THE DIFFERENT MASK OF LEE'S COMMAND, APRIL 1861-JUNE 1862:

THE PREPARATION OF A COMMANDER

BY

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This study of General Robert E. Lee focuses on his first year with the Confederacy. It asserts that his experiences during this period prepared him extremely well for his command of the Army of Northern Virginia, which he assumed on 1 June 1862. Although history draws attention to this period of Lee's career, it fails to highlight its significance in providing Lee an opportunity to develop. History seems more prone to sweep past Lee's first year in an effort to view him in the context of later battles fought and fame acquired. However, this earlier period allowed Lee to gain a mature, operational perspective of Virginia. It provided him experience in conceptualizing and directing large troop movements, encountering the administrative and logistical burdens of raising armies, working with civilian masters, and gaining an understanding of key subordinate leaders. Drawing largely from the Official Records, the study reveals that Lee emerged in 1862 as a general most qualified at and comfortable working in the operational arena. The study also suggests that history re-examine Lee's first year to gain the full value his experience provides (contd.--
19., continued.

for the instruction of current and future military leaders.
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AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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This study of General Robert E. Lee focuses on his first year with the Confederacy. It asserts that his experiences during this period prepared him extremely well for his command of the Army of Northern Virginia, which he assumed on 1 June 1862. Although history draws attention to this period of Lee's career, it fails to highlight its significance in providing Lee an opportunity to develop. History seems more prone to sweep past Lee's first year in an effort to view him in the context of later battles fought and fame acquired. However, this earlier period allowed Lee to gain a mature, operational perspective of Virginia. It provided him experience in conceptualizing and directing large troop movements, encountering the administrative and logistical burdens of raising armies, working with civilian masters, and gaining an understanding of key subordinate leaders. Drawing largely from the Official Records, the study reveals that Lee emerged in 1862 as a general most qualified at and comfortable working in the operational arena. The study also suggests that history re-examine Lee's first year to gain the full value his experience provides for the instruction of current and future military leaders.
"Events are not going to await our convenience."

Lee to his wife, 11 June 1861

Douglas Southall Freeman, Robert E. Lee's foremost biographer, prepares the stage for Lee's assuming command of the Army of Northern Virginia with an aura of drama and seeming sense of relief. He does so in his four volume R. E. LEE by devoting a chapter, entitled "An Anxious Fortnight Ends in a Memorable Ride," to unfolding the drama. This chapter builds with a sense of dark, southern romance reminiscent of Sidney Lanier poetry to the fall of Johnston at Fair Oaks Station and the subsequent order of President Davis, "General Lee,... I shall assign you the command of this Army." In Lee's Lieutenants, Freeman's tact is similar. In his chapter, "Grim Fruits of An Anniversary," he recounts the struggles of the South and the failures of Johnston during the first year of war. He calls the "mismanaged" battle of Fair Oaks Station a "birthday present of ill omen." However, there was a much more meaningful gift at hand. "To the command that Johnston laid down, to resume no more, the President on 1 June named R. R. Lee." Clifford Dowdey, another noted Lee historian, offers his remarks in Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee, concerning Lee and the end of his first year of war. He states that "after thirteen frustrating months, he emerged quite suddenly as the General Lee of legend."

It isn't that Lee dramatically "emerged quite suddenly," for to the men he would lead and command, and to those for
whom he would continue to serve, he had always been there as a key figure. And, most important, if Lee's first year of war had been one of frustration, so had it also been one of paradoxical advantage. This year offered him an opportunity to mature and emerge as a leader through the experiences of four challenging--and certainly meaningful--duty assignments. His commitment to these assignments nurtured him as the leader that myth has turned into, as Thomas L. Connelly suggests, the marble man of not just Southern, but of American fame. Initiallly, Lee had been the Commanding Officer of the Army of Virginia. With Virginia's full merger into the Confederate command, he became a coordinator without command for Davis during the early campaign in Western Virginia, followed by duty as the commander of Confederate coastal defenses. For the three months prior to the battle at Fair Oaks Station, he served as personal Military Advisor to President Davis.

It isn't that prominent historians such as Freeman and Dowdey discount Lee's first year of the war. They don't. Their history is informative. But, for them and seemingly for so many others, the real story of Lee does not begin until 1 June 1862 when he assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia. However, to fail to emphasize the importance of Lee's subordinate roles during the first year of the war is to fail to recognize the complete story of Lee. His experience during this year in the shadows had a significant effect on his subsequent success in the years that followed when he was dealt a leading role on
the stage of war. Clearly, this man who was offered command of
the Union Army, came to the war with a talent and maturity
based on a career of successful military experience. However,
it was a maturity, save for a short tour in the Mexican War,
deprived of combat and significant command experience. Lee, as
all of his peers, was still not a rounded, seasoned veteran. It was this first year that rounded him out and nourished his
ability to become the real Lee that everyone wants to study.

Of particular significance, this first year provided Lee
the opportunity to develop an acute sense of place for the war
he would fight in Virginia and Maryland. Viewing the war from
his subordinate positions, he could figuratively stand back and
appreciate spacial relationships in conjunction with lines of
communication, especially in reference to Washington and Rich-
mond, Virginia and Tennessee, and the Confederacy as a whole.
He came to understand quickly the importance of frustrating the
enemy's lines of communication and of concentrating force at
the decisive point. From the outset, he was a man focused on
the operational art. Again, in a figurative way, Lee came to
see the war, and consequently see himself in it.

In consonance with his ability to see and think operation-
ally, he became an adept administrator who taught and enforced
the need to protect and distribute expeditiously scarce
resources in men and materiel. Time and again, he sensed a
need to put the logistical necessities of weapons, ammunition,
food, clothing and transportation first in his operational
considerations. He also took into account the adverse effects of weather and terrain as they applied to his logistical approach. So also did he become adept toward the administration of people and organizations. It was the mind of Lee that raised and equipped the Army of Virginia.

Although he enhanced his ability to administer to the logistical needs of war, he never allowed himself to be tied to the office of an administrator. He was constantly seen by soldiers, and demonstrated a personal attention to details through tours and inspections. As he was seen by subordinates, so also did he see for himself through personal reconnaissance.

Lee clearly emerged as a man who saw the need for synchronized operations that utilized the combined strength of the maneuver and artillery components of nineteenth century warfare. However, possessing a sense of such central vision, he never appeared as one who deprived field commanders of using their individual initiative. If anything, during this period, he is viewed as a man who encouraged the initiative of subordinates to execute as they saw fit. He developed a framework of operational expectation that provided centralized direction, but encouraged and depended on decentralized execution.

He also grew familiar with the temperament and capabilities of many officers who later became key subordinates. Early-on, for instance, he established a straight-forward and confident dialogue with Thomas J. Jackson. In conjunction with this knowledge, his ability to deal effectively with complex
personalities began to appear. This ability, not always common to those in positions of high responsibility, would allow him to foster and develop future command relationships that insisted on a sharing of information and stressed cooperation for the good of the common cause. For instance, during this period he insisted that his people talk to each other and to collectively seek and confirm intelligence.

Lee became exact in issuing well conceived, clearly defined orders that were coupled with easily understood intent. He helped to focus those with whom he dealt by not only explaining what had to happen, but also what could not happen. In essence, he demonstrated an ability to make mission orders concise and in conjunction with intent and concept of operations in ways that kept his subordinates focused and working on a similar, objective purpose.

One viewing Lee during his first year of war cannot neglect to focus on his temperament and instinctive qualities. If one can characterize Lee in any way during this year, it is through an impatience and desire to get on with things. He suggested to his wife early in the war that "events are not going to await our convenience." His was a temperament prone to attack a problem or situation before it took control of him or his given area of responsibility. This trait never left him. He was also a man willing to accept change as a constant in all affairs, and receptive to it, demonstrated enormous flexibility. He saw quickly the realities of war, and came to realize that the South would have to fight alone without the aid of England.
He developed a resolve that in order to defeat a stronger and better resourced enemy, the South must threaten the North operationally by utilizing a scheme of defensive maneuver that concentrated force against the enemy away from Richmond. This resolve led to the invasion of the North and the battle of Antietam in 1862.

If his temperament was one characterized by impatience, it was also one that established great confidence between himself and civilian leaders, especially southern state governors. He dealt with these people in a sensitive, respectful and subordinate yet enlightened way. He was a master at explaining things to and dealing with politicians--his civilian masters. It is in this light and during this period that what may be his true genius as a general emerges--his ability to subordinate himself not only to his task at hand, but also to the responsibility of subordinating himself to those in government appointed over him.

Freeman, in his introduction to the second volume of Lee's *Lieutenants*, says that writers on military history present one test of their trustworthiness in the limits they recommend for the application of the facts they establish. Doomed would be the army that fought its battles 'out of books.'

