Priority Intelligence Requirements:
The Operational Vacuum

A Monograph
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Priority Intelligence Requirements: The Operational Vacuum (U)

This monograph examines the problem of developing priority intelligence requirements at the operational level. Tactical and strategic priority intelligence requirements have been clearly defined and are taught throughout the military education system. There appears to be a vacuum at the operational level of war. This paper asks, is the Army training and educating intelligence officers to meet operational requirements and the answer is no.

The monograph begins by examining the current Corps/Echelons Above Corps intelligence structure. It reviews the manning and experience level of these organizations and concludes the force structure is not robust enough to support continuous operations.

Second, the paper examines the doctrinal literature to include Joint Chiefs of Staff publications and Army manuals to determine what operational intelligence requirements have been identified. It concludes the basic requirements have not been defined.
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However, the operational intelligence requirements for each service are
different and the current concept of "jointness" has not permeated our
doctrinal literature.

Third, the paper analyzes how intelligence officers are trained and
educated to develop and evaluate operational priority intelligence
requirements. Today, we do not train or educate our officers to perform
these functions. The doctrine and its very existence remain a mystery to
the majority of our officers.

Finally, six joint exercise after action reports are used to judge how
well the training and education system prepares officers to meet actual
operational requirements. This section concludes, due to an inadequate
force structure, stealth doctrine, and a lack of training, intelligence
officers are not prepared to provide operational intelligence support to
the commander.
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ABSTRACT

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: THE OPERATIONAL VACUUM
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Second, the paper examines the doctrinal literature to include Joint Chiefs of Staff publications and Army manuals to determine what operational intelligence requirements have been identified. It concludes the basic doctrine is available in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. However, the operational intelligence requirements for each service are different and the concept of "jointness" has not permeated our doctrinal literature.

Third, the paper analyzes how intelligence officers are trained and educated to develop and evaluate operational priority intelligence requirements. Today, we do not train or educate our officers to perform these functions. The doctrine and its very existence remain a mystery to the majority of our officers.

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INTRODUCTION

AirLand Battle doctrine has dramatically changed the way the U.S. Army will fight future wars. The doctrine has evolved from a firepower oriented, attrition style of warfare to one dependent upon a combination of factors to include initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. These tenets form the basis for maneuver warfare.

The adoption of maneuver warfare has placed greater emphasis on understanding how seemingly separate battlefield activities are part of the same operation. For example, FM 100-5, Operations, recognizes three separate levels of warfare; tactical, operational, and strategic. Despite the delineation, the three levels are part of the same activity.

The doctrine is also applicable to many different environments. The principles are pertinent to low intensity conflict in the urban sprawl of Europe or high intensity conflict in the jungles of Panama. The superiority of maneuver warfare is derived from the courage and competence of soldiers, good training and equipment, the soundness of combined arms doctrine, and above all, the quality of leadership. These factors remain constant.

The synchronization of these elements depends upon leaders who thoroughly understand the doctrine and know when and where to take action. Maneuver warfare thus depends
much more on intelligence and intellect than attrition warfare. Intelligence enables the commander to choose where and when to use the courage and competence of his soldiers to achieve the maximum effect desired.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IFB) is a systematic way of analyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain. It is an analytical tool which helps the commander and staff think through what the enemy can do and how it relates to their operations. It does not provide concrete answers but does provide options from which our commander can plan his operation and its various branches and sequels.

This process takes place at all levels. At the operational level, the challenge is to determine what the critical point, the center of gravity, is. This will allow the commander to plan his operation to affect the center of gravity.

It is incumbent upon the intelligence community to identify the centers of gravity by collecting and analyzing information. The commander's operational priority intelligence requirements (PIR) are the most important bits of information which the commander needs to know to answer this question. The purpose of this paper is to determine if the U.S. Army is training and educating intelligence officers to meet operational intelligence requirements.
Section I. The Intelligence Structure: Organizing for Success. This section will show the current configuration and rank structure of the Corps and echelon above corps (EAC) intelligence structure production elements.

Section II. Doctrinal Guidance: Blueprint for Success. This section will review the doctrinal literature pertaining to operational intelligence to determine the specific requirements which must be answered to support AirLand Battle doctrine.

Section III. Intelligence Training: Building the Foundation. This section will review how the U.S. Army trains officers to meet operational requirements. I will use the programs of instruction for the Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, Warrant Officer All-Source Technician Course, Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College to outline the training and education program for operational intelligence requirements.

Section IV. Intelligence Production: Reaping the Rewards. This section will assess the ability of the intelligence staffs to develop operational intelligence requirements based on their training and education. I will use six joint exercise after action reports to form the basis of my assessment.

Section V. Conclusions and Recommendations.
Operational intelligence is the stepchild of the intelligence community. The commanders need operational intelligence but no one single agency is responsible for its production. The tactical and strategic intelligence structures are very well defined however, at the operational level, we condone and even encourage a fractured intelligence effort because of the current force structure.

