ESSAYS ON STRATEGY

Wider Effects of the Vietnam War
The Future of SDI
Superpower War Termination
Managing Security Assistance
Europe and Future US Security
Japanese Military Burdensharing
Soviet Pacific Policy
Is War Obsolete?

Edited by THOMAS C. GILL
ESSAYS ON STRATEGY
ESSAYS ON STRATEGY VI

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FOREWORD

Strategic thinking is, by its very nature, dichotomous. If a strategist's thought is divorced from reality, there is little likelihood that implementation of a particular strategy will achieve desired objectives. If the strategist, on the other hand, is too firmly fixed on current circumstances, then the lack of long-range vision can stifle the creativity necessary to meet new challenges. Furthermore, if a particular strategy succeeds, it usually changes conditions in the real world, and if it fails, the original conditions still remain to be addressed. Either way, strategists continue to face new challenges.

This collection reflects the wide range of issues confronting strategists. Two essays in the collection examine how the United States might shape anew its relations with Japan and Western Europe, given the economic and political strength of these important allies—strengths that are largely a result of successful US postwar strategy. A third essay reconsiders the Vietnam War in light of regional growth and stability that was greatly aided by US efforts in Southeast Asia. Other essays address the future of the Strategic Defense Initiative; the likely American and Soviet approaches to ending a superpower war; and management of US security assistance, paying particular attention to the structure and function of security assistance organizations overseas. In addition, Essays on Strategy VI includes two illuminating articles by Chinese writers—one on the PRC's view of Soviet strategy in the Pacific, the other on the question of whether war is still a political option in the nuclear age.
Five of these essays were recognized for excellence in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition sponsored by the National Defense University. All of them represent the kind of innovative thinking and fresh perspectives necessary to policymakers as they continually reassess issues of national strategy in a contentious world increasingly characterized by rapid change.

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ESSAYS ON STRATEGY
WIDER EFFECTS OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM:
REEXAMINING THE CONTEXT

ROBERT HOPKINS MILLER

To paraphrase Edmund Burke, the study and the practice of politics are two different things. The student of politics pursues the truth in the clear light of hindsight, without the constraints of time or the pressure of events. The statesman, however, must make decisions in the light of imperfect information, with limited time available, under opposing pressures, receiving contradictory advice, and unable to foresee the future. Furthermore, at least in a democracy, the statesman is responsible for his decisions to the public for whom he acts—and to its elected representatives.

The continuing debate about the US involvement in the Vietnam War highlights the enduring wisdom of Burke’s remark. Views expressed within official circles about what went wrong in Vietnam differ markedly from those expressed in the public debate on the subject. Within official circles arguments focus mainly on whether policy or military strategy failed: whether the war might have been won.

Ambassador Robert Hopkins Miller wrote this essay while serving as Vice President of the National Defense University. Ambassador Miller is currently Diplomat in Residence at George Washington University, Washington, DC.
if US political objectives had been clearer or if fewer political restraints had been placed on US military forces. Moreover, much of the current official debate on post-Vietnam national strategy and foreign policy continues to employ phrases regularly used to justify both the US military commitment to Vietnam and the US unwillingness or inability to end the engagement when domestic support had seriously eroded: the United States must maintain the credibility of its commitments; the United States must see it through; communist expansionism wherever it occurs, even when carried out by proxies, threatens US security interests.

Much of the public debate, on the other hand, swirls around a different set of issues: whether the war was wrong to begin with; whether, once engaged, the United States should have fought to win; whether the United States had interests in Vietnam that justified either the deaths of over 50,000 young Americans or the longer-term damage—still with us today—to US society, from the ravages of inflation to the plight of veterans unable to come to terms with their war experiences. Was the entire basis for the US involvement in Vietnam mis-conceived and the American people thereby misled? Was it truly the “march of folly,” as Barbara Tuchman has maintained?

The continuing recriminations and soul-searching today over the US experience in Vietnam require careful assessment of these questions and others: Could or should American political leaders of both parties have done things differently? Could not, for example, President Eisenhower have left the responsibility for South Vietnam’s fate to France, the colonial power that went to Geneva in 1954 with the express intent of negotiating its withdrawal from Vietnam, and to the international community, which sanctioned the resulting Geneva Accords? Perhaps President Johnson or Nixon, like French Premier Pierre Mendes-France in 1954, could simply have negotiated the terms of the US departure from Vietnam—even if it cost one of them an election. Would the credibility of US commitments around the world
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have been more damaged by an earlier US withdrawal than it was by the final US failure? Was the “abandonment” of an ally any less honorable as it happened than it would have been earlier on? Did communist expansion, so antithetical to everything the United States stands for, demand an American response wherever it occurred regardless of the consequences? Perhaps the United States could have won militarily in Vietnam with other strategies, other tactics, and with a more realistic appraisal of the underlying causes of the conflict and of the United States’ ability to influence them.

We need also to recall how vulnerable the rest of Southeast Asia was to communist pressure and subversion in the 1960s compared to the dynamism and stability of the region in the 1980s. In the 1960s North Vietnam’s so-called war of liberation against South Vietnam seemed to many to be the wave of the future for the entire Third World. Today a reunified Vietnam seems wholly absorbed by its internal political and economic problems and by its waning occupation of Cambodia. Looked at in this regional perspective, cannot the US effort to blunt further communist encroachments in Southeast Asia in the 1960s be considered a major—albeit costly—success?

Vietnam, like many other relatively small nations in the world, has been dominated or threatened by outside powers throughout its history. It is therefore not surprising, given Vietnam’s common border with China, that until the mid to late nineteenth century China was the power that historically dominated, or threatened to dominate, Vietnam. Like many regional powers throughout the world too, Vietnam over the years, in its turn, has pushed back, absorbed, or otherwise dominated smaller neighboring peoples and states. So it is also not surprising that, since before the eighteenth century, partly to escape Chinese domination and partly to escape the wars imposed on them by their own leaders, the Vietnamese people migrated down the coast of Vietnam, absorbing over time the Cham people and culture,
and pushing the Cambodians back from the South China Sea, westward to behind their present borders. When France completed its control over Vietnam late in the nineteenth century by occupying Tonkin (the northern third of Vietnam), China threatened war. It argued that France was interfering with the Middle Kingdom’s traditional right of suzerainty and tribute over Vietnam. China’s military impotence, however, prevented the Chinese from thwarting France’s colonial aims there. In this contest, the United States, because it was friendly to both France and China—not because of any national interest in Vietnam—was willing to exercise its good offices to prevent war. But because France was not interested at the time, the US efforts came to naught. France thus replaced China as the outside power dominating Vietnam, and Vietnam’s own expansion and efforts to dominate Cambodia and Laos were held in check as a result.

Some sixty years later, Japan drove France and the other colonial powers from their possessions in Southeast Asia and the rest of the Pacific region. It was Japan’s southward advance, specifically its occupation of Indochina, that made the United States realize that war with Japan was becoming inevitable. Again, the United States became involved not because of any important US interests in Indochina per se but because of the US need to maintain access to the strategic materials of the Dutch East Indies, as well as concern over Japan’s growing threat to other US interests in the region (the Philippines, for example).

Later, in the struggle to rebuild a war-shattered world, a struggle in which only the United States had the capacity and the will to take the lead, US priorities clearly went to Western Europe and Japan. Much is made of Roosevelt’s alleged predilection to prevent France from reasserting its authority in Indochina after World War II and to work instead for an independent Indochina. Had Roosevelt lived longer, however, he would undoubtedly have faced the same imperatives that Harry Truman did: France was determined to
reassert its authority over Indochina. China was weakened by its decade-long war with Japan and by a bitter civil war. The United States needed to gain France's cooperation in rebuilding Western Europe and in integrating France's arch-enemy, Germany, into the Western defense and economic communities. And finally, the communist Viet Minh were determined to drive the French out of Indochina a second time, this time for good.

In 1946 the French came close to negotiating a turnover of power in Vietnam to Ho Chi Minh, but such an arrangement proved unacceptable domestically in France. France's not turning over power at this time is one of the critical turning points—one of the "what ifs"—in postwar history: How might history have been different had France in fact turned power over to Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh in 1946, three years before China fell to Mao Zedong's forces and America was wracked internally by the question, "who lost China?" and four years before North Korea launched its massive surprise attack across the 38th parallel? It is worth recalling in this connection that the United States had relatively good relations with Ho Chi Minh at the time as a result of wartime cooperation against the Japanese in both China and Vietnam.

There seems to be little doubt that a negotiated settlement in 1946 would have precluded wars in Vietnam. On the other hand, neither does there seem to be much doubt that Vietnam would have quickly resumed its historical goal of dominating Laos and Cambodia, which would in turn have presented a serious threat to Thailand's territorial integrity. Moreover, the United States was already assisting the newly independent Philippine government to put down a communist-led Huk rebellion, and the British were struggling against a parallel rebellion in Malaya, still a British colony. As in Vietnam's case, these rebellions were inextricably entwined with Southeast Asian nations' efforts to gain their independence in the vacuum left by Japan's occupation,
subsequent defeat, and withdrawal. Accordingly, with Vietnam communist already, China embroiled in a debilitating civil war between nationalist and communist forces, and Malaya and the Philippines under internal assault as well, the domino theory could well have been even more plausible in Washington than it was.

In any case, France embarked on a long, bitter, and ultimately unsuccessful war against the Viet Minh. Mao Zedong’s forces completed their conquest of China in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist forces retreating to Taiwan. In June 1950 North Korea attacked South Korea, and six months later nearly half a million Chinese communist troops entered the Korean fray after United Nations (principally US) troops had nearly reached the Yalu River on the Chinese frontier. Tentative thoughts in Washington of seeking an early reconciliation with the People’s Republic of China, which might have led the United States to view the communist challenge to the French in Vietnam in a more limited, regional perspective, were dashed by the major military confrontation between US and Chinese communist forces in Korea. Looked at in this light, the mistaken belief that Korea might be reunified by the UN forces’ driving to the Yalu had lasting global strategic consequences—producing another “what if” in postwar history.

Across a broad front in Asia, then, from Korea in the north to Vietnam in the south, the United States perceived its interests to be threatened by communist moves to expand Moscow’s and Beijing’s spheres of influence and control. In Europe, as a result of aggressive Soviet actions in Berlin and Czechoslovakia and the civil war in Greece, the Truman administration had launched the Berlin airlift, the Marshall Plan, and NATO, and enunciated the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey. In a bipolar world, in which the United States saw itself pitted against an expansionist, monolithic communist movement directed from Moscow, only the United States was in a position to seek to contain the Soviet Union’s perceived drive for world domination. So
the world appeared to US leaders—and to much of the American public—at the time.

Meanwhile, becoming more and more bogged down in Vietnam against a determined Viet Minh, France called for more and more support from the United States. Ever mindful of the critical importance of French cooperation in the fledgling NATO alliance, particularly in integrating Germany into the NATO defense structure, the United States provided France with growing financial and military support in Vietnam. As France's final failure drew near, however, Eisenhower refused to listen to those who urged him to use the atomic weapon on France's behalf, thereby setting an outer limit to US support for French commitments in the area.

France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu came and went. The French people wanted the war ended, and in 1954 Pierre Mendes-France, France's new Prime Minister, negotiated a provisional settlement with the Viet Minh at Geneva: Vietnam was provisionally partitioned at the 17th parallel for two years, the Viet Minh controlling North Vietnam and the non-communists controlling South Vietnam. French and Viet Minh forces were to be withdrawn to their respective sides of the 17th parallel, and in 1956 free elections were to be held throughout Vietnam to determine who would govern the entire country permanently. No new foreign forces nor new military equipment could be introduced on either side of the 17th parallel, except one-for-one replacements of military personnel and like-type items of equipment. An international commission, composed of neutral India (in the chair), Canada, and Poland, was established to monitor compliance by both sides.

Paris acceded to the Accord compromise (after getting the partition line set at the 17th rather than the 13th parallel as Hanoi demanded) as an honorable way to disengage from an unpopular war. Hanoi reluctantly acceded to the compromise, believing it could ultimately gain control of all of Indochina by manipulating the electoral process in large areas
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throughout Vietnam by 1956. The Eisenhower administration, especially its Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was deeply troubled by France’s willingness to negotiate with the communist Viet Minh and to turn over territory to Viet Minh control even temporarily. Accordingly, the United States participated in the Geneva Conference of 1954 only as an observer, refusing to endorse the resulting Geneva Accords. It did, however, undertake not to interfere with their implementation.

Here was a second turning point—another “what if.” Disappointed as it was in the Geneva Accords, the United States’ commitment in Indochina had been to its friend and ally, France, and not to South Vietnam itself. The United States could have left the responsibility for France’s failure with France and elected not to step into the breech in its place. By then the civil war in Greece had been won by the nationalists, the Huk rebellion had been put down in the Philippines, and the “emergency” was going well for the British in Malaya. Perhaps, had US support for South Vietnam been limited to economic and military assistance, that country might have made it too. For US policymakers, however, the factors on the other side of the ledger were too strong: By 1954 the United States was already underwriting the major portion of France’s military effort in Indochina. One year after China’s conquest by Mao Zedong’s forces in 1949, US forces had confronted North Korean and Chinese communist forces on the Korean peninsula. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia was headed by the radical nationalist Sukarno, who opposed Dutch plans for federation and seemed determined to thwart American strategic interests and policy objectives in the region to the benefit of Communist China and the Soviet Union. The Soviet and Chinese assertion that wars of liberation were the wave of the future found ready resonance in the Third World as it struggled to emerge from colonial status to full independence.
Under the circumstances, no US president, Republican or Democrat, who represented the mainstream of the American electorate sufficiently to get elected could have accepted easily the domestic political burden of “abandoning” the US investment already made in faraway Vietnam. Moreover, the United States, militarily and economically the most powerful nation on earth, could not conceive of failing against a primitive enemy, the French experience notwithstanding. The Eisenhower administration, with John Foster Dulles in the vanguard, accordingly committed itself to wholehearted support of South Vietnam—politically, militarily, and economically. To counter what were seen in Washington to be the unfortunate effects of the Geneva Accords, the administration hastened to persuade like-minded nations to form the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—SEATO—to help shore up the region’s defenses against further communist inroads. At US instigation, the SEATO treaty contained a protocol extending its provisions to “the free territory of the State of Vietnam,” Cambodia, and Laos.

On the political front, the United States threw its support behind Ngo Dinh Diem, a strong nationalist leader (and a Catholic) from central Vietnam, as president of the Republic of Vietnam. Without firm US support, Diem probably would have been unable to establish his authority within the country in the face of numerous rival groups and persons, some of whom were little more than independent gang leaders. With solid US financial and political backing, though, Diem managed to build a semblance of representative government, a functioning economy, and armed forces and police organizations. However, when the time stipulated by the Geneva Accords for national elections approached, Diem made a turning-point decision. He ruled that, because genuinely free elections would not be possible in communist North Vietnam, nor in parts of South Vietnam where, contrary to the Geneva Accords, communist cadres were putting pressure on the populace, he would not go forward with the elections.
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Diem's decision was controversial domestically in the United States and internationally. It was widely seen as a major violation of the Geneva Accords. Many people believed Ho Chi Minh was a far more popular nationalist leader throughout Vietnam than Diem was; they saw Diem as unwilling to compete against such popularity. Even Eisenhower in his later years acknowledged that "Uncle Ho" was probably more popular than Vietnam's figurehead emperor, Bao Dai. Nevertheless, unwilling to be a party to a communist victory in South Vietnam, the United States backed Diem's decision. Not surprisingly, Hanoi, Moscow, and Beijing attacked Diem's decision and US support for it. But the Eisenhower administration had firmly opted to support South Vietnam as a permanent entity to counter North Vietnam's determination to win control of the entire country. This turning-point decision confirmed Vietnam's division into two parts, one heavily dependent on Moscow and Beijing and the other heavily dependent on Washington. Thus the Soviet Union and China on the one side and the United States on the other were locked into a struggle to succeed France as the outside power dominating (or threatening) Vietnam.

Was the US decision a wrong one? Diem's action in foreclosing national elections presented the United States with another opportunity to leave to France the responsibility for the consequences of the Geneva Accords. Wrong or right, and despite its highly controversial nature at home and abroad, the US decision was a "mainstream" American political choice, consistent with Eisenhower's and Dulles' global strategic choices in the depths of the Cold War. The US choice, however, had its own consequences. For many at home and abroad, it placed on the United States and Diem, rather than on North Vietnam, the onus for undermining the Geneva Accords. It thus clearly started the United States down the road to responsibility for preserving an independent South Vietnam as a permanent entity by placing on the Accords an unintended burden.
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US support for Diem's assessment of Hanoi's real intentions may have been valid in international political terms. However, much of domestic US and international opinion was less concerned about Hanoi's intentions and more cynical about the ultimate outcome. The public perception—domestically and internationally—that the United States, not Hanoi, took the first step to undermine the Geneva Accords dogged US efforts in Vietnam to the end. Perhaps more importantly, Diem's US-backed decision effectively thwarted Hanoi's ability to manipulate the electoral process to its own ends, thus triggering the communists' decision to resume their "peoples' war." Hanoi changed its tactics from politics to insurgency in pursuing its long-held goal of conquering South Vietnam.

Ironically, later, even when Hanoi was blatantly—but clandestinely—violating the Geneva Accords by infiltrating large numbers of men and quantities of equipment into South Vietnam, continuing US respect for the Accords' military constraints helped to limit US military options—including different levels and kinds of military assistance and advice—for more than a decade under both Republican and Democratic administrations. In a sense, then, the United States had shot itself in both feet on the Geneva Accords: its Vietnam policy became controversial early on when it backed Diem's decision not to proceed with the elections of 1956; and later the United States attempted to portray itself as respecting the Accords' military constraints long after Hanoi's equipment and personnel violations of the Accords were flagrant. In any case, although neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy ruled out the possibility of direct US military intervention in Vietnam, neither was persuaded of the efficacy of such intervention. While Eisenhower held office, Hanoi's military challenge did not appear to warrant such drastic action.

By the time John Kennedy entered the White House in January 1961, US support for Diem was firm, unyielding—
and controversial. And military options could no longer easily be ignored. For its part, Hanoi, thwarted in its objective of taking over South Vietnam through the electoral process and through subversion, had stepped up its infiltration of cadres and weapons into South Vietnam. Malaya—now independent Malaysia—had overcome its communist insurgency by 1961, but Indonesia's internal stability and neutralist foreign policy were of as much concern as ever. Faced with a breakdown of the Geneva Accords on Laos thanks to Hanoi's pressure, Kennedy had succeeded in negotiating a fragile restoration of that Accord in 1962. Cambodia, headed by the mercurial Sihanouk, represented a weak neutralist buffer between Hanoi's pressures in South Vietnam and Laos on the one hand and the exposed US ally, Thailand, on the other. The domino theory was still alive and well, and Vietnam's 17th parallel was still the front line between two antithetical ideological and power systems competing for domination of the whole country.

Eisenhower had warned Kennedy that Vietnam would demand his attention—and it did. Choices remained to be made, and a new president could make new choices. Kennedy's decision essentially was "to bear any burden, pay any price." to quote the stirring words of his inaugural address. He and his brother, Bobby, were not about to preside over South Vietnam's defeat by Hanoi, thereby adding to the Democratic Party's opprobrium for the "loss of China" a decade before. Kennedy was also only too conscious of his early Bay of Pigs fiasco. Yet in 1961, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior advisers, including Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow, recommended that US troops be introduced into South Vietnam, Kennedy chose to accept the advice of others, such as Dean Rusk, that small numbers of US troops would not deter Hanoi's infiltration of cadre and equipment into the South. According to Rusk and others of his mind, Hanoi would have judged that US troops would be no more successful against guerrilla warfare than French troops had been.
In effect, as Hanoi's pressure against South Vietnam grew, Kennedy's policy in Vietnam followed Eisenhower's in a straight line, eschewing direct US military involvement and instead providing unstinting political support for Diem and growing military and economic assistance and advisory programs. Under Kennedy the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), headed by a full general (Paul Harkins), replaced the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), headed by a major general. US military advisers were placed in South Vietnamese operating units down to battalion level, as well as at province and sub-province levels in the government structure. The size of MACV grew between 1962 and 1965 from some 10,000 to well over 20,000 members. Along with this burgeoning structure, civilian US aid programs grew as well. And still Hanoi poured men and equipment into the South, determined to stick to its goal of taking over the entire country. Hanoi saw that the growing US involvement was increasingly controversial at home and that the United States was likely to tire of the whole affair if Hanoi could just keep up the pressure. US military and civilian advisers in the field discovered that their approach to the war was quite different from that of the South Vietnamese. The US aim was to win the war and go home. For the South Vietnamese, there was no escape from the war—their aim accordingly was to survive and keep casualties as low as possible in doing so.

To counter Hanoi's increased pressure in South Vietnam and growing domestic criticism of his administration's Vietnam policy, Kennedy pressed Diem for political reforms to broaden the base of his government and to strengthen its popular support. In effect Diem, who had escaped two coup attempts (in 1960 and 1962), did the opposite, relying on unstinting US support instead of exercising genuine political leadership. Diem correctly calculated that US concern for the continuing communist assault against South Vietnam would keep the United States solidly behind him no matter what. Lyndon Johnson's characterization of Diem as "the
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Winston Churchill of Asia” during Johnson’s visit to South Vietnam as vice president in 1961 surely did little to disabuse Diem of his assessment. And Hanoi of course calculated correctly that its continued pressure on South Vietnam would make it impossible for Diem to widen the base of his political support.

The “marriage of convenience” between Diem and the United States began coming apart in the spring and summer of 1963 as dramatic Buddhist demonstrations against the Diem regime spread from central Vietnam to Saigon, where they were punctuated by self-immolations by Buddhist bonzes or monks. These grisly scenes, flashed across America’s television screens, rapidly eroded what support there was for the Kennedy administration’s policies in Vietnam and led the administration to conclude that the war could no longer be won with Diem in power. Reports that Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were engaged in secret contacts with Hanoi heightened the administration’s concern. After considerable debate and soul-searching, the United States made it clear to the Vietnamese generals waiting in the wings that it would understand their wish to overthrow Diem in order to prosecute the war more vigorously and effectively. The inevitable happened, although the United States had not counted on Diem’s and Nhu’s assassinations following the coup.

The Kennedy administration’s decision to countenance Diem’s overthrow was a turning-point decision of major consequence: the United States thereby accepted full responsibility for South Vietnam’s fate, brushed aside a possible chance for an internal Vietnamese political solution, and ensured that prosecution of the war became more important to the United States than it was to the people of South Vietnam. The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had fallen into the trap of allowing Diem to substitute US support for the exercise of internal political leadership. For his part, Diem had fallen into the trap of allowing South
Vietnam to become the chosen instrument of two US administrations. The Vietnamese tarbaby had really begun to stick to successive American presidents. Such a relationship of mutual dependency was bound to fail in the end.

Was any other choice possible? Could the war effort have succeeded had Diem remained in office? Ironically, in 1963 the war was going relatively well. Although American television showed scenes of riots, demonstrations, and grisly immolations, mostly from Saigon and central Vietnam, the Buddhist demonstrations never really spread to the Delta—the southern third of South Vietnam where over 60 percent of the country’s population lived. Both Diem and the Kennedy administration, though, found themselves hostages to American and international media pressures. Under the circumstances, there were no good choices. Diem handled his internal crisis badly, and the Kennedy administration handled equally badly its decision to encourage Diem’s overthrow. In fact, to this day it is unclear whether Kennedy himself would have approved the coup if the issue had been squarely and formally put up to him, instead of being decided, as it apparently was, during a confused holiday weekend in which a number of principal officials were out of town and unreachable.

Had Kennedy “toughed it out” with Diem—and had Kennedy himself lived—it seems certain that, ready since his inauguration to “bear any burden, pay any price in the defense of liberty,” Kennedy would have found it difficult to walk away from South Vietnam and to face the ensuing domestic political heat or the implications for US security commitments worldwide. But, had Diem “toughed it out” with Kennedy and Johnson, would he have resisted the growing American desire to introduce combat troops into his country? And if Diem had done so, would Hanoi still have been driven to use major combat units in a conventional war? Would Diem and his brother Nhu have persisted in pursuing their fledgling contacts with Hanoi as an alternative to American intervention, or would they have believed such
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contacts were unnecessary in the face of continuing stalwart US support? These are among the most intriguing and compelling "what ifs" of the entire Vietnam saga, since they raise the question of which side was most responsible for escalating the war.

These various possibilities lead to yet another "what if": What if Richard Nixon had won the 1960 US presidential election by 100,000 votes instead of John Kennedy? Would Nixon have adopted a different approach to Hanoi's challenge? Would he have abandoned Diem, and opposed Diem's and Nhu's feelers to Hanoi? History of course cannot be rewound, and there are no clear answers to any of these questions. However, Nixon's later writings and declarations, and his record as president, suggest that he might have followed a policy that combined stronger, more clear-cut military measures in support of South Vietnam with moves to exploit growing Sino-Soviet tensions. To do so, though, would have required a readiness to confront widespread domestic and international criticism for overtly violating the Geneva Accords; it might also have required further headway with the Chinese than they—or we—were ready for in the early 1960s. Additionally, such an approach would have needed a concerted effort at home to mobilize public support for a long-term security commitment to South Vietnam—a doubtful prospect in the face of no identifiable, established US national interest in Vietnam other than preventing its domination by a hostile power. It was an even more doubtful prospect as an international obligation of the fragile SEATO treaty. In any case, Nixon would have found himself bound by many of the same domestic and international constraints that Kennedy did.

In the event, one tragedy followed hard on the heels of another—Diem's overthrow and assassination in November 1963 were followed by Kennedy's own assassination three weeks later. Lyndon Johnson in turn confronted only unpleasant choices in Vietnam. Johnson, even more than Kennedy before him, was heavily burdened by the decisions and
actions of his predecessors, decisions and actions that had taken the United States further and further down the path toward direct military involvement in Vietnam. Past actions having made the United States effectively responsible for South Vietnam's fate, could a new president turn tail and run? Johnson's answer, of course, was no—and that led him to his own first major turning-point decision, within a year-and-a-half of his taking office: faced with a succession of weak, ineffectual South Vietnamese governments and with growing North Vietnamese military pressure, Johnson acceded to widespread—but by no means unanimous—advice to introduce US combat troops into South Vietnam and to carry the war to the North with air attacks against selected military targets. Johnson's overall political objective, however, remained the same as that of his predecessors: to preserve South Vietnam's right to determine its own future—not to seek military victory over North Vietnam. Johnson would agree to military actions only if they were consistent with this objective. He refused to widen the war in an effort to defeat North Vietnam, insisting instead that his goal was to persuade Hanoi "to leave its neighbors alone." Like Eisenhower deciding in 1954 not to use nuclear weapons in Indochina and Kennedy resisting advice to introduce combat troops, Johnson set clear limits to the US involvement in Vietnam.

The political objectives thus were clear, but were they realistic? Moreover, did US actions support the political objectives or did they work against them? By the time Johnson came into office, as one South Vietnamese government followed another and as the war worsened, the United States' increasingly desperate need to succeed in its objectives led it progressively to thrust the Vietnamese aside and to take over responsibility for the conduct of the war. South Vietnam's government became a subordinate command in its own war for survival; the war became more important to the United States than it was to South Vietnam. This is the critical fact of the Vietnam War: in its frustration, everything
the United States did to thwart Hanoi's objective of domi-
nating south Vietnam actually weakened South Vietnam's
own stake in its survival, thus undermining US objectives.
And as the South Vietnamese people and government were progres.
vely disenfranchised, Johnson's growing commit-
tment to South Vietnam, confidently advertised at home as
short-term problem—as another American "coonskin to
nail to the wall"—lost credibility. Hanoi's poorly equipped
and poorly supported forces could not possibly withstan
the might of the modern, well-equipped forces of the most
powerful nation on earth. Yet the harder US forces fought
and the more victories they won on the battlefield—including
those fought in response to Hanoi's Tet offensive in
1968—the more elusive the US political objective in Vietnam
became. A "Peanuts" cartoon pinned on the wall of an
American Embassy office in Saigon at the time said it all:
Charlie Brown, marching onto the baseball field with bat
and glove in hand, was depicted saying, "How can we lose
when we're so sincere?"

Johnson's decisions, urged on him step by step by his
national security advisers, ultimately led to a US military
force in Vietnam of half a million men and women. When
General Westmoreland, after the Tet offensive, recom-
ended that another 125,000 troops would finish the job
without unduly jeopardizing US commitments elsewhere,
Johnson turned back. To meet Westmoreland's request
would have required full mobilization of the economy, and
Johnson knew the Congress would not have supported him.
Johnson instead proposed the opening of peace negotia-
tions with Hanoi and withdrew from the 1968 presidential
race—another turning-point decision that set the final limit
on the US involvement in Vietnam.

In succeeding to the presidency in January 1969, Rich-
ard Nixon was given a chance to try his luck on Vietnam—
certainly under adverse circumstances. His choice of
approach was another Vietnam turning point, leading to
another "what if": What if Nixon had followed Mendes-
France's example at Geneva in 1954 and simply negotiated
the conditions under which US forces were to be withdrawn from South Vietnam? For a Democratic president—a Hubert Humphrey—elected in the aftermath of another Democratic president’s—Johnson’s—perceived Vietnam policy failure, such a choice would have signaled a major defeat. But Nixon, a Republican president with unquestioned anti-communist credentials, could probably have carried off a total American disengagement from Vietnam had he moved quickly after taking office—and he would have been a hero at home and abroad. For Nixon it would have been the liquidation of a disastrous war badly mismanaged by Democratic presidents and a clearing of the decks for his historic China initiative. Yet Nixon chose instead to seek what he considered an honorable settlement that upheld US commitments to an ally and dignified the sacrifices of those who had died fulfilling those commitments. Nixon’s choice led to a process that involved four years of hard negotiating and heavy fighting, and that eventually ended in failure.

The negotiating nut that proved difficult to crack was Hanoi’s insistence that Nguyen Van Thieu’s government in Saigon be dismantled as US troops withdraw, versus Washington’s insistence that Thieu’s government be left intact while North Vietnamese and US troops were withdrawn simultaneously according to a mutually agreed plan. Both sides in effect sought to achieve at the negotiating table what they had been unable to achieve on the battlefield. Just as neither side was able to act decisively on the battlefield, neither side was decisive at the negotiating table. While the negotiations dragged on, the United States sought to bolster South Vietnam’s independent fighting capability as domestic political pressure forced the gradual unilateral withdrawal of US troops and the “Vietnamization” of the war. This process undermined the US negotiating position even further: Hanoi saw no need to withdraw its forces (which it had never admitted were in South Vietnam) according to a mutually agreed plan since the United States was withdrawing unilaterally. Although the Paris Agreements signed in
ROBERT HOPKINS MILLER

January 1973 left the Thieu government intact, North Vietnamese forces did not withdraw. Nixon had assured Thieu that he would renew the bombing of North Vietnamese targets if Hanoi violated the Paris Agreements. But Nixon, increasingly embroiled in the Watergate scandal, failed to carry through on his assurances. Early in 1975, as Hanoi launched its final offensives, the Congress stopped appropriating aid monies for Vietnam and Cambodia. The two countries collapsed within weeks of that action. Just as Kennedy’s and Johnson’s actions in prosecuting the war had undermined the policy objectives they were seeking to achieve, Nixon’s policy of disengaging the United States from Vietnam in what he considered to be an honorable way had the same effect: the more the United States “Vietnamized” the war, the less Hanoi felt compelled to negotiate seriously.

While the “talk, talk, fight, fight” process was continuing in Paris and Vietnam, Nixon chose to test his conservative, unquestioned anti-communist credentials on a far more fundamental undertaking: the turning-point “opening” to China. This historic decision at last offered the possibility of putting Vietnam into perspective—of showing that a constructive US relationship with China, communist or not, is of far greater importance to US strategic interests and to the global strategic balance than the ill-fated US involvement in Vietnam. Almost in a single stroke, Nixon reduced to size Vietnam’s relevance to US strategic interests, an added tragic irony when one considers how much longer his administration stayed stuck to the Vietnam tarbaby.

