Isolating the Theater of War: Operational Implications of Border Sanctuaries in Limited War

A Monograph by
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This monograph examines the French experience in Algeria (1954-1962) and the Israeli experience in Lebanon (1982) in order to determine how operational forces can overcome the operational advantages an adversary derives from border sanctuaries in limited war. An examination of this issue offers US military leaders understanding of the theoretical and practical dimensions of border sanctuaries and of the efficacy of US doctrine on the subject.

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ITEM 18 (Continued)

* Algerian War, 1954-1962
* Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Lebanese Border Sanctuaries, 1970's and 1980's
* Algerian National Liberation Front and Tunisian and Moroccan Border Sanctuaries, 1956-1962
* US counterinsurgency doctrine

ITEM 19 (Continued)

directly at the beginning of hostilities, it is imperative that the operational commander negate the advantages that insurgents gain from sanctuaries. He must consider the tactics and techniques required to neutralize sanctuaries in terms of an overarching operational scheme that is suitable, feasible, and acceptable.

These conclusions indicate that US doctrine provides a firm foundation for contending with enemy border sanctuaries in limited war.
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ABSTRACT

ISOLATING THE THEATER OF WAR: OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF BORDER SANCTUARIES IN LIMITED WAR by MAJ Randy J. Kolton, USA, 64 pages.

This monograph examines the French experience in Algeria (1954-1962) and the Israeli experience in Lebanon (1982) in order to determine how operational forces can overcome the operational advantages an adversary derives from border sanctuaries in limited war. An examination of this issue offers U.S. military leaders understanding of the theoretical and practical dimensions of border sanctuaries and of the efficacy of U.S. doctrine on the subject.

In each case study a combatant’s border sanctuaries are examined in terms of how they enhanced his ability to achieve mass, maneuver, economy of force, offensive, security, and surprise by shaping specific elements of the operational canvas (bases of operations, lines of communications, centers of gravity, decisive points, and zones/lines of operations). Military operations undertaken to neutralize border sanctuaries are a product of the elements of operational design and their effectiveness is assessed in terms of feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. The monograph concludes with an overview of operational implications of border sanctuaries; operational methods for neutralizing them; and US doctrine on the subject.

The Algerian and Lebanese wars demonstrate that sanctuaries offer an insurgent secure bases, lines of communications and lines of operations to train, sustain, disperse, and stage military operations. These benefits enhance his ability to achieve mass, security, and surprise and to conduct maneuver, economy of force operations, and offensives. Though it is not essential for the counterinsurgent to attack sanctuaries directly at the beginning of hostilities, it is imperative that the operational commander negate the advantages that insurgents gain from sanctuaries. He must consider the tactics and techniques required to neutralize sanctuaries in terms of an overarching operational scheme that is suitable, feasible and acceptable.

These conclusions indicate that US doctrine provides a firm foundation for contending with enemy border sanctuaries in limited war. The four interdependent functions of an internal defense and development (IDAD) program - balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization - described in FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict offer the base for integrating civil and military operations at the operational level to overcome the advantages that insurgents acquire from border sanctuaries. Viewing border sanctuaries in an operational context requires the operational commander to devise a campaign plan that integrates the IDAD functions with other operational functions (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, support, protection, and command and control). In this manner, a nation can undertake effective civil and military operations that neutralize border sanctuaries, isolate the theater(s) of operations, destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, eliminate sources of internal conflict, and translate tactical and operational successes into strategic victory in limited war.
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I. Introduction

The thaw in East-West tensions offers new opportunities for a more stable international environment, but other forces threaten global stability and peace. Weapons proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, and the growing debts of third world nations combine with ubiquitous social, political, economic, and ideological rivalries within nations to create conditions that generate internal conflict and war. While it is unlikely that the United States will undertake a major protracted conflict in foreign nations, it must, nevertheless strengthen friendly countries against internal and external threats and assist friendly governments in undertaking essential political, social, and economic reform. Furthermore, the US must deter conflict by preparing to confront aggressors decisively, swiftly, and with discrimination. For these reasons it is critical that US military leaders understand the theoretical and practical dimensions of limited war.

A common characteristic of limited warfare is the border sanctuary - a nation or area near or contiguous to the theater of operations which by tacit agreement between the warring powers is exempt from attack. This paper examines the French experience in Algeria (1954-1962) and the Israeli experience in Lebanon (1982) in order to determine how operational forces can overcome the operational advantages an adversary derives from border sanctuaries in limited war.

Operational advantages of sanctuaries are examined in terms of how they enhance a combatant’s ability to achieve mass, security, and surprise and to conduct maneuver, economy of force operations.
and offensives by shaping specific elements of the operational canvas (bases of operations, lines of communications, centers of gravity, decisive points, and zones/lines of operations). Military operations undertaken to neutralize the affects of border sanctuaries are a product of elements of operational design (operational objectives, application of resources, sequence of operations, and operational functions - intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection, and command and control)(Appendix 1). They are assessed in terms of effectiveness: acceptability, feasibility, and suitability. An examination of these issues offers US military leaders understanding of the efficacy of US doctrine on border sanctuaries.

A. Limited War Defined

A nation undertaking a limited war directs its resources towards achieving a limited political aim because it has little fear that its national existence is threatened. The intensity of conflict is proportional to the resources belligerents are willing or able to muster to support their particular military strategies. Limited strategic ends and finite resources encourage combatants in a limited war to confine the conflict to a specific nation, territory or region. As other nations, particularly major powers, increase their support to a belligerent, the war increases in intensity and scope. This, in turn, escalates the violence and expands the territorial parameters of the war.

Current US military doctrine defines limited war in the context of a continuum of conflict (peacetime competition, conflict, and war). Military forces committed to a war contribute directly to
the achievement of strategic ends; the direct use of military power establishes the conditions which make the achievement of the desired political end-state possible. Low intensity conflict is an ambiguous environment in which military operations support non-military actions (i.e., economic, political, diplomatic) that create conditions conducive to the realization of the strategic aim. Wars often incorporate characteristics of all three conflict environments: the cessation of hostilities in a war, for example, may not resolve tensions within or among states and persistent animosities may take the form of low-intensity conflict.

Since the end of World War II, insurgency has been the most common form of limited war, often occurring concomitantly with a conventional war. An insurgency implies a situation in which a nation is threatened by an internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, to overthrow the legitimate government. Insurgencies occur when the population is vulnerable, insurgent leadership is present, and government lacks control. The insurgent organization normally includes a covert political organization and an overt military element, the guerrilla force. To succeed, insurgents must possess or produce popular support, unity of effort, will to resist, leadership, discipline, intelligence, propaganda, favorable environment and external support. Most insurgencies reflect Mao's three evolutionary phases: phase one, latent and incipient insurgency (recruitment, establishment of insurgent organizations at the village level, terrorism, and organizing popular support against the existing regime); phase two, guerrilla warfare (increased control over geographical areas,
establishment of an alternative government structure, and guerrilla warfare); and phase three, mobile warfare (conventional operations against government forces). As the insurgency matures, insurgents continue activities associated with earlier phases and are prepared to revert to earlier phases when they suffer strategic, operational, or tactical reversals.  

B. The Theoretical and Strategic Significance of Border Sanctuaries

According to Mao, insurgents rely on secure bases to preserve their forces, to expand their influence among the people, and to compete with government forces for political and military control of three geographical zones (zone one - insurgent controlled; zone two - government controlled; and zone three: contested area). A successful insurgency requires guerrilla success in maintaining control of zone one, winning control of zone three, and defeating government control of zone two. In this context, border sanctuaries support the insurgent's struggle against government forces. They enhance his ability to achieve economy of force, mass, maneuver, offensive, security, and surprise.

Current debates over neutralizing border sanctuaries emphasize two perspectives. One view is that a nation involved in a limited war must attack and neutralize sanctuaries at the beginning of hostilities. A second orientation is that air and ground operations directed against sanctuaries expand the theaters of war and operations and magnify the operational commander's military requirements without necessarily resolving fundamental causes of conflict. An analysis of the Algerian and Lebanese wars offers
insight into these issues and suggest ways for operational commanders to address border sanctuaries in limited wars.

II. French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962

A. Strategic Overview

Between 1954 and 1962, the French waged a counterinsurgency against the National Liberation Front (FLN), which sought independence from France. During the conflict, the FLN relied extensively on border sanctuaries to support its political and military activities. The French attempted to neutralize these sanctuaries through a series of military operations and civil-military programs (Map A).