The Corps was designated as the headquarters for interface between national and tactical commanders. The corps headquarters may exercise both operational and tactical responsibilities. The Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade in support of the corps doctrinally has four primary tasks: situation development, target development, electronic warfare (EW), and counterintelligence (CI).

Note, that despite being designated as the link between the tactical and strategic commands, the doctrine does not identify indications and warning as one of the corps' primary tasks even though it is one of the primary tasks of operational intelligence doctrine. This is the first of many discrepancies between the doctrine and the force structure.

The PIR and other intelligence requirements developed by the
IPR process drive the tasking and execution of the primary tasks at both levels of war.3

The G2 and functionally, the Corps Tactical Operations Center Support Element (CTOCSE), are responsible for intelligence production. Figure 1 shows the CTOCSE Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), 34207L dated 1 October 1984 with its authorized officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers.6

![CTOCSE TOE](image)

Figure 1

The Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) section is the intelligence planning element for the corps. Intelligence requirements to include PIR are generated by the Commander, the G2, the All-Source Production Section (ASFS), and the CM&D. The requirements are translated into questions which become specific collection tasks for subordinate units and requests for information to higher Headquarters. The CM&D is also responsible for disseminating the final intelligence products to the users.
The CM&D has 17 soldiers to accomplish this critical around the clock mission.

The ASPS produces all-source intelligence products through the evaluation of their data base, normal combat information, and other intelligence data. Evaluation is a standardized method to determine the pertinence, reliability, and accuracy of information in further processing, disseminating, and decision making actions.

Analysts determine whether the information is relevant to the current operation, is filed for future reference, or is disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent commands. This responsibility falls on the shoulders of the 44 soldiers assigned to the section.

Both the CM&D and the ASPS appear to have enough manpower to accomplish the mission. This notion was verified by a former III Corps G2 who surmised, "because of an intensive collection effort and a robust analytical structure, today's corps maintains a comprehensive picture of the battlefield and is well suited to conduct warfare at the operational level." However, after closer examination, the physical manning of these sections and the average level of military experience can be drastically reduced with minor combat losses or the normal requirement for continuous operations. For example, a typical twelve hour shift rotation, immediately cuts the manning level in half.
Coupled with the loss of any of the senior leadership, the sections could experience a dramatic reduction in their experience base. Figure 2 provides an overview of a typical CM&D and ASPS experience base.

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<td>10 : WD</td>
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<td>5 : E4/6</td>
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<td>9 : E5/6</td>
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<td>11 : E3/4</td>
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*Clery typists and draftsman were not considered part of the intelligence experience base.

The Corps' analytical capability is further limited by the range of its organic collection systems. Corps ground based intercept and direction finding equipment must be physically deployed in the brigade area of operation to provide extended coverage. Technologically, the ground based systems have a range of less than 40 kilometers and are dependent upon electronic line of sight. Other corps
systems are dependent upon aerial platforms which have an increased range but are vulnerable to weather and airspace constraints. Clearly, these limitations do not give the commander a good operational perspective of the battlefield. Coupled with the lack of expertise in the Corps intelligence production sections, the commander may not get an accurate assessment of battlefield conditions.

The tactical exploitation of national intelligence capabilities (TENCAP) gives the commander intelligence collected by national level systems. It provides a better picture of the battlefield however, the national systems are focused to collect strategic intelligence. Operational information is collected on a secondary basis and the strategic analyst is responsible for determining the usefulness of the information to the subordinate commanders. This is an arbitrary decision based on the experience of the analysts. When information is identified, it is passed to the Corps by the Theater Army IEW CM&D.

The next link in the intelligence system is the Theater Army IEW element. Theater Army IEW organizations are tailored regionally and functionally to meet the special needs of the command. Regional tailoring matches units to a geographic area to provide appropriate language skills, area expertise, data bases, and equipment. Functional tailoring provides the proper mix of assets to support the five IEW
operational intelligence tasks. These tasks are: situation development, target development, EW, security and deception, and indications and warning.

Today, there are six multidisciplinary IEW brigades performing these tasks in support of the operational commanders. The echelons above corps intelligence center (EACIC) is the element in the brigade that provides all-source production and EAC level collection management support to the theater commander.

The EACIC is under the command of the MI brigade commander and under the operational control of the theater Army G2. Figure 3 shows how the EACIC and supported commands interface.10

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Figure 3
Figure 4 shows the EACIC TO&E, 34014J4, dated 1 April 1986, with its authorized officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers. Only the intelligence producing sections have been highlighted.

Figure 4

Figure 5 provides an overview of a typical EACIC experience base.

