AVENUES EMBATTLED: URBAN OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

A Monograph by
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AVENUES EMBATTLED: URBAN OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (U)

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ABSTRACT

Changing times have brought with them new definitions of security threats and national interests. Within the military establishment, these changes have especially affected the Army. Thus, the Army is increasingly seeing the need for involvement in operations "short of war." The recently approved final draft of FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-intensity Conflict, acknowledges these challenges and presents an umbrella concept for the implementation of such operations. The manual also recognizes that the nature of the conflicts, as well as emerging demographics, require a force able to operate in an urban environment. Optimally, this force is a security force, composed of police, paramilitary, and military organizations, and according to FM 100-20, is used only within the confines of a higher internal defense strategy. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army has little experience on which to base actual implementation of such doctrine.

The monograph first examines the doctrine of FM 100-20 in order to place in perspective the requirements of urban operations in low-intensity scenarios. This examination includes a brief discussion of the types of operations which are envisioned, as well as those functions which must be performed in order that urban operations may support the overall campaign strategy. Next, the threat is portrayed. This discussion looks at the threat from two vantage points -- first, in terms of classic urban revolution theory; and second, in terms of the models we have designed in response to such violence.

Given these foundations, the experiences and doctrine of the British army are presented, in order to provide some perspective on our own experiences and doctrine, which are subsequently addressed. As discrete lessons, the experiences of the two armies are seen to be very similar. When viewed in the aggregate, however, the experiences have had quite divergent impacts on urban warfare doctrine. The British, with nearly continuous urban operations, have developed a unified doctrine specifically for low intensity situations. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, has had only limited experience in urban combat, and has developed a disjointed doctrine caught between the competing demands of high intensity and low intensity conflict.

Finally, a new perspective is proposed for our urban operations. It is suggested not only that FM 100-20 include more on the urban threat, but that a framework be provided for urban operations in low intensity conflict. Called "Urban Consolidation Operations", this framework would unite the disjointed elements of our doctrine, and in so doing, bring low intensity urban doctrine on par with that of high intensity urban doctrine.
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Changing times have brought with them new definitions of security threats and national interests. Within the military establishment, these changes have especially affected the Army. Thus, the Army is increasingly seeing the need for involvement in operations "short of war." The recently approved final draft of FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, acknowledges these challenges and presents an umbrella concept for the implementation of such operations. The manual also recognizes that the nature of the conflicts, as well as emerging demographics, require a force able to operate in an urban environment. Optimally, this force is a security force, composed of police, paramilitary, and military organizations, and according to FM 100-20, is used only within the confines of a higher internal defense strategy. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army has little experience on which to base actual implementation of such doctrine.

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Urban warfare has always been an unappealing affair. In the distant past, as early as 300 BC, Sun Tzu could only advise, "The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative." Though he was writing of siege warfare, the same warnings have been applied equally throughout history. Even today they remain the hallmark of urban warfare doctrine.

What has changed, however, has been the necessity of such operations. In the more recent past, as urbanization has become more widespread and the aims of war more total, the alternatives to urban warfare have diminished considerably. Thus, by the end of World War II, urban combat was commonplace, and decisive in all theaters of operations. Greatest of these battles, without a doubt, were those fought between German and Russian forces, first for Stalingrad and then for Berlin.

U.S. perceptions of urban warfare are based largely on World War II experiences also. Though none of the American battles equalled the magnitude of the German-Russian encounters, countless lessons were learned in hundreds of villages, towns, and cities throughout Europe and the Pacific. Foremost of these were the battles for Palermo, Aachen, Brest, Cherbourg, and Manila.

Since then, the U.S. has been involved in two major urban battles. The first of these was the recapture of Seoul, in 1951, and the second was the battle for Hue, in 1968. Although the actions in Seoul did little to arouse interest in urban warfare during the 1950s, the
battle for Hue generated a great deal of interest. This resulted in the production of a number of studies on firepower-based urban tactics.\textsuperscript{6}

More recently, the battles in Suez City (1973), Beirut (1978 and 1982), and Khorramshahr (1980) have renewed again our interests in the subject.\textsuperscript{6} As with the urban battles of Korea and Vietnam, these were fought in a traditional manner. Though each were conducted within a politically limited conflict, all were fought in a tactically unlimited fashion. Even the battles in Beirut were dominated by firepower.\textsuperscript{7}

Thus, even though we have participated in, or have been observers of, several recent conflicts involving urban operations, our perceptions remain essentially those of the Second World War. By and large, we understand urban warfare only in terms of convention conflict in which force is applied in a traditional, direct manner.\textsuperscript{6}

But since the mid-1980s our Army's attention has increasingly been drawn to much less violent forms of conflict. Changing national priorities and threat assessments, as well as a changing world environment, have brought about a heightened interest in 'low intensity conflict,' or 'LIC.' We now even speak of military operations during periods of 'Routine Peaceful Competition.' While not excluding our traditional views on urban warfare, these new approaches certainly suggest that some modification of our thoughts on urban warfare be considered.
This study, then, formalizes such a consideration, and seeks to link urban warfare doctrine to that of low intensity conflict. The specific question to be answered is whether or not current U.S. Army doctrine adequately addresses how conventional forces should operate in urban environments. The first step in developing this answer must be to explain the exact nature of low intensity conflict, and how urban warfare fits into that doctrine.

II. URBAN OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict defines LIC as "a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among states." At the operational and strategic levels low-intensity conflict represents an 'indirect approach' for the United States, where objectives are to be attained primarily through nonmilitary means. At the tactical level, where actions will be much more direct, we are told that operations will be conducted generally in the Third World, and in a number of different environments. Although the normal environment is not specifically defined, three special environments are: Remote areas, border areas, and urban areas.

Within any of these environments, FM 100-20 defines as possible four different categories of operations. These include insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.
At first glance, it might seem that this categorization would mean that urban operations should only be approached in terms of each of the four categories. In fact, it might even be a misnomer to speak of "urban operations in low intensity conflict." A closer look, however, reveals that each of these types of operations cannot be thought of as distinct from one another. Rather, it is much more probable that any given low intensity conflict will move from one type of operation to another, or will have characteristics from a number of the categories present at the same time. Indeed, FM 100-20 states that any operation may involve "two or more of these categories." Of the four categories, only counterinsurgency operations are discussed in terms of urban operations.

Counterinsurgency, which includes all military and other actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency, is itself based on what is called the internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy. Ideally, IDAD is a preemptive strategy against insurgency. If an insurgency develops, however, it is also a strategy for counterinsurgency activities.

These activities, in turn, are a blend of four interdependent functions. **Balanced development** and **mobilization** are primarily the responsibility of the civil government, and refer to efforts to satisfy grievances and to motivate the populace to support the government in defeating the insurgents. **Security** includes all activities to protect the populace from the insurgency and to provide a safe environment for development. Finally, **neutralization** is
the defeat of the insurgent, and can vary from psychological operations to combat actions.\textsuperscript{13}

Within this framework, military forces participate as part of what is called the security force. This force, which is composed of police, paramilitary, and military units, is primarily concerned with the security and neutralization functions described above.