Moslem frustration with a century of social, economic, and political inequities erupted on 1 November 1954 with the FLN striking French government and military installations and personnel throughout Algeria.\textsuperscript{18} The FLN's strategic end was to establish an independent, Moslem Algeria. Its strategic means included a small political and military insurgent organization supported by a dissatisfied Moslem population. The strategic ways included Mao's three stages of revolutionary warfare. Between 1954 and 1956, the FLN employed terrorism and guerrilla warfare with the operational aims of disrupting French economic, social, and political activities in Algeria and of suppressing opposition to the FLN within the European and Moslem communities. The FLN's political leadership, or external delegation, established its headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. By 1956, the war settled into a stalemate, with the FLN lacking the resources to venture beyond phase two activities.\textsuperscript{19} Morocco and Tunisia's declaration of independence from France on 2 March and 20
March 1956, respectively, offered the FLN new opportunities. The former French protectorates aligned themselves with the FLN and offered the Algerian insurgents secure bases.20

Determined to maintain control of Algeria, France established as strategic ends countering FLN terrorism, eliminating the insurgency, and reasserting French control over Algeria. The strategic means for achieving these goals were government, law enforcement and military organizations. Strategic ways included rendering the rebels incapable of maintaining and sustaining the insurgency and instituting reforms that would attract Moslem support for France.21

B. The FLN and Border Sanctuaries

The FLN and its military arm, the National Liberation Army (ALN), depended on a network of internal and external bases for political and logistical support and to facilitate economy of force, mass, maneuver, offensive, security, and surprise. Various Arab, African, and communist states provided financing, weapons and administrative support. From its secure headquarters in Cairo, the FLN formulated strategic policy, acquired funds, arranged arms purchases, conducted diplomacy, and waged psychological warfare against France.22 By 1958 the FLN’s international position and France’s unwillingness to attack Algerian rebels in Tunisia and Morocco encouraged the FLN to create the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) on 19 September in Tunis, Tunisia: an act that increased international support for the revolutionaries and undercut French claims to legitimacy.23
Algeria's 855,000 square miles represented a formidable challenge for French military leaders waging a counterinsurgency and offered cover and concealment for FLN bases. Major urban centers and agricultural areas supporting a population of nine million were located in the region between the Mediterranean Sea and the mountainous fringes to the south (81,000 square miles). The remainder of Algeria, which was known as the Sahara (774,000 square miles), was arid and mountainous and was inhabited by less than one million. About seventy percent of Algeria's Moslems lived in the Tell - the hilly maritime region of the Atlas Mountains and the band of fertile land along the northern edge of the high plateau.

Another twenty percent lived in the major cities. The country's large size; long, open and underpopulated borders with Tunisia and Morocco; many miles of coast lines; and concentration of Europeans in northern urban areas supported the FLN's dispersion of forces inside and outside of Algeria and complicated French efforts to devise effective methods for locating and defeating guerrillas.

FLN command, control and organization reflected the peculiarities associated with operating in urban areas and in remote parts of the country. Within cities, the FLN organized cells, districts, sectors and regions, which were largely self-supporting. The ALN, however, operated in more remote regions and relied on bases in rural Moslem communities for food, recruits, intelligence and administrative support. In 1957, the FLN established military garrisons, training areas, and logistic sites at the East Base near the Tunisian city of Souk-Ahras along the Tunisian Algerian border and the West Base at the Moroccan city of...
Nador along the Moroccan-Algerian border. The external delegation in Cairo purchased arms from sources around the world, shipped them to Tunisian and Moroccan ports and transported them by sea to clandestine coastal sites in Algeria or overland from Egypt through Libya to Tunisian border sanctuaries.

By 1957, the NLA increased from several hundred untrained insurgents to about 15,000 armed and disciplined fighters in Algeria and 25,000 soldiers in bases in Tunisia and Morocco. An additional 55,000 to 100,000 auxiliaries in Algeria provided intelligence and administrative support. The ALN divided Algeria into five regions or wilayas that centered on Constantine, Algeria, Oran and the geographic regions of Aures and Kabylie. It organized its forces into battalions, companies, platoons, groups, and half groups. The ALN concentrated its forces to attack the French when success was assured or when potential political gains justified risks, as occurred during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. In most instances, the ALN waged economy of force operations (terrorism and guerrilla attacks). The erection of French barriers along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders after 1957 and subsequent French offensives restricted ALN cross border operations. ALN and sympathetic Moslems increasingly sought refuge in Tunisia and Morocco and, by the end of the insurgency, the refugee population reached 200,000 in Tunisia and 100,000 in Morocco. The FLN relied on this source of manpower to create an army that enhanced its political credibility during negotiations with the French and could assure Algerian security after independence.
France's lack of success during the first two years of the war reflected its failure to understand the FLN's organization and strategy. Military leaders initially viewed the 1954 uprising in terms of tribal warfare and attempted to suppress guerrilla activity by attacking entire tribes. This merely aggravated tensions and increased Moslem support for the FLN.\(^{33}\) With the ALN's forces dispersed among bases in Algeria and border sanctuaries, French military commanders concentrated post-1956 attacks on the FLN's cellular external (Cairo) and internal (Algiers, Constantine, Aures, Kabylie and Oran) leadership structures.\(^{34}\) These efforts upset the tempo of insurgent activity within Algeria for several months; they did not cripple the FLN or ALN. Furthermore, public disclosure of brutal French interrogation practices employed during the Battle of Algiers exacerbated international and French public opposition to the war.\(^{35}\)

Meanwhile, France's largely mechanized forces, which grew from 55,000 in 1954 to over 400,000 by 1956, relied on bases and lines of communications that centered on Algeria's urban areas. Large units garrisoned major cities and smaller elements secured small villages and remote areas. This defensive disposition reduced the availability of rapidly deployable reserves to attack insurgent forces and increased the security of FLN internal and external bases.\(^{36}\) Furthermore, the FLN exploited border sanctuaries to launch attacks against French military and political targets and pro-French Moslems in order to destroy the European economy in Algeria, neutralize opposition to the FLN among Europeans and Moslems, and increase Moslem support for the insurgency. Ineffective
French countermeasures eroded public confidence in French leadership and undermined the limited French effort to carry out reforms.\textsuperscript{37}

While French offensives in 1957 and 1958 eliminated several FLN leaders and decreased ALN capabilities to mount offensives and to permanently occupy territory in Algeria, border sanctuaries preserved FLN political and military strength. The FLN subsequently employed terror and guerrilla strikes to achieve a military stalemate that supported its diplomatic aim of increasing international and domestic pressure on the French government to accept Algerian independence.\textsuperscript{38} In this fashion, it forced France to grant Algeria independence in July 1962.\textsuperscript{39}

C. Analysis of French Operational Methods for Neutralizing Border Sanctuaries.

French operational aims during the Algerian War were to defeat guerrilla warfare and terrorism, render the FLN and ALN incapable of maintaining a sustained and effective insurrection, gain Moslem support for the French position in Algeria, and undermine Moslem support for the rebels.\textsuperscript{40} The FLN's border sanctuaries obstructed achievement of these goals after 1956.

Though French military forces concentrated on defending against ALN terrorism and guerrilla attacks between 1954 and 1957, outposts in remote areas were unable to prevent ALN strikes. The French military's ineffective human intelligence apparatus accentuated deficiencies in its counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. Short duration, sixty man French patrols consistently failed to uncover guerrilla bases or interdict rebel forces, proved incapable of securing the local population and were too small to
defeat large guerrilla formations. On those occasions that they concentrated forces for major strikes, the French failed to achieve surprise.41

In order to correct past failings, the French inaugurated the operational strategy of "quadrillage" in February 1956. French forces garrisoned major cities and positioned smaller forces in villages, hamlets, and farm areas to protect Europeans and Moslems, increase Moslem support for France, decrease Moslem sympathy for the FLN, and gather intelligence on the FLN.42 In remote regions of Algeria, the French relocated Moslems to areas under French military protection. Installations were constructed with watch towers, barbed wire barriers, and shelters to protect soldiers and the local population from rebel attacks.43 Battalion sized units (four infantry companies of 150 men each) conducted search and destroy missions in remote areas of the country.44 Zone reserve forces and theater of operations reserves were available to reinforce these forces.45 These activities, however, did not achieve significant results and did not address border sanctuaries.46

By 1957, French military leaders undertook initiatives to block external financial and material support for the FLN and to neutralize rebel sanctuaries. The French Navy instituted naval and air patrols along Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan coasts and, in 1959 alone, over 41,200 ships were surveyed, 2,565 stopped and searched, and 84 rerouted under escort to French ports: large numbers of weapons and munitions were subsequently seized.47 In mid-1957, French Defense Minister Andre Morice directed the construction of a barrier line along the Tunisian-Algerian border that became
known as the Morice Line. The barrier extended between 100 and 300 miles in length to the south along both sides of the Bone-Tebessa railroad to the Sahara. A second, less intricate barrier line was also constructed during this same period along the Moroccan border (Map B). The initial elements of the Morice Line were completed in September 1957 at a cost of $2,400,000. By 1959, the defensive system consisted of three parallel barbed wire fences (one of which was charged with 5000 volts of electricity), minefields, floodlights, rocket and gun emplacements, ground surveillance radar and a system of automatic alarms and searchlights. French military forces occupied strong points constructed every 2000-3000 yards while tactical aircraft, tanks, armored cars, and dismounted patrols operated along parallel roads between strong points. Warning of attempted infiltrations was provided when breaks in the fences caused a power failure that triggered an alarm within French military posts. The cost of maintaining these barrier complexes was high; 25,000-40,000 French soldiers and over 2500 technicians defended the Morice and West Lines between 1957 and 1962.

