"Fighting" at the Lower End:
Applying Operational Art to Security Assistance

A Monograph
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FIGHTING "AT THE LOWER END: APPLYING OPERATIONAL ART TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE (U)"

LTC THOMAS E. MITCHELL, USA

This monograph first examines operational art; exploring the concepts of end state, center of gravity, and culmination point in the design of campaign plans. This is followed by a primer on security assistance. Security assistance is explained through a discussion of its ten component programs and the organization and responsibilities for execution. Next, there is an analysis of the application of operational art to security assistance as an approach to its design and execution. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the applicability of operational art as a method for improving the execution of security assistance.

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Beyond studies have suggested that security assistance is becoming a limited instrument and that it needs to be support if it is to enhance our national security. This monograph offers a conceptual approach to strengthening the design and execution of this program, the application of operational art.
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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Recent studies have suggested that security assistance has become a blunted instrument and that it needs to be sharpened if it is to enhance our national security. This monograph offers a conceptual approach to strengthen the design and execution of this program, the application of operational art.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The winter of 1989-1990 has been a season of profound change. A very bipolar world, with much of the earth's population shackled in communism, is breaking out in freedom as the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are ushering in democracy and an end to the Cold War. While these changes are significant, threats to the security of our nation have not gone away.

The world has become increasingly multipolar and interdependent over the past two decades. Many new threats to our national security have emerged, particularly from the third world. Hostage taking, state supported terrorism, poverty and underdevelopment in emerging nations, religious and ethnic violence, narcotics trafficking, and threats to access and passage are just some of the new challenges in the evolving post-Cold War period. This new era is causing a shift in national security focus to the lower end of the operational continuum (see Figure 1) into the areas of peacetime competition and low-intensity conflict.¹

According to the 1987 edition of The National Security Strategy of the United States, "U.S. Low-intensity Conflict policy...recognizes that indirect -- rather than
direct -- application of U.S. military power is the most appropriate and cost effective way to achieve national goals. The principle military instrument in Low-intensity Conflict, therefore, is security assistance." As Figure 1 shows, the military's role as an instrument of national power in operations short of war is indirect and in support of the other instruments of power. The operational environment, as Figure 1 suggests, will be one of interagency effort and cooperation. Often, this interagency approach to security assistance is lacking.

The Regional Conflict Working Group of the Commission on Long-Term Strategy in its 1988 paper Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World describes security assistance as dysfunctional and a "blunted instrument" of national policy. The working group's paper offers many political, organizational and procedural improvements to reinstate security assistance as a powerful instrument of policy. This monograph offers another concept to strengthen this program, applying operational art to security assistance.

JCS PUB 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, assigns Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) direct and supporting responsibilities for security assistance in their assigned areas of responsibility. JCS PUB 3-0 also states that,
Adapted from an unpublished Army Special Operations Command briefing slide (A/B/003 02/07/90:FW) designed to visually support discussion on the operational continuum as contained in JCS PUB 3-05.

Figure 1
"A CINC plans his campaign for war, and when war comes executes his campaign through the application of operational art." The most likely scenario for military operations for the next decade is in an environment short of war, primarily in the realm of peacetime competition and low-intensity conflict. As we are encouraged by recent events to shift away from the likelihood of war, it is essential that the renewed focus on operational art and campaign planning be expanded for use at the lower end of the operational continuum. Our security assistance efforts, the mainstay of military operations at this end of the continuum, must be derived from a clear strategy, translated into operational direction for subordinates, and executed using operational art to ensure maximum security against the multiple threats and challenges in the years ahead. The application of operational art to security assistance will enable our CINCs to "fight" a better war at the lower end of the continuum.

The theme of this monograph is the compatibility of operational art and security assistance. The thesis of this paper is that the application of operational art will result in a more coherent and rational process for the employment of our national resources in pursuit of our national security strategy. My research question is,
"How can operational art be applied to security assistance?" My criteria will be whether the conceptual application of operational art to security assistance improves its execution in pursuit of our national security objectives.