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<td>1 x E6/8</td>
<td>16 yrs</td>
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<td>12 x E3/5</td>
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Figure 5

*Clerk typists were not considered part of the intelligence experience base.
As figures 1-5 depict, the TO&E authorizations for personnel and the subsequent military experience base of both the Corps and EAC MI Brigade is thin at best. The majority of officers and enlisted soldiers have less than six years of military experience. Continuous operations can further deplete the experience base and cull the sheer number of soldiers producing intelligence. In order for this force structure to be effective, the soldiers would have to be thoroughly trained and educated in all facets of AirLand Battle doctrine. They would specifically have to understand the relationship of the operational level of war to the strategic objectives and tactical imperatives.

The following section will review pertinent doctrinal manuals and training literature and outline what the intelligence soldiers and commanders are learning about operational intelligence and operational PIR to support the commander's requirements. This review should provide a measure of the probable success of the current force structure. As noted above, the limited experience base of the current force structure must be well trained and educated to understand and implement AirLand Battle doctrine.
DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE
BLUEPRINT FOR SUCCESS

Operational intelligence doctrine has not been championed by any intelligence agency or branch intelligence service. A full eight years after the adoption of AirLand Battle doctrine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a draft operational intelligence manual and the U.S. Army for all intents and purposes has one chapter of a tactical intelligence manual dedicated to the subject.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS Pub) 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence to Joint Operations, is the keystone statement of doctrinal principles for intelligence in joint operations.12 The principles outlined in the manual are a synthesis of joint and service publications and the manual clearly states, "the doctrine is authoritative, not directive."13 However shallow, joint intelligence doctrine finally has something to build upon.

The manual is revolutionary in many respects. It is the first intelligence manual to set principles which are applicable across the operational continuum in any theater or joint operations area.14 It outlines intelligence purposes and applications which will enable intelligence operatives to focus their efforts. Particularly, intelligence is to be used to identify operational
objectives which will help the commander and staff develop operational level PIR through the use of the operational IPES model. Another often overlooked aspect is the use of intelligence to assist the commander in determining when objectives have been reached so forces can be reoriented and operations ended. Recognition of these principles will for the first time, force the intelligence community to expand their tactical view of the battlefield and focus their strategic perspective on the operational level. It will force the analyst to anticipate follow-on operations.

JCS Pub 2-0 is also confusing in many respects. I will cite three examples. It attempts to categorize intelligence by the level of war for which the intelligence is produced and used. Unfortunately for the analyst, intelligence does not have a convenient tactical or operational label. Analysts must determine the value of information at each level and across many levels.

Analysts perform many functions to meet operational intelligence requirements. JCS Pub 2-0 outlines six primary intelligence functions which must be performed to meet the operational requirements of joint commanders. They are: indications and warning, current intelligence, intelligence production, target intelligence support, collection management, and operational intelligence integration. These "functions" are similar to the five Intelligence and
Electronic Warfare (IEW) "tasks". These tasks are:
situation development, target development, electronic
warfare, counterintelligence, and operations security. The
variations in terminology and individual functions/tasks
does not allow for the systematic flow of intelligence from
echelon to echelon. It hinders the continuity of
intelligence doctrine and understanding.

Finally, the manual highlights a five step intelligence
cycle.18 This is a departure from the well known four step
intelligence cycle that has been used throughout the 20th
Century and is found in every intelligence manual produced
by the Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca,
Arizona.

These three examples are an indication of the division
in the intelligence community. Jointly, we cannot decide on
the basic doctrinal terminology we will use to describe how
we will do business. It makes it difficult to train and
educate our soldiers to perform in a joint environment.

For the intelligence operator, the dichotomy in
terminology and subsequent training means the services
reserve the right to conduct intelligence operations in a
parochial manner instead of operating jointly to meet new
doctrinal requirements. The manual clearly states,
"components are responsible for providing appropriate
products for integration."19 This allows each service to
analyze the information in a vacuum and arrive at a service oriented conclusion. These conclusions will have to be mediated, which will further hinder the timeliness and accuracy of the reported information. Under this broad guidance, the individual services are not responsive to the needs of the commander.

JCS Pub 2-0 has some major difficulties to overcome. It does not provide the necessary directive guidance needed to implement a comprehensive joint intelligence effort however, it is a start point for future development.

The Army’s doctrinal guidance is derived from FM 100-5, the Army’s premiere warfighting manual. It lays the foundation of how the Army will operate in a joint and combined environment and provides standardized Army terminology to minimize misunderstandings. It defines operational art as, "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations." Operational intelligence supports the commander and staff by providing information to develop campaign plans. The manual does not go into any level of detail regarding operational intelligence.

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, is the capstone intelligence manual, yet it does not detail intelligence responsibilities in support of the
operational level of war. It defines operational level of war intelligence as, "the intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns within a theater of war."2 It concludes, intelligence concentrates on the collection, identification, location, and analysis of strategic and operational centers of gravity.22

The IEW tasks performed at the operational level are more complex and involved in reflecting the political, military, economic, and psychological elements of power at this level.23 The idea persists that each level of command and intelligence is an aggregation of all elements at the next lower level and that there are no qualitative differences, only quantitative differences.24 The idea that operational intelligence is more than a rehash of the enemy, weather, and terrain is a big step forward in the intelligence thought process.

