modern, conventional war.
INTRODUCTION

We’re marching off for Sitting Bull
And this is the way we go--
Forty miles a day, on beans and hay.
With the Regular Army, O!

This verse from an old marching tune recalls perhaps the most romantic period of the United States Army, the Indian wars of 1865 to 1890. This era is certainly familiar to most Americans thanks to the countless novels, television programs, and movies telling of the Army’s battles with various tribes of the West. The popular images of campaigns against the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Apaches are of a small, professional Army meeting an unconventional enemy on his own terms and defeating him. The casual student of this chapter of history often supposes that the Army developed a doctrine of war specifically tailored to the mobile hit-and-run tactics employed by the Indians.

Unfortunately, the romantic view created by movies and novels is only partially true. Engagements with hostile Indians were rare enough and rarer still was one that was an unqualified victory for the Army. Even rarer yet were examples of Army units fighting Indians with unconventional techniques. Instead, as noted by Robert Utley, "the Army as an institution never evolved a doctrine of Indian warfare." No course of instruction to distinguish between
conventional and unconventional warfare was ever instituted at West Point, nor
did the staff bureaus ever issue guidance to deal with the guerrilla tactics of the
Indians. Utley concluded that "lacking a formal doctrine of unconventional
war, the Army waged conventional war."^2

This unconcern with doctrine for fighting Indians is remarkable.
Throughout most of the Army's history, its major occupation was dealing with
Indians. In fact, this mission often was the only justification Congress and the
American people saw for the continued existence of the Army.

What explains the Army's neglect of unconventional warfare doctrine?
Several factors contributed to this phenomenon. The Army of 1865-1890 was
an organization which became increasingly isolated from the society it served
during the post-Civil War period. Army leaders recognized that the Indian
threat would sooner or later end and the Army's traditional internal security
mission would end with it. Therefore, the Army sought to define a new role
for itself in the closing decades of the 19th century.

Influencing and defining this search for a continuing relevance in society
was the Army's own history, contemporary political and social trends, and the
belief that the United States would become a major force in the international
community. In combination, these factors led the Army to reject its previous
view of itself as a largely constabulary force and to see its future as a

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professional force oriented on external threats. These foreign threats, while not clearly defined, would certainly be conventional military forces on the pattern of leading European armies. Thus unconventional war and doctrine, such as that typified by Indian campaigns, was viewed as irrelevant and not worth pursuing.

**ISOLATION OF THE ARMY**

The most important factor leading to the rejection of unconventional doctrine as a subject of importance to the Army was its increasing isolation from American society. John M. Gates and other scholars reject the concept of isolation.³ Other scholars view the isolation of the frontier Army as a "prerequisite to professionalism."⁴ Regardless, the officers stationed on the frontier believed they were isolated, and it is a crucial concept to understand their resulting neglect of unconventional warfare. At times this alienation was seen as a threat to the continued existence of the Army. Therefore, civilian ambivalence and, at times, hostility was the catalyst which drove the Army to such a redefinition of its role. This isolation was itself the product of various causes.

The first and perhaps most pervasive cause was the traditional American belief that a large standing military was a threat to a democratic society. Samuel Adams summarized this American suspicion of standing armies in
general by saying that a "standing army, however necessary it may be at sometimes, is always dangerous to the liberties of the people." He further noted:

Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of the citizens. They have their arms always in their hands. Their rules and discipline is severe. They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to yield implicit obedience to their commands. Such a power should be watched with a jealous eye.5

The nation's response to this belief in the danger of a standing army has always been to have the smallest Regular Army possible in peacetime. This tiny regular force would be augmented in an emergency with state militias and volunteer troops. Paradoxically, the success of the Union Army in the Civil War reinforced both the fear of a large peacetime Army and the belief in the utility of the militia system. Between 1865 and 1890 Congress often acted on this principle of American democracy and sought to limit the size of the Regular Army. In doing so, Congress came to be viewed by the Army as an enemy.

The first post-Civil War act establishing the peacetime strength of the Army was signed by President Andrew Johnson in July 1866. This act set the strength of the Army at 54,302 officers and men.6 However, Congress shortly began to cut the strength of the regular force. In 1869 the number of infantry
regiments was reduced from 45 to 25, effectively reducing the Army to a total strength of 37,313. The next year Congress further reduced the Army to a total of 30,000 enlisted and in 1874 it limited the enlisted force to no more than 25,000.  