Recognizing that these barriers alone would not seal the borders nor defeat the ALN, French commanders undertook other initiatives. In 1957, the French Army adopted General Andre Beaufre's 1956 strategy for the Constantine East area and instituted population control measures: the French relocated 70,000 to 80,000 Moslems from a zone 15-35 miles wide. Along the Algerian-Tunisian border this "forbidden zone" extended approximately 200 miles south to the Nementcha mountains. Within this area the French designated free fire zones: outposts consisting of two infantry companies
equipped with 105mm howitzers conducted surveillance, attacked infiltrators, and supported the French Special Administrative Service's (SAS's) civil action programs in Moslem villages. A astride major routes into Algeria, these outposts deterred rebel infiltration and forced the ALN to rely on more circuitous routes. While barriers and border control measures reduced ALN infiltration, many French commanders complained of restrictions on attacks against border sanctuaries and of poor synchronization of military operations. Their impatience reached a high point during January and February 1958 when a 300 man ALN battalion that had infiltrated from Tunisia ambushed a French patrol and when a French reconnaissance plane operating in the same sector was shot down near Sakiet, Tunisia. In response to pressure from the military, the French government approved in late January a vaguely defined "right of pursuit." Some commanders pressed for mechanized raids into Tunisia to destroy FLN bases while others supported air strikes against the same targets. The desire of French political and military leaders to escalate the war against border sanctuaries subsided, however, when, on 8 February, a local French commander launched an ill-conceived air strike against Sakiet that produced few tangible military benefits while contributing to international and French public condemnation.

Air Force General Maurice Challe's appointment as commander-in-chief in Algeria on 15 December 1958 was a turning point in French operational strategy. Reasoning that border barriers and quadrillage would not defeat insurgents and that they hindered concentration of forces for effective offensives, Challe championed
a four point campaign plan that included: improving the Morice and West lines; conducting large unit offensives to destroy ALN forces; waging relentless counterguerrilla operations to eliminate the FLN infrastructure within Algeria; and undertaking an internal defense and development strategy that encouraged Moslems to accept an integrated French-Algerian society. He subsequently formed an operational reserve that consisted of two divisions, sufficient helicopters to lift two battalions simultaneously, jet fighters to carry out battlefield air interdiction, and slower moving propeller aircraft to provide close air support. To enhance the effectiveness of maneuver operations, "forbidden zones" were modified to incorporate a "free-fire band" that was too wide for insurgent units to cross in a single night. In this area, French forces employed aerial and artillery fires to destroy enemy units.

To enhance the effectiveness of conventional military operations, Challe expanded French use of unconventional forces: Les Commandos de Chasse or stalking commandos. Trained and equipped to be as mobile as the rebels, the Commandos de Chasse stalked specific guerrilla bands, collecting intelligence on leaders, composition, habits, friends, and relatives. They shadowed the ALN units wherever they went, were not restricted by unit boundaries, and only engaged the rebels under favorable conditions. Once they fixed a guerrilla force, a strike force from zone or theater reserves rapidly deployed to destroy it.

On 22 July 1959, Challe conducted his first major offensive, Operation Binoculars, which involved over 20,000 soldiers conducting operations among the nearly one million Moslems in the Kabylie
Mountains. The objective of the operation was to destroy ALN forces and FLN infrastructure. By the end of October, French forces had killed 3,746 ALN fighters and dispersed the remaining units. To discourage a resurgence in FLN activities in the region, the French Army resettled Moslems residing in remote areas, established military and civil administrative outposts, and conducted psychological warfare and civil affairs operations that stressed Moslem "integration" within French Algeria. By spring 1960, it appeared that Challe's campaign strategy had paralyzed the ALN and that the FLN was on the verge of defeat.

Unfortunately, Challe found a military victory elusive. French political leaders failed to financially and legislatively support economic, political and social reforms. Furthermore, 25,000 ALN soldiers remained secure in border sanctuaries. Challe's inability to attack these forces, combined with deficiencies in reform programs and with Moslem cynicism towards integration in a French Algeria, undermined French operational success. In January 1960, the French military in Algeria, concerned that France's political leaders were too eager to compromise with the FLN and to abandon pro-French Moslems, revolted to secure Algeria. The ensuing violence intensified the French public's desire to end the war. By April the revolt was defeated and on 23 April, De Gaulle ousted Challe as commander-in-chief for his complicity in the rebellion. This marked the end of a coherent French operational strategy.
D. Assessment of the Effectiveness of French Operations in Neutralizing FLN Border Sanctuaries

Throughout the Algerian war, border sanctuaries shaped the operational canvas in ways that benefited the FLN. The most significant impact was in providing secure locations for the FLN to conduct diplomacy and strategic planning; to train, sustain, and disperse its forces; and to stage military operations. Recognizing that strikes against FLN border sanctuaries would require violating the sovereignty of other states, lead to civilian casualties, and precipitate international condemnation, the French government elected to restrict counterinsurgency operations to Algerian territory. Consequently, the FLN enhanced concealment, protection, and logistical support for its fighters by establishing bases near Tunisian and Moroccan villages. Similarly, insurgents could use well-traveled roads to mask their movements in Tunisian and Moroccan sanctuaries and to facilitate infiltration into Algeria. The FLN linked these capabilities with the benefits derived from its bases located among Moslem communities in Algeria's cities, rural areas and remote regions to achieve surprise in offensive operations and to preserve its forces.

These conditions influenced both the French and the FLN's strategic and operational centers of gravity. The insurgent strategic center of gravity was its bond with Algerian Moslems. Ultimate success or failure of the insurgency depended on the preservation of that relationship. The French had two inextricably linked centers of gravity: the relationship between the French and the Algerian Moslems and the relationship among the French
government, people, and military. Operationally, the FLN carried out activities consistent with Mao's three phases of revolutionary warfare. Unprepared to wage mobile warfare, the FLN exploited the benefits of its internal and external bases to wage terror and guerrilla warfare (economy of force operations) against physical, cybernetic and moral decisive points to exhaust French will in metropolitan France and to erode the bond between the French and the Moslems in Algeria. It dispersed its forces in time and space and only concentrated forces to present an operational center of gravity when risks were politically justified (Battle of Algiers, 1957; ALN formations in Tunisia and Morocco, 1960).

Their government's refusal to approve strikes against FLN border sanctuaries presented French operational commanders with the dilemma of dispersing forces to protect vital installations or to concentrate to attack insurgent bases within Algeria. Between 1954 and 1960, France viewed civil-military operations undertaken in Algeria as being of acceptable risk: there was little likelihood that the FLN could seriously threaten the security of metropolitan France or that it could defeat the French Army in battle. Yet, achieving French strategic ends required an operational strategy that combined civil and military operations to defeat the FLN and to increase Moslem support for France. Unfortunately, the French government was unwilling to undertake or finance the extensive political and economic reforms necessary to gain Moslem loyalty. This reluctance obstructed French military efforts to devise a balanced counterinsurgency strategy that melded civil reforms with military operations.
Regardless of the operational scheme adopted, sealing the borders to deny the FLN infiltration routes, external sources of supplies, and means to interact with the Algerian Moslem population was critical. Though resource intensive, the Morice and West Lines isolated the theater of operations, disrupted FLN lines of communications, disorganized ALN command and control, and, to a limited degree, created a rift between FLN/ALN forces located in Tunisia and Morocco and those in Algeria. The ALN reported that during a six month period in 1958, they lost over 45,000 men in efforts to cross into Algiers. By 1959, losses escalated to the point that many members of the ALN requested political asylum in Tunisia in order to avoid dying in attempts to cross the border. During his sixteen month command (15 December 58 - 22 April 60), Challe combined barrier operations with "quadrillage" to secure remote areas and cities and to undermine FLN influence in Algeria; a combination of operational maneuver and unconventional warfare within Algeria to systematically identify and destroy FLN infrastructure and forces; and psychological warfare and civil affairs programs to suppress a resurgence of insurgent activity and to institute limited social, economic, and political reforms. These actions undermined external support for the FLN, destroyed over half of the ALN forces in Algeria, and reduced terror acts by fifty percent. By 1960, according to official estimates, only 780 rebels remained in western Algeria and 900-1000 in the east. In keeping with strategic guidance of France’s political leaders, however, the military respected restrictions on attacking the FLN’s border
sanctuaries and allowed the FLN to amass an operational center of
gavity that supported its diplomatic offensive.68

By 1960, the French people were weary of protracted war in
Algeria and found continuation of the conflict unacceptable. This
erosion of French will reflected, in part, the military's failure to
devise a suitable operational strategy prior to 1959. Having used
its border sanctuaries to preserve its military and political power,
the FLN exploited French willingness to negotiate an end to the
insurgency and achieved the strategic victory that had eluded them
operationally.69