One studying Lee from April 1861 to June 1862 does not study him in the context of battles won, lost, or how they were fought. True, so much of the study of Lee does seem to be the text of battle and war. But the appropriate look at Lee, especially
during this era, focuses on his experiences as he emerged as leader. It is a focus on preparation. Its reward is an appreciation not for lessons learned, but on the art of command.

THE MOBILIZATION OF VIRGINIA

"Deprive them of the use of the railroad, take the field, and endeavor to arrest their advance up the valley."

Lee to Johnston, 1 June 1861

On 23 April 1861 Lee assumed command of the military and naval forces of Virginia. He held this position for seven weeks until all "Virginia forces were transferred to the Confederate States" on 8 June. The mission given him by Virginia's Governor John Letcher was essentially two-fold--defend Virginia against Federal attack and raise and mobilize an army equipped to fight. Freeman suggests that these several weeks provide an interesting glimpse of Lee, and that a "close study of what Lee did in Virginia in April-June 1861 would have prevented some of the blunders of the Spanish War in 1898 and might have simplified the far faster mobilization of 1917." More to the point, during this period Lee began to see Virginia as a theater of war, and think of it in an operational context. He became an administrator of war, and developed an appreciation for the logistics and administration required to raise and support an army. In performing his duties, Lee demonstrated an ability to confront and deal with a wide range of issues that required a concentrated focus and clear insight into the realm of high level problem solving and decision making. Of
note, he emerged as a man who could articulate critical intent and reasoning through well fashioned orders and correspondence. And, he began to foster insights and relationships with key subordinates and political leaders.

Lee set about quickly to design an operational scheme for the defense. "Erecting an outline of defense," Clifford Dowdey suggests, "required no particular brilliance;" however, it took a clear vision to conceptualize Virginia's defense in an operational context. Lee believed that defending rivers and railroads was key, and to the areas of Harpers Ferry and Norfolk he devoted first priority. Not only did Harpers Ferry contain a Federal arsenal replete with the machinery of war materiel, it also represented the Northern gateway to the breadbasket of the Shenandoah Valley. It also sat at the approach from Ohio and the west from Grafton along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Norfolk possessed not only a large and industrious naval shipyard, but it also strategically offered control of the Hampton Roads and Chesapeake Bay water basins and a hold on protecting eastern Carolina. To secure Norfolk also provided protection from the Union-held Fort Monroe just north of Norfolk, and provided access to the Atlantic openings of the James and York Rivers, both key water avenues of approach that severely threatened Richmond.

Lee emphasized the importance of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad when he wrote Major Alonzo Loring, Commander of Virginia Volunteers at Wheeling, on 29 April. He instructed
Loring to "direct the military operations for the protection of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad on the Ohio River, and also that of the road." On 30 April, he wrote Major F. M. Boykin, Jr., Commander Virginia Volunteers at Weston, and instructed him to assume command of forces in the northwestern portion of the state or near Grafton with the purpose of controlling "the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the branch to Parkersburg."

He provided a clear description of intent and with whom Boykin should coordinate his activities. Lee wrote,

> It is not the object to interrupt peaceful travel on the road or to offer annoyance to citizens pursuing their usual avocations; but to hold the road for the benefit of Maryland and Virginia, and to prevent its being used against them....Major A. Loring, at Wheeling, has been directed, with the volunteer companies under his command, to give protection to the road, near its terminus at the Ohio River, and you will place yourself in communication with him, and cooperate with him if necessary.

On 4 May, he wrote Colonel George A. Porterfield, then at Harpers Ferry, to also "repair to Grafton...and select a position for the troops called into service...for the defense of that part of the country." He detailed him "to hold both branches of the [Baltimore and Ohio] Railroad to the Ohio River, to protect its being used to the injury of the State."

Lee further stated his concern for protecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as well as Harpers Ferry, when he wrote Colonel Thomas J. Jackson, Commanding at Harpers Ferry, on 6 May. In this most instructive letter, he warned Jackson that he considered it
probable that the Government at Washington will make a movement against Harper's Ferry, and occupy the B&O Railroad with that view, or use the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal for the transportation of troops.

You are desired to watch the avenues of approach, and endeavor to frustrate their designs. On receiving certain intelligence of the approach of troops it will become necessary to destroy the bridge at Harper's Ferry and obstruct their passage by the canal as much as possible. You might make some confidential arrangements with persons in Maryland to destroy the Monoclay railroad bridge and draw the water out of the canal, should there be assurances of the enemy's attempt to make use of either.

Not only does this letter provide Jackson Lee's clear operational concern for protecting the railroad, its specific guidance also leaves little doubt for Jackson in how to accomplish his mission. It also leaves little doubt as to Lee's anticipation of the Federal design for war against that portion of Virginia.

As Lee demonstrated a concern for protecting lines of communication in the northwestern portion of Virginia, so also did he focus his attention toward critical lines in the east. On 29 April, he wrote Colonel Andrew Talcott, the Engineer's Officer at Norfolk, instructing him to

proceed up James River, to the vicinity of Burwell's Bay, and select the most suitable point, which in your judgment, should be fortified, in order to prevent the ascent of river by the enemy....You will then proceed to the mouth of the Appomattox, and there perform the same service.

On 3 May, he instructed Major General Walter Gwynn, commanding at Norfolk, to "be prepared by land and water" to defend his
position. On the same day, he wrote Colonel William Taliaferro, Commanding at Glouster Point, "to defend the passage of the York River." He wrote Gwynn again on 12 May, asking specific questions regarding the defense of Norfolk. He wrote,

Is the revetment at Fort Norfolk sufficiently protected by earthen-covered ways, and are the parapets of all your redoubts sufficiently thick to resist heavy shot and protect the men within?

He followed this letter with another to Gwynn on 14 May suggesting, with seeming impatience, that "you must organize your troops and advance their instruction as speedily as possible."

If Federal access to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad threatened Harpers Ferry from the west, so also did access to the Manassas Gap Railway from the south. A "strong expedition sent out from Washington along the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad could cut off communications" from this direction.

Lee knew this, as did Colonel St. George Cocke and Colonel George E. Terrett who he had posted at Culpepper Court House and Alexandria respectively to prepare defenses against invasion from Washington. On 14 May, Cocke sent a letter expressing deep concern for the lack of troops and provisioning along his line to Colonel R. S. Garnett, then Lee's adjutant general. On 15 May, Lee replied to Cocke to assuage his concern, and also one to Terrett. Both letters explained Lee's operational concern for a defense to the north, and also provided an insight to ways in which Lee dealt with key subordinates. Both letters appealed to a cooperation in command, a sharing of
critical knowledge between and among commanders, and an understanding for his intent and rationale for defense.

The letters also provided a straightforward explanation as to why Lee had not yet placed the emphasis he had wanted to for the interests of Cocke's and Terrett's commands. In Lee's letter to Cocke, he explained that "hitherto it was impossible to concentrate an adequate force for the defense of Alexandria.... The posts at Norfolk and Harper's Ferry, which seemed first to be threatened, being in some measure fortified, our resources can now be applied to your line of operations." He directed some of Cocke's troops to Manassas Junction to serve with Terrett, to make use of "natural obstacles" in his sector, and insisted that he give to Terrett "the benefit of your information and advise respecting the troops and the country in which he is operating." He then wrote Terrett at Alexandria and provided the background of his letter to Cocke. He told him to give "particular attention" to defending Manassas Junction and the railroad there against an advance from Washington. He told Terrett to notify Cocke immediately should Manassas Junction be attacked so Cocke could in turn reinforce with additional troops.