These reductions did not lower the number of companies in the force structure, so company strength was reduced dramatically. For example, in 1881 the average infantry company strength was 41, that of artillery batteries was 40, and of cavalry troops was 58. This drastically curtailed strength was extremely detrimental to unit efficiency and its ill effects were compounded by the usual absences due to desertion, illness, and detached duty.

The Army leadership viewed this long-term trend with alarm. They saw that the Army was overcommitted and in danger of being unable to perform its missions. Further, they feared that continued reductions could eventually threaten the organization's existence. Reviewing the cumulative effects of these reductions in his annual report of 1880, General William T. Sherman noted that "the Army is too small in enlisted men to fulfill the heavy duties now imposed on it, and is overworked." Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, commander of the Division of the Missouri, felt compelled to add to his superior's remarks in his own annual report for 1880. He stressed the danger of inadequate strength:
To thoroughly and effectively perform the duties devolving upon us compels us many times to overwork our troops, and not unfrequently obliges us to take the field with small detachments, which have heretofore occasionally been overmatched and greatly outnumbered by our foes. This is not as it should be; but so long as our companies are limited to their (low) average strength, ... it cannot be avoided.

To remedy this situation, the Army leadership made numerous appeals to Congress for increases in the size of the force. Typical of these appeals was that of Sherman in 1880 when he asked for a net increase of 5,000 men. Congress's usual response was to ignore these requests. In fact, by 1885 the overall strength of the Army was allowed to decrease by 969 men to a total of 26,859.

Appropriations are another example of Congressional neglect and hostility to the Army. In 1877 and 1879 Congress failed to pass an appropriations bill. The effect of these failures was that the pay of soldiers stopped. Although rations and clothing issues to enlisted men continued, officers and married soldiers faced severe hardship until Congress passed emergency funding measures. This action certainly did not convince soldiers and officers that the Army was a promising career or that Congress was sympathetic towards the military.

The traditional concern about the threat of a standing army to liberty was not the only source of Congressional hostility. In the early years following the
Civil War, much of the Army was assigned to duties in the South enforcing Reconstruction. In this role the Army became involved in political power struggles first between the executive and legislative branches and later between the Republican and Democratic parties.

The Army's problems in Reconstruction were essentially unsolvable. Initially, the Army was compelled to follow the more moderate policies of President Andrew Johnson. However, Radical Reconstructionists in Congress soon began to gain the political ascendancy. Grant, first as Commanding General and later as President, moved the Army into the Radical Reconstruction camp.

Most Army officers disagreed with the harsh policies of the radicals. Many expressed the view that the radical approach was self-defeating because it would only provoke Southerners rather than speed their reassimilation into the Union. Sherman best expressed this view in a letter to his brother in 1865:

> No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people . . . we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we afford to maintain . . . an army large enough to hold them in subjugation.\(^\text{14}\)

Another widely held view was that the demands of Radical Reconstructionism were counter to the constitutional provisions mandating civil control of the military. In a public statement rebuking a subordinate who had
stated that civil government in the South was subservient to the military, the Commander of the Fourth Military District of Arkansas said

Your assertion that the military forces are not the servants of the people of Arkansas, but rather their masters, is unjust both to the people and the military... The military forces are the servants of the laws and the laws are for the benefit of the people.15

Expressing a similar viewpoint was Winfield Scott Hancock. In a letter to his wife he explained his reluctance to assume Reconstruction duties in New Orleans by stating, "I have not been educated to overthrow the civil authorities in time of peace."16

Lenient views such as these neither pleased Radical Reconstructionists nor escaped their notice. The result of this displeasure was that Congressional Radicals disbanded regiments no longer needed for Reconstruction rather than posting them to the frontier. By these acts, the Radical Republicans demonstrated that the Army could expect no sympathy.17

On the other hand, Southerners were generally hostile to the Army. In some cases, local Federal commanders did support harsh Reconstruction. For example, Sheridan saw fit to fire the mayor of New Orleans, the governors of Louisiana and Texas, and numerous other Southern officials during his tenure in the South.18 Southerners also violently objected to the Army enforcing the new laws regarding black suffrage and civil rights. In any case, Southerners
clearly saw that without the Army, Reconstruction would be finished. Their natural desire for self-determination guaranteed their hostility to the Army.