Only history will be able to judge whether the “decent interval” between the signing of the Paris Accords on Vietnam in January 1973, which allowed the United States to complete its troop withdrawal, and South Vietnam’s final collapse in April 1975 lessened the trauma for the American people or better preserved the honor of US commitments. As it is, South Vietnam’s last president, Nguyen Van Thieu, certainly believes that Nixon and Kissinger betrayed him and his country by failing to resume the bombing of North
Vietnam when Hanoi violated the Paris Agreements. Into the balance of judgment about the honorable way out must also be factored the thousands of American casualties suffered from the time Nixon took office in January 1969 until the US withdrawal was completed in 1973.

The final irony is that, although the successive decisions that took the United States deeper and deeper into Vietnam ended in failure, the longer-term effect of that “failure” on the rest of the region has been unreservedly positive. Today the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—are economically prosperous, are politically stable, and enjoy a sense of regional solidarity. They are far better able to withstand communist pressures, internal and external, today than they were in the 1950s and 1960s. In Vietnam the situation is just the reverse. In the 1950s and 1960s Vietnam was in the vanguard of Soviet- and Chinese-inspired propaganda that wars of liberation were the wave of the future in the Third World. Today, Hanoi lies exhausted by its “success” against the United States, unlikely to be able for years to come to pursue its ambition of dominating all of Southeast Asia.

What, then, is the ultimate evaluation of this puzzling state of affairs? Was the US failure in Vietnam, with which American society continues to be preoccupied even today, in fact a US success if viewed in regional Southeast Asian terms? If so, perhaps the US Vietnam policy, in the end, was effective after all. Could a policy that avoided all of the pitfalls discussed in this essay have been so successful either in Vietnam or regionally? And finally, was the evident success of the policy for Southeast Asia today worth the cost in blood, treasure, and divisions created in US society?

There is no escaping the fact that the US failure in Vietnam itself was—and is—a major tragedy for Vietnam and the untold thousands of Vietnamese who fought side by side with Americans to keep South Vietnam free of communist domination. It is also a tragedy for the more than 50,000
young Americans who lost their lives in that war, for their families, and for the thousands more whose lives were shattered by their experiences there. It is a tragedy, too, for the American society, which has suffered so much trauma, guilt, and division over the war. Americans and Vietnamese alike share responsibility for the tragedy—Americans for pushing the Vietnamese aside and undermining their stake in their own war; Vietnamese for allowing the United States to do so as a substitute for their own leadership and motivation.

Neither is there any escaping the fact that US policy weaknesses in Vietnam were many and self-defeating in important respects. Successive American presidents misjudged the task to be far easier than it turned out to be. Gradual escalation of the US effort misled the American people on the nature and tenaciousness of North Vietnam's challenge to South Vietnam. It also misled North Vietnam as to the extent and degree to which the United States was ultimately willing to go to preserve South Vietnam's freedom to determine its own future. For both sides, each incremental escalatory step was relatively easy to take—and very difficult to back away from.

The Eisenhower administration started down this path, first with its support of the French effort in Indochina and then with its support of Diem's decision not to proceed with elections in 1956. For its part, the Kennedy administration made a growing US involvement in Vietnam inevitable by undermining South Vietnam's strong—if flawed—political leadership when it acquiesced in Ngo Dinh Diem's overthrow. Kennedy's action may also have destroyed a potentially important opening toward reconciliation between Saigon and Hanoi. In its turn, the Johnson administration fanned domestic opposition—active resistance—to the war by its repeated public assurances to the American people, first, that "American boys" would not be asked to do what "Asian boys" should do for themselves and, then,
that "our boys would be home for Christmas." The Nixon administration compounded the Johnson administration's mistakes and misjudgments by prolonging an already unpopular war with a negotiating posture, forced by domestic pressure, that undermined the very settlement it sought to achieve.

The final weakness in the US Vietnam policy lay in the American penchant for believing in its own omnipotence and omniscience: as the US frustration grew, the United States tended to blame South Vietnamese weakness, incompetence, and corruption. Consequently, the United States undermined the stake of the Vietnamese in their own survival by thrusting them aside and taking over the war. Ironically, as the United States lost confidence in South Vietnam, South Vietnam lost confidence in the United States.

Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that different US policies or different strategies would have had as favorable an outcome for US interests in the region as a whole. In fact, taking into account Hanoi's unbending determination to dominate all of Indochina, and the full support its efforts received from China and the Soviet Union, the policies the United States actually followed weakened Hanoi sufficiently to contribute importantly to the favorable result in Southeast Asia today. Alternative US policies that left more responsibility to South Vietnam, or that distanced the United States from unpopular South Vietnamese leadership, could have led to an ambiguous result in Vietnam and left a North Vietnam still capable of pursuing not only its objective of dominating all of Indochina but also of extending its influence throughout all of Southeast Asia. Moreover, acting in the bipolar world of the 1960s, only the United States could have brought about the favorable regional result that exists today. Only the United States had the resources to bring to bear against the large, well-disciplined, well-supported forces of North Vietnam. And it was—and still is—very much in the US national interest to ensure a stable, non-communist en-
environment in Southeast Asia. Today’s strong, dynamic ASEAN region, moreover, is able to help guide Vietnam into a more constructive position in the regional—and world—communities.

Today the members of the European Community, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China, in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, are all major players on the world stage. Today US strategic interests in containing Vietnam parallel those of all the major powers—and the states of ASEAN—except for the Soviet Union. All parties, apparently including the Soviet Union, favor a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and establishment of an independent Cambodian government. Even the Soviet Union, following its decision to withdraw its own forces from Afghanistan, appears to see Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia as a liability to Soviet foreign policy—interfering with an improvement in the Soviets’ relations with both the People’s Republic of China and the United States, as well as with the ASEAN states. In the short term, then, it was the United States that failed in its objectives in Vietnam; over the longer term, however, it is Vietnam that is unlikely to achieve its larger objective of dominating the region. This long-term outcome is a decided strategic success for the United States—and, in its essence, what successive American administrations had set out to do: to stop the advancement of communism in Southeast Asia.
THE FUTURE OF SDI:
A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONMAKING

BARRY W. HOLMAN

In his March 1983 speech that would launch the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, President Reagan outlined a vision for the future in which a US defensive system could detect and destroy nuclear weapons soon after their launch, certainly before they could strike the United States. Reagan envisioned a world in which technology would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." The years since that speech have been marked by sharply polarized, seemingly endless debate within the scientific and political communities over the feasibility, desirability, and affordability of such an undertaking. Critics have scoffed at the notion of a defensive system that could protect the entire US population from nuclear weapons; some have seen in the proposed program an effort on the part of the United States to regain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union—a situation viewed as very destabilizing. Other analysts have viewed the effort as one necessary to move the United States beyond reliance on the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, as a means of deterring nuclear war, or to counter Soviet research efforts.

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Today, the SDI research effort goes on, as does the debate over the program. The design of a strategic defense capability is not yet known, though it is likely that the SDI program, if successful, will involve the evolutionary development of multiple systems for a strategic defense capability. The SDI program's 1987 report to Congress stated that the program's goals "can be reached through the phased deployment of defenses, and that incremental deployment of defenses is the only likely means of deployment." Some observers claim that the goals for a strategic defense capability have changed over time, and that today the program's short-term, if not primary, goal is for an enhanced deterrent capability. In 1987, some observers began to suggest that the administration might be rushing too quickly toward an initial deployment decision at the expense of important further research necessary for sound decisionmaking, and at the risk of violating the existing ABM Treaty. Others have suggested the program objectives should be redirected or scaled down.

During the 1988 presidential and congressional campaigns, candidates' public pronouncements on SDI varied from endorsement of immediate deployment of a strategic defense system to statements that broadly denounced SDI. Little in-depth discussion was heard from most candidates concerning their "vision" of the program, what changes, if any, they would make in program direction and emphasis, or how they would approach future program decisionmaking.

The events noted above, especially a new presidential administration coming to Washington, raised questions as to whether program changes had occurred and would occur in the SDI mission, and as to what the basis for future program decisions might be. This essay examines these issues and addresses a series of questions that, taken together, may suggest parameters for future SDI decisionmaking. Those questions are the following:
THE FUTURE OF SDI

1. Was SDI solely a research effort of the Reagan administration, an effort to be abandoned by a future administration or Congress?
2. Have the program goals for SDI changed over time, and does the concept of phased deployment call for a clearer or expanded statement of mission and need?
3. What criteria exist for deployment decisionmaking, and are they adequate?
4. What consensus exists concerning possible Soviet reaction to a US strategic defense capability, and how might it affect arms control negotiations?

Discussion of these questions is designed to show that SDI does not present simply a one-issue, go or no-go decision, but involves interrelated issues that should be considered collectively in determining the program's future. This essay is intended to provide an expanded basis for public understanding of the SDI program's complexities from a policymaking standpoint, and to provide a framework for decisionmaking.

OVERVIEW OF THE SDI CONCEPT

The Strategic Defense Initiative was formally launched in 1984. It brought together under one roof, and with a new and challenging mandate, related ongoing research. Development of a strategic defense capability is envisioned by some analysts as an effort dwarfing both the Manhattan project, which produced the atomic bomb, and the Apollo project, which placed man on the moon.

SDI is conceived as a layered defense effort, aiming at a defense in depth. It envisions being able to detect the launching of nuclear-armed missiles and being able to destroy the weapons in flight, before they reach their targets in the United States. This layered capability is intended to intercept and destroy incoming nuclear-armed missiles by
striking them at some point during their four phases of travel after launch. Those four phases are the following:

- A boost phase, lasting 3 to 5 minutes.
- A post-boost phase, lasting 5 to 8 minutes, during which multiple warheads are released from what is often referred to as a post-boost vehicle or a “bus.”
- A mid-course phase, lasting up to 25 minutes, during which the warheads travel above the atmosphere toward their targets.
- A terminal or reentry phase, lasting 30 to 90 seconds, during which the warheads reenter the atmosphere and head toward their targets.

Hence, SDI research is aimed at exploring technologies that could defend against attacking missiles during each of the four phases of flight. The Reagan administration stated, “SDI is not based on any single or preconceived notion of what an effective defense system would look like. A number of different concepts, involving a wide range of technologies are being examined. No single concept or technology has been identified as the best or most appropriate.”

SDI research is currently divided into five areas:

- Surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill assessment (SATKA)
- Directed energy weapons (DEW) technologies
- Kinetic energy weapons (KEW) technologies
- Systems analysis and battle management (SA/BM)
- Survivability, lethality, and key technologies (SLKT)

A directed energy weapon is defined by the SDI program as “a weapon that employs a tightly focused and precisely guided beam of very intense energy, either in the form of a light (a laser) or in the form of atomic particles traveling at velocities at or close to the speed of light (a particle beam weapon).” A kinetic energy weapon is identified as one “that uses a nonexplosive projectile moving at very high speed to destroy a target on impact.”

The SDI program’s 1987 report to Congress stated,
Each phase of deployment would be sized and given sufficient capability to achieve specific military and policy objectives and lay the groundwork for the deployment of subsequent phases. Of equal importance, the technologies employed in, and objectives served by, the initial phases of deployment would be fully compatible with the technologies and objectives of the ultimate strategic defense system. In fact, such early emphasis would facilitate the achievement of the ultimate system.\(^7\)

The report goes on to state,

A first deployment phase could use kinetic energy weapon and sensor system technologies to concentrate on the boost, post-boost, and late mid-course intercept layers. The boost and post-boost layers could consist of space-based kinetic-kill interceptors combined with surveillance and targeting satellite sensors in geosynchronous orbit. The late mid-course phase intercept layer could consist of ground-launched interceptors combined with ground-launched surveillance probes and could be used to destroy nuclear weapons that are not destroyed in the boost or post-boost layer defense.\(^8\)

The report then outlines how subsequent phases could improve on the initial phase of deployment, including the use of kinetic energy weapons in a third phase.

Clearly, a survivable and workable SDI system would involve a tremendous technological undertaking. Although a specific system has not yet been determined, the environment in which such a system might have to function has been described by a former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official, who envisions it as

an Armageddon environment: as thousands of Soviet warheads, with hundreds of thousands of accompanying decoys, hurdle through space on the way to targets in the United States, the space-based radars and other sensors of "Star Wars" must be able to scan, track and discriminate; space-based mirrors must reflect laser beams projected from earth or space generators; space- and ground-based missile launchers must be able to launch their missiles, and orbiting battle
management satellites and airborne command posts must be able to monitor, assess and control the myriad engagements taking place.  

WHOLLY A REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVE?

The Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, as the program is officially known, will undoubtedly be recorded in history as a hallmark of the Reagan administration. Often lost in the polarized debate over the program, however, is recognition that although the formal SDI program was launched in the Reagan administration, it was founded upon research already underway, funded by prior administrations. *The New York Times Magazine* has noted that before the launching of the SDI program, about $1 billion was being spent each year "to investigate lasers, particle beams and other technologies for anti-missile defense." \(^9\) Prior funding does not suggest automatic endorsement of the current SDI program, but it does indicate that research into the relevant technologies has had a life apart from the current controversy over program direction.

On one hand, this may seem to be a small point, yet, viewed in the context of the polarized debate over SDI, it is instructive for reminding us that the issue is not simply one of having an SDI or killing the program. Authors of a March 1986 staff report to three Democratic senators, titled *SDI: Progress and Challenges*, noted, "Public debate on SDI has often centered on the desirability of performing a robust research program. The authors of this report consider that question moot. Public support for research is broad and bipartisan. The more relevant question involves the pace and direction of this program." \(^11\)

Public support exists for strategic defense, though it is not necessarily clear to what extent that support reflects
more the hope for such a capability than an understanding of the scientific and political debate that has surrounded the program. A December 1985 Gallup Poll found that among the more than 60 percent of persons it surveyed who had "followed the 'star wars' discussion very or fairly closely," 61 percent responded affirmatively to the question, "Would you like to see the United States go ahead with the development of such a system, or not?" Other surveys have produced similar results. A fall 1987 study found, however, that the public has "only a general concept of the program." So although there may be strong public desire for a strategic defense capability, there is not necessarily an appreciation for the complexities of the task.

Despite congressional concerns over the goals and direction of SDI, funding for DOD's portion of the program increased yearly from 1984, reaching $3.6 billion in fiscal year 1988. Although the increases have been less than requested by the administration, and some funding votes have been close (with one tie vote broken by the vice president), these increases do reflect support for varying degrees of research. Some members of Congress have been concerned about the level of defense spending on SDI relative to funding for enhancing conventional defense capabilities. They have supported specific programs and funding for concerted research efforts in the conventional area designed to compete with SDI in terms of visibility. Those supporting the conventional defense initiatives cite the importance of a "broad-based and balanced technology initiative" to exploit emerging technologies.

But the Senate Armed Services Committee has also reported, "The committee continues to support a robust SDI research program because it believes the program serves a number of valid U.S. security purposes." These statements suggest that SDI may have to compete for future funding in the Congress against conventional defense initiatives (particularly in light of the INF Treaty) as well as receive closer scrutiny in light of overall budget constraints.
Yet there is recognition of the need for research in both areas.

CHANGE IN PROGRAM GOALS?

A case can be made that the goals emphasized for SDI have changed over time in response to early criticism of the president’s long-term objective of making nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” Likewise, it appears that some uncertainty remains, at least in the eyes of Congress, over the program’s future goals and objectives. Some congressional members themselves desire changes in program direction and emphasis.

Reagan’s March 23, 1983, speech outlining the concept of a strategic defense capability marks the starting point for the debate over the program and its purpose. Although close reading of the president’s speech indicates a clear recognition that research was needed to explore the feasibility of a strategic defense capability, critics, including numerous scientists and former government officials, were quick to criticize the concept of a system capable of providing a population defense and making nuclear weapons obsolete—many considered it infeasible. Fairly or not, this lofty ideal became the benchmark against which the program has often been judged.

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, himself a physicist, has stated his judgment “that a comprehensive, near-perfect defense of population will be infeasible for decades, and probably forever against an attack by many thousands of warheads.” Various other former government officials, Republicans and Democrats, also have expressed doubt about the feasibility of a population defense capability and have suggested a near-term research emphasis on protecting US missiles and command and control facilities.

The Union of Concerned Scientists notes that doubt about the concept of population protection was officially
recognized when, "within a week of each other in May 1984, for example, Defense Secretary Weinberger and [SDI Program Director] General Abrahamson acknowledged that the 'short-term' goal of SDI was to protect U.S. offensive nuclear forces, though this retreat to partial defense to 'enhance deterrence' rather than replace it was in all likelihood the only realizable objective of the program." This emphasis on a short-term goal different from President Reagan's original vision for SDI has led some to characterize the program as having shifted from an SDI-1 to an SDI-2 emphasis.

A January 1985 presidential statement on SDI does place much of its emphasis on SDI's contribution to deterrence but also addresses population defense criticism. It states, "The combined effectiveness of the defenses provided by the multiple layers need not provide 100% protection in order to enhance deterrence significantly. It need only create sufficient uncertainty in the minds of a potential aggressor concerning his ability to succeed in the purpose of his attack." The statement says that the purpose of SDI is to strengthen deterrence: "Effective defenses against ballistic missiles have potential for enhancing deterrence. . . . An aggressor will be much less likely to contemplate initiating a nuclear conflict, even in crisis circumstances, while lacking confidence in his ability to succeed." These statements about the role of uncertainty seem to fit what former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ken Adelman has described as the "quintessence of deterrence."

Although these words seem to describe a defensive effort designed to enhance the longstanding basis of deterrence rather than the version enunciated by Reagan in March 1983, other administration statements addressed both goals. In 1987 congressional testimony, then Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated,

Neither the President or the DOD have ever accepted the notion of a defense that would protect only our national command facilities or retaliatory forces. The President's consideration of the concept of phased deployment does not
imply this policy has changed. The type of defense we are seeking is capable of providing protection for our entire national territory including the general population.\textsuperscript{21}

Additionally, the defense secretary's fiscal year 1988 Annual Report to the Congress states, "The goal of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program is to provide a new and better way to deter war by reducing the utility of offensive ballistic missiles, ultimately rendering them impotent and obsolete."\textsuperscript{22} That report also states the belief that strategic defenses, "if feasible, would provide a better basis for deterring aggression by strengthening strategic stability, thereby increasing our security and that of our allies."\textsuperscript{23}

Lest one think the issue settled, we need only turn to the Congress to see that the question of SDI's goals still exists. A Senate Armed Services Committee report, accompanying the fiscal year 1987 defense authorization legislation, referred to "continuing indications of basic disagreements within the administration as to the program's goals."\textsuperscript{24} Senate floor debate over fiscal year 1988 funding authorization for defense also focused on continuing perceptions of change over time in the goals for SDI. Senator J. Bennett Johnston stated, "This program has zigged and zagged every which way in its goals and priorities."\textsuperscript{25}

The controversy over SDI's goals is related to the argument over SDI providing a population protection versus enhanced deterrence, the concept of phased deployment of SDI, and some concerns about premature deployment of a first-phase system. The September 1987 Senate floor debate brought out strong concerns from some members that SDI funding priorities indicated a shift from emphasizing long-term research on advanced technologies to emphasizing a premature push for early deployment of a system using existing technologies—a system that the Soviets could easily overwhelm.\textsuperscript{26}

On the other hand, controversy over SDI's goals may be viewed as more than just a change in funding priorities of
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the program. It can also be linked to a lack of consensus among the Congress, the administration, and others over what the goals should be. For example, the Senate Armed Services Committee report cited earlier stated the committee's belief that "the major emphasis within the SDI should be dedicated to developing survivable and cost effective defensive options for enhancing the survivability of U.S. retaliatory forces and command, control and communications systems."27

Such views raise the question of what role SDI should play in preserving US retaliatory capabilities relative to the roles of other programs such as the MX and Midgetman missile programs. Some questions arise in the Congress about the future of those programs, particularly the Midgetman, which was deleted in the administration's fiscal year 1989 congressional budget submission. One press account in February 1987 quoted a deputy assistant secretary of defense as saying, "A limited strategic defense system would be favored over the single-warhead Midgetman missile in a future budgetary showdown."28 It remains to be seen what debate may ensue in the Congress over the Midgetman program, either separately from or in conjunction with debate over SDI.

Former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, in a January 1988 article, asserted, "Without a new strategic consensus, budget cuts will only bring chaos." He went on to say, "We need, above all, a consensus on SDI and the respective roles of offensive and defensive forces in preventing nuclear conflict." Perhaps more significantly, he pointed out, "Our new strategic consensus should recognize that one cannot expect to put the nuclear genie completely back in the bottle,"29 suggesting he believes it is not feasible to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

We should note that the initial phased deployment suggested by the SDI program would involve at least a partially space-based system. The March 1986 Senate staff report on
SDI not noted, "The shuttle tragedy pointed out current logistical difficulties with the deployment of space-based payloads. Unless fairly dramatic advances are made in U.S. space transportation, logistics and support capabilities, it may be impossible to begin deploying any SDI system until after the year 2000." Later that report also stated, "It may well be that the production, transportation, support, logistics, and administrative requirements of a strategic defense system are as tremendous as the military technical requirements." This report suggests that an early 1990s deployment of a layered defense system as envisioned by the SDI program may be difficult from a space transportation standpoint, regardless of other technology considerations. It also suggests that progress in both space transportation capabilities and SDI technology will require close scrutiny in assessing the timing of any space-based deployment of a strategic defensive capability.

One US senator has argued for immediate deployment of a strategic defensive capability, based on existing technology, to protect US retaliatory capability and "use our permitted ABM deployment both as a true defense site and as a working laboratory." Under that approach, existing technology would be used now within constraints of the ABM Treaty, with later decisions made on upgrades based on emerging technology and decisions about continued compliance with the ABM Treaty.

More recently, Democratic Senator Sam Nunn has proposed that both the United States and the Soviet Union develop a limited defensive capability to protect against accidental launch of nuclear missiles. This approach would be directed toward building on earlier risk reduction efforts promoted heavily by Nunn and Republican Senator John Warner.

These last two alternatives appear directed toward what is often referred to as a ground-based "point defense" rather than the broad-coverage, space-based layered defense normally associated with the SDI concept—even in a
phased deployment. We can only assume that much debate is yet to come over the goals and mission of a strategic defensive effort.

**SUFFICIENT CRITERIA FOR DEPLOYMENT DECISIONMAKING?**

Former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in his fiscal year 1988 annual report to the Congress, stated that an important consideration in current research is the degree to which certain types of defenses, by their nature, discourage an adversary from attempting to overwhelm them with additional offensive weapons. Any defensive system we might employ must not allow an adversary to degrade its effectiveness less expensively than we can restore it. In 1987 congressional testimony, Secretary of State Shultz said the president's criteria for deploying a strategic defensive system were that it has "to be particularly feasible; it has to be survivable; and cost-effective at the margin." This was a variation on SDI deployment criteria cited by various administration officials, and originally attributed to Paul Nitze, President Reagan's senior arms control adviser.

We should also note that an amendment to the fiscal year 1986 Defense Authorization Act prohibits strategic defense deployments in whole or in part until

1. the President determines and certifies to Congress in writing that—(A) the system is survivable (that is, the system is able to maintain a sufficient degree of effectiveness to fulfill its mission, even in the face of determined attacks against it); and (B) the system is cost effective at the margin to the extent that the system is able to maintain its effectiveness against the offense at less cost than it would take to develop countermeasures and proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to overcome it; and
2. funding for the deployment of such system has been specifically authorized by legislation.
enacted after the date on which the President makes the certification to Congress.36

The legislation does not define "the system." When questioned about deployment criteria in 1987 congressional hearings, Secretary of State Shultz stated that one would not want to start phased deployment of a strategic defense system "until you have a clear, confident idea of where you are going."37 However, the significant and not easily answered question confronting phased deployment is, How would one know at the point of an initial system deployment whether subsequent systems would be particularly feasible, survivable, or cost effective at the margin.

On the surface, this could be a difficult if not impossible question to answer if the intent is to assure the viability of an ultimate system, and emphasis is given to early deployment of a system with limited capabilities. The question could be applicable, however, to individual deployment decisions—about the extent to which separate systems might stand on their own, and where uncertainty exists about future phases. On the other hand, one might question whether these criteria provide a sufficient basis for decision-making for individual phases that are intended to be interdependent and to lay the groundwork for subsequent phases. In that case, other questions, including the following, might first need to be asked regarding individual phases:

- What specific strategic needs is this initial system designed to fulfill: enhanced deterrence in general, building on the role of uncertainty; protection of strategic retaliatory capability; or some degree of population protection? Are there other system alternatives for fulfilling the strategic need—if so, how do they compare in terms of cost and benefit?
- How feasible and survivable is the designated phase and how definitively can projections be made about subsequent phases?
- What capabilities does the Soviet Union have forcountering the system, if deployed; and how would
Soviet capabilities potentially affect the feasibility, survivability, and cost of future systems? If the initial deployment phase is deemed necessary to meet some short-term strategic need, then the question of feasibility, survivability, and cost effectiveness of a later system could be less critical. Additionally, one benefit that should not be overlooked in terms of phased deployment decisionmaking is the opportunity such an approach affords for periodically examining and controlling long-term program costs, particularly where individual phases are less interdependent.

ADVERSE SOVIET REACTIONS?

Much criticism of SDI has concerned the Soviet reaction to or potential counteraction of a US strategic defensive capability, either as originally envisioned or in a more limited form. How seriously should those views be taken? Many critics of the US strategic defense program seem to focus more on what the Soviet Union might do in response to deployment of a defensive system without fully discussing the Soviets' own current research efforts or system deployments. We can gain some balance in perspective by briefly considering those criticisms collectively and by further considering what the Soviet Union may or may not be doing in the area of strategic defense.

Initial concern about the US SDI program centered on the perception that it could be viewed as a US effort to regain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, thus in effect to have a first-strike capability. Concern has also been raised that any SDI system would cause the Soviets to expand their nuclear arsenal in order to be able to overpower and penetrate the system—thus further fostering an offensive arms race, if not launching a defensive one.
Some members of the US scientific community have been part of the opposition to the SDI program from its inception, voicing their concerns from a scientific and also a political perspective on issues including SDI's effects on US-Soviet relations. That opposition has extended even to phased deployment of defensive systems. A recent pledge against SDI taken by a number of US scientists said SDI is ill-conceived and dangerous, and that anti-ballistic missile defense of sufficient reliability for population defense is not technically feasible. Further it said, "A system of more limited capability will only serve to escalate the arms race by encouraging the development of both offensive overkill and all-out competition in anti-ballistic missile weapons." It goes on to say that the SDI program "jeopardizes existing arms control arrangements and makes negotiations even more difficult than at present."38

The Soviet government itself has mounted an unusually strong, vociferous assault against the US strategic defense effort. Does this mean that the Soviets do not share the publicly expressed skepticism of many scientists and other officials in the United States concerning the program? Or does it mean the Soviets fear the many technological advancements, if not a quantum leap in technology, that the United States might achieve through the research effort even if a strong strategic defensive capability is not in the offing, at least in the near term? The former seems less likely, given the periodical interactions between US and Soviet scientists, in which Soviet scientists would probably have heard the views of scientists in the United States on the subject. Fear of US technological advancement seems more likely.

What about Soviet views concerning a phased deployment? One source has recently suggested, "Soviet strategists find little consolation in the notion that the United States cannot devise a 'leak-proof' system. A less effective system, they maintain, could serve a critical offensive function by encouraging the United States to launch a nuclear
strike on the assumption that the strike would destroy many Soviet ballistic missiles and that the defenses would neutralize the rest."39 Other sources suggest that strategic defenses may lead to war before they are operational, as the USSR could be tempted to attack elements of the system during deployment.

Although concerns about potential Soviet reactions to SDI should not be dismissed, they need to be balanced by consideration of the Soviets' own strategic defense activities. Mr. Gorbachev, while in the United States in December 1987 for signing of the INF Treaty, stated that his country, too, is researching strategic defense capabilities. The secretary of defense's fiscal year 1988 annual report to the Congress states,

Moscow has increased both its active and passive defenses in an effort to negate the effectiveness of U.S. and allied retaliatory forces. The Soviets maintain around Moscow the world's only operational antiballistic missile (ABM) system, now being upgraded to a two-layered defense. In addition, they are now constructing a network of new phased-array radars that can track more ballistic missiles with greater accuracy.40

The Soviets are also recognized as having the world's only operational antisatellite system. Should these systems be viewed as destabilizing? Should one also question whether Soviet civil defense efforts are not also destabilizing? There are those who dispute the effectiveness of these defensive efforts. One might question why, and to what extent, an initial-phase SDI system of limited capabilities would necessarily be considered more destabilizing than existing or potential Soviet defensive measures.

A difficult question to answer is, How seriously are administration statements on the Soviet capabilities and research efforts viewed by the public at large and, particularly, by the Congress? Are these statements viewed as credible, or as exaggerated in an effort to build support for the US SDI program? Perhaps a formal bipartisan assessment of Soviet
research efforts and capabilities would be helpful as a necessary underpinning to developing a consensus on the level of research, development, and deployment to be undertaken by the United States.

Robert Jastrow and James Frelk, citing CIA estimates, advance the view, "In the early 1990's, the Soviet Union is likely to have a lethal combination of a first-strike force and a defense against retaliation." This conclusion is based on an already ongoing buildup of Soviet ICBMs and the potential for a quick, large-scale duplication of the current Moscow ABM system. One could argue from this view for a quick SDI deployment decision for a strategic defense system. On the other hand, a more gradual approach, staying within the confines of the 1972 ABM Treaty, might avoid precipitous Soviet action and better assure an optimum US defensive system if deployed later. Perhaps a point that should be explored before any decision on SDI deployment is the extent of US capabilities for offsetting existing and near-term-deployable Soviet offensive and defensive measures with or without a US defensive capability. US decisionmakers should also consider whether Soviet defensive measures would be undesirable, to the extent they contributed toward nuclear stability and risk reduction. In that light, a more balanced assessment might also be made concerning how destabilizing a US defensive effort might be.

SDI AND FUTURE ARMS REDUCTIONS

SDI was initially seen as in impediment to arms reduction negotiations in Geneva. Now SDI is widely credited with bringing the Soviets back to the negotiating table. Yet now that the INF Treaty has been signed, concern has shifted to the US insistence on continuing the SDI program: Could this US position inhibit an agreement on reducing long-range missiles?
THE FUTURE OF SDI

Although some observers see SDI as an impediment to deep reductions in nuclear missiles, others see deep reductions as fostering the need for SDI and potentially making any such system more effective. Jonathan Schell suggests that deep reductions in nuclear weapons are a necessary prerequisite to deployment of a strategic defense capability. Keith Payne and Colin Gray advance the view, "Deep reductions in offensive missiles which probably cannot be verified, could be tolerated in the presence of the SDI, which would compensate for all but large scale cheating." Robert Kupperman states, "Traditional arms control policies contain an inherent yet profound paradox—we do not yet know how to reduce the world’s nuclear arsenals without increasing rather than decreasing the threat that these weapons might be used. For example, under certain circumstances, there can be greater risks in maintaining small arsenals than large ones." This seemingly reinforces the argument of Keith Payne and Colin Gray concerning verification difficulties. Kupperman also suggests that, if a mixed offensive-defensive strategy is adopted, "An agreed upon protocol with the USSR would be desirable. For example, the conditions under which initial defensive actions could be taken might be explored." These considerations do not suggest the absence of room for negotiating any restrictions on SDI as part of an agreement providing deep reductions in long-range missiles. They may, however, provide reason for preserving some options for future testing and deployment of a strategic defense capability.

INTEGRATION OF ISSUES

Without question, much uncertainty still surrounds the issues of what SDI is, what its mission is, how strongly it should be pursued, and when it should be deployed. These
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are important, interrelated issues facing the Bush administration and Congress. On what basis will they make their decisions? I believe we can at least sketch out a framework within which they can come to decisions:

Should SDI research be viewed solely as a Reagan administration initiative? Not entirely. Research in strategic defense technologies had a beginning apart from the Reagan administration and the concept of strategic defense is supported by the public. These facts should have some important bearing on future decisions, at least in supporting some continuing level of research. If we take as a given that some level of research should be continued, then on what basis will program decisions be made?