Security force activities which support these functions are, in turn, classified as either consolidation or strike operations. Strike operations are much like a raid, in that they are designed to destroy insurgent tactical forces without holding the terrain after the strike. Consolidation operations, on the other hand, are designed to restore government control of an area and its people.\textsuperscript{14} Consolidation operations, themselves, are broken down into eleven functional areas, of which Populace and Resource Control (PRC), Tactical Operations, Civil Affairs (CA), Public Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and Intelligence are highlighted as critical for operations in urban areas.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, it's a fairly long way from the tip of the 'umbrella' doctrine to the handle, where LIC doctrine sets out requirements for urban warfare (see Appendix A). In reviewing these relationships, though, we are now able to redefine the Army's role in urban warfare more accurately than before. Specifically, military units operate as members of security forces, and routinely conduct consolidation operations emphasizing activities in each of
the six functional areas listed above. As such, the doctrine of FM 100-20 provides the 'what' of urban operations in a low intensity conflict. Unfortunately, though, the manual provides little of the 'how'.

The question remains, then, of whether or not we have the appropriate doctrine to implement these tactical requirements. The search for doctrine, though, must begin with an understanding of the threat, as the threat must remain the focus of any doctrine.

III. THE THREAT

Theorists and practitioners of insurgency and counter-insurgency doctrine have long concentrated on the writings of the classic revolutionaries -- Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Che Guevara. Because of their emphasis on the primacy of the rural revolutionary fighter, little attention has been paid to the urban guerrilla.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, though, as attempts to export such Cuban model revolutions failed throughout the southern hemisphere, more and more attention was placed on the urban center as a base for fermenting revolution. Foremost of the urban insurgency advocates was Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian urban guerrilla leader who was killed in a gun battle with police in Sao Paulo in November 1969. His Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, which was first published in 1970, has become the standard handbook for urban guerrilla warfare.

According to Marighella, the principle task of the urban guerrilla is to divert, weaken, and demoralize the military,
the military dictatorship, and their repressive forces. In addition, attacks and looting operations should be launched against American, foreign, and bourgeoisie interests. To him, such tactics are the special strength of urban guerrilla forces, and are destined to make the urban guerillas a decisive part in revolutionary war.18,19

The Minimanual also discusses specific urban operations which will support such objectives. Marighella lists seventeen types of operations, which for our purposes can be grouped into four general categories.20 **Mass action** operations are designed to build popular support for causes which elevate the prestige of the guerrillas relative to the government. Insurgents will often infiltrate the ranks of otherwise legitimate groups in order to agitate violent actions during public demonstrations.

**Terrorist operations** are used to induce fear and insecurity in the public, and to weaken confidence in the government's ability to control the situation. Examples of terrorist operations include sabotage, kidnapping, and selective assassinations.

**Guerrilla operations** include assaults, raids, and ambushes. Often, these are carried out in order to obtain supplies. These operations are always characterized by a planned withdrawal and dispersion.21

The fourth category is that of **Psychological operations**, which can be of two types. The war of nerves is designed to misinform the populace, creating distrust of government organizations, as well as a sense of general
insecurity. Rumors are an important part of this type of operation. **Armed propaganda** is the exploitation of the other operations discussed above. Here the efficiency and impunity of the guerrilla forces are compared to the ineffectiveness of government reactions.

The purpose of each of these operations, of course, is to cause the security forces to overreact, causing a backlash of alienation and revolt within the population. In many ways, the urban guerrilla in less dangerous for what he does than for what he inspires.\(^2\)

The city, of course, presents the urban guerrilla with a fertile environment in which to be inspirational, especially in light of the urbanization rates in many of the third world nations.\(^3\) The mass movement from rural areas to already overcrowded urban centers is often accompanied by unrealistic rising expectations. But instead of opportunity, migrants are all too often confronted with complications, pressures, and ultimately frustration. To be sure, the attendant problems of inadequate housing, poor sanitation, boredom, unemployment, and corrupt officials and businessmen all favor the actions of the urban guerrilla.

As for how these urban guerrilla activities develop over time, most theorists see an evolutionary growth, much like that of Mao Tse-Tung's model of insurgency.\(^4\) Frank Kitson, a retired British officer well versed in counter-insurgency operations, has offered a slightly modified version of this model. His model has proved to be
especially useful in interpreting urban guerrilla warfare.

According to Kitson, insurgencies progress in three phases: the preparatory phase, the nonviolent phase, and the open insurgency phase.\(^2\) The preparatory phase is one in which the guerrillas build up organizational structures, frequently taking advantage of the government's inability to understand, or react to, the budding insurgency. During the nonviolent phase, guerrillas take advantage of numerous nonviolent protest organizations, either using nonviolent techniques as an end in themselves, or else as a means to ultimately foment violence.\(^2\) Open insurgency, the third and final phase, occurs when armed insurgents come out into the open and fight the forces of the government by conventional methods.

Other models have been developed exclusively for the analysis of urban insurgency. One of these, developed by Brian M. Jenkins, merits our special attention.

This model consists of five phases, or stages as Jenkins calls them, each marked with different objectives, targets, and tactics.\(^3\) He calls Stage One, *The Whole World is Watching*. During this stage, publicity is the primary objective of the guerrillas. Because cities are centers of communications, the insurgents have ample opportunity to make their story known to the nation and to the world. This stage is also characterized by sporadic bombings, abductions, and selected assassinations.

Stage Two is that of *Organizational Growth*. In this stage, symbolic targets give way to real targets, as the
guerrilla organization acquires money and weapons in order to continue the fight. Though violence increases, it is still somewhat restrained by the desire to avoid a premature crackdown by the government.

During Stage Three, which Jenkins calls Fort Apache, the guerrillas begin offensive actions. Their objective is now control of the streets, and the government's security forces become their principal enemy. All attacks are designed to demoralize and isolate the security forces from the populace, such that they begin to see themselves as defenders of isolated forts in Indian country. In accomplishing this, the urban guerrillas begin to supplant the legitimate government.

But before the insurgency can move beyond guerrilla warfare, the masses must be mobilized in the efforts against the government. This is the objective of Stage Four, in which Repression is Rapture. By forcing the government into invoking extralegal methods, such as martial law, mass arrests, or suspension of civil liberties, the guerrillas are able to position themselves as protectors of the people. Strikes, marches, demonstration, and riots are all used to reinforce this alienation of people and government.

Finally, in Stage Five, the tactics of the urban guerrillas are combined with the mass movements, and the urban uprising becomes a full assault on the government. In effect, the now violent mass movements act in an economy of force role, tying down governmental forces in a battle
for the streets. This allows guerrilla units to occupy or
destroy key installations and kill officials. This, then,
is urban equivalent of Mao's *War of Movement*, or Kitson's
*Open Insurgency*.

Obviously, the threat posed by the urban insurgent is
not one of a haphazard nature. Rather, it is based on a
coherent strategy, displays certain tactical operations,
and can be expected to go through certain phases of
development. The role of experience must be seen as a key
in this process, for not only has it been the basis for the
theoretical underpinnings of urban insurgency, but also for
the models we have subsequently designed in order to
explain the urban threat in action. Experience is also the
key to actions taken to counter these threats, a subject to
which we now turn.

