Denmark, Norway, and NATO: Constraints and Challenges

Richard A. Bitzinger

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PREFACE

This Note describes the unique domestic and regional environment in which Danish and Norwegian security policy is formulated and executed. It addresses the security policy structure, process, and politics of Denmark and Norway and how traditional security consensus and constraint, together with recent security policy developments, have affected the roles that these countries play within the NATO alliance. This Note should be of interest to analysts and organizations concerned with Nordic security issues and the defense of NATO's northern flank.

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SUMMARY

As the strategic value of the Nordic region has grown, what was once regarded as no more than a flank of the more critical Central Region is now seen to be a potential front in its own right. NATO interest in the role of its Nordic allies Denmark and Norway has also increased. This has mostly been manifested in criticism of Danish and Norwegian security efforts, particularly of their low level of military expenditures and the declining size and/or capabilities of their armed forces. The alliance has been irked by political activities on behalf of detente and greater arms control, often in opposition to official Western stances. All this has led to a strained relationship between Nordic NATO and the rest of the alliance.

Domestic Danish and Norwegian politics are noteworthy by their emphasis on consensus, both in overall political values and in political decisionmaking. Such a consensus also exists in the realm of national security policy. Security policy is characterized by a balance of active defense efforts coupled with efforts to improve East-West relations and lower tensions in northern Europe. This “two-track” approach is known as “deterrence-reassurance” policy. Deterrence is based on national defense efforts (mainly Danish and Norwegian armed forces) and NATO reinforcements. Reassurance is based on unilateral confidence-building measures, such as prohibitions on foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Danish and Norwegian soil and restrictions on national and allied military operations on Nordic NATO territory, designed to lower the “provocativeness” of Danish and Norwegian security activities.

The role that political parties play in the formulation and execution of national security policy cannot be overemphasized. In particular, the Danish Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Norwegian Labor Party historically have been instrumental to the operation and preservation of the security consensus in Nordic NATO. These two parties have been crucial in determining the direction, scope, and tone of security policy, especially in the development and functioning of Danish and Norwegian deterrence-reassurance policy. For the most part, the nonsocialist blocs in these countries have had to be content with following the lead of the social democratic parties, although they do play an important role in steering the security consensus toward the center.

The advantages of such a consensual structure are its continuity and stability. One of its drawbacks, however, is that a great deal of constraint about Denmark and Norway’s role within the alliance is built into the system, such as in their approach toward foreign troops.
and nuclear weapons. In addition, there is a good deal of institutionalized immobilism in
Danish and Norwegian security policy, which would make it difficult for these countries
to take on additional alliance defense commitments, even if external situations (e.g., the
regional Soviet threat) should worsen radically.

Recent developments in the Danish and Norwegian political culture and system
raise new concerns about Nordic NATO's role within the alliance. Basically, three kinds
of change can be detected. One is change in basic security policy values; there has been
at least a partial move away from traditional national security values in favor of "common
security" ideas and "alternative security" concepts; coupled with this is an even greater
emphasis on arms control and East-West detente. There has also been a fundamental
change in security policy actors, particularly as players hitherto not very involved in the
security debate have begun to increase their influence. This includes political parties on
both the far right and far left and the peace movement. The SDP and the Labor Party
have moved left on security matters, a phenomenon encouraged by its leadership's
inability or unwillingness to prevent such a shift. Finally, the security consensus has
changed as security policy has become more complicated, controversial, and conflictual.
In particular, defense and foreign policy issues have become polarized and politicized.
There has also been an apparent shift in Danish and Norwegian security policy in favor of
increased restrictions on national and allied military activities in the Nordic region and
greater arms control and detente—particularly in the area of nuclear weapons and NATO
nuclear policy—to further lower the nonprovocativeness of Western defense efforts in
northern Europe. As a result, the delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance is being
tilted in favor of the latter, despite Soviet bellicosity in the region. The concern here is
that this move could help destabilize the Nordic region and actually lower Danish and
Norwegian security.

What is still undetermined is how permanent these security policy shifts are and
how deeply they have permeated the Danish and Norwegian society, particularly the SDP
and Labor. Still, recent developments have greatly weakened the old consensus, as well
as undermining NATO solidarity and cohesion. In particular, concern over
nonprovocativeness has had a racheting effect upon security policy. Change has been
particularly pronounced in the realm of nuclear weapons and nuclear policy.
Antinuclearism has become deeply internalized within a large part of the Danish and
Norwegian populations, and it can be argued that either no domestic consensus any longer
exists around current NATO nuclear policy, or there is now a new majority against nuclear
weapons.
NATO should not expect Denmark and Norway to overturn their deterrence-reassurance policies and should instead accept such policies for the benefits they accrue to the West in northern Europe. At the same time, Denmark and Norway should be persuaded not to make any more changes in their overall deterrence-reassurance policies until more concrete Soviet responses are clearly apparent.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

It has become axiomatic, almost cliché, to state that while the next war in Europe may not be won in northern Europe, it could certainly be lost there. It cannot be denied that, over the last several decades, the intrinsic strategic value of the Nordic region has slowly grown.

What was once seen as no more than a flank of the more critical Central Region is now believed to be a potential front in its own right. The military importance of the Nordic region has not been lost on NATO planners. The Soviet military buildup in the region over the past 20 years has been tremendous. The Soviet blue-water navy, for example, has expanded, evidenced by the Northern Fleet, headquartered in Murmansk. More than 80 major surface ships and 100 smaller ships are now deployed on the Kola Peninsula, plus around 110 attack submarines (half of which are nuclear-powered); this is twice the number of vessels deployed in 1970. The region has also become the main operating base for the Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, two-thirds of which, including their most sophisticated Delta and Typhoon submarines, are stationed on the Kola. These SSBNs are also deploying to the Barents and neighboring seas for their patrols; these waters have become sanctuaries for Soviet missile-carrying submarines. The Soviets also maintain substantial ground and air forces on the Kola. Two full-strength and eight lower readiness motorized rifle divisions are stationed in the region. Many of these outfits receive arctic training and have special all-terrain vehicles for operation over snow and marshes.\(^1\) A Soviet naval infantry brigade is situated at Pechenga, only seven miles from the Norwegian border. Finally, the Kola is home to about 250 fighter-bomber aircraft, including MiG-31s and Su-27s. Moreover, in the late 1980s, the Soviets began basing Backfire bombers in the region. See the Frontispiece for a map of the area.

The Norwegian coast straddles a major transit lane between the Barents Sea and the North Atlantic, and control of these waters and of coastal airfields in Norway could be crucial in a major European war. Soviet ships wishing to leave their Kola bases to interdict Western sea lanes of communication would have to make a long, dangerous journey down this coastline to gain access to the open seas. At the same time, U.S. and NATO naval vessels wishing to steam north to bottle up the Soviet Northern Fleet and

\(^{1}\)Terry, 1988, pp. 35-36.
conduct antisubmarine warfare in the Baltic, Barents, and Norwegian seas would need to retain control of Norway to secure their flank. At the very minimum, then, denial of this important asset to the other side is a major military concern in Northern Europe.

The waters off Norway have also taken on a potential nuclear value. With the recent ratification and implication of the treaty banning ground-based intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the Norwegian and Northern seas have been eyed as possible deployment areas for a limited number of nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) on submarines and even surface vessels. These are perhaps the only waters—with the exception of the Eastern Mediterranean—where such systems could seriously threaten targets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The area incorporating and surrounding Denmark and southern Norway—the Baltic Approaches—is important for three military-strategic functions. One is the surveillance of critical land, sea, and airspace adjacent to the Central Region. In this regard, Danish territory straddles another major chokepoint for Warsaw Pact forces, and the Danish island of Bornholm, positioned far behind Pact lines in the Baltic Sea, is a natural location for deep surveillance of Pact activities. The second is control of the transit of forces between the Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea. NATO, for example, would like to prevent the Soviet Baltic Fleet from exiting to the Atlantic while keeping the Baltic Approaches open to its own naval forces in support of operations north of the central front. Finally, Danish territory could be an important staging and basing area: NATO, for example, for waging a counterattack against a Warsaw Pact offensive across the North German Plain; and the Warsaw Pact for outflanking NATO forward defensive operations in northern Germany.

Regarding the threat to the Baltic Approaches, the Soviet Baltic Fleet currently consists of three cruisers, 20 destroyers, approximately 100 landing craft of all types, and around 50 submarines, including six (admittedly aging) Golf III-class submarines armed with sea-launched ballistic missiles. Along with the Polish and East German navies, the Warsaw Pact maintains permanent patrols in the major straits around Denmark and frequent seasonal patrols in other areas of the Western Baltic.

The Warsaw Pact is believed capable of bringing five to six divisions against NATO forces in Danish Jutland and German Schleswig-Holstein (although there may not be room for more than three divisions to operate collaterally). In addition, Pact amphibious units, including one Soviet naval infantry brigade (some 2,500 troops) and one Polish sea landing division (approximately 5,000 troops), are available in the Baltic, along with requisite landing craft, to carry out amphibious assaults on Jutland and
Zealand. Warsaw Pact air forces in the Baltic region number around 700 combat aircraft.\(^2\)

As Soviet military activity in northern Europe has grown, so too has the West’s. One of the more controversial Western military initiatives involving the Nordic region was the Reagan administration’s proposed “forward maritime strategy” to send carrier battle groups in wartime deep into the Barents Sea and traditional Soviet waters. These forces were to meet enemy naval forces—especially Soviet submarines—as close to their bases as possible and to attack enemy naval, air, and ground bases on the Kola.\(^3\)

The growing Soviet threat emanating from the Kola and the Baltic and corresponding NATO response has, if anything, increased the area’s geostrategic importance along with the importance to the Western alliance of Denmark and Norway. These two countries, once minor players within the alliance, today figure much higher in NATO security calculations. Their attitudes regarding foreign policy, domestic defense efforts, and Nordic participation in the Atlantic alliance are all coming under much greater scrutiny—and often much more criticism—than they did in the past.

Many of these criticisms are, by now, fairly well-known. Denmark, for example, has been particularly singled out by NATO for its failure to increase defense spending, both in real terms and as a percentage of the country’s GNP. More important than mere inputs, however, is the problem of outputs. For instance, although for past ten years Norway has raised real military expenditures by more than 3 percent per year, increased spending has not always translated directly into more defense capability, partly because of high personnel costs and a very tight procurement budget.\(^4\) In terms of number of men under uniform, armored vehicles, naval vessels and aircraft, both Danish and Norwegian armed forces have shrunk consistently over the past 20 years, while much of their equipment is aging and obsolete.