III. Israeli Experience in Lebanon, 1982

A. Strategic Overview

On 4 June 1982 Israel invaded southern Lebanon to eliminate
the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO's) sanctuaries in
that nation. The Israeli offensive was the culmination of years of
Israeli concern over the PLC's presence in southern Lebanon. That
presence had increased as a result of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli
Wars and of King Hussein's 1970 expulsion of the PLO from Jordan.
By 1975, Palestinians comprised a state within the state of Lebanon.
In the aftermath of the 1975 Lebanese civil war between Maronite
Christians and a coalition of Moslem factions, the PLO gained
influence in large sections of southern Lebanon.70 This development
represented an intolerable situation for the Israelis who feared
that PLO strength would lead to increased terrorism and would
intensify West Bank and Gaza Palestinian opposition to Israel.71

The PLO's strategic aims in the early 1980's were to destroy
Israel and establish a Palestinian state. The means to achieve these
ends were the PLO's small military formations and over a million Palestinians scattered throughout the Middle-East. The strategic ways included diplomatic, political, psychological, and military actions. Recognizing their inability to topple Israel's military forces, PLO leaders stressed terror and guerrilla warfare to intensify Israeli sense of insecurity, increase domestic unrest among Israelis, and rally support among Palestinians throughout the Middle-East.72

During 1981 Israeli intelligence determined that the PLO was stockpiling supplies in order to escalate its insurgency against Israel. At the same time, PLO infiltrations, terrorism, artillery strikes, and efforts to inspire revolt among Arabs in the occupied territories impelled some Israeli leaders to press for an invasion into southern Lebanon to neutralize PLO sanctuaries, destroy the PLO infrastructure and support the establishment of a pro-Israeli Lebanese government. Such an operation, they argued, offered ancillary benefits of supporting Israeli efforts to reach an accommodation with West Bank Palestinians that would assure Israel control of the occupied territories.73

B. The PLO and Border Sanctuaries

From its inception in 1964, the PLO was dependent on sanctuaries in Arab states bordering Israel to provide strategic bases for its political infrastructure and as operational bases for conducting attacks against Israel. After King Hussein ousted the PLO from Jordan in 1970 as a result of its threat to his rule, the PLO moved to bases in Lebanon.74 Between 1970 and 1975, the PLO broadened its influence within Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanese
cities. Syrian and Lebanese Christian assaults on the PLO during the Lebanese civil war in 1975 forced it to shift many of its activities to southern Lebanon. PLO strength and influence subsequently increased as it allied itself with other Arab groups, such as the Lebanese Left, pro-Iraqi Ba'ath Party, and several Marxist groups.

Lebanese terrain and demographics enhanced the security of PLO sanctuaries and extended PLO guerrillas opportunities for achieving surprise in their military operations against Israel. From the Israeli border north towards Beirut, there was only one, poorly maintained two lane road, bordered on both sides by mountainous terrain and citrus groves and which passed across three major rivers and through several urban areas. In the central zone of Lebanon, rugged terrain and limited east-west mobility corridors also limited maneuverability. In eastern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley offered improved mobility and contained routes that ran east towards Syria and west towards Beirut. While Lebanon’s border offered few natural barriers to insurgent infiltration into Israel, lack of transportation assets, poor roads, and internecine strife among Arab factions consistently hamstrung PLO efforts to capitalize on the benefits derived from Lebanese sanctuaries.

Two major events in the late 1970’s enhanced the security of PLO sanctuaries and the PLO’s ability to conduct offensives against Israel. By 1978, Syrian forces guarded major road networks between Damascus and Beirut and controlled the Bekaa Valley. Also in 1978, the United Nations positioned the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) along the Lebanese-Israeli border in the aftermath of Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon during that year.
While this force was supposed to prevent either side from using southern Lebanon for military purposes, the PLO repositioned over 700 hundred guerrillas within the UNIFIL zone.  

Israel’s lack of strategic and operational depth caused its leaders to exaggerate PLO capabilities and the threat posed by PLO sanctuaries in Lebanon. Though the peace settlement with Egypt and subsequent placement of peacekeeping forces in the Sinai in the early 1980’s provided Israel with relative depth to the southwest, other Arab states and the PLO remained capable of striking Israel with air, indirect fire, conventional ground assaults, and terrorism. Between 1980 and 1982 Israeli leaders became alarmed as a result of an escalation of PLO attacks against northern Israel, improvements in the PLO’s weaponry (tanks, artillery, rockets, and surface to air missiles), and Syria’s increased presence in southern Lebanon. In reality, however, the PLO was a fractured organization possessing limited military resources and capabilities. The political wing of the PLO, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), approved programs, established budgets, and coordinated administrative activities. As leader of the executive committee, Yasir Arafat was the titular head of the PLO and of its leading guerrilla group, Al Fatah. The military arm of the PLO was a fragile coalition of nine major groups embracing competing ideologies, perspectives, and tactics. Together these forces totaled around 15,000 in the area from the Lebanese-Israeli border to southern Beirut and were armed with an assortment of limited numbers of tanks, artillery, mortars, rockets, and air defense missiles and of large numbers of small arms.  

These forces were poorly led,
trained and organized and usually operated in company and smaller size formations. Another ninety private armies representing Moslem, Druse and Christian factions further muddled Israeli threat assessments. Though these forces individually posed no operational threat, they were unpredictable and could hinder Israeli tactical operations and exacerbate regional instability.

To surmount its weaknesses, the PLO relied extensively on Syrian forces in Lebanon. Syria deployed its units to enhance its influence in the region and to deter an Israeli invasion. Thirty thousand soldiers in two divisions constituted that nation's operational center of gravity in Lebanon. They defended the road networks in the vicinity of the cities of Hasbaiya, Masghara and the Jouf Jannine in order to deter or defeat an Israeli invasion of Syria. A second Syrian concentration of approximately division size secured the highway connecting Damascus and Beirut.

The PLO distributed its forces in Lebanon in a fashion that would capitalize on the presence of Syrian forces; would protect its bases from attack from Israeli, Phalangist, and other Moslem forces; and would facilitate terrorist and guerrilla attacks against Israel. PLO command of Lebanese sanctuaries hinged on its control of coastal cities with large concentrations of Palestinian refugees (Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre). Though of secondary importance, control of the interior of southern Lebanon denied Israel access to Lebanese urban areas and provided bases for launching harassing fires and ground attacks against Israel. Consequently, the PLO established four major defensive zones of operations. In the east, 1500 guerrillas, supported by Syrian forces, established bases and defended road
networks between Hasbaiya and Rachaiya (Fatahland). In the Achiye area north of Marjayoun, 500 PLO fighters, supported by 8000 residents of Nabitiya, defended a second zone of road networks leading to the Bekaa Valley. A third zone consisted of Beaufort Castle, which dominated terrain in the Nabitiya area and provided the PLO with observation of northern Israel. The fourth major interior defensive zone consisted of 700 guerrillas occupying positions in Jouaiya. Though sanctuaries supported PLO strikes against Israeli targets, lack of unity among PLO factions led to poorly conceived and executed operations that routinely ended in failure and often embarrassed the PLO’s political leaders.

C. Analysis of Israeli Operational Methods for Neutralizing PLO Border Sanctuaries

During the late 1970’s, Israel conducted air strikes against PLO installations in southern Lebanon in retaliation for terrorist attacks. These efforts were limited and did not reflect a concerted Israeli effort to neutralize PLO bases. In March 1978, the Israelis conducted Operation Litani, a limited strike against PLO bases in Lebanon south of the Litani river in order to establish a 25 kilometer wide security zone. For three months the IDF destroyed PLO bases and forced the PLO to withdraw to Lebanese cities north of the Litani River. They augmented this buffer with a barrier fence along the Lebanese-Israeli border that included strong points, patrols and strike teams that would identify and destroy PLO infiltrators. To suppress PLO resurgence in the buffer zone, the Israelis expanded their support for Christian militias operating in southern Lebanon. Led by Lebanese Major Sa’ad Haddad, the Christian
forces were dispersed in three enclaves that were connected by a line of communications that ran through northern Israel. Despite these efforts, Israel was unable to prevent the PLO from using sanctuaries to conduct military operations.96

The Israeli cabinet considered three campaign plans five months prior to the June 1982 invasion. Plan one, which expanded on the 1978 Operation Litani, called for a limited air-ground campaign directed against PLO forces concentrated in southern Lebanon with the aim of preventing further artillery and terrorist attacks against northern Israeli settlements. Forces were to avoid a confrontation with the Syrians and were to advance approximately forty kilometers from the Israeli border as measured from the town of Rosh Hanikra.97 A second plan, also oriented on destroying the PLO in southern Lebanon and on avoiding a direct confrontation with the Syrians, but required an advance extending to Beirut, where Phalangist forces, the military arm of the Lebanese Christian Kataibe Party, would assist Israeli forces in destroying the PLO political and military infrastructure in the city. At the conclusion of hostilities, Israeli forces would withdraw to a line forty kilometers from the Israeli border as measured from Israel's northern most border town in the Galilee fringe.98 The third plan sought to eliminate the Syrians and the PLO from southern Lebanon as far north as Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. As in the second plan, the Phalangists would support the IDF in Beirut.99

The means to achieve the goals expressed in each of these plans were Israel's superior strategic and operational intelligence infrastructure and its well-trained and well-equipped military. The
134,000 standing strength of Israel's army could be increased by an additional 100,000 within twenty-four hours of mobilization and by another 350,000 within three days. Israel's air force provided operational and tactical fires while its small navy secured the coast line and supported limited amphibious landings along Lebanon's coast. While the Phalangists offered potential benefits, they were unwilling and, to a large extent, incapable of conducting the tasks that Israeli leaders envisioned in the second and third campaign plans. Though supported by Israel throughout the 1970's, the 8000-10000 Phalangists were poorly led, trained and equipped. Unprepared to wage combat in Lebanon's urban areas, their true value to Israel was in providing intelligence on the PLO and Syrians.