IV. EXPERIENCE AS DOCTRINE

If the focus of doctrine must be the expected threat,
then it is equally true that its' foundation must be built
on solid experience. Although FM 100-5, *Operations*, does
not specifically state as such, others have noted the
importance of experience in the development of doctrine.
The distinguished Professor of history, Dr. I.B. Holley, for
one, has stated that actual experience must come first and
foremost in the search for doctrine. In effect, good
document links the future with the past, with the hope that
success will be repeated and failure merely remembered.

Unfortunately, the U.S. Army has had relatively little
experience dealing with urban warfare in low intensity conflict. In fact, the two have nearly been mutually exclusive, with experience in urban operations limited to total war scenarios, and with experience in low intensity conflicts primarily limited to rural areas. Our experience, then, viewed by itself may not form the best basis on which to develop an urban doctrine for low intensity conflict.

Fortunately, however, our friends in the British army have had extensive experience in these types of internal security operations -- especially in light of their recent and continued military presence in Northern Ireland. Though there are obviously many unique local issues and circumstances surrounding the Northern Ireland conflict, most observers have agreed that much can be learned from the British army's experiences. And while few expect military force to solve the current troubles, the army itself is often cited as an example of a 'well disciplined, highly professional, trained security force'. Such an example is one we can ill afford to ignore.

British Army Experience

British experience in internal security operations, of course, has been long and varied. In fact, the British army has been involved with these types of operations since the imperial policing days. Since those times the army's role has changed from that of conducting 'small wars', or the actual capturing of land and peoples, to that of maintaining shared power and providing assistance in the form of...
internal security. By the mid-1930s, these experiences had lead to the development of a comprehensive doctrine for counterinsurgency operations.

After World War II, the British army continued to be heavily involved with counterinsurgency operations. In fact, of the more than 50 limited conflicts in which British soldiers were committed, all but Korea, Suez, and the Falklands were of a counterinsurgency nature.

Increasingly, these conflicts required responses in urban environments. In November 1945, rioting in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv led to a decision to send troops to Palestine, and over the next two years British soldiers became proficient in riot control and urban search and cordon operations. Later, from 1953 to 1958, soldiers were used extensively in Nicosia, Cyprus. Then, from 1965 to 1967, soldiers were again engaged in urban operations in Aden, where duties ranged from riot control to combat against open insurgency. As before, the general principles of counterinsurgency doctrine were applied in each of these cases, giving the doctrine itself an urban orientation.

Thus, by the time troops were dispatched to Northern Ireland in 1969, British counter revolutionary doctrine was well developed, and included many of the lessons learned in the urban operations of the postwar period. In addition, many of the leaders who were to shape army operations in Northern Ireland had extensive personal experience in urban, low intensity operations. Nevertheless, many tactics, techniques, and procedures had to be learned, or at least
relearned, for the urban conditions of the Northern Ireland.

Although the army was initially deployed to Northern Ireland to quell communal riots, it soon found itself fighting multiple threats. These threats included simple criminal activity, continued communal riots, sectarian violence, and ever increasing levels of terrorism. Not only did these threats vary and develop over time, but they also varied from one section to another at any given point in time. In addition, the violence did not always progress in an orderly, phased developmental fashion. Rather, it was often the product of a 'spiral of violence' which frequently demonstrated an independence all of its own. Urban operations, therefore, could only be thought of as a blend of many tactics, from those of riot control to those of striking guerrilla bases.

Individual soldiers not only had to be able to function in a number of different circumstances, but also in a number of different roles. As such, regular soldiers were frequently tasked to perform missions seemingly unrelated to their tactical internal security responsibilities. Included were civil affairs, public information, and psychological operations. It was quickly realized, though, that such activities were the essence of urban operations. The closer the soldiers were to the population, and the more intiment their knowledge of their areas of operation, the better security was served.

In light of this, intelligence gathering activities were of paramount importance. Although special units were
responsible for undercover operations, regular units routinely conducted house searches, overt and covert surveillance operations, and vehicle checkpoints. Most often, units were given specific areas of responsibility, normally coinciding with established police boundaries. Again, this was done in order to build up the working knowledge of the soldier. Other innovations were also developed. For instance, "snap" vehicle inspections, in which checkpoints operated at one point for only a very short time, prevented targeting by guerrillas. House searches, ostensibly conducted to uncover arms, were used to determine the ages and occupations of residents, as well as the details of rooms and furnishings. Later, such information would be invaluable when testing the validity of statements given by suspects.

Patrolling, however, proved to be the primary source of intelligence in Northern Ireland. In the early days of the army's involvement, these patrols were conducted using normal procedures and organizations. Experience in the urban area, however, soon brought about a number of adaptations to the patrols. For one thing, the eight to ten man section was found to present too large a target for snipers, and was really bigger than needed, since firepower was not an issue. As a result, sections were broken down into four man teams, often called bricks, which provided mutual support for one another. Because every window was a potential ambush site, hard targeting, which was the tactic of darting from door to door, soon became standard
practice on even the quietest of streets. 

Patrols were also used offensively, to dominate contested areas. For these operations, a technique called saturation patrolling was used, with the intention of concentrating so many resources in one area that there would be little chance of escape for an exposed terrorist. In effect, this use of multiple patrols was designed to take away the inherent tactical mobility advantage enjoyed by urban insurgents, who could otherwise quickly disappear into the maze of buildings and people.

Tactical mobility was also an issue in riot control operations, where a gap was automatically created between weighted down soldiers and fleeting crowds. As a result, arrests of the leaders and suspected terrorists were difficult at best. Eventually, a tactic involving the use of snatch squads was developed to overcome this problem. This involved placing reserves of lightly clad soldiers out of sight from the demonstrators, who would then dart into the crowds to make arrests at the opportune time.

The tactical mobility of patrols, in turn, was greatly enhanced by the use of armored vehicles. For this, the British relied principally on outdated wheeled reconnaissance vehicles. Outdated vehicles were used because the modern inventory of vehicles were tracked, and tracked vehicles were considered totally inappropriate for internal security operations. Not only were tracked vehicles considered too noisy and too damaging to roadways, but they were also considered politically inappropriate.
(ie, they would viewed as tanks). Before long, the army had an extensive array of suitable vehicles, to include an armored fish and chips van.\(^2\)

There were other initial equipment shortages and 'mismatches' which were also solved during the conflict. Significant among these was the development of individual protective gear, to include effective riot shields and body armor, and equipment for detecting and dealing with explosive materials. This latter category included an impressive array of sensors and robotic devices.\(^3\)

Some equipment used in Northern Ireland proved to be less effective than anticipated, especially those used for crowd control operations. Two of the least liked weapons were the water cannon and riot control agents. The main problem with both of these was that they were area weapons and were, as a result, indiscriminate in their effects. In the view of the British, such indiscriminate use was not conducive to the restoration of law and order, and the weapons were used only as a last resort. Of more favor in the army's eyes was the baton round (later the rubber bullet), which was designed to be a discriminate and non-lethal substitute for an actual round of ammunition. Unfortunately, neither the baton round or the rubber bullet proved to be totally non-lethal, and the casualties resulting from the use of these weapons has fueled controversy even to this day.\(^4\)

For the British, the media became the key to solving, or at least reducing, these and other controversies. What
they discovered, of course, was that in public relations
the first to speak is most often the one heard. They also
discovered that results were much better when the press was
not treated as an adversary. Consequently, measures were
taken to accommodate, not just tolerate, the press.
Lessons were also learned about the relative value of
information. It was found, for example, that an
on-the-spot interview with a soldier had a greater positive
impact than less timely, but more accurate reports
presented by higher ranking officers.**

In total, all of these experiences have had a profound
impact on the actual tactical level techniques and
procedures of the British army. The influence of Northern
Ireland (and other urban areas) on their doctrine is
unmistakeable, and merits our further attention.