Lee supplemented these letters with one to Brigadier General Willedge L. Bonham, then commanding at Manassas Junction. He told Bonham that "the Manassas Junction is a very important point on your line, as it commands the communications with Harper's Ferry." He insisted that "railroad
communications must be held... and their use by the enemy prevented."\(^{31}\)

Not only did Lee acquire an operational perspective of the theater, but he also gained a quick appreciation for the administration and logistics required to support military operations on a large scale. In this capacity of administrator of war, Lee displayed "an extraordinary gift for organization... and a rare combination of conceiving in larger patterns with an 'infinite capacity' for working in details."\(^{32}\) In this regard, one of Lee's greatest tasks became that of raising an army where none had existed before. On 3 May, Governor Letcher, in a proclamation, gave Lee the authority to "call out and cause to be mustered into the service of Virginia" those forces required to defend the state.\(^{33}\) Early estimates revealed a figure of 15,000 men necessary to defend Virginia.\(^{34}\) However, Lee appraised the defensive requirements differently, and adjusted the total to 51,000.\(^{35}\) In attempting to acquire this total, Lee "had to contend with divisions between militia" units and recruited "volunteers" as he assembled what became the "provisional" Army of Virginia.\(^{36}\)

One reading the *Official Records* of the Civil War quickly realizes that a vast proportion of Lee's correspondence during this period focused on the mobilization, provisioning, and training of this new army. His 4 May letter to General Daniel Ruggles at Fredericksburg, Virginia provides an excellent example of Lee's attempts to muster an army as well as an
example of the content of many such letters. Lee told Ruggles that

under the authority of the governor of Virginia, by his proclamation of the 3d instant, you are hereby authorized to call out and muster into the service of the state, volunteer companies from Fredericksburg, the counties of Stafford, Spotsylvania, and Caroline, to rendezvous at Fredericksburg....You will organize the troops into regiments, associating together, as far as possible, companies from the same section of the State, and place them temporarily under such officers as may be available. 37

By 15 June, when Lee provided Letcher an overview of Virginia's military preparation, he stated that efforts to muster an army had provided about 40,000 combatants. 38

Raising such a force presented Lee a massive administrative challenge, one complicated by the need to arm, provision, and train the army. He anticipated the problem when he wrote Letcher on 27 April inquiring as to "what arrangements have been made to enable the army of the State to take the field." He foresaw the immediate need for "supplying troops with provisions,...horses for the light artillery,...and wagons for local transportation." 39 Although no recorded response from Letcher exists, had there been one, the answer to the letter would have been "none." So, the task of provisioning, equipping, and training a new army fell on Lee also. However, working with scant resources and under a constraint of time, Lee accomplished this mission. In his same letter of 15 June to Letcher, Lee discussed the difficulty of this task. He wrote,
The assembling of the men, however, was not the most difficult operation. Provision for their instruction, subsistence, equipment, clothing, shelter, and transportation in the field, required more time and labor. Ammunition of every kind had to be manufactured. The carriages of the guns for river, land, and field service had to be made, with necessary implements, caissons, battery, [and] wagons.

Lee's matter-of-fact tone in these comments to Letcher belies his efforts to supply Virginia's military needs. It was a monumental undertaking. However, his endeavors in this critical area sensitized Lee early-on to a problem that would plague the Confederacy's efforts throughout the war.

Lee's duty during this period also brought him into close contact and acquainted him with key personalities, military and civilian, with whom he would deal during later stages of the war. Two key examples are Generals Thomas J. Jackson and Joseph E. Johnston. Although Lee had served with both men during previous military assignments, certainly no duty embraced the consequences in which all three men were soon to be engaged. Lee's correspondence with Jackson reveals a straight-forward, professional dialogue concerning the business at hand. On 27 April, Lee posted Jackson to Harpers Ferry to organize the defense, and to safe-guard "arms, machinery, parts of arms, raw material, etc., that may be useful." He later instructed Jackson to move weapons producing equipment to Richmond, as he guarded against attack from Pennsylvania, and to keep all "plans and operations secret." Jackson's response to Lee was always timely and to the point. On 6 and 7 May, he wrote Lee regarding
his defensive preparations and status of equipment at Harpers Ferry. He advised him of Federal military action in the area and of his upcoming plans. Jackson's letter to Lee of 11 May is typical of the direct dialogue these two men established, and of the confidence in a senior-subordinate relationship that would later flower. Jackson wrote,

The precautions mentioned in your letter of the 6th instant have been under consideration for sometime, and some of them have been taken; others are progressing as rapidly as the circumstances admit of. Arrangements are complete for a desperate defense at Point of Rocks. I have troops also at Berlin, Shepardstown, and Martinsburg. Marylanders, with artillery, are opposite Shepardstown, and have threatened us there to such extent as to induce the officer stationed there to call on me for artillery; and though I can poorly spare it, yet, under the circumstances, I must comply.

After giving Jackson general guidance, Lee—as he did with most of his subordinates—left the direction of activities to Jackson. He was clearly pleased with Jackson's performance and had gained confidence in his ability, as evidenced by Lee's remarks in a letter to the Honorable James Mason. Explaining to Mason the general operational situation at Harpers Ferry, and particularly the enemy situation at Maryland Heights, Lee wrote,

Colonel Jackson was directed to give to their occupation the appearance of its being done by the people of that State, and not to take possession himself till necessary; but the time has been left to his discretion which I'm sure will be wisely exercised.
Freeman provides special praise to the initial correspondence between Lee and Jackson when he states that Lee's orders were written "as if he knew he was dealing with a man who would understand and obey without the stimulus of euphemism or diplomatic flourishes." 46

Lee's correspondence with Johnston was also direct, yet tempered with tact and diplomacy. Senior to Lee in the United States Army, Johnston had accepted a rank of Brigadier General in the Confederate Army, and for a short period was actually subordinate to Lee in the Provisional Army of Virginia before that state joined the Confederacy. 47 On 24 May, Johnston replaced Jackson in command at Harpers Ferry, and shortly thereafter began to disagree with Lee as to the importance of that position. Johnston preferred to fall back from Harpers Ferry to better safeguard his small army. On 27 May, Lee wrote Johnston explaining his views concerning the area, especially that of the western region, and of the importance of the "command of the railroad." Of note, he also suggested that "Colonel Jackson might be applied to the mounting and preparing the batteries for service." 48 While Union commanders at this time were preparing artillery commands for captains, Lee was already looking to seniority in artillery command positions. On 28 May, Johnston began to question the defensive arrangements at his position, 49 and on 31 May he reinforced his concern in a memorandum for Lee. 50 Lee's response of 1 June further explained the situation as he envisioned it, and closed with a clear
expression of intent concerning action that should be taken against the enemy. Lee wrote, "Deprive them of the use of the railroad, take the field, and endeavor to arrest their advance up the valley." After conferring with President Jefferson Davis (who agreed with Lee's operational perspective at Harpers Ferry), Lee again wrote Johnston advising him accordingly, and concluding that "being informed of the object of the campaign, you will be able to regulate its conduct to the best advantage."52

Advantage would quickly shift Johnston's way. On 8 June, Virginia joined the Confederate states, and Lee relinquished command of all Virginia forces. These forces now came under the control of Johnston and General G. T. Beauregard. Lee wrote his wife on 9 June informing her that he had just returned from an inspection tour of "the batteries and troops on James and York Rivers," where he said he had been for some time. As consumed as he was with the administration of command, he still found time to conduct personal inspections. And, he also informed her that he had turned over command. "I do not know," he wrote, "what my position will be."53 As Clifford Dowdey suggests, his would be a position of "no defined duties or authority."54 At best he became, as Freeman writes, an assistant secretary of war and a deputy chief of the general staff.55 During this period, he was under no apparent delusions as to his expectation of the course of the war. He wrote his wife on 24 June that "it is well to prepare for what may reasonably happen and be provided for the worst."56 If the
worst for a soldier is not being with the action, then Lee may have experienced it waiting, as an "unheeded spectator" in Richmond on 21 July for messages concerning the South's crowning victory at Manassas. However, Lee had been more than a spectator during his first phase of duty supporting the Southern cause. Of the victorious army at Manassas, Lee had raised a quarter of it. He had directed the command activities of, and had come to know many of the key players then on the field of battle. And, if he had been a spectator, it is what he had seen that became important in his preparation for eventual command. He had seen--operationally--Virginia as a theater of war. What he would soon see during his next duty assignment in western Virginia is what one might figuratively describe as the worst. But, he would continue to learn, see, and prepare.

WESTERN VIRGINIA

"It is so difficult to get our people, unaccustomed to the necessities of war, to comprehend and promptly execute the measures required for the occasion."

Lee to his wife,
4 August 1861

Lee departed Richmond on 28 July for field duty in western Virginia. Earlier in the month, Union forces under the command of General George McClellan had routed Confederate forces in the area, thus threatening critical lines of communication along the Virginia Central and Virginia and Tennessee Railroads leading from the Shenandoah Valley to Richmond. This threat, in conjunction with a disaffection of southern sentiment across
the entire region, created a great concern to the southern leadership. Lee suggested to his wife that his own "uneasiness" regarding the situation compelled him to go out there. His mission was no better defined than to "coordinate" the activities of several scattered and poorly controlled armies operating in the region. The major commanders of the forces with which he would deal were two former governors of Virginia, Brigadier Generals John B. Floyd and Henry A. Wise, and an Indian fighter of considerable federal service, Brigadier General W. W. Loring. Although President Jefferson Davis provided no recorded general orders for Lee, that he had a clear purpose for Lee is sure as revealed by his letter to General Johnston on 1 August. Writing from Richmond, he explained to Johnston that he had posted Lee to the western part of the state to "strike a decisive blow; or, failing in that, ... to check the enemy." Clifford Dowdey calls this assignment Lee's most "inconclusive phase" and Freeman refers to it as an "unlucky turn of the wheel" that destroyed Lee's "prestige." Yet, this was an important assignment for Lee in preparing him for the eventuality of far greater responsibility. This tour of duty, which lasted three months, provided an opportunity for Lee's operational vision to mature, and allowed him for the first time in his career to direct the activities of large bodies of troops over extended areas. It forced him, under the pressures of war, to deal with several complex and self-serving personalities. The combination of Loring, Wise and Floyd commanding
in the same theater approached the epitomy of a crisis in command. And, of great importance, Lee's campaign in western Virginia provided him the experience, first hand, of witnessing and appreciating the devastating effects defeat, foul weather, disease, and poor logistics impose on the functional capabilities of an army.