This thought process is captured in the five IEW tasks. The tasks are; situation development, target development, EW, security and deception, and indications and warning. These tasks form the basis for intelligence support to the commander. I will discuss each task and how they relate to the commander's PIR.

Situation development is IPB at the operational level. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, has a comprehensive list of requirements to include the
identification of PIR, which culminates in the determination of the enemy's center of gravity. It consists of theater area (TA) evaluation (the political/military objective), evaluation of the characteristics of the TA, threat evaluation, and threat integration. It focuses on theater transportation and economic systems, the political and sociological makeup of the population, the commander's personality and training, and the incorporation of the enemy's political and military objectives. Situation development forms the basis of operational intelligence support and all other tasks are derived from the analysis done during this task. The complete four step operational IPE process is shown at Appendix 1.25.

Operational target development is more difficult because the commander must have timely, accurate locations of high payoff targets so the operational fires can attack selected high value targets. This places an added burden on the intelligence system to better focus the PIR.

The commander must also plan his fires to support his branches and sequels early. He may not have direct control of the operational fires which may limit his execution options. For example, joint and combined aviation assets are the most likely candidates to execute operational fires. Coordination becomes more important because aviation assets require more logistics, intelligence, and planning support.
to execute their missions. Also, the targets identified must support the commander’s campaign plan. It is a waste of resources to attack an enemy vulnerability that will not contribute to the direct defeat of the enemy.26

EW is the means to exploit and disrupt the enemy command and control (C2) system. PIR must be identified rapidly so collection assets can be tasked and jamming targets can be identified. Operationally, aviation is the key to both collection and jamming operations. The commander’s intercept capability is located in the Air Exploitation Battalion in the Corps MI Brigade. The Air Force maintains the commander’s jamming assets. These systems require intensive coordination before their employment.

Indications and warning involves the continuous development and refinement of regional or theater based indicator lists.27 These lists give the staffs information on changes in the political, military, and economic behavior in the area of operation. The staff must translate these changes into intelligence the commander can use to develop his contingency and campaign plans.

Security is simply the steps taken to deny the enemy information about planned, ongoing, and completed operations. The objective of security procedures is to protect the essential elements of friendly information.
These elements are the enemy's PIR. Overall, security remains the responsibility of every member of the command.

In summary, true operational intelligence doctrine exists only in JCS Pub 2-0 and in FM 34-130. However, the manuals do not provide a coordinated approach to operational intelligence.

JCS Pub 2-0 provides a macro view of intelligence operations by encompassing the broad doctrinal concepts of all services. Its problems stem from a lack of a directive approach, thereby further institutionalizing the separate service policy of intelligence support to the commander.

Appendix D of FM 34-130 is the only practical operational intelligence doctrine available. It provides a solid framework for discovering friendly and enemy centers of gravity through a logical process called operational I²E. The process of discovery will generate PIR which will lead to the centers of gravity.

However, FM 34-130 is a single service manual. The doctrine needs to be tested in joint practical exercises to determine its value. Until all manuals reflect a joint approach to intelligence, operational intelligence will continue to be ignored in the intelligence soldier's education and training. This diversity of operational doctrine makes training to meet the commander's operational PIR much more difficult.
Building the foundation for a good intelligence system is a long and tedious process. Doctrine must be translated through the training and education system into a product the soldiers can understand. This translation process assumes that those that turn doctrine into training and educational experiences thoroughly understand AirLand Battle doctrine. Simply knowing the intelligence process does not guarantee a quality intelligence product. The Army needs officers who can think and decide about the tactical, operational, and strategic problems facing them and the Army as a whole. At the operational level, the number of tanks and airplanes is not as important as how these elements will be employed, how they will fight, and how their employment will help accomplish the commander's operational goals. This is the task of the training and education system.

The U.S. Army recognizes there is a difference between training and education. Training is instruction which will increase the individual and collective capacity to do specific military functions. Education is the systematic instruction of soldiers to enhance their knowledge of the art and science of war. It implies the comprehension of broad principles.
AirLand Battle doctrine embraces three levels of war. The Intelligence Center and School maintains proponency for developing and teaching all intelligence doctrine to meet AirLand Battle requirements.30 Today, the MI training and education system is geared to meet only tactical and strategic requirements.

There are many problems with the current intelligence training and education program and I will highlight several which need attention. Volume I of the Review of Education and Training for Officers study states those who develop and teach doctrine in the Army's schools must be subject matter experts (SMEs).31 However, throughout the Training and Doctrine Command, there are no published criteria enumerating the skills and knowledges required to become a SME and a member of the military faculty.

The skills and knowledges required to become a SME in operational intelligence meet this criteria void. The Army's operational intelligence doctrine is based on CPT Larry V. Buel's briefing paper entitled, "Intelligence at the Operational Level of War: Operational-Level Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield." The paper is an excellent foundation for further study but very little has been done to teach, test, and revise his ideas.