British Doctrine

The British army equivalent of our FM 100-20 Military
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict and FM 90-8
Counterguerrilla Operations is called Land Operations,
Volume III, Counter Revolutionary Operations. Not only is
it the equivalent of the two, but it also sounds a lot like
the both of them. Indeed, at the conceptual level, little
differentiates British doctrine from that of the U.S.

One difference, though, is that British doctrine does
not attempt to categorize sub-elements of counter
revolutionary operations to the extent that we do with low
intensity conflict operations.** Although definitions
are given for a number of different threats, the 'techniques and procedures' described are considered counter revolutionary actions, and are not described in terms of sub-category actions.

Another difference, and the most important for us, is that the doctrine of this manual has been written with the urban area in mind. Though it is not considered the only area in which counter revolutionary operations may take place, the urban area is not considered a special environment either.

This appreciation for the urban area begins in Part I of the manual, which is entitled 'General Principles'. Here information on urban guerrilla theory and tactics is presented. Part I also has chapters on Intelligence, Civil Affairs, Information, and Counter-Propaganda, all discussed in terms of the urban environment.

Part II of the manual, 'Procedures and Techniques,' begins with a discussion of four possible settings in which the military could be used in counter revolutionary operations. All four of these are described as urban areas.

Actual procedures and techniques applicable to urban areas are covered throughout the manual. Included are sections on subject such as: Use of Force, Arrest Procedures, Evidence, Public Relations, Contact with the Media, Crowd Control, Cordon and Snatch Operations, and Covert Observation Posts for Urban Areas. There is also an additional chapter specifically on urban operations.
U.S. Army Experience

Our Army has much less experience with counter-insurgency operations than does the British army, and even less so in operations conducted in urban terrain. Unlike the British, whose experience has continually reinforced the urban aspect of counterinsurgency operations, our experience has been fragmented and inconsistent, leading to a disjointed appreciation of the urban environment.

Though our involvement with insurgency is as old as the American Revolution itself, our involvement in counterinsurgency operations is normally fixed somewhat later, in the early 1900's. These early experiences were primarily those of the Marine Corps, who deployed over 130 times between 1800 and 1934. Perhaps most notable of these deployments were those to Nicaragua from 1909 through the 1920's.

From these experiences, the Marines developed an extensive doctrine for what was then called Small Wars. This doctrine, which was initially developed from a series of lectures given to students at the Marine school at Quantico, was ultimately published in 1940 as the Small Wars Manual. Unfortunately, virtually no mention was made about urban warfare, as the experiences in the Caribbean had been primarily rural in nature. More recent observers have noted that the reason for the Marine's success in applying civil control measures was due more to "constant sharpening to meet any emergency", than to any specific training for specific missions.
Since World War II, the most often cited uses of military force in urban areas have been the interventions in Lebanon in 1958 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Both involved the deployment of large numbers of soldiers to act as part of a security force dealing with an insurgency, and both were set primarily in urban terrain.

The Lebanon intervention, which represented the largest troop deployment between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, was initially envisioned as an operation to defeat armed rebels who posed a conventional type threat to the stability of the nation. Once inside Lebanon, however, the Army realized the threat was much different than expected, and soldiers were soon deployed in an urban security mission throughout Beirut (a mission which was to last 102 days). Though not a counterinsurgency operation, *per se*, the army began to learn some valuable lessons on low intensity urban operations. Of these, the need for restraint by soldiers even in the face of unanswerable violence was the most difficult to learn -- or accept. This issue would be looked at again, though a number of years later, in an operation in another part of the world.

This operation, of course, was in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Like the Lebanon intervention, POWER PACK began as an operation to prevent conventional rebel forces from assuming power in a traditional sense, but soon changed into one much less violent.

Unlike the Lebanon intervention, however, this intervention came at a time when security operations were
in vogue, at least in terms of accepted vocabulary. Thus, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., commander of US forces in the Dominican Republic, defined the operation as one designed 'to establish a climate of order in which political, psychological, economic, sociological and other forces can work in a peaceful environment.' Defined in this manner, and given the importance of Santo Domingo, urban 'combat' was to be critical to the operation, and many lessons were to be learned from the experience.

It must be noted that these lessons were to be learned by the 82d Airborne Division and the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, both trained in traditional urban warfare techniques. Once in Santo Domingo, though, the leaders of both units realized that they were hardly experts. Indeed, often times success or failure was based on knowing when to do something by the book or when to throw the book away.

A good example of this was the procedure for clearing a building. The then current doctrine urged soldiers to clear buildings from the top down. In Santo Domingo, however, sniper fire prohibited the movement from roof to roof, while the rules of engagement often prohibited effective covering fire on suspected sniper locations. As a result, doctrine had to be modified, and buildings were cleared from the ground up.

In other areas, the doctrine for urban warfare could be of little assistance, as soldiers and marines alike were tasked to perform a variety of non-tactical functions.
Included in this were civic action, civil affairs, and psychological warfare operations. In some cases, the lack of familiarity with proper procedures in these areas resulted in less than satisfactory results. For instance, troops unfamiliar with civic action procedures exercised little control over initial food distribution points, causing an inequitable handout amongst families.

At the same time that these "hearts and minds" activities were taking place, counterinsurgency operations of a more violent type were taking place. This battle, in which snipers were the major threat, was fought in a much more traditional manner: with firepower. The weapons primarily used in this fight included the M79 grenade launcher, the .50-caliber machine gun, the M16 rifle, and (on a much more limited basis) the 106mm recoilless rifle. Even as the peacemaker role of the military in a security roles was being defined, the traditional reliance on firepower remained.

To prevent unwise use of force, however, stringent rules of engagement were imposed, both by Washington and by General Palmer. These rules became the biggest single issue of the operation. Although history may prove that the disciplined observance of these rules was the key to the political settlement of the conflict, to the soldiers, they were a constant source of frustration and confusion. As Dr. Yates writes, "the soldiers cursed the restrictions and wondered why the military had not better trained them for political-military operations."
Unfortunately, little attention was paid to such questions after the successful completion of the intervention, especially in light of the rising concerns towards the situation in Vietnam. Nevertheless, focus was soon to return to urban operations, as racial violence threatened to tear apart numerous American cities in the late 1960's. Though of a different nature from the fighting in Santo Domingo or Beirut, these riot control operations were an important source of experience for the military in urban operations.