The following methodology will be used to examine security assistance to make a determination of the applicability of operational art. First, I will examine current doctrine and the key operational concepts of operational art. Second, I will discuss the component programs of security assistance. Third, I will review the organization and responsibilities for security assistance. Fourth, I will analyze the application of operational art to security assistance to determine if the concept provides a framework for improved execution. And finally, I will discuss the implications that result from applying operational art to security assistance.

II. OPERATIONAL ART

The United States Army reintroduced the operational level of war into its doctrine with the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, and it is now appearing in joint doctrine with the latest draft of JCS PUB 3-0. This level
of war, between strategy and tactics, focuses on the use of campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic objectives. Conducting war at this level has produced the umbrella concept that has become known as operational art.

JCS PUB 3-0 defines operational art as, "...the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals...through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations." PUB 3-0 goes on to describe operational art as the process, "that translates strategy into operational and, ultimately tactical action." While no specific level of war is solely concerned with operational art, it tends to overlap from strategy, extend through a range of theater level actions, and then blend into tactics.

As the above implies, a principle practitioner of operational art is a unified commander with an assigned area of responsibility. These CINCs participate in the development of the national military strategy through their regional oriented input. Based on the decided national military strategy, the CINCs then formulate a regional strategy for their theater. To execute their regional strategy, the CINCs design campaigns "to seek theater and national... strategic military objectives through a series of campaigns or major operations."
The campaign plan is the theater master plan that provides broad concepts for achieving strategic goals and is the basis for all other planning done by the CINC's staff and subordinate commands. The campaign plan provides the commander's vision, concept, and intent. It orients on the threat's center of gravity. The campaign plan lays out an orderly schedule of decisions as it seeks to achieve unity of effort. It phases a series of related major operations. The campaign plan creates subordinate forces, establishes command relationships, and provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates. It clearly defines what constitutes success. Finally, and most importantly, the campaign plan synchronizes efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole.

In addition to campaign planning, current doctrine describes several more ideas and concepts that are key to operational design and the understanding and execution of operational art. The first we will look at is the concept of "end state".

While end state is not a doctrinal term, it is an essential concept that evolves from strategy which becomes the basis for campaign development. The end state describes what the strategists want the situation to look like at the conclusion of effort. Clausewitz in his
On War, stated:

No one starts a war -- or rather no one in his senses ought to do so -- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve in that war and how he intends to conduct it.\(^9\)

It is a concept that some have suggested was overlooked or not fully developed in the case of our involvement in Vietnam, Lebanon (in the early 1980s), and more recently in Nicaragua. The result of not defining the end state is that there is no direction for effort, an inefficient use of resources, an inability to define success, and not knowing when you are finished. The operational commander must know what end states are required, along with any political or military constraints or restrictions, in order for him to design his campaign plan(s). All efforts must be directed towards clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable objectives.\(^{10}\)

The next operational concept that is key to campaign design is the concept of "center of gravity". FM 100-5 describes the center of gravity as:

\[\ldots those \ sources \ of \ strength \ or \ balance. \ It \ is \ the \ characteristic, \ capability, \ or \ locality \ from \ which \ the \ force \ derives \ its \ freedom \ of \ action, \ physical \ strength, \ or \ will \ to \ fight. \ Clausewitz \ defined \ it \ as \ "the \ hub \ of \ all \ power \ and \ movement, \ on \ which \ everything \ depends." \ Its \ attack \ is -- \ or \ should \ be \ -- \ the \ focus \ of \ all \ operations.\(^{11}\)\]
While an enemy force, a line of communication, or a physical location such as a logistical base is a typical center of gravity, at the operational and strategic levels of war the center of gravity can take on abstract or intangible qualities such as popular support or moral factors.\(^{12}\)

The concept of center of gravity assists operational commanders in analyzing both the enemy's and their own sources of strength and balance. Once identified, they provide focus, direction, and objective in the design of a campaign plan. A constant evaluation of the center of gravity is necessary as it can change in the course of operations. FM 100-5 sums up this concept by saying, "Identification of the enemy's center of gravity and the design of actions which will ultimately expose it to attack and destruction while protecting your own, are the essence of the operational art."\(^{13}\)

The last concept of operational design we will look at is that of "culmination point". FM 100-5 describes culmination point as:

Unless it is strategically decisive, every offensive operation will sooner or later reach a point where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued offensive operations therefore risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.\(^{14}\)
Operational art on the part of the offensive commander is to achieve the operational objectives before culmination. The defensive commander, on the other hand, must cause the offensive force to culminate before it achieves its operational objectives. While many factors such as physical exhaustion, casualties, overextended lines of communication, moral fatigue, and loss of will can cause culmination, it is difficult, at best, to detect. Like determining and maintaining the center of gravity for operational focus, the operational commander must keep a constant vigil on the pulse of operations to ensure that culmination is not reached when he is on the offensive. Likewise, on the defensive, he must be able to recognize when his opponent has become overextended and about to culminate so he can shift his operations to take advantage of the situation.\textsuperscript{15}

We have completed our look at the key concepts associated with operational art. We will now shift our focus to security assistance. The next section is designed as a basic primer on security assistance and will be used as the basis for applying the concepts of operational art later in the monograph.
III. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

"Security Assistance serves a number of purposes: it helps allies and friendly countries to defend themselves and to deter threats of outside interference; it gives us influence to help mediate conflicts; it helps sustain our access to valuable bases in strategic areas; and it gives us the opportunity to promote the importance of respecting civilian government and human rights. Security assistance also enables allies and friends to accept defense responsibilities that we might otherwise have to assume ourselves -- at much greater cost in funds and manpower. Dollar for dollar, it's the most effective security money can buy."

George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
14 April 1986

There are ten major security assistance programs conducted by the United States. They are designed to achieve national security in the manner that Secretary of State Shultz described above. Seven of the programs are managed by the Department of Defense. These are: the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS), the Foreign Military Sales Finance Program (FMSF), the Excess Defense Articles Program (EDA), the Stockpiling of Defense Articles for Foreign Countries (SDA), and the Special Defense Acquisition Fund.
(SDAF). The remaining three programs are managed by the Department of State. They are: the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Commercial Export Sales Program (CESP), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). All ten programs are statutorily addressed in either the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, or the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. Because security assistance involves different departments of the executive branch, and the Congress which approves the annual security assistance program through appropriation, security assistance is clearly a multi-branch, department and agency program.

While it is easy to list the statutes and the programs that comprise security assistance, defining it is more difficult. Security assistance is often associated and used in conjunction with the terms foreign aid, foreign assistance, military assistance, arms transfers, collective security, international defense cooperation, international programs, and international logistics. Although security assistance can be looked at from different perspectives, such as the legislative point of view or by component, this monograph will use a Department of Defense perspective as it best relates to the thrust of this paper.

JCS PUB 1 defines security assistance as:

A group of programs...by which the United States
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives.¹

Now that security assistance has been defined, it is necessary to look at the ten component programs that make up security assistance. An understanding of the purposes and the dynamics of these programs is important as we apply concepts of operational art to security assistance.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Military Assistance Program was originally established under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 as a loan or grant program for military equipment, materials, and services to include training. The program has emergency provisions that enable the President to provide Department of Defense equipment and services to a foreign government on an emergency grant basis. The program is significant because in the absence of loans or grants, many poor countries would have to divert scarce financial resources from debt servicing or economic development, for example, to purchase and maintain military equipment and to receive external training support.² For countries whose security interests coincide with ours, our support under this program enhances both their security and that of the United States while enhancing regional
stability. This, in turn, reduces the risk that regional conflict might threaten the United States. MAP enables friends and allies to share the burden of collective security. Importantly, it reduces the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement during periods of instability and conflict.  