Is there a consensus concerning program goals and objectives for a strategic defense capability? Not yet. A consensus is needed between the administration and Congress concerning the long- and short-term goals of strategic defense research and development. Then a consensus is needed on program focus and priorities in terms of seeking to pursue new technologies, deciding whether to pursue a near-term deployment using existing technologies, or limiting both technology and deployment efforts in the face of budget constraints and emphasis on conventional weapons. The issue is much broader than just SDI—it involves a consensus on integrating offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. Forming such a consensus requires moving beyond polarized rhetoric over the feasibility and desirability of making nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

How should deployment decisions be made? Feasibility, survivability, and cost effectiveness are important but provide only a partial basis for deployment decisions. If considering whether to seek short-term deployment of a system, what mission need will the program be seeking to fulfill? What are the costs and benefits of the strategic defensive system relative to other systems for meeting that need? In one view, a ground-based system could be deployed using existing technology, within the constraints of the existing ABM
TREATY, to provide some protection of our nuclear retaliatory capability and serve as an operational test bed. If the initial defensive capability is intended primarily as a test bed, then such a system could be viewed as a relatively less destabilizing first step toward shifting to a mixed offensive-defensive strategy. If the primary purpose of a defensive system is to protect nuclear response capabilities, then that decision would probably need to be considered in the broader context of development of the MX or Midgetman missile system, along with a decision concerning to what extent each of these systems is needed and at what level of cost. And if the decision is made to continue pursuit of a layered defensive capability, then both technical feasibility and space transportation capabilities must be factored into an integrated decision.

How should our decisionmaking be affected by Soviet actions or responses? A necessary underpinning to future SDI research and development efforts should be a bipartisan consensus on Soviet research efforts and advances in antisatellite capabilities, and how US SDI research could and should provide any needed response. Questions will need to be addressed concerning to what extent there is room for using SDI as a bargaining chip in arms reduction negotiations. The availability of technology for systems development and the availability of supporting space transportation systems can help determine what trade-offs might be desirable in arms reduction negotiations.

These questions are interrelated and should be considered as US leaders make program and funding decisions affecting the future of SDI. Rather than offering a course for the United States to follow concerning strategic defense, this framework can help decisionmakers rationally and realistically determine that course.
NOTES

5. Ibid., p. xi.
6. Ibid., p. xii.
7. Ibid., p. II-11.
8. Ibid., pp. II-11, II-12.
16. Ibid.
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23. Ibid., p. 281.


30. SDI: Progress and Challenges, p. 2.

31. Ibid., p. 51.


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45. Ibid., p. 83.
SUPERPOWER APPROACHES TO WAR TERMINATION

PAUL M. CURRER

The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles, signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in December 1987, signifies a fundamental change in Soviet attitudes about the appropriate scope of arms control agreements. Many commentators have noted that the treaty shows a new willingness to reduce the number of nuclear warheads and gives unprecedented consent to on-site inspection procedures. It also reflects an evolution in the Soviets' thinking about what amount of nuclear force is sufficient to ensure their security, and it may show an even broader reconsideration of how they see a major war starting, being fought, and ending.

For decades, US strategic defense policy has focused on improving the country's ability to wage a successful nuclear war if deterrence fails. An important component of the US strategy has been the assumption that the US leadership fully understands Soviet views of war, warfighting, and war termination. Any substantial Soviet changes in this regard should affect US strategy.

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This essay seeks to answer the question, Are the US and Soviet national security policies toward nuclear conflict and its resolution essentially incompatible? My thesis is that the United States and the Soviet Union see nuclear war being fought and ending in fundamentally different ways. Misunderstandings about each other's doctrine could result in rapid, uncontrolled escalation once nuclear weapons were used. So the Executive Branch needs to clearly delineate US doctrine on the fighting and termination of nuclear war, to avoid catastrophic results if a US-Soviet conflict started.

Thorough analysis of this subject requires consideration of three questions:

- Do the United States and the Soviet Union have adequate doctrines regarding nuclear conflict and its resolution?
- Is the Soviet doctrine changing?
- What approaches to war termination would be best for the US leadership—civilian as well as military—to take after the start of nuclear war?

In this essay, I also consider mutual misperceptions about doctrine, discuss the importance of identifying the nuclear threshold early in a conventional conflict, and suggest some practical steps the United States could take after the start of a conventional conflict to strengthen the West's hand in resolving a growing crisis.

US AND SOVIET APPROACHES

Although US doctrine on the conduct and termination of war has been the subject of considerable discussion in the academic world, it has received far less comment from government officials. Much of the US approach to fighting and ending a war is contained in documents not available to the public. Enough material has been officially released, however, to provide the gist of overall US doctrine. Essentially, it
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is to deter war if at all possible, but, if deterrence fails, to be able to fig. it different levels of conflict so that escalation can be controlled and the conflict ended at the lowest possible level at which US interests can be preserved. This view of war sees conflict ending with strategic surrender of the adversary.

Perhaps the most authoritative public statement of relevant US doctrine is in a 1987 White House publication, entitled National Security Strategy of the United States. It says,

We must ensure that . . . [the Soviets] clearly perceive that the United States has the capability to respond appropriately to any Soviet attempt to wage a nuclear war, and that we have the means to do this in ways which will defeat Soviet military objectives without necessarily triggering a massive exchange.\(^5\)

The pamphlet adds, “The United States also requires sufficient residual capability to provide leverage for early war termination, and to avoid coercion in a post-conflict world.”\(^6\)

Related Department of Defense and Service documents, such as the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report and Air Force Manual (AFM) 1–1, present a similar theme. Secretary Weinberger’s Annual Report for 1987 says that, should deterrence fail, the United States would “seek to terminate any war at the earliest practical time and restore peace on terms favorable to the United States that secure all of our aims and those of our allies and friends.”\(^7\) This objective would be accomplished by a response sufficient to convince the Soviets that they could not prevail in a nuclear war.\(^8\) AFM 1–1 says that if deterrence fails, the United States national security objective is to fight at the level of intensity necessary, for as long as necessary, to obtain US political objectives.\(^9\)

Although these documents present a consistent strategy for dealing with nuclear conflict, they are deficient in several respects. First, focusing on deterrence as the cornerstone of US policy, they actually say little about what the United States would do if deterrence fails. Second, they
draw virtually no distinction between fighting a conventional and a nuclear war. This omission, as we will see, is in contrast to Soviet statements. Third, these US documents do not reflect an integrated diplomatic and military response to conflict resolution, nor do they say how the United States actually sees a war ending. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, these statements may not fully recognize that Soviet thinking on warfighting has changed during the past few years.

General Secretary Gorbachev’s actions since taking office show that he is avidly pursuing a number of major reforms designed to enhance the economic productivity of the Soviet Union. Less obvious, however, is that the new regime is reexamining its national defense strategy and the type of personnel found in its defense establishment.

Changes in Soviet defense doctrine reflect a maturing of Soviet thought on the fighting and termination of war, thought that has been neither as one-dimensional nor as stagnant as the West has sometimes perceived. Most apparent have been a clear differentiation between conventional and nuclear war, introduction of a new concept called “defense sufficiency,” and frequent repetition of a desire to keep conflict conventional if at all possible.

In general, Soviet doctrine regarding the fighting and termination of war has gone through three phases since the mid-1960s. The first is reflected in the writings of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, the second in the statements of Marshal Dmitri Ustinov and Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. The third, which is still evolving, is revealed in the writings and speeches of Mikhail Gorbachev and his minister of defense, D. T. Yazov.

The Sokolovsky Era. For the West, perhaps the most widely recognized Soviet military strategist is Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, whose book *Soviet Military Strategy* has been widely available for more than two decades. The last edition, published in Moscow in 1963, sets forth what is often identified as a warfighting strategy. According to Sokolovsky,
nuclear and conventional war are fought in essentially the same way. Nuclear war should be conducted under the same principles as conventional war, but on a far greater scale. More important, nuclear war is survivable and should be fought with that quality in mind.15

How does Sokolovskiy see nuclear war ending? According to him, nuclear war ends only with the complete destruction of the enemy—strategic victory.16 He notes, "In a future world war...it may be assumed that the belligerents will use the most decisive means of waging war with, above all, the mass use of nuclear rocket weapons for the purpose of achieving the annihilation or capitulation of the enemy in the shortest possible time."17

Several points characterize Sokolovskiy's thinking. First, although he acknowledges that nuclear war is more destructive than conventional, he still regards it as survivable. Second, he stresses that nuclear war should be fought quickly and massively. Third, he shows no thought of a gradual or escalating response to a nuclear attack.18

Much of today's US national defense strategy appears to have been formed in response to Sokolovskiy's work. The absence of any statements in his writings about escalation control or limited nuclear options, however, suggests significant differences between the US and Soviet views of how a war would be fought and won.

The Ustinov Era. The publications of Marshal D. F. Ustinov, General Secretary Brezhnev's minister of defense, show that a significant evolution in Soviet defensive doctrine took place in the 1970s. For the first time, the Soviets began to distinguish nuclear from conventional warfare. Because nuclear war would be catastrophic, conflict should be limited to the conventional level. At the same time, Brezhnev himself avowed in a 1977 speech that the Soviet Union did not seek strategic superiority, only parity.19

In a 1982 article entitled "Parrying the Menace of Nuclear War," Marshal Ustinov called upon the Soviet armed
forces to devote "still more attention" to the problem of pre-
venting escalation of a military conflict to the nuclear level.
He pointed out that the problem is particularly troublesome
because the "U.S. and NATO would be expected to augment
their forces with nuclear weapons during periods of
hostility."20

Although Ustinov implies that war should be ended if
at all possible during the conventional phase, he does not
contradict Sokolovskiy about the need for obtaining stra-
tegic victory once the nuclear stage has been reached. Usti-
nov seems to recognize that escalation control might be
possible during the conventional phase of conflict, but he re-
jects the idea that this control would continue once a war be-
came nuclear.

*The Ustinov-Ogarkov Controversy.* A dispute regarding
which doctrine to follow—Sokolovskiy's or Ustinov's—be-
came public in 1983. Early in 1983, Marshall Nikolai Ogar-
kov, then chief of the Soviet General Staff, disagreeing with
Ustinov's views, publicly espoused a purely Sokolovskian
view: nuclear war is in reality no different from conven-
tional, it is survivable, and the only legitimate objective dur-
ing nuclear conflict is complete destruction of the enemy.21

Ogarkov, under apparent coercion, later recanted this
view, first in an unusual 1983 interview with a *New York
Times* reporter,22 and then more fully in his 1985 book enti-
tled *History Teaches Vigilance.*23 In his book, Ogarkov writes,
"Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, nuclear weapons were
few and viewed only as a means of supplementing the fire-
power of troops."24 In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the
rapid quantitative growth of nuclear weapons—and the de-
velopment of long-range, precision delivery means—had
led to a "fundamental reassessment of the role of these
weapons, and to a break in previous views on their place
and importance in war, in the methods of conducting en-
gagements and operations, and even on the possibility of
waging war at all with the use of nuclear weapons."25
The “fundamental reassessment” that Ogarkov refers to apparently was not finished in 1985. The most recent phase of the evolution of Soviet doctrine was publicly revealed by General Secretary Gorbachev and his defense minister, D. T. Yazov, in their 1987 presentation of the concept of “defense sufficiency.”

The Gorbachev-Yazov Era. Along with his perestroika and glasnost campaigns, General Secretary Gorbachev has repeatedly spoken during his tenure of a “revolutionary” revision of defense policy. According to Gorbachev, this revision was responsible for the INF Treaty and for movement toward the potentially deep reductions that would result from an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons.26

The Gorbachev doctrine appears to have two principal parts. First are repeated assertions that nuclear war must be avoided at all costs and that conflict must be kept conventional if at all possible.27 Second is the concept of “defense sufficiency”: force levels must be great enough to deter aggression from potential adversaries, but not any greater.28 Notably absent, however, is any explicit commentary by Gorbachev or Yazov about how a conflict would end once it reaches the nuclear stage. This lapse suggests a reaffirmation of one aspect of Sokolovskiy’s doctrine that survived through the Ustinov era: once a conflict has passed the nuclear threshold, the only appropriate goal is strategic victory.

The concept of “defense sufficiency” appears to be the greatest single change from earlier Soviet defense doctrine. The concept seems to be based on the idea that lower force levels are acceptable as long as they still deter aggression.

The clearest official statement of the new doctrine came on 27 July 1987, when Defense Minister Yazov explained a number of decisions adopted at the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee (PCC) meeting in May 1987. The principle of “defense sufficiency,” as Yazov describes it, is to have “precisely the magnitude of armed forces necessary to
defend oneself against an attack from outside." He notes that the composition, quantity, and quality of Warsaw Pact armed forces are measured against the threat. The primary objective is to guarantee that the forces are strong enough to ensure the security of the Warsaw Pact and to "rebuff aggression." Should the Warsaw Pact be attacked, however, military forces must be sufficient to give "a crushing rebuff to the aggressor."

Yazov flatly rejects what he interprets as the doctrine of flexible response, calling it "a trick designed to delude simpletons." He rejects the concept of nuclear deterrence as well, saying that it is "contradictory and dangerous" because the "NATO concept... renders the military equilibrium shaky and increases the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war."

Writers from the Soviet academic world also have explained the new defensive doctrine in detail. In an article published in Izvestiya on 13 August 1987, Doctor of Historical Science L. Semeiko said that the concept has two fundamental parts. The political aspect involves communicating a sense of reasonableness in the actions of the Soviet Union. It is designed to "ensure that the other side has no unwarranted fears." The military aspect requires that "military power and combat readiness be sufficient to prevent oneself from being taken by surprise... and, if a hostile attack is nonetheless launched, to deliver a crushing rebuff to the aggressor."

In a July 1987 article published in Pravda, academician Ye. Primakov strongly underscored the political element of the new defensive doctrine. He explained,

Until relatively recently, we still said—and not only said but were certain of it—that if... [Western forces] committed aggression against the [Soviet Union], they would be consumed on the flame of the war they had kindled... In the past, this conclusion pointed to the need for increasing fighting efficiency as virtually the only means of maintaining the country’s security at the proper level...
Today, such assessments and interpretations are clearly insufficient and inaccurate. . . . While maintaining the great importance of improving its defense capability, the Soviet Union is bringing to the fore political means of ensuring its security."

Thus, while the military aspect of the new doctrine is designed to maintain sufficient force to discourage attack, the political aspect is designed to apply all other means to achieve the same result. Although Primakov is not specific about what these means are, one can identify at least some of the steps that the Soviet leadership has taken in this regard. Most obvious is the dramatic use Gorbachev has made of the print and electronic media, and even of his own books, to proclaim his diplomatic proposals. A number of Western commentators have criticized the INF Treaty for shifting the balance of power in Europe from nuclear to conventional forces. If this shift has actually occurred, it would be consistent with the Gorbachev and Yazov statements about the need to keep conflict conventional while ensuring that the Warsaw Pact is sufficiently strong to discourage aggression.

THE PROBLEM OF MISPERCEPTION

Gorbachev’s statements about nuclear conflict present a potential dilemma for the US defense policy community. Taken at face value, they indicate that although the Soviet Union is not willing to fight a nuclear conflict, it would engage in a massive response if a nuclear war starts. Should the policy community assume that a war of this type can be controlled? Making this assumption would be a risky gamble, because nothing in current Soviet literature indicates an acceptance of escalation control after the nuclear threshold has been crossed.

Differences in the way the United States and the Soviet Union see a war being fought and ending make it difficult for
the policy community to decide what steps should be taken in a conflict that leads up to, and extends into, nuclear war. For the United States, conventional or nuclear war ends with "strategic surrender," occurring at the lowest level of conflict needed to convince the other side that continued hostilities would not be in its interests. For the Soviet Union, nuclear war ends with "victory"—the complete destruction of the enemy's ability and will to fight. The two approaches have a similar problem: each side could easily misconstrue what the other was doing because their views of fighting and ending war are so different.

Much has been written about the care with which the United States could proceed up the escalatory ladder by using various attack options. Soviet leaders, however, have been reluctant to acknowledge any possibility of observing limits in nuclear war if their homeland is attacked. Long after acquiring the technical means for measured nuclear response, Soviet political and military leaders continue to reject the idea of limitation in strategic nuclear war.

Furthermore, what the United States might consider an obviously limited nuclear attack, the Soviets might perceive as the first strike or initial phase of a major attack. Soviet statements about the need for quick and decisive action once a conflict has reached the nuclear stage suggest they might perceive a small attack as massive when the United States actually intended it to be a warning or demonstration of resolve.

Other scenarios where misperceptions of the other side's actions would result in unintended escalation are easy to imagine. Such misinterpretations could occur if the Soviets started to move most of their attack submarines out of their normal Northern Fleet basing areas to support conventional hostilities in the Atlantic. Seeing this step taken, the United States probably would perceive that the nuclear phase of conflict was rapidly approaching.

In a worst case scenario, misperceptions could lead to preemption. With one side's forces on high alert, the other
side might think such a step was preparation for an actual strike. The case for waiting to see what happens—for conceding the operational initiative to the other side—could appear quite weak.\textsuperscript{42} In such a situation, the chasm that so often separates military plans from political needs could once again become an important cause of war.\textsuperscript{43}

On the other hand, Soviet strategic policy contains a strong element of military rationalism that would probably enable the United States and the Soviet Union to do business in the interest of common safety.\textsuperscript{44} Although Soviet thinking would likely be inflexible after a decision to launch a nuclear strike, the conventional phase of a conflict might offer far more chance for settlement of a conflict than US planners have previously realized. In fact, the Soviets' differentiation of conventional and nuclear conflict is one aspect of their thinking that the United States could exploit to terminate a conflict on terms acceptable to the West.

Several factors indicate that the period just before the nuclear threshold is reached would be a key time at which to seek resolution of the conflict. First, any debate within the Kremlin about the use of nuclear weapons would be at its most intense. Second, the leadership and policymaking structure of the Soviet Union would still be intact. And third, Soviet flexibility toward reaching a diplomatic solution probably would decrease rapidly after the first nuclear weapons were used.

\section*{WORKING TOWARD WAR TERMINATION}

One of the most important steps the United States could take in a conflict with the Soviets would be to exploit any debate that occurred within the Soviet leadership structure. As the nuclear threshold was approached, emergence of debate in the Kremlin about how to proceed could allow the North Atlantic Alliance to buy time, as envisioned by the NATO members.
Where would such a debate take place, and what course would it follow? Although it would not be public, discussion of when and how to end hostilities probably would involve an ascertainable number of readily identifiable authorities within the Defense Council, the most critical party body for military decisionmaking. Some members of the Defense Council (such as the minister of defense) might be willing to launch a nuclear strike to end a conflict quickly and decisively, but others (perhaps the general secretary or foreign minister) whose jobs are to ensure the continuity of the state might not be so inclined.

Each side's willingness to negotiate probably would decrease after the nuclear threshold had been crossed because of the emotional impact of nuclear strikes against one's home territory. So US exploitation of a Kremlin debate would be most likely to work if responsible agencies acted in an integrated manner before and during the conventional phase of conflict.

Before a Crisis Starts. An important objective that should be pursued well before any crisis is reduced uncertainties about the other side's current and likely future forces, practices, and intentions. The ongoing arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are an important vehicle in this regard. The negotiations facilitate communication between informed representatives of the two governments and provide a place where the two sides can express concerns, exchange data, resolve ambiguities, address compliance, develop confidence-building measures, and agree on limitations. At a minimum, the talks reduce uncertainties and constrain worst case planning on both sides.

Because the United States has not, to date, discussed war termination doctrine face-to-face with the Soviets, the US leaders have had to deal with unnecessary uncertainty about what should be a clearly understood aspect of Soviet strategy. Discussions of this subject at the ministerial level and above should have a high priority. The newly created
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which are a component of the verification program for the INF Treaty, would be a good place to start such discussions.  

*After Conventional Conflict Starts.* Although a key goal for the West would be to gain control of a crisis through use of conventional weapons, NATO can achieve this goal only if it prepares properly during peacetime—such as by improving its conventional capability or by obtaining asymmetrical reductions in conventional arms negotiations. It would be important not to plan for the early release of nuclear weapons because the first use probably would significantly decrease US options.

Public diplomacy, private negotiations, informal discussions with Soviet officials, and military force would all have to be used in a coordinated manner to achieve common objectives.  

The following would be useful actions in this regard:

- Identify the Soviets' grievances and motivations for war, and how they see war ending.
- Assess what the Soviets see as the threshold for nuclear conflict.
- Use public and private diplomacy to argue the futility of crossing the nuclear threshold.

Repeated Soviet assertions about the destructiveness of nuclear war could be used to influence the likely Politburo debate about nuclear release. Pressure from other countries—especially those in the socialist camp—could have a similar effect. Channels of communication would have to be kept open throughout the entire crisis to ensure that the Soviets understood that the United States was acting rationally.

*After the Nuclear Threshold is Crossed.* Even though US options would severely decline after the first nuclear release, it would still be in the US interest to be alert for any hint of the Soviet leadership departing from its public statements on war termination. The United States would need to keep
channels of communication open and try to discourage further use of nuclear weapons. Although the task would be extraordinarily difficult, the US leadership would have to try to maintain rationality and encourage the Soviets to do the same; this effort would require asking the Soviets how they viewed the situation and what they foresaw as the next step.50

US memories of the Cuban missile crisis would probably produce a strong temptation to "stand tough" after an initial nuclear strike and to forego all non-military responses. In actuality, the United States would have to take diplomatic and informal actions as well, in order to make the best political and military decisions under the circumstances.

I have argued that Soviet concepts of how to fight a large-scale war have evolved during the last two decades. Perhaps the greatest single change is the recognition that any future war should be kept conventional if at all possible. Nonetheless, the Soviets apparently still believe that nuclear war, though devastating, must be fought quickly and decisively if it cannot be avoided.

Given their concept of victory, the Soviets see nuclear war ending only with complete defeat of the enemy. Soviet doctrine regarding the end of conventional war is not as clear. But it appears that there would be a greater chance of a negotiated settlement during the conventional phase of conflict.

Differences in Soviet and US views about escalation present a dilemma for the US policy community, because the Soviets see nuclear war ending in a fundamentally different way than the United States does—with victory, not strategic surrender. The United States should seek to control escalation, starting in the conventional phase of conflict or
earlier, by using carefully coordinated public and private diplomacy, military means, and informal contacts with the Soviets.

Because of their current doctrine, the Soviets probably would be reluctant to cross the nuclear threshold except in the most dire circumstances. If they did so, however, rapid—and perhaps uncontrolled—escalation would be likely. Taking these probabilities into account, the United States can improve its chances of controlling conflict if it does the following:

- Pays deliberate attention to plans and national policy involving war termination doctrine.
- Analyzes more fully the relationship between conventional and nuclear phases of warfare.
- Encourages better integration of political, diplomatic, and military solutions to developing crises.
- Attempts to define more precisely where the nuclear threshold lies in various conflict scenarios.
- Better refines its definition of what would constitute an acceptable end to war under various scenarios.
- Undertakes meaningful dialogue with the Soviet Union on warfighting and war termination issues.

These steps would help to control future conflict and, perhaps even more important, keep it from starting in the first place.
NOTES

6. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
10. The need for joint use of diplomacy and military force was stated more emphatically during the 1970s. One official, for example, said, "The controlled use of nuclear weapons would . . . stop the immediate aggression and create a pause or hiatus in the enemy's military activities to allow time for diplomacy to work." Reagan administration statements, in contrast, imply that greater emphasis is placed on military force. See Lynn E. Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine, Adelphi Paper No. 121 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975/76), p. 6; and US President, pp. 21-22.

12. See Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 33. General Secretary Gorbachev calls his campaign “[p]erhaps . . . the most important and most radical program for economic reform our country has had since Lenin introduced his New Economic Policy in 1921.”

13. Ibid., pp. 139-144.


17. Ibid., pp. 202-203. Sokolovskiy makes this point repeatedly throughout his book. In a later section, for example, he says, “A simultaneous nuclear rocket strike against the vital centers and means of armed combat of an enemy is the greatest and most reliable way of achieving victory in modern war. . . . This principle has now become indisputable.” Ibid., p. 276.

18. Ibid., pp. 210-211.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.
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26. Gorbachev, pp. 139-144.
28. Gorbachev, pp. 140-141.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
37. See, e.g., Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Gorbachev: Mandate for Peace, (New York: Paperjacks, Ltd., 1987); and Gorbachev, Perestroika.
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42. Ermarth, p. 609.
44. Ibid., p. 610.
47. Many events could occur after the nuclear threshold is crossed which would easily cut off rational evaluation of the situation. It is not clear from publicly available literature, for example, whether the Soviet Union could successfully rescind an execution order that had been transmitted to its submarine forces. But an inadvertent nuclear strike after a cease-fire probably would eliminate any possibility of a negotiated end to the crisis.
49. The US decisionmaking process probably also would change as the nuclear threshold approached, with the outcome not necessarily subject to the “checks” of peacetime government administration. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, President Kennedy created a relatively small “Executive Committee” (ExCom) that handled the situation without any consultations with Congress. While the outcome of the ExCom’s proceedings was favorable, the process could have resulted in a policy that might not have worked as well had there been less time for action. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 801-819; and Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1974), p. 514.
50. In a full-scale nuclear response, a lull probably would occur between the first and subsequent attack waves as each side quickly assessed damage and calculated how much of its reserve remained. Even in the worse situations, thus, the United States would still have an opportunity to communicate with the Soviets.
MANAGING SECURITY ASSISTANCE:
TIME FOR CHANGE

JOHN P. KLINE Jr

Since beginning to study security assistance, I have observed that my fellow officers lack an understanding of the subject. This is true despite the fact that security assistance is a controversial element of daily discussions about national strategy and instruments of power. There is confusion about its substance, its purpose, and its administration. This essay provides basic information about the subject for the uninformed but interested military reader.

More importantly, the essay discusses perceived problems with the system as they relate to its administration “in country.” Even well-informed officers who have worked closely with, or as part of, the security assistance program express frustrations that warrant analysis. The literature in the broad field of security assistance often addresses the topic from a macro level of foreign policy or economic impact. The subject of arms transfers has drawn commentary from almost every corner of the globe. But the role of the military officer charged with implementation in the host

country is often ignored or glossed over. This role—its background, current status, and future—is my focus.

Before we begin looking at the history of security assistance, we need a working definition. The term is frequently used interchangeably with military aid or military assistance and is generally thought of in terms of weapons transfers, either as sales or as gifts. It actually has become an "umbrella" term, encompassing many facets of assistance to other nations. Although it is generally associated with, if not equated to, the provision of military hardware, it is important for us to note that the umbrella also covers advice and training. Several programs make up security assistance. There are five major congressionally funded programs: the Foreign Military Sales Credit (FMSCR) Program, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The first three of these form the military element of security assistance. The last of these, though involving military forces, does not necessarily include any US forces. PKO is a means of contributing dollars to help finance multinational organizations such as the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in southern Lebanon. The Economic Support Fund is foreign aid (economic assistance) administered by the Agency for International Development.

Besides this funded US security assistance, there are additional unfunded elements. These include Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales, both of which involve some governmental management. Clearly, security assistance is a complex of many programs and projects, requiring a large bureaucracy to implement it.

Problems and issues concerning security assistance are many and varied. I present several here, without substantiation at this point, to give a sense of my orientation.
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The security assistance efforts are not an effective, integral part of a cohesive foreign policy toward many countries. The programs are administered through diverse systems and often do not work in harmony with other US-supported or -sponsored programs. The chiefs of the security assistance organizations are sometimes in competition with other military officers, principally the defense attaches, for access to and influence with the ambassador. In fact, though, the programs are administered not so much by officers in the field but by bureaucrats in Washington.

Much of the focus is on military hardware, whether sales, gifts, or credits for purchasing. The role of trainer and, particularly, of adviser has been downgraded, to the detriment of a cohesive, effective policy. The role of the commanders in chief (CINC) of the Unified Commands is often unclear and, in some countries, downplayed by the ambassador or an office in Washington. The CINC's efforts to develop strategies for regions of the world is often frustrated. Congress has imposed severe limitations on the authority and flexibility of security assistance organizations, denying the chiefs of these organizations any leverage with the host nations.

To more fully understand these perceived problems, we will examine the evolution of the program. Some knowledge of the history of security assistance and of the impact of legislation is critical to my analysis.

HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

Arms sales have been a part of international relations for many years; though their effect has varied, their presence has been pervasive. The United States gained its independence with military assistance from France (not a disinterested party) during the American Revolution. During the American Civil War, the Confederacy tried to obtain
assistance from the British but was thwarted in part by the Union's naval blockade. In the first half of the twentieth century, the United States was heavily involved in arms sales. Before entering World War I, the United States exported $2.2 billion in war materials to Europe (selling to both sides). On the eve of its formal entry into World War II, the United States was already actively engaged in supplying the Allies through the Lend Lease Program.

The scope of American participation in military assistance broadened significantly after World War II when President Truman formed the first security assistance organizations overseas: the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece and its counterpart in Turkey. The United States thus began to form what was to grow into a vast sea of Military Assistance Advisory Groups, or MAAGs. These organizations were to assume many titles over the years, but the aims were essentially the same for all—to help the host nation's military and to further US interests.

Under President Eisenhower, assistance to allies and friends continued, expanding on Truman's policy of containing communist expansion. President Kennedy again enlarged the role of "advisers" by encouraging more active participation in the field. This greater role was evident in the escalating entanglement in Vietnam. The specter of US advisers increasingly engaged in combat would come to have a major influence on the American perception of MAAGs in their advisory role.

The Nixon Doctrine was largely a reaction to the disastrous war in Vietnam. President Nixon planned to leave the fighting to the host nation while the United States provided economic assistance and military hardware to help. The idea was to keep US troops from engaging in combat while still trying to help friends and allies. Nevertheless, MAAGs maintained their size and importance throughout the world, and the advisory role remained important.
During the Ford administration, Congress took an active role in formulating policy concerning MAAGs by passing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. This legislation was an expression of the concern over proliferation of arms transfers and of the fear of involving US field personnel in active combat roles. President Carter, sharing the concern over proliferation of weapons, particularly in developing nations, sought to limit US involvement in arms sales. He announced in 1979, "Arms transfers would henceforth be viewed as an exceptional foreign policy implement."7

President Reagan sought to reverse the declining role of security assistance. In expressing national security strategy, the president declared,

U.S. Low Intensity Conflict policy, therefore, recognizes that indirect—rather than direct—applications of U.S. military power are the most appropriate and cost effective ways to achieve national goals. The principal military instrument in Low Intensity Conflict, therefore, is security assistance.8

Regardless of presidential intent, though, the Congress has become increasingly involved in foreign policy, particularly in security assistance policy. I will briefly outline the actions of Congress, because they play such an important role in many of the frustrations discussed in this essay.

The main legislation regarding security assistance is contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. The 1976 act and its successors affect the management of security assistance by amending the 1961 act. The Arms Export Control Act first placed significant restrictions on the management of security assistance and reflected Congress' intent to limit the authority and influence of US military personnel abroad. This act was signed into law only after President Ford vetoed its predecessor.9 The veto was based on a number of grounds, including questions about maintenance of the constitutional separation of powers. In its comment, the
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House Committee on International Relations called the new bill "a reform measure." The committee cited many reasons for the reform—the "Indochina war," the economy, balance-of-payments deficits, a lack of public support, and the belief that decisions regarding security assistance had been made "without the knowledge or concurrence of the Congress."

The declared intent of Congress to eliminate MAAGs and all other security assistance organizations by 1 October 1977 naturally had a long-lasting effect on MAAGs' effective functioning. Except when specifically authorized to exist by Congress, MAAGs were to be replaced by "the assignment of up to three U.S. military personnel to each Chief of a U.S. Mission to perform security assistance functions." The International Security Assistance Act of 1977 amended this restriction slightly by allowing augmentation of the three Armed Forces personnel, to "perform accounting and other management functions with respect to international security assistance programs . . . [with] three additional members of the Armed Forces . . . when specifically requested by the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission." The limitation, to "perform accounting and other management functions," was enacted with the 1976 law and continued in this augmentation allowance. Note that Armed Forces personnel assigned to security assistance duties are, in all cases, to serve under the direction and supervision of the ambassador or chief of mission; they are not an autonomous influence.