In the aftermath of the 3 June assassination attempt against Israel's Ambassador to Great Britain, Shlomo Argov, the cabinet ordered air strikes against PLO command and control, logistical, and training sites in the vicinity of Beirut on 4 June. Denying that it was involved in the attack on Argov, the PLO retaliated for the air strikes by shelling twenty-three northern Israeli settlements on 5 June. That evening the cabinet approved the limited aims and operations in campaign plan one. Israeli forces would operate along three major zones of operations (an advance in the western sector in the direction of Sidon along three main routes; an advance in the center sector, towards Zaharani; and an advance in the eastern sector towards the town of Hasbhaiya) and would complete operations in 24-48 hours (Map D).

Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, acting through Chief of Staff General Rafael Eitan, was the operational commander. He controlled
the offensive through subordinate commanders of each of the three zones of operations. General Officer in Charge (GOC) North, Major General Amir Drori, commanded western forces consisting of 22,000 troops and 220 tanks in two divisions (91st Mordecai Division; 96th Yaron Division), two separate brigades (211 Geva Brigade; 35th Yarom Brigade) and a separate battalion (50th Battalion). In the center, Drori's deputy, MG Simchoni, commanded 18,000 troops and 220 tanks in two divisions [36th Kahalani Division (-); 162 Einan Division (-)]. In the east, the Israelis formed a corps level field command under MG Ben Gal with 38,000 troops and 800 tanks in five divisions [(232 Sakel Division; 90 Lev Division; 880 Tamir Division; Vardi Provisional Division (-); Paled Provisional Division (-)]. The IDF air force was to maintain air superiority and provide close air support and battlefield air interdiction throughout the campaign. Meanwhile, IDF naval forces would support amphibious landings.

Following heavy artillery and air strikes against PLO bases and command and control structures, Israeli forces advanced in the western, center and eastern zones of operations. According to the campaign plan, forces were to encircle and fix major PLO concentrations, destroy PLO weapons, command and control, munitions and supplies, reduce PLO political and military infrastructure, and deter Syrian intervention. In the west, Drori's 211th Brigade and the 91st division were to advance up the coastal road and encircle PLO forces in Tyre with part of the force, while the remainder advanced north to Sidon and Damour. Meanwhile, Yaron's 96th Division was to conduct an amphibious assault into Sidon from two staging areas in Israel. In the center Simchoni's two divisions
were to carry out supporting attacks to encircle and reduce the PLO strongpoint at Beaufort Castle along the Litani River and to capture the road junction at Nabitiya. The 36th Division subsequently would link up with the 91st Division at Jouaiya, while the 162d Division advanced north to Jezzine, orienting on the Beirut-Damascus highway and on the Syrian forces to the east in the Bekaa Valley. In the east, Ben Gal’s corps (the Israeli operational center of gravity) was to advance into the Bekaa Valley orienting on Hasbaya, Masghara, Lake Qaraoun and Joub Jannine to prevent the Syrians from either reinforcing from their own territory to the east, or shifting forces to the west to influence actions along the coast.

Rugged terrain and PLO resistance resulted in traffic congestion that slowed Israeli movement during 6 June. During 7 June, forces continued to advance along the coastal highway toward Sidon, while other forces attempted to clear the Rachidiya refugee camp near Tyre. Meanwhile, center forces linked up with those on the coast in the vicinity of Zaharaani junction while the 96th Division conducted an amphibious landing into Sidon, thereby encircling the city. In the center, Israeli forces overcame tough PLO resistance and rugged terrain and seized initial objectives by the morning of 7 June. Despite difficult fighting in the refugee camps, operational success of the first two days encouraged Israel’s political leaders to endorse military operations beyond the 40 kilometer line and to seek the elimination of the PLO. By 14 June, Israel’s political leaders modified strategic ends to include those favored by the hardliners: withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces (including those of the PLO and Syria); formation of
a pro-Israeli Lebanese government; and signing of an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty.\textsuperscript{112}

Unfortunately, Israeli leaders based new strategic ends on flawed operational assumptions. PLO forces that had exfiltrated from the Israeli encirclement in the south joined 12,000 -14,000 PLO fighters and a Syrian mechanized brigade in Beirut to defend the city.\textsuperscript{113} Though the PLO now presented an operational center of gravity vulnerable to destruction by superior Israeli combat power, the Israelis had to contend with political sensitivities and military complexities of urban warfare.\textsuperscript{114} Furthermore, Phalangist leader Basjir Gemayel, fearing reprisals from Syria, the PLO, and other Lebanese factions, and recognizing that an open alliance would aggravate post-war political alignments, refused to assist the Israelis in reducing the PLO-Syrian forces in Beirut.\textsuperscript{115} For the next two months, Israeli forces laid siege to Beirut.\textsuperscript{116}

Though it had moved slower than expected during the first three days of the invasion, Ben Gal's corps successfully seized critical urban areas and road networks and was positioned to encircle Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley.\textsuperscript{117} By 8 June, Sharon convinced the cabinet that Syria's efforts to reinforce its air defenses and ground forces justified an Israeli military response. This led to massive Israeli air strikes against Syrian air defense batteries on 8 June and counter-air operations against Syria's air force on 9 and 10 June that insured Israeli air superiority.\textsuperscript{118} On the ground, Ben Gal's forces clashed with two to three Syrian tank and mechanized brigades and a recently committed armored division. In addition, the Israelis detected an additional Syrian armored
division defending the Beirut-Damascus highway. These forces obstructed Ben Gal's rapid seizure of key road networks in eastern Lebanon before Israel and Syria accepted a US arranged cease fire on 11 June. The failure of the Israelis to control the Damascus-Beirut highway impinged on its efforts to force the PLO in Beirut to capitulate. Air and artillery fires failed to destroy or dislodge the PLO and intensified domestic protest, US pressure, and international resolutions for Israel to end the fighting. On 22 June, while Prime Minister Menachem Begin was in Washington conferring with President Ronald Reagan, Sharon attempted to regain the initiative by violating the ceasefire and launching a successful offensive in the center zone to seize the Beirut-Damascus highway. Despite this effort, the Israelis were unable to force the PLO to abandon Beirut.

Throughout the month, US Ambassador Philip Habib attempted to negotiate a cease fire and a PLO withdrawal from Beirut. By then, the PLO was under pressure from Israelis, Phalangists and Shi'i and Sunni Moslem groups to evacuate the city. While leaving Beirut meant the temporary loss of valuable strategic and operational bases, PLO leaders believed that they would retain the international prestige gained over the previous years. Meanwhile, Israeli leaders recognized by late July that destruction of the PLO in Beirut would entail unacceptable Israeli military and Lebanese civilian casualties and that continuing the war threatened their aim of installing a pro-Israeli Lebanese government. On 12 August Begin rejected Sharon's arguments for continuing the fighting and accepted
the US ceasefire proposals. According to the plan, Syria, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq and southern Yemen would accept PLO forces. 123

D. Assessment of the Effectiveness of Israeli Operations in Neutralizing PLO Border Sanctuaries

The PLO's aim of creating a Palestinian state required either the destruction of Israel or that nation's acceptance of a Palestinian nation comprised of captured territories. Though it enjoyed support from Palestinians throughout the region, the PLO's ability to conduct an insurgency within Israel was frustrated by that nation's effective internal security policies. Consequently, PLO leaders relied on Lebanese sanctuaries as secure bases for administering the organization; for conducting diplomacy and strategic planning; for training, sustaining, and dispersing forces; and for staging military operations. The diverse mix of religious groups and political organizations within Lebanon, combined with the large concentration of Palestinian refugees in camps near major cities, offered the PLO concealment and protection and provided the organization recruits and logistical support. Similarly, PLO fighters used Lebanon's well-traveled international air, sea, and ground lines of communication to screen their movements and their attacks. While Israel was not averse to launching ground and air strikes against PLO positions in Lebanon, it generally was restrained in the scope of such operations by domestic and international political considerations.