Just as important as national military spending and defense efforts is the changing nature of the Danish and Norwegian role within the NATO alliance. Beginning around the late 1970s, these countries—or large, influential elements within them—have been

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\(^3\) Kennedy-Minott, 1988, pp. 6-18.
\(^4\) For example, Norway’s buy of 72 F-16 aircraft in the late 1970s and early 1980s consumed much of this increase in defense expenditures, as well as taking the lion’s share of the overall procurement budget for all the services. As a result, many parts of the armed forces were starved of funds for other investments, and few new weapon systems were added to the Norwegian arsenal over the past decade or so. Denmark has suffered the same budgetary tradeoff problem, compounded by the ongoing shortfall in military expenditures.
critical of many fundamental tenets of alliance security policy. Scandinavian reservations regarding INF modernization and the "dual-track" decision, criticisms of SDI and NATO first-use policy, efforts to restrict port calls by possibly nuclear-armed allied naval vessels, and, above all, an unprecedented level of Danish and Norwegian interest in a Nordic nuclear-free zone (NNFZ) all underscore a growing antinuclearism in these countries. Norwegian balkiness at prepositioning heavy equipment for U.S. reinforcements and Danish qualms about the "offensiveness" of their armed forces go to the heart of alliance forward defense strategies. Danish and Norwegian calls for the Western alliance to redouble its efforts at detente and arms control have further irritated many in NATO.

Little wonder, then, that the Danish and Norwegian relationship with the rest of NATO has become somewhat strained. A major 1988 defense study, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense, singled out Norway for criticism (although Denmark might conceivably be included in the same such faultfinding), complaining that "increased restrictions on U.S. and NATO activities . . . limit our ability to bring force to bear quickly in defense of the region."5

Although one may easily see (and criticize) the results of Danish and Norwegian security efforts, less is known about the domestic factors that have historically dominated, shaped, and characterized the nature and process of these activities. Strong indigenous factors explain why Denmark and Norway act the way they do within the alliance. It is critical to understand this domestic environment and the recent developments within that environment to comprehend and deal with the present course of these policies. In particular, such an understanding should cause others in the West to accept that NATO may be severely limited in what it can reasonably expect from Denmark and Norway and that applying pressure on these countries to dramatically alter their ways could be futile. It might also help direct constructive criticism of Danish and Norwegian defense efforts where it may do the most good.

Section II discusses the postwar course of Danish and Norwegian security policy, addressing the pattern of constraints at work in these countries' security consensuses. Section III examines recent developments and changes in Nordic NATO security policy and how these have altered the basic security consensus in the 1980s. Some conclusions

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will be offered as to the possible implications of these changes, both for Denmark and 
Norway and for the Atlantic alliance, and what kind of reaction and response NATO 
might wish to construct.
II. CONSENSUS AND CONSTRAINT IN POSTWAR DANISH AND NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY

THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS IN DANISH AND NORWEGIAN POLICYMAKING

Consensus is an inescapable ingredient in Danish and Norwegian politics and policymaking. Scandinavian political systems have frequently been characterized as "consensual" or as "consociational democracies," meaning that political decisionmaking in these countries has traditionally gone beyond mere majority rule to construct broad support across the social and political spectrum for critical national policies. This has as much to do with the natural consensual nature of Scandinavian society as with anything else. The characteristics and values inherent in the peoples of the Nordic region—their ethnic homogeneity; strong sense of unity and community; and historical emphasis on egalitarianism, welfarism, and cooperation over class conflict and political partisanship—have left a very definite imprint on political policymaking in both countries. The Danes and the Norwegians are more predisposed than many other political cultures toward consensus, both in overall policy and in the decisionmaking process.

Consensus is also dictated by simple political need. Since the end of World War II, the domestic political situation in both countries has been characterized by a lack of strong majority governments. This tendency has been much more pronounced in Denmark. For one thing, the Danish electoral process, based on proportional representation with a low (2 percent) minimum vote hurdle, has encouraged the proliferation and fragmentation of political parties. (See Table 1.) Since 1973, for instance, the Danish parliament, the Folketing, has never contained fewer than eight parties. (See Table 2.) Over the years, several Danish parties have split over extremely narrow political hairs, resulting in the formation of breakaway parties and a highly factionalized and more ideologically charged parliamentary system. Hence, it has traditionally been difficult to form strong governments in Denmark. No party has ever won a majority in the postwar history of Denmark, and neither the left nor the right in the Folketing has been willing or able to construct a majority bloc by which to govern. The result has been either weak minority governments (both single-party and coalition) or occasional majority coalitions that have been too broad and too internally divided to be dynamic and decisive in power.

For Norway, minority governments are a slightly more recent, if no less bothersome, phenomenon. Indeed, for the first 15 years after World War II, Norway was governed by an uninterrupted series of majority Labor Party cabinets. (See Table 3.) In
Table 1
DANISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945
(Majority cabinets in bold face)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>National Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-47</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-50</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-53</td>
<td>Liberal/Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-57</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-60</td>
<td>SDP/Radical/Single-Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>SDP/Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-68</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-71</td>
<td>Liberal/Conservative/Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-73</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-75</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-78</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>SDP/Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-82</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-88</td>
<td>Conservative/Liberal/Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic/Christian Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-</td>
<td>Conservative/Liberal/Radical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1961, however, Labor split, and since then it has governed only in a minority, tolerated by one or more opposition parties. Furthermore, all majority governments since then have been nonsocialist coalitions, cobbled together out of parties that have often deeply distrusted and even despised each other. Increasingly, therefore, Norwegian politics have moved more toward the Danish model.1 (See Table 4.)

Traditionally, therefore, Scandinavian political culture has tended toward policy "across the middle," bridging the traditional left/right or government/opposition political spectrum. Indeed, Nordic politics and power-sharing have tended to be so consensual that it often makes little sense to attempt to distinguish between who is in the government and who is not.2

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1 Particularly in light of the September 1989 national elections, in which neither the socialist nor the nonsocialist bloc was able to win a majority, and the balance of power in parliament is now held by the maverick Progress Party.
2 See Fitzmaurice, 1987a, pp. 80-82.
Table 2

COMPOSITION OF THE FOLKETING
(May 1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicals</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Democrats</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Peoples</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Peoples</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressives</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945
(Majority cabinets in bold face)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-61</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-71</td>
<td>Conservative/Liberal/Center/Christian Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>Center/Christian Peoples/Rump Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-81</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-83</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-85</td>
<td>Conservative/Center/Christian Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>Conservative/Center/Christian Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-89</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-</td>
<td>Conservative/Center/Christian Peoples</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE SECURITY CONSENSUS: DETERRENCE AND REASSURANCE

In 1949, Denmark and Norway joined the Atlantic alliance as founding members. In so doing, they each set aside a tradition of isolated and largely unarmed neutrality that, in the case of Denmark, stretched back nearly one hundred years. Yet although the decision to enter into NATO initially was not an easy one, very soon thereafter a

3Western alignment was not necessarily these countries' initial choice. After World War II, many Danes and Norwegians had high hopes that the new United Nations organization could
Table 4
COMPOSITION OF THE STORTING
(September 1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Peoples</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Left</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressives</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

domestic consensus overwhelmingly favorable to the idea of Western alignment was well-established in both countries.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the postwar Danish and Norwegian security consensus is its broadness: Nearly all major traditional actors in these countries' policy- and decisionmaking processes—politicians (from conservative right to social democratic left), bureaucrats, the military, various civilian advisers and analysts, the trade unions, business organizations, and the local media—agree about the fundamental serve as an international peacekeeping body capable of protecting their neutrality. By 1947, however, as U.S.-Soviet relations worsened and the Cold War began to emerge full-blown, the postwar dream of a new international order faded, and it became obvious that the UN's effectiveness and influence were severely limited.

Throughout 1947-48, both countries then pursued efforts with Sweden to create a Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU), which would collectively protect the neutrality of the three Nordic nations. Although the Danes were enthusiastic about an SDU, the Norwegians were more reticent. For one thing, Norway insisted on having a guaranteed source of arms and outside reinforcements, and Oslo believed that Sweden—which would constitute the anchor of any SDU—would be unable to provide sufficient amounts of either. It saw the United States as the most reliable supplier of both weaponry and assistance in times of need. Yet, at the same time, to expect U.S. aid and assistance without entering into a formal alliance with the West was thought to be unlikely. In 1948, therefore, Norway made a counterproposal to the Danes and the Swedes for an SDU in some kind of loose, informal alliance with the United States and Western Europe.

This, however, was unacceptable to the Swedes, who believed it would compromise their nonalignment and neutrality policies; it also met with skepticism in the West. After this proposal was finally rejected, the Norwegians put the idea of a Scandinavian security pact behind them and arranged to join the Atlantic alliance.

Denmark was still willing to enter into a bilateral SDU with Sweden. Without Norway, however, the Swedes believed an SDU would be impractical, and in the end it was Stockholm that ended all talk about a Scandinavia-only security alliance. Denmark was now left with no practical choice except alignment with the West. Even so, at the time that was just about Denmark's last choice when it came to establishing a new course for its postwar security policy.
elements of national security policy. Moreover, Danish and Norwegian public support for the basic tenets of security policy has also been traditionally strong. Opinion polls in these countries have usually revealed a high approval rate (particularly in Norway) for the concept of self-defense, for using military means to deter or repel an invader, and for maintaining sufficient armed forces to defend the country. Danish and Norwegian public support for NATO historically has also been very high.4

This security consensus traditionally has been characterized by a largely elitist approach to security policy decisionmaking. The problems of defense and foreign affairs in Denmark and Norway have tended to be the concern of a small and rather cozy group of politicians, bureaucrats, and security specialists; for the most part, the general public and most other national actors have been indifferent to or only vaguely supportive of security policy. There has been little debate over security issues, either in public or in parliament, and the basic assumptions underlying national security policy have rarely been called into question.

Nevertheless, the emerging realization immediately after World War II that national security now entailed alignment and collective security still had to contend with strong cultural and historical traditions emphasizing a low international profile, an accommodationist foreign policy, and a purely defensive military posture. Postwar security policy, therefore, has always had to satisfy two often colliding requirements: the new demand for external security guarantees and the traditional inclination to pose as small a threat as possible.