From the outset of the campaign, Lee saw it in the fullness of its operational context. Before departing to the west, he wrote Loring, assigned him the command of the Northwestern Army, and told him to prevent the "advance of the enemy,... restraining him the other side of the Alleghany Ridge." On 24 July, he wrote Wise, whose Legion was then in the Kanawha Valley, advising him of McClellan's advance on Cheat Mountain and of the danger of a Union advance to "Lewisburg to turn you or to seize at Millborough the Virginia Central Railroad." He warned Wise that a "concentration of all forces may be necessary," and that he should look to the security of protecting his rear. In a letter of 3 August, written from Huntersville, he warned Floyd of a possible Union march to Lewisburg where they might "attempt to seize the Central Virginia Railroad and the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad if their force is sufficient." He then instructed him to move his forces and "join General Wise at the White Sulphur, and reoccupy Lewisburg with your united forces." In another letter of 3 August, he informed Wise that the union of his and Floyd's forces at Lewisburg would not only protect the Virginia Central
Railroad, but checking the Union forces there would cut them off "from Covington and Newbern, on the central and southwestern railroads." On 8 August, after a move to Valley Mountain, Lee wrote Floyd again, impressing upon him the need to hold the enemy "west of Lewisburg...and of preventing his approach...to the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad." It would be the working out of the operational vision regarding the key points of interest described above that occupied Lee's attention during the late summer and fall of 1861.

Operationally, the campaign was one of missed opportunity, brought about by a variety of circumstances and confounded by a general sense of confusion that prevailed during this initial period of the war. Because of the emphasis placed by the Confederacy on the "Manassas-Valley sector, the forces sent to the mountains were small, the equipment generally poor, and supplies precarious." Neither side had a good logistical framework in place. Weather hampered the efforts of Confederate and Union forces alike, and in the case especially of the South, poorly trained leaders and troops provided Lee constant frustration. "It is so difficult," he wrote his wife, "to get our people, unaccustomed to the necessities of war, to comprehend and promptly execute the measures required for the occasion." When he arrived in Staunton in late July, he witnessed defeated southern soldiers and a "panic exhausted in paralysis."

He directed his attention first to the northwest where the Union occupied Cheat Mountain and thereby commanded the
Allegheny Range. A personal reconnaissance by Lee inspired an attack on Cheat Mountain on 12 September, a victory which would open an avenue of advance on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Grafton. Working in conjunction with Loring, Brigadier General H. R. Jackson, and Colonel Albert Rust of the Third Arkansas Regiment, Lee carefully detailed a plan of attack on Cheat Mountain that failed, if for no other reason than it was too "elaborate." But, for a man who had never commanded more than 300 men in the field, it provided him an opportunity to begin dealing with forces closer in size to those he would command a year later.

Although Lee's efforts to capture Cheat Mountain from Union control failed, his ability to hold the passes leading from it toward central Virginia were secure, so he redirected his attention to the southwest where a large Union force commanded by General W. S. Rosecrans "was advancing up the valley of the Kanawha against Generals Wise and Floyd." He arrived at Meadow Bluff in the Kanawha Valley on 21 September, and from there began to direct the activities of the small armies in that region. Although his posturing of forces failed to bring on a decisive engagement with Rosecrans, it did convince Rosecrans to retire from the Kanawha Valley on 6 October. Again, Lee had experienced moving forces of at least moderate size.

Lee confronted more than Rosecrans, however, as an obstacle to his efforts in the Kanawha Valley. Throughout the campaign, he had to deal with the conflicting personalities of Generals
Wise and Floyd, two men who agreed to disagree. He had confronted, earlier, intense problems with Loring, who by all accounts was jealous of Lee's authority. Loring's animosities apparently did not subside until, on 31 August, Lee was confirmed "as a full general in the regular army of the Confederate States." Both Wise and Floyd were ambitious and generally content to work their own agendas. Wise had specifically asked when called to duty to lead an "independent partisan command, subject only to the general laws and orders of the service." On 24 August, he wrote Lee requesting that he "be entirely detached from all union with General Floyd's command," and wrote President Davis on 26 October that "General Floyd's design ...was to destroy my command." Floyd was one who travelled with three newspaper editors on his staff, and had no misgivings in writing President Davis directly, complaining of Wise's ineptitude for command. This is the same general of whom Bruce Catton wrote would "abdicate" his command and flee to safety at Fort Donelson in the face of General Grant and his Union Army the next February.

Lee dealt tactfully with both men, and insisted that unity of effort was the only possibility for victory. As an example of Lee's insistence for such unity, he wrote Wise on 21 September stating, "I beg therefore...that the troops be united, and that we conquer or die together." A crisis between the two evidently reached a climax when Lee arrived at Meadow Bluff in the Kanawha Valley. It would not be resolved until Wise received
a letter from the War Department of 25 September requiring him to relinquish his command to Floyd and return to Richmond. This clash between command personalities was but an omen of what Lee would confront during the entire course of the war.

In none of Lee's personal letters during this period, or for that matter in official reports, did he speak of the difficulties in dealing with the likes of Loring, Wise or Floyd. But, in such correspondence he did complain of the disease, weather, and general inability to supply his troops during the campaign. "The soldiers everywhere," he told his wife in a letter of 4 August, "are sick. The measles are prevalent throughout the whole army, and you know that disease leaves unpleasant results." He wrote her again on 1 September, telling her that "we have a great deal of sickness, and now those on the sick list would form an army." In a letter of 29 August to his daughters Annie and Agnes, he complained of the weather and how it had adversely affected the ability to supply his men. He wrote,

There has not been sunshine enough since my arrival to dry my clothes. But the worst of the rain is, that the ground has become so saturated with water that the constant travel on the roads have made them so impassable, so that I cannot get up sufficient supplies for the troops to move. It is raining now. Has been all day, last night, day before and the day before that.

To his son, Custis, on 3 September he wrote that "the cold, too has been greater than I could have ever conceived." He continued that the weather had "aggravated the sickness that has attacked the whole army....Some regiments have not over 250 for
duty." In writing Governor Letcher on 17 September, Lee remarked that "our greatest difficulty is the roads. It has been raining...about six weeks. It is impossible to get along. It is that which has paralyzed all our efforts."

That armies have always confronted paralysis due to disease, foul weather, bad roads and poor supply is a matter of fact. But, for one who never encounters such difficulty save in the lesson books of war, the impact sometimes fails to take effect. But for Lee, who confronted these imponderables of war through experience, the lesson book became reality, and as such, further preparation for the command he would assume the following June. However, that duty to the east was still many months away. His next assignment would take him far south of the Kanawha Valley and Allegheny Range. In some respects, it would be his first seven weeks as commander of Virginia's military and naval forces all over again.

THE DEFENSE OF THE SOUTHERN COAST

"I hope our enemy will be polite enough to wait for us. It is difficult to get our people to realize their position."

Lee to his daughters, 22 November 1861

Lee's next assignment would be to South Carolina, where he arrived on 6 November to organize the southern coastal defense. Clifford Dowdey says that this posting "combined the duties and the unrewarding elements of the first two." But in reality, the duty rewarded him, and it may have been his most
important assignment in preparing him for his command of the Army of Northern Virginia. This tour built in many ways on his experiences in Virginia during the previous spring. Again, a part of his business was that of administrator of war where he labored to raise and equip another army. His operational vision continued to mature as he developed an inner line of defense for the southeast that depended on moving soldiers along railroads to concentrate force at critical points, and on building improved earthworks integrated with artillery support to bolster the defenses along 300 miles of coastline that included the major ports of Charleston and Savannah. In this regard, he continued to experience moving large bodies of troops in an army that eclipsed 25,000 before he returned to Richmond the following March. As his operational vision matured, he also began to see the entire South, and not just Virginia, as a theater of war. He also came to realize that in order to prosecute war across such a vast arena, the newly mobilized army needed a clearer sense of organization, and that only the best people should be selected for key leadership positions. And, of great importance, he became most adept at working with political leaders as he gained their confidence in his ability to organize in support of the Southern cause.