These factors affected PLO strategic and operational centers of gravity. Its strategic center of gravity was the durability of its relationship with Palestinians scattered throughout the region.
Too weak to wage large scale guerrilla operations or mobile warfare within Israel, the PLO relied on the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon to deter an Israeli invasion. Lebanese sanctuaries supported its efforts to erect a political infrastructure in the occupied territories and to wage terrorist and limited guerrilla attacks against Israeli and pro-Israeli physical, cybernetic and moral decisive points. Through limited military action, the PLO sought to publicize its cause; increase its prestige among Palestinians; enhance its position internationally; and erode Israel’s will to resist the PLO. Acknowledging that economy of force operations alone would not destroy Israel, the PLO hoped that its strength, combined with the capabilities of its Arab allies, would increase relative to that of Israel over time. Consequently, the PLO stressed preservation of its forces. The exception to this mode of operations occurred during the 1982 invasion when Israel’s destruction of bases throughout southern Lebanon and overpowering of Syrian formations forced the PLO to avoid defeat by concentrating forces and creating an operational center of gravity in Beirut.

Post-1978 efforts to neutralize PLO bases in southern Lebanon oriented on buttressing the UNIFIL presence with a barrier fence, mobile patrols, periodic air and ground strikes against PLO infrastructure, a 25 kilometer buffer zone, and an alliance with Lebanese Christians. Though these actions disrupted PLO operations, Israeli leaders increasingly favored measures that would eliminate PLO bases in Lebanon. By June 1982, the Israeli government approved a campaign plan that initially included operations that were acceptable, suitable, and feasible. The 1979 peace treaty with
Egypt, Iraq's war with Iran, Jordan's internal strife, and the relative weakness of Syrian and PLO forces reduced operational risk.\textsuperscript{124} During the first week of the invasion, Israel employed air, ground, and naval forces to create a 40 kilometer buffer zone to enhance the security of Israel's northern border.\textsuperscript{125} Capable of attaining and maintaining air superiority, possessing well-equipped and well-trained mechanized forces, and able to sustain an army of 11 divisions for 28 days, Israel could overcome limited maneuver space, PLO urban defenses, and Syrian forces to destroy PLO sanctuaries.\textsuperscript{128}

By modifying strategic goals during the first week of the war to include the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the establishment of a pro-Israeli Lebanese government, Israeli leaders adopted a course that proved operationally unattainable.\textsuperscript{127} Though it neutralized Syrian forces and encircled Beirut, the IDF and its Phalangist ally were unable to destroy the PLO. In erroneously basing future security along the northern border on ties with Christian Lebanese, the Israelis failed to recognize that Phalangist leaders were unwilling to alienate Lebanese Moslems and the Syrians. While negotiations led to the evacuation of the PLO and Syrians from Beirut in September, Gemayel was unable to reconcile the differences among Christians, Sunni, Shi'i, and Druse. His assassination on 14 September unleashed a new wave of violence and instability.\textsuperscript{128}

In subsequent years, Christian power waned while approximately 100 private armies battled one another. These factors diminished Israeli influence and increased Syrian prestige in southern Lebanon.\textsuperscript{129} Israeli forces occupied a buffer zone in southern
Lebanon before withdrawing in February 1985. Since then, intense animosities have continued to divide Israelis and Palestinians and have blocked peace negotiations. For these reasons few Israeli leaders have been willing to experiment with civil programs that might undermine the Palestinian insurgency in the occupied territories. To secure its northern border, Israel has resorted to barrier fences, patrols, punitive measures against Palestinian activists in Israel and in occupied territories, and intermittent air and ground strikes against groups threatening its security. While these measures have provided adequate security for Israel's northern border, they have done little to reconcile persistent differences with Palestinians that threaten Israel's long term security.

IV. Conclusion

The Algerian and Lebanese wars indicate that border sanctuaries shape the operational canvas in limited war and that a nation engaged in limited war must undermine the advantages that its opponent gains from border sanctuaries. Furthermore, an operational artist must address neutralization of sanctuaries in the context of defeating the enemy at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

Border sanctuaries have a pervasive impact on insurgent bases, lines of communications and lines of operations. They provide security for insurgents to train, sustain, disperse guerrilla forces and stage military operations. Though political demands, military considerations, or geography may dictate the establishment of bases in remote regions of neighboring nations, insurgents capitalize on
the reluctance of counterinsurgent governments to violate international borders and to inflict civilian casualties by erecting their infrastructure in cities, villages, and hamlets. Bases in these areas conceal, protect, and sustain insurgents and are astride road networks that mask insurgent movements. Such bases and routes facilitate insurgent mass, security, and surprise, and support insurgent economy of force operations and offensives.

These considerations affect both insurgent and counterinsurgent strategic and operational centers of gravity. In the Algerian and Lebanese wars, the insurgent strategic center of gravity was its bond with the people whose allegiance it sought (i.e., FLN-Algerian Muslims; PLO-Palestinians). Similarly, the counterinsurgent strategic center(s) of gravity were the strength of the relationship among the government, military and people of a state(s). In an insurgency, each side’s ability to achieve strategic ends depends on its success in defeating the other’s strategic center(s) of gravity while preserving its own. In this regard, sanctuaries afford insurgents the ability to protect their strategic center of gravity and to pursue military strategies that exhaust the will of their opponent.

In keeping with Mao’s theory of revolutionary warfare, insurgents disperse their forces in time and space, and concentrate to form an operational center of gravity only when operational success is likely (i.e., phase III-mobile warfare) or when risks are politically justified (i.e., Battle of Algiers, 1957; Battle for Beirut, 1982). In the interim, dispersed guerrilla forces employ terror and guerrilla warfare (economy of force operations) to attack
physical, cybernetic and moral decisive points to exhaust the will of the counterinsurgent and to gain time to strengthen the insurgent organization politically and militarily.

Border sanctuaries confront counterinsurgent political and military leaders with strategic and operational dilemmas. By rejecting strikes against border sanctuaries (French in Algeria), a government requires the operational commander to choose between dispersing forces to protect vital installations and concentrating to attack insurgent bases and guerrilla forces within the nation. The first alternative increases the security of government rear areas at the costs of extending the initiative to the insurgent and enhancing the security of insurgent bases. The second diminishes counterinsurgent security but leaves the general population and government infrastructure vulnerable to insurgent attacks. In electing to concentrate forces to eliminate insurgent border sanctuaries (Israel in Lebanon), the counterinsurgent government increases its military options and its opportunities for seizing the initiative while accepting the risks associated with securing rear areas, widening the conflict, and sparking international condemnation.

In both options, the insurgent's tendency to disperse forces in time and space requires counterinsurgents to identify and to concentrate combat power against physical, cybernetic and moral decisive points that exhaust insurgents over time. As the French and Israelis discovered, attacks against decisive points rarely lead to rapid defeat of the insurgent. In many instances, insurgents can preserve their strength by withdrawing to new sanctuaries (i.e., FLN...
withdrew to Tunisia and Morocco; PLO withdrew to northern Lebanon and other Arab states). In this context, the strategic value of striking decisive points is to gain time for the government to carry out diplomatic initiatives that isolate insurgents internationally and deny them sanctuaries and to conduct reform programs that reduce the causes of internal conflict. Operational benefits derived from attacking decisive points include securing friendly bases, disrupting insurgent bases, destroying insurgent infrastructure, and defeating guerrilla formations. At the same time, government forces must be prepared to defeat an insurgent operational center of gravity if presented (i.e., FLN in Algiers, 1957; PLO in Beirut, 1982).

The Algerian and Lebanese wars indicate that an operational commander must include provisions for neutralizing insurgent sanctuaries in his campaign plan. Various tactics and techniques must be linked together in an overarching operational scheme that addresses neutralization of sanctuaries in the context of defeating the insurgents. The French and Israeli efforts demonstrate that planners should consider the following: deny the enemy use of land, air, and sea routes of infiltration; erect a barrier system consisting of population, remote area and resource control programs, fences, sensors, mobile patrols, and mobile reserves to control border regions and to detect and destroy insurgents; prepare to conduct air and ground strikes against enemy sanctuaries; prepare to conduct offensives internally and/or externally; employ unconventional forces and foreign allies; employ psychological warfare; and integrate military operations with civil reform programs to eliminate sources of internal conflict. Most important,
political and military leaders must view sanctuaries in the strategic context and insure that national and operational strategies are suitable, feasible and acceptable.

V. Implications for US Doctrine on Border Sanctuaries

These conclusions indicate that US military doctrine provides a firm foundation for contending with enemy border sanctuaries in limited war. The Army's doctrine on border sanctuaries is the most developed of the armed services and is contained in FM 100-5 Operations, FM 100-20/AFM 2-20 Low-Intensity Conflict, and FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations. Four major factors account for the linkages among the ideas expressed in these manuals. First, combat considerations govern tactical operations when US military force is applied against hostile forces in a conflict situation and in war. Second, military confrontations may involve simultaneously peaceful competition, conflict, and war. Third, military operations in low-intensity conflict are designed to prevent escalation of tension. Finally, US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations provide sufficient internal security to enable the host government to conduct counterinsurgency programs and to pursue national goals.