In 1981 emphasis shifted slightly. In its report on the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated that the "bill also repeals or otherwise modifies several restrictions that have been previously placed on Presidential authority to provide foreign assistance." The law retained the six-man limitation on military personnel to manage security assistance programs in all but twelve countries specifically authorized larger organizations. It did, however, remove
the "three and three augment" encumbrance. In signing this legislation into law in January 1982, President Reagan recognized the restoration of "needed flexibility" to the foreign assistance program.15

Until this 1981 act (since 1976), the clear intent of Congress had been to severely limit the role of military officers assigned to security assistance offices overseas. They were to perform logistic management functions, that is, assure the proper delivery of hardware, the transfer or sale of which was arranged in Washington. They were specifically not to advise or train host country armed forces. Any necessary training would be performed by teams temporarily assigned for that specific purpose (Mobile Training Teams, for example). They were also specifically prohibited from promoting arms sales (unless authorized by competent authority in the Executive Branch). Despite the new "flexibility," most of these restrictions remained. One important change in wording did appear in 1981. One of the functions to be performed by the permanently assigned military forces was to be "evaluation and planning of the host government's military capabilities and requirements."16 A liberal interpretation of this function permits some "advice" if not training.

A period of essentially no legislation concerning security assistance organizations, just a series of continuing resolutions to keep the government running, followed the 1981 act's passage. Even the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, the first security assistance act passed since its predecessor of 1981, contained no significant changes regarding the functioning of security assistance offices. Through 1986 the law still allowed "evaluation and planning" but insisted that "advising and training" would be performed by personnel temporarily assigned for the purpose.17 No other notable changes to the Foreign Assistance Act regarding the management of security assistance have occurred since.

Despite the extensive congressional involvement in the management of security assistance, a distinct shortage of
critical analysis or comment on this involvement exists. Dr. Larry Mortsolf and Dr. Louis Samelson of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, noting this shortage, prepared an insightful paper in 1987 to "fill the void" and address the need for more understanding of congressional effects. They succinctly summarize the legislative restrictions on management of security assistance. In addition to limitations on the size of organizations, they list two other restrictions having noticeable effects on the scope of MAAG activities: the prohibition against any duty, including training, that might involve US military forces in combat, and the prohibition against any assistance to police forces (with a few exceptions).

Mortsolf and Samelson present an interesting argument that, although the conduct of foreign policy is generally recognized as belonging to the president, the Congress "possesses and exercises the basic constitutional power to authorize the military assistance grant and sales programs." They maintain that the Congress delegates this function to the Executive Branch through legislation, specifically the Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Control Acts already discussed. They underscore the basic frustration of many dealing in the world of security assistance by noting, "Considering the behavioral dispositions of the two branches—with one usually for and the other sometimes for, unsure, or against military assistance—it is a wonder that we have any workable program at all."

To begin to fully come to grips with the problems and frustrations inherent in the security assistance programs, we must also look at the organization for implementation. The State Department has overall statutory responsibility for administration of the program within the Executive Branch. Within the State Department the undersecretary for security assistance, science, and technology is primarily responsible for security assistance.
Military Affairs is also an instrumental part of the State Department's management effort, as is the chief of US diplomatic mission (or ambassador). Many departments and agencies take part in the management of security assistance, but the Department of Defense clearly has the largest commitment of manpower. This Defense manpower can be found in numerous offices and agencies in Washington and on posts and stations throughout the United States and in countries around the world. Some of the principal participants include the under secretary of defense for policy, the assistant secretary of defense (international security affairs), the assistant secretary of defense (international security policy), the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Unified Commands (the CINC s), Security Assistance Offices overseas, and Defense Attache Offices.

Detailed discussion of the roles and missions of all these departments and agencies is well beyond the scope of this essay. The relationships of those operating outside the United States are particularly germane to the discussion, however, and I will outline them here. The chief of the security assistance organization (for example, military group commander) is responsible to the chief of the US diplomatic mission (the ambassador). He is also responsible to the CINC in his region and to the director, DSAA, in the Pentagon. In many countries security assistance functions are performed by Defense Attache Offices. In these instances, the defense attache is responsible to the chief of mission and to the director, DIA. The attache must also communicate with the CINC and the DSAA, but they are not in his chain of command. Without really beginning to investigate the many participating organizations, it is clear that the management of security assistance, even from the limited vantage point of the military officer in the field, is complex. This complexity plays a significant role in the frustrations experienced by military officers struggling with implementation and management of policy in-country.
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PROBLEMS WITH MANAGEMENT

Security assistance as a subject of debate within the United States is, like other foreign assistance, a program without a domestic constituency. As already discussed, US security assistance has ebbed and flowed as a major instrument of power. Its expense has been decried; its usefulness has been questioned; its motives have been suspect both at home and abroad. Yet it has been touted as the foremost instrument of foreign policy. In 1981 Andrew Pierre, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote, “Arms sales are far more than an economic occurrence, a military relationship, or an arms control challenge—arms sales are foreign policy writ large.”

Ernest Graves of the Center for Strategic and International Studies recognized collective security as a cornerstone of US defense strategy and noted, “Security assistance provides the added resources and the symbolic ties to make collective security work.”

Gabriel Marcella observed, “One of the central justifications for the U.S. security assistance program is that it wins influence with recipient nations.” Whether these claims are true or even appropriate is certainly open to question, but that they exist as justification in the minds of some is clear.

Stephanie Neuman, writing in 1986, concluded that despite the entry into the worldwide arms market of many new salesmen, the superpowers “have continued to dominate the arms trade, using military assistance both to enhance their position in the world and to limit each other’s expansion.” That there are now many countries dealing in arms, not just as recipients of superpower largesse or as purchasers of superpower weapons but as producers and sellers, is undeniable. Most European countries, Israel, Brazil, and many others are in the arms business for profit. Where the United States has declined to sell, other producers have not hesitated to step in. It seems safe to conclude that secu-
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Security assistance, especially in the larger sense of arms trade, is an important component of international relations. And if this is so, the issue becomes how best to manage it and how much to spend.

In addressing the question of how to manage the program, the extent of involvement of the overseas organizations rises to the top of the list of concerns. The frustrations experienced by military officers assigned to US missions abroad, both as chiefs of security assistance offices and as defense attaches, are the impetus for this look at the problems and issues involved in the administration of security assistance.

What are, or have been, the problems with the role of the MAAGs in security assistance? In 1974 Robert Pranger and Dale Tahtinen proposed several reasons for “evaluating and cutting the MAAGs” based on the premise that they encouraged arms sales, acting “as advocates of particular kinds of military doctrine and equipment congenial to American forces (and U.S. defense contractors).” This explicit condemnation of US military personnel for pushing doctrine and sales of equipment for the benefit and profit of the United States is implicit in much of the concern over MAAGs. In particular, Congress has been concerned that military personnel in the field were generating demands for U.S. military equipment either by assisting representatives of the uniformed services or of U.S. commercial firms, or by actively promoting the acquisition of American defense equipment in their consultations with host military personnel. A fear existed that MAAGs, through these activities, were creating situations in which the policymakers in the Executive Branch and Congress were being presented with fait accompli [sic] concerning sales requests from foreign governments.

Regardless of whether this salesmanship was well intentioned or malevolent, its adverse effects were noticed not only by members of Congress but also by other military professionals, including some assigned to security assistance duties overseas. In this context, the complaint would
usually be that the United States was supplying equipment inconsistent with the needs of the host country, such as helicopters when the real need was for trucks or jeeps. The accusation might very well be aimed not just at MAAG personnel but at the bureaucracy in Washington where so much of the trading takes place and all of the decisions are made.

Another related concern was that the MAAGs were too autonomous, often formulating policy independently of the Department of State or even of the Department of Defense. Senior US military officers had access to senior officials of the host nation that even the US ambassador did not have, particularly in countries where the military effectively ran the government. This ability to influence the host nation was recognized in a nonpejorative sense by earlier researchers. Writing in 1973, Gary Guertner observed, “The opportunities for influencing the policies of recipient states are great since military missions and advisory groups are structured in such a way as to maximize access to high officials.” In 1967, John Bahm had concluded, “The more developed and powerful a state is, the less direct influence the Advisory Groups have within the country.” Acting on these beliefs and concerns, the Congress placed strict limitations on the size and activities of the MAAGs, as outlined earlier. The emphasis for management of security assistance was shifted to the bureaucracy in Washington, where it could be subjected to congressional oversight. There was a sense that the colonels in charge of the MAAGs were simply too powerful and were out of control.

After enactment of the major amending legislation in 1976 and 1977, the General Accounting Office published two reports critical of security assistance management, with emphasis on shortcomings in the performance of the MAAGs. The thrust of the first of these, published in 1978, can be clearly seen in its title, Management of Security Assistance Programs Overseas Needs to be Improved. The GAO recommended that as many tasks as possible be transferred from
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the MAAGs to either the host country or the bureaucracy in Washington. Additionally, tasks that must be performed by the MAAGs should be clearly delineated by the secretaries of state and defense. Confusion over who was supposed to do what seemed to prevail, according to the GAO study.

The second report, *Opportunities to Improve Decisionmaking and Oversight of Arms Sales*, published in 1979, further condemns the guidance given to the oversea managers of security assistance. In addressing the autonomy of the MAAGs, the report acknowledged that the Executive Branch had placed significant restraints on, though perhaps had not provided sufficient “guidance” to, in-country personnel by emphasizing the following:

- Foreign interest in U.S. defense equipment was not to be encouraged in conversations or correspondence.
- Provision of information, including planning data, that might elicit or influence a foreign request to purchase significant combat equipment required approval by the executive branch.
- U.S. officials should not speculate about possible release of a particular system or take actions such as studies, briefings, or visits implying a positive decision without prior approval.
- All official or private foreign interest in significant combat equipment, including informal inquiries, were to be reported through Embassy communication channels.
- U.S. personnel should not facilitate sale of significant combat equipment by representatives of U.S. commercial firms overseas by giving advice on sales tactics, making appointments with the host government, or providing support indicative of U.S. Government endorsement.

Even with this rather formidable list of restrictions, the GAO found that the United States was not restraining its sales of arms in accordance with President Carter’s expressed desires and the intent of Congress. More congressional oversight was needed.
Not surprisingly, perceptions of MAAG personnel differ markedly from the Congressional and GAO observations. In interviews with MAAG personnel after passage of the legislative restrictions and major reductions in personnel, frustration prevailed. Although they often agreed with the GAO that there was uncertainty as to their "new" duties, MAAG personnel believed that the reduction in strength deprived them of the wherewithal to meet the demands placed upon them. The restrictions on discussing arms sales simply made them look foolish in the eyes of the host country military and often drove the potential buyers to other countries. Foreign suppliers were seen in-country filling the arms sales gap left by US inaction. The administrative burdens imposed on the reduced staffs were seen as so time consuming as to prevent the MAAG from having any time to "talk philosophy, strategy, and military tactics with their host counterparts." Of course, critics would argue that this is exactly what was supposed to happen.

Analyst Paul Hammond concluded that there was a dangerous disparity between the reduced capabilities of field personnel and the information requirements of decisionmakers in Washington. The MAAGs were a major source of information on the capabilities of the host-nation military and provided extensive monitoring of and feedback on the security assistance program. The reductions and restrictions effectively negated these capabilities. Hammond suggests, "If, as presently constituted and organized, they do not deserve the confidence necessary to make them effective, then it would seem advisable to alter their organization until they are able to command the confidence needed." We will return to this suggestion later.

A better understanding of staffing, organization, and functioning of current security assistance organizations is essential to this discussion. The 1986 edition of *The Management of Security Assistance* describes "three basic types of SAOs: those authorized more than six permanently as-
signed Armed Forces personnel, those which have three to six, and those DAOs [Defense Attache Offices] authorized to perform security assistance functions, and which may have personnel augmentations.” The internal organization of the SAOs varies “according to size of the mission, country, objectives, working facilities and arrangements as well as the desires of the Chief [of the SAO].” The number of military personnel assigned to security assistance duties in fiscal year 1986 ranged from zero, where the DAO was not authorized any augmentees, to 80 in the US Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia; in the same year, the organizations administering security assistance programs, the “MAAGs,” operated with 21 different titles (SAO, DAO, MAAG, JUSMAAG, JUSMAG, MILGP, MLO, etc.).

I have already mentioned the defense attaches and the Defense Attache Offices, or DAOs, several times. It is time to look more closely at their roles to see how they became involved in security assistance.

Military attaches have been part of the international diplomatic world since early in the nineteenth century. Military and naval officers were assigned, or attached, to a country’s diplomatic mission or embassy to observe the host nation’s armed forces and to report on their activities. The United States officially adopted the practice of assigning attaches in 1888 when Congress passed a law “authorizing the appointment of military and naval attaches to diplomatic missions abroad.” Almost from the beginning, service attaches became involved in arms sales. Alfred Vagts writes that at the turn of the century,

Diplomats had to back up the service attaches, who acted as advance salesmen for the producers of explosives, warships, guns or rifles. In spite of indignant outcry about “merchants of death,” the diplomats had become very much aware that foreign orders for such home industries strengthened their own country’s war potential, that foreign sales in fact helped to keep these war industries on a stand-by basis.
Although the United States still has service attaches, in 1965 the program was consolidated as the Defense Attache System under the Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA was itself established by Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 on 1 August 1961. Later versions of this directive charge the DIA to "direct, operate and support the Defense Attache System." In providing direction to the defense attaches, DIA assigns four basic roles. The attaches are (1) representatives of their services to their host-nation counterpart, (2) collectors of information, (3) military advisors to the ambassador, and (4) managers of the security assistance program when that duty is assigned to them. (As we have seen, all of these roles are also attributed to some extent to the officers assigned to MAAGs.)

Should the MAAGs have a significant role in formulating policy and managing the security assistance program? As we have seen, Congress has applied extensive pressure to minimize the role of MAAGs and centralize management in Washington. The Department of Defense has also made efforts to centralize management, forming the Defense Security Assistance Agency as the central manager. But others have stressed the importance of the man on the scene as being influential and knowledgeable about the specific needs and concerns of the host nation. There is something of a consensus, expressed in many ways from many diverse points of view, that US foreign policy lacks consistency and coherence. Recommended curatives for this inconsistency range from a return to eighteenth-century isolationism to the exercise of power to change sovereign states' governments.

Commenting on this perception of a lack of a coherent US policy, Ernest Graves gives importance to the MAAGs by noting, "The complementarity of the various assistance programs is more evident at the level of the U.S. missions to the recipient countries." In the host country is, in fact, where the most knowledgeable and coherent assessment should
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take place. The MAAG compiles an “Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance” (AIASA) with the input of the other members of the “country team.” The various counselors along with the defense attache and the chief, SAO (if there is an SAO), make up the country team headed by the ambassador. This team is “on the scene” and has a feel for the immediate (and future) economic, political, social, and military situation in the country.

In theory, the AIASA should be the dominant factor in determining the extent of security assistance to be provided for a particular country. In fact, this may not be the case. Budget constraints, of course, may dictate another course of action despite the best intentions of the Washington bureaucracy to act in accordance with the AIASA. But budget constraints may not be the reason for deviating in many cases. Policymakers in Washington often believe they know better than the representatives in the field. They have “the big picture,” unbiased by being too close to the action. Military officers assigned overseas, whether in SAOs or DAOs, naturally believe they are in a position to know what will work in their country and are frustrated when their advice is ignored.

One aspect of security assistance directly involving the MAAGs warrants special consideration in this discussion. In those countries where there is an active armed insurgency or an active conflict with another state, the MAAGs feel especially constrained. An example is El Salvador, which has been fighting an insurgency for years. As noted earlier, President Reagan has identified security assistance as the principal military instrument for US involvement in low-intensity conflict. In order to effectively administer this instrument, MAAG chiefs feel the need to remove constraints. The ban on permanently assigned personnel actively participating in training and the prohibition of all US military, even the Mobile Training Teams, from participating in combat operations have proven particularly frustrating.44
Another frustration is the conflict that sometimes exists between the defense attache and the MAAG chief. As noted, their roles often overlap. For example, both have the mission of advising the ambassador. Who is the principal adviser? Who has the best access to the ambassador and to the host nation's military? Who best represents the interests of the CINC? Who is the senior officer and is seniority important? The answers to these questions vary by country and according to the personalities involved. But I believe that, on the whole, this conflict interferes with the effectiveness of the security assistance effort in-country.

A MORE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION

Accepting that security assistance is important to US foreign policy and that the security assistance organizations in-country are an integral part of managing security assistance, we must consider how to get the most from those organizations. Numerous possibilities might suggest themselves: removing legislative restraints, increasing personnel strength, improving the training of personnel assigned, increasing (or decreasing) the rank of officers assigned, assigning more civilians, and probably many more. A recurring suggestion is to combine the efforts of military personnel assigned in-country into one organization. In 1971 Edwin Erickson and Herbert Vreeland cited a proposal to establish a “Defense Section of all military, including attaches” in the Embassy. A major advantage of such an establishment is that it would give the ambassador a single point of contact for military matters, because “one of the most persistent difficulties the Ambassador experiences is dealing with the military.” This “persistent difficulty,” identified over fifteen years ago, is certainly open to argument and is obviously not universally experienced. However, that it has long been identified as a problem and that it is sometimes experienced is undeniable.
In January 1988 the US Air Force formally submitted to the secretary of defense a proposal to merge SAOs and DAOs under the direction of the defense attache. This was done for a number of reasons, not all of which are germane to this discussion. But the merits and demerits of the concept in relation to its effect on the functioning of security assistance management overseas is relevant here.

In the supporting talking paper, the proponents first argued, 

Competition among independent SAO and DAO “fiefdoms” can be all but eliminated by virtue of reporting to a common boss, the DATT [defense attache]. This reinforces the age-old principle of unity of command. There will cease to be a question as to who is in charge of the military contingent at the Embassy. Designating the DATT as the undisputed military point of contact in the Embassy will clarify authority to the host government and improve SAO/DAO responsiveness to the Ambassador and regional CINC. I will examine the elements of this argument in detail. Lesser included arguments, such as the possibility of sharing common services and equipment—motor pools, typists, drivers, office supplies—are interesting but beyond the scope of this essay.

We saw earlier that there is sometimes friction between the MAAG chief and the defense attache. This situation is obviously exacerbated when personalities clash, and largely eliminated when the individuals are highly compatible. A difficulty clearly exists when the MAAG chief is markedly senior in rank to the defense attache, such as in Turkey and Korea where the MAAG chief is a general officer and the defense attache is a colonel. The attache sees himself as the ambassador’s principal military adviser and representative. The general in charge of the MAAG also sees himself as an (if not the) adviser. The attache is often located physically closer to the ambassador, with an office in the Embassy, while the MAAG chief may have his headquarters located
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closer to the host country's military headquarters. The defense attache can easily find himself in an awkward position trying to fulfill his responsibilities while deferring to his military superior (even though that superior is not in the attache's chain of command).

So why not consolidate under the SAO, or whoever is senior? As we saw earlier, the attaches have been on the international diplomatic scene for over a hundred years, while MAAGs have only existed since 1947. Virtually all countries have attaches in their diplomatic missions abroad and receive attaches from around the world. The security assistance organization is unique to the United States. Other countries still actively employ their attaches in arms transfers and the other activities associated with security assistance. Even the United States does not have security assistance organizations everywhere, but with very few exceptions, all diplomatic missions have defense attaches. As relations and conditions change, the need for a security assistance organization may disappear, but the requirement for attaches remains constant. It simply makes sense to place the defense attache as the senior military officer responsive to the ambassador. There may be, of course, senior military officers assigned to combatant commands deployed in the host country, such as we find in Germany, Korea, and Panama. These officers are responsible to the cognizant CINC and do not come directly under the supervision of the ambassador.

It would seem obvious that consolidating the functions under the DATT would conform to the "age-old principle of unity of command." However, this is only true if the DATT has both the responsibility and the authority to carry it out. He must really be in the chain of command, with administrative and operational control of all military personnel assigned to either an SAO or DAO function. He must write the efficiency reports of the personnel under him. This implies that he must be senior in rank (at least by date of rank). An old axiom in military service is that you can tell who you
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work for by seeing who writes your efficiency or fitness report—by seeing who controls your promotability. Because the services have very different efficiency report systems, the determination can be very complicated in this environment. We will consider a possible chain of command (and of efficiency reporting) later.

By “designating the DATT as the undisputed military point of contact” in the Embassy and by assuring that he has the senior rank, the military authority within the Embassy should, indeed, be clarified. Responsiveness to the ambassador would almost surely be improved. Should the ambassador, or other members of the country team, wish to speak to someone working directly on a security assistance issue, an appropriate briefing could be arranged by the DATT just as in any military organization where the decisionmaker wants to talk to the appropriate action officer.

Clarifying authority to the host government might not be quite as straightforward as within the Embassy. The new system would have to be carefully coordinated with the host government to ensure thorough understanding and to prevent any possible perceived slight. Since other governments are already very familiar with defense attaches (they, after all, employ them in capitals worldwide), and since other countries do not use separate security assistance organizations, the consolidation should not be difficult to explain. The authority of the DATT should be readily accepted in a short time. However, such a designation cannot be approached with a cavalier attitude. Each host country is different and requires a unique approach in examining this change.

One of the benefits is to be improved “SAO/DAO responsiveness to the . . . regional CINC.” Having a single point of contact would, indeed, seem to facilitate responsiveness. However, this will only be true if the DATT is responsible to the CINC. That is, in keeping with our axiom, the CINC must have some say in the efficiency report of the DATT. That the CINC must have access to the consolidated
office is clear. One of the stated purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility. Any action that might diminish the authority of the CINCs would clearly diverge from the intent of Congress. If, as I postulate, this consolidation proposal would eliminate friction between the SAO and the DAO, improve responsiveness to the ambassador, the CINC, and the host government, and thereby improve the effectiveness of the organization and of the security assistance program overall, why not implement the change immediately? Besides the personnel movements and the changes to directives (including some legislative changes) to dictate a phasing in of the plan, there are basic arguments against the consolidation. The first and most pervasive, if not most persuasive, of these is that the principal function of defense attaches (collecting information or intelligence) is incompatible with that of SAOs (providing assistance). The argument is that host nation military officers will be reluctant to deal with the DATT, because they know that one of this functions is to gather military intelligence. The ready access now enjoyed by the chiefs of SAOs will disappear. Since other nations do not have security assistance organizations and use their attaches for security assistance functions, one has to wonder whether this distinction between the DATT as an intelligence officer and the chief, SAO, as a helper is seen only through our own institutional biases and not through the eyes of the host nation’s military. The debate on this question could no doubt rage back and forth with one side pointing to an example of an SAO chief with better access than the DATT in a particular country, the other side identifying a DATT with better access (because of rank, perceived status, language ability, personality, prior friendship, etc.).
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Another argument against consolidation has to do with the chain of command issue mentioned earlier. In keeping with the intent of Congress to grant responsibility and authority to the CINCs, the consolidated office must be fully responsive to the CINC, as the SAO is now. The Defense Intelligence Agency argues that this will eliminate (or reduce) its control over the defense attaches.50 (Currently, the DIA controls the efficiency reports of the DATTs.) The result of this shift in control from the DIA to the CINC will be a loss of responsiveness, on the part of the attache, to national-level intelligence needs. The argument here is that the DIA is tasked with providing intelligence to the National Command Authority, specifically the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regardless of the specific recipient, the point is that he needs integrated, national-level intelligence. Why DIA could not continue to provide this service is not clear. Reports from the attaches would continue to be sent to DIA as well as to the CINCs. If there is a serious conflict in tasking, the National Command Authority wanting information that the CINC has placed on a lower priority, I am certain the CINC would understand that he, too, works for the National Command Authority.

There is another potential problem with the CINC—one of perspective or of perceived pressures. In the current arrangement, the DATT feels free to “objectively” report issues to DIA regardless of the CINC’s views. The chief, SAO, is under some pressure from the CINC to show improvement in the host nation’s defense posture (state of training, quality of equipment, readiness, etc.). If the DATT were made responsible to the CINC for this kind of progress, he might feel pressure to report improvements rather than admit to continuing problems. Under this scenario, intelligence reporting would suffer. It is also true, in this scenario, that security assistance would suffer if dishonest reports were submitted about the effectiveness of current efforts. This issue strikes at professionalism and integrity. If individ-
ional officers (CINCs, DATTs, or chiefs of SAOs) lack these qualities, the system, as it exists or as it is proposed to be, will not work.

Another look at the Goldwater-Nichols Act will shed some light on the intent of Congress regarding this consolidation and the relationship with the CINCs. The law directs a "Reassessment of Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities." It directs a study to

analyze methods to improve the performance and responsiveness of Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities with respect to the entities to which they provide supplies and services, particularly with regard to the unified and specified combatant commands. [It directs that studies consider] . . . alternative allocations of authority and functions assigned to the Defense Agencies . . . including—(A) various possible redistributions of responsibilities among those agencies; . . . (B) transfer of the responsibility for those functions to . . . the commanders of unified or specified combatant commands . . . (D) consolidation of two or more such agencies and activities.

It is difficult to miss the intent of Congress to give more authority to the "unified or specified combatant commands," the CINCs. Congress also clearly intends for the Department of Defense to seriously study consolidating agencies and activities, looking for greater efficiency and effectiveness. To ignore this directive is folly.

Mechanics of consolidation are necessarily complex, not prohibitive. Some steps are quite simple, such as providing security assistance training for the defense attaché (this is already done where the DATT has security assistance responsibilities), while others require changes in legislation to clarify funding sources and authority (SAOs are provided funds taken from the proceeds of Foreign Military Sales; DAOs are not). Some issues, such as the efficiency reporting chain involve many diverse, parochial views. The details of the chain require study and input by all the services (because each service has a different system), but, in general, the DATT would report on the officers under
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him, and the ambassador would report on the DATT. The CINC would be the first military endorser of the DATT’s report. Although some of these issues are rather complex, necessary changes generally fall within the authority of the secretary of defense.

This brief essay has looked at the problems and frustrations associated with the management of security assistance programs overseas: the lack of a coherent, integrated country policy, the many congressional restrictions on military officers in the MAAGs, the friction between MAAG chiefs and defense attaches, the Washington bureaucracy, the congressional move to enhance the CINCs’ authority, and others. Some of these problems are in the eye of the beholder. One man’s problem is another man’s solution. (The MAAG chief is restrained from advising and training to the delight of the congressman who believes the MAAG chief has too much latitude and ought to be restricted to administrative and logistics management duties.) As noted earlier, if MAAGs do not deserve the latitude necessary to do the job, their organization should be changed until they are “able to command the confidence needed.”

In view of the potential to improve the effectiveness of the country team and the security assistance program, of the potential to allow the officers in the field “to command the confidence needed,” the consolidation proposal merits serious study—not of how to avoid change but of how to smoothly and professionally implement change. It is time to take heed of congressional intent, analyze the needs of US national security strategy as it relates to security assistance, and take action. Congress has demonstrated that when the military bogs down in bureaucratic, parochial quagmires, it is not reluctant to dictate change. The Department of Defense can—and should—solve this one on its own initiative.
NOTES


3. See DISAM, ch. 1, for an excellent discussion of the history of American security assistance.

4. Ibid., pp. 1-10.

5. Ibid., pp. 1-16.


7. DISAM, pp. 1-21, emphasis in original.


11. Ibid., p. 1389.

12. Ibid., p. 1394.


19. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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20. Ibid., p. 21.
21. Ibid., p. 23, emphasis in original.
22. DISAM, ch. 5, provides a comprehensive discussion of the government organization for the administration of security assistance.
27. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, FY 1988, p. 357. In accordance with the prevalent practice in literature on the subject of security assistance, I have used MAAG as a generic term for the many titles applied to Security Assistance Organizations. This reference provides a comprehensive list of the titles in use in FY 1988.
35. Ibid., p. 20.
37. DISAM, p. 25-2.
38. Ibid., p. 25-5.
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41. Ibid., p. 245.
43. Graves, p. 155.
46. Ibid.
52. Ibid.

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EUROPE AND FUTURE US SECURITY

CHARLES C. McCLOSKEY III

To a US citizen looking at the world today, the view is one of complexity and uncertainty. In international politics, some past friends have become enemies (Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua) and other current friends are becoming less congenial (Greece, Spain, New Zealand). Some past enemies have become friends (Germany, Japan) and other current enemies (the Soviet Union, China) appear less threatening. Economics seems equally muddled. Europe and Japan depend on Middle East oil, but it is the United States that has kept the sea lanes open. American heavy industry (steel, shipbuilding) has cut back or shut down, in many cases replaced by overseas competitors. The United States welcomes imports from foreign countries, but many of these same countries impose costly barriers to prevent reciprocal US exports.

Diplomatically, the United States seems concerned and industrious but generates few concrete results (the nine-year Central American problem offers an example). What little military aid the United States provides is concentrated in just a few countries. Militarily, the nation has experienced its greatest peacetime buildup in history, yet the Soviet

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threat matches or exceeds US capability. Meanwhile, the cost for this unprecedented American buildup has been a massive budget deficit.

Given this disconcerting if not ominous view of the present, what does the future hold for America? Specifically, what region or regions of the world will most shape American destiny, and what can America do in national security terms to best equip itself to sustain its ideals and way of life in the decades to come?

My purpose in this essay is to demonstrate the critical role Europe will play in the future of the United States and to prescribe actions the United States should take to best protect its own national security interests. Europe twenty-five years hence will be economically vibrant, comfortable dealing with both East and West in trade and all other facets of international relations, militarily less dependent on the United States, especially in terms of forward-deployed conventional forces, and a superpower in its own right. The United States must, therefore, take the following actions to enhance its own national security:

- Restructure the national defense establishment to greatly curtail foreign deployments of forces while maintaining offensive and defensive strategic deterrence.
- Promote increased international trade by revitalizing American industry.
- Rejuvenate American energy and resources devoted to diplomacy.
- Develop a supportive consensus on America's European strategy into and through the twenty-first century.

WHY EUROPE?

All regions of the world command US attention. The major regions with which the United States must be concerned are Europe and the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia,
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Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand, the Americas—all are important. Why will Europe, more than any other, most influence the destiny of the United States? The reasons are many: history and heritage, economics, geographic location, the military threat, technology growth, and increasing European unity.

As a preface, let me define the term Europe. For this discussion, Europe includes the British Isles, France, West Germany, the Benelux countries, Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark), Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. These countries have in common political freedom (albeit tenuous in some) manifested by democratic governments and open participation in international commerce. The other European nations (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and western Russia) are part of the Soviet region, for they have communist governments, do not engage freely in international commerce, and are greatly influenced by the will of the Soviet Union.

Europe has been the leader of world civilization for the last six centuries. From the Renaissance until the post-World War II era, the bulk of the world’s wealth, culture, technology, and advancement stemmed from Europe. Although World War II and its aftermath divided the continent into two camps, the influence of European thinking, both in the West and in the East, remains. The United States was founded upon European values and traditions, with its initial laws and lawmaking following the European design. Much of America’s population is descended from European ancestors; family, custom, and culture still keep ties to the “Old World” strong.

The Russians have similar links to Europe. When Czar Peter the Great began the modernization of Russia, he followed the European model. The current Soviet leader, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, writes,
Russia's trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe by Christianity, and the millennium of its arrival in the land of our ancestors will be marked next year [1988]. The history of Russia is an organic part of the great European history. The Soviet Union's attraction to Europe, shown in this and many other ways, both peaceful and aggressive, is of great interest to the United States.

The economics of Europe are also of major concern to the United States. Collectively, the European economy is the largest in the world, surpassing that of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, or all the Third World nations combined. The following table highlights this economic situation:

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Further, US-European trade is well established and American business cannot afford to ignore the world’s largest market.

In geographic terms, Europe is close to the United States, providing trade and basing advantages. More important, Europe encircles the western flank of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. To gain access to the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union must pass...
through the GIUK gap (the passage from the Norwegian Sea bounded by Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom), the Baltic Sea, or the Bosporus, choke points controlled by Europe and its allies.