In 1875, Democrats won majority control of the House of Representatives. This began the return of Southerners to national power. Allying with Northern Democrats, they began to attack the Army, hoping to eliminate it as a means of enforcing Reconstruction. The Southern Democrats supported all attempts to decrease the Army’s size and appropriations. These attacks on the Army continued until the end of Reconstruction in the late 1870’s.¹⁹

Another source of Congressional problems for the Army was its use to suppress strikes and other civil disturbances. The Army was used often outside the South to quell riots and break strikes. For example, in 1885 and 1886 troops were used to suppress anti-Chinese riots in Wyoming and Washington. The Army broke strikes in Michigan in 1872, intervened in the Great Railway Strike of 1877, and was employed in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho in 1892 and 1894. Labor interests were enraged by these actions and they sought political support from Democrats to halt this practice. Labor leaders became the willing allies of Southerners and actively supported the efforts of the House majority to reduce the Army drastically.²⁰
Yet another reason for the Army's isolation was the conflict in civilian society over appropriate Indian policy. One faction was resoundingly pro-Indian and believed that the Army was directly responsible for most Indian hostilities. These groups, known generally as Reformers, were made up largely of liberal Easterners who advocated the gradual, peaceful assimilation of Indians into American society. These groups, the most powerful of which was the Indian Rights Association led by Herbert Welsh, argued that land-hungry Western whites were using the Army to annihilate the Indian. While most of the Reformers' attacks were directed at Western civilians and their supporters in Congress, the Army was the target of many attacks in the media and in Congress. On the other hand, Western civilians often castigated the Army for failing to protect them from Indian raids. Many believed the Army to be incompetent and too sympathetic to the Indian.

For its part, the Army generally held both sides in contempt. Army leaders criticized the Eastern Reformers, generally holding that these groups were ignorant of conditions in the West. General Nelson A. Miles perhaps best summarized the Army view of these humanitarian groups. In a letter to his wife he noted it "required a peculiar kind of genius to conduct an Indian campaign from West Point--or Boston, although they know a great deal about Indians in that model city--at least they think they do, which is very important."
Army contempt for Western extremists was also harsh. Many officers believed Whites were responsible for hostilities because of greed. This view is typified by the writings of Major Alfred Hough who charged that frontiersmen were "wholly unscrupulous." He opined that "it is an outrage that we of the Army who have all the hardships to encounter should be made such catspaws or mere tools of ambitious men who care only for their own interests and cater to the public for sympathy."23

So, the Army sought to walk the middle ground between these two disparate groups. As is the usual fate of those who seek compromise, it found itself assailed by both sides. Being caught between these two factions strengthened professional soldiers' feelings of alienation and, in turn, reinforced their fears for the continuance of their organization.

Another factor contributing to the Army's isolation was the low esteem society had for soldiers and the Army in general. A not uncommon view of soldiers was presented by a reporter in Hays City, Kansas in 1883 who referred to soldiers from the local post as "white trash" and "coons."24 Officers were held in only slightly better regard as evidenced by Congressman Fernando Wood's remark that they were "idle vagabonds who are well paid and do nothing."25
The manifestations of these adverse attitudes ranged from ridicule to open hostility and were plainly evident to soldiers. For example, one regular soldier asked his Congressman for help in getting a pension and was flatly refused. Writing his former commander, he explained the politician had refused to help because he "had worn the uniform of a 'regular'." A more ominous result of civilian antipathy was an incident in Walla Walla, Washington, where a gambler shot and wounded a soldier. Enraged, and fearing that the civilian criminal would escape justice, a group of soldiers seized the man from the sheriff and lynched him in the jail grounds. Undoubtedly, this did little to improve soldiers in the eyes of civilians, but it does illustrate the strained relationships that existed.