FM 100-20 correctly surmises that operational planners in a counterinsurgency must determine the military conditions that constitute success, identify steps necessary to achieve desired ends, and apply the requisite resources. In this context, the four interdependent functions of an internal defense and development program (balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization) described in FM 100-20 provide a base for integrating
civil and military operations at the operational level to neutralize the benefits insurgents gain from border sanctuaries. Security and neutralization functions include those counterinsurgency operations and counterguerrilla tactics and techniques that impact directly on border sanctuaries. In the interest of protecting the populace from the insurgents and of providing a secure environment for national development, security measures include actions designed to secure national borders. The border security operations described in FM's 100-20 and 90-8 are consistent with those French and Israeli actions that proved effective in Algeria and Lebanon. To overcome difficulties associated with sealing borders to prevent external support to insurgents, doctrine discusses the utility of air, ground and sea surveillance operations and border control methods (restricted zones and friendly population buffers). These activities are linked to neutralization operations (i.e., consolidation and strike campaigns and unconventional warfare) that orient on physically and psychologically separating insurgents from the population by disrupting, disorganizing, and defeating an insurgent organization while simultaneously strengthening public confidence in the government.

Often overlooked by military planners at the operational level are balanced development and mobilization functions. Balanced development includes political, social and economic reform programs and seeks to alleviate sources of popular dissatisfaction. Effective reforms require the government to recognize and allocate sufficient financial and legal resources to correct sources of internal
conflict. Mobilization involves all activities that orient on organizing and motivating manpower and material resources in support of counterinsurgency programs and on enhancing the legitimacy of the government. Though military officials understandably perceive balanced development and mobilization as being the responsibility of political leaders and civil agencies, they must incorporate civil programs within the campaign plan. As the French and Israelis demonstrated, the failure to accomplish this civil-military integration at the operational level reduces military and government counterinsurgency operations to a set of disconnected engagements and programs. This in turn negates the value of security and neutralization operations designed to neutralize insurgent border sanctuaries.

Viewing border sanctuaries in an operational context requires an operational commander to avoid the errors of French and Israeli leaders by devising a campaign that aligns strategic, operational, and tactical ends, ways and means. He must display imagination and innovation in developing a plan that integrates IDAD functions with other operational functions (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, support, protection and command and control). In this manner, a government can undertake military operations that neutralize border sanctuaries, isolate the theater(s) of operations, destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and eliminate sources of internal conflict. Effective execution of these civil and military operations translates tactical and operational successes into strategic victory in limited war.
Map A: Algeria, 1954-1962

Map B: Northern Algeria - Morice and Western Lines, 1957

Map C: Lebanon, 1982

Map D: Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 6 June 1982

Operations - 6 June 1982

1. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

- CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT
  - FORMULATE REQUEST FOR STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF JOINT/COMBINED FORCES TO THEATER OF OPERATIONS 1.1.1
  - TRANSITION TO AND FROM TACTICAL BATTLE FORMATIONS 1.1.2

- CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MANEUVER
  - CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN DEPTH 1.2.3
  - OVERCOME OPERATIONALY SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES 1.2.2

- PROVIDE OPERATIONAL MOBILITY
  - SELECT LOCATION FOR OPERATIONAL OBSTACLES 1.3.1

- PROVIDE OPERATIONAL COUNTERMOBILITY
  - ENHANCE MOVEMENT OF OPERATIONAL FORCES 1.4.2

- CONTROL OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT AREA
Appendix 1 (Continued): Blueprint of the Battlefield Operational Level of War (Tradoc Pam 11-9)

2. FIRES

- PROCESS OPERATIONAL TARGETS
  - SELECT OPERATIONAL TARGETS FOR ATTACK
  - ALLOCATE JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONAL FIRES RESOURCES
- CONDUCT LETHAL ATTACK ON OPERATIONAL TARGETS
- CONDUCT NON-LETHAL ATTACK ON OPERATIONAL TARGETS
- INTEGRATE OPERATIONAL FIRES
- ATTACK OPERATIONAL TARGETS
- REDUCE ENEMY OPERATIONAL FORCE EFFECTIVENESS
  - CONDUCT AEROSPACE OPERATIONAL FIRES ATTACK

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Appendix 1 (Continued): Blueprint of the Battlefield Operational Level of War (Tradoc Pam 11-9)

3. PROTECTION

[Diagram of Protection system with various branches and levels, showing the complexity of the operational level of war blueprint.]
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL
Appendix 1 (Continued): Blueprint of the Battlefield Operational Level of War (Tradoc Pam 11-9)

5. INTELLIGENCE

- COLLECT OPERATIONAL INFORMATION
  - COLLECT INFORMATION ON OPERATIONAL SITUATION AND HAZARDS
  - COLLECT INFORMATION ON OPERATIONAL TARGETS

- PROCESS OPERATIONAL INFORMATION
  - EVALUATE OPERATIONAL THREAT INFORMATION
  - ANALYZE AREA OF OPERATIONS

- INTEGRATE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
  - DEVELOP ENEMY OPERATIONAL INTENTIONS

- IDENTIFY FRIENDLY VULNERABILITIES
  - DEVELOP OPERATIONAL TARGET INFORMATION

- PREPARE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
6. SUPPORT

- ARM
- FUEL
- RX: MAINTAIN EQUIPMENT
- MAN THE FORCE
- PROVIDE FIELD, PERSONNEL AND HEALTH SERVICES
- TRAIN UNITS AND PERSONNEL
- PROVIDE MOVEMENT SERVICES
- RECONSTITUTE FORCES
- CONDUCT THEATER OF OPERATIONS RECEPTION OPERATIONS
- RECOMMEND NUMBER AND LOCATION OF SUSTAINING BASES
- PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRISONER CONTROL
- EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS FROM THEATER OF OPERATIONS
- CONDUCT CIVIL AFFAIRS
- MAINTAIN SUSTAINMENT BASE(S)
- SUPPLY OPERATIONAL FORCES
- PROVIDE SUSTAINMENT ENGINEERING
- DISTRIBUTE
END NOTES


a. Bases of operations: That portion of the country from which the army obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which it is supported when it takes position to cover the country offensively.

b. Lines of communications: Air, ground, and sea routes that support the movement of supplies, combat forces and maintenance and liaison units. Lines of communications are subdivided into supply routes and lines of operations.

c. Center of gravity: The center of gravity is the hub of all power. At the operational level, a center of gravity is formed when subordinate maneuver formations are concentrated, thereby providing potential combat power.

In "Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity," Schneider and Izzo provide an excellent analysis of the operational center of gravity. The operational artist seeks to maneuver dispersed to avoid collisions with the enemy's center of gravity. He swarms to create a center of gravity faster than his opponent (agility). He creates this concentration of combat power at a decisive point and time (synchronization). After battle, he disperses his forces in preparation for the next encounter. His forces continue the maneuver of swarm-fight-disperse sequentially and simultaneously throughout the depth of the theater of operations. Cumulative victories of each encounter, governed by an overall strategic framework serve to set the terms of the operation and maintain the initiative. In this fashion the operational artist erodes and destroys the enemy's will without suffering high friendly casualties.

Thornton and Campbell reject the traditional definition of centers of gravity in the context of insurgent warfare. Thornton contends that the operational center of gravity of government forces is political support, manifested by funding. The insurgent center of gravity is the sources of external support or insurgent - populace linkage or a combination of the two. Campbell argues that security is the insurgent's center of gravity by offering him the capability
to exercise initiative. Thornton is actually describing a "strategic" center of gravity while Campbell is defining a cybernetic/moral decisive point. In part, confusion in identifying an insurgent's operational center of gravity stems from a failure to recognize that an insurgency evolves through three phases (Mao's model of revolutionary warfare) and that the insurgent can disperse his operational center of gravity in time and space; thus, insurgents concentrate forces during phase II (guerrilla warfare), when success is likely or when the political risks justify concentrating forces, and during phase III (mobile warfare). The counterinsurgent must be prepared to recognize when the insurgent has created an operational center of gravity and react by quickly concentrating forces and attacking the decisive point that will bring about the defeat of the insurgent's forces.

d. Decisive points: A decisive point is any objective that will provide a force with marked advantages over his opponent. The seizure or retention of a decisive point will decide the outcome of the action. There are three kinds of decisive points: physical, cybernetic, and moral. Physical decisive points include terrain, facilities, and forces. Cybernetic decisive points are those that sustain command, control, communications and the processing of information. Moral decisive points are those that sustain the forces' morale and will to fight. Decisive points are decisive only in relation to the center of gravity.

e. Theater of operations: The contiguous geographic area of the theater of war that supports the integrated military, naval, and aerial actions, both logistical and operational, directed toward the attainment of a major portion of war plan objectives. The integrated actions are called campaigns.

f. Operational axis: The contiguous geographic portion of a theater of operations that supports the integrated actions primarily of military and air forces. These actions are directed toward the attainment of major campaign goals.

g. Zones of operations: Contiguous geographic portion of an operational axis that supports the integrated actions of primarily military and air forces. These actions seek to attain a portion of the major operational aims. These aims are achieved through the planning and execution of operations (i.e., one zone of operations for each US corps in Europe).

h. Lines of operations: The major routes suspended between bases of operations and objectives.