The major military threat opposing the United States today and into the future is the Soviet Union. No other nation except the United States can match the military might, measured in strategic weapons capability, of the Soviets. In conventional terms, the Soviets surpass all nations in levels of both military personnel and military equipment. In the past, the Soviets have been clear and blunt about their desire to destroy the West and its way of life. Their quick, brutal suppression of movements toward democracy (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Afghanistan) as well as their use of surrogate forces (Cubans, East Germans, North Koreans) to export communism have underscored this aim. The key region where Soviet expansion must be checked is Europe, because Europe is where democracy and freedom meet communism and repression head on. While we hope Europe will not again become a battleground of armies, we should recognize that it is already a battleground of ideologies.

The growth of technology also makes Europe critical to US national security. Two of the acknowledged members of the world’s nuclear club are European—England and France. Any serious discussion of nuclear capabilities or nuclear disarmament must factor in Europe. Europe is also a leader in heavy industry, electronics, aviation, and space technologies. Not only does the United States encourage, compete with, and consume European technology, but in addition the Soviets covet that technology, and unchecked export of technology from Europe to the East could seriously harm Western security.

Within the continent, Europeans increasingly are bonding closer together and acting in the international arena more as a region than as individual countries. This
trend toward increased European unity underscores Europe’s importance to the United States. This greater unity is evident in several ways. Militarily, NATO is maturing and gaining strength. Economically, the European Common Market has grown and is flourishing. Diplomatically, we see routine and frequent consultation among Europeans over issues of extra-European concern, such as the establishment of computer data banks to fight international terrorism. Politically, practical compromise among European nations shows recognition of one nation’s policy impact on the health and survival of fellow European nations. As European regionalism develops and strengthens, the United States must recognize Europe as an emerging superpower.

David Denoon, in his book *Constraints On Strategy*, summarizes effectively the importance of Europe to the United States:

Why are developments in Europe so critical for U.S. national security? Europe is crucial because, at present, the United States and its allies can handle the Soviet conventional threat outside the European landmass. Although a conflict in the Persian Gulf poses particular difficulties, in East Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Mediterranean, the United States and cooperating nations have distinct strategic advantages.

Europe is also a geopolitical prize. Its skilled population, income-generating capacity, advanced armaments industry, and location (limiting Soviet naval access to the Atlantic, Baltic, and Mediterranean) are all vital attributes. Europe’s future will also have an important psychological effect on non-Marxist countries around the globe. In addition, the ancestral ties that most Americans have to Europe create a political bond that cannot be evaluated in purely military terms. It is here that Western Europe’s special relationship with the United States comes into play.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

A strong wind of change is blowing over all of Europe. Consider the following:
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On January 23, 1988, The Washington Post reported, France and West Germany, celebrating 25 years of postwar friendship, strengthened their ties today with formation of a high-level military commission to coordinate Franco-German policies on nuclear disarmament and other defense matters.

President Francois Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl . . . also announced creation of an economic commission to promote increased cooperation on trade and monetary policy.4

Less than a week earlier, The Wall Street Journal had reported,

You don't have to look hard these days to find evidence of the new vigor in relations between West Germany and the East bloc. . . . [Yesterday] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze . . . told several hundred German businessmen that the Soviet Union needs German investment. He reminded them of business cooperation, which, he said, had been so fruitful before World War II. He warned against bowing to Western pressure to restrict technology exports to the East.5

And at almost the same time, The New York Times reported on tensions within NATO:

The United States, after months of fruitless negotiations with Spain, has decided to accede to Spanish demands and withdraw 72 F-16 jet fighters based in that NATO country.6

These recent headline stories are samplings from a stream of events pointing to significant change in European affairs and the world balance of power. The direction of change appears to be as follows: Given the overcommitment of the United States, the desire of the Soviet Union to develop a viable national economy, the major change in the nuclear equation with the signing of the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Force) Treaty, the solid and skilled technology base of Europe, and the sophistication of Europe in international trade and politics, the likely course of world events is the gradual withdrawal of American forces (par-
particularly ground forces) from Europe, increased trade between Western Europe and the Eastern bloc, movement toward regional cooperation in Europe (to include conventional defense), and the emergence of Europe as, if not a full superpower, a superpower in all terms save the size of its nuclear arsenal.

Significant trends that will greatly influence the future of Europe are important to mention here. These trends concern population, East-West trade, the electronics revolution, changing roles and expectations of the superpowers, European regionalism, and the development of space.

**European population** into the twenty-first century is expected to grow only slightly, by only 0.2 percent from 1995 through 2000. Several nations, including both East and West Germany, are forecast to have declines in population. The US and USSR populations are projected to grow at a higher rate of 0.7 percent each. The significance of these population forecasts relates to food supplies. Europe can feed itself and looks to be able to do so far into the future. Further, it has the economic wherewithal to trade for any food shortfalls it might face. The same is true for the United States, but is questionable for the Soviet Union because of economic difficulties and the sensitivity of Soviet agriculture to the severity of the climate. There is a direct connection between nutrition, health, productivity, and economic well-being, and Europe looks to be in good shape for many years to come.

**East-West trade** is likely to increase, although US concerns over technology transfer to the Soviets will have to be overcome. The profit potential certainly argues for greater trade, given the tangency of the European and Soviet-Warsaw Pact markets. Further, both sides desire it, the Europeans not only for profits but also to reestablish old ties to the East and begin to restore the past glory of a Europe without mined borders. The Soviets, for their part, need the trade and technology of the West to energize their dormant economy. To move forward, the Soviets must inspire their people to greater productivity. This inspiration can
come from the rewards of freer trade, such as modern and plentiful consumer goods, an end to staple shortages, and positive production incentives. But these rewards can come only after advances in trade and technology, the apparent goals of General Secretary Gorbachev's *perestroika*.

**The electronics revolution** continues to shrink the world. Satellites, computers, and the resultant instant communication by voice or data have changed the world forever. There is great opportunity for rapid advancement in all areas of life, although the opportunity comes with the string of continuous outside scrutiny attached: anyone can do anything, but, thanks to electronics, everyone knows what everyone else is doing. The general trend, though, is a boon to Europe. Europeans are in a central position to exploit electronics for their own benefit, drawing on the best in theory, technology, and application from both East and West. Their own electronics industries are established, they have their own satellites in orbit, and they look to remain world leaders in this field.

Concurrent with changes in Europe, the roles and expectations of the superpowers have changed. The Soviet Union is now the world's preeminent military power, matched by only the United States in nuclear arms and superior to all nations in conventional forces. Yet the Soviet economy languishes far down on the list of economic powers. On the other hand, the United States has struggled mightily, at great cost in resources, to modernize its military forces. It now finds itself with a staggering federal deficit and, at best, only military parity with the Soviet Union. Strong forces within the US Congress advocate curtailing further resources for national defense. Given these conditions, and the sobering effects of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the INF Treaty likely is ushering in a new era in superpower relations. It has been argued that large-scale conventional forces and nuclear weapons are both unusable. The United States and the Soviet Union, although still major adversaries, must adjust to coexist in a changed
world. As they steer a new course, they now must take more counsel from their regional fellow travelers, particularly the Europeans who ride between them.

**Europe as a region** continues to forge a closer union. Europeans recognize the risks and challenges of unification: loss of US support, need to field their own defenses against the threat from Soviet military might, yielding of some national sovereignty, old hatred toward Germany. But they appear willing to face these difficulties with regional interests clearly in the forefront.

Last, the **development of space** will significantly affect Europe. With progress in the Soviet anti-ballistic missile defense system and the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the relationships among Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union will change. The United States and the Soviet Union will in theory be protected from each other, but Europe will not be protected from either. Will Europe then need a similar defense? Will Eastern Europe? These questions will clearly challenge the involved governments for years to come, but they also will likely draw the Europeans into increasingly unified action.

Some other events and conditions within and outside Europe may also have major effects on Europe's future. These include the AIDS epidemic, Third World problems, conflict at global flash points, and acts of terrorism. The AIDS epidemic is potentially devastating. The exponential growth of cases, the apparent 100 percent mortality rate for AIDS victims, and the uncertainty of a medical solution threaten major effects on the future of Europe and the world—possibly population changes, disruption of leadership, new patterns of resource allocation, and travel restrictions. At the same time, the Third World has a serious food shortage as a result of increasing population. In addition, Third World nations have strong aspirations for national development. These problems and hopes could lead to major difficulties or opportunities for the rest of the world. Meanwhile, trouble at any of the world's flash points, such
as the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Central America, or Korea, could have secondary effects on Europe through trade restrictions, requests for assistance, and superpower crises. Terrorism generates similar problems, but additionally it commands resources on a steady basis for countermeasures, generates delicate diplomatic situations, and puts intense pressures on legitimate governments. As in dealing with more direct challenges, though, Europe continues to move toward a regional approach in planning for these less immediate possibilities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR US NATIONAL SECURITY

As Europe changes, so must the United States, for it is in the US national interest to do so. The areas where the United States must change, in order not to imperil its future, are four. First, the United States must restructure its European military commitment and strategy. Second, it must revitalize American international competitiveness and promote increased East-West trade. Third, it must re-energize American diplomacy. And fourth, it must educate and win the support of the American electorate on a national strategy for Europe: where the nation is going, how it intends to get there, and how much it will cost.

Many American voices are calling for change in the US military commitment to Europe. James H. Webb Jr, former secretary of the Navy, has postulated,

Although the NATO alliance is one of the keystones of our military structure, we need to remind ourselves that we are more than a European nation. Moreover, we should bear in mind that no region is better equipped to reassume a great share of the burden of its own defense than Western Europe.13

Melvyn Krauss, in How NATO Weakens the West, is more specific:

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WASHINGTON SHOULD ANNOUNCE A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS OVER A PERIOD OF, SAY, FIVE YEARS. 

Even Europeans are beginning to talk much the same way. A West European ambassador recently stated, I would find it altogether extraordinary if the United States still had 326,000 troops in Europe in the year 2000. I think that feeling is very widespread.

 Likewise, the movement toward a European regional approach to defense is growing. In October 1987 The Washington Post reported, 

Defense and foreign ministers of seven West European allies resolved today to speak with a stronger voice in military and disarmament decisions affecting their continent.

Given the future of Europe I have outlined, the implications for the US military commitment to Europe are that landpower forces need to be greatly reduced and military strategy revised. Conventional defense is becoming increasingly unaffordable to the United States and increasingly affordable to Europe. Melvyn Krauss, again from How NATO Weakens the West, clarifies the situation:

European underinvestment in defense is not an unavoidable consequence of an inherent resource inferiority, but the result of the perverse "incentive effect" of U.S. military guarantees: When the United States pledged itself to the defense of Western Europe, it gave its European allies an irresistible incentive to substitute American military spending for their own.

The United States should undertake the following military actions and strategy revisions now:

- Within a transition period of five years, withdraw two divisions of American ground forces from Europe and turn over that defense role to the Europeans. Establish a long-range goal of withdrawing all US ground forces, subject to similar withdrawal by the Soviets of their forces from Warsaw Pact nations. Forces in Berlin should remain and continue to serve their tripwire function.
• Maintain the nuclear shield from US submarines and aircraft in place, as well as from contingency plans and options.
• Retain basing rights on the perimeter of Europe (Iceland, the British Isles, the Azores, Turkey), primarily for stationing and servicing of nuclear delivery vehicles.
• Continue to develop new high-technology systems, particularly "low-observable" systems, "smart" weapons, ballistic missile defense (SDI), and space capabilities for wartime operations (as highlighted in Discriminate Deterrence, the report of the President's Commission on Integrated Long-Range Strategy).18
• Negotiate contingency basing and overflight rights to allow the United States to reinforce allies and respond to other national security emergencies.

The United States must also change economically. It needs to restore a favorable balance of trade by becoming more competitive on world markets, and it needs to encourage and support greater East-West trade by moderating its current restrictive policies. The effect of these changes will be the enhancement of both European and US economic strength and the promotion of US national security.

The United States for the last several years has been a net importer of world goods and services. The primary reason for this is that US business has been out hustled by foreign competitors. American consumers, whether individual, institutional, or corporate, thrive on quality and value. Because US producers, in many cases, were not able to deliver the desired quality and value, a flood of foreign products that could, such as Japanese electronics, Korean clothing, and German automobiles, flowed into America. Protectionist legislation, often proposed, is an easy quick fix, but a short-sighted and impermanent one. For the long haul, the United States needs to work hard at becoming more competitive in the technologies it handles best. Costs
need to be cut, productivity enhanced, government subsidies reduced, and concessions made by both management and labor. Only then will the nation be in a position to compete and negotiate effectively in world trade arenas.

Simultaneously, and in direct recognition of the growing role of Europe, the United States needs a new approach to East-West trade. The new approach needs to be up-front encouragement of expanded Europe-Warsaw Pact trade. There are strong reasons for this action. Robert Hormats, vice chairman of Goldman Sachs International and a former senior National Security Council staff member, writes,

If we maintain our security, cohesion and standards for participation in global economic institutions, while our private sectors take advantage of opportunities for increased trade, investment and contacts with Soviet officials, we can put Moscow’s intentions and reforms to an honest test—and even give them a boost—without compromising our own interests.\(^1^9\)

Paul Bracken, professor of public policy and political science at Yale University, further states,

Greater economic and financial ties between Eastern Europe and the West could make East European and Russian goals even less congruent than they already are, something that would reduce confidence in the success of a [Warsaw Pact] military attack. That is, if Moscow could not count on the reliability of Pact states in a crisis, this could be a benefit to the West easily worth 30 or more divisions.\(^2^0\)

In other words, increased East-West trade holds inherent advantages for all players—advantages that outweigh the associated risks. Like the INF Treaty, increased trade can be a “win-win” situation.

Diplomatically, the United States needs rejuvenation to participate effectively in European and Soviet relations in the future. The US problem has been one not of expertise but of a lack of resources. The will for diplomatic effectiveness has been there, but the way has not. Two areas need serious attention and corrective action.
EUROPE AND FUTURE US SECURITY

First is the funding of the State Department per se. In recent years the State Department has suffered severe budget reductions to the point of closing overseas embassies, with accompanying personnel reductions and loss of diplomatic effectiveness. Secretary of State George Shultz underscored the seriousness of the problem:

The budget crisis is perhaps the most urgent—and the least recognized—foreign policy problem facing our nation today. These cuts have seriously impaired our ability to provide necessary economic and military support for our allies and friends in need. . . . They signal—correctly or not—a declining U.S. interest in supporting our friends and allies in strategically important regions. . . . They restrict our attempts both to promote democratic values and reforms overseas and to expand trade and develop jobs. And, by forcing us to close overseas posts and to curtail necessary training, they are weakening not only our career Foreign Service but the government's very ability to follow, analyze, and understand developments in a fast-changing international environment.21

A potential tradeoff for increased State Department funding would be a portion of the cost savings from the European US force reductions called for earlier. The increased resources would allow a more effective diplomatic effort worldwide, such that more weighted effort could be applied toward Europe and the Soviet Union.

The second major diplomatic change required is in administration of the US security assistance program. Over the last ten years, Congress has restricted increasing amounts of this program to the point where, in the 1987 budget, 62 percent is specifically earmarked for Egypt and Israel, 17 percent for Greece and Turkey, and 6 percent for Pakistan, leaving only 15 percent of the total available for the president's discretionary use.22 The effects of this restriction have already begun to be seen. Some military security assistance commitments the United States has made cannot be honored. For example, Portugal will receive $117
Charles C. McCloskey III

million in 1988, marking the third straight year of declining military aid for that country, despite a US promise in 1983 of an annual program of $205 million. This cutback has led to increasing difficulty in renewing basing agreements for the strategically important airbase in the Azores. In the Third World, the anemic US aid program explains why the United States is hard-pressed by the Soviets in cementing solid relationships with developing nations. Without a coherent and flexible economic and military aid program, US diplomacy becomes much less credible and far more difficult to execute.

In order to meet the challenges of the increasing role of Europe, the United States must devote more resources to diplomacy. Specifically, the United States needs to adequately fund the State Department and give the President more flexibility in executing the security assistance program.

The final area where the United States needs to change is in the education of its people. The electorate of America needs to know what the nation’s vision of the future is, why so much attention needs to be directed toward Europe, how the nation will implement the policies and objectives of the vision, and how it will all be funded. Certainly, this is a challenging and complex task, but it is one that must be accomplished, for without the support of the American people, it is unlikely that the vision and the strategy, plans, and programs for dealing with a new Europe can be implemented. Complicating the task is the long-term nature of the vision. Americans tend to want quick results, but many of the issues will take years to resolve (for example, withdrawal of American ground forces). Moreover, a presidential administration will not likely last long enough to see plans fulfilled.

All concerned agencies of the US government need to do the following to generate national support for a new US strategy toward Europe:
EUROPE AND FUTURE US SECURITY

- Formulate the strategy comprehensively and coherently.
- Present the strategy clearly to the Congress, national leaders, and the American public, to the point where there is consensus support.
- Revise and reinforce the strategy annually and reinforce the Congress, national leaders, and the public to maintain consensus.

Twenty-five years from now, to a US citizen looking out across the world, the view need no longer be of great complexity and uncertainty. Should the strategy and vision I have outlined be formulated and followed, the world will likely be safer and better able to satisfy the needs of its inhabitants. Problems would remain, but the world would be one of less tension, reduced threat of nuclear destruction, better economic conditions, improved international relations between the United States and the world, and an American nation united and secure behind its leadership in its quest for world peace, prosperity, and freedom.
NOTES

8. Ibid.
11. United Nations, pp. 72-76.
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22. Ikle and Wohlstetter, p. 16.

6

JAPANESE MILITARY BURDENSHARING

HAJIME MATSUSAKI
and
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The development and expansion of Japanese military forces go to the very heart of Japan’s future and explore the sensitive nerves of Japan’s political life.

—John Allison
US Ambassador to Japan
April 1952

In terms of the continuing debate concerning Japan’s rearmament, not much has changed since 1952. Today’s debate, however, is inextricably tied to economic as well as political dimensions in Japan-US relations. Economic difficulties in the United States today have once again spurred criticism that Japan’s “free ride” must end. The emotional reaction to Japan’s seemingly uncooperative attitude is understandable. After all, the US protective umbrella enabled Japan to prosper by minimizing Japan’s need to spend on its own defense, allowing concentration of Japan’s

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resources on its economy. So it appears reasonable to demand that Japan now reciprocate by rearming or contributing more to defense burdensharing with the United States.¹ Some critics even argue that Japan should assume a greater role in the security of all of Northeast Asia.

But despite American emotional reaction, the prospect of Japan doing much more toward its own defense, and certainly toward the security of the entire region, appears dim. The evolution of Japan’s defense forces has been painful; therefore, substantial changes are not likely to occur soon. From the US perspective, Japan appears arrogant and ungrateful. From Japan’s view, however, it is following a necessary course of action, at least for now, for its current position on defense is a product of carefully balanced consensus; changes are difficult.

Japan faces serious future challenges, especially management of major internal forces shaping the future and maintenance of its full partnership in the Japan-US defense alliance.² Under the protective umbrella of the United States, Japan has invested only 1 percent of gross national product (GNP) on defense over the years. Meanwhile, it has emerged as a front-rank economic power with a per capita GNP that surpasses even that of the United States. The oil embargo in the 1970s, however, highlighted Japan’s vulnerability to external forces and the frailty of its economy. Accordingly, in order to manage these future challenges, Japan once again looked to the United States for help, for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces were built only to counter a limited, small-scale threat to Japan. The United States in turn has let Japan know of its concerns about the alliance.

Although the Nakasone cabinet eventually superseded the self-imposed 1-percent-of-GNP limit on defense,³ the fundamental questions of national security remain. Should Japan rearm? Can the Japanese still count on the United States to defend Japan against the Soviets? If Japan must

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rearm, can its economy survive? These are difficult ques-
tions that Japan must answer in order to meet the basic chal-
lenges it faces.

This essay examines these questions in an effort to bet-
ter understand Japan’s position. It looks at the role the So-
viet threat plays in Japan’s planning for defense. It traces the
evolution of Japan’s defense posture and analyzes various
critics’ views of Japan’s defense effort. The essay also out-
tlines Japan’s position and explores future possibilities and
implications.

Essentially, the essay argues that patient negotiation
with Japan, which Ambassador Allison urged almost forty
years ago, will serve the best interests of the United States.
In offering explanations for this approach, the essay asserts
that Americans must first understand Japan, its people, its
culture, and its history in order to effectively negotiate with
the Japanese. Finally, we offer some clues as to how Ameri-
cans can negotiate better with the Japanese.

The future of the Japan-US relationship will be tem-
pered by the quality of agreements and the understanding
of economic and defense issues. Therefore, it is vitally im-
portant that the United States prepare now for future nego-
tiations. This essay is intended to help that process.

UNDERSTANDING JAPAN

The lack of understanding of—in some cases, the un-
willfulness to understand or even appreciate—each other’s
views is a major factor in what has become a most difficult
bilateral relationship. Unfortunately, it is probably true that
the Japanese know more about the United States than
Americans about Japan. In order to be successful in dealing
with the Japanese, Americans need to know more about the
Japanese lifestyle, motivation, and values. When American
critics press for Japan to rearm, they need to understand Japan's sensitivity toward other Asian nations. Additionally, when American negotiators deal with their Japanese counterparts on trade or defense issues, an understanding of Japan's future will be a key asset in formulating an effective negotiation strategy.

Some Common Misperceptions About the Japanese

Perhaps the most common misperception about the Japanese, caused by Japan's economic successes, is that they are enormously wealthy. No doubt, the healthy economy helped boost their personal income, and some Japanese, in fact, enjoy a very comfortable life. The number of Japanese tourists in the United States certainly reinforces American perceptions of Japanese wealth. In Japan, however, one sees an entirely different picture, for most Japanese live modestly, frugally, with little sign of the wealth the Americans attribute to them. Many Japanese live in small, exorbitantly priced houses, labor 500 hours a year longer than their European counterparts, and pay almost twice as much for food as North Americans. To make matters worse, Japan is extremely crowded. (Travel is always measured, for example, by the time it takes, not by the distance.) All in all, the quality of Japanese life is incongruent with their perceived wealth and comfort.

Yet, despite strong criticism of the high cost of land and houses and concern for pollution caused by industries, the Japanese are content and grateful for what they have, especially after having experienced the devastation of war. They consider their current status the product of long years of hard work and sacrifices; they therefore take exception to any suggestions that they must either change or make more sacrifices. Robert Scalapino, a professor of East Asian studies at the University of California at Berkeley, describes the feeling of many Japanese:

For many Japanese . . . there is no particular reason to alter economic practices for the benefit of others. Is not Japanese
success the product of hard work and sacrifice, with material gratification often postponed?

So some Japanese look upon suggestions by American economists to increase domestic spending as attempts to change the basic structure of Japanese lifestyle, because saving now for pleasure later is the Japanese way of life. For this reason, an attempt by the Japanese government to help balance the trade imbalance by spurring domestic spending will probably not produce any measurable results soon. Apparent wealth of the Japanese should not drive an economic initiative to ease Japan-US trade tension, for such perceptions are at least partly erroneous.

Americans also fail to appreciate another important aspect of Japanese lifestyle that affects the Japan-US relationship. The Japanese possess a deep, intense competitive spirit; success is achieved only by winning, with no consolation in having participated in the competition. Winning becomes institutionalized to the point that it simply becomes the essence of the process of academics, business, politics. It starts early. In some cases, the process begins even in the kindergarten, in order to enter a prestigious university, which in turn maps out a winning course for later endeavor. Winning in industries is obviously determined by the margin or profit, in politics by adroitly gathering consensus, and so forth. It is a relentless process the Japanese thrive on; it is their lifestyle.

Because of this competitiveness, trying to remedy the trade imbalance puts the Japanese in a difficult predicament. With Japan's economic success based on exporting, being told by the government to export less and import more is looked upon as accepting defeat—totally contrary to the winning lifestyle. Helping, they understand; losing is another story. The Japanese government, therefore, must be extremely careful in dealing with trade issues, for it was the unique partnership of Japan's political bureaucracy and the private sector that brought Japan into its economic superpower status in the first place. Concessions, then, if any at
all, on trade and overall economic issues will have to be carefully derived. The necessarily slow process of arriving at concessions is what often results in emotional responses from US congressmen. But shortsighted “Japan bashing” episodes and threats of retaliation by protectionism only delay that already slow process. A deliberate and patient approach is best for American negotiators.

Another important ingredient in the Japanese way of life is the sense of loyalty, both interpersonal and organizational. The Americans hear about the concept of life-long employment in Japanese businesses, but they often do not comprehend the magnitude of its relevancy in the Japanese lifestyle. Loyalty also begets expectations of reciprocation, not by demand but simply by a sense of obligation.

Sometimes this sense of obligation transcends time, as in the case of protecting the interests of farmers. The Japanese government vowed many years ago to give the farmers special consideration because of centuries of abuse and injustice during the feudal periods. Consequently, the farmers now wield considerable influence in the political process, thus ensuring continued protection. But their influence does not imply, by any means, that the interests of the farmer will continue to be protected. Already, Japan has become the largest importer of farm products from the United States. More concessions might be made. Again, however, it will be a careful and deliberate process that will take time, perhaps much longer than some US congressmen are willing to wait. The bond of loyalty and obligation is difficult to transcend in the interest of expediency.

In Japan’s value system, breach of loyalty causes irrevocable damage to a relationship. Unfortunately, the “Nixon shocks” of the 1970s are still being felt in Japan and continue to undermine trust and confidence that are essential to a sound Japan-US relationship. The Japanese are also victimized by an even more significant breach of loyalty in the past—by their own government before and during World War II. The Tojo government’s deception throughout the
war misled the people into believing Japan was winning the war and their sacrifice and hardship in the name of the Emperor were not in vain. Lingering feelings of betrayal continue to haunt any Japanese effort toward rearmament, with some Japanese not willing to support the Self-Defense Forces, much less the rearming of Japan. For them, non-military diplomacy is the main approach to promoting peace and stability for Japan.

Japan's Sensitivity Toward Other Asian Nations

Critics of Japan's defense posture often fail to consider other Asian nations' reactions to Japan's rearming. If they do consider these reactions, they show only a superficial understanding of and appreciation for the sensitive nature of the relationships among Asian nations, where Japan is still remembered by many as the former enemy. This sensitivity is certainly understandable since most of the current leaders of these Asian nations have first-hand experience of occupation and domination by Japan's military forces in World War II. Now that Japan has become an economic giant, these Asians fear Japan's potential to become a military power as well. Therefore, they watch Japan's actions on defense carefully and respond to any sign of militarism. For instance, George Packard wrote of China's reaction when Japan breached its self-imposed 1-percent-of-GNP limit on defense spending,

Japanese leaders were shocked by harsh criticism from China over this step, and they continue to face strong domestic opposition to a more rapid military buildup. Thus it seems clear that American advocates of faster Japanese rearmament will be disappointed for some years to come.6

Informal interviews with officers representing the Asian nations at the US Army War College revealed unanimous concern about Japan's potential for rearming. These Asians were particularly concerned about Japan's proposal to defend its sea lines of communication (SLOC) extending 1,000 miles from Japan. The sight of Japanese warships so
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far from home would certainly evoke the memory of the Imperial Japanese Navy escorting the armada of invasion troops. The Japanese battle flags on these warships will restore fears of 40 years past. Because such perceptions can adversely affect trade, and Japan is already looking for China to become its major trade partner in the future, Japan is certain to move cautiously toward implementing the SLOC defense. For this reason, some critics of the SLOC policy believe Japan’s SLOC defense to be more myth than reality.7 Regardless of Japan’s actual SLOC defense capability, Japan will certainly remain sensitive to other Asian nations’ perceptions.

A Possibly Troubled Future

Japan should also be studied with a view toward its future, for understanding the future beyond its current economic success could give valuable insight as to how Japan may react to American proposals on trade and defense. To assume that Japan will continue to be an economic superpower, and therefore to argue that Japan should contribute substantially more for its defense, may be too simplistic.

It appears that Japan is headed for difficult times. For example, the strength of the yen is said to be already adversely affecting its economy. Export in 1986 dropped by 16 percent and industrial production fell to its lowest level in 11 years. Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, Japan’s unemployment figure might have topped 3 percent in 1986.8 These are figures Japan is unaccustomed to seeing in modern years. Additionally, for the first time there are domestic voices of discontent with Japan’s economy:

At the root of the problems in contemporary Japan is the fact that men and women are used as tools for economic competition. . . . The process had “deprived them of their humanity.”9

Industrial concerns also exist:

Japan, the great tinkerer, is not yet the great inventor. In high technology it will have to face the unsettling question of
whether it can be truly creative or must be resigned to imi-
tate—perhaps better and more cheaply—what someone else
has already invented.\(^\text{10}\)

Japan obviously would like to consider itself above the
"tinkering" level in its technology. And it can, in fact, show
evidence of higher-level accomplishments in computer and
other technologies. Yet the days of Japan's domination even
as a tinkerer may be rapidly nearing their end as it faces stiff
competition from other Asian nations. Such views are ex-
pressed by Peter Drucker, a professor of social science and
management at the Claremont Graduate School in Cali-
fornia. He traces the history of Japan's economic develop-
ment, analyzes its growth, and warns that Japan's future
rests on making decisions about the "persona of Japan in the
modern, that is, Western World." Interestingly, he argues
that the unique Japanese ways that helped Japan become an
economic power may also serve to bring a major economic
disaster.

Drucker judges that Japan's cost advantage, despite its
high productivity, is rapidly declining, yielding to such
newcomers as South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. This
decline is expected to seriously affect Japan's export-led eco-
nomic strategy. Accordingly, Japan has already reacted with
several initiatives. It has successfully marketed quality in
luxury cars and electronic equipment. It has also invested
heavily in automation to cut production costs. Most success-
ful, yet most controversial from the perspective of Japan's
future, was its decision to adopt a multinational approach
that moved production out of Japan. Hondas and Toyotas
quickly became the symbols of success in Japan's multina-
tionalism. According to Drucker, however, serious problems
emerged because moving factories overseas meant fewer job
opportunities for Japan's blue-collar work force. A more se-
rious problem profoundly affecting Japan's society is the un-
dermining of its traditional family-like approach to
management. Drucker maintains that Japan must now
choose between its traditional way or the Westernized way
of multinationalism. Japan's economic survival depends on that choice.\textsuperscript{11}

Japan, in fact, has been "going Western" for some time. In the last decade, the term internationalization has become immensely popular. However, Japan's definition of Westernization was more in the realm of participating, for pleasure or in business, abroad rather than freely opening Japan for Western invasion. Japan will most likely practice Westernization overseas and continue to stay with traditional ways in Japan. Japan really has no choice despite an anticipated downturn in economic production, for Japanese society is resistant to any major change. The country still remembers the arrival of Commodore Perry more than a hundred years ago and the effects of opening up to the West. Whatever choice Japan ultimately makes will most likely be accompanied by turmoil in its society.

In addition to its economic problems, Japan is expected to face important social problems. One is the growing number of elderly Japanese coupled with acute housing shortages because of high cost. Fortune estimates that by the end of the twentieth century as many as ten million elderly Japanese could be looking for places to live.\textsuperscript{12} That total amounts to 16 percent of Japan's population over the age of 65. Current expenditure of 5 percent of GNP for the elderly is expected to go up substantially. The problem of care for the elderly is relatively new in Japan. Traditionally, parents were taken care of by the oldest son. However, more and more elderly persons are being displaced now, and the government is expected to be burdened by this relatively new phenomenon. Obviously, the enormous cost of caring for the elderly will compete with defense programs in the future. Austere times may be ahead.

Future social problems will not be limited to the elderly. In fact, Japan's more serious problem as far as long-term implications may be its educational system. Japanese educa-
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tion has been the object of criticism for many years, but not much progress has been made to solve the problem. Japan’s educational system involves an extremely stressful process. It is a process that places much more emphasis on rote learning than on creativity, efficiency over deliberateness, and conformity over new ideas. It is fair to state that a student’s success as an adult is primarily determined by his or her educational accomplishments. As already explained, the competition starts early, even in kindergarten, and continues toward the ultimate goal—to be accepted by one of the prestigious universities, which significantly enhances one’s job prospects after graduation. In this process, many high school students with aspirations to go to college attend preparatory courses after school at their own expense.