Lee assumed command in South Carolina on 8 November 1861 pursuant to orders published in Richmond on 5 November establishing the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Eastern Florida as a military department under Lee's command. Lee's first impressions upon arrival were not good. He wrote
Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, that after an initial inspection tour on 9 November, he feared few state troops were "ready for the field." Defenses were not well organized, especially at Hilton Head and Port Royal Harbors, and Union fleets threatened Charleston and Savannah. From this juncture until late November, Lee directed his efforts to the administration and organization required to raise and equip an army for this new command, as well as devise a framework for and begin preparing a defense for the entire region.

On 10 November, Lee wrote Benjamin requesting authority to use all Georgia and South Carolina troops passing through his region to Virginia to aid in his mobilization efforts. Benjamin's positive reply insisted that Lee do so, as well as to use all government resources available to assist in the task of defending the southeastern region. In a following letter of 14 November, Benjamin informed Lee that "it is the President's wish that you scruple not in employing every governmental resource within your reach." As Governor Letcher in Virginia had assisted Lee with mobilization efforts earlier in the year, Governor F. W. Pickens of South Carolina and Joseph E. Brown of Georgia worked closely with Lee and Benjamin in this theater to begin the task of raising and equipping an army. Correspondence between these governors and Benjamin developed a framework for getting weapons and equipment for Lee's use in an expeditious manner.

However, the failing fortunes of the Confederacy complicated all their efforts. Richmond required Lee to share scarce
resources to support the demands of General A. S. Johnston's army in the western theater of Tennessee where a Union encirclement in that region had begun to exact its toll. However, having to share scarce resources with Johnston's army in Tennessee worked, at least in one aspect, to Lee's advantage. It expanded his vision to the needs of the entire Confederacy. But, the requirements of his own theater grew daily. Field commanders, such as Colonel A. M. Manigault, expressed a continuing need for more artillery pieces, powder, and small arms in a region that had done little to aid its own cause of preparedness since the fall of Fort Sumter the previous April.

On 16 November, Lee began issuing his first mobilization orders, reminiscent of those he drafted and issued in Virginia the previous spring. He assigned commanders and authorized them to muster and equip troops. In a 16 December letter to Benjamin, Lee updated the progress of the mobilization endeavor insisting that, despite consistent effort, the department still needed far more provisioning and a special need for more "heavy guns." By the time Lee's mobilization efforts concluded, however, he had raised an army larger and certainly far better equipped than the one he surrendered in 1865.

As Lee toiled with state governors to mobilize an army, he also formulated and began to prepare his outline of the defense. Through a personal reconnaissance of existing "scattered defenses" that took him from Charleston through Savannah to the northern coast of Florida, Lee determined that he would focus on three defensive objectives. He resolved to fortify only key strong points along the coast, withdrawing "all the guns and
garrisons from...outlying positions." He chose to defend the entrance to Cumberland Sound, and the "approaches to Brunswick, Fort Pulaski, Savannah and Charleston." And, of great importance, he decided to develop the route of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad as an interior line that he could employ for troop movement and concentration against an enemy attack. His intent was to draw the enemy as far inland as he could to provide him as much flexibility as possible in concentrating force through defensive maneuver. He would use this operational tactic again in defending Richmond.

Lee outlined his scheme on 21 November in a letter to General S. Cooper, the Adjutant and Inspector General in Richmond. In this letter, Lee insisted that much had to be done to bolster the works at the approaches to the defense "to make a good defense against any batteries that are...brought against them," and displayed a specific concern for the need of more guns and gunners. He wrote, in describing his defense, that more guns could be usefully employed if available for this service; those at hand have been placed in the best positions and the troops distributed so as to work them to advantage....The greatest difficulty to be contended with is the want of artilleryists and proper officers as instructors.

Lee had formulated this operational plan for the defense by 19 November. It became his resolve to implement its construction, with a special focus on the inner line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, until he returned to Richmond and passed his command to General J. C. Pemberton the following March.
Lee wrote to Pemberton on 10 December and expressed a concern for properly constructing defensive measures to protect the railroad along the Combahee River. Several days earlier, he had written General R. S. Ripley at Charleston insisting that he, too, take special measures to protect the railroad. He warned Ripley that

the defense of the rivers Ashepoo, Paw Paw, and Combahee, for the protection of the railroad, is of the greatest importance, and I trust may be speedily accomplished.

Lee worked closely with both Pemberton and Ripley across the winter, and always kept them focused on the importance of the inner line of the railroad. In a letter to Pemberton on 20 February, he made his rationale quite clear. "I have always thought it probable," he wrote, "that preparatory to an attack upon Charleston or Savannah the enemy would attempt to seize the line of the railroad." And, if the enemy seized the line of the railroad, it would deprive Lee the opportunity to reposition other forces quickly enough to respond properly to an attack.

Although Lee focused great attention to the importance of his inner line, his emphasis on properly constructed earthworks interlaced with artillery support was always paramount. In a 4 February letter to General Thomas F. Drayton, he provided guidance on readjusting a defensive line to better defend Savannah. He wrote, "You will strengthen this line by artificial defenses, breastworks, abatis, etc., as best you can, and have a sufficient force at hand to attack and drive back an
advancing foe." On 17 February, he wrote a similar letter to Colonel C. H. Olmstead at Fort Pulaski. Lee specifically recommended that,

if necessary for that purpose, shift some of your barbette guns to the gorge of the work, and the casements in the northwest angle, which bear up the river, be provided with guns. I would also recommend that the parapets of the mortar batteries be carried all around, so that the mortars can be protected from the fire up the river as well as from Tybee Island, and that everything be done to strengthen the defenses of your work from the rear.

These specific defensive tactics Lee would also use in defending Richmond and central Virginia.

The need to attract good officers became a major concern for Lee during his duty in South Carolina. He turned to civilian leaders for assistance. On the eve of a state convention in Columbia in late December, he wrote the Honorable Andrew G. Magrath in response to Magrath's request to Lee for suggested topics of debate. In this letter, Lee appealed for an intelligent sense of organization, staffing, and leadership in the army. He insisted on the "urgent necessity of bringing out the military strength of the State and putting it under the best and most permanent organization." He made a special plea for good officers, stating that "only the best men for that position should be selected," and that the "strictest economy should be enforced in every department and the most rigid accountability be required of its officers." Although he did not encounter the likes of Wise or Floyd during this assignment, he must have
remembered his experiences with them when he added that "special corps and separate commands are frequent causes of embarrassment." Lee's maturing vision of operations insisted on having an army geared to fight on the scale that would soon be the battlefield on the banks of the Antietam.

Lee's letter to Magrath represents but an example of the many dealings Lee had with political leaders during this period. Many complained, for instance, when he withdrew troops from outlying areas to man his inner line. Yet to each he responded with tact and reasonable explanation. Lee worked well with all the governors of the region and won their trust in his ability as a leader. On 7 January 1862, Governor Pickens of South Carolina wrote President Davis and praised Lee as being a perfect head, quiet and retiring. His reserve is construed disadvantageously. I find him all that a gentleman should be, and all that ought to be expected of a thorough and scientific officer.

"In close dealings with politicians like Pickens and Brown," writes Freeman, "Lee was as successful as he had been in winning the good opinion of Governor Letcher."

As Lee demonstrated his ability as a trusted leader, he also developed, or at least displayed in his personal correspondence, an increased sense of anxiety. He wrote his wife on 8 February, and with a characteristic sense of impatience, told her that much had not been done "which ought to have been finished." He had written his daughters on 22 November that he hoped "our enemy will be polite enough to wait for us. It is difficult to
get our people to realize their position." In a letter written not long after to his daughter Annie, he said that "people do not seem to realize that there is a war." The thought of war obviously never left his mind, as he continued in his resolve that the South would have to go it alone. He had written his wife on 29 December that "we must make up our minds to fight our battles ourselves."

That the fight was coming his way rings clear in the Secretary of War's letter to him on 24 February. The army in Tennessee was being defeated. Secretary Benjamin appealed to Lee for men and equipment to make up losses. A letter of like substance followed on 1 March, and the next day President Davis called him back to Richmond. He had yet to complete the defensive line along the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. But, that he felt confident in its construction is sure, because he took time on 2 March in a letter to his daughter Annie to tell her about it. After providing an overview of enemy activity around Savannah, he wrote,

But we have an interior line they must force before reaching the city. It is on this line we are working, slowly to my anxious mind, but as fast as I can drive them.

If Lee had become confident in the resilience of his inner line, then President Davis could also be confident in bringing back to Richmond a general who had become, after his duty in the southeast, an astute administrator of war and one most comfortable working at the operational level.
MILITARY ADVISOR

"The more active the troops on the Rappahannock, the more on the defense will the enemy be kept."