4 Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations (Wash., D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986), pp. 9-10; Field Manual (FM) 100-6 Large Unit Operations (Coordinating Draft) (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), p. vii, pp. 1-4 - 1-5, 3-1 - 3-24; Thornton, p. 13; TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield (DRAFT) (Ft. Monroe, Virginia: HQ, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1989), pp. 1-1 - 1-3, 2-3, 2-7, 2-9, 4-1, 4-3, 4-5, 4-7, 4-10, 4-13, 4-15, C 2, 2-3; Schneider, pp. 17-20. The major elements of the operational operating systems include:

a. Operational movement and maneuver: Conduct operational movement; conduct operational maneuver; provide operational mobility; provide operational countermobility; control defense of operationally significant areas.
mobility: provide operational countermobility; control defense of operationally significant areas.

b. Operational fires: Process operational targets and attack operational targets.

c. Operational protection: Provide operational air defense; provide protection for operational forces; employ operational security; conduct deception in support of campaigns and major operations; assess effect of operational deception plan.

d. Operational command and control: Acquire and communicate operational level information; assess operational situation; determine operational actions; direct and lead subordinate operational forces; employ C3CM.

e. Operational intelligence: Collect operational intelligence; process operational information; prepare operational intelligence reports.

f. Operational support: Arm, fuel, fix/maintain equipment, and support the force; distribute supplies; maintain sustainment base(s); conduct civil affairs; evacuate noncombatants from theater of operations.

5 Schneider, pp.17-20.

a. Feasibility: Means available can support the attainment of the operational end.

b. Suitability: Attainment of operational end contributes to the achievement of the strategic end.


8 FM 100-20, p. viii.


10 FM 90-8, pp. 1-1 - 1-2.

11 FM 90-8, pp. 1-2 - 1-3; Robert H. Scales, "Calling Down Thunderbolts in Small Wars," _Army_ (July 1989), 72.

support from critical groups within society and which exploits the weaknesses of the existing regime. Insurgents embracing this approach are active in urban areas, where political and economic power is concentrated. While Leninist strategy has few adherents today, its emphasis on the revolutionary party remains a fundamental characteristic of insurgent and revolutionary groups.

b. Foco Strategy: A foco strategy involves a small group of insurgents exploiting social, economic, and political unrest within a nation to spark popular desertion from the government. Because it does not require the establishment of a large insurgent organization, focoism offers potential for rapid revolution. Though it proved successful in Cuba and Nicaragua, focoism has failed repeatedly throughout Latin America. Some insurgents view it as a useful tactic in support of other strategic approaches.

c. Urban Strategy: An urban strategy involves relatively small, cellular terrorist organizations creating a climate of political crisis designed to provoke the existing regime into overreacting militarily and politically. This, in-turn, sparks social upheaval, contributing to wide scale disaffection with the government. While aspects of urban strategy were present in the 1970's Iranian Revolution and in Northern Ireland, it has proven to be of limited value to insurgents in revolutions in other parts of the world. Like focoism, some insurgents view urban strategy as providing useful tactics to support other strategies.

13 Mao, pp. 170-172; McCuen, pp. 50-53.
14 Mao, pp. 173-175.
15 FM 100-5, pp. 173-177.

a. Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
b. Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
c. Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative
d. Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage
e. Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared.


19 Horne, "French Army," p. 71; RB 31-100, pp. 4-7, 4-14.


21 Horne, "French Army," pp. 71-72; RB 31-100, p. 4-14; French Practical guide for Pacification, pp. 1-54.

22 RB 31-100, pp. 4-7 - 4-12.

23 Kelley, p. 36; RB 31-100, pp. 4-9, 4-12.

24 RB 31-100, p. 4-4.


26 Horne, "French Army," p. 71; RB 31-100, p. 4-4.

27 RB 31-100, p. 4-7.

28 Ibid., p. 4-11.

29 Kelley, p. 34; RB 31-100, pp. 4-10 - 4-12.

30 McCuen, p. 248; RB 31-100, pp. 4-8 - 4-9.

31 Horne, "French Army," p. 72; McCuen, p. 248; RB 31-100, pp. 4-8 - 4-9.

32 Kelley, p. 35; RB 31-100, p. 4-10.

33 RB 31-100, p. 4-12.

34 Ibid., p. 4-7.

35 Horne, "Regular Army," pp. 71-72, 77, 79; RB 31-100, pp. 4-7 - 4-10.


37 Horne, "Regular Army," pp. 9, 78-79; RB 31-100, pp. 4-7 - 4-8.

38 RB 31-100, p. 4-9.


40 RB 31-100, p. 4-14.


42 Horne, "Regular Army," pp. 77-78; RB 31-100, pp. 4-14 - 4-15.; Kelley, pp. 46-47; Trinquier, pp. 67-72.

43 RB 31-100, pp. 4-14-4-15; Trinquier, pp. 74-80.

44 RB 31-100, p. 4-16; Trinquier, p. 76.

45 RB 31-100, p. 4-16; Trinquier, pp. 81-82.

46 Trinquier, pp. 91-93; Kelley, p. 52.

47 Kelley, p. 55.

SAS units consisted of a French officer, noncommissioned officer, approximately three civilian contractors, and a security force of 30-50 Muslim Maghzen volunteers. SAS handled all military and civilian local problems.
Gabriel, pp. 50-53; Israeli, pp. 6-7.

Gabriel, pp. 130-131.

Ibid., pp. 53-54, 233. The Syrian 1st Armored Division (392 tanks; 300 artillery pieces; 30 SAM batteries; 12,000 soldiers) and ten commando battalions (2500 soldiers); Davis, p. 79.

Gabriel, pp. 53-54, 233. The 85th Infantry Brigade reinforced (224 tanks; 7500 soldiers) and twenty commando battalions (5000 soldiers)

Ibid., pp. 47-48, 50. Palestinian refugees were concentrated in the following locations:

a. Beirut - 1.7 million, residing primarily in Sabra, Shatila and Bourj el Barajneh refugee camps.

b. Sidon - 150,000, residing primarily in Ein Hilwe and Mija Mija refugee camps.

c. Tyre - 40,000, residing mainly in El Bass, Bourj El Shamali, and Rachidiya refugee camps.

Ibid., p. 49, Davis, p. 79.


Gabriel, pp. 57-58.

Ibid., p. 56; Davis, pp. 60-61; Israeli, p. 6.

Israeli, p. 6.

Davis, p. 76.

Ibid., p. 76.

Ibid., pp. 76-77.


Ibid., pp. 129-130.

Ibid., pp. 61-62,69; Davis, pp. 77,83,87; Evron, pp. 121-122,124-128,138. The Israeli cabinet's endorsement of the first campaign plan obscured disagreements among Israeli political leaders over the nation's strategic ends. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, and other hardliners wanted to invade Lebanon to eliminate the PLO and Syrian presence and to establish a pro-Israeli Lebanese government. Recognizing that this aim would be opposed by many Israelis and the US, Begin publicly endorsed the limited goal of widening the buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

Davis, pp. 77-79; Gabriel, pp. 75-77.

Davis, p. 79.

Ibid., pp. 78-79; Gabriel, p. 65.

Davis, p. 79; Evron, pp.132-133

Davis, p. 81.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 86.

Ibid., p. 84-86.

Ibid., p. 88.


Ibid., p. 134.

Gabriel, pp. 132-134.

Ibid., pp. 130-131.

Ibid., pp. 132-134; Evron, p. 141.

Davis, p. 83.

Evron, p. 135

Ibid., p. 137
120 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
121 Ibid., p. 142.
122 Ibid., pp. 142-144.
123 Ibid., pp. 146-147, 149.
124 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
125 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
127 Evron, pp. 160-161.
128 Ibid., pp. 151-153.
129 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
130 Ibid., pp. 138-139, 161-166; Gabriel, pp. 214-216.
132 W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of
133 FM 100-5, p.i; FM 100-20, p. i
134 FM 100-5, pp. 2, 4-5, 169-172; FM 100-20, p. viii; Colonel Kempf,
135 FM 100-20, pp. 1-13-1-14.
136 Ibid., pp. 2-17 - 2-18.
137 FM 90-8, p. 3-47.
138 Ibid., pp. 3-10 - 3-15, 3-44 - 3-45, 3-46 - 3-47;
FC 100-20, pp. 4-25 - 4-26; FM 100-20, pp. 2-17 - 2-18,
5-14.
139 FM 90-8, pp. 3-10 - 3-15, 3-44 - 3-45, 3-47; FC 100-20, pp. 4-25 -
4-26; FM 100-20, pp. 2-17 - 2-18, 2-25 -
2-26,5-14.
141 This perspective is borrowed from FM 100-8, p. vii.
142 Tradoc Pamphlet 11-9 (Draft), pp. 1-1 - 1-3, 2-3,
2-7, 2-9, 4-1, 4-3, 4-5, 4-7, 4-10, 4-13, 4-15, C-2, C-3.
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