In reviewing the after-action reports from troop deployments to Detroit in 1967, and to Chicago, Baltimore, and Washington D.C. in 1968, the universality of several observations becomes clear. Perhaps most important of these was that the early arrival of forces, in overwhelming strength, served as an effective deterrence to further violence. As one might expect, discipline and appearance were key to the success of such shows of force. But disciplined formations were not enough, especially when the unit arrived after the point when impressions could be made merely by marching.

Once true offensive operations were required, mobility became an important consideration. For Task Force Baltimore, from the XVIII Airborne Corps, mobility was considered a "key to dealing with the guerrilla type activities" of the looters and arsonists. Problems existed, though, with the use of ill-suited vehicles (too large, too noisy), and from the lack of armored wheeled
Patrolling on foot was also considered to be critical, not only to dominate terrain, but also to gather intelligence. Much as was the case with the British, often the most valuable intelligence was to come from soldiers talking with spectators and participants.

In the area of command and control, the single most important lesson learned was the need for coordinated efforts with civilian agencies. As such, collocation of command posts, operational boundaries which coincided with existing police precincts or subdivisions, and joint police-military patrols were considered to be essential. Other issues included were: the necessity of commanders commanding forward, the accomplishment of unit relief in place, the need for detailed maps, and the strict observation of rules of engagement.

These experiences, unlike those of the British, have not had a major impact on our low intensity doctrine. The lessons of Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and the riots of the 1960's, while not totally forgotten, have been lost to either the conventional urban warfare doctrine, or to the traditions of our low intensity doctrine, or to the exigencies of the moment. It is to the status of our current doctrine to which we now turn.

U.S. Army Urban Warfare Doctrine

Units that deployed on all of these operations did so having been trained in urban warfare as envisioned in FM
Combat in Built-Up and Fortified Areas (1964). An updated version of this manual, written to better support heavy-force operations, was completed and published in 1979 as FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). This manual remains the Army's keystone source of doctrine for operations that 'include military actions that are planned and conducted on a terrain complex where man-made construction impacts on the tactical options available to the commander.'

Though written in consonance with the Active Defense doctrine of 1978, the provisions of FM 90-10 are still quite appropriate for the battles envisioned by AirLand Battle doctrine. As a cornerstone for urban operations conducted in a low intensity conflict, however, the manual suffers a number of serious shortfalls.

The most obvious of these is that the manual was written for application in a high-intensity scenario. As a result, it is a firepower oriented doctrine. It was also written exclusively for a European conflict, with the threat portrayed as a conventional, maneuver-oriented Soviet ground force. In addition, urban offensive and defensive operations are portrayed much like those for open terrain -- with fire and maneuver used to seize or deny terrain. In low intensity conflict urban conflict, offensive and defensive operations may very well need to be defined in different terms.

In 1982 an additional manual was issued on MOUT doctrine. Entitled FM-90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to
Urban Combat, this manual was designed to give explicit instructions on the infantry skills needed to support the operations described in FM 90-10. This is an excellent manual. Unfortunately for our purposes, it suffers from the same drawbacks as FM 90-10. Although the manual recognizes that urban combat occurs 'even in insurgencies', all of the skills described, the examples given, and the sketches drawn, apply to street fighting in an unlimited manner.

Thus, the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the current US Army urban warfare doctrine only marginally support the type of operations envisioned by FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, or those experienced by British and American forces since the end of World War II. While the doctrine provides guidance for the more violent operations in a low intensity campaign (such as strike or contingency operations), it simply does not address the routine requirements of an urban security force. Like the British, we can only find specific tactical guidance by taking a closer look at counterinsurgency doctrine itself. For us, much of this doctrine is contained in FM 90-8, Counter-guerrilla Operations.

Unlike the British Counter Revolutionary Operations manual, however, FM 90-8 remains excessively rural in perspective. All tactical and consolidation operations, both offensive and defensive in nature, are viewed in terms of the rural environment. Urban operations are specifically mentioned only well into the manual, on the
last three pages of Chapter 3, "Counterinsurgency Operations", while urban guerrilla organization and tactics are discussed for only two pages, in an appendix. Quite naturally, FM 90-10 and FM 90-10-1 are referenced for further information on urban operations.**

This is not to say that the manual does not address some of the specific procedures which will be used in urban operations. Most notably, FM 90-8 contains a very useful section on 'Police-Type Operations', which includes details on searches, checkpoints, cordon and search operations, and civil disturbance control procedures. Much later in the manual, in an appendix entitled 'Related Operations,' a general overview of populace and resources control operations is also presented. It is here that PRC operations are classified into three categories, which include surveillance (of individuals, groups, and activities); restrictions (such as curfews, travel permits, gun registration, and control of foods and medical supplies); and enforcement (by use of roadblocks, checkpoints, rewards, and searches of buildings). Together, these three categories contain all of the police-type operations previously mentioned. Unfortunately, much is summarized in both sections, and frequent references are made to other field manuals.

Thus, for a number of reasons neither FM 90-10 or FM 90-8 serve us well as base manuals for urban low intensity conflict operations. It seems that specific doctrine must be found in specific manuals. Given the fact that the
doctrine of FM 90-10 and FM 90-10-1 will support actual combat activities in an urban area, we must then look to the specific manuals on populace and resources control, civil affairs, public affairs, intelligence, and psychological operations for our doctrine. These, it should be recalled, are the functions deemed critical to urban operations by FM 100-20.

For the first of these, however, there is no basic manual. While the term is used generously in both FM 100-20 and FM 90-8, it seems that here doctrine has not gone beyond description. Populace and resources control doctrine must be found in other supporting field manuals.

The obvious source of much of this doctrine is the Military Police series of manuals. The base manual in this series is FM 19-1 Military Police Support For The AirLand Battle. Here PRC operations are addressed in terms of how military police organizations can support such operations. Essentially, PRC missions are redefined in terms of the military police's battlefield circulation control and area security missions. Unfortunately, FM 19-4 Military Police Team, Squad, Platoon Combat Operations, which gives detail procedures for accomplishing these missions, is written entirely from a high intensity perspective, and contains no guidance on urban operations or on PRC operations. Other aspects of PRC, especially those in the restrictions and enforcement categories, are covered extensively in FM 19-10, Military Police Operations.

Enforcement, as we have seen, often includes dealing
with mass civil disobedience. Our doctrine for controlling such disturbances is contained in FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances. This is an excellent manual, and the positive influence of the lessons learned from the American riots of the 1960's, as well as those from the Northern Ireland riots of the 1970's, is readily apparent. Not only does this manual provide a general concept of the operations, but it also provides detailed techniques and procedures for use by the soldiers at unit level.

A final source of doctrine on PRC operations is FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. This manual, while never providing a definition of PRC, explains the objectives of these operations, and delineates "general control principles." The manual also emphasizes the close ties between PRC operations, public affairs, psychological operations, and military civic action operations.