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM

The International Military Education and Training Program, considered relatively inexpensive and one of the most effective components of security assistance, is a grant program that provides training in the United States and, on occasion, at overseas U.S. military facilities for selected foreign military and civilian personnel. The training provided to friends and allies is designed to impart knowledge and skills that will improve their military personnel and armed forces, contribute to their security, and promote self-sufficiency. As a personnel program, IMET has many ancillary benefits. The program not only exposes foreign students to a professional military, but also to the American people, our culture, democratic values, political system, and the policies and objectives by which our nation pursues world peace and human rights. Additionally, IMET provides future access to the civilian and military leadership of other countries. Over the
years, many of the students trained under IMET have gone on to become their country's national leaders, cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and chiefs of their service or armed forces. The positive experiences and generally pro-American attitudes that were developed during their IMET training have resulted in continued influence and access.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM

The Foreign Military Sales Program enables allied and friendly countries to purchase U.S. manufactured military equipment, services, and training. The program also provides foreign governments with the ability to purchase supply, materiel, maintenance and other support to maintain their U.S. manufactured military purchases. Additionally, design and construction services can be purchased under this program. The purchasing government bears all costs that are associated with each sale. The benefits of this program are similar to those previously discussed under MAP.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES FINANCING PROGRAM

The Foreign Military Sales Financing Program provides credits and loan repayment guarantees to eligible foreign governments for the purchase of defense articles, services, and training. In addition to direct loans and credits, the United States attempts, where possible, to arrange loans at
below market interest rates for governments eligible under this program.

This program has come into trouble in recent years due to the global recession and high interest rates of the early 1980s which caused many defaults and reduced repayments. To ensure that our security requirements are met through security assistance rather than by direct U.S. involvement, the U.S. government is keeping the FMS program alive by forgiving debt, refinancing loans, and buying down loan interest rates.26 The Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Fiscal Year 1990 states: "The Administration is requesting all-grant FMS financing for FY 1990....This all-grant initiative is consistent with the trend advocated by Congress to modify the FMSF program in order to ease countries' debt burden."27 While the costs of this program are going up, the prime benefit to the United States is that national security purchased through FMS using FMSF is cost effective when compared to direct U.S. involvement.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

The Economic Support Fund provides loans and grants that will provide economic or political stability in countries where the United States has special political and security interests. These funds are designed to promote
peace or to reduce or eliminate economic or political crises. ESF is made available for a variety of economic and political purposes including infrastructure projects, balance of payment support, health, education, agriculture, and family planning. While long term economic and political stability are the goals of this program, the funding is directed at projects of direct benefit to the poor. Military articles, services, or training cannot be purchased with ESF funds. With ESF support, recipient countries can apply more of their own resources to defense and security than would otherwise be possible without economic or political repercussions. ESF is administered by the Agency for International Development, under direction of the Department of State.28

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping funds are administered and provided by the Department of State to support friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations that bring stability to a country or region which is in the security interests of the United States. The United Nations Force in Cyprus and the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai are two organizations that are receiving PKO support.29

COMMERCIAL EXPORT SALES PROGRAM
The Commercial Export Sales Program is designed to further United States security and foreign policy objectives of regional and world stability through the control of commercial sales and services of defense articles and related technical equipment and data. The Office of Munitions Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State is charged with the monitoring and control of all commercial sales by U.S. business to foreign governments to prevent sales that would adversely effect stability and our national security.30

EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES PROGRAM

The Excess Defense Articles Program provides, whenever possible, defense articles no longer needed by the U.S. Armed Forces to meet FMS and MAP grant aid requirements rather than providing like articles through new procurement. The recipients of articles received under this program are charged for packing, crating, handling, and shipping unless this equipment is provided under grant arrangements. The EDA program enhances both U.S. and friendly countries' security at little cost and puts to use equipment that would otherwise be aging while sitting in warehouses or holding yards.31

STOCKPILING OF DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

The Stockpiling of Defense Articles for Foreign
Countries Program is designed to establish stockpiles of defense articles in overseas locations that are designated as war reserves for non-NATO allied and friendly nations. The contents of these stockpiles remain U.S. military service-owned stocks that are intended for emergency use only. Any transfer of these stocks to an allied or friendly nation would require full reimbursement by the purchaser under FMS or MAP procedures. Currently, only the Republic of Korea has stockpiles of war reserves provided by this program.

SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND

The Special Defense Acquisition Fund is a revolving fund designed to finance the acquisition of defense articles and services in anticipation of sales to be authorized by FMS. Additionally, this fund enables the United States to meet urgent need for military hardware by allied or friendly nations without adversely impacting on U.S. military forces readiness caused either by withdrawals from service inventories or diversions from production. This program has several side benefits. It promotes cooperative planning with friendly and allied countries, and because of increased production of end items contributes through economies of scale to lower unit costs. These reduced costs can be passed on not only to the
purchasing nation, but also to the U.S.. Additionally, this program can allow, as possibly in the current case of the M1A2 Main Battle Tank, the maintenance of our tank production lines along with their thousands of subcontractors. This in turn protects anticipated FMS sales of these tanks and enhances the national security posture of our country.

We have now taken a brief look at the component programs that make up security assistance. Although each is different, and while managed by two departments of our Executive Branch, they all contribute to..." our security objectives by strengthening allies and friends, bolstering regional security, deterring conflict, and securing base rights and access." Achieving the objectives of our national strategy requires complete interdepartment and interagency coordination, planning, cooperation, and execution. Figure 2 provides a conceptual summary of the security assistance program, its component programs, and the interdepartment effort required for meeting our national security objectives through security assistance.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Figure 2
We will now look at security assistance from a responsibility and organizational point of view.

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

While all three branches of the United States Government have a role in security assistance, it is the Executive Branch that has the lead. Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution establishes the President as the single chief executive of our country and empowers him, with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties and appoint ambassadors and other public ministers. Article II, Section 3 authorizes the President to receive ambassadors. By inference, this makes the President responsible for foreign policy and provides him the essential tools he needs for execution. As part of his responsibility for carrying out our nation's foreign policy, the President presents his security assistance program and budget to Congress for their consideration and approval, and then executes the program once it becomes law.22

The principle departments within the Executive Branch that assist the President in the formulation and execution of security assistance as part of our national security strategy are the Department of State and the Department of Defense. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA) provide statutory roles for the Secretaries of these departments.

Section 622 of the FAA and Section 2 of the AECA state that the Secretary of State, under the authority of the President, shall be responsible for:

a. The continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, military education and training, and sales and export programs.

b. Determining whether there shall be a security assistance program, or sale or export for a country and the value thereof.

c. Insuring such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad, and that the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.

As can be seen in the provisions of the FAA and AECA, the Department of State has the overall responsibility and oversight for the Security Assistance Program. The Secretary of State executes his responsibilities through the Chiefs of Diplomatic Mission, his ambassadors who head their country teams throughout the world.

The country team is usually composed of political and economic officers, the defense attache, the chief of the security assistance organization (SAO), and representatives of other governmental agencies as desired by the ambassador and the in-country situation requires. The country team is
designed to facilitate interdepartment and interagency coordination and execution of our foreign policy as it relates to the country of assignment. Figure 3 presents a typical country team organization. We have now completed a brief look at the State Department's responsibilities and organization for security assistance and will now turn our discussion to the Department of Defense.

Section 623 of the FAA and Section 42 of the AECA make the Secretary of Defense responsible for:

a. The determination of military end-item requirements.

b. The procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration with service programs.

c. The supervision of end-item use by recipient countries.

d. The supervision of the training of foreign military and related civilian personnel.

e. The movement and delivery of military end-items.

f. The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment.

g. Within the Department of Defense, the performance of any other function with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education, training, sales, and guarantees.

Assisting the Secretary of Defense in carrying out his security assistance responsibilities are a number of
THE COUNTRY TEAM

Ambassador

Deputy Chief of Mission

Political Counselor
Economic Counselor
Administrative Counselor
Defense Attaché
Chief, SAO
Director Peace Corps
Director USAID
Consular Officer

Director USIS
Agricultural Attaché
Other Agency Representatives


Figure 3
individuals by position and subordinate agencies. This monograph, however, will focus on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his military staff, the five Commanders in Chiefs of unified commands that have security assistance responsibilities, the security assistance organization of the country team, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principle military advisor to the President and serves in the chain of command that extends from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS to the commanders of the unified and specified commands. The Chairman and his staff serve as key players in the planning, development, and review process of security assistance.

The JCS is responsible for coordinating and integrating security assistance with U.S. military plans and programs. In this regard, the JCS prepares the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM), the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and supporting analysis, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). Additionally, the JCS reviews all military related security assistance guidance, plans, and programs that are formulated at the national level to ensure that they do not adversely impact
on force objectives, strategic concepts, or military plans, and that they are consistent with the national security strategy.  