Lee to Ewell,
17 April 1862

All the skill Lee had acquired since April 1861 in working at the operational level would prove fruitful in his last assignment before taking command of the Army of Northern Virginia. On 13 March 1862, President Davis charged him "with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy."¹³⁷ This presidential charge, deemed by many as advisory to Davis, represents to Freeman another "thankless assignment."¹³⁸ However, in terms of further preparing Lee for the responsibility he assumed the following June, it was far from thankless. Not only did it thoroughly acquaint him with the theater of operation that would be his until 1865, it provided him the opportunity to direct the operations of several Confederate armies and to orchestrate the activities of many of the commanders who would soon figure prominently in Lee's subordinate chain of command. Generals John B. Magruder, Benjamin Huger, Thomas J. Jackson, Henry Heth, and Richard S. Ewell all played key roles as Lee's lieutenants the following summer. During this period, he also developed the operational vision that led to his invasions of the North in 1862 and 1863, a vision that conceived operations which lured Union activity away from Richmond by the use of offensive counter-manuever that in turn
threatened Washington. This vision evolved from the results of Jackson's Valley Campaign, an operation conceived by Lee in April.

Freeman is on the mark, however, when he suggests that Lee assumed his duties "in an atmosphere of disaster." When Lee reported to Richmond during the first week of March, the Confederate political situation was in confusion. A third secretary of war was just in place, and the second secretary of state had resigned. Complicating the political upheaval, President Davis had grown distrustful of General Joseph E. Johnston, the senior commander in the field, who questioned the President's interference with his army's disposition north of Richmond. In essence, the atmosphere around Richmond seemed one of deterioration.

From a Confederate standpoint, the military situation in Virginia had also deteriorated since Lee had gone to South Carolina the previous October. The Union had all but tightened a vise around the state, and had positioned a large array of forces north and west poised to launch a multipronged attack on Richmond. The Confederate defensive perimeter had withdrawn toward Central Virginia, and was manned by a series of independent commands with no united command influence other than that provided by President Davis himself. At best, the Confederacy in Virginia's theater of operations defended, through dispersed commands, against a force of greater than twice its size.
From March until June, Lee, working generally with independent commanders, either directed or advised the operational movements of all Confederate forces. The masterplan of defense became, in large measure, his. These movements adhered to three specific areas of concern. The first one focused toward the Peninsular region of Eastern Virginia and along the old Manassas line where General George McClellan threatened Richmond with a large Union force. Another was directed from around Fredericksburg to the Shenandoah Valley where the combined forces of Generals N. P. Banks and John C. Fremont, under the command of General Irvin McDowell, threatened a breakthrough in that sector and possible link-up with McClellan moving on Richmond. A third force, under the command of General W. S. Rosecrans, threatened the Blue Ridge in the west. The conduct of the first one represented for Lee an exercise in frustration and diplomacy as Johnston, at constant odds with President Davis, retreated south, abandoned Norfolk and withdrew to the outskirts of Richmond; that of the other two became for Lee, coordinating with Jackson, one of the stunning accomplishments of the war.

In late March, McClellan shifted a major force to Fort Monroe, but left on the Manassas line a force large enough to confuse the Confederates of his intent. They could not discern whether he would attack south through the Peninsula, where Generals Magruder and Huger defended at Yorktown and Norfolk respectively, or along the withdrawn Manassas line defended by General J. E. Johnston. Major General Benjamin Huger
reported the movement to Lee on 24 March, whose response on 26 March revealed his confusion as to McClellan's intent to attack Norfolk or Richmond, and directed a possible defensive stand behind the James River. On the same day, Lee wrote Major General Magruder at Yorktown, advised him of the situation, and told him to "use every means" in his power to determine Union intent and to consider defending behind the Chickahominy River to delay an advance on Richmond.

Earlier, on 25 March and writing on behalf of President Davis, Lee had directed General Johnston to prepare to move a large portion of his force toward Richmond to counter a Union move there, yet to keep sufficient force in place along his "present line." To this directive, Johnston issued a plea to Lee on 27 March to convince Davis that a move to the Peninsula, which he wanted to prosecute, should be to concentrate total force and not to divide force. He stated, "We cannot win without concentrating." Lee, using some discretion and flexibility, replied on 28 March that Johnston should shift his forces as he saw fit, but warned that some respectable force should remain fixed to deter a Union attack that would threaten the loss of communications with the Shenandoah Valley. He further invited Johnston to a conference with President Davis where "the latest intelligence is collected."

As events unfolded, Johnston assumed command of the Peninsular forces, including those in Norfolk, and McClellan moved successfully up the Peninsula and laid seige to Yorktown. At a
series of war councils, Lee and President Davis opted for a strong defense of Yorktown against Johnston's desire to concentrate further inland. Although all three men finally concluded to defend Yorktown, Johnston—in a seemingly defiant gesture in early May—abandoned Yorktown. This move also uncovered Norfolk to the enemy, which consequently had to be evacuated leaving the major deep water port and ship-building facility to the enemy. Johnston then retreated to within ten miles of Richmond. Lee, responding to the evacuation of Norfolk which left Richmond vulnerable to a Union advance down the James River, orchestrated a masterful defensive measure. He fortified Drewry's Bluff, which overlooked the James at a narrow bend in the river, in a fashion reminiscent of his previous work in defending South Carolina. This move proved key to the defense of Richmond at this critical period in 1862. And, in fact, at this position, "enemy ships were held at bay throughout the war."  

However, it was not the defense at Drewry's Bluff that saved Richmond, even though it served its purpose. Richmond's salvation was directly related to General Thomas J. Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley which occurred during the same period from late April to mid-June. This campaign, a counter-offensive directed against scattered but large Union forces operating from Fredericksburg to the Valley, prevented a concentration of those forces with McClellan. Such a union of force might have provided the men necessary to take Richmond and win the war in June 1862. The daring execution of the
campaign belonged to Jackson, who operated against a far superior, three to one, Union force advantage. However, as Jackson's heralded biographer, G. F. R. Henderson, suggests, the genius behind the plan was Lee, whose "strategy was indeed remarkable."154

Lee's design was to threaten the Rappahannock, thereby confusing the North of Confederate strength and intent. Success in this sector, Lee reasoned, could relieve pressure on Richmond and prevent a total concentration of Union force against the capitol. The first hint of Lee's resolve appeared in a 17 April letter to General Richard S. Ewell, then operating along the Rappahannock in conjunction with Jackson further west toward Staunton. Both men at the time reported to General Johnston, but responded to guidance from Richmond and hence from Lee.155 Ewell had reported to Richmond on 16 April that a Union force was gathering toward his front.156 Lee's response to Ewell on 17 April encouraged Ewell to attack that force if he felt that he "could strike a successful blow at the enemy." He stressed that the "more active the troops on the Rappahannock, the more on the defensive will the enemy be kept."157 For his concern of the entire western region, Lee warned General Henry Heth of a threat to Staunton, and to "endeavor to hold the passage of the Blue Ridge."158 Subsequently, Lee learned from "verbal reports" that Brigadier General C. W. Field had evacuated his key position at Fredericksburg,159 and moved quickly to reinforce it. On 21 April in a letter to Jackson, Lee provided what Freeman
considers one of Lee's most "historic" dispatches. Lee reasoned that the Federals would want "to occupy Fredericksburg and use it as a base of operations against Richmond." He gave Jackson three possible courses of action. He could use "Ewell's division in an attack on...Banks," which would provide "a great relief to the pressure on Fredericksburg." Or, if he thought Banks too strong, he could position Ewell "between Fredericksburg and Richmond." And, if he felt Banks could be held without using Ewell's division, he could hold it in "readiness to re-enforce General Field." Lee's guidance to Jackson was a statement of intent to strike the Federals first before they could defeat the scattered Confederate forces piecemeal, then move to Richmond to "unite with McClellan." On 23 April, Jackson responded with the concept of operations that called for a concentration of force to surprise the Federals and frustrate their movement and ability to unite. Of great importance, it triggered the activities of his Valley Campaign.

Lee's response on 25 April to Jackson's plan represents, in typical fashion, his attitude of offensive maneuver that would characterize his mindset throughout the war. Lee wrote,

I have hoped in the present divided condition of the enemy's forces that a successful blow may be dealt them by a rapid combination of our troops before they can be strengthened themselves either in their position or by reinforcements....The blow, wherever struck, must, to be successful, be sudden and heavy.