Such are the sources of doctrine on populace and resources control. Closely related to these operations are civic action operations, the doctrine for which is also found in FM 41-10. Military civic action, according to the field manual consists of operations that involve military forces in short-term projects useful to the local population. Though the manual states that civic action is often limited to civil affair units or personnel, it also stresses the need for combat units to be able to assist in such projects. While urban operations are not specifically addressed, an appendix to the manual contains a "Functional Specialty Tasks" listing which includes
activities appropriate for urban environments.

FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, and FM 46-1, Public Affairs, present doctrine for two more functions which are critical to success in any low intensity conflict. As with civic action programs, both of these are also closely related to PRC operations. While the manuals address the need for all soldiers to participate in public affairs and psychological operations, neither provides specific guidance helpful to soldiers involved in urban operations.

Intelligence doctrine, which represents the final function critical to urban operations, is found in the FM 34-XX series of manuals. The basis for this series is FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. This manual addresses both low intensity conflict and urban terrain, classifying the former as a "special operation," and the latter as a "special environment." 73

Although the discussion of low intensity conflict is quite short, it is rather good. Not only does it consider the value of local intelligence sources, but is also includes a brief discussion of urban operations in low intensity conflict. In particular, the field manual stresses the impact of urban terrain on the IPB process.

Still, there are a couple of major drawbacks to the manual as a source of doctrine for low intensity urban operations. First, the section on urban terrain is written strictly from a traditional, high-intensity conflict perspective, and is of little utility to us. Second, and more importantly, the manual does not address the specific intelligence gathering skills needed of a soldier in an

-31-
urban area. The manual provides a broad brush, but no
details.

V. A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Thus, we have come full circle, from general notions of
where urban warfare fits into low intensity conflict
doctrine, to specific doctrinal statements at the tactics,
techniques, and procedures level. Throughout, experience
has played a crucial part. We have learned, though, that
experience must be viewed from at least two perspectives.

When viewed as individual, discrete lessons in urban
warfare, many of the experiences of the British and American
armies have been very similar. From these experiences have
come numerous lessons learned which are common to both
armies. For instance, the importance of large reserves,
 mobility, local sources of intelligence, and adaptable and
responsible small unit leadership have all been stressed,
regardless of army or conflict.

When viewed in the aggregate, however, the experience of
the US Army is considerably different from that of the
British army. This is the perspective not of the individual
urban operation, but of the conflicts taken as a whole.
From this perspective it is apparent that even though many
specific experiences have been similar, there has been a
significant difference in the impact of those experiences.
Here we see just how much attention each army has paid to
those experiences.

Thus, we have the British army, which has been involved
in urban fighting nearly continually since the end of the Second World War, develop a doctrine which is clearly marked by their experience in cities. For them, the frequency and duration of these urban operations has fostered a gradual urbanization of their low intensity conflict doctrine. The results of this process can be seen in their manual, *Land Operations, Volume III, Counter Revolutionary Operations*.

US Army experience, on the other hand has been much more limited and infrequent. For us, urban warfare in low intensity conflict has been the exception to the rule, an anomaly in an otherwise conventionally defined tactical world. Our doctrine, too, bears the results of this. Two of these results are of particular importance.

First, and most obvious, is that we have a doctrine for urban operations in low intensity conflict which is suspended in the chasm between the competing doctrines of high-intensity conflict and low-intensity conflict. On the one hand, the doctrine we are looking for does not fit neatly into high-intensity doctrine because, by definition, we are concerned with operations taking place in other than conventional war. On the other hand, the doctrine does not fit comfortably into low-intensity doctrine, as that doctrine is oriented to rural operations. In effect, urban operations are caught in the doctrinal non-world of 'not conventional, not rural' somewhere between conventional and low intensity doctrine. Because we have been successful in our brief encounters with such operations in the past, we remain content with the doctrine as it is.
The second, and less obvious, result is more a problem of definition within low intensity conflict doctrine than of a discontinuity between doctrines. FM 100-20, it seems, simply defines the problems of urban operations away.

It does this with its emphasis on the noninvolvement of US forces in direct security force operations. While not specifically addressing urban operations, the manual is clear that the role of the Army is to advise and provide resources, and not to actually conduct operations. In particular, the field manual stresses that the Army not become involved in populace and resources control (a function which, as we have seen, forms a major part of urban operations). This is undoubtedly sound advice, and should clearly be the policy of the US. Unfortunately, the intentions of policy have unintentionally weakened our doctrine.

The bottomline of all of this, of course, is that we now have a hollow and fragmented urban warfare doctrine. This hollowness of the doctrine can be seen in the lack of substance of FM 100-20, which raises the issue of urban operations, but then fails to provide a framework for these operations within the overall low intensity conflict doctrine.

The fragmented nature of the doctrine is not so much a problem of FM 100-20, as it is of the implementing branch and functional manuals. Here, where tactics, techniques, and procedures are to specified, little consistency exists either vertically (with FM 100-20), or horizontally (with
one another). Those manuals that do examine urban related functions do so from differing perspectives, often using varying definitions and assumptions. Even finding the doctrine is difficult, requiring a search through numerous manuals.

At this point, then, the question of the adequacy of our doctrine reemerges. We must now ask ourselves, 'Does our doctrine adequately address how conventional units should operate in urban areas during low intensity conflicts?'

The results of this study indicate that the answer to the question must be a qualified yes, because the doctrine does exist in FM 100-20 or in portions of other field manuals. As a result, though, it only exists in a fairly disjointed manner.

What is needed is a new perspective on urban doctrine. Fortunately, there are a number of things that can be done to bring about this change.

First of all, FM 100-20 should be written to include a discussion of the urban threat. Though the current field manual recognizes the urban guerrilla as an increasingly active player in contemporary conflict, it fails to describe urban insurgency in any detail. Other insurgency threats are discussed in terms of organizational and operational patterns, and it would seem appropriate to include the urban threat in those discussions. This is especially important since the urban environment offers so many different ways in which threat forces can work against
the legitimate government. A discussion of classical urban theory would help emphasize the multiple nature of the urban threat.

Second, doctrine should clarify how urban warfare fits into low intensity doctrine as a whole, and not just into the category of counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, it is highly probable that the same actions will be required in counter-terrorism and contingency operations. Some of these actions may even be required during peacekeeping missions, especially if peacekeeping evolves into peacemaking. The best way to do this would be to move the discussion of urban fighting out of the counterinsurgency material, and approach it from an all encompassing low intensity conflict perspective.

To do this, urban doctrine itself must be clarified. This represents the third action which can be taken to improve doctrine. One should not have to make the tenuous journey down a cognitive chart (as illustrated in Appendix A) to discern what the role of military forces are in urban operations in low intensity conflict. The fault is not with the functions themselves, but that they are not bound together into a recognizable framework. Such a framework would allow one to speak of urban operations in low intensity conflict in the same way MOUT operations can be associated with high conventional conflict. It would also go a long ways in solving the linkage problem between field manuals by enforcing common definitions and terminology.
This framework, which could be called 'Urban Consolidation Operations,' would start with the functions already provided in FM 100-20, but would be complete only with the integration of doctrine from the various field manuals that already exist for each function. For instance, FM 19-15 Civil Disturbances and FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations both have much to offer for urban operations. So does FM 90-10-1 An Infantryman's Guide to Urban Combat. Each of these must not merely be 'cut and paste' contributions. Rather, all of the sources used must be integrated, and present a unified perspective on urban operations in low intensity conflict.