In March 1987, the Intelligence Center and School Commander asserted the School had conceived an operational
IPB methodology which would yield the enemy center of gravity. Three years have passed and the school has not incorporated operational intelligence doctrine into their curriculum. Consequently, operational intelligence doctrine remains a mystery to the junior officers and warrant officers who are responsible for operational analysis at the Corps and EAC level. The dilemma for the school, is how to train SMEs when there are no SMEs to conduct the training.

Currently, when officers study a nation's elements of power, they study only the military aspects of power. The emphasis is placed on "bean counting." The important facts are the numbers of divisions and armored vehicles, not how the systems are used to achieve operational goals. Enemy mobilization, employment philosophy, and history are excluded in their analysis. This is also true for the non-commissioned and warrant officer analysts who receive less formal training and education, yet they make up three fourths of the analysts in every intelligence section.

The next major step in an officer's formal professional education is the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). One of the stated missions of the college is to develop leaders who will train and fight units at the tactical and operational levels. As a student in 1988-89, I was struck by the lack of emphasis on operational level planning, and
particularly the void in operational intelligence planning.

CGSC has two courses "dedicated" to the operational level of war. P157, "Operational Warfighting" and A332, "Operational Level of War." Contrary to the CGSC mission statement, the concept of the operational level of war is not fully integrated into the curriculum. I will briefly discuss each focused course.

P157 requires students to plan and execute a conventional military operation in a theater of operations. The focus is on "applying the operational concepts of deployment, employment, and sustainment at the joint task force level." The students are thrust into a scenario without receiving any instruction which would prepare them for the leap from the tactical to the operational level.

For example, the intelligence estimate maintains a distinctive tactical orientation. It does not reference the enemy commander and his operating style, the enemy doctrine, time/space factors, or the political and moral will of the people. More importantly, it does not suggest tentative strategic enemy centers of gravity to focus the commander's PIR. The fact is, CGSC students are never introduced to a process which would identify enemy centers of gravity. Interestingly, the operational IPB model is not taught or tested during this course.

A332 is an elective course designed to produce officers
with an understanding of the "concepts, principles, and actions" which make up the operational level of war. The students are required to develop a plan for a major operation using the concepts they learn. During the course, operational intelligence is introduced in the eighth class session. One of the reading assignments for the course is CPT Buel's briefing paper. This three hour class is the only instruction the students receive which is focused on operational intelligence. I attended the operational intelligence class and found it did not generate much discussion. Neither the students nor the instructor had the background to break away from their tactical focus. During this three hour session, the students did not grasp the concept of how the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war impacted on each other and how this interaction impacts on the intelligence production effort. The class is a good start point, but the block must come earlier in the course and the instructor must have a better grasp of the material to generate meaningful discussion.

These two courses are the only ones dedicated to teaching CGSC students operational intelligence. The instruction does not educate them to use operational intelligence tools like IPB; nor, does it educate them to understand the complexities of the synthesis of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence into a product the
operational commander can use to develop his plans.

The final formal educational experience for most officers occurs at the U.S. Army War College (AWC). The AWC has the mission to develop senior leadership and to promote strategic study and analysis. The focus is on the acquisition of knowledge versus learning specific material. The AWC has dedicated one three hour block of instruction, "Theater Intelligence, Implementing National Military Strategy" (Lesson 3-35-L/S), to operational intelligence. The block has a one hour lecture and a 90 minute question and answer period. The only substantive reading assignment is CPT Buel's briefing paper. The AWC students do not have the opportunity to test the doctrine through actually developing operational PIR and working with the results of their collection effort. They do not analyze operational intelligence products.

The stated mission of developing disciplined, all-source intelligence officers is not being met by the intelligence community. The officer corps as a whole is being deprived of an operational intelligence background. Commanders without an operational intelligence perspective cannot hope to achieve victory. The key to success is to teach soldiers how to recognize the principles of war in action across all levels of war. This is the challenge for the 90s.
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
REAPING THE REWARDS

The production of quality intelligence is made possible by a robust force structure, sound doctrine, and good training. These elements form the basis of the intelligence system. It allows the intelligence system to direct the collection effort, gather information, process the information into intelligence, and disseminate the intelligence to satisfy the commander’s PIR.

FM 34-130 outlines a framework for determining the commander’s PIR. The operational IPB process is a four step process within the task of situation development. The process as noted earlier entails, TA evaluation (political and military objectives), evaluation of the characteristics of the TA of operations, threat evaluation, and threat integration. I will use the operational IPB process to show what information is required by the operational commander and what intelligence is actually produced. I will use six recent training exercises to highlight key points and indicate areas where a lack of training and education created difficulties.