The Commanders in Chief of the United States European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and Central Command (CENTCOM) have significant responsibilities in the conduct of security assistance in their assigned regions. Their major responsibilities include:

a. Making recommendations to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense on any aspect of security assistance programs, projections, or activities.

b. Commanding and supervising the SAOs in matters that are not functions or responsibilities of the Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions, including the provision of necessary technical assistance and administrative support to SAOs.

c. Coordinating and assisting DOD components in the conduct of regional security assistance programs and activities.

d. Developing and submitting recommendations concerning organization, staffing, and administrative support of SAOs.

e. Keeping the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and military departments informed on matters or actions that could impact on security assistance and other DOD programs.

f. Ensuring coordination of regional security assistance matters with U.S. diplomatic missions and DOD components.
g. Providing evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD overseas security assistance organizations and programs.4

The regional CINCs have a direct role in the execution of security assistance. They coordinate and integrate all military security assistance plans and activities with the national and regional strategy, their warfighting campaign plans, and the requirements of the U.S. diplomatic missions in the region. JCS Pub 3-0 directs the CINC to develop interdepartment and interagency relationships within his area of responsibility to ensure that he supports or is supported for planning and operations in pursuit of national security policy. The regional CINCs work with the U.S. diplomatic missions and their country teams by providing materiel, advisors, trainers, security assistance forces, and other military resources in support of the mission's military objectives.42

The Defense Security Assistance Agency, established as a separate agency of the DOD under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provides DOD level administration and supervision of security assistance planning and programs. The DSAA is the principle DOD security assistance coordinator at the national level with other governmental agencies. This agency assists the regional CINCs and the SAOs with international logistics.
and sales negotiations with foreign countries. Additionally, the DSAA serves as the DOD focal point for liaison with U.S. industry that supports security assistance.42

The final element of the security assistance organization we will discuss is the Security Assistance Organization that is assigned to the U.S. diplomatic mission. The term SAO is generic and represents the DOD element that has the responsibility for carrying out the security assistance management functions for a particular country. SAOs are joint organizations that are better known as military missions, military groups, offices of defense cooperation, offices of military coordination, and several other titles based upon agreements with the host country.

SAOs are organizations limited in size by law to ensure that they remain managers of security assistance and are not able to delve into training, advising, or other functions that belong to the CINC. Figure 4 presents a typical security assistance organization that is assigned to a country team. To perform his logistical, financial, contracting, and country team functions, the Chief of the SAO must maintain close liaison with the host government defense establishment. While the Chief of the SAO works
Figure 4
for the ambassador who heads up the country team, he also works for the regional CINC in matters that are not a function or responsibility of the ambassador, and has a close working relationship with the Director, DSAA.

Figure 5 provides a summary of the United States Government organization for security assistance. As this overview of security assistance has shown, security assistance is a complicated program that has many players that belong to different branches, departments, and agencies of our government. Only when security assistance is put together and executed in a coherent manner, can it achieve the end states of our national security strategy. This discussion completes a very basic primer on security assistance. While brief, it provides the detail necessary to support the purpose of this monograph. We will now turn to the application of operational art to security assistance.

IV. APPLYING OPERATIONAL ART TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Operational art is a conceptual process. It is an approach that turns a large problem into a number of easily solved smaller ones. It is a process that shows the location of the starting line and the direction to the
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Figure 5
finish line. It is a framework for ideas that leads to creative and innovative problem solving. It is a process that gives direction, maximizes resources, and achieves results. Finally, it is a process which may have merit if properly applied to security assistance. We will now look at how operational art might be applied to security assistance.

As we know from a regional CINC's responsibilities and further amplified by recent testimony from CINCSOUTHCOM and CINCCENTCOM to the Senate Armed Services Committee, security assistance is a major military operation and currently their number one priority in executing their peacetime strategies. This discussion will use a regional CINC's perspective and consider the operational concepts of end state, center of gravity, and culmination point in campaign planning for security assistance.