This framework should stand on its own, independent of FM 100-20, FM 90-8, and FM 90-10. It should not be contained as a part of FM 100-20 for the reason that this manual, as a statement of 'umbrella' doctrine should remain rather general. The other two manuals, while more detailed, have orientations which would detract from the urban framework. FM 90-8 is a counterinsurgency manual, and would serve to cubbyhole urban doctrine once again. FM 90-10, of course, is concerned about high-intensity urban operations and should remain so.

Perhaps, then, we would best be served by placing this new doctrine in a separate field manual. For this, I would recommend inclusion in the FM 90-XX series. Thus, we would have FM 90-10 for high-intensity operations, FM 90-10-1 for specific infantry skills in high-intensity operations, and FM 90-10-2 for specific 'Urban Consolidation Operations.'
VI. CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the current state of doctrine related to urban operations in low intensity conflict. In so doing, it has also attempted to show the influence of experience on doctrine. What we have found is that our current doctrine is disjointed, and fails to present a common framework, or concept, of urban operations. This was found to be the result not of a lack of experience, but of infrequent and short-duration experiences.

British doctrine, on the other hand, takes a much more unified approach to urban operations in low intensity conflict. Their extensive experiences, while individually of no greater value than our own, have fostered the development of a counter revolutionary doctrine in which urban operations are considered an essential element.

We need to learn from this perspective. More importantly, though, we need to build our own perspective of urban operations in low intensity conflict, and place it level with our high-intensity urban doctrine. While we do not intend to become actively involved in urban operations, we must be knowledgeable about the environment, the threat, and the appropriate responses.

Urban warfare, as always, remains unappealing. But it happens.
Appendix A

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

PEACEKEEPING  INSURGENCY  CONTINGENCY  COUNTER
COUNTERINSURGENCY  OPERATIONS  TERRORISM

[I D A D]

BALANCED  MOTIVATION  SECURITY  NEUTRALIZATION
DEVELOPMENT

[SECURITY FORCES]

[POLICE  PARAMILITARY  MILITARY]

CONSOLIDATION  STRIKE

POPULATION  TACTICAL  CIVIL  INTEL  PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESOURCES  OPERATIONS  AFFAIRS  OPERATIONS
CONTROL  (PRC)  (CA)/PUBLIC  (PSYOPS)
(PA) Affairs
ENDNOTES


2. For instance, Chapter 1 of FM 90-10 begins, "Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted only when required and that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than risking a costly, time-consuming operation in this very difficult environment." (p. 1-1)


5. INTREC, Incorporated’s Weapons Effects in Cities, Volumes I and II, (Santa Monica,CA, 1974) and the Infantry School’s Combat in Cities Report, Volumes I and II, (Fort Benning GA, 1972) are two of the most well known of these studies.

6. An excellent report is R.D. McLaurin’s Modern Experience in City Combat, (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Lab, 1987). The have also been a number of SAMS monographs written on urban warfare in the last few years, all of which have dealt with a mid- to high-intensity conflict scenario. See D.E. Kirkland, 'Offensive Operations in Urban Europe: The Need for a 'Heavy' Light Infantry Force'; L.W. Sherfey, 'Light Infantry in the Defense of Urban Europe'; and G.C. Gardner, 'Concept of the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe'.

7. Sherfey, p. 27.

8. This is not to say, however, that a number of valuable lessons cannot be learned from these experiences which might find application in future low intensity conflicts. For instance, in Lebanon (1978), the Syrians attached high-powered TV cameras to ZSU 23-4 and 57mm AAA guns in order to knock out point targets (such as individual window positions) at ranges in excess of five kilometers. See Kenneth J. Strafer, ‘A Recapitulation of Contemporary MOUT Techniques,’ Military Review, (February, 1981), p. 51.


11. Insurgency is defined as: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The primary objective is mobilization for a revolution. (FM 100-20, pp. 1-11, Glossary-12.)

Counterinsurgency is defined as: Those military,
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. The objective is counterrevolutionary mobilization. (FM 100-20, pp. 1-11, Glossary-7.)

Combating terrorism is defined as: Actions, including anti-terrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counter-terrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (FM 100-20, p. Glossary-6.)

Peacekeeping operations are defined as: Military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution of a conflict between the belligerents. (FM 100-20, p. Glossary-16.)

Peacetime contingency operations are defined as: Politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short term rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war. (FM 100-20, p. Glossary-16.)

13. FM 100-20, pp. 2-12 - 2-18, E-3 - E-4.
14. FM 100-20, E-7.

15. The other *functional areas are logistics, civil-military operations, health services support, deception, and C3. See FM 100-20, pp. E-14 - E-18, E-21.

16. This is not to say, however, that they did not recognize the value of the urban insurgent, or benefit from his existence. For instance, when Castro landed in Cuba, his efforts were aided considerably by the urban pockets of resistance already in existence. This urban underground played a major role throughout the confrontation, serving to divide the revolution into two fronts, one in the city and the other in the rural areas.

Even Che Guevara, who evolved into a rural guerrilla theorist, saw the importance of urban areas, at least in his earlier works. In his first book, *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, Guevara wrote:

There has been a lack of appreciation of the value of guerrilla fighting in the suburbs, but it is, in fact, very important. Appropriate operations of this kind, extended over a wide area, can almost paralyze the commercial and industrial life of an area and cause disturbance and distress to the entire population. This makes the people anxious for violent developments to bring an end to troubles. If thought is given at the beginning of the war to future possibilities, specialists can be organized for suburban
fighting.


Maraghella, however, was not the first urban insurgent. According to Richard Clutterbuck, the first recorded example of a guerrilla leader acting in an urban area with a tactical plan to achieve a political aim was that of Michael Collins in Ireland, 1919-1920. Richard Clutterbuck, *Guerrillas and Terrorists*, (Chicago: Ohio University Press, 1980), p.32.


19. The primary difference between Marighella and Guevara was not so much that of urban vs. rural orientation, but of which operation comes first. Guevara maintained that urban guerrilla action could arise only after the establishment of a rural base, whereas Marighella believed that urban guerrillas could begin independently of the rural base. To him, urban insurgency will often even predate rural insurgency. See Schlack, p.22.


21. FM 100-20 states that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to guerrilla attacks due to the increasing availability of high technology weapons. Others do not see high technology as central to the problem. Robert Moss, for one, emphasizes that the vulnerability is the infrastructure itself. As a result, even 'low technology weapons' can do considerable damage. He calls this the vulnerability of 'primitive weapons against complex technology'. See Robert Moss, *The War for the Cities*, (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972), p.11. This is echoed by N.C. Livingstone in, "Fighting Terrorism and 'Dirty Little Wars,'" in William A. Buckingham, Jr. (editor), *Defense Planning for the 1990's*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984).