As a result, this postwar security consensus has come to combine Western alignment with several important, often critical, constraints that sharply delineate the nature and extent of Nordic NATO defense efforts, particularly Danish and Norwegian roles within the Western alliance. What is immediately notable about Danish and Norwegian security policy is a conscious desire to balance active defense efforts with political undertakings designed to improve East-West relations and to promote the traditional low tension and stability of northern Europe. This “two-track” approach has come to be known as “deterrence-reassurance” policy. The object of this process is, of

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4For example, in 1985, 84 percent of those polled in Norway answered yes to the question, “Do you think that Norway should have a military defense under the present circumstances?”—an approval rate that has rather consistently risen over the past 20 years, in fact. In addition, about 65 percent of all Norwegians supported NATO membership as helping to deter an enemy attack. In Denmark, meanwhile, in May 1983—at the height of the INF debate—61 percent of those polled favored Danish membership in the alliance, the highest approval rate ever. (Norwegian Defence Review, 1986, section on “Facts on Norwegian defense”; Thune and Petersen, 1985, p. 11.)
course, the Soviet Union; and the ultimate goal of Nordic NATO security policy is to
deter or dissuade Soviet aggression in the region while lessening any possible concerns
on Moscow's part that Scandinavia might become a staging area for aggression against
the USSR. This dictatorial approach is explicit and openly integrated into official
Norwegian security policy. In the case of Denmark, such deterrence-reassurance policy,
particularly reassurance of the Soviets, although not officially pronounced, is certainly
implied; in actuality, it is no less prominent in Danish defense and foreign policy
activities.  

**Deterrence**

For Denmark and Norway, deterrence is grounded in two constituent parts:
domestic defense efforts and the NATO alliance. Both countries now place a great deal
more emphasis on national defense and on maintaining the military means to deter or
repel an adversary than they did before the war. The main features of the Danish and
Norwegian armed forces are the use of conscription and reliance upon the mobilization of
large numbers of reserves to fill out wartime establishment.

The Danish armed forces currently stand at about 30,000 peacetime troops, of
whom roughly 10,000 are conscripts. Upon mobilization, Danish forces can be increased
to over 110,000 troops. Danish ground forces are organized into two divisions—one on
Jutland and the other on Zealand—with a total of five infantry brigades. Denmark also
maintains an air force of six squadrons (F-16s and Swedish-built *Drakens*) and a naval
force of four submarines, ten frigates, and an assortment of patrol boats. Moreover, the
Home Guards, a strictly volunteer organization, complements active and reserve forces
with an additional 78,000 soldiers, although it is estimated that only about 10,000
guardsmen could make a genuine contribution to the defense of the country, because of
their low service obligation (24 hours per year) and minimal training.

Like their Danish counterpart, the Norwegian armed forces are essentially
mobilization forces based on conscription. Norwegian peacetime forces number
approximately 39,000 troops, of whom 25,000 are conscripts. Upon mobilization, ground
forces number 138,000, organized into 12 infantry brigades. The bulk of Norway's

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5 The Nordic usage of the term "deterrence-reassurance" should not be confused with
Michael Howard's definition of the phrase. In Howard's argument, "reassurance" refers to steps
taken by a European ally to assure *its own population*, rather than the Soviet leadership, that it
would not permit NATO (and particularly U.S.) activities to harm detente or increase East-West
tensions. In a larger sense, the Nordic approach toward reassurance could have a similar effect
upon its own domestic situation (see Howard, 1982/83).
standing forces are oriented toward the north, and its one active brigade (approximately 6,500 troops) is permanently stationed in North Norway. Norway also maintains a five-squadron air force comprising F-16 and F-5 fighter jets and a small navy tasked for coastal defense. Like Denmark, Norway also has a Home Guard of approximately 80,000 soldiers; unlike Denmark, the Home Guard comprises both conscripts and volunteers, and most guard members have obligations to serve a higher minimum number of hours per year.

Although these countries maintain their own national armed forces, deterrence is ultimately based on Danish and Norwegian membership in NATO and on collective security arrangements within the Western alliance. Perhaps the key lesson that the Danes and Norwegians learned from World War II was the need for explicit and binding external security guarantees. Their own forces, no matter how well outfitted, would always be insufficient to repel a full-scale attack by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the mere expectation of outside assistance was no longer enough to satisfy the defense requirements of these countries.

As a result, Denmark and Norway have extracted from the Atlantic alliance a series of detailed, formal external defense commitments—what they have come to refer to as their “NATO drawing rights.” For one thing, in keeping with the current NATO nuclear doctrine of extended deterrence, the Nordic NATO countries come under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Furthermore, should war break out in Europe, or should either nation come under a direct military threat, prearranged NATO reinforcements would be despatched to Norway and Denmark to aid in their defense.

Allied military assistance to Denmark comprises German, British, American and other NATO forces. German aid would come primarily through the Allied Command Baltic Approaches (BALTAP), which was established with the aim of utilizing West German forces to plug the gaps in Danish defense by means of a fully integrated German-Danish defense of BALTAP territory. BALTAP is a subcommand of NATO’s Allied Forces, Northern Command (AFNORTH). It incorporates Denmark (minus Greenland and the Færøe Islands), all West German territory north of the Elbe river, and surrounding waters. BALTAP has at its disposal a standing force of 110,000 soldiers (mobilizable to 300,000), about 200 warships, and over 350 combat aircraft, helicopters, and bombers, including the formidable German Naval Air Arm (comprising about 120 Tornado jet fighters). German forces in Schleswig-Holstein are committed to the defense of Jutland and even have equipment prepositioned in Jutland for such a contingency. Land Forces Jutland (LANDJUT)—which consists of one Danish and one German division—in fact
constitutes the only binational corps in NATO. Danish-German defense cooperation is aided by a high degree of weaponry and equipment interchangeability and interoperability.

Besides the possible deployment of German troops to Jutland, other forces are explicitly committed to reinforcing BALTAP. Britain has the largest commitment of ground forces to Denmark, and it is pledged to send the U.K. Mobile Force (UKMF), consisting of roughly 17,000 troops, to aid in the defense of the Baltic Approaches. In addition, up to 170 U.S. Air Force and RAF air defense and fighter-bomber aircraft could be deployed to Denmark in wartime, under collocated operating bases (COB) agreements.

Other allied forces may also be despatched to Denmark. A U.S. Marine Amphibious Force of approximately 50,000 troops and over 120 combat aircraft, committed to reinforcing NATO's Northern flank, could send some elements to Denmark. Forces of SACEUR's Strategic Reserve (which consists of a U.S. infantry division, some elements of the British-Dutch marines, and U.S. Air Force and RAF combat aircraft) have the reinforcement of northern Europe as their first priority. Finally, NATO's multinational ACE Mobile Force (AMF—a light brigade of roughly 7,000 troops, and about 40-50 aircraft), and the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) also have deployment options for BALTAP.

External security guarantees are particularly critical to Norwegian defense. Norwegian defense tactics depend on maintaining national armed forces in sufficient numbers and capability to slow any Soviet advance through northern Norway until NATO reinforcements can arrive. Hence, ensuring that these guarantees will be kept and that these reinforcements will be inserted in a timely matter has been an ongoing concern of the Norwegians within the alliance.

Until recently, the only NATO force specifically earmarked for reinforcing Norway was the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade, a force of about 5,000 troops specially trained in arctic warfare. In 1987, however, Canada announced that it would be substantially reducing this commitment by the early 1990s. Oslo demanded, and eventually received, promises from other NATO countries to reinforce North Norway; and a special multinational "fire brigade" (the NATO Composite Force, or NCF) is currently being organized for such a task. This force will include soldiers from the Bundeswehr, marking the first time since World War II that German combat troops will be earmarked for operations in Norway. Norway, like Denmark, maintains COB agreements with other allied countries, and combat aircraft from the United States and Britain would be deployed to Norway in wartime.
As previously mentioned, the U.S. Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is to be at least made available for possible reinforcement of the Northern region; in fact, the chances of its being despatched to the defense of North Norway in time of war is quite high, because the MAF typically trains for arctic combat operations. This force, backed up by its own complement of combat aircraft, would make a substantial contribution to the defense of Norway. Forces of SACEUR’s Strategic Reserve are also likely to be sent to Norway (again, rather than to Denmark). Finally, North Norway is included as one of the ACE Mobile Force’s possible deployment areas.

In both cases, the allied reinforcement and defense of Nordic NATO has been backed up by the prepositioning of war stocks to support those reinforcements, including fuel, ammunition, heavy equipment, and even tanks and artillery. Under the terms of the INVICTUS and COB agreements, for example, Denmark and Norway agreed to prestock supplies and equipment and to provide necessary logistical support to assist in the reception and operation of incoming allied forces. In addition, the MAF already has supplies, equipment and heavy weapons prepositioned in Norway’s Trondelag district.

Reassurance

While Denmark and Norway have consistently supported a reasonable national defense and strongly pushed for guarantees external security commitments, they have tended to give roughly equal emphasis to restricting national and alliance military activities in northern Europe to demonstrate the strictly defensive nature of their security efforts and to reduce the chance the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact would perceive their military activities as offensive or provocational.\(^6\) As Norway’s former defense minister Johan Jørgen Holst has put it, this is done with the explicit intention to “communicate [to the Soviet Union] peaceful intentions and [to] avoid challenging vital Soviet security interests during peacetime.”\(^7\) “Reassurance,” therefore, refers to a series of deliberate and unilateral self-restraints placed by Denmark and Norway on their domestic defense efforts, on their national participation within the alliance, and on alliance activities in and around their territory.

A fundamental element of reassurance policy has been the constraints placed on peacetime alliance activity in and around Danish and Norwegian territory. Altogether, these have become known as Denmark’s and Norway’s “minimal” conditions for membership in the NATO alliance. They include:

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\(^6\) Brundtland, 1985, p. 177.
\(^7\) Holst, 1985, p. 4.
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- A ban on the permanent stationing of foreign troops on Danish and Norwegian soil
- The rejection of the stockpiling and deployment of nuclear (and chemical) weapons
- The imposition of "geographic, quantitative and qualitative" restrictions on allied military activities.\(^8\)

The first of these conditions—the ban on foreign bases—dates back as far as February 1949, while the Norwegian government was still negotiating on its entry into NATO. At that time, Oslo attached an important qualification to its future NATO membership:

The Norwegian Government will not be party to any agreement with other states involving obligations on the part of Norway to make available to the armed forces of foreign powers bases on Norwegian territory, so long as Norway is not attacked or subject to the threat of attack.\(^9\)

The Danes tend to take their security policy cues from the Norwegians, and the Danish basing ban, although less formal than the Norwegian injunction, could be inferred as least as far back as 1949. In the early 1950s, however, NATO proposed stationing 150 U.S. warplanes in Denmark. The resulting domestic political debate eventually led to an official Danish government statement in 1953 prohibiting the basing of foreign troops on Danish soil "under present conditions." Subsequent statements have defined these "present conditions" as referring to peacetime or noncrisis situations.