The final source of isolation which must be understood was the physical separation of the Army from the population. During most of the post-Civil War era, the Army was posted to numerous small forts on the frontier. Physical isolation contributed to a growing civilian ignorance of the Army and its problems. Illustrating this lack of knowledge brought about by isolation was the reaction of an Eastern woman in 1885. Meeting a colonel, she said, "What, a colonel of the Army? Why I supposed the Army was all disbanded at the close of the [Civil] war."
The psychological and physical separation of the Army was a matter of great concern to the Army's leaders. Major General John Pope addressed the danger of alienation on soldiers' attitudes:

So long as the soldier remains one of the people; so long as he shares their interests, takes part in their progress, and feels a common sympathy with them in their hopes and aspirations, so long will the Army be held in honorable esteem and regard. . . . When he ceases to do this; when officers and soldiers cease to be citizens in the highest and truest sense, the Army will deserve to lose, as it will surely lose, its place in the affections of the people, and properly and naturally become an object of suspicion and dislike. 

Pope went on to note, "the well-being of the people equally with the well-being of the Army requires a common sympathy and common interest between them." Thus, Pope saw isolation as a threat to the bonds between the Army and the society it served. If these bonds were broken, the Army's existence would be threatened. Therefore, for most of the period 1865-1890, the Army's attention was focused on identifying and describing a role which would secure its link to society. Unconventional war against Indians did not offer this sort of mission and therefore was ignored. Indian war did not seem to be a promising role for two reasons.
First, the Indian posed only a minor, regional threat. By 1865 Indians were a danger only in the Great Plains, the Southwest, and the interior portions of the Pacific Northwest. The major population areas in the East and on the West Coast were not in danger. As noted earlier, civilians from these latter areas tended to view the Indian as the threatened party. Therefore, the majority of Americans could not be expected to support the Army in its battles with hostile tribes.

Second, Army leaders believed the Indian threat would soon end. As early as 1866, General Grant foresaw the end of the Indian wars noting, "with the expiration of the rebellion, Indian hostilities have diminished."\(^3\) In 1875, Sherman echoed this view in his annual report saying,

> Generally speaking the damage to life and property by Indians is believed to be less during the past year than in any former year, and the prospect is that as the country settles up it will be less and less each year.\(^3\)

Another significant reason Army officers devoted little effort to developing an unconventional war doctrine was that conventional tactics often worked well. As Robert Utley points out, "the conventional tactics of the Scott, Casey, and Upton manuals sometimes worked . . . [and] when they worked, they worked with a vengeance."\(^3\)
Essentially, the problem with conventional tactics was that the Army simply was not sufficiently mobile to bring the Indians to battle. Time and again, cavalry and infantry would trail hostile bands for weeks but could never get them to stand and fight. An excellent example of this sort of futile campaign was that led by Major General Hancock against the Southern Plains tribes in April 1867. Hancock was in command of a force of approximately 4000 soldiers consisting of 11 troops of the 7th Cavalry, seven companies of the 37th Infantry, and a battery of the 4th Artillery. Initially he attempted to negotiate a peace treaty with a large band of Cheyenne and Oglala Sioux. When these meetings failed, Hancock attacked the villages only to discover the lodges were empty. He immediately gave pursuit and followed the hostiles through Kansas, southwestern Nebraska, and eastern Colorado. In spite of his best efforts, Hancock never caught the Sioux and Cheyenne war parties. Finally, his command exhausted, he was forced to return to his base in Fort Wallace, Kansas, in early July 1867.14

Analyzing this failure, Sherman saw winter warfare as a means to deprive the enemy of mobility. Putting this idea to the test, Brigadier General George Crook began a winter offensive against the Paiutes in Oregon during the winter of 1867-1868. Keeping constant pressure on the enemy, he pursued the hostiles far into the winter months. Since Indian horses were grass fed, the
winter months were exceptionally hard on them because of poor forage. Also, pursuit forced the Indians to move constantly which kept them from hunting or gathering other food supplies. Army horses, on the other hand, were grain fed and could be replaced, if necessary. Also, the wagon trains or strings of pack mules which slowed the Army in the summer allowed them to continue operations in the coldest of winters. Thus, in winter the Army had the advantage of superior mobility. Crook's tactics forced the Paiutes to surrender in the late winter of 1868. This campaign clearly demonstrated that the innovative application of conventional tactics could defeat the Indians.35