TA evaluation is the translation of foreign policy into strategic objectives for subordinate commanders. It is a very difficult process and can appear to be disjointed.
Often American foreign policy can seem to be at odds with sound defense policy. For example, President Carter’s unwaivering stand on human rights issues often influenced his relations with foreign nations. This was particularly true in Latin America and with the Warsaw Pact nations. A more lenient foreign policy may have enabled the U.S. to coexist more peacefully and may have ensured more stability in our strategic objectives.

As soldiers, we must realize that political policy is not synonymous with sound tactical defense policy. They are only two of the five elements of national power which interact to create foreign policy. These elements of power are: geography, national will, economics, politics, and the military.

None of the after action reports I examined, noted the staff work required to translate the higher headquarters mission statement into manageable objectives for the operational commanders. This staff work requires the analysis of the five elements of power on a grand scale, before they are evaluated as the characteristics of the TA of operations. This critical area is not part of any evaluation criteria used to evaluate exercises.

Operational TA evaluation is routinely done for each exercise. The exercise directive plainly addresses the elements of geography, transportation nets, the current...
political situation, and communications capabilities. However, the underlying economic, sociological, and scientific and technological potential of the threat nations is not mentioned. Characteristically, each exercise directive is virtually a carbon copy of its predecessor. This indicates we have done very little to exercise our analytical capability in relationship to how these characteristics impact upon one another. This also implies we have not incorporated operational intelligence doctrine into our evaluation criteria. The scenarios I reviewed appear to be "canned".

Operationally, weather is a characteristic which we have in common with all services. The Army needs to work closely with the Air Force and Navy to develop a better understanding of our shared requirements. During Able Archer 87, the Air Force and Navy liaison elements noted they did not fully understand the type of detailed information the Army needed to conduct operations.45 For example, the majority of weather information for aviation, artillery, and intelligence units is provided by Navy and Air Force assets. The weather information for artillery units is normally much more detailed than the information required for intelligence units. The Navy and Air Force must understand what we need and respond rapidly.

Air Force and Naval assets are typically the
commander's only responsive sources of information on road, rail, sea, and inland waterways. These operational lines of communication are critical to planning offensive operations and anticipating enemy movements.

Despite the joint nature of the headquarters involved in the exercises, dissemination of this critical planning information is slow. Typically, intelligence data bases are not compatible among all the services. Normally, joint headquarters can pass information rapidly among themselves, but units under their operational control may not be able to exchange data bases. This is further compounded during combined operations where incompatible software, a language barrier, and extensive security problems create massive bottlenecks in the dissemination of intelligence information.

Today, we sport a tremendous intelligence data base however, there are several areas which remain relatively untouched by intelligence analysts. Typically, a generic political scenario is used to initiate hostilities for most exercises. The recent political background is habitually omitted and only cursory mention is given to the opposing nation's political support for the military. Recent events in Europe have shown how important the support of the people can be. The East German Army, formidable in numbers, but lacking in popular support, is but one example.
Economically, geography and strategic minerals play an important part in world events. Saudi Arabia without oil and South Africa without her mineral wealth, are not as vital to our national interest. However, coupled with their strategic geographic locations, these nations take on increased importance in our foreign policy.

Sociologically, the nations of India and Indonesia are important because of their tremendous population base. They have huge military age populations which if properly harnessed, could create problems in their respective regions.

Finally, the threat nation's scientific and technological potential for warmaking must be examined. Israel and South Africa are regional powers because of their nuclear arsenals. Despite their other shortcomings, membership in the "nuclear club" identifies them as nations which must be handled delicately.

Elementary AirLand Battle intelligence doctrine is available to help analysts evaluate the TA of operations. The doctrine clearly outlines the individual and collective tasks which need to be accomplished. The validation of these tasks has not occurred because our training exercises have not incorporated these tasks into the evaluation criteria.

The third task of operational IFB is threat evaluation.
It involves the review of tactical, operational, and strategic considerations of the enemy coupled with the TA evaluation. All exercise directives provide an indepth enemy order of battle list to include air, ground, and naval forces. The majority of this information is collected and analyzed by strategic assets and is forwarded to subordinate commands as threat intelligence. Operational analysts must scan these summaries to gather threat intelligence for their use.

Soldiers migrating to Corps and EAC assignments are hampered during exercises by their inability to transform this threat information into an operational intelligence product. Typically, the analysts revert to the familiar tactical scenarios and focus on enemy strength figures, tactical reinforcements, and the close battle force-space ratios.

These analytical errors are caused by a lack of personnel in the analytical sections coupled by inexperience. During Gallant Knight 88, augmentation of the EACIC by more and senior analysts was critical to mission accomplishment. The units participating in the exercise did not have enough skilled analysts to get the job done because the MI TO&E does not support required MI activities and doctrine.

The collection of information to satisfy the PIR
depends on the skill of the operational intelligence analyst. Collection management is based on the commander's PIR, the most important information he needs to know. The collection manager gets the requirements from the analyst, who tries to fill in gaps in the intelligence data base. The collection assets are tasked with questions to answer focused PIR. At the operational level, the PIR are questions which focus on information gaps in the evaluation of the TA of operations and the threat. The essence of the problem is, an inadequate number of unskilled analysts are developing the questions geared to answer operational PIR. This is the basic problem facing the intelligence community.