The second major Danish and Norwegian condition placed on NATO membership is a peacetime prohibition on the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory. This can be seen as an extension of the basing ban. In 1957, NATO further agreed to stockpile nuclear weapons in Western Europe, including the basing of medium-range ballistic missiles in Italy, Turkey, and Great Britain and the deployment of tactical nuclear forces to West Germany. That same year, the Danish government, concerned that the deployment of such weapons to their country would be taken as a provocative act, unilaterally announced that it would not accept nuclear weapons on Danish soil "under

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\(^8\)Holst, 1986b, pp. 5-6.

\(^9\)Terry, 1988, p. 16.
present circumstances,” again defined as peacetime. Around the same time, Norway made a similar pronouncement. Later, this ban was extended to include chemical weapons.

Finally, although foreign troops have been permitted to enter Danish and Norwegian territory temporarily to train and conduct exercises, additional restrictions gradually have been placed on allied activities in and around these countries. Norway, for example, has instituted a rather sophisticated range of constraints. It does not permit allied ground maneuvers to take place in Finnmark, its northernmost territory. No allied vessels may operate in territorial waters east of 24° E, nor may they enter territorial waters if they have been operating east of 24° E in international waters. No allied aircraft may operate in Norwegian airspace east of 24° E. Moreover, all exercises conducted in Norway must be “small and limited in duration,” and all must be announced. Finally, both countries have tried to restrict port calls by allied naval vessels that might possibly be carrying nuclear weapons.

This pattern of deliberate restraint has also been applied to national armed forces. For example, Norway keeps the bulk of its standing forces in North Norway stationed around Troms, fully 300 miles from the Soviet-Norwegian frontier, and only a modest force of 500 troops is deployed in Finnmark. Norway also restricts exercises and maneuvers in Finnmark. Danish troops do not participate in certain NATO maneuvers east of 17° E. The strategic island of Bornholm, in the Baltic, has also been effectively demilitarized, although it still carries on important intelligence-gathering and surveillance activities. Both countries have unilaterally limited the offensive capability of their armed forces, such as arming their aircraft for deep interdiction strikes. Finally, in keeping with their nonnuclear status, Norwegian and Danish weapons systems, such as F-16 aircraft and artillery pieces with potential “dual-use” capabilities, are not adapted to deliver nuclear weapons, and their soldiers are not trained in the use of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, while these countries have placed important and sometimes severe restrictions on their membership and participation within the alliance, Denmark and Norway have taken pains to insist that these are limited and that they do not interfere with

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10 The chain of command within BALTAP provides an interesting irony to this nuclear ban. Although BALTAP is a joint German-Danish authority, its commanding officer is always a Danish general or admiral. This means that, in effect, a Dane commands all German forces north of the Elbe. It also means that, in wartime, a Danish commander would control the use of nuclear-tipped Lance missiles, deployed with the German forces in Schleswig-Holstein, even though Denmark itself has refused to allow nuclear weapons to be based on Danish territory.

11 Terry, 1988, p. 17.
NATO strategy or with the adequate defense of northern Europe. Danish and Norwegian basing policy, for example, should not be taken as prohibiting allied exercises or port calls by NATO vessels. It certainly does not preclude the idea of allied reinforcements, should the need ever arise, nor does it prohibit these countries from making preparations, including the prepositioning of equipment, for the possible receipt of NATO forces. The Danish basing ban does not apply to Greenland, which is a vital link in the U.S. surveillance and early warning system. Finally, the territorial ban on nuclear forces does not mean that Denmark and Norway necessarily reject extended deterrence and the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, nor have they traditionally opposed NATO flexible response doctrine, which calls for the option of nuclear strikes in response to a Warsaw Pact conventional attack.

Above all, however, Denmark and Norway have gone to great lengths to demonstrate to their NATO allies and especially to the Soviets that their reassurance policies are entirely self-defined and conditional. In particular, they assert that there is no Soviet droit de regard, and that these policies are open only to their, and not Soviet, interpretations. Finally, they insist that the continuation of these unilateral restraints are contingent on Soviet "good behavior," and standing defense policies could change should the Soviets decide to raise the stakes in the region.12

Danish and Norwegian Security Policy and the "Nordic Balance"

Finally, it is important to understand how these countries’ deterrence-reassurance policies interconnect with the Nordic element in Danish and Norwegian security. Although Denmark and Norway are today members of the Atlantic alliance, they remain historically and culturally Nordic nations. The countries of Scandinavia, consequently, feel a strong sense of common kinship and unity. In turn, this has traditionally meant a high degree of sensitivity and concern for each other’s welfare and a desire to act cooperatively, if often informally, on a regional basis.

Nordic identity has had important implications for how the Danes and Norwegians define and pursue their foreign and defense policies. Hence, they often have had two views on security policy: how it affects the Western alliance and how it affects the Nordic region in particular. The Danish and Norwegian approach to security, therefore, attempts to address both requirements.

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12Holst, 1981, pp. 70-77.
Briefly, Nordic security today is a dynamic, often cooperative regional process involving all the Scandinavian states—Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland—with the goal of maintaining the "stability and peaceful development of the Nordic region"—the so-called "Nordic Balance." Although the individual Nordic nations pursue widely differing roads to security—alignment (Norway and Denmark), nonalignment (Sweden) or neutrality (Finland)—each has adopted a security stance that largely complements the others, and one can see evidence of a broad regional equilibrium. Although there has been wide debate over the exact nature and extent of this equilibrium, both independently and collectively, the Nordic states aim to reduce the potential threat to northern Europe and encourage the traditional low tensions and stability of the Nordic region.

An important component of this process is a regional convergence on overall security concerns—a "mutual respect among the [different Nordic] states for the different security options and political standpoints of each." For example, Finnish neutrality coupled with a more or less accommodationist stance toward the Soviet Union, and a fiercely nonaligned Sweden backed up by the force of arms enhance Danish and Norwegian regional security, both by providing a defensive buffer for the Nordic NATO states and by helping to reduce, politically and diplomatically, any perceived threat to the USSR emanating from Scandinavia.

Denmark and Norway believe that they, too, have a role to play in this regional security calculus. Hence, they approach their participation in NATO with a careful eye toward how it might affect the pattern of security in northern Europe and, in particular, how it might negatively affect the security of their neutral Nordic neighbors, especially Finland. For example, in 1961, in response to NATO's establishment of a joint German-Danish military command in the Baltic Approaches, the Soviets demanded (in accordance with the Fenno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance) talks with the Finns that could have led to the deployment of Soviet troops on Finnish soil. The so-called "Note Crisis" was averted only after Finnish President Urho Kekkonen personally intervened to reassure Khrushchev. The Norwegians and Danes believe, therefore, that their basing and nuclear policies must be viewed in the context of "mutual consideration": that any major change in these policies could increase Soviet pressures.

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13 Hagard, 1987, p. 3.
14 Ibid.
on Finland and Sweden, thereby undermining the status quo of the whole Nordic region, ultimately to the detriment of NATO security.\textsuperscript{16}

**THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE SECURITY CONSENSUS**

Like most West European nations, the postwar political structure in Denmark and Norway has witnessed the emergence of a “two-bloc” system. Two roughly equal political blocs—one socialist, the other nonsocialist (also called “bourgeois”)—have come to dominate both domestic politics and their countries’ national parliaments.\textsuperscript{17} In the case of both Denmark and Norway, the socialist bloc is subdivided into two factions: a large, predominant social democratic type of party—the Danish Social Democrats (SDP) and the Norwegian Labor Party—supported by the urban working class and trade unionists, and a smaller, leftist grouping consisting of communists, various other Marxists, and “orthodox” socialists.\textsuperscript{18} The nonsocialist bloc in both countries, meanwhile, is fractured into three or more bourgeois parties representing nonworking-
class, special-interest-group voters; although separate political institutions, they generally attempt to work together as a single unit inside parliament.19

As already noted, because of their inability to construct strong majority governments, Danish and Norwegian policymaking depends upon the construction of "tactical consensuses" at the parliamentary level. This consensus-building generally involves both government and nongovernment parties and usually cuts across the political continuum. This has been particularly true when it has come to Danish and Norwegian security policy decisionmaking, and the major bourgeois and socialist parties have traditionally cooperated with each other in the implementation of national security policy.

For more than 25 years, the Danish security policy decisionmaking process has been manifested in the so-called "defense agreement" (forsvarforlig). The forsvarforlig is unique to Denmark—perhaps no other NATO country has anything like it. More than an annual projection of defense spending over the next several years, it is a meticulous, multiyear agreement—generally running three or four years—worked out between the major political parties (typically, the Social Democrats and the Conservative and Liberal parties) covering both "inputs" (such as the level of defense spending) and "outputs"...
(such as the strength and structure of the armed forces) for the period of the agreement. Defense expenditures are specified for each year of the agreement, and these figures tend to survive more or less intact throughout the annual budget battles in the Folketing. Moreover, the defense agreement also lays out in considerable detail the future mission, priorities, size, and structure of the Danish forces, to the extent of defining the precise number of troops, personnel categories, the length of national service, and types and number of armaments to be procured during the run of the agreement.

A unique feature of these defense agreements is the indexing of annual military expenditures to inflation. Individual line items (personnel, investments, operations and maintenance, etc.) in the defense agreement are appropriated in constant costs, and annual defense budgets subsequently attempt to take into account varying projected rises and fluctuations in wages, weapons procurement, energy costs, and so forth.

The first forsvarforlig was reached in 1960, and since then successive Danish governments have come to rely heavily upon these agreements to regularize and stabilize defense policymaking in light of parliamentary factionalism. Although such an arrangement has not prevented defense policy decisionmaking from being a sometimes quite rancorous affair, the use of multiyear settlements has at least spaced out these periods.

The Norwegian foreign policy and defense decisionmaking process has traditionally been much smoother than that in Denmark. Although Norway's political system is now very much like that of Denmark (minority governments or unstable, internally divided majority coalitions), the emphasis on consensual policymaking on security issues goes back as far as the period of uninterrupted Labor majority rule. Beyond any natural predispositions toward seeking as broad an agreement as possible on issues of vital national importance, the moderate elements who ran the Labor Party at the time found it to their advantage to gain the support of the nonsocialist bloc, and particularly the Conservatives. This isolated their own radical left wing, which tended to stand in vociferous opposition to prevailing Labor party policy and often constituted a greater threat to the government than did the nonsocialist opposition. By enlarging the national decisionmaking process to include the opposition, the resulting consensus made for much more stable policy. Today, with the loss of Labor's absolute majority in parliament (and hence Norwegian politics' traditional anchor), this need for bipartisan consensus is more strongly felt than ever.