Variations on this theme were frequent. Crook altered his own tactics in 1882-1883 in actions against the Apaches in Arizona by using highly mobile Apache Scouts to fix the hostiles. However, he still relied on a constant, dogged pursuit to eventually wear down and defeat the enemy.36

Using essentially the same tactics, Brigadier General Miles finally completed the defeat of the Apaches in 1886. He added a new feature: outposts of signal troops to detect and report enemy movement. In his instructions to his soldiers, he stressed constant pursuit stating, "commanding officers are expected to continue a pursuit until capture, or until they are assured a fresh command is on the trail."37
Praising Miles for his successful campaign, Lieutenant General Sheridan summed up the success of conventional tactics as well when he said Miles’ “troops followed up the hostiles with vigorous energy, broke up their camps by attack four or five times, and gave them no rest until they surrendered.”

Conventional tactics were not always successful. However, they did achieve victory often enough to persuade Army officers that there was little point in devising new doctrine. Utley notes that “unit for unit—however great the numbers—the Indians could not come close to matching the discipline and organization of the Army.” In fact, the real key to military defeat of the Indians was not doctrine, but discipline. Utley concludes that “when Indians made the mistake of standing and fighting on the Army’s terms, they usually lost.”

**THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM**

The final factor which shaped doctrinal thinking was the rise of professionalism. In the view of Edward M. Coffman, professionalism was an emerging trend throughout American society in the last three decades of the 19th century. He argued that society changed because of the emergence of a new middle class in which the professions organized and established standards for themselves. Soldiers became a part of this movement. Further, realizing its days as an Indian-fighting force were numbered, "Sherman and other leaders
had reached the conclusion that the Army's mission in peacetime was to prepare for war."

Since officers were coming to see themselves as professionals dedicated to preparing for future wars, the question then became, what would a modern war be like? In answering this question, leaders looked to their own most recent experience and to those of other modern, 19th century armies. The most relevant American experience was obviously the Civil War. Almost every senior officer during the period 1865-1890 was a veteran of this conflict and many had held high volunteer rank. This war was obviously the shaping event of these men's lives and in the words of Jerry M. Cooper

... affected the officer corps more profoundly than had the Mexican War. The nature of the Civil War, with its enormous logistical demands and costly battlefield stalemate altered the corporate consciousness of a significant element of officers."

The Civil War, as the seminal event of their careers, influenced Army leaders' thinking about both present operations and the nature of future conflicts. In the area of immediate operations against the Indians, it reinforced the tendencies of commanders to apply conventional tactics. The massive scale of Civil War operations and the emergence of a total war philosophy were key features in the minds of Sherman, Sheridan, and their subordinates. Lacking
the resources for massive campaigns against the Indians, they nevertheless practiced total war against the tribes. As noted earlier, their real and perceived success using conventional, total war tactics further reinforced their bias towards this doctrine.\textsuperscript{43}

Its influence on their perceptions of the future also prompted them to emphasize conventional doctrine. The carnage and lengthy stalemate of the Civil War caused them to seek new methods of command and organization to prevent a repetition. Americans believed they found these new methods in examples of foreign armies. Especially significant was the model provided by Prussia in its defeat of the French in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian War.

Major General Sheridan and Colonel William B. Hazen were observers of the Franco-Prussian War. Both were tremendously impressed with the similarity of that war to the American Civil War and with the German military system.\textsuperscript{44} Reporting their observations to Sherman, the Commanding General dispatched his protege, Emory Upton, on a world-wide tour to study foreign armies and methods.

Upton published his results in 1878 in his book \textit{The Armies of Asia and Europe}. In this work, he heavily criticized the American military system and argued strongly for adoption of the German model. Although Congress was unwilling to accept most of Upton's suggestions, Sherman enacted those he
could on his own authority. Most importantly for future doctrine in the American Army was Sherman's attempt to foster professional development. Specifically, Sherman instituted a series of professional schools which could grow to mirror the Prussian Army's educational system.