The first operational concept we will discuss is end state. As previously covered, the regional CINC participates in the development of the national security strategy through his input. From the national strategy he develops his regional strategy, and ultimately methodology for carrying out military operations which support both. As JCS PUB 3-0 describes, the CINC receives national level guidance, everything from strategic direction to rules of
engagement, which is to be integrated into his regional strategy and subsequent plans. From the national strategy and the additional guidance he receives, the CINC has all the information he needs to determine the end state that he is to achieve. The CINC's definition of end state can be confirmed by the JCS through the approval of his plan.

A notional end state for a particular country might be a stable democratically elected government that fosters political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions; has a viable and growing economy; and has capable armed forces that are able to combat threats from aggression, coercion, insurgency, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking. While the above is a tall order, security assistance is a multi-program and multi-department operation. When an end state is specified, such as in the above example, the CINC can identify his implied tasks and derive his vision, concept, and intent for military operations that will produce the end state.

An example of an implied task for the CINC in the above end state would be to organize, train, and equip that country's army to be able to secure its borders, conduct counterinsurgency operations, or perform certain counternarcotics tasks. While this is simplified and only
shows three of many possible tasks, and none of the sub-tasks a CINC would identify, it illustrates the clarity that the identification of end state provides. The CINC in coordination with the State Department and the U.S. mission could then activate the appropriate security assistance component program(s) that would produce the desired end state. In this case, the CINC could possibly incorporate FMS, FMSP, MAP, IMET and EDA to equip and train the army.

As stated in Section II of this monograph, end state is the basis for campaign development, and ensures that all efforts are directed towards clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable objectives. End state is an appropriate operational concept that can be applied to enhance security assistance.

The next operational concept is center of gravity. As previously discussed, the center of gravity is the source of strength and balance on which everything depends, and that its attack should be the focus of all operations. The identification of the center of gravity for both the enemy and yourself, provides focus, direction, and objective in the design of a campaign plan.

For example, the enemy's center of gravity in an insurgency situation might be his popular support. The capital city of the country which we are supporting might
be the friendly center of gravity. With these centers of gravity identified, a campaign plan can be designed to focus an attack on objectives that will separate the guerilla from his base of support, and at the same time protect the capital city.

In the above example, the CINC could provide security assistance to this nation through FMS, FMSP, and MAP with an emphasis on counterinsurgency training, psychological operations training and support; provision of appropriate equipment; and human rights training for the army's leadership through IMET. To protect the county's capital; tanks, artillery pieces, antitank weapons, barrier materials, and appropriate training could again be provided through security assistance programs. In the above example, particularly in actions preventing the guerilla from gaining popular support, the Department of State is a major participant by providing economic aid through ESF. Using the concept of center of gravity keeps all efforts coordinated and focused on the enemy which translates into maximum efficiency and decisive results. The operational concept of center of gravity can assist in the achievement of the desired end state and can be applied to enhance security assistance.

The next operational concept we will look at is the
culmination point. As discussed in Section II, the FM 100-5 definition of culmination point, "... is the point that the strength of the attacker no longer exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued offensive operations risk overextension." A reasonable modification of this definition for use with security assistance would read, "...is the point where the strength of the program, or a combination of programs, no longer produces results that will achieve the desired end state, and beyond which no results are produced and resources are wasted." The current situation in El Salvador validates the conceptual application of this operational concept. Millions of dollars worth of security assistance, mostly in the form of FMSP, MAP, ESF, and IMET, have been provided to El Salvador over the past decade. This effort to institutionalize democracy, help the armed forces combat communist insurgents, stabilize the economy, and prevent expansion of Soviet influence in this hemisphere have produced little, if any, progress toward achieving an end state. General Maxwell R. Thurman opined in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee during the FY 1991 Budget Hearings that additional security assistance would not produce the desired results, and that the government of El Salvador would have to enter into negotiations with the FMLN
guerillas. Clearly in the opinion of General Thurman, the culmination point had been reached.47 It is unfortunate that it has taken so much bloodshed, time, and money to reach stalemate. By using this operational concept, the culmination point might have been determined earlier. Like center of gravity, evaluation of culmination is continuous. It is a feedback process that can maximize the effectiveness of a security assistance program(s) with the greatest efficiency. The application of the operational concept of culmination point can enhance the execution of security assistance.