The most important parliamentary activities concerning defense policy and military spending are usually carried out by the Storting (parliament) working at the
committee level. Since these parliamentary committees include all the major political parties, this helps ensure that the mainstream opposition will have considerable input and consultation rights when it comes to security policy and defense spending. Hence, defense budgets tend to gain approval from both opposition and governing parties, while further reducing the influence of more radical elements with regard to security policy. For one thing, smaller parties (such as the far left) are not generally represented on those committees that are crucial for parliamentary defense policy decisionmaking. The broad parliamentary consensus on defense matters has meant that the left wing of the Labor Party is usually frozen out of the decisionmaking process.

Nevertheless, although the participation of the nonsocialist bloc is essential to the bipartisan nature of the Nordic NATO security consensus, the mainstream leftist parties have had the most influence over the construction of national security policy in these two countries. In fact, one of the most critical things to remember when looking at security doctrine in Denmark and Norway is the instrumental role that the SDP and the Labor Party have played in shaping these policies. By virtue of their political clout (both the SDP and Labor remain the largest parties in their respective parliaments) and ideological pre-eminence (as the guardians of the welfare state), these parties have come to dominate the political lives of their countries since World War II. Hence, no major national policy, including defense and foreign policy, has been made without their participation and input. At the very least, they have had a tremendous amount of influence over the course of national security policy; in several cases, they have controlled the security agenda outright.

Historically, these two parties have been crucial in determining the direction, scope and tone of postwar security policy in Denmark and Norway. It was, for example, Social Democratic or Labor governments that led Denmark and Norway into the alliance in 1949. In addition, these parties have traditionally acted as a bulwark of unwavering support for national defense efforts and for their countries' participation in the NATO alliance. At the same time, the SDP and Labor essentially drafted and enforced their countries' deterrence-reassurance policies, and their intellectuals and leaders have most concerned themselves with the particulars of balancing their countries' Western defense commitments with maintaining a nonprovocative stance toward the Soviet Union. It was Social Democratic or Labor governments, for example, that initiated the peacetime bans on foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Danish and Norwegian soil, and, despite initial objections from the nonsocialists, these basic principles have become part of the political landscape of the Nordic NATO countries, broadly accepted by all major political parties.
Furthermore, their continued adherence to the security consensus, particularly during periods of nonsocialist rule, has been critical to the maintenance of continuity in Danish and Norwegian security policy. The SDP, for example, has generally served as the "swing vote" on security policy, and no defense agreement has ever been approved without seeking input from the Social Democrats, even when they have been in opposition. Labor has traditionally controlled the Norwegian security debate, and the party almost single-handedly determined the postwar course of the country's security policy. In fact, the most important decisions concerning Norwegian security policy have historically occurred inside Labor. Labor party policy regarding foreign and defense matters was, in essence, national policy. Even after Labor lost its majority in the Storting and began to experience periods in opposition, the party has continued to dominate the national security policy decisionmaking process. Quite simply, Danish and Norwegian security policy cannot be made or carried out in absence of support (or at least the acquiescence) of either the Social Democrats or Labor.

For the most part, the parties in the Danish and Norwegian nonsocialist blocs have had to be content with following socialists' lead. Although they are strongly pro-NATO and prodefense, disunity and factional strife within the nonsocialist bloc, especially at the parliamentary level, because of personality clashes and their inability to resolve policy differences (EEC membership, abortion, taxes, etc.), have undermined nonsocialist solidarity. This, in turn, has diminished the authority of the Danish and Norwegian bourgeois parties, weakening their influence and political effectiveness. This has been particularly true in Norway, where differing political roots and values have sometimes made it difficult for the centrist parties to work together with the Conservatives. Moreover, both the Center and Christian Peoples parties in Norway tend to contain not-insignificant minorities that are often sympathetic (for moral reasons) to pacifistic or antinuclear sentiments. This has made it harder for the Norwegian nonsocialist bloc to work in unison against the socialist forces, as opposed to the Danish counter-socialist grouping. This dearth of input has been particularly evident at the conceptual level of

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20 For example, although the current Conservative-Liberal-Radical government's proposed 1989-91 defense agreement already enjoyed the support of a nonsocialist majority (comprising the coalition, the opposition centrist parties, and the Progress Party) in the Folketing, Social Democratic consent was believed to be essential, and negotiations with the SDP continued until the party was satisfied with the agreement.

21 The ongoing decline in traditional and rural Norwegian society, because of increased urbanization and modernization through the proliferation of television, centralized educational standards, and greater social and geographic mobility, has been reflected in the steady decline of the centrist parties. For example, despite its best efforts to expand its power base beyond the
national security decisionmaking, and the bourgeois parties have all too often had a "me-too" tendency when it has come to foreign and defense policy.

The most important function of the Danish and Norwegian nonsocialist blocs generally has been to put pressure on the Social Democrats or the Labor Party to stay near the center on defense and foreign affairs issues. By pushing for increased defense spending and national defense efforts, and by being solidly supportive of NATO doctrine and of such recent NATO decisions as INF modernization and the Long-Term Defense Plan, these parties act as a brake to any leftward tendencies on the part of the mainstream socialist parties. The nonsocialist parties generally have opposed policies or actions that they have perceived as threatening to NATO solidarity or deterrent capability or that they believed might weaken their country's role within the alliance. For instance, although they may adhere to the by-now sacrosanct conditions for Norwegian or Danish membership in the alliance (e.g., the peacetime ban on foreign forces and nuclear weapons on their territory), the nonsocialist parties have traditionally fought any attempts to restrict Danish and Norwegian participation in NATO even further, and generally they prefer to delineate these conditions more loosely than their socialist counterparts.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The advantages of such a broad consensus on security are its continuity and stability. Agreement on the basic elements of security policy, moderation, and a conscious effort to find "common ground" on defense issues have meant that security policy decisionmaking in Denmark and Norway has traditionally been a rather low-key, elite-based affair. In particular, the procedural consensus compensates for weak governments and guards against the instability possible in a political system where minority cabinets and frequent changes in government are the norm. With regard to Danish security policy, for example, this broad consensus has been a powerful guarantor of continued, across-the-board commitment to NATO at the conceptual level (from left of center to far right) and the maintenance of a stable rate of defense spending. Furthermore, the development of the defense agreement and the indexing of military expenditures has provided Denmark with one of the strongest built-in safeguards of defense spending levels in the entire Atlantic alliance.²² In the case of Norway, a process

²²A few caveats to this process should be noted, however. For one, some defense agreements have been only partially indexed (the 1985-87 settlement, for example, limited the
of consensual security policy decisionmaking has been most crucial in isolating anti-NATO and antidefense elements in parliament. In addition, pragmatism on the part of the political blocs (and particularly on the part of the SDP and Labor) has greatly aided national security policymaking.

A great deal of constraint in Danish and Norwegian security policy is already built in to the structure of this system. Despite certain qualifiers, stringent limits exist as to the extent of Danish and Norwegian defense efforts and as to their relationship with, and commitments to, the rest of NATO. Much of this is the result of conscious, unilateral self-restraint exercised by the Danes and the Norwegians as part of their reassurance policies. Such long-standing practices as basing policy, peacetime nuclear bans, and restrictions on allied presence and even on their own armed forces have had obvious repercussions, both for the level of Danish and Norwegian defense efforts in northern Europe and for other allied nations' perceptions of Danish and Norwegian commitments to Western security.

Such conceptual constraints have been complemented by the procedural nature of the Danish and Norwegian security consensus. If the principal advantages of such an approach to security policy is continuity and stability, then the main disadvantage is immobility. Although the base of the security consensus is broad, its scope is shallow, and for the most part, a majority exists only for the preservation of the status quo. The heavy emphasis on consultation and interparty accommodation has led to a plodding and often unresponsive decisionmaking process; generally, it has been extremely difficult to institute change, especially drastic change, in government policy regarding foreign affairs or defense matters. As a result, the security consensus contains a good deal of inertia, and Danish and Norwegian security policy cannot react quickly to environmental changes in the regional security calculus, such as altering the Soviet threat in northern Europe, or to alliance requests to accept additional or different defense commitments.²³

For example, in the case of Danish security policy, although the consensus has made it difficult to cut defense spending, it has also been nearly impossible to raise it (for example, like the NATO Long-Term Defense Program of 1977-78).
Finally, the Social Democratic and Labor parties have traditionally had tremendous influence over Danish and Norwegian security policy. These parties have been central to the construction and maintenance of their countries' security consensuses and the policies that have gone into them. Moreover, any change in these parties' attitudes and approaches toward security policy will naturally have major repercussions, both nationally and internationally.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DANISH AND NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY

So far, this Note has been concerned with the nature and scope of the traditional constraints built into Danish and Norwegian security policy. For a variety of reasons, the conditional nature of Danish and Norwegian participation in the alliance is of long standing. Yet, for most of the postwar period, these restrictions have neither greatly hobbled alliance defense capabilities in northern Europe nor constituted any major problem for NATO security doctrine. So long as the deterrent aspect of this policy was clearly given priority, the Atlantic alliance was content to live with these constraints.

However, recent developments within the security policy environment of these countries have begun to affect certain longstanding elements in Danish and Norwegian foreign and defense policies. In particular, an important shift in security policy has taken place on the part of certain critical actors in these countries, and that has undermined the traditional course of the security consensus. In many cases, this has resulted in even greater limitations and constraints being placed on Danish and Norwegian defense activities.

This section draws upon Nikolaj Petersen’s study of the security policies of small NATO states.1 It examines change in three areas: security policy values, security policy actors, and the security policy consensus itself. This approach goes a long way in laying out a model for analyzing the recent evolution in Danish and Norwegian security policy. This section particularly addresses the influence that recent changes within the mainstream socialist parties—in this case, the SDP and the Labor Party—has had on these countries’ security policy.

CHANGE IN SECURITY POLICY VALUES

One recent development has been a noticeable value change within a large segment of Danish and Norwegian society when it comes to security policy. Inherent in these changing values is a shift away from traditional security policy concepts that emphasize the security and territorial inviolability of the nation-state and are based on ensuring that a nation has the military means to guarantee those goals, in favor of a broader concept that stresses “the physical and social security of the individual.”2 A key

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1Petersen, 1988.
2Ibid., p. 148.
ingredient in this value change is a changing outlook on the Soviet Union, particularly the perception of a declining Soviet threat. There is an emerging belief that the threat is actually systemic, that the threat to the individual is based on a bipolar world dominated by two mutually antagonistic blocs. Hence, there is concern that security policy must somehow transcend alliance politics and even the security of the nation-state to embrace a broader concept of "common security."

Consistent with this is an emphasis on more "nontraditional" efforts aimed at stabilizing the political-military situation in Europe over longstanding Western concepts regarding defense and deterrence—a "simple," alliance-oriented, militarily based approach to security. In particular, greater importance is now placed on the political and economic aspects of security over its military side. For example, emphasis is placed on improved interbloc relations through renewed Western efforts at detente, greater East-West trade and development aid, and additional arms control initiatives.