This response also provides a good example of Lee's ability to express operational concepts and relay them through clearly
stated intent to his subordinate commanders. He then relied on them to execute an operation in a decentralized manner using their discretion. This sense of discretion and decentralization becomes apparent in this response when Lee concluded,

I cannot pretend at this distance to direct operations depending on circumstances unknown to me and requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment as to time and execution but [provide] these suggestions for your considerations. 164

Although Lee could not have known at this time in April the effect his threat on the Rappahannock would have on Union strategic thinking, he subsequently realized that, as the Valley Campaign unfolded with a key Confederate victory at Winchester, just what effect it did have. President Lincoln—who as a result of Winchester withdrew the Valley forces to protect Washington,165 thereby preventing their concentration with McClellan—would "make almost any military sacrifice and forego any offensive plan in order to save Washington from the risk of capture."166 It would become Lee's strategy, for the rest of the war, to threaten Washington in an endeavor to relieve Richmond from enemy pressure and its possible capture.

The report of Jackson's victory at Winchester reached Richmond on 23 May, but news of the disposition of General McDowell's forces in the Valley remained a mystery. Initial reports indicated that McDowell had departed the Valley enroute to join McClellan where the large and confusing battle of Fair Oaks was about to be joined. However, on 29 May, Brigadier General J. E. B. Stuart reported that McDowell had "halted his
columns" and returned toward Fredericksburg. That news brought a Confederate hope for victory and the salvation of Richmond. But victory, for either side, did not come at Fair Oaks on 31 May. It only brought stalemate, and for the South, the fall of General Joe Johnston. For Lee, it marked the end of a year of preparation. The next day, he assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia.

That his performance over the last three months had been significant is apparent alone in the withdrawal of McDowell toward Washington. Henderson provides specific praise for Lee's actions throughout. He writes, "From the moment he assumed command, we find the Confederate operations directed on a definite and well considered plan." In total, he continues, "his operations had been bold." Lee had directed the movements of large bodies of men, and had come to know intimately the theater of operations that was now his to command until the end of the war. And, too, he had worked closely with many of the commanders who were also now his to command. The confidence they had gained in him might be summed up in Jackson's appraisal. "'Lee,'" he said, "'is the only man I know I would follow blindfold.'" Lee, by no measure, was blindfolded as he took command of the Virginia front.
BEHIND THE MASK

"It was a most impressive [sermon], and more than once I felt the tears coming down my cheek. It was from the text, 'and Pharaoh said unto Jacob, how old art thou?' It was full of humility and self reproach."

Lee to his wife,
16 May 1861

Any commentary on Lee is incomplete without some focus on the personal qualities of the man himself. Those aspects of character, temperament, and prior experience that embody personality directly affect one's impression of what Lee did or did not accomplish over a given period. However, to delve into what some would refer to as the "inner workings" of Lee, or to get behind what others would call his mask, is not easy. He is an enigma. There are several reasons for this. First, outside of military circles, Lee was a relative unknown before the war. Therefore, little was written about him. Only his personal letters remain to provide any real understanding of the man. Second, and although he wanted to, Lee never provided any written perspectives after the war. It became then the task of historians to provide a perspective of Lee using their interpretation of historical accounts and of what little Lee left behind. Although these interpretations vary, and on some issues vastly disagree, there is more than enough substance to draw a general conclusion as to the fabric of the man behind the mask.

Although Douglas Southall Freeman suggests that Lee "was a simple soul, humble, transparent and believing," most
refute this belief. No man who accomplished what Lee did, even during his first year with the Confederacy, could be simple. In *The Marble Man*, Thomas Connelly, and his student, William Garrett Piston, in his defense of General James Longstreet in *Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant*, offer another perspective. They insist that Lee was a deeply distraught individual affected by perceptions of a mediocre career, self-doubt, and an unfulfilled marriage. Their accounts, however, are speculative at best. They too depend on interpretation. For most, the answer regarding Lee's psyche lies somewhere between the two explanations. Suffice it to say, Lee was a complicated man.

All do agree, however, that Lee was deeply religious and served a personal and Calvinistic God. For him, "life was only a preparation for eternity," and that "whatever befell the faithful was the will of God, and whatever God willed was best." The effects of a Calvinistic God on personality can be dramatic. For instance, B. H. Liddell Hart suggests in his review of Freeman's *R. E. Lee* in 1935 that Lee possessed a "limitation of outlook" that drove him to defend Virginia and not the Union at the outbreak of the Civil War. In so doing, Liddell Hart may have discounted the effect Calvinistic belief can have on limiting perception and solidifying resolve. When Lee stood for Virginia, he did so at the call of God's will. This same "limitation" encouraged others to stand for the Union, and drove an enlightened John Winthrop from England to Massachusetts Bay. When Lee wrote his wife on 16 May 1861 that a sermon he had heard had brought "tears" to his "cheek"
as it was "full of humility and self-reproach," he was affected by his Calvanism that made "self-denial and self-control...the supreme rule of his life." These traits served Lee well in his trials, even during the first year of the war when he seemed to inherit the responsibility of one disaster after another.

If a Calvanistic God provided Lee a direction and perspective on life, then as most also agree, his upbringing in an atmosphere of Virginia "noblesse oblige" made his governing principle that of a "Christian and a gentleman" whose model was his distant relative, George Washington. This embodiment of the refined man made it easy for Lee to subordinate himself to civil rule and work cooperatively and tactfully with his civilian masters. And, as it probably complicated his dealings with more ambitious military personalities such as Generals Loring, Wise and Floyd, it certainly worked to his advantage in fostering cooperation and respect among the many other military leaders and soldiers who shared his belief in Southern independence. As Freeman states, Lee's "dealings with brother officers had never been darkened by scheming or marred by jealousy." It was not Lee's to place blame on or to humiliate his subordinates for failure. As a Christian gentleman, he could "forgive and forget." Although he could anger, it was always slow to come and rarely apparent. His sense of self-control took over. This attitude, exemplified by a "dignity of character" and "calm self-reliance," writes
Connelly, built a "trust" among his officers. The trust was reciprocated by their lack of fear in using "their own discretion," and thus operating with a feeling of confidence and élan raised by the example and attitude of their commander.183 As Henderson states, the Army of Northern Virginia became, under Lee, "a living organism, endowed with irresistible vigour."184 Yet, contradicting this calm and dignified demeanor, Lee seemed to possess by instinct a trait of "boldness and daring" that typifies a risk-taker.185 At times, his actions were audacious. Lee's was a temperament that had no fear of a long reach. It built from a confidence of resolve and acted on the occasion, often with devastating effect. This trait still mystifies biographers today. The best anyone can do is explain it in the fashion of Liddell Hart, who traces it in part to Lee's "paternal heredity--the blood of 'Light Horse Harry' Lee."186 To compliment his boldness, Lee also possessed an ever-active sense of impatience. He was, writes Freeman, "rapid in his work," and had a "zest for action and a profound aversion to delay. His delight was in getting results."187

Lee got results throughout a career that, although relegated in large part to that of an engineer, impressed General Winfield Scott enough in 1861 to recommend him as field commander of the newly forming Union army.188 He had served heroically on Scott's staff during the Mexican War where he had developed a particular flair for reconnaissance and gathering intelligence.189 As an engineer, he had also developed a
a systematic approach to problem solving, had become "an excellent topographer," and "fortification he knew thoroughly." Lee's duty with Scott also impressed upon him a keen sense of nineteenth century military strategy, what one now refers to as the operational art. Though never that thoroughly read on the subject of strategy, Lee learned his lessons well in Mexico. For instance, he learned the importance of lines of communication and well-directed reconnaissance to survey terrain and find an enemy. He also developed an offensive mindset that appreciated the need to concentrate force on an enemy flank to deliver a strong blow. He came to learn and appreciate the use of the element of surprise. These lessons from the Mexican War affected Lee's decision-making process in devising his offensive strategy throughout much of the Civil War.

However, Lee's prewar development had not been complete in preparing him for duty with the Confederacy. He had "scant knowledge with militia and little experience with hastily trained volunteers." He was also "lacking in any detailed knowledge of supply," and had gained little or no knowledge in a defensive methodology. Of note, he had gained "a very limited knowledge of tactics." That he would overcome the first two shortcomings during the first year of the war is a tribute to the man and demonstrates something about his nature that no historian yet has explained effectively. Yet, the latter two shortcomings became a detriment to Lee throughout
the war. At times, and especially during the first year of the war, Lee displayed a brilliance in formulating defensive strategy. But he was more inclined to an offensive maneuver that depleted the ranks of the Confederacy against odds from which it could not recover. And, though Lee became, writes Liddell Hart, "a great artist of war," he lacked "for all his brilliance of manoeuvre...no clear grasp of the basic tactical conditions upon which strategy depended." 197

But in the scope of all the talents Lee did possess, he brought to Richmond in 1861 the ability to visualize problems and conceptualize solutions where none seemed apparent. Lee, writes Freeman, had the ability to "visualize his...problem as though it had been worked out in a model." Freeman credits this ability to the "accurate reasoning of a trained and precise mind." 198 Whatever the rationale, and perhaps working from a stance of necessity, Lee saw quickly the importance of his inner line in Georgia and South Carolina, the operational importance of Drewry's Bluff outside Richmond, and the strategic significance of a counterblow along the Rappahannock in April 1862. This vision may not have been the long view that the Confederacy needed to win the war, if such a view ever existed at all. However, this trait, and certainly working as a part of all that was Robert E. Lee, may be that one characteristic of the man that served to prolong the agony of the war until the spring of 1865. For this vision, as productive as it was for Lee early in the war, always predicted a need to attack. In
all that fabric that lay behind the mask of the man, somewhere
there was a knot that had to strike a blow and could never

call retreat.