Now that we have analyzed the operational concepts that are used for operational design and execution, we will analyze the campaign plan in relation to security assistance. As discussed in Section II, the campaign plan provides the commander's vision, concept, and intent. As it orients on the center of gravity to produce the conditions that will achieve the desired end state, the campaign plan performs several functions.

First, it lays out an orderly schedule of decisions as it seeks to achieve a unity of effort, while it phases a series of related major operations. The kinds of decisions that are required to design and execute security assistance are no different than for war. CINC decisions would be
made in coordination with the appropriate State Department elements, as to the sequence, method of application, and integration of security assistance programs. For example, provide immediate MAP grants of equipment, trainers, and advisors to stabilize an immediate insurgent threat; simultaneously apply ESF to eliminate the cause of the insurgency; follow with FMSP for additional equipment; establish defense stockpiles under SDA for future contingency requirements, and finally provide PKO support to bring stability after hostilities cease.

The next function served by a campaign plan is to create subordinate forces, establish command relationships, and provide operational direction for subordinates. In coordination with the State Department, the CINC would establish his subordinate forces. This time, instead of joint task forces or service component commands consisting of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, the subordinate forces are SAOs, state department agencies, mobile training teams, and political and economic officers -- different players, same concept.

Finally and most importantly, the campaign plan synchronizes efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole. As the master plan, it does this by establishing responsibility, describing the concept of operations, and
by assigning tasks. There is no requirement to change this process for security assistance. It is only a framework, a vehicle, a way of thinking. Although designed for warfighting, it could be used just as effectively for building a house. Campaign planning can be easily applied to security assistance to enhance its execution.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Operational art can be applied to the design and execution of our nation's security assistance program. As resources become more scarce and an indirect approach to achieve national security objectives becomes dominant, security assistance becomes a key instrument to project our influence and power. As the Regional Conflict Working Group of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy stated, security assistance has become a blunted instrument. Security assistance has evolved into a series of programs that are "managed" and, all too often, poorly coordinated and integrated. Instead of being a major operation that is "fought" by the CINC with his J3 battle staff, it is managed as a logistical program by the J4. The way the United States executes security assistance must change if we are to sharpen this spear once again.
The revival of the operational level of war has reintroduced operational art as a way to employ our forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns. This is a warfighting concept that was developed for war. The most likely "wars" in the near term will be at the lower threshold of the operational continuum where security assistance will play a major role in the outcome. The key point I want to make is that security assistance should be executed with a warfighter mentality. CINCs plan and fight wars using campaigns and major operations to achieve their strategic objectives. CINCs should "fight" security assistance instead of managing it. The lead for security assistance should be taken out the J4 and shifted to the J3 where it can be given the proper focus and "fought" as a campaign. The application of operational art to security assistance will produce a warfighter approach that can restore the cutting edge to this important instrument of our national security.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid., p. III-4.


11. Ibid., p. 179.

12. Ibid., pp. 179-180.


15. Ibid., pp. 181-182.


18. Ibid., pp. 2-2 - 2-7.


22. Ibid., p. 18; and Field Manual 100-20, p. A-23.


27. Congressional Presentation, p. 12.


29. Congressional Presentation, p. 31.

30. Ibid., p. 46; and Management of Security Assistance, p. 2-10.


32. Ibid., p. 2-13.
33. Congressional Presentation, p. 33.


36. Management of Security Assistance, p. 5-1; and The United States Constitution, Article II, Section 1.

37. Management of Security Assistance, p. 5-5.

38. Ibid., p. 5-10.


40. Ibid., p. A-8; and Management of Security Assistance, p. 5-12.

41. Management of Security Assistance, p. 5-13; and JCS PUB 3-0, pp. II-5 - II-6.

42. JCS PUB 3-0, pp. II-5 - II-7; and Field Manual 100-20, p. A-9.

43. Management of Security Assistance, p. 5-14.

44. Ibid., pp. 5-13 - 5-14; and Field Manual 100-20, p. A-10.


46. JCS PUB 3-0, p. I-7.

47. Author's opinion.
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