As the military aspect of security has been deemphasized and as threat perceptions have begun to decline, criticisms of Western defense strategy, particularly of Western nuclear policy, have increased. With much of Danish and Norwegian society, traditional, accepting stances on defense and alliance policy have given way to a much more questioning approach to standing NATO deterrence doctrine, including flexible response and forward defense. In particular, an "acquiescent attitude" toward nuclear weapons is no longer so readily apparent in these countries, and instead a general antinuclearism has permeated much of Danish and Norwegian society. Correspondingly, there have been growing concerns that the United States and NATO, by pursuing nuclear (and conventional) modernization over arms control, are spoiling detente and heightening tensions in Europe.

Finally, in conjunction with this new critical stance, one can see the possibility of a fundamental reevaluation of national defense doctrine. In recent years, such "alternative

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3 Despite high approval ratings for NATO, public opinion polls have also revealed a high degree of rejection of specific alliance defense activities. For example, in spring 1983, 58 percent of all Danes opposed deployment of new NATO INF systems, while a poll taken in November 1982 showed that 69 percent of all Norwegians were also opposed. At the height of the prepositioning debate in Norway, approximately 40 percent in 1981 consistently opposed the prestocking of NATO equipment in the country. Finally, opinion polls have shown a consistently high level of support throughout most of the 1980s for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Danes and Norwegians have shown their changing attitudes toward defense and NATO by their growing support for antinuclear movements and for political parties that espoused antidefense and antialliance policies. In the early 1980s, for example, more than a half a million Norwegians—nearly one-eighth of the population—signed a petition in favor of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. (Faurby, 1984, pp. 49-50; Waldahl, 1985, pp. 289, 294-297, 305.)
security’ concepts as ‘defensive defense’ and denuclearization have gained in popularity. These include the elimination of any ‘offensive capability’ on part of the Western armed forces (such as tanks, artillery, submarines, and air-to-ground munitions), an emphasis on more ‘static’ defenses, and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region. Many Danes and Norwegians perceive these concepts as natural adjuncts to their traditional nonprovocative defense stance and well in keeping with their emphasis on arms control and on enhancing the stability and low tension of northern Europe.

Although these new security policy values have permeated much of Danish and Norwegian society, they have been especially and most dramatically internalized in the mainstream left. As a result, beginning around the mid-1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s, one could see the SDP and the Labor Party start to move away from their almost automatic support for NATO policy and toward a more critical attitude in defense matters and the Atlantic alliance and a greater interest in alternative security concepts. For one thing, a subtle change could be detected in overall security outlook; a former SDP foreign minister once remarked, for example, that ‘to view security in East-West terms was an extremely narrow definition.’

In general, too, there has been reluctance to go along with both domestic and NATO demands for higher defense spending and rearmament, coupled with a new party emphasis on détente and arms control that has often outstripped concerns for alliance solidarity. In the early 1980s, for example, the Norwegian Labor Party took the unprecedented step of endorsing a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Labor has, on occasion, shown a favorable attitude toward a NATO no-first-use policy and the idea of a nuclear freeze while criticizing the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The Danish Social Democrats have gone even further down this road. The SDP has, for example, toyed with the idea of accepting an NNFZ without the consent and guarantee of

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4 Kjeld Olesen, cited in Gress, 1982, p. 89.
5 It has been longstanding policy of the Norwegian Labor Party and the Danish Social Democrats that any NNFZ, if implemented, would have to be ‘guaranteed’ by the superpowers. This is as much to ensure U.S. and NATO support for such a zone as to make sure that no nuclear weapons would be emplaced in or adjacent to the zone. The SDP and Labor have usually insisted that any nuclear-free zone in northern Europe would have to include Soviet territory and weaponry, particularly those stationed on the Kola peninsula.
6 Labor has often found allies in the small centrist parties in Norway. As previously mentioned, both the Center and the Christian Peoples Parties contain tiny pacifist or antinuclear wings, and during the early 1980s, these sometimes broke ranks with the nonsocialist bloc to support Labor on various security policy initiatives, such as a nuclear freeze or no-first-use (Dörfer, 1986, p. 24).
the United States and NATO—an unthinkable idea just a few years ago.\footnote{In summer 1985, an SDP spokesman hinted that it might be “necessary” to accept only a Soviet guarantee of a NNFZ. Only a strong reaction, within and without the SDP, and ultimately a denial by the SDP leadership were able to quiet the ensuing storm of protest.} The party has also proposed making the current peacetime ban on nuclear forces permanent and unconditional, even in wartime. And in 1986, in preparation for parliamentary discussions for a new defense agreement, the SDP published a defense proposal outlining a defensive-defense posture for Denmark. In particular, the paper questioned Denmark’s commitment to the forward defense of Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein, calling instead for a non-threatening defensive defense structure . . . which by its composition demonstrates peaceful, non-offensive intentions, but which at the same time is able—in cooperation with other nations—to inflict such losses on an aggressor . . . that an aggression cannot be assumed beforehand to lead to a successful result for the aggressor.\footnote{Socialdemokratiets forslag til modernisering af forsvaret, May 1986 (quoted in Petersen, 1986, p. 30).}

In conjunction, the SDP has, at various times, recommended scrapping Denmark’s submarine fleet, withdrawing one of its brigades from BALTAP, and removing all ground-attack bombs from its aircraft (thus relegating them to defensive air defense only).

**CHANGE IN SECURITY POLICY ACTORS**

Closely tied to this change in security policy values is a change in security policy actors. This has largely been the result of an expansion of the number and variety of participants in the security policy debate and an influx of “new blood.”

**Additional Actors**

One of the most dramatic phenomena of the 1980s has been the widening of the Western security debate beyond its traditional policymaking elite. In Denmark and Norway, this has meant both a rise in extraparliamentary activity regarding security policy and an increased role and influence for political parties and other groups that had been excluded from the debate. Many of these new participants have tended to hold diverging views from the mainstream toward national defense policies and NATO.
Two such actors are the Danish Radicals and the Danish and Norwegian Progress parties. Although largely middle class, both often take unpredictable positions on policy issues and hence are not usually lumped into the nonsocialist bloc.

The Radical Party (also called the Radical Liberal Party) is a holdover from Denmark’s prewar neutrality. Indeed, it was the Radicals who largely shaped and guided Danish foreign and defense policy between the two World Wars. The Radicals constitute an anomaly in Danish politics: rightist on domestic policy (their support of the 1982-88 nonsocialist government’s domestic programs was instrumental in implementing its austerity program, for example), yet “leftish” on security issues, retaining their largely pacifist, antimilitarist stance on matters of national defense. Despite the Danish experience during World War II, they were late in coming around to the idea of collective security, and even then it was not until the late 1950s that they finally accepted Danish membership in the Atlantic alliance. Even so, the Radicals historically have not been a major participant in the national security consensus, nor have they usually been party to the defense agreements that determine Danish defense efforts and the military budget. The party has frequently shown itself in the past to be favorable to Danish defense cuts and various disarmament proposals, and throughout the 1980s (up until it joined a nonsocialist coalition government in 1988), it tended to line up with leftist forces on such issues as a Nordic nuclear-free zone and Denmark’s refusal to participate in INF modernization.

The Danish and Norwegian Progress parties started out largely as protests against high taxes and big government. Basically, they are nonconformist parties, and their success has lain mainly in their ability to tap popular frustrations and a sense of powerlessness in the face of a system that many see as unresponsive and elite-based. In particular, they have been the beneficiaries of a backlash against the welfare state (although more recently they have added an anti-immigrant position to their party platforms). In this sense, therefore, the Progress parties are sometimes less political parties and more antiparty and antigovernment movements.

As political outsiders, the Danish and Norwegian Progressives, like the Danish Radicals, have generally not been involved in security policy decisionmaking. On the whole, particularly recently, they have supported national defense policies and even additional defense spending.9 At the same time, however, as populist movements, the

9Not that it was always the case. The Danish Progress Party, for example, sometimes put forth outlandish or irresponsible policies, and its leader once suggested that the country’s armed
Progressives have often taken a “nationalistic” approach to defense, and they tend to push for a more independent line for their countries within the alliance. This has been particularly the case with the Norwegian Progress Party, which has been very critical of NATO and which wants national defense efforts to more directly benefit Norway.

The Danish Radicals and the Progress parties can be quirky, unpredictable parliamentary allies, and most other parties have been reluctant to rely too much on their largess. Neither the Radicals nor the two Progress parties are very large, but because of the recent trend toward minority governments and the close left-right division in both the Folketing and the Storting, these parties have lately found themselves holding the balance of power in their respective parliaments. In May 1988, for example, the Radicals entered the government for the first time in 17 years; the current coalition must still rely upon the Progress Party for at least some support. In Norway, the Progressives have overtaken their Danish counterparts, rising from two to 22 seats in the Storting in the September 1989 elections and becoming the third largest party in the country. No government is likely in Norway without at least the acquiescence of the Progress Party. These maverick parties’ emerging role as kingmaker or as necessary political partner has increased their influence over foreign and defense affairs, resulting in even greater uncertainty in Danish and Norwegian security policy.

The other new actors in the Danish and Norwegian security debate lie at the other end of the political spectrum, including the radical leftist parties—principally the Socialist Peoples Party in Denmark and the Socialist Left Party in Norway—the left wings of the SDP and the Labor Party, and the peace movement in both countries. All the parties on the far left generally embrace an anti-NATO, antidefense, and antinuclear security platform. They support Denmark’s and Norway’s eventual withdrawal from NATO (and, in the case of Denmark, from the European Community); and they have continually pushed for reductions in national defense efforts and for drastic cuts in military expenditures. They are keen supporters of defensive or nonprovocative defense doctrines. Not surprisingly, the far left in these countries opposed NATO’s decision to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear forces to Western Europe, while they have strongly backed the idea of unconditionally entering into a nuclear-free zone (that is, without first gaining Soviet and particularly U.S. assent to such a zone) embracing all the Nordic countries.

forces disband and be replaced by a telephone answering machine repeating “we surrender” in Russian.
Both mainstream socialist parties have lately had to contend with a more vocal and activist left wing, particularly in Norway. Despite two major ruptures, for instance, the Labor Party still retains a very active and outspoken doctrinaire socialist bloc, and it holds strong isolationist and semineutralist views, a legacy of the party's prewar heritage. In fact, the Labor left traditionally has been a much more powerful force than the Socialist Left Party, and within the domestic political structure, this faction is the country's principal orthodox socialist grouping. The SDP has also had to contend with a much more radical left wing. The late 1970s saw the influx of a new, young, left-wing grouping into the party, many of whose members have very different ideas when it comes to security policy.\textsuperscript{10} It is estimated that about one-quarter of the parliamentary SDP holds beliefs similar to this bloc.\textsuperscript{11}

The peace movement in Denmark and Norway has become a major actor in these countries' security debates during the 1980s, and, given the movement's massive, nonpartisan grass-roots organization, it has expanded the base of the security debate more than any other institution. The movement has spawned or promoted a new school of "peace research," which provides "counter-expertise" to traditional Western security analysis. The Scandinavian peace movement has been consistently critical of much of NATO policy, while functioning as an influential proponent for alternative security concepts and disarmament proposals.