23. By the year 2000, 92% of the world's growth rate will be in third world nations. Of this growth, a full 59% will be in urban areas. This means that within ten years there will be over 400 third world cities with populations of over one million. These figures are taken from a study conducted


26. Kitson feels that non-violent actions are a key component of an urban insurgency. He states that civil disorder must be recognized as one of the distinct phases of urban insurgency, and that non-violent actions are "essentially geared to urban life because they rely on the participation of large numbers of individuals." Kiston, p.85. See also Gene Sharp's, The Politics of Nonviolence, (Boston: P. Sargent Publisher, 1973).


32. The problems of counterinsurgency are immense, and according to Sir Charles M. Gwynn, the army is often in a precarious situation. This is due either to its' own actions or those of the government. He writes,

   "much less attention is paid to the circumstances which have in various cases necessitated the intervention of the Army than to the controversy which occasionally arises over the actions the troops have taken." (Gwynn, p. 2)


35. One of the most influential of these men was Brigadier Frank Kitson. This is the same Kitson whose phases of insurgency were discussed in the threat section. Brigadier Kitson had extensive experience fighting in counter-insurgencies in Kenya, Malaya, Mussat, Oman, and Cyprus. He drew on this experience when he wrote the seminal work, *Low Intensity Conflict*, as well as British and French colonial experience, and the experiences of the United States in the Vietnam War. The book represents the state-of-the-art counterinsurgency doctrine for the British as they went into Northern Ireland. Brigadier Kitson would command a brigade in Northern Ireland. He also was deeply involved in the revision of the British army manual on counterinsurgency, *Counter Revolutionary Operations*. See Roger Faligot, *Britain’s Military Strategy in Ireland: The Kitson Experiment*, (London: Zed Press, 1987), pp. 4-19.


37. Ibid, 57-74, 85-98


40. Sniper fire has been a real concern to the British throughout the Northern Ireland conflict. One of the problems in dealing with snipers is determining their location once shots have been fired. This is due in large part to the acoustics of the bullet itself. Raymond Siljander explains the problem and solutions in his book, *Terrorist Attacks*, (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1980), pp. 111-127.

41. Dewar, p. 220.

42. Ibid., p. 197. Armored vehicles were also used for clearing barricades. During 'Operation Motorman,' numerous 'no-go' areas (which were controlled by IRA groups) were cleared in a short period of time. Centurian tanks with blades were also used during this operation. These tanks were used under the cover of darkness to lessen the negative impression that tracked vehicles normally cause.


45. Clutterbuck, pp. 107-108.

46. The British army manual, *Land Operations Volume III* -
Counter Revolutionary Operations, defines counter revolutionary threats as including 'civil disturbances, terrorism, and organized insurgency, irrespective of whether these are nationalist, communist, or racially inspired or directed from within or outside the threatened territory.' (p. iii)


49. Included in the 'sharpening' process was emphasis on discipline of mind and body, PT, marksmanship, high esprits de corps, and proficiency in drill and ceremonies. See James High, 'The Marine Corps and Crowd Control: Training and Experience,' in Robin Higham's Bayonets in the Street, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1969), p. 131.

50. It should also be noted that the Marine Corps now places much emphasis on preparing for urban operations in low intensity conflicts. Their emphasis, however, is not on the long-term requirements of counterinsurgency operations, but more on 'quick-punch' combat. Recent journal articles reflect this, with an orientation on combat operations on the very high end of the LIC spectrum (what the US Army calls contingency operations. See R. David Clark, 'Status Quo - Or Change to Win,' Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1989), p. 42 and Paul Melsher, 'Taking On Low-Intensity Conflict,' Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1987), pp. 45-52.


52. Other lessons learned included the value of joint patrols mounted in jeeps, the importance of detailed city maps, the need for adaptable and dependable small unit leaders, and the value of having sufficient military power to deal with any threat which might materialize. See Spiller, pp. 24-25, 34, 38, 42-44.


54. The reason doctrine called for top-down clearance was to facilitate firepower intensive operations: it is easier to drop grenades downward than to throw them upwards.

55. Yates, pp. 133,179.

56. Ibid., pp. 122-123.

58. Yates, pp. 177-178.

59. This represented the first use of Federal troops in a domestic conflict since the 1930s. Previous use of Federal troops in domestic civil disturbances had been during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, the Railroad Strike of 1877, the Coal Strike of 1914, and the Bonus Army March of 1932.

National Guard units, on the other hand, have been used extensively in domestic conflicts. Between the end of World War II and the time of the riots addressed in this paper, National Guard units had been called to state or federal duty for civil disorder operations over 140 times.


61. Ibid., p. II-i-5.


64. It is interesting to note that the Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, received quite a bit of criticism for his decisions related to 'use of force' during the Baltimore riots of 1967. He was not criticized, however, for using too much force, but rather too little. According to him, he saw his role to protect human life over the security of property. *AAR, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery*, p. D-12.

65. FM 90-10 was written as the result of a number of studies that were conducted after the battle for Hue in Vietnam reacquainted us with the importance of urban combat.

66. FM 90-10, p. i.

67. In chapter 1, "The Tactical Impact of Urban Areas," the following is said of urban operations in what would become known as low intensity conflict:

Even in insurgencies, combat occurs in cities. In developing nations, control of just a few cities is often the key to control of national resources. Thus, urban combat is fast replacing rural guerrilla war as the most common form of insurgency. The city riots of the 1960's,
and the guerrilla operations in Santo
Domingo, Caracas, Belfast, Managua, and
Beirut point out the variety of situations
that can result in urban combat
operations.* Unfortunately, that is the
last time mention is made of such
activities.

68. The current FM 90-8, which was written before FM
100-20 became doctrine, includes actions to be taken
against guerrilla forces in both insurgencies and
conventional warfare. Having said that, though, nearly all
of the manual is devoted to counterinsurgency operations.
Much of the material covered in this manual is now covered
in FM 100-20. FM 90-8 does include a number of the
tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to implement the
doctrine of FM 100-20, however.
FM 90-8 also makes a distinction between
counterinsurxency and counterguerrilla operations.
Counterinsurgency operations are equated with the IDAD
strategy, while counterguerrilla operations are "geared to
the active military element of the insurgent movement
only." Nevertheless, many of the operations oriented on
the populace (and not the insurgency itself) are included
in this manual.

69. FM 90-8 does, however, discuss a number of the
strengths and weaknesses of guerrilla forces in general.
Many of these can be applied to urban insurgents also.

70. FM 19-1, pp. 10-6 - 10-7. See also Mitchell M. Zais,
"Matching Missions and Forces," Military Review, (August
71. These principles are: Control of Individuals, Control
of Movement, Control of Activities, Control of Materials,
Financial Controls, Control of Communications, and
Relinquishment of Controls. FM 41-10, pp. 3-10 - 3-11.

72. FM 41-10, pp. 3-6, 3-9.
73. FM 34-1, pp. 12-5 - 12-7, 12-12.
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