These efforts began in 1881 with the establishment of the Infantry and Cavalry School of Application at Fort Leavenworth. A logical extension was the requirement for officers to participate in lyceum programs at their posts. These programs were conceived by Major General John Schofield in order to "stimulate professional zeal and ambition."45

In addition to schools, Army leaders encouraged participation in professional organizations such as the Military Service Institute. Other professional organizations were formed, examples of which were associations of cavalry, artillery, and infantry officers. The most significant feature of these organizations was that they all published journals and urged their members to contribute articles.46 In these studies, Army officers' views of themselves as professional soldiers were strengthened.

They began to actively develop new ideas and theories about tactics, logistics, leadership, and the purpose of an army. It was only natural for them to view conventional war on the scale of the Civil War, but as practiced by an army on the European model as the epitome of modern war and
professionalism. Their experiences in unconventional war against savages in the West clearly did not fit this mold. Thus, they tended to ignore Indian-fighting as beneath them as professionals. Clearly, unconventional war would not be relevant in the future and thus study of doctrine peculiar to it would be of little value.

CONCLUSIONS

In the final analysis, the Army turned its back on its unconventional war history mainly because it felt itself threatened as an institution. The conclusion of the Civil War unleashed the anti-military sentiment always close to the surface in American society. The fact that the North had won a brilliant victory with a volunteer army in the greatest war of American history only exacerbated the suspicions towards the Regular Army. To civilians it clearly seems the Regular Army was not essential to fighting great wars. Further, it did not seem as if there was any threat of a great war now that the South was defeated.

The only clear roles for the Army now lay in enforcing Reconstruction, quelling civil disorders and strikes, and campaigning against the Indians. All of those missions were controversial and brought severe political pressure on the Army. Further, both Reconstruction duty and the conduct of Indian wars were missions which would sooner or later end.
The hostility, political pressure, and neglect suffered by the Army caused a sense of psychological isolation to develop within the Army and its leadership began to search for a new mission. At the same time, professionalism became a force in American civilian society. Eagerly assimilating the professional ethic, the Army saw its peacetime role as preparing for war. Leaders adopted European styles of war as the epitome of professional armies and modern wars. Accordingly, the American Army came to emphasize conventional war rather than irregular, unconventional struggles against hostile natives.

But what were the costs of this evolution to conventional war doctrine? Largely, by failing to develop and record a coherent unconventional doctrine, a valuable tradition was lost. Many lessons learned by hardship, trial, and error on the frontier were pushed out of mind. However, the Army soon found itself fighting unconventional war in the Philippine Insurrection. Could that conflict have been won at a lesser cost if officers and soldiers of that time had been trained in unconventional doctrine based on the Army’s Indian-fighting tradition? Further, if unconventional doctrine had been explored in-depth as the Army sought to professionalize itself, could the doctrine have become a part of traditional, respectable study in the American Army? And if unconventional
war was a legitimate area of study for the Army, could more study have helped avoid the errors made in 20th century unconventional war?

On the other hand, the move away from unconventional war held benefits for the Army and the nation. The Army would be engaged in unconventional wars after the close of the frontier. However these wars would not be as vital to the nation as its conventional conflicts. The Spanish-American War accelerated America’s assumption of an important international role. The two world wars continued this process and ultimately solidified the United States as a pre-eminent world power. This might not have been possible had the Army not become a professional organization oriented towards fighting large-scale conventional wars. In conclusion, the words of Russell Weigley provide a useful, provocative summary:

If isolation from the main currents of American life encouraged an unhealthy introspection in such a figure as Emory Epton, it also . . . encouraged the healthy aspects of concentration upon things military. The rapid accomplishments of the early twentieth century in building a new Army suited to world power were built upon foundations laid in the twilight years of the old and isolated Army.
ENDNOTES


7. Ibid., p. 15.

8. Ibid., p. 16.


10. Ibid., p. 53.

11. Ibid., p. 3.


15. Ibid., p. 239.

16. Ibid., p. 239.


20. Coffman, pp. 246-249.


23. Ibid., p. 121.

24. Coffman, p. 401


30. Ibid., p. 270.


32. Secretary of War, *Annual Report (1875)*, p. 34.


35. Wooster, pp. 126-127.


38. Secretary of War, *Annual Report (1886)*, p. 73.


40. Coffman, p. 270.


43. Wooster, p. 213.

44. Coffman, p. 272.


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