The ability of the far left and the peace movement to affect Danish and Norwegian security policy is almost entirely due to their success in influencing, both directly and indirectly, the defense and foreign policies of the mainstream left. For example, links between the peace movement and the SDP and the Labor Party have tended to be quite strong. Many socialists have been active in the peace movement, and certainly many more have been sympathetic with the movement's cause. As a result, the "peace issue" has become legitimized within the SDP and Labor. Furthermore, orthodox leftist forces have frequently been successful in constructing tactical alliances with the Social Democrats or the Laborites on individual security issues, and thereby affect national defense policy indirectly and incrementally. The far left has been particularly adept at the

\textsuperscript{10}For example, a survey taken at the 1978 SPD congress revealed that 50 percent of all delegates aged 20-29 opposed continuing Danish membership in NATO (compared with a 58 percent approval rate for delegates aged 30-39 and an 85 percent approval rate for delegates in their 60s). This new, more radical left wing has also embraced many of the new shifts in security policy, particularly opposing NATO's current nuclear doctrine, coming out early against INF modernization, for example. Bjøl, 1986, p. 608; Petersen, 1985, pp. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{11}Petersen, 1985, pp. 6-7.
parliamentary level of the security process. In Denmark, for example, the ability of the Socialist Peoples Party and other far-left groups to enter into an "alternative majority" with the Social Democrats on certain national security matters, along with their skill in controlling the debate agenda, has provided them with a surprising amount of input into the national security debate. In Norway, meanwhile, it has primarily been the efforts of the Labor left wing, bolstered by support from the SLP and the peace movement, that has been most successful in influencing party policy and, through Labor, national policy regarding security matters.

Finally, other, extranational factors have influenced the Social Democrats and the Labor Party. These parties have traditionally had strong ties with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD); and Nordic social democrats have historically looked to the SPD for ideological and doctrinal inputs. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the SPD's recent flirtations with alternative security concepts and "defensive-defense" doctrine have affected the Scandinavian left, particularly in the Danish SDP. The Scandilux group of the Socialist International (founded in 1980 and comprising the social democratic and labor parties of Nordic NATO and the Benelux countries) can be seen as another such "external factor." It provides a forum in which to discuss and promote alternative security ideas and fosters a certain degree of "likemindedness" on defense issues among the mainstream left in these countries. Moreover, the Scandilux group has further enhanced the influence of the SPD, as the German party serves as active "observer-member" to the organization.12

**Actor Changes Within the Mainstream Socialist Parties**

Crucial actor changes within the SDP and the Norwegian Labor Party have resulted in a lurch to the left in recent years. For one thing, there has been an influx of more radical members into the parties. This has been particularly true at the parliamentary level, where many new Labor or SDP members of parliament stand much more to the left than their predecessors and are more sympathetic to the new security policy values. The men and women who have led the SDP and Labor during the 1970s and 1980s have been either unwilling or unable to enforce their parties' traditional strict allegiance to the principles of a strong national defense and NATO defense doctrine and less inclined to damp their increasingly activist left wings. This, in turn, has permitted...

12 Ibid.
the shift in security policy values—and in some cases has even accelerated the process—and made these parties more susceptible to growing left-wing or pacifist influences.

For instance, Anker Jørgensen, party chairman of the Danish Social Democrats from 1972 to late 1987, was a trade union leader with no previous experience in foreign affairs, and although he was not identified as being in the left wing of his party, he has been described as a “foreign policy dove” with an “avowedly emotional” point of view when it comes to nuclear weapons. Jørgensen frequently appeared receptive to radical shifts in SDP security policy, he was sympathetic to the Danish peace movement, and he even spoke before antinuclear rallies. As a result, the SDP leadership during the 1970s and 1980s emboldened the party left and aided its cause. The “internal authority structure” of the party has also weakened in recent years, while party discipline has been allowed to lapse. One major repercussion has been the “almost total eclipse of the party’s traditional security policy elite,” again primarily to the benefit of the SDP left and its policy program.

Although the Norwegian Labor Party appears to be in slightly better circumstances, with the party still tightly run by its moderate wing, party attitudes toward foreign and defense matters have definitely changed from the times of the “old guard” of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. While the current Labor leadership may still profess to have ardently pro-NATO and prodefense credentials, it is also much less Atlanticist and more questioning of NATO policies than have been previous leaders. The present leadership appears to be more concerned with the national and regional consequences of Norwegian foreign and defense policy and how this affects Norway’s own security or Nordic stability than with demonstrating NATO solidarity and loyalty.

CHANGE IN THE SECURITY CONSENSUS

The security policy consensus has become more complicated, controversial, and conflictual in recent years. As security policy values have changed and participation in the security debate has widened, the process through which security policy is formulated and enacted has become more politicized and polarized. The traditional pattern of broad left-right cooperation (e.g., between the SDP and the Conservative and Liberal parties in Denmark, and between Labor and the Conservatives in Norway) on security matters has

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13 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
14 Petersen, 1988, p. 150.
been disrupted, and the result has often been rancorous stalemate. As a result, it is “much more difficult for the old security policy ‘Establishment’ to control the process.”\textsuperscript{15}

Once again, the mainstream left in Denmark and Norway has been instrumental in effecting this change. Shifts on the part of the SDP and Labor regarding security policy values and activities have most contributed to the increased polarization and conflict over the security process in these countries. Perhaps the most remarkable example of mainstream leftist divergence from the traditional security consensus was the emergence in the Danish Folketing of an “alternative majority” on certain aspects of security policy (see Fig. 1). From 1982 to 1988, this majority—comprising the SDP, the Socialist Peoples Party and the Radicals—through a series of binding parliamentary resolutions (called \textit{dagsorden})—was able to force the then-ruling minority nonsocialist coalition to pursue foreign and defense policies that the government itself vehemently opposed. These resolutions, once passed, become part of official government security policy, and the government of the time is legally bound to respect and act upon them, whether it agrees with them or not. For six years, then, this alternative majority passed more than 20 such security policy resolutions over the objections of the government, most dealing with nuclear issues: reserving official Danish opinion regarding INF modernization, calling upon NATO to work for greater arms control (including a Nordic nuclear-free zone), and strengthening Danish policy restricting port calls by possibly nuclear-armed allied naval vessels. Altogether, these actions, more than anything else, create Denmark’s reputation in the 1980s as a “footnote” country.

As a result of these shifts in the security policy consensus in the late 1970s and early 1980s, one can see a departure from the traditional pattern of Danish and Norwegian security policy, particularly with regard to these countries’ longstanding approach to their deterrence and reassurance policies. As previously noted, this policy was never entirely satisfactory to the rest of NATO; however, it was reasonably stable and predictable and therefore more or less acceptable to the alliance. Recent incidents, however, point to an effort by key forces in Denmark and Norway to reinterpret or “rebalance” deterrence-reassurance policy in preference to bolstering the nonprovocative image of these countries’ defense postures. Depending on how far it goes, this could ultimately undermine the gentlemen’s agreement between the Nordic NATO countries and the rest of the alliance.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 151.
Defense-mindedness

Political Alignment

Low

High

Left

Right

NATO Majority
Defense Policy Majority
"Alternative Majority"
Domestic Policy Majority

SDP: Social Democratic Party
Gov: Government Parties (nonsocialist)
PP: Progress Party
RP: Radical Party
SPP: Socialist Peoples Party
LS: Left Socialists

Source: Petersen, 1985, p. 3A.

Fig. 1—Political consensus in Denmark, 1982–1988
In the early 1980s, for example, many Norwegians, including some in the then-Labor government, vehemently opposed the prepositioning of weaponry and supplies for the 4th U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade in northern Norway even though the prepositioning initiative originated in the Norwegian government. While this was designed to facilitate the rapid insertion of badly needed reinforcements in a wartime or crisis situation, some saw it as a violation of the country's basing policies and ultimately provocative to the Soviet Union. (In the end, a political compromise was reached whereby the equipment was prestocked in the middle of the country, far from the unit's likely defensive positions in North Norway. Even then, nine Labor MPs voted against their own government on this compromise.)

In another case, during the early 1980s, Norway, worried about growing Soviet naval activity in the Norwegian Sea, asked the United States to increase its own number of sailing days in the region. Again, however, although the Norwegian government originally made the request, it soon became more concerned about an increased U.S. presence and activity in the high north (particularly in conjunction with the U.S. forward maritime strategy concept); and many Norwegians, including Defense Minister Hoist, began to call instead for initiatives that would prevent a "mediterraneanization" of the Norwegian Sea.

Denmark and Norway have more recently tightened up national nuclear policy, with the declared intent of making it more difficult to use nuclear forces in and around northern Europe. In the early 1980s, for example, Norway announced new restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory, including a prohibition on the training of Norwegian troops in handling and firing nuclear charges and a refusal to build special nuclear storage depots to aid in the wartime introduction and stockpiling of nuclear forces. Furthermore, Norway has on at least one occasion asked that allied aircraft operating in Norway under terms of the COB agreement be restricted to conventional roles only. In 1986, Oslo refused to allow a nuclear-capable U.S. Air Force F-111 fighter-bomber to land at a Norwegian airfield. Norway has also criticized proposals to station nuclear-tipped SLCMs on submarines and surface ships in the Norwegian Sea as a way of compensating for NATO's loss of land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces, following the ratification of the INF Treaty.

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16 Only U.S. forces seem to be perceived as provocative: While the Norwegian government was seeking additional defense support from the United States, it also asked for, and received, stronger reinforcement commitments from Canada and the United Kingdom. The Canadian and British prepositioning agreements were signed with little trouble.
17 See Kennedy-Minott, 1988, pp. 24-32.
18 Archer, 1984, p. 33.
Antinuclear activities in Denmark, at both a parliamentary and national level, have already been mentioned. The most recent event occurred in spring 1988, when the Danish opposition parties, against the desires of the governing coalition, pushed through a law demanding that all allied naval vessels prove their ships were not carrying nuclear weapons. This action infuriated other NATO countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain, who have a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on naval vessels, and the incident eventually led to the downfall of the government and new elections.\(^{19}\)

By far the greatest security policy debate of the 1980s in Denmark and Norway centered around the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The NNFZ initiative received an amazing amount of popular and political support in the two countries. In the early 1980s, there were massive campaigns in support of such a zone. Moreover, the zone concept gained unprecedented official backing from the SDP and the Labor Party. In Norway in 1984, and several times in Denmark in the early 1980s, the parliaments passed resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe.