BEYOND LEXINGTON

"You will take with you the satisfaction
that proceeds from the consciousness of
duty faithfully performed."

Lee to his soldiers,
10 April 1865

Lee's farewell message to the Army of Northern Virginia
in April 1865 does not fully acknowledge defeat. A temperament
such as Lee's, that was prone to attack against even enormous
odds, rarely does. He merely wrote his soldiers at Appomattox
that the Army had "been compelled to yield to overwhelming num-
bers and resources." Then, in a most moving passage, he coun-
selled his men to rest and reflect in the satisfaction of a
"consciousness of duty faithfully performed."

Consciousness
of duty, a compelling urge to attack, and a reluctance to
accept defeat characterize so much of the man. And, unfortun-
ately, even with some of the best historians, the image, nature,
and memory of Lee are shrouded in studies that seem content to
interpret this characterization alone.

But there is nothing instructive in this. These studies
simply view Lee where he now lies, in Lexington, Virginia,
either as an heroic memory of a devastating war or as a thought-
piece on the enigma of personality. For example, Bruce Catton,
in his book *Terrible Swift Sword*, refers to Lee and the stand
that he took at Antietam. He writes,

And yet Lee stayed when he did not have to stay, and fought when he did not have to fight, and since he was not out of his mind the only conceivable answer is that he believed that he could win.

The veracity of Catton's statement is left to conjecture. No one really knows why Lee chose to defend at Sharpsburg. Catton's unsupported assertion only serves to create a self-confident, defiant, warrior image of Lee. However, a close study of Lee during his first year with the Confederacy provides another "conceivable answer" unrevealed to Catton, and one that is instructive, if only to the student whose practice is war. Lee may have seen no other option but to gather his scattered army along the Antietam if he were to protect Harpers Ferry and hence the gateway to the Shenandoah Valley, a town and an area of strategic import to Lee as early as April 1861. To view Antietam in this light is to reveal it as more than one of Lee's heroic stands or watershed events in American history. Antietam becomes a consequence of the operational vision Lee acquired from April 1861 to June 1862.

Studying Lee during this period is significant if for no other reason than it demonstrates how well Lee had been prepared to command the Army of Northern Virginia, something history has yet to adequately uncover. Working at an operational level, he had raised armies, provisioned them, and directed their movements. He had worked convincingly well with politicians and obstinate senior commanders alike, and had
become thoroughly familiar with his theater of operations. Such study diminishes the credo that Lee "emerged quite suddenly" in June 1862 to become the Confederate Arthur.

But what else the study offers—and what history also fails to adequately unveil—is the instruction it provides, today, on the art of senior level command and the preparation for it. Even Freeman's masterpiece, Lee's Lieutenants, A Study in Command, fails to measure up in covering this interesting and important period of Lee's career. If nothing else, Lee's experience from April 1861 to June 1862 is a model study in discerning operational vision and the administrative and logistical considerations required to support it. In this regard, Lee's brief duty as commander of Virginia's land and naval forces is instructive in and of itself. A full study of the period also demonstrates the importance of conceptualization and flexibility in a thought process that produces a centralized, objective focus for operations, yet encourages decentralized execution. It reveals the importance of good orders that clearly articulate intent, rationale, and governing concepts. A relook at the genesis of the Valley Campaign alone uncovers many lessons in these critical areas. And, such a study also provides, if so directed, an opportunity to explore the importance of personality as it relates to a leader's style of command. Just a view of Lee's relationships with his civilian masters and senior military colleagues provides a profitable field of study in the realm of strategic leadership.
Studies of Lee, as well as other leaders of the Civil War, do not entirely discount the value of such instruction. But in their attempts to demarble Lee, untarnish Longstreet, and reglorify Jackson, they fail to realize their full potential. No one yet, for instance, has provided a meaningful appraisal of how or why the three very different personalities of Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson worked so cohesively in becoming one of the best operational command teams in American military history. Instead, these studies seem content to recapture history as they mold a specific and sometimes inaccurate vision of a man.

Good history instructs. If the measure of good historians, as Freeman suggests, is the limit they recommend for the application of facts they establish, then—certainly as regards to Lee and his experiences during the first year of the war—the limits have not been fully explored. The potential for deeper investigation is enormous. But in order to do so, and take saddle and ride the full route with a great captain, history and its scholarship must step back from the grave. It must move beyond Lexington and view General Robert E. Lee in a context that provides the full value of his experience and example in ways that are applicable today.

John T. Bolger III

Carlisle Barracks, PA
15 March 1991
ABBREVIATIONS

ENDNOTES

BEYOND RICHMOND

6. Ibid., p. 457.

THE MOBILIZATION OF VIRGINIA

11. Ibid., p. 472.
15. Ibid., pp. 482, 479.
17. Ibid., pp. 790-791.
18. Ibid., p. 802.
19. Ibid., p. 806.
20. Ibid., pp. 788-789.
22. Ibid., p. 800.
23. Ibid., p. 836.
24. Ibid., p. 840.
27. Ibid., p. 841.
28. Ibid., p. 845.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 865.
32. Dowdey, p. 6.
38. Ibid., p. 927.
39. Ibid., p. 784.
40. Ibid., p. 927.
41. Ibid., p. 785.
42. Ibid., p. 794.
43. Ibid., pp. 809, 814.
44. Ibid., p. 832.
45. Ibid., p. 860.
48. Ibid., p. 883.
49. Ibid., p. 889.
50. Ibid., p. 895.
51. Ibid., p. 898.
52. Ibid., p. 910.
53. Dowdey, pp. 46-47.
54. Ibid., p. 8.
56. Dowdey, p. 53.
57. Ibid., p. 8.

WESTERN VIRGINIA

60. Dowdey, pp. 59-60.
61. Ibid., p. 61.
63. Ibid., pp. 542, 580.
68. Ibid., p. 996.
70. Ibid.

57
73. Dowdey, p. 59.
74. Ibid., p. 61.
75. Freeman, R. E. Lee, Vol. 1, p. 543.
76. Ibid., p. 560.
79. Ibid., p. 457.
80. Ibid., p. 574.
83. Ibid., p. 550.
84. Ibid., pp. 559-561.
86. Ibid., p. 805.
87. Ibid., p. 155.
90. Bruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword, p. 150.
94. Dowdey, p. 61.
95. Ibid., p. 68.
96. Ibid., p. 67.
97. Ibid., p. 70.
98. Ibid., p. 76.
THE DEFENSE OF THE SOUTHERN COAST

100. Freeman, R. E. Lee, Vol. 1, p. 630.
102. Ibid., p. 309.
103. Ibid., p. 313.
104. Ibid., p. 314.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid., p. 320.
109. Ibid., p. 327.
110. Ibid., p. 322.
111. Ibid., pp. 322-323.
112. Ibid., p. 346.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
120. Ibid., p. 344.
121. Ibid., p. 339.
122. Ibid., p. 395.
123. Ibid., p. 374.
129. Dowdey, p. 111.
135. *Ibid*.

**MILITARY ADVISOR**

140. Dowdey, p. 125.
141. *Ibid*.
148. Ibid., p. 409.
149. Dowdey, p. 126.
151. Dowdey, p. 126.
152. Ibid.
157. Ibid., p. 852.
158. Ibid., p. 855.
159. Ibid., p. 856.
164. Ibid., p. 866.
166. Ibid., p. 38.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., p. 307.
BEHIND THE MASK

177. Dowdey, p. 7.
180. Freeman, R. E. Lee, Vol. 1, p. 496.
181. Ibid., p. 456.
182. Ibid.
185. Connelly, p. 198.
186. Hart, pp. 53-54.
188. Ibid., pp. 435-437.
189. Ibid., p. 457.
190. Ibid., p. 455.
191. Ibid., p. 457.
192. Ibid., p. 458.
193. Ibid., p. 456.
194. Ibid., pp. 456-457.
196. Ibid., p. 457.
197. Hart, p. 216.

BEYOND LEXINGTON

199. Dowdey, pp. 934-935.

201. Observation regarding Lee's possible rationale provided by Dr. Jay Luvaas, US Army War College, on a staff ride to the Antietam battlefield in October 1990.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