Although highly efficient in producing disciplined and competitive students, the educational system fails miserably to produce creative thinkers and innovators. The process simply does not permit the nurturing of “what if” ideas, for there is neither the time nor the place to successfully challenge the norm. The economic arena so far has been very much enhanced by highly productive managers and workers. However, this regimented style, with practically no flexibility, only reinforces Drucker’s characterization of Japan’s business practices as imitative rather than innovative. Unless Japan’s educational process changes, Japan will not be able to produce the innovators and inventors, and without them, “Westernization” may be difficult.

The Need for Understanding

Misconceptions about another nation and its foreign policy can be dangerous. Unfortunately, the Japan-US relationship in recent years seems to reflect such a lack of understanding. The United States perpetuates the problem by not having “Japan experts” in the government. Japan, though very knowledgeable of the United States, does not appear to be able to articulate its own position to the US government.13
American critics of Japan’s defense effort often fail to consider other Asian nations’ reactions to Japan’s potential in rearming. Ignoring other nations’ reactions will only increase the US burden by forcing Americans to mediate between Japan and other Asian countries that will look to the United States to keep Japan under control.

Japan’s anticipated economic decline will certainly have an adverse effect on its defense efforts in the future. If the quality of life in Japan declines because of an economic slowdown, the Japanese are not likely to support a substantial increase in defense spending. A steady, modest increase in the defense budget is more realistic than any significant rearming.

In the difficult times ahead, Japan must actively and carefully cultivate its economic relationships with other nations. One viable method, especially in dealing with other Asian nations, is to step up technological assistance to newly industrialized countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Similar aid to the Philippines, Thailand, and China will also be helpful. Akira Kubota, an editorial writer for the Asahi Shimbun, offers his view:

Japanese industrialists should also remember that almost all sectors of Japanese industry have benefited from the generous technological cooperation given to Japan by the United States. This cooperation was responsible for the revival and boom of the postwar Japanese economy. Now Japan’s turn has come to share what it has learned to other nations in Asia.14

Additionally, technological cooperation between the United States and Japan could offer tangible benefits to both sides. The signing of the Strategic Defense Initiative agreement, under which Japanese companies will be allowed to participate in the program, appears to indicate positive progress. There are, however, problems. The deeply ingrained attitude of the Japanese government and industries keeps the Japanese from openly sharing what is developed in Japan although they still acquire needed technology from

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abroad. One way to motivate Japan's cooperation, according to an executive from a major US aircraft industry, is to offer Japan the same degree of cooperation as that between the United States and its NATO allies. In any case, technological cooperation between the United States and Japan is a lucrative area for exploration on both sides.

Japan can also help the United States significantly by continuing to fund a large segment of the cost for the US forces in Japan. The Self-Defense Forces should continue to modernize and to upgrade their combat capability through combined exercises with the US forces.

The success of any recommendations for Japan to increase its defense role will depend on the health of its economy. Japan, therefore, must do its utmost to tackle its social problems and devise an innovative strategy for maintaining its economic might. While remaining sensitive to other Asian nations, Japan must continue to upgrade its Self-Defense Forces according to its own schedule. The United States, in turn, must recognize the domestic economic and social problems that Japan will be facing in the future.

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT TO JAPAN

The existence of military forces is justified in most countries on the basis of the threat they face. Sometimes, the threat is more imaginary than real, but the perceived threat is what matters. Japan is no exception. The threat of communism in the 1950s is what led to the formation of the Self-Defense Forces, and the threat of Soviet forces sustained the growth of Japan's military forces in the 1970s. But is the Soviet threat now and in the future real enough to justify rearming? The answer depends on how political leaders translate the Japanese people's perception of threat and shape that perception into consensus.
The Soviet Threat

Tadanori Fukuta, a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force officer, documented the threat in a 1987 essay. The deployment of a division of troops, backed by tanks, armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters, heavy artillery, and high-performance aircraft, on islands just northeast of Japan's northern island of Hokkaido seems to indicate that the Soviets intend to invade Hokkaido in the event of war, creating a strategic buffer to facilitate uninterrupted movement of Soviet naval forces from the Sea of Japan. A similarly formidable troop concentration on Sakhalin Island, north of Hokkaido, reinforces the Japan Defense Agency's concern not only for Hokkaido but for all of Japan. It seems that, at the very least, the Soviet troops are there to intimidate Japan, if not to dominate all of Northeast Asia. In either case, the Soviets are poised strategically to serve their purposes at any time.

But do the Soviet forces really pose a threat to Japan? What are their intentions? The nature of Soviet intentions, ironically, can be discovered in examining US strategic interests in the region. First, the economic potential of the region clearly is enormous. For example, one study shows that the combined GNP of Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and Hong Kong approaches that of the combined European community or that of all the Warsaw Pact nations and the Soviet Union together. A Rand Corporation study also concluded that Asia's economy will play a large part in a future US-Soviet conflict, and may even be the cause or object of such conflict. Japan's economy and advanced technology, in particular, have become targets of opportunity for Western nations—and for the Soviets as well. The recent Toshiba scandal and espionage cases in Japan demonstrated clear intentions of the Soviet Union to acquire Japan's technological products at any cost. Soviet interests in Japan, then, are similar to those of the United States. The Soviets, however, face an enormous dilemma—how to be friendly enough with
Japan to acquire technological help while still maintaining a large concentration of forces near Japan.

The subtlety of recent Soviet gestures of friendship toward Japan is typical of Gorbachev’s style. The Soviet Union may not only gain valuable help in technology but also, as suggested by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s visit to Japan, help in neutralizing any US strategy of encircling and “containing” the Soviet Union.20 Gorbachev’s initiative is already affecting how Japan perceives the Soviet Union. Because of the easing of tensions between the two nations, many Japanese do not believe that the Soviet Union poses an immediate threat to Japan, in spite of the presence of Soviet forces near Hokkaido.21

The absence of a perceived threat certainly affects any attempt to rearm. A Japanese observer of defense issues notes,

It is indeed this rather benign threat perception that is the basis for the general acquiescence in the nation’s current defense efforts. The Japanese think their defense is adequate and requires only incremental improvement according to technological changes.22

The unfortunate aspect of this perception is that neither the historical relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union nor incidents involving the Soviets in and around Japan supports it. Airspace violations by Soviet aircraft are many, as are allegations of Soviet espionage activities in Tokyo. The downing of a Korean airliner just north of Japan was a clear example of the Soviets’ ruthlessness.

The militant aspect of Soviet intentions, however, is readily forgotten as the Japanese see Soviet merchant ships peacefully anchored in Japanese harbors and enthusiastically attend Soviet cultural events in Japan. Furthermore, Japanese perceptions of individual Soviets are very positive since most diplomats speak fluent Japanese, appreciate Japanese culture, and are skilled in cultivating Japanese friendships. Perception of the Soviet threat is merely academic; in
the Japanese people’s minds, the Soviet threat is just a myth.

For this reason, the powerful Japan Socialist Party is the leading opposition to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which has always, despite some tentative moments, remained positively committed to the United States. The perceived lack of a Soviet threat among some Japanese political groupings obviously helps the Socialist Party, which has always opposed alliance with the United States and questioned the existence of the Self-Defense Forces. The challenges faced by the Liberal Democratic Party are even more magnified now that the Socialist Party is openly preaching the danger of being drawn into a superpower confrontation by being aligned with the United States.

**Can the Soviets Be Trusted?**

The official US view regarding the Soviet threat differs markedly from Japanese popular views. According to the US Department of State,

The most serious threat to the U.S. and its allies continues to be Soviet military power and Moscow’s willingness to use that power, thereby endangering our interests. The Soviets threaten our interest directly and also exploit regional instability.\(^{23}\)

The apparent disparity between how the Americans (and the Japan Defense Agency) interpret the Soviet threat and how the Japanese, in general, perceive Soviet intentions is explainable in terms of the historical standpoint from which they look at the Soviet Union. The Japanese, in general, are basing their perceptions solely on what they see now, whereas the Americans and the officials of the Japan Defense Agency cite events in the past to be a more accurate gauge of true Soviet intentions.

Historians of the Japan Defense Agency believe that the Soviets, still remembering defeat in the Russo-Japanese
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War, really do not trust the Japanese. The Soviets fear Japan's potential to become a military power, so they are determined to dominate Japan now in every possible way. The positioning of troops so close to Japan is a means of achieving that domination. Japanese military planners do not trust the Soviets either and caution government leaders that the Soviets' apparent move toward openness and reconciliation is only to gain access to the Japanese technology market. The Japanese military leaders also remember the Soviets' previous attempt to gain control of Japan after World War II by declaring war on Japan two days after the bombing of Nagasaki and occupying the northern territories. Therefore, from the historical perspective, despite overtures of friendship by Gorbachev, Japanese military leaders consider the Soviet threat to be real.

Threat to Sea Lines of Communication

Obviously, threats to Japan are not limited to those posed by the Soviet forces near Japan. Perhaps the more realistic threat is to the security of Japan's sea lines of communication, essential to its economic survival. Incidents in the Persian Gulf graphically demonstrate this threat. Without oil from the Persian Gulf, Japan cannot survive. Accordingly, even before the Persian Gulf crisis, Japan had announced an ambitious plan to secure its sea lines of communication out to 1,000 miles from its land territory. It was a politically risky move, but the United States welcomed it as a sign that Japan would do more toward sharing the defense burden.

Unfortunately, it was a plan beyond Japan's current capability or even future aspirations, for the obstacles to implementing the proposed plan are many. First of all, it is expensive. More important, however, the plan arouses the sensitivity of other Asian nations whose leaders still remember the events of some 40 years ago. Therefore, while the Japanese may agree that the threat to their SLOC is more real than the Soviet threat to the home islands, not much can
be expected in terms of building a credible SLOC defense force—at least for now.

**EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S DEFENSE POSTURE**

It is fascinating that as early as 1952, when the Japanese peace treaty was enacted, the United States had a vision of Japan’s rearmament and its role in the Pacific. Referring to NSC 125/2, a strategy paper prepared at that time, H.W. Brands Jr writes,

“For the immediate future, America would have to remain the primary guarantor of Japanese security, but this situation should not be allowed to persist. It ought to be the policy of the United States to “encourage and assist” Japan to rearm with non-nuclear weapons. The first objective of a rearmament program obviously was to allow Japan to defend itself against outside attack and thus to lighten the American strategic burden. The second objective was more ambitious: to bring Japan into a system of collective security for the Pacific area, so that its resources might contribute to the defense of other American allies in the region."

One may then ask why Japan still has not made much progress since 1952, except for the formation of the small but well-equipped Self-Defense Forces. Although doing so might not answer that question, examining the relationship between the United States and Japan after World War II may be instructive. We can identify several events that might have adversely affected that relationship.

**Early Years**

As the occupation of Japan ended, the overriding concern for the United States was to keep Japan aligned with the West, and to keep communism out of Japan. The goal of American policy was to strengthen Japan’s economy.
through trade and to build a limited defense against the Soviet Union or China. The idea of rearming Japan was met immediately with protests from American allies, especially from the Philippines and South Korea. Even with assurances from the United States that Japan would not be permitted to become a major military power, Asian countries remained suspicious and fearful—and they remain so today.

In the midst of these concerns, the Japan Self-Defense Forces were created in 1954. Even within Japan, only a slight majority of the population supported the creation of Japan's military forces. Japan's prime minister was confronted with strong opposition stating that Japan's Constitution did not permit rearming of any kind. Opponents asserted that the term self defense was being used as a euphemism for rearming, a ploy to eventually militarize Japan with or without revising the Constitution. However, despite early difficulties and without the convincing support of the people, the Self-Defense Forces survived and matured into what they are today.

The strength of pacifist sentiments placed the government on the defensive and led to restraints on the Self-Defense Forces. The size of the forces became an important issue because size was looked upon as crucial to the definition of self defense. Additionally, as weapon systems were received from the United States, the capability of such weapon systems also became an issue, as a large segment of the population in Japan feared Japan's involvement in an offensive war. As an example, Japanese Phantom jets were modified and external fuel tanks removed so they could be employed only in a defensive role. Although patently ridiculous on the surface, such actions were politically prudent in order to preserve the Self-Defense Forces. Considering the restrictions on and close monitoring of Japan's fledgling military forces, developing the Self-Defense Forces into something that the United States had envisioned in NSC 125/2 was extraordinarily difficult.
The Security Treaty and Domestic Political Contention

The outbreak of the Korean conflict vividly demonstrated Japan’s strategic importance to the US campaign to contain the spread of communism. The Japan-US security treaty essentially placed Japan under the protective umbrella of the United States. The treaty, however, did not immediately gain popular support in Japan. In fact, for over a decade, the status of the security treaty remained uncertain, with only a third of the population supporting it in 1960. The renewal of the unpopular treaty in 1960 brought unprecedented student violence, which ultimately caused President Eisenhower to cancel a planned visit to Japan. The resignation of the Japanese prime minister elevated Japan’s crisis and highlighted the delicate nature of Japan’s attempts to balance the people’s desire with that of the United States. These difficult years truly tested Japan’s commitment to the treaty and to the United States.

A similar crisis and political instability resurfaced again in the late 1960s during another review of the treaty. Student violence was provoked in part by sentiment against US involvement in Vietnam and in part by continued US possession of Okinawa. Emergence of the notorious Japan Red Army Brigade further threatened the stability of the pro-US government of the Liberal Democratic Party. The survival of the Liberal Democratic Party largely depended upon positive actions from the United States to stem the rising tide of the socialist movement and the growth of the Japan Socialist Party. The reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 was such a positive act that strengthened the Liberal Democratic Party. Additionally, hosting of the World Exposition in Japan, despite threats from the Japan Red Army Brigade and other terrorist groups, signaled Japan’s economic recovery and progress toward leadership in the international scene.

Unfortunately, more crises were yet to come. First were a series of “Nixon shocks” that disappointed the Liberal Democratic Party. Specifically, President Nixon’s travelling to China without consulting Japanese leaders provided a
negative cast to Japan-US relations. Then, when President Carter proposed a phased withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea, the Japan Socialist Party argued in Japan’s Diet (legislature) that being aligned with the United States would not be in the best interest of Japan.

The lack of confidence in the United States and its commitment still lingers today among some political leaders and plays an important part in Japan’s relationship with the United States. A breach of protocol is unacceptable behavior in Japan. Although Japanese leaders do not expect foreigners to live by the Japanese code, they still desire courtesy and thoughtfulness in international politics. The impact of these difficult years will continue to be a factor in Japan’s view of the United States in economic and defense negotiations.

New Hope in the 1980s

Although the 1970s were difficult years for the Japan-US relationship, the 1980s began more optimistically with the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone to Washington. Nakasone said,

Japan should be an unsinkable aircraft carrier equipped with a tremendous bulwark of defense against the [Soviet] Backfire bombers, and should assert complete and full control of the four straits that go through the Japanese islands so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines and other naval atrocities.

Although the statement created controversy in Japan, it helped to restore Japan’s relationship with the United States. Frequently criticized for being too outspoken, Prime Minister Nakasone nevertheless was popular in Japan for his confident demeanor in the international political arena and his vitality in dealing with the opposition in Japan. Many people saw hope, then, that the Reagan-Nakasone duo would break out of the seemingly stalemated progress toward the Self-Defense Forces’ assumption of a greater se-
security role. Indeed, Japan’s defense expenditure did surpass the 1-percent-of-GNP mark and more Japan-US combined exercises were undertaken. In the end, however, the Reagan-Nakasone duo was not able to fulfill the expectations of some congressional leaders, who now seek a commitment of an even greater percentage of Japan’s GNP for defense.

As long as the problem of trade imbalance remains, the United States will continue to press Japan to do more to relieve the burden for American forces. The new prime minister will most likely devote more time to domestic issues and Japan’s expenditures than his predecessor. One bright note from Japan reveals that now nearly 70 percent of the Japanese population expresses support of the security treaty. Perhaps this unusually high approval rate will encourage the Japanese government to do more for defense burdensharing with the United States. However, at least for now, even such popularity for the treaty is not expected to significantly affect Japan’s defense spending. The events and memories of the past are difficult to overcome overnight.

VIEWS ON THE REARMING OF JAPAN

Views vary on whether or not Japan should rearm. Some critics argue solely from the economic standpoint. They believe Japan’s larger role in defense burdensharing will help relieve America’s economic woes. Others argue from a strategic perspective that supports strengthening of the allied forces, thereby reducing the load of American forces deployed to forward locations such as Japan and South Korea. Some, on the other hand, do not support rearming of Japan, at least for now. The Reagan administration took a middle road that encouraged Japan to do more without suggesting rearming. With these diverse views in
the background, a review of some noted authors' speculations about the future and explanations of where America might have gone wrong may be beneficial.

Opposing Views

Stephen Gibert of the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University states that because of the growing importance of Northeast Asia, the United States must adjust its traditionally European strategy to focus on Asia. He argues that the allied nations must do more to help the United States, particularly with its maritime strategy. However, the difficulties in acquiring such help from the allied nations are compounded by differences in the threat faced by these nations. Regardless of how difficult these programs are, Gibert still asserts that Japan, in particular, must do more:

While all of the great powers in Western Europe are appropriately regarded as allies of the United States, Japan, despite the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960, and some improvement recently in the Self-Defense Forces, is in essence a military protectorate of the United States. How extraordinary it is that the deficit-ridden United States, with twice Japan's gross national product but equivalent per capita income, spends approximately twenty-two times as much as Japan on defense. More to the point, the unreciprocated U.S. commitment to defend Japan stands in sharp contrast to the genuinely mutual security situation in Europe.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger agreed with Gibert on the importance of Asia to the United States and the critical role Japan plays in Asia's equilibrium. However, he arrives at a completely different assessment of Japan's rearming:

It cannot be in America's interest to have one Asian power or group of powers so strong that it can dominate the rest. Kissinger obviously is talking about Japan. He further argues that Japan will rearm according to its own schedule and for its own purpose. Therefore, he continues, America's
demand for quick fixes is dangerous. He also warns that, contrary to what many Americans believe, a major rearming effort by Japan will further spur its economy because of a greater involvement by the Japanese government to ensure its success. The end result of Japan’s rearming, then, would be destabilizing because Japan would certainly emerge as a major military power backed by its powerful economy. Besides, Kissinger argues, Japan does not need to further rearm, for its Self-Defense Forces are capable of making a Soviet attack on Japan too costly. Instead, he recommends that Japan make a more substantial contribution to global peace by increasing aid to developing nations. He also advocates that American foreign policy toward Japan stress a stronger political relationship before military matters are allowed to dominate.  

Richard Armitage, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, also agrees on the strategic importance of Northeast Asia and Japan’s role in alliance strategy. And he claims that the defense relationship with Japan is a success story. Through quiet diplomacy instead of open criticism, the Reagan administration made substantial progress in convincing Japan to do more for defense. Armitage also cautions that Japan is too small to survive a conflict with a military superpower independently, and neither Japan nor its trading partners in Asia desire to see Japan assume military superpower status.  

Japan, in fact, has made significant progress in building its defense capabilities. Japan’s 1988 defense budget showed a 5.2 percent increase over the previous year, to about $30 billion, placing Japan among the top five or six countries in the world by size of military expenditure. The 1988 defense budget is consistent with the view of the former director general of the Japan Defense Agency, who stated,  

The security treaty helps maintain countervailing power. Japan also has to make a greater contribution to its own defense.
Japan’s current defense expenditures and the optimistic statement by Armitage, however, do not appease the critics of Japan’s role in defense burden sharing. They still believe that Japan should do more. It is intriguing then to examine the explanations offered by several noted Americans as to why Japan does not want to rearm.

Why Japan Doesn’t Want to Rerarm: American Views

Takesugu Tsurutani, a political science professor at Washington State University, says that the United States and Japan view the Soviet threat differently. He writes that a large concentration of Soviet forces in Northeast Asia is simply a manifestation of the Soviets’ traditional sense of inferiority and insecurity, and that, therefore, the Japanese do not have to fear Soviet aggression. Tsurutani bases his argument on historical analysis of the Soviets and observations of life in Japan, which almost totally lacks civil defense. Thus, he states that Japan considers its current defense programs to be adequate.

Tsurutani further comments that the Japanese are more afraid of being dragged into war by being aligned with the United States. The surprise attack on Libya, the invasion of Grenada, and the fiasco at Beirut do not give the Japanese a sense of security. The ambiguity of Japan’s defense policy, therefore, is a reflection of its uneasiness in being tied to the United States. Thus Japan is not likely to jeopardize its security by rearming the Self-Defense Forces, which symbolize the tie with the United States.

Ezra Vogel, a Harvard University professor, examined the same issue from another perspective. He states that Japan conceived a vision of economic power without military power and made it work. In fact, Vogel argues, Japan believed expanded military power would detract from the willingness of trading partners. On the criticism of a “free ride,” the Japanese would argue that they pay for their own defense and that rearming would not result in a safer environment. Why do the Japanese behave this way? Vogel
maintains that the Japanese naturally resist, with all due politeness, any foreign influences, as they have done ever since Commodore Perry forced the opening of Japan:

Through long decades of subservience to the United States, the Japanese have learned how to develop and use whatever leverage they have to achieve their goals. They have learned how to delay and postpone while being polite, yielding only when all other choices seem absolutely exhausted.50

The current trade problems with the United States further illustrate Japanese attitudes. Vogel states that Japan questions why Europe and the United States presume to set the standards of what is fair and unfair when Japan, generally following international laws, has won the economic competition. In other words, Japan beat the West at its own game. He then criticizes American economists who do not seem to understand Japan's economic power:

It is not yet clear that America has the political will to overcome the decades of complacency that stemmed from the unique period following World War II.51

Although critical of Japan's attitude and America's ineptness in dealing with the Japanese, Vogel believes that Japan will eventually increase its defense spending as the United States becomes less able to maintain its commitments. However, he warns of the dangers of emotional outbursts in Congress, because Japan will resist once more as it did when Commodore Perry forced open its door.

Another view on why Japan is reluctant to respond to pressures from the United States on defense matters is eloquently expressed by Richard Morse and Edward Olsen, scholars on Asia:

Confident that the United States is far more important to Japan than Japan is to the United States, American officials have consistently treated Japan as a junior partner in defense and economic affairs. Japan is told frequently that it, not China, has been and still remains the cornerstone of Washington's Asia policy, but the Japanese find it difficult to take such rhetoric seriously.52
Morse and Olsen argue that the United States is ineffective in dealing with Japan because there are no Japan experts in Congress, the State Department, or even in the US embassy in Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese place a high premium on training experts on the United States. Japan’s bureaucratic edge, therefore, will continue to make the difference in US-Japan relations—in Japan’s favor.

Larry Niksch, a specialist in Asian affairs with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, explains Japanese attitudes from the perspective of four themes: pacifism, reliance on the United States for defense, the perceived absence of an external military threat, and the primacy of economic expansion. He states that Japan’s pacifistic sentiments came from the American policy of complete demilitarization after World War II. The resulting pacifism made rearming of the Self-Defense Forces unpopular; limiting of defense budgets to less than 1 percent of GNP and renunciation of nuclear weapons also were inevitable results of pacifism.

Furthermore, Japan’s reliance on the United States for defense was strengthened by the 1960 version of the security treaty, which placed greater demands on the United States to defend Japan than on Japan to rearm. It was a departure from the 1951 security treaty, which was based on expectations that Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense. This position is supported by the previously mentioned NSC 125/2. Niksch also states that Japan has placed little emphasis on defense because it did not see the Soviets to be threatening and because the promotion of its export-oriented economy was its top priority.

**Where Did America Go Wrong**

In examining how the United States has erred in its dealing with Japan, Kissinger’s memoirs offer interesting insights. Essentially, he states that the lack of understanding of Japan’s national style places the Americans in a difficult
position in dealing with the Japanese. Americans, for example, fail to recognize that the Japanese rely on consensus to plan for the future. Consensus avoids confrontation. The art of Japanese decisionmaking seeks deliberation until genuine agreement is reached. For this reason, decisions are normally firm and difficult to change. Not recognizing this process, Americans often make the serious mistake of pressuring the person they presume to be the Japanese leader, failing to see that such an individual is only a part of a larger decisionmaking process.

Additionally, the Japanese normally come to negotiations with thoroughly informed positions, arrived at through meticulous study and analysis of issues. Therefore, it is quite possible that when a Japanese negotiator asks a question, he or she is not really looking for an answer; the answer is already known and figured into the overall strategy of negotiation. Kissinger summed up his observation and analysis of Japanese decisionmaking and diplomacy by quoting a passage from a former Japanese foreign minister’s autobiography:

In diplomacy, even when an agreement cannot be reached, it is essential that each party have an understanding of the other’s position. The fostering of understanding and trust, in fact, is just as important as the actual reaching of agreement. Between Japan and the United States, in particular, it is of the utmost importance.55

If Kissinger focused primarily on the Americans and their naivete, Karel Wolferen, a Dutch correspondent who is a long-time resident of Japan, concentrated on the character of politics and economy in Japan. Using the term Japan problem, he described the fundamental conflict between the United States and Japan:

What makes conflict between Japan and the United States so menacing is that the two countries do not know how to cope with each other. The United States does not understand the nature of the Japanese political economy and thus cannot accept the way it behaves. Americans can hardly be blamed for
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this, as the Japanese themselves present their country as simply another member of the community of democratic nations committed to the free market. Japan is largely unaware of the threat posed by America’s unwillingness to accept it for what it is. Never having experienced its wrath, Japan does not believe in the powers of the American legislature. The Japanese make things worse with ritualistic arguments and empty promises that only convince congressmen, businessmen, and other Americans that they are being deceived.56

Wolferen observed that the Japanese government has no top; power is shared among groups of bureaucrats and politicians without a single source of national decisionmaking. Failing to see this shows a deficiency in political skill. However, perhaps a more serious error is often made in the economic arena. He cites a well-known economist to argue that Japan falls into an economic category called the capitalist developmental state, characterized by a partnership between central bureaucrats and entrepreneurs.57 An often-made mistake is that the United States thinks that Japan belongs to the capitalist free-market economy category, and that, therefore, Japan should obey the same rules that the United States and European nations follow. The capitalist developmental state is essentially protectionist, thus magnifying the “Japan problem” and perpetuating the trade imbalance.

These varied views on the rearming of Japan are as many as they are complex. Obviously, economics on both sides plays a major role in influencing the divergent views. And again, lack of understanding limits the quality of the Japan-US relationship. The Dutch correspondent offers a useful assessment in summing up a major cause of these Japan-US differences:

In American eyes Japan does not perform commensurately with its wealth, in any field, so it is time for Japan to grow up and play a responsible role in the international community. Japan is all the more obliged to do this, according to the American perceptions, after four decades of American nurture,
HAJIME MATSUSAKI and BRIAN Y. SHIROYAMA

help, and protection. The United States, of course, has helped create the current situation by providing diplomatic and military shelter for Japan, by discouraging strong central rule and by accepting, at least initially, Japan's postwar economic practices.58

THE FUTURE OF THE JAPAN-US RELATIONSHIP

As views expressed by American critics on Japan's defense effort vary, similarly, Japanese views are divergent, some forecasting more crises ahead and others predicting an optimistic future. It does appear, however, that unless the trade conflict is resolved between the two countries, optimism about getting Japan to do much more on defense burden-sharing may be premature.

Japanese Views

According to Kiyofuku Chuma, editor and senior staff writer for Asahi Shimbun, a major Japanese newspaper, many Japanese are critical of any dramatic increase in defense spending. He cites Asahi's poll in March 1987 as evidence: only 15 percent approved the removal of the 1-percent ceiling while more than 60 percent expressed disapproval.59 He states that the Japanese, although aware of the Soviet buildup, are not really concerned about that threat. In fact, according to Chuma, most believe a buildup of the Self-Defense Forces to be more provocative than the Soviet buildup.

Chuma offers reasons for antimilitaristic views in Japan and for the unwillingness of the Japanese to expand their defense forces.60 He argues that the experience of defeat in World War II is still influential. Additionally, he states that the postwar democratic education by the United States and drafting of the Constitution that denounced any offensive military posture helped guide the Japanese disposition toward antimilitarism. Still more, Chuma maintains that the

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Japanese are not willing to give up their successes in the economic arena by risking war. He concludes, therefore, that more US pressure on Japan to rearm will only result in unfavorable perceptions of the United States:

Unfortunately, the more emphatically the United States warns Japan about the Soviet threat and the heavier US pressure on Japan for military buildup becomes, the greater the tendency is for Japanese to cast a cold eye on the United States. Some say that Washington is intent upon forcing Japan to raise its defense capability so that Tokyo will take on some of America's military responsibilities. Others even suspect that Washington's real intention is to weaken Japan's economy and financial power and reduce its international competitiveness. 61

Accordingly, the differences in perception of the Soviet threat lead to an inadequate understanding that strains the Japan-US relationship. It is Japan's inadequate understanding of US strategy and America's lack of understanding of Japan's defense policy that contribute to this problem.

Equally critical of Japan's rearming is a noted military critic, Hisao Maeda. Evaluating former Prime Minister Nakasone's proposal to block the straits surrounding Japan to trap the Soviet navy in the Sea of Japan, Maeda warns that such a plan would only provoke a limited nuclear attack by the Soviets in retaliation. 62 He also argues that the security treaty does not bind Japan and the United States in military alliance. The treaty, according to Maeda, only provides for joint defense in the event either side is attacked on Japanese territory; it does not require Japan to militarily aid US forces in attacks outside of Japan. Further, he warns of the danger in cooperating with the United States:

The United States is now urging Japan to build up its defensive power on the pretext of the Soviet "military threat." But . . . the Soviet threat exists for Japan only so far as Japan cooperates militarily with the United States. By strengthening its defenses and stepping up military cooperation with
the United States, Japan is in fact steadily undermining its own security and inviting Soviet nuclear attack.\(^3\)

The views of Chuma and Maeda, in our opinion, are not representative of Japanese views in general. It is important to note, though, that an influential journalist like Chuma can profoundly influence Japanese public opinion. It is also important to recognize that the Japanese do not necessarily view defense matters in the same way Americans do. For instance, as previously discussed, the Japanese, in general, are not concerned about the Soviet threat in Northeast Asia as much as the Americans are. Instances of Soviet military aircraft penetrating Japan's airspace—one even resulting in warning shots being fired—do not arouse the Japanese to perceive a higher level of threat. The Japanese rely on the powers of diplomacy to maintain the security that ensures the flow of natural resources into Japan and manufactured goods abroad. Additionally, the Japanese are worried about being dragged into war by being aligned with the United States, especially into a war starting in Europe or Southeast Asia.

Some views, on the other hand, especially those expressed by military members, do take the Soviet threat seriously. Masashi Nishihara of Japan’s National Defense Academy, for example, states that the popular perception that there is little or no Soviet threat does not downgrade the serious nature of military threat to Japan.\(^4\) He cites a recent Soviet military exercise near Japan, simulating an invasion of Hokkaido, as a clear indication that the Soviet threat cannot be ignored. He therefore advocates strengthening ties with countries that possess important natural resources and modernizing the Self-Defense Forces. Additionally, he supports allowing Japanese naval forces to help defend US naval forces outside of Japanese territory if the US forces are on their way to defend Japan.\(^5\) He is concerned, however, that the US naval strategy of horizontal escalation will endanger Japan in a US-Soviet confrontation elsewhere in the world.
Some Japanese thought, therefore, is far from the anti-militaristic views expressed by Chuma and Maeda. Voices of support for the military, as expressed by Nishihara, are also strong. However, views supporting massive rearming of Japan are conspicuously absent even among the strong supporters of the military. The subject is much too sensitive for politicians to discuss, for, as Chuma and Maeda bring out, the Japanese in general are not concerned enough to support rearming.

**A Pessimistic View of the Future**

As the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan persists and the American economy remains stagnant, the Japan-US relationship will be headed for more difficult times. George Packard, well-known scholar on East Asian matters, predicts the coming of a US-Japan crisis:

Since the 1970s we have seen a gradual decline of trust, at least at the governmental level. As Japanese exports poured into American markets, Japanese corporations have been accused of conducting "adversarial trade," targetting one American industry after another for destruction. For their part, Japanese leaders have become privately critical of American weaknesses. The extraordinary friendship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone tended to obscure the strong undercurrents of hostility within the higher levels of government and the private sectors on both sides.