More recently, both Denmark and Norway have come out against modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear forces (SNF). They have sided with West Germany in the desire to delay any decision on a follow-on to the Lance short-range nuclear missile and instead support early negotiations with the Soviets on the reduction of SNF in Europe.

What is still undetermined is how permanent are these security policy shifts and how deeply have they permeated Danish and Norwegian society, particularly the SDP and Labor. The new security policy values never spread to the center right in these countries, for example, while various alternative security and defensive-defense concepts appear to have lost some of their earlier appeal. The peace movement has largely collapsed, not only in Denmark and Norway but throughout the West, and its influence has diminished accordingly. More radical arms control initiatives have also waned; after a brief flurry of activity in the early 1980s, for example, interest in the Nordic nuclear-free zone idea has fallen off considerably. The domestic decisionmaking process on security policy also appears to have become less rancorous than before. With the entry of

\(^{19}\)These elections were inconclusive, and neither the government parties nor the major opposition parties improved their position much. In the end, a new Conservative-Liberal-Radical government was formed, effectively dismantling the old "alternative majority," and the naval restrictions were watered down to the point that allied vessels entering Danish harbors were simply "informed" of Denmark's nuclear prohibitions without expecting any response.
the Radical Party into a coalition with the Conservatives and Liberals, the "alternative
majority" in Denmark has broken down; as a result, the government can, if necessary,
rely upon a bare nonsocialist majority to support its security policies.

Meanwhile, on the mainstream left, the Norwegian Labor Party has never gone as
far as the SDP has with regard to alternative security concepts. The new Social
Democratic leadership might be pulling back from some of its earlier radical stances on
foreign and defense policy. The SDP and Labor never went as far as the radical left in
their basic attitudes toward NATO and national defense efforts, and they never
abandoned their adherence to NATO or to collective security. On basic security issues,
the SDP and the other leftist parties in Denmark still remain too far apart ever to construct
a socialist coalition; indeed, outside of nuclear policy issues, there was no "alternative
majority."

It cannot be denied that much of the broad security consensus in Denmark and
Norway remains intact and functioning, including a strong commitment to Western
alignment (large percentages of the population in both countries still support NATO
membership), the desire for external security guarantees (mainly in the form of allied
reinforcements) and the concept of armed national defense. One of the more recent
examples of this still-operational security consensus was the ratification of a new Danish
defense agreement by the both nonsocialists and the SDP.

Nevertheless, in recent years the traditional Danish and Norwegian approach to
deterrence-reassurance policy has evolved toward giving ever greater emphasis to the
reassurance side of the security equation. Some Danes and Norwegians, for example,
have come to interpret practically any change in northern Europe on the part of NATO,
such as advanced preparations for the receipt of reinforcements, as potentially
provocative and destabilizing. Some even oppose long-standing national commitments to
aiding NATO nuclear deterrence--from maintaining theoretically dual-capable systems
(such as artillery or F-16 aircraft) to permitting SSBN navigation and communications
systems on their territory--arguing that these subvert Nordic NATO "base and ban"
policies and undermine the spirit of reassurance policy.20

In essence, deterrence-reassurance policy is a two-edged sword that has come to be
used with ever increasing frequency against the Nordic NATO states themselves. For
example, although from a legal standpoint the Soviets have no droit de regard over
Danish and Norwegian reassurance policies, in practice the situation is far murkier.

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Danish and Norwegian warnings to Moscow hardly have affected Soviet activities over the past 20 years or so. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have doubled the size of its naval force on the Kola Peninsula (including the recent deployment of a second aircraft carrier and its newest missile cruiser to the Northern Fleet), increased by half its ground forces in the Leningrad Military District, and strengthened its Baltic Fleet. Soviet submarines have violated Swedish territorial waters with impunity and have even ventured into Norwegian fjords. Where is this Soviet "good behavior," then? And yet Soviet actions seem to have had only limited effect on the Norwegians (e.g., finally agreeing to the prepositioning of equipment to aid allied reinforcements) and apparently none at all on the Danes, who have continued to let their defense capabilities contract.

After 40 years, the Danes and Norwegians would view any movement toward a less restrictive NATO and/or defense policy as "destabilizing" for the Nordic region. Rather than placing responsibility on the Soviets for any heightening of tensions in northern Europe, these countries now feel compelled to go out of their way to placate the Soviets and, in a sense, rebuild detente unilaterally and without reciprocation. In fact, the more belligerent the Soviets have acted in the region, the more many Danes and Norwegians have pursued additional and more far-reaching reassurance efforts, even though these may anger or alienate their NATO allies. This, perhaps more than anything else, reveals how far the security consensus in Denmark and Norway has evolved.21

21Gorbachev, of course, injects a whole variable into the Nordic security equation, and it may well turn out that Danish and Norwegian practices will eventually reap some benefits from a reformed Soviet Union. At the same time, two points are worth noting: Thus far, the "Gorbachev factor" has made little difference in Soviet activities toward the Nordic region (save a promise to withdraw six obsolete Golf III ballistic missile-carrying submarines from the Baltic, which the Soviets for years have been offering as a bargaining chip in return for the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone), and much of the potential Soviet threat remains. These new reassurance efforts predate Gorbachev's rise and were carried out during a period of stiff Soviet intransigence, pointing to a Danish and Norwegian willingness to placate the Soviets no matter who is in control.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Beyond the traditional course of Danish and Norwegian security policy and its pattern of self-imposed constraints in its defense efforts, more recent internal developments have greatly affected the domestic environment in which security policy is carried out. As one Danish security analyst has put it, Denmark and Norway “have experienced the breakdown of traditional consensus patterns, and polarization and politicization have complicated the policy process substantially.”¹ As a result, the traditional deterrence-reassurance balance has shifted, generally in favor of the latter. Should reassurance policy go too far, however, it could alter the security calculus in the Nordic region. If Denmark and Norway allow their defensive capabilities to decline even further, and if these countries continue to place additional, or more restrictive, constraints on their participation in NATO—all in the name of “nonprovocation”—this could possibly undermine Western deterrence in the region, thus actually reducing Danish and Norwegian security.²

It has been noted that these shifts in security policy may be temporary or limited. At the same time, to assert that “sanity is breaking out” in the Danish and Norwegian security policy process may be premature. Although the old security consensus has not crumbled entirely, it has certainly been weakened at several points. For example, for the SDP and Labor even to consider alternative security concepts could still be seen as a radical departure for these parties. The emergence of “alternative thinking,” even on individual defense issues, has certainly not helped the traditional security consensus in these countries, and it has clearly created a gap between the nonsocialist and social democratic blocs. Furthermore, to remain conceptually in favor of NATO and of Danish and Norwegian membership in the alliance while criticizing the very foundation upon which Western security and NATO strategy is based (forward defense and flexible response) is an approach fraught with political and military risks. While the Atlantic alliance is a voluntary defense association of democratic nations and should be able to tolerate some debate and dissension within its ranks, the basis upon which NATO adheres to forward defense/flexible response is sometimes so fragile that to attack it too strongly

¹Petersen, 1988, p. 160.
²For instance, Lund (1989) argues that the Nordic NATO states may be so concerned with reassuring the Soviets and with maintaining a nonprovocative defense stance that, in a time of crisis and uncertainty, they may delay mobilizing their national defenses and calling for allied reinforcements until it is too late.
threatens to undercut alliance unity and the effectiveness of its deterrent capabilities.
This is the risk that the Danish SDP and the Norwegian Labor Party (and, indeed, other NATO social democratic and labor parties) run when they promote such radically diverging security concepts (from standing NATO doctrine, that is) as defensive defense and nuclear-free zones. Therefore, cause for concern remains that, over the long-term, Danish and Norwegian security—and therefore, NATO security—could be undermined.

Moreover, despite some moderation in the new security policy values and process, there has not been a return to the status quo ante. For one thing, the days when a small group of politicians and bureaucrats could impose strict control over the security policy process are probably over, and it is likely that security policy debate in Denmark and Norway will remain a more visible and more rancorous affair. For another, these recent developments have left their mark on domestic attitudes toward national defense efforts. In particular, they have had a ratcheting effect upon security policy. In all likelihood, the Danish and Norwegian security policy process will continue to be more questioning and more critical of U.S. and NATO security policies, less automatic in its relationship to the rest of the alliance, and more concerned with emphasizing the "nonprovocativeness" of its defense.

Nowhere has change in the traditional security consensus been more pronounced than in the area of nuclear policy and nuclear weapons. It can be argued, in fact, that either no domestic consensus any longer exists around nuclear forces or else there is actually a new majority against nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear issues are the most troubling and the least likely to be resolved anytime soon. Even if a Nordic nuclear-free zone never comes to fruition, antinuclearism has become deeply internalized in a large part of the Danish and Norwegian populations and across a broad expanse of the political spectrum in both countries. However, nuclear policies and the role nuclear weapons play in Western defense go to the heart of NATO security doctrine. In this single issue lies the germ for a serious debate over the whole future of the Western alliance.

In the end, even without the recent developments within their internal security processes, traditional security policy patterns in Denmark and Norway already greatly constrain these countries' role within the NATO alliance. Putting pressures on them to change their security policies, therefore, will probably have little positive effect. Where one can and perhaps should try to influence the Danes and Norwegians is in preventing any further reinterpretation of deterrence-reassurance policy. Because of these countries' sensitivity to criticism from the United States or even the United Kingdom, pressure from these sources is likely to be counterproductive, as it will probably be interpreted as great
power interference. Hence, it may be more effective, although perhaps less efficient, for the alliance as a whole to bring its influence to bear on Danish and Norwegian policies.

Ultimately, what kind of security policy—and, in particular, what kind of alliance policy—these countries have rests on their own shoulders. The United States and NATO will always be hard-pressed to respond satisfactorily to Danish and Norwegian security desires because, in large part, the Danes and the Norwegians themselves often do not know exactly what they want out of Western alignment. At the same time, their reassurance policies are currently leading to where they could eventually weaken alliance interests in the Nordic region. At the very least, therefore, Denmark and Norway should be persuaded not to make any more alterations in their deterrence-reassurance policies until more concrete Soviet responses are apparent.
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