Further complicating matters is the problem of "jointness". At the operational level, the majority of operational collection assets are aviation assets. During Able Archer 87, the joint intelligence staff had problems understanding how Army and Air Force assets could be used to complement each other. Assets were tasked to collect on tactical targets or on targets which do not emit a signature the platform could acquire. This problem was resolved for the exercise by the exchange of liaison elements. The exchange of personnel is critical to assist in integrating service elements and to speed the flow of threat information to the commander.

The final step in the operational IPB process is threat
Integration. Threat integration has four substeps: enemy political objectives, military objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. To win battles, campaigns, and wars, the nation's political and military goals must be compatible. These are two elements of national power that cannot work against each other. For example, the U.S. achieved virtually all its military objectives in Vietnam but was soundly defeated at home and abroad politically. The political objectives of a free and democratic Vietnam were negated by our policy of artificially supporting a corrupt military government with U.S. military forces. These objectives were fundamentally incompatible.

None of the joint exercises I reviewed evaluated the effectiveness of the integration of political and military objectives. The sterile environment of the exercise scenarios indicates we work in a strictly military environment. However, during the invasion of Panama, the U.S. found it necessary to become involved in nation building at every level of war. We must prepare our soldiers to work in this complicated environment or we may arrive at conclusions which do not reflect the reality of the world situation. This could lead to an overassessment of our capabilities and an underassessment of the enemy's capabilities. Either situation could lead to severe consequences for our operational commanders.
Enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities are the final sub-steps in the operational IPB process. JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines capability as, "the ability to execute a specific course of action."56 It defines vulnerability as, "the susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or will to fight diminished."57 These definitions do not concentrate solely on the military element of power, but incorporate how all elements of power impact on the enemy's capabilities. This scope of analysis is not taking place in the Corps and EAC intelligence structure.58

As stated previously, intelligence training is focused on the military element of power and is oriented toward "bean counting". This is also true of the exercise evaluation process. Computer driven exercises are by nature numbers oriented.59 Opposing forces are assessed to have an advantage based on superior numbers at the tactical level, not on their operational deployment and employment. The majority of exercises degenerate into attrition warfare once the forces collide. The REFORGER 85 exercise specifically noted the focus of intelligence collection and analysis shifts to the close battle once engagements are reported.60 This observation is also true at the operational and strategic levels. The result is, the analysis of the close
battle does not lead to the development of operational PIR and the identification of the enemy's centers of gravity.

Finally, to further hone the operational PIR, it is the intelligence community's responsibility to analyze friendly vulnerabilities. During the REFORGER 85 exercise, this analysis was done as an afterthought and did not contribute to the exercise play. The reason for this oversight was, the analysts conducting the vulnerability surveys did not know the vulnerabilities of their own system.

Realistically, if the intelligence system were to provide factual enemy versus friendly comparisons, the analysts would immediately double their work load and, "open themselves up to a new and more dangerous area of bureaucratic vulnerability." This awkward position could spell disaster. Politically, the analyst could be pressured to produce comparisons with a biased viewpoint. This type of infighting and selfdeception could only create hostilities which could further obscure the process of developing operational PIR and the identification of the enemy's center of gravity.

The production of quality intelligence depends on a robust force structure, sound doctrine, and good training. Today, the focus of our training evaluations and lessons learned program are at the tactical level. To fully inculcate AirLand Battle doctrine into the total military
force, we must broaden the scope of our evaluations to encompass the synergistic effect of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war on the operational commander. This is the only way to eliminate the current operational intelligence vacuum.
CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

Operational intelligence is a new aspect of intelligence. It is new in that no specific organization is responsible for operational intelligence; there is no established and tested doctrine; it currently remains untaught in the military education system; and it receives only lip service during exercises, which should hone the focus of the intelligence effort to meet operational intelligence requirements.

The MI force is undermanned to meet the increased intelligence requirements of the modern battlefield. There are simply not enough soldiers to perform continuous intelligence operations. This fact, coupled with a low rank structure, means quality operational intelligence analysis cannot be performed with the current forces available.

Reality also shows that MI units rarely exceed a category II authorization, which keeps the normal manning level at approximately 70% strength. This strength level is again cut in half because of the need for continuous intelligence operations. This level of manning does not indicate a robust, experienced analytical force.

As stated, to make the current force structure operate effectively, all soldiers would have to be thoroughly
trained and educated in the intricacies of AirLand Battle doctrine. The military education system teaches functions, not substance. It assumes the soldiers will learn the intricacies of their job through the unit’s on the job training program. This is not the case. It is the school system’s responsibility to teach the soldiers what they need to know to prepare them for their assignments.