A recent spectacle of US congressmen smashing a Japanese radio on Capitol Hill was a manifestation of American frustration. Similarly, a group of Japanese farmers were seen smashing a symbol of their own frustration—an American-made tractor. Events like these back up Packard's observations about the difficult relationship between the two countries. It is no surprise, then, that a *New York Times/CBS*—*Tokyo Broadcasting Company* survey taken in May 1987 showed that 55 percent of Japanese polled viewed US-Japan relations to be "unfriendly," up dramatically from less than one-third of a year ago; a *Washington Post/ABC* poll in the
same month showed that 63 percent of Americans favored a higher trade barrier. Packard cites an Asahi Shimbun poll in April 1987 revealing that China had become the favorite nation of the Japanese people, bumping the United States into second place.

Despite these incredible revelations, Packard states that Americans know Japan is important to their economy, and Japanese recognize the importance of a healthy American economy for Japan to maintain its economic success. The fundamental problem is that Americans do not understand the Japanese ways of doing business and the Japanese underestimate the vitality and resilience of Americans. Fortunately, Packard further observes, Japan's decision to purchase the new generation of fighter aircraft from the United States, rather than to produce its own as originally considered, helps to improve the US-Japan relationship. Additionally, action by the Nakasone cabinet to breach its own self-imposed 1-percent-of-GNP limit on defense spending helped to dispel allegations by some American critics that Japan is not doing enough in defense burdensharing. Despite some optimistic trends, however, Packard predicts the coming of more crises between the two countries and does not see Japan rearming in the near future.

**An Optimistic Outlook**

In contrast to Packard's rather pessimistic outlook on the future of the Japan-US relationship, there are also optimistic forecasts. For example, Michael Armacost, US under secretary of state for political affairs, sees Japan's participation in global affairs and praises the expanding scope of Japan's foreign assistance and aid programs. Although there are many trade problems to overcome, he sees hope of reducing friction between the United States and Japan. Additionally, he is impressed with Japan's greater expenditure of funds for US forces and Japan's willingness to participate in more combined exercises. He warns, though, that both
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sides must overcome the difficulties and promote a permanent relationship.

An even more favorable view toward Japan's defense effort comes from Gaston Sigur, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Regarding the security relationship, Sigur states that Japan's steady growth in defense expenditure and significant contribution toward supporting the US forces in Japan are positive signs of Japan's effort toward its defense. He then argues that the Japanese recognize the Soviet threat and the need to build military forces to counter the threat. In this effort, the presence of US forces to provide the nuclear umbrella is vital. Sigur then asserts that Japan's defense programs are correct because they reflect a careful balance between a need to develop military capabilities against the Soviet threat and sensitivity toward its neighbors. On the economic issue, Sigur observes,

In our attempt to deal with the effects of trade on our industries and with political pressures in the United States, we often forget that other democratic governments must deal with much the same political realities and problems as we. This is by no means an argument for inaction. Rather it is a caution that patience and subtlety may bring better results than importunate demands.70

The quality of forecasts can be judged by their accuracy in comparison with actions. The Economist made such a comparison and reported that although America and Japan may be antagonists on trade issues, their defense relations have rarely been better.71 Additionally, the report states that Japan's 1991–1995 defense plan is expected to include a defense concept beyond just defending Japanese territory. It will include, among other things, the controversial SLOC defense out to 1,000 miles from Japan. Further, the 1988 increase in defense expenditure by 5.2 percent (1.01 percent of GNP) amounts, if computed on the same scale by which NATO counterparts are measured, to some $40 billion (1.5 percent of GNP)—the world's third largest defense outlay.
following the United States and the Soviet Union. Additionally, Japan will be paying more for American troops in Japan, providing navigational equipment for ships operating in the Persian Gulf, and giving more aid to developing countries. According to The Economist, then, the optimistic outlook for the Japan-US relationship appears to be accurate. New Prime Minister Takeshita’s visit to Washington also underscored optimism for the future, with his pledge to improve East-West relations and world economic development and to upgrade the quality of Japan’s self-defense capabilities.

Despite optimistic signs, though, the pessimism of Chuma and Maeda cannot be overlooked. Their views still reflect sentiments of a large portion of Japan’s society. In consensus-driven politics, the dissenting faction plays a crucial role in decisionmaking. Even former Prime Minister Nakasone ran into difficulties and was ultimately unable to completely fulfill his part in the “Ron and Yasu” relationship. And as long as the problem of trade imbalance remains, the US Congress will not be satisfied with Japan’s defense efforts. Optimism can quickly turn into further frustration.

SHAPING THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP

Japan’s challenges in defense burdensharing become even more complex as Japan heads toward economic and social difficulties at the turn of the century. The voices of pacifism, militarism, nationalism, internationalism, and protectionism will continue to influence Japan’s future. Japan’s rearming or defense programs will continue to be tied to trade issues not only with the United States but also with Asian countries. As long as the current trade imbalance persists, Japan will continue to be under pressure to contribute more to defense burdensharing.
Pressure from the US Congress and high-ranking US officials is not new, and the response from Japan is not expected to be any different from what Prime Minister Takeshita told President Reagan he could expect: gradual but steady growth of the military according to Japan's current and future defense plans, while paying substantially more to help the US forces in Japan. As pointed out earlier, with 1988's 5.2 percent increase, Japan's defense budget became the third largest in the world if computed on the NATO scale of measuring defense burdensharing. Negotiating for a 3-percent-of-GNP contribution, therefore, will be extremely difficult.

**Some Thoughts on How to Deal With Japan**

Given the conditions in Japan that we have outlined, the United States needs to steer a careful course in its relations with Japan. Some fundamental thoughts on how to deal with the Japanese may be helpful.

Obviously, Americans must diligently study everything about Japan—its people, history, culture, and so on. Additionally, anyone who will negotiate with the Japanese must learn the language. Most Japanese negotiators are skilled in English, although they will not show it. Their English skills give them a distinct advantage, having extra time to formulate their response while American negotiators' comments are being translated. The Japanese negotiator has the additional advantage of being able to listen to consultation among the American staff, allowing the Japanese to better assess the American position. Soviet diplomats in Tokyo have mastered the Japanese language, and they are successful in dealing with the Japanese. The Americans must do the same in order to be at par with the Japanese negotiators.

Unfortunately, learning the Japanese language is only the first step toward understanding the hidden nuances of the spoken language. A skilled negotiator must be mindful of the "linguistic fog," which can be quite misleading.
Japanese response, for example, "I will do my best" or "I will think about it" generally means "I don't like it." Furthermore, "it is difficult" almost always means "the answer is no and don't press the issue anymore." A skilled negotiator, therefore, must learn to interpret the response correctly by understanding that linguistic ambiguity, vagueness, and haziness are all part of the Japanese culture, ways to avoid concreteness. It is also important to understand that not all Japanese contribute to this linguistic fog. Then again, some Japanese believe that the most effective communication is nonverbal, and that conversations in negotiations are mere formality. In any case, the American negotiator must recognize that demanding immediate answers is not the best approach and that the Japanese reply may have a meaning totally different from its literal meaning.

The American negotiator must also understand the intricate nature of Japan's consensus-driven decisionmaking. One must resist the temptation to react to its slowness; one must be patient and persistent. Most important, however, is to take advantage of the delay in response by lobbying with those in the decisionmaking process. This lobbying is common practice in Japan, and failing to play the political game according to Japanese rules and procedures often yields nothing for the American negotiator. One must, of course, be astute enough to discover the key players in the decisionmaking process. For example, in defense matters, proper protocol should be extended to other key figures in addition to the prime minister, such as those representing the Defense Agency, the Finance Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry. Additionally, recognizing the hidden power within the Liberal Democratic Party (for example, a previous prime minister) will pay important dividends.

The American negotiator must pay close attention to the Japanese media in order to gain valuable information on public opinion. As already discussed, the consensus of Japan's society will strongly influence the political decisionmaking process. The American negotiator must pay
particular attention to the contents of at least three major newspapers, Yomiuri, Asahi, and Mainichi Shimbun. The Japanese are avid readers of daily newspapers, thus becoming well informed of world and domestic issues. Being able to "gauge the mood of Japan’s society" may be a significant asset in formulating an effective negotiation strategy.

A study by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on government decisionmaking in Japan made excellent recommendations for American negotiators:

1. There should be a clearer American definition of what U.S. interests vis-a-vis Japan are and what the United States wants Japan to do.
2. U.S. representatives should better coordinate their approaches to Japan.
3. The U.S. side must make a strong effort in negotiations to show the Japanese that initiatives proposed by the United States are rational in a Japanese context, and are in the best long-term interest of Japan.
4. The United States must apply steady pressure and persuasion, especially at the working level of the bureaucracy, the party, and among nongovernment interest groups. A broad, high-level pressure from the United States at Japan’s leadership level may also be helpful.26

The Prospect of Increased Japanese Military Burdensharing

If defense burdensharing is defined as the rearming of Japan, the prospect is dim. However, if burdensharing means paying more for the defense of Japan to help the United States bear the cost of its military strategy in Northeast Asia, the prospect appears somewhat brighter. The United States needs to recognize, though, that Japan’s ability to implement the new Five-Year Defense Plan may hinge on continuing Japanese economic growth. Japan’s possible economic slowdown and costly domestic problems may cause delays in meeting the goals of Japan’s future defense programs. If these goals aren’t met, the description of the
US-Japan defense partnership as an "unshakable alliance" may turn out to be more of a wish than a reality.

In this essay, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of Japanese and Americans knowing and understanding each other for future negotiations. Professor Akira Nishikawa of the National Institute for Defense Studies makes this point clear relative to Japan's defense strategy:

I believe that a major problem with future Japanese defense strategy lies not with the fact that it would not properly serve our purpose of defense, but with the fact that the concept and theoretical structure of defense policy are not understood accurately either at home or abroad.  

We have also discussed the significance of perceptions when translated into political actions. The existence or lack of a perceived threat from Soviet forces near Japan will be a key influence on defense spending. Perceptions of the Americans? A survey by Yomiuri Shimbun in June 1987 revealed that Japanese perceptions of America, in general, had changed over the past decade. Popular focus was less on World War II and more on American strength and freedom. Although members of the older generation still thought of America in terms of World War II, the future leaders of Japan perceived the United States much more positively—a good sign that the United States should cultivate.

In discussing Japan's military forces, it is important to remember that Japan's security programs are intended to acquire the minimum necessary force level for defending the country from a limited, small-scale aggression without relying on the United States. The Self-Defense Forces were never conceived with the idea of defending Japan against a massive attack; Japan will continue to rely on US forces to thwart such aggression. For this reason, the proposed SLOC defense will remain controversial, and other Asian nations will continue to worry about Japan's potential for rearming, as suggested by the SLOC defense concept. In the
meantime, the Self-Defense Forces are expected to modernize through technology and become even more capable. Perhaps, then, the strongest aspect of Japan’s contribution for defense burdensharing may not be quantity, but quality.
NOTES

1. The terms rearming and militarism are used interchangeably in this essay to imply a substantial increase in military capability. Japan's current defense expenditure characterized by gradual growth, therefore, would not fall within the definition of rearming or militarism. The term burdensharing relative to Japan is used in most American literature to imply Japan's assumption of a greater military responsibility through larger monetary contributions for defense. Burdensharing, however, has added meaning from Japan's perspective, including diplomatic and economic issues.

2. Fortune (in "Japan's Troubled Future," 30 March 1987) cited five forces that will shape the future of Japan. demands from outsiders for Japan to "internationalize"; discontent with a school system that may stifle creativity; the burden of caring for the increasing number of senior citizens; shortage of space; and a blow to the national psyche as the ideal of lifetime employment fades away.

3. Although Japan's annual defense budgets for the last decade were limited to 1 percent of GNP, the expenditures showed real growth because of an increase in GNP each year. Notwithstanding pressures from the United States, the real growth in Japan's defense budgets were necessary in response to changes in the international environment such as the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets and the perceived decline of US strength in Asia after the withdrawal from Vietnam.

4. "Japan Inc.'s New Face," Maclean's, November 30, 1987, p. 26. Newsweek (14 March 1988, p. 30) quotes last month's editorial from the Asahi Shimbun: "A great majority of the Japanese people continue to feel deprived, even though their nation is the richest in the world today. And while many people sympathize with the poor and starving in Africa, they have mixed feelings about giving them a modern sewer system when they themselves don't have one."


JAPANESE MILITARY BURDENSCHARING

10. Ibid., p. 22
13. *Yomiuri Shimbun* (14 March 1988, p. 1) reported that a government poll in October 1987 revealed that 52.7 percent of respondents believed Japan did not accurately convey its opinions and positions to other countries. Among them, 56.9 percent cited other countries' inadequate understanding of Japan as a reason for their assessment of Japan's inability to articulate its opinions and positions. Only 15.2 percent of the respondents believed that Japan did convey its opinions and positions accurately to other countries.
21. For example, Taketsugu Tsurutani, "Japan's Defense Forces, Can the Islands Defend Themselves?" *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* Vol. 5, 1987, p. 48. Also, Larry A. Niksch, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense and Security Issues," *Naval War College Review*, July-August 1983, p. 61. Tsurutani does not define Japanese when he writes, "the Japanese do not really believe in the likelihood of a limited small-scale aggression or of a disruption of their lifelines in the western Pacific." Niksch uses an *Asahi Shimbun* survey to discuss the Japanese attitude "that Japan was in little danger of being attacked by another country." However, no further explanation of Japanese is available. In this essay, unless specifically identified, Japanese is used similarly to refer to the Japanese people in general.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.


31. Ibid., p. 391.


33. According to Theodore McNelly, “The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol 13, Fall 1987, p. 83, Japan is the only major country to ban military forces in its Constitution. McNelly quotes Article 9 of the Constitution:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The 1987 White Paper, Defense of Japan, states, “It is recognized beyond doubt that the provision in the [Constitution] does not deny the inherent right to self-defense that Japan should be entitled to maintain as a sovereign nation.” According to McNelly, the formation of the Japan Self-Defense Force was prompted by the outbreak of the Korean War. Since then, the Japanese government has successfully maintained that the self-defense military is not unconstitutional. The courts have been reluctant to rule on the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces. Therefore, defining what constitutes “self-defense” has become the subject of much debate since the creation of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954.

34. Niksch, pp. 57–72.


36. Because of Okinawa’s strategic location for the defense of Korea and Taiwan, the United States retained the island even after the termination of its occupation of Japan in 1952. By the late 1960s, however, “Re-
unite Okinawa with Japan" had become an important national issue in Japan. At the same time, negotiations for the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty, vital to US Asian strategy, were starting. Politically, therefore, reverting Okinawa to Japanese control was in the best interest of the United States provided that the US military bases in Okinawa were still made available for US forces. For an excellent account of the Okinawa negotiations, see Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1979, pp. 325-336.

37. Concerning the "Nixon shock" over the announcement of Nixon's impending trip to China, Kissinger wrote, in White House Years, p. 726,

I believe in retrospect that we could have chosen a more sensitive method of informing the Japanese even though [Ambassador Armin] Meyer's considerations precluded earlier consultation. It would have surely been more courteous and thoughtful, for example, to send one of my associates from the Peking trip to Tokyo to brief [Prime Minister] Sato a few hours before the official announcement. This would have combined secrecy with a demonstration of special consideration for a good and decent friend.


41. Ibid., p. 366.


43. Ibid.

44. Armitage, "U.S. Strategic Interests in East Asia and the Pacific," p. 2.

45. Ibid. In his remarks at the Pacific Symposium (National Defense University) on 25 February 1988, Armitage commented on the criticism of Japan's defense spending: "The critics are unclear, and at times, contradictory. While demanding that Japan buy advanced US defensive systems so that it can relieve us of military roles in the area, they warn that Japan will steal our technologies for other uses. Bashing a key friend and ally in this manner is, to say the least, not an edifying spectacle, viewed from either Washington or Tokyo. (News release from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 25 February 1988, p. 6.)

HAJIME MATSUSAKI and BRIAN Y. SHIROYAMA showed a substantial increase although negative and zero growth was seen in 7 of 12 categories in the general budget.

49. Ezra F. Vogel, “Pax Nipponica?” Foreign Affairs 64, No. 4, pp. 752-767.
50. Ibid., p. 759.
51. Ibid., p. 763.
55. Ibid., p. 744.
57. Ibid., p. 295.
58. Ibid., p. 301.
61. Ibid., p. 15.
63. Ibid., p. 395. This view is similar to that often expressed by the Japan Socialist Party. From the American perspective, William Finan and Richard Samuels, writers for The New York Times (22 July 1987, p. A–27) commented, “Many Americans question the value of the overall alliance. They wonder what America gets for its continuing defense of Japan and why our Navy should protect Middle Eastern oil that fuels Japan’s exports. The Toshiba sale is forcing a re-examination of the old answers.”
65. Ibid., p. 39.
67. Ibid., p. 353.
68. Ibid. Packard’s reference may be misleading. The authors’ research, assisted by Asahi Shimbun representatives in Washington, failed to disclose such a poll in April 1987. However, both Asahi and Yomiuri Shimbun did report (16 March 1987) the result of a government survey conducted in October 1986 to assess the “familiarity” or “closeness” of the
Japanese toward the United States, China, Korea, and the Soviet Union. This is an annual survey since 1977. According to this 1986 survey, the scores for the United States did drop to 67.5 percent from 75.6 percent the previous year. Trade tensions and escalating value of the yen relative to the dollar were cited as reasons for this decline. Also, China's score of 68.6 percent did, in fact, replace the United States at the top of these four nations. However, the 1986 scores as cited above tend to skew the interpretation and therefore cause erroneous conclusions. If Packard used this government survey to draw his conclusions he failed to mention that the scores for both China and Korea also declined from the previous year (for China, the 1985 score was 75.4 percent; for Korea, the score dropped from 45.4 percent in 1985 to 39.7 percent in 1986). The Soviet Union scored a modest increase from 8.6 percent to 8.9 percent. Furthermore, China had previously recorded the top scores three times since the survey began. Nevertheless, the essence of Packard's argument—the "closeness" of the Japanese toward the United States should not be assumed—remains valid. Note: The results of the 1987 survey were reported in Yomiuri Shimbun 14 March 1988, p. 1. According to this latest survey, the United States has regained the lead by scoring 72.2 percent to China's 69.3 percent. the Soviet Union's score also rose to 9.8 percent.)

72. Ibid., p. 28.
73. "Takeshita Comments on Talks with Reagan," East Asia (Daily Report by Foreign Broadcast Information Service), 14 January 1988, p. 1. According to this latest survey, the United States has regained the lead by scoring 72.2 percent to China's 69.3 percent. the Soviet Union's score also rose to 9.8 percent.)
Mr. [Kazuhsa] Inoue, who belongs to the opposition Komeito Party, says it is bad enough that ordinary Japanese cannot figure out what their leaders are saying. But with Japan now a global force, he says obtuse language can only create mistrust and encourage overseas stereotypes of "sneaky Japanese."
Haberman also added that "making an effort" means "doing nothing at all." We contend that Haberman is essentially correct. However, Japan's multinationalistic approach to its economic endeavors has opened the
door for more direct negotiations. Consequently, as Americans learn more about the Japanese way in their effort to compete in Japan, the Japanese are learning the American way in their effort to compete in the United States. In the political arena, however, the problems associated with the “linguistic fog” are likely to continue.

SOVIET PACIFIC POLICY:
A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE

ZHÚ CHÉNG-HU

After Mikhail Gorbachev took over leadership in the USSR, the new Soviet administration extensively re-examined Soviet foreign policy. This review included the policy of his predecessors, especially Brezhnev, toward the Asian-Pacific region. Before Gorbachev occupied the top position in the Kremlin, Soviet leaders had concentrated their attention on Europe, neglecting the Asian-Pacific region. Since then, the Asian-Pacific region has become salient in Soviet global strategy, and as a result its importance has been greatly enhanced in Soviet policy, although the Soviets continue to put their greatest emphasis on Europe.

This enhancement has been shown in the important and dramatic changes of Soviet Asian-Pacific policy which were manifested in the government statement of 24 April 1986,1 Gorbachev's major policy speech of 28 July 1986 at Vladivostok,2 reorganization of foreign policy apparatus and personnel, and a series of activities in the Asian-Pacific region. It is apparent that Mikhail Gorbachev has given up the policy of purely military intimidation which had been practiced since the mid-1960s, and is now introducing a

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multi-dimensional policy toward countries in the Asian-Pacific region. This essay examines changes in Soviet policy, the background of those changes, and the prospects for current Soviet Asian-Pacific policy.

CHANGES IN SOVIET ASIAN-PACIFIC POLICY

Since the succession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership, the USSR has undertaken significant new initiatives in its Asian-Pacific policy. Virtually every country in the Asian-Pacific region—from the United States to Vanuatu—has been the object of Soviet gestures and overtures for improved relations.

The United States. Though continuing to regard the United States as its primary adversary in the Asian-Pacific region, the USSR has made some conciliatory gestures toward it since 1986. The Soviets are trying to increase the dialogue with the Americans and ease relations with them by openly admitting, "The US is a great Pacific power" which "has important economic and political interests in the region." Without the United States, without its participation, the Soviets now suggest, one cannot solve the problem of security and cooperation in the Pacific Ocean zone in a manner satisfactory to all the states in the region.  

At the same time, the Soviets have reshaped the initiative of the All-Asian Nations Forum, which excluded the United States, into an Asian-Pacific Nations Forum with the United States included. The purpose is to foster an impression that the USSR will be more accommodating on Asian-Pacific issues. But, unlike its policy on US interests in Europe, which has embodied substantial Soviet concessions and led to the conclusion of the INF Treaty and to relaxation of tensions in that region, in the Asian-Pacific area the Soviet Union is actually intensifying its contention with the
United States. The most striking evidence is the redeployment of its armed forces, with the focus on the buildup of its navy in the region.

China. Improved relations with China, the focus of Gorbachev's Asian-Pacific policy, are of particular importance. The Soviets believe that a great deal of international development depends on the two largest socialist states. In the Soviet view, a rapprochement with China would enable the Soviet Union to modify its present disadvantageous position in contention with the United States, free the forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders, and help increase exchanges in culture and sports, and especially in economic trade, thus facilitating economic development in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Such a rapprochement would also help prevent the formation of a strategic relationship between China and the United States, a relationship which would obviously constitute alignment in opposition to the Soviet Union.

To achieve such a rapprochement with China, the Soviets have over the past few years made some unprecedented conciliatory gestures toward China's security and territorial concerns. These have pleased both the Chinese people and the Chinese leadership. As a result, we have seen a continuing increase of trade volume and exchanges in other fields. We may continue to see the development of bilateral relations, particularly economic trade.

Japan. As with China, the Gorbachev administration has made new diplomatic initiatives toward Japan in the past several years which, to outsiders, seem more flexible and accommodating. The Soviet efforts are intended to help thaw Soviet-Japanese relations. In January 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Tokyo. In May of the same year, Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe returned a visit to Moscow. The Soviets have also compromised with Japan for the first time on a secondary issue of emotional significance to the Japanese people and government, now allowing visits to Japanese grave sites in some of the Northern Territories.
The Soviet efforts in the past few years have mainly been focused on probing Japanese readiness to expand relations, and perhaps to increase the export of technology and capital to the USSR, in the absence of any Soviet concessions on the issues most important to Japan, such as the Northern Territories and the military threat. Therefore, the Soviets have proposed joint enterprises in the Soviet Far East and Siberia, cooperation in research on ocean resources, programs for the study and peaceful use of space, and similar cooperative projects.

As a result of these Soviet initiatives in the past three years, relations between the Soviet Union and Japan have been repaired to some extent. Japanese interest in economic development in the eastern part of the USSR has been rekindled. The indicator is the increase of economic activities between the two countries. But the Soviets are far from achieving their overall purpose. They have neither neutralized Japan, preventing it from joining the US strategic defense research, nor gained tremendous access to Japan's capital and technology.

Korean Peninsula. Due to the rivalries between the two superpowers, there have been many confrontations between the two Koreas in the past forty years and more. Although the situation has been stable and peaceful recently, the two sides on the peninsula have different perceptions of the future there. In recent years, owing to the continuing sophistication of weapons and equipment of the South and the intensified annual "Team Spirit" exercises held jointly by the United States and South Korea, the Soviets and North Koreans have perceived an increasingly imminent threat of imbalance of force on the peninsula, an imbalance favoring the South. In response the Soviets increased their collaboration with the North.

The Soviets have speeded up their delivery of weapons and equipment (which are not advanced in comparison with those the South has had access to in recent years), held joint
exercises with North Koreans on severa... occasions, and provided economic assistance. However, Moscow's giving and assistance have never been cost-free for the recipients. Since 1985, the Soviets have been given port-call rights and over-flight rights in North Korea; this is the only breakthrough of strategic significance the Soviets have achieved since Gorbachev came into power. The over-flight rights have provided the Soviet military command in the Far East with several new lines of air reconnaissance covering not only the eastern part of China and the whole of Japan, but also the bulk of US forces in the Western Pacific. In the future, such cooperation along the Korean Peninsula is likely to increase.

India. For the Soviet Union, India is a valued partner in Asia. Therefore, Mr. Gorbachev chose New Delhi as the site of his first visit to Asia in November 1986. Since then, the Soviet Union has increased the weight of diplomatic activities along with military and economic assistance to India. Last year, India was given by the Soviets both MiG-29 warplanes and nuclear-powered submarines. It is worthy of note that India is the first foreign country to have been provided these two kinds of advanced war instruments. It has been reported that India will continue to be provided with nuclear submarines and other up-to-date weapons. Of course, this does not necessarily indicate that the Soviet Union can establish an alliance with India, because the latter depends heavily on the West economically. However, it is quite likely that the two countries will move closer. In that case, the balance of forces in Asia at large, and in South Asia in particular, will be upset.

The purpose of Moscow's policy toward India is very obvious. The Gorbachev administration is making every effort to keep India parallel to the Soviet track and to prevent it from closing toward the West, thus portraying the Soviets' willingness to use their influence to promote regional cooperation. As a result, the Soviets and Indians have aligned on a number of international questions, including arms control, some regional problems, and SDI.
ASEAN. ASEAN, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is very important to the Soviet Union because the association plays a key role in maintaining regional stability. Its members (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines) cover the area which sits astride the vital sea and air lines of communication linking Siberia and the Soviet Far East with the Indian Ocean, the throat of Soviet global deployment. ASEAN members are in the process of adjusting their policies. They have become more united and more mellow in recent years. Some members are even trying to free ASEAN from the influence of any big power. They increasingly oppose the military presence of big powers, and especially their nuclear presence in the region.

Economically, ASEAN members are increasingly concerned with their own problems and the policies of protectionism adopted by Western industrialized countries, the United States in particular. The Soviets take these adjustments as an opportunity to exert their influence. Therefore, the USSR is seeking to improve bilateral political and economic relations with ASEAN members by extending its "support" to peace efforts of the countries concerned, and by utilizing the disagreements existing between these countries and the United States. Already the Soviets have made some progress in the economic field, the results of which are a series of agreements reached with these countries and increased trade. The economic programs may possibly be accompanied by the expansion of political influence there.

Island States in the South Pacific Ocean. In recent years, a deterioration has occurred in the United States' relations with Pacific island nations. The Soviets have successfully exploited it. They have joined Pacific island national governments in opposing the US nuclear presence. Mikhail Gorbachev also endorsed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Agreement drafted by Pacific Forum members at Rarotonga in 1986. At the same time, the Soviets are making use of the serious economic problems most of the Pacific island
governments face to approach them and give them some offers. Thanks to the efforts made in recent years, the Soviets have not only established diplomatic relations with some of the island nations, but have also signed some fishing agreements which have led to a presence in an area where the Soviets had been absent. Soviet presence and influence will undoubtedly be expanded in the coming years.

From these policies toward different countries in the Asian-Pacific area, we can see a great change in the Soviet overall policy in the region, a change from purely military intimidation to a multi-dimensional approach. This change could possibly achieve the following objectives: politically, expand Soviet influence and reduce US influence; economically, make use of the capital and technology in the region to speed up the development of the Soviet Far East and Siberia; and militarily, turn the Soviet Union from an Asian continental power into a Pacific Ocean power.

To achieve their political objectives, the Gorbachev administration, holding aloft the banners of disarmament, peace, and security, has carried out "smiling face" diplomacy toward governments in the Asian-Pacific region so as to create an image among the nations there that the Soviet Union is a peacekeeper, and to eliminate the ill fame of the "Soviet threat." So the Soviets have put forward a number of initiatives and made great efforts to improve bilateral relations with the countries in the region. These efforts have resulted in the expansion of Soviet influence there. The Soviets clearly know that it is very difficult for the influence of the Soviet Union to coexist with that of the United States. They have, therefore, tried different approaches to reduce and overwhelm the influence of the United States. The first and foremost is the utilization of differences existing between the United States and Asian-Pacific countries to sow discord between them, while relying on existing US political frustrations to limit American actions.

The new Soviet policy toward the Asian-Pacific region has been economy-centered. Therefore, the Soviets have
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carried out economic diplomacy toward the countries in the region over the past few years. They have established a wide range of economic contacts with almost every country in this region. The two-way trade between the Soviet Union and other countries there, though not as big as that of the United States, has greatly increased. Cooperation in the economic field between the USSR and Asian-Pacific nations has been strengthened. All these activities of the Gorbachev administration are intended to attract the capital and technology of Asian-Pacific nations so as to serve the exploitation and development of the Soviet Far East and Siberia.

In the military field, we have seen two shifts in the Asian-Pacific region since Gorbachev came into power in the Soviet Union. One is the shift from a general military buildup to a naval buildup; the other is the shift from a buildup mainly targeting China to a buildup mainly targeting the United States and Japan. As everybody knows, the Soviet military buildup in the Asian-Pacific region began in the mid-1960s, when Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated. By the 1970s, the Soviet forces in Soviet Asia numbered more than a million men. In 1978, the Soviets gained access to Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, which used to be a base used by the American troops in the US-Vietnamese war, at the price of supporting the Vietnamese in occupying Cambodia. At first, there were only two piers at the base, and the Soviet forces there were quite limited. Use of the facility was mainly intended to encircle China from the south.

The Soviets have been enjoying a superiority over their neighbors and potential adversaries in ground forces and ground-based aviation since the 1970s. But their naval and long-range air forces, due to the lack of large surface combatants and aircraft carriers, could not match those of the United States in the Pacific, except in the North Pacific. They could pose a real confrontation with the Americans in Northeast Asia and the North Pacific, but not in any other
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place in the Asian-Pacific region. Therefore, the Soviet Union was in the past basically an Asian continental power.

Yet, in the recent years, especially after 1985, the build-up of ground forces and frontal aviation seems to have stopped. The Soviets have actually intensified their efforts in expanding their naval and air force presence at Cam Ranh Bay and in the South Pacific. Now the base at Cam Ranh Bay has been greatly enlarged and has become the largest overseas naval base of the Soviet Union. There are seven piers now, six of them are used by the Soviet navy. Among the piers, two have bomb-proof shelters for submarines. The complex of piers has the capacity for berthing at the same time 140 vessels, each with a displacement over 40,000 tons. It has also been reported that supporting facilities there have been greatly improved. The whole installation at Cam Ranh has basically quadrupled in capacity. On any given day, one will find 20 to 30 Soviet surface combatants, 3 to 5 submarines, a squadron of MiG-23s, and about 16 Tu–16 and 8 Tu–95 aircraft. Vietnam has been turned into an outpost of the Soviet Union, and the whole of Indochina will possibly be further turned into such an outpost of the Soviets.