Today’s operational intelligence doctrine is not joint doctrine. The current doctrine is not directive which leads to parochialism and wastes critical intelligence resources. This misuse of assets will be particularly important in the future in a budget constrained environment.

Finally, the production of intelligence can only be increased in quantity and quality by joint exercises which test current operational intelligence doctrine. The current fledgling doctrine remains untested, because most exercises are computer driven, attrition type exercises which do not take into consideration the moral element of war. Also missing from these exercises is the incorporation of the five elements of power. Without the interaction of all these elements, our operational intelligence doctrine will focus on the military aspects of war which are only a small part of the total conflict.

The problems of operational intelligence may seem insurmountable however, there are solutions to these
problems. I will offer several recommendations under these categories: organization, doctrine, training, and intelligence production.

First, a single organization must be identified to provide operational intelligence guidance. Once the level of responsibility has been named, an organization can be tailored to support the operational commander. Lieutenants and junior enlisted soldiers are not trained or experienced enough to perform operational analysis and should not be listed on the force structure. The majority of experience must be found with the senior captains, majors, and warrant officers. If and when the training and education level improves, then these soldiers should be offered the opportunity to serve in these positions. The force structure must include liaison teams from all the service organizations. Operational intelligence is joint intelligence and the force structure must recognize this fact.

Operational intelligence doctrine must be joint doctrine. Today, no single service has the luxury to operate independently. During the Panama invasion, the predominantly Army action was heavily supported by all the sister services. The joint doctrine must be authoritative and all identified operational intelligence staffs must be joint staffs, using joint doctrine. All doctrinal manuals
must be joint manuals.

The education and training of our operational intelligence officers must be a joint venture. All officers at the rank of captain must attend joint schools and be prepared to think using joint doctrine. The current military education system would have to be expanded to meet these increased requirements. The minimum requirement should be a mandatory correspondence course geared to familiarize soldiers with joint doctrine.

The current military education system does not challenge officers to learn the underlying reasons for changes in doctrine. Military history must be the cornerstone in the rebirth of operational art and provide the background for systematic change in the U.S. Army by Army officers.

Operational intelligence production must be practiced in peace and in war with the same urgency. By using the recommendations above, the operational commander will have the foundation he can build upon.

The final element in the operational intelligence equation is the human factor. Each commander has his own operational style and his own intelligence needs. Intelligence soldiers must learn to synthesize all levels of intelligence to provide a more comprehensive view of events which may impact on the commander’s plan. Exercises are an
excellent way to think through situations which may occur. No plan will survive the campaign intact, but we must do everything humanly possible to ensure the "campaigners" survive the plan. For the intelligence officer, joint exercises are the best way to test the emerging doctrine and get this type of information.

Operational intelligence doctrine is a weak link in our AirLand Battle doctrine. The problems are due to ignorance of the doctrine not stupidity. Luckily, ignorance can be cured. The solution is to use and revise the current doctrine to meet the commander's intelligence needs. If we do not resolve to test our doctrine it is the commander who will be suspended in the operational intelligence vacuum.
1. Theater Area (TA) Evaluation: Given the imperatives of American foreign and defense policy, the commander assigns strategic objectives to subordinate theaters of operation.

2. Evaluate the Characteristics of the TA of Operations:

   A. Geographical aspects to include climate, weather, topography, hydrography, of operational and strategic importance to the theater of operations. May define natural avenues of approach, lines of communication, and key terrain.
   
   B. Transportation. Road, rail, air, sea, and inland waterways.
   
   C. Telecommunications. Critical communications facilities.
   
   D. Economics. The impact of geography, climate, strategic materials, metals, and the nation's potential for economic expansion.
   
   E. Politics. The nation's political system and the depth of political support for military operations to include a historical review.
   
   F. Sociology. The demographic and sociological make up of the population.
   
   G. Scientific and Technological. The ability to increase the nation's warmaking potential.
3. Threat Evaluation:
   A. The Enemy Commander. Campaign style and idiosyncracies.
   B. Doctrine
   C. Composition and Equipment. Air, ground, sea, special operations (SOF/ABN/AA)
   D. Reinforcements. Mobilization potential and the quality of personnel.
   E. Strengths. Maritime nation vs a strong ground force.
   F. Time/Space Factors
   G. Force/Space Ratios
   H. Efficiency. Mobilization capability and administrative organization.
   I. Morale. National will and leadership ability.
   J. Political Reliability of Allied Military Forces.

4. Threat Integration:
   A. Enemy Political Objectives
   B. Enemy Military Objectives
   C. Enemy Capabilities
   D. Enemy Vulnerabilities (Centers of Gravity)
      (1) Strategic: Fielded forces, alliances, sustainment forces (logistics), territory, and special weapons.
      (2) Operational: Major committed forces (main effort), operational reserves, C3I, lines of communication (sustainment), and special weapons.
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<tr>
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<td>United States Air Force Weather Team</td>
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ENDNOTES


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