With a strategic breakthrough on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviets could have linked the Soviet Far East with Indochina even more closely. What warrants our attention is the Soviet Pacific initiative which was mounted a decade ago when the Soviets obtained the base rights at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Moscow has upped its Pacific ante since 1985, when it paid $1.5 million to Kiribati—which lies just southeast of the US ICBM test range at Kwajalein—for fishing and shore rights. Now, the Gorbachev administration is not only supporting the New Zealanders in their anti-nuclear policies and suggesting that the new government of the Philippines end its support of US military bases there, but is also enlarging political and economic ties with many other micro-states
in the South Pacific. In the author's view, Moscow's Pacific initiative is mainly intended to achieve its military objectives; otherwise, it would not have concluded fishing agreements with Kiribati and Vanuatu under which Soviet losses outweigh the gain.

Take the case of Vanuatu as an example. To conclude an agreement with Vanuatu, the Soviets paid a $1.5 million annual fee; but, according to the estimate of fishery experts, the commercial value of the take in the territorial waters is somewhere between $600,000 and $800,000 annually. Why, then, did they conclude the agreement? Because a Soviet presence in the area offers many advantages. First, the Soviets could keep a closer watch on the movement of American forces in the region. Second, the Soviet fishing operations would provide cover for Soviet military movements, including intelligence collection. Third, the Soviet fishing vessels could prolong the cruising activities of submarines by serving as floating supply depots. Fourth, they could expand the Soviet Pacific Fleet's operating range from its base at Cam Ranh Bay by building local relationships. Last, they might also obtain the right to establish in the region ground tracking stations, control facilities, emergency landing sites for the Soviet "star wars" program, or improvements in Soviet global and space communications.

It seems that there is a striking discrepancy between the Soviet actions mentioned above and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's peaceful overtures in a series of policy speeches and diplomatic offensives which outline Soviet intentions for peace and economic growth. These actions portray the real intention of the Soviets: expand their military presence in the South Pacific; pose a real confrontation with the United States not only in Northeast Asia but also in the Asian-Pacific region as a whole; turn the Soviet Union from an Asian continental power to a Pacific Ocean power; and secure political influence and strategic and economic interests in the region.
SOVIET PACIFIC POLICY

BACKGROUND OF THE CHANGE

The background behind the change of Soviet Asian-Pacific policy is of profound internal and external significance. Internally, the new Soviet leadership has realized, after a comprehensive re-examination of the Soviet domestic policies, that the policies of the Brezhnev administration were unsuccessful. After 18 years of Brezhnev’s rule, economic development in the Soviet Union had become slower and slower, and the growth rate of national income had become lower and lower. The average increase was 7.7 percent from 1966 to 1970, 5.7 percent from 1971 to 1975, and 3.7 percent from 1976 to 1980; it was 3.2 percent in 1981, and in 1982, when Brezhnev died, it was 2.6 percent, which was the slowest increase in the postwar years.

Thus the economic gap between the Soviet Union and the United States was becoming larger and larger instead of being narrowed. In comparison with the United States, Soviet national income is only 66–67 percent, the total output value is about 40 percent, the gross value of industrial output is about 80 percent, and labor productivity is about 55 percent, while the gross value of agricultural output is only 20–25 percent. The Soviet Union is lagging further behind in the fields of new technologies such as micro-electronics, new materials, etc., and its technologies in civilian industries are even more backward.

The Soviets have found that their strength cannot match the ambition of their global strategy, and that their superpower status is very precarious. Therefore, immediately after coming into power in the Soviet Union in early 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev put forward a new strategy of “accelerating the social and economic development.” The primary intention of this strategy is to strive for a peaceful period of time in the coming 15 years or longer for speeding up the economic development, so as to double the total output value by the end of the century. The Gorbachev administration believes that, to realize the strategic objective, it is
necessary to speed up the development of the whole Soviet economy by developing the Soviet eastern region in earnest. In the Soviet European section, resources are nearly exhausted or not economical to exploit, while its eastern area contains 60–80 percent of total Soviet mineral resources. Most of the reserves of Soviet fuel resources are also in this area. At present, Siberia alone provides two-thirds of the petroleum and more than one-half of the natural gas used by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet leadership may have concluded that the exploitation of Siberia and the Soviet Far East will determine to a great extent the development, speed, and efficiency of the Soviet economy as a whole, and will be the foundation for strengthening Soviet economic power as well as defense power. Therefore, for developing the Soviet Union east of Lake Baikal, the Soviets have worked out a project of $359 billion. This project reflects a change of emphasis in Soviet economic development and a change in Soviet domestic policy. This change will inevitably find its expression in Soviet policy and approach toward the countries and regions concerned. Hence, the new Soviet Asian-Pacific policy.

Externally, several factors contribute to a new Soviet policy toward the Asian-Pacific countries. Politically, there is in the Asian-Pacific region not only competition between superpowers, but also various regional conflicts. The mingling of interests of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and the two regional powers, China and Japan, which have increased their influence, has contributed to the importance of the region in the current international situation. Besides that, ASEAN members and some other countries are adjusting their policies and becoming more independent, so that a tendency toward political pluralism is emerging in the region. On the other hand, due to the Brezhnev doctrine, the armed occupation of Afghanistan, support for Hanoi in invading and occupying Cambodia, and a policy of military intimidation, the Soviet
Union had become increasingly isolated, losing some of its former friends.

All these political factors might have reduced the capability of the Soviet Union to maintain its influence, not to mention to expand it. Moscow has, therefore, paid greater attention to the reshaping of its policy toward the region to secure its strategic interests there.

Economically, the Asian-Pacific region contains 60–70 percent of the resources of the world and provides about 60 percent of the products. The region produces 49 percent of the world’s copper ore, 54 percent of lead and zinc ores, 54 percent of vanadium, 40 percent of asphalt, 60 percent of sodium, 47 percent of silver, 80 percent of nickel, 69 percent of tin, and 46 percent of coal. The region is very rich in reserves of strategic mineral resources such as coal, rutile, zircon, ilmenite, uranium, etc.\(^9\) The United States is becoming increasingly dependent on the Asian-Pacific region for strategic and other industrial resources. It mainly imports raw minerals from this region. The titanium, chromium, and mica sheet imported by the United States from this region are respectively 97, 82, and 80 percent of the total the United States imports.

With the development of space technology and sophisticated industries, the United States will be more dependent on the resources in the region.\(^10\) At present, the Soviet Union, by contrast, is not greatly dependent on the strategic and industrial resources in the region. But with the development of its economy and the requirements of future global competition, the Soviet Union will gradually become more dependent on the resources of the Pacific. A change of policy might result in Soviet access to the resources in the region, which would be advantageous to the Soviets in their future rivalry with the Americans.

What the Soviets envy are the advanced technology and capital of some countries and areas in the Asian-Pacific region. In the past 20 years or so, most countries and areas
in the region have had a faster increase in their economies than other regions of the world. The output value of the region had increased from 6.5 percent of the world total in 1960 to 16 percent in 1980. It is predicted that from the 1970s to the end of the twentieth century the average rate of economic increase in the world as a whole will be 4.8 percent, while the Asian-Pacific region could reach 6.3 percent; its total output value is expected to increase from 16 percent in 1980 to 23 percent of the world total by the year 2000. The Soviet Union's adjustment of its policy is intended to strengthen economic trade and technological cooperation with the countries in the Asian-Pacific region, and to attract Japan's capital and technology in particular, so that it can ride on "the express of oriental economic development," which is the most dynamic in the world.

In China, major efforts have been concentrated on a modernization drive since 1979, and an open-door policy has been introduced in support of this effort. As a result, we have seen a continuous and steady increase in the Chinese economy. China's GNP doubled from 1979 to 1986. If this momentum of economic increase can be maintained, the GNP in China by 1999 could reach more than $1,000 billion. With the rapid development of its economy and rich resources at its disposal, China will undoubtedly have a greater influence in the future on the Asian-Pacific region and the world as a whole. The new Soviet leadership, attracted and inspired by this fact in China, wants to take China as an example and open up Asian-Pacific nations to some extent for its own economic development.

In the United States, on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the emphasis of economic interest is shifting toward the Asian-Pacific region so as to prepare for the "Pacific century," the twenty-first century. At home, the US economy is shifting westward. Nowadays, many high-tech industries, such as micro-electronic industry, space industry, and military industries, are concentrated along the Pacific coast.
California is a state which attracts about 50 percent of the total US military research and development budget and provides 21 percent of DOD procurement. In addition, the United States has turned the Asian-Pacific region into the largest market of US foreign trade.

In 1980, the US trade with the Asian-Pacific nations surpassed the volume of that with Western European countries for the first time. In 1983, the total volume of foreign trade increased by .5 percent of the the previous year, but the trade volume within the Asian-Pacific region increased by 8 percent over the previous year, reaching $136.5 billion, which is 24 percent more than that with the Western European countries. From 1983 to 1986, the trade volume with Asian-Pacific countries increased by 54 percent, reaching $211 billion, which is 36 percent of the total volume of US foreign trade. The Asian-Pacific region has also become the biggest market for American goods and an important outlet for American investment abroad. The shift of industries and change of the structure in US foreign trade and investment are of large importance and constitute another factor contributing to the change of Soviet policy toward the Asian-Pacific region.

Militarily, the Asian-Pacific region is an important strategic sphere for Soviet containment of their primary adversary and support of their actions in Europe, for the region occupies an important strategic position in the Soviet global rivalry with the United States. In the 1970s, the Soviets, making use of the opportunity to intensify their military buildup when the Americans drew back their armed forces after the Vietnam War, dispatched their troops everywhere in the world; the Asian-Pacific region was an important part of this Soviet expansion.

Access to the naval and air bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang pushed the deployment of the Soviet Pacific Fleet 4,000 kilometers southward. This achievement posed a threat to the US forces in the Pacific region and facilitated Soviet strategic deployment in the Asian-Pacific region.
it was obtained at great cost and invited a strong reaction from the United States and other Asian-Pacific nations. This constituted an important check to further Soviet expansion in the region. This strong reaction, together with Soviet failure to conquer Afghanistan and difficulty in Indochina, conveyed to the Gorbachev administration that it is difficult to achieve objectives merely by military means; the military means must be coupled with other means. Therefore, the new policy has laid its emphasis on political and economic means while maintaining military gains and expanding military presence in a prudent way.

In short, the change of the Soviet policy toward the Asian-Pacific region has stemmed from the requirement of social and economic development and from anticipated contention with the United States in the twenty-first century.

PROSPECTS OF THE POLICY

The Asian-Pacific policy of Gorbachev’s administration is still in the process of adjustment, and thus embodies many uncertainties. But taking into consideration its implementation in the past three years and the situation in the region, one can roughly predict the prospects of the policy.

Thanks to a policy toward the region more flexible than that of his predecessors, and to the gestures he has made, Mikhail Gorbachev has made some progress in some countries and in some fields. And we will continue to see progress and achievements in the future.

The supremely important focus for the change of Soviet Asian-Pacific policy lies in the economic field. Based on the progress made in the past few years, the Soviet leadership will continue its efforts to improve economic ties with the countries in the region by capitalizing on American protectionist policy. We will possibly see an expansion of Soviet trade and economic cooperation with Asian-Pacific nations,
such as India, China, Japan, ASEAN, Pacific island nations, and Korea. The expansion of cooperation and trade will serve, to some extent, the strategy of accelerating social and economic development, especially the exploitation and development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, thus gradually enhancing the potential of the Soviet Union to play a substantial economic role in the Asian-Pacific region.

In the military realm, China completed a reduction of one million military troops in 1987, some of whom had been deployed along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders. As a result, China may no longer be perceived as a threat to the Soviets. Therefore, the Soviets might scale down their ground deployments there accordingly; the emphasis of their deployment might be further switched to naval and air presence in the Asian-Pacific region, especially in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and the South Pacific. They might also intensify their military cooperation with Indochinese countries, North Korea, and India by providing them with additional weapons and equipment at relatively low prices. At the same time, they will seek military cooperation with some of the ASEAN members and Pacific island nations, so as to increase their port-call rights, making up for the inadequacy of oversea naval and air force bases and gradually developing the Soviet Union into a Pacific Ocean power capable of presenting a real threat to the United States in the region.

As we have seen in history, Soviet political influence has always accompanied its military presence, economic aid, and cooperation. The Soviets, making use of the anti-American sentiment prevailing in the Asian-Pacific region, will probably seek every opportunity to sow discord between the countries in the region and the United States. In so doing, they might make further progress in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

However, in considering Soviet weakness in the political, economic, and military fields and the actions taken, one can say with confidence that Soviet progress in the Asian-Pacific region will be quite limited.
ZHUKHONG-HU

Up to now under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, the Soviets have made no substantial concession in the Asian-Pacific region except the decision to draw the invaders back from Afghanistan. They have shown thus far somewhat less flexibility and less willingness to make concessions in the Asian-Pacific region than in Europe, and have not yet demonstrated their readiness to make more than token changes in long-established policy toward different countries in the region on the issues of most fundamental importance to them. To China, the Soviets have shown some gestures, but have made few practical concessions on the issues of China's primary concern.

As Ligachev revealed at a news conference in Hanoi when he represented the Soviet leadership at the Vietnamese Party Congress, the Soviet Union would provide 8–9 billion rubles to aid Vietnam from 1986 to 1990, that is, approximately $2 billion a year. There is no indication that the Soviets will cease their support of Vietnam after 1990. Doing so might bring to an end the Soviet use of military bases in Vietnam, bases which have been gained at great cost and are of strategic significance both in contending with the United States in the Asian-Pacific region and in encircling China.

To the north of China, the Soviets are still deploying on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders large quantities of forces, presenting a direct threat to China. Furthermore, the Soviets have in recent years been engaging in various military activities around China which are mainly aimed at contending with the United States but are also clearly of value in containing China. In such a situation, it is impossible to have a substantial breakthrough in political relations between China and the Soviet Union; this will have a negative impact on the development of other relations.

The Kremlin posture toward Japan has shown a great Soviet willingness to probe Japanese readiness to expand
their relations, particularly to increase the export of technology and capital to the USSR. But the new Soviet leadership has not made any practical concessions on the issues most important to Japan. On the issue of the Northern Territories, the Soviets take them as their own and have steadily increased their armed forces there. Since the 1970s, the two major islands have become fortified and are now important Soviet military bases. Up to now, the Soviets have not even provided any evidence of willingness to bargain with Japan over them. Gorbachev himself insists that there is no territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan.

The Japanese government has always clung to the principle that the territorial dispute cannot be separated from economic problems; that they should be settled simultaneously. Moreover, the Soviet naval and air force buildup in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia presents a serious threat to Japan’s islands and the sea lines of communication upon which the Japanese economy heavily depends, thus bringing other political consequences to Soviet-Japanese relations. The progress in Soviet-Japanese economic relations will be limited because of Soviet economic weakness, especially the limited Soviet hard currency earning capacity. With all these problems unsettled, there will be no major advance or breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relations.

China and Japan are two major actors on the Asian-Pacific stage, and the primary objects of the Soviet efforts; they are of some influence over some of the other Asian-Pacific countries. As the Soviet Union is not likely to achieve noteworthy progress in its relations with these two countries, it will also be difficult to make breakthroughs in its relations with other countries in the region.

Proceeding from the necessities of the strategy of accelerating development and the global strategy, taking the United States as the primary adversary, and taking military strength as powerful support, the new Soviet Asian-Pacific policy of Gorbachev aims at carrying out all-round competition with the United States in political, diplomatic, economic, and military fields in the twenty-first century.
Presently, the Soviet Union is trying to consolidate its vested interests there, to weaken gradually the influence of the United States in the region, and to improve the Soviet strategic position in global competition with the United States by launching peace offensives.

By capitalizing on the policy adjustments made by the Asian-Pacific nations, the Soviets have made some gains in the region. In the future they will, while being careful to sacrifice no strategic interests, take flexible and prudent measures to probe the weakness of the countries in the region so as to realize the objective of the new policy. But the implementation of this policy will be dependent on the reaction of the United States and other countries in the region, and will be limited by Soviet political, economic, and military weakness. As a matter of fact, the Soviets are facing a series of formidable obstacles in the diplomatic, economic, political, ideological, and strategic fields. These obstacles will work against any fundamental or substantial change in the adversarial relationship that they now have with major regional powers. However, the region should be mentally prepared for a potentially more dynamic and more flexible Soviet policy, be alert to potentially unstable situations which the Soviets could take advantage of at a very low cost, and be prepared to deal with the possible turmoil ensuing from such events.
SOVIET PACIFIC POLICY

NOTES

1. Pravda, April 24, 1986.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
IS WAR OBSOLETE?
A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE

FAN ZHEN JIANG

Since nineteenth-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz put forward the theory that war is “a mere continuation of politics by other means,” it has been regarded as one of his achievements and widely accepted among the military theorists of the world, be they from the West or the East, in a capitalist country or in a socialist country. This is because it throws the first light on the essence of war.

Since nuclear weapons came into being, this theory has come under criticism; many, including some holding high office or position, now hold that the theory of war as a continuation of politics has fallen behind the times. Is this really the case? Before giving an answer to this question, we’d better first make an analytical study of Clausewitz’s theorem to find out what he originally meant.

By “war is a continuation of politics,” Clausewitz meant the following four concepts:

First, wars are “only the expression or manifestations of policy itself.”1 “State policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state like the qualities of living creatures in their germs.”2

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1 Fan Zhen Jiang, Chinese People’s Liberation Army, wrote this essay while at the US National Defense University as a Visiting Fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies.
FAN ZHEN JIANG

War "always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive." 3

A war breaks out not without any causes; it must have some underlying causes. A contingent factor might well be a fuse that will lead to war, but it is not a real and underlying cause. The real cause of war is nothing but the policies adopted and political goals aimed at by the two opposing sides before a war breaks out. The real cause of a war, that is to say, exists in the policies before the war.

Second, "the conduct of war, in its great features, is policy itself." 4 Wars "may all be regarded as political acts." 5 "This political intercourse does not cease by the War itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist. . . . War is merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts." 6

If a war had nothing to do with policy or became what Clausewitz termed an "absolute war" or "abstract war," its "violent nature" would go unchecked to the extreme, at which point opposing sides in war would avail themselves of all their might and means until one or both perish in it. But in history, neither since man entered civilized society nor in the present world can we find a war as such, a war that is aimed at manslaughter instead of certain political purposes. For Clausewitz, there isn't such a thing as an "absolute war" in the real world; it is only a starting point for him to make further studies. For him, an "absolute war" has to be so modified in the real world that it is subordinated to politics as a kind of political action.

Third, policy "is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse." 7 Military strategy must be second to policy. "To leave a great military enterprise, or the plan for one, to a purely military judgment and decision, is a distinction which cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial." 8

That war is forever subordinate to politics and cannot depart from it for a single moment is borne out in the fact that it is politics that decides the nature and purpose of war
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and the principles and plans involved in it. In a word, war must answer the needs of politics. Ludendorff, however, the so-called “faithful disciple” of Clausewitz, did not see eye to eye with his teacher on this point. He claimed, “War and politics serve the survival of the people, but war is the highest expression of the racial will of life,”9 so politics must be subordinate to strategy. But, now, few go along with him on this point, for we all know that a war without the guidance of politics will be blind, in that it will have nothing to show for a definite aim. A blind war is quite likely to plunge a whole country and its whole people into an abyss of disaster.

Fourth, war is not policy in general; it is a kind of policy in which a nation “takes up the sword in place of the pen.”10 War as a special instrument is a check on the mapping-out of political goals. “The political object is no despotic lawgiver on that account; it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means.”11 “That policy makes demands on the war which it cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that it knows the instrument which it is going to use.”12 “The first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages, not to take it for something, or to wish to make of it something which, by the nature of its relations, it is impossible to be. This is, therefore, the first, the most comprehensive of all strategical questions.”13

In any war, targets, scale, and methods should not only be determined according to their political ends but also according to the specific nature of war means. In considering whether a war should be fought, what is sought in fighting the war, and on what scale and in what way the war should be undertaken, one should take into account not only political ends, but also the peculiarity of war as a special means to these ends. Only by taking a comprehensive view of both political ends and war as a special means to them can a strategist map out the best strategic plan. This is all the more true
in the case of nuclear warfare, which is a special means to
certain political ends. Immense caution must be taken in
considering consequences that nuclear warfare will bring
about and whether it is in line with political ends.

The four concepts mentioned above, in my opinion,
cover what was originally and totally meant by Clausewitz’s
theorem. All the four concepts should be kept in mind in de-
ciding whether this theorem has fallen behind the times. It
would be rather hasty for one to conclude that Clausewitz’s
theory has become obsolete because he clings to the one
concept of war as “an instrument of policy” while believing
that nuclear warfare cannot realize political ends. It is true
that Clausewitz states, “war is a continuation of politics,”
but he did not hold that war is the best or the only means to
political ends. On the contrary, he held that politics must be
aware of the different nature of different means and be cau-
tious in applying war as a means.

In the nuclear age, the nature of war as an instrument
has truly undergone great changes. As an instrument, nu-
clear warfare is no longer fit for achieving political ends. At
present, all the nuclear weapons in the hands of the two su-
perpowers are quite sufficient to destroy both countries
many times over. If they entered a nuclear war against each
other, they would both be wiped out. For quite a long period
of time, the Soviet Union has been developing its own stra-
tegic defense system and has deployed around the Moscow
area the only combat-worthy antiballistic missile defense
system in the world. But, under an all-out nuclear attack
from the United States, it would be quite inadequate. As for
the United States, it is devoting huge amounts of financial
resources to the development of its Strategic Defense Initia-
tive (SDI). Yet, even if this were accomplished, it could not
destroy all the incoming nuclear missiles launched from the
Soviet Union. If only ten percent of the present Soviet nu-
clear missiles broke through the United States’ defense sys-
tem, the United States would be annihilated.
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A nuclear war would not only wipe out the opposing sides, but also bring endless disaster to mankind. According to the recent "nuclear winter" hypothesis, after a nuclear war all the heavy radioactive fall-out would not only rain disease and death upon people on earth, but also blot out the sun and envelope the whole globe in such darkness and cold that it would be impossible for all living things to survive. This absolutely is not the point in the policymaking of any country, nor the end of any real statesman. Those who started such a nuclear war might survive the catastrophe, but in no way could they achieve any political end. In this sense, nuclear warfare obviously is not an effective means to political ends, for it cannot help realize any political end.

Based on this fact, nine out of ten people from either the East or West would claim that Clausewitz's theory is outdated. When mapping out their policies and strategies, some strategists or statesmen tend to work hard at some theory for their own advantage. Their focus of attention, however, is not on the theory itself, but on their own policies and strategies. Therefore, when they claim that "war as a continuation of politics" has fallen behind the times, their purpose is to find theoretical justification for their policies and strategies instead of considering the comprehensive concepts of this well-known idea.

As early as the 1960s, Dr. Henry Kissinger stated that the traditional approach of regarding war as a continuation of politics had become out of date in the nuclear age. In doing so, Kissinger was in fact giving a theoretical interpretation of why the United States had changed its strategy. As we all know, the United States began to adopt in 1953 the strategy of "massive retaliation" under the assumption that it could check on or stage retaliations against any attack aimed at its national interests. At that time the United States was able to launch a nuclear attack without facing the danger of receiving a counter-attack of a similar kind. By the late 1950s, however, great changes had taken place. The Soviet
Union had speedily developed its own nuclear weapons and their own carrying vehicles. It had also successfully launched the first Sputnik. The United States had lost its nuclear dominance. Should the United States launch a nuclear attack under these conditions, it would be drawing ruin upon itself. Obviously, the strategy of "massive retaliation" was no longer fit in the changed world situation. Consequently, another strategy, the strategy of "flexible response," was worked out in the United States to take its place.

In the early 1960s, when Kissinger claimed "war as a continuation of politics" had become an outdated theory, he was just trying to endorse, in theory, replacing the strategy of "massive retaliation" with the strategy of "flexible response." Of course, what he claimed is true in some sense; it is true to the extent that nuclear warfare fails to be an effective means to any political end, since the opposing sides at war with each other, with their powerful nuclear forces, can win nothing but ruin in a nuclear war. But, it is at least theoretically incomprehensible to declare for this reason alone that Clausewitz's statement has become out of date.

According to the US strategy of "flexible response," various sorts of limited warfare, such as conventional warfare, large-scale conflict or local combat, or anti-guerrilla warfare, should be undertaken to make up for what an all-out nuclear war cannot do. Are not those kinds of limited warfare just a continuation of politics? One of the reasons for the US failure in the Vietnam War was that the relationship between political ends and war as a means to those ends was not seen in its true light. In other words, the theory of "war as a continuation of politics" failed to be understood in its comprehensive and profound sense. Without a political end having been properly established, war as a means would not be properly employed.

At the forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Mankind," held in February 1987 in Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev said, "We came to conclusions that made us review something that once had seemed axiomatic, since
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, world war ceased to be a continuation of politics by other means." In making this statement, Gorbachev was both brave and cautious. He was brave because he might face opposition from some people, especially those from the armed forces of the Soviet Union. To admit that war is no longer a continuation of politics could mean that the Soviet Union’s military policies, which have all along been made on the assumption of winning a nuclear war, are no longer feasible, and that the current Soviet armed forces might undergo changes in scale as well as in structure. To change a vast military system that has been built up over the past several decades, however, is a gigantic difficulty task. In fact, as early as the 1960s some people in the Soviet Union had held that war in the nuclear age was no longer a continuation of politics.

In this respect, Major General Nikolai Talensky, the military theorist, was an outstanding representative; but his idea later received severe criticism. Communist of the Armed Forces once published an article to say,

The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons leave war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war moves beyond the control of policy, ceases to be an instrument of policy and does not constitute its continuation, is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary.

Now, Gorbachev has repeated what Talensky had said, but we have not heard any different voice from the Soviet armed forces. But neither have we heard anyone in the Soviet armed forces speaking well of Gorbachev's statement on this point. I am sure quite a few in the Soviet armed forces are opposed to this point of view. Gorbachev was cautious because he did not categorically negate Clausewitz's theory, which was praised as a maxim by Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Communist Party.
When making his statement, Gorbachev chose the term "world war" instead of war in general. That is to say, he made this statement in reference to a world war only, not a limited or local war. It stands to reason that he should choose this special term, since the Soviet armed forces were still engaged in the war of Afghanistan, which was of course a continuation of Soviet policy.

The reason why Gorbachev made this statement is clear. At present, in order to revitalize its economy, the Soviet Union is carrying out a series of reforms whose smooth fulfillment requires a favorable international environment. Faced with a challenge from the United States with its Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviet Union has to either devote large amounts of financial resources to the development of its own strategic defense, the carrying out of which would hinder the progress of its economic reforms and might even exhaust its economy, or work for a detente to slow the arms race so as to relieve itself of much economic burden for the benefit of facilitating its economic reform. Since Gorbachev wishes to impress the world as a lover of peace and to force the United States to slow down its rate of arms expansion at the same time, it is a matter of course that he should declare "war as a continuation of politics" has fallen behind the times.

When claiming that war is no longer "a continuation of politics," both Kissinger and Gorbachev have one thing in common: to justify their policies and strategies, they need not, nor could they, have expounded on a theory as thoroughly and comprehensively as Clausewitz. This one-sided view has led to a partial negation of Clausewitz's well-known statement.

Now, we need to clarify the following different concepts:

First, "war as a continuation of politics" is quite different from "war as a means to political ends." The former is an answer to the question as to the essence of war as an objective phenomenon while the latter is about whether war as a
means should be undertaken and how to apply this means. Since times of old, war has been a common social occurrence, one still far from disappearing from human society. Man feels the need to know what war is in essence and what its cause is. Clausewitz is the first to give a correct answer to these questions—war is the continuation of policy, an end result of the evolution of a country’s pro-war policy. Is it possible that all the wars that have occurred since the appearance of nuclear weapons have turned into anything other than politics? Of course, it is not. War is still a continuation of politics.

Under given circumstances, which means should be applied to obtain certain political ends, means of war or political, diplomatic, or economic means? This question is different in nature from the question as to the essence of war. In view of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, no statesmen dare resort to nuclear warfare as a means to their political ends. This is a fact, but a fact that is not enough to negate categorically Clausewitz’s statement about the essence of war, for we cannot find in this statement implications that war is the only or the best means to political ends and that statesmen must under all circumstances go to war to arrive at certain political objectives. On the contrary, the fact proves that war, as a continuation of politics, must be subordinate to politics and that whether the means of war should be applied or not depends on whether political ends could be achieved.

Second, a nuclear war is different from a conventional war, and a world war is different from a local war. It has been more than forty years since we entered the nuclear age upon the end of World War II. During this period, though there have occurred many crises, a world war has never occurred, nor has a nuclear war. To account for this, there may be many reasons, but one of the most important is the gigantic destructive power of nuclear weapons, as well as the nuclear balance between the two superpowers. Nuclear terror has prohibited a nuclear war, but not conventional or regional
wars such as those between Israel and Arab countries, between Iran and Iraq, as well as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Falkland Islands conflict, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. All those were undertaken in the nuclear age, many by countries with nuclear weapons, for certain political purposes.

Therefore, to claim that Clausewitz's theory on the essence of war has fallen behind the times in a nuclear age is to defy the hard and stark facts. In fact, it is just after realizing that nuclear warfare is not a proper means to their political ends that the superpowers began to resort to regional wars, to low-intensity warfare, to achieve their political goals. In doing so, they are just going by the principle that "war is a continuation of politics."

Third, that a nuclear war has not broken out does not mean there is not any possibility of such a war. Though a nuclear war has not broken out, nor has any large-scale conventional war between the two superpowers, though we do not expect such a war to break out in the near future, and though all the countries in the world have claimed that they hope for peace instead of war, nobody can proclaim that there will be no war in the future and that the possibility of nuclear war no longer exists.

With rapid development of science and technology and increasing improvement of strategic defensive systems, the nuclear balance existing now might become lopsided someday. Once a country were sure of winning a nuclear war, the war would be more likely to break out. Perhaps the war would be fought within a limited area and on a limited scale, to become the so-called "limited nuclear war." When turned into reality, this would be a case in point to illustrate that politics has a decisive role in war because, first, the war was started because of politics and, second, it would be political factors that limited the war within a certain area and on a limited scale. In other words, the principle of war as a continuation of politics would still be applicable in nuclear warfare.
At present, people are apprehensive of a nuclear war, although it has not yet turned into reality. Why? Because there is a possibility of such a war. Were there not, people would not stand in constant fear and nuclear deterrence would be nothing at all. Since there exists a possibility of a nuclear war, no matter how remote this possibility is, we cannot claim that war is no longer a continuation of politics. In fact, ever since the invention of nuclear weapons, they have been used as an instrument with which to achieve political aims. The only difference is that they have been applied not in the form of war but in the form of "nuclear deterrence" and "nuclear blackmail."

It cannot be refuted that, in the present world, the countries that have great nuclear forces enjoy powerful political influence. It is a good beginning that the Soviet Union and the United States have concluded the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. But they are far from stopping the development and improvement of their nuclear weapons. We cannot definitely say that they have developed nuclear weapons in order to start a nuclear war, but at least we can say that their development is intended to achieve their political aims. Though not having evolved into a nuclear war, "nuclear deterrence" does entail the possibility of such a war. In our nuclear age, Clausewitz's statement on the essence of war is still true, for it is politics that carefully examines the nature of war, it is politics that puts war as a means in subordination to political aims, and it is whether a political aim can be achieved that decides whether "nuclear deterrence" will evolve into a nuclear war.

Having proved that "war is a continuation of politics" is still true today, I do not mean that we should take nuclear warfare as a solution to political problems. On the contrary, I think only by admitting that war originates from and is a continuation of policy can we correctly handle the relationship between war and politics and more cautiously engage
ourselves in political activities so as to prevent politics from evolving into war. In sum, only by admitting that war is a continuation of politics can we find the way to avoid war. At any time, in any circumstances, war must be fought under the guidance of politics, and politics in turn must closely examine the nature of war as an instrument and cautiously consider whether political aims can be achieved by means of war. For a statesman or a strategist, it is far more important to have a profound understanding of the total meaning of war as a "continuation of politics" so as to correctly handle the relationship between war and politics, than to pose as a lover of peace by simply negating Clausewitz’s famous statement.
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NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 203.
3. Ibid., p. 118.
4. Ibid., p. 410.
5. Ibid., p. 120.
6. Ibid., p. 402.
7. Ibid., p. 405.
11. Ibid., p. 119.
13. Ibid., p. 121.
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