CONFEDERATE CAVALRY AT CHICKAMAUGA--
WHAT WENT WRONG?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

LAWYN C. EDWARDS, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1975
M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology, 1987

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1990

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**Confederate Cavalry at Chickamauga - What Went Wrong?**

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**Abstract:**
This study investigates General Braxton Bragg's use of cavalry during the pivotal Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. As army commander, Bragg was responsible for organizing units, selecting commanders, and assigning missions. His decisions had significant impact upon the tactical and operational fortunes of the Army of Tennessee and on Confederate strategy. First, this investigation defines the unique heritage of American cavalry. Second, it addresses the actual employment of cavalry in the United States of America. Did these roles coincide with those of European cavalry? Did available army and cavalry leadership play a crucial part in the successes and failures of Confederate plans? Do the careers of Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and Forrest offer clues to their efforts at Chickamauga? Also, how did the elements of national power (political, military, economic, geographic, and national will) contribute to Confederate cavalry performance? This study concludes that blame is to be shared between the commanders involved and the system within which they fought. This study presents an in depth view of the performance of Confederate cavalry in this "victory" at the "River of Death".

**Subject Terms:** American Civil War, Battle of Chickamauga, Confederate Cavalry, Civil War Cavalry Doctrine.
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DEDICATION

I am dedicating this work to the American soldier. Not only to the soldier of today, or the blue or the gray, but to all of them. My final conclusion in this work does not lay any guilt upon the private soldier of the Army of Tennessee. I truly believe it is up to the leadership to assist and allow the American fighting man to win this nation's wars. As a member of that leadership element, I am always reminded of a quote from a past president of Washington College, R.E. Lee. He said, "Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more. You should never wish to do less."

I also will allow myself the belief that the armies of the United States and the Confederate States in the field during the Spring and Summer of 1863, Americans all, were good enough to have walked across the face of Europe if they had been of a mind to do so. No matter what General von Moltke thought about these being two armed mobs rather than armies, they would have knocked his Prussians off the field. Since this is merely a personal feeling, I need not defend it here. I hope to do better in the thesis on its subject. I thank my wife for the untold assistance in this work and the patience to put up with me. She motivated me several times. I also will now go play ball with my twins, just like I promised them. I thank my mother and father for the help they rendered also. The final work was worth the hassle.
Introduction

This thesis has deep roots in a life-long thirst for knowledge on the War Between the States, the American Civil War. For my family, this was not a Civil War. No one fought or sided with the North in any of my four ancestral lineages. Interestingly enough, my wife’s family can say the same. These people lived so far back in the Georgia and Alabama woods that they probably did not even know any "Yankees", much less understand Yankee ideas and ways. In my great-great grandfather Louis Trawick’s family, ten brothers went off to war. One came home; it was not Louis.

Also, in today’s modern army, I am a cavalryman, having served both in the air and on the ground. I have spent my career learning the employment of light, fast-moving, hard-hitting cavalry forces whether they consist of M551 Sheridan Assault vehicles, M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles, OH-58 Scout helicopters, or AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. Though a small part of the US Army’s forces, cavalry units guard the forward deployed forces and will most likely be the first to fight in a full-scale war. Whether or not they are properly manned, equipped, organized, and led will certainly play a large part in US Army success in any such war. Learning from operations of the past may prepare me for those of the future. Certainly at the level where cavalry plays its largest role, the US Corps, the operational art of battle is in effect.
Cavalry units have historically been, and still are, almost always vastly outnumbered. Nevertheless, cavalry units today must successfully play their role in the battle with the ultimate goal being to win the battle in the covering force area. We must win from the outset.

Cavalry units did play a role in the great Civil War battle of the Western Theater, Chickamauga. Cavalry units were available for employment before the active fighting started in the campaign, through the battle, and during its aftermath. Chickamauga, however, was an infantry fight. The tangled undergrowth and woods kept use of artillery and mounted cavalry options very restricted. Glenn Tucker said that Chickamauga was "mere ground that few had ever heard of, much of it near worthless ground that lay uncultivated, vine-strewn, thicket-matted,—stretches that had never known a saw or heard the ring of the axe of man." Looking at a map of the battlefield and recalling this statement makes one wonder whether there were a cavalry mission here. Yet, Confederate cavalry units were present and made a contribution. Did their presence contribute to Union defeat? Could they have given more? Why were their uses and accomplishments so limited if they could have done better?

General James M. Gavin of World War II fame wrote in 1954 that he was not convinced that the army knew what it was doing with current cavalry operations. He said, "What we now need, as a nation, is an understanding of the past
that can be converted into tactics and battle hardware, and
give its soul back to the cavalry." However, the trend
which has culminated in the current J-Series Tables of
Organization and Equipment (TO&E) in the US Army, has been
away from General Gavin's desired objective. Current
document has emasculated the divisional cavalry squadrons
with the intent of making them light-weight reconnaissance
units only. Many suspect that their ability to develop the
situation is limited, thereby restricting their usefulness
to a division commander.

Conversely, at the operational level, the armored
cavalry regiment of an army corps is one of the strongest,
most versatile organizations in the history of warfare.
This organization is not only well manned and equipped but
it honestly has the ability to hurt an enemy.

The US Army adopted the doctrine of Air Land Battle in
the 1980's. The idea was to gain and maintain the
initiative. The intention was to hit the enemy hard on the
battlefield and deep behind the lines. He must be hit
continually until he can no longer hold his army together.
This doctrine called for a commander of strong fiber who had
his ultimate goal in mind and who, by personal leadership,
imbued his whole army with his confidence and will to win.
Continuous operations require almost superhuman effort,
because winners get just as tired as losers. However, when
using tactical maneuver and effort to gain the national
objective, extra effort even when tired pays off with great reward.

Chickamauga was a battle in which the Confederate army was the clear victor on the field. The Chickamauga campaigns, however, were not a Confederate victory. Retreats, tactical setbacks, and losses of territory demonstrated the poor Confederate performance in the maneuver phase of the battle. The aftermath was even worse. Chickamauga, the clear battlefield victory, was nothing but a hollow victory, wasted because the commander cast away its successes. Tactically, Chickamauga was a superb victory. Operationally, Chickamauga was a loss. Confederate leadership lost sight of its goals and its cavalry played a large role in the defeat.

The operational level of war, campaigns as opposed to just battles, is the level at which the Confederacy lost the battle of Chickamauga. The operational art of war takes the goals and political aims of a country and converts resources available into plans and orders for military campaigns. In the Chickamauga campaigns, the military forces of the Army of Tennessee should have been employed in a series of maneuvers or battles designed to fulfill the well-planned goals of the army commander. As one campaign neared completion, whether defensive or offensive, the commander should have known what to do next to further his goals. These rapidly executed follow-on campaigns should cause the greatest possible hurt to the enemy.
While the commander plans his campaigns, he should also decide when he will give battle and on what terrain. If he feels the need, he can decline battle at any point, planning to fight on his own terms and terrain at a later date. He should strenuously identify the strengths and weaknesses of his enemy, as well as those of his own army. He should protect his weaknesses and exploit his strengths. He should go for the enemy's jugular -- his center of gravity -- and avoid his enemy's strengths.

To accomplish his goals, the commander must plan constantly. He must keep himself well informed and protected. Information gathering and security are the job of the cavalry. The commander must organize, equip, and train his cavalry to accomplish what he desires and then let them go do the job. He must also put to use what they bring him.

According to FM 100-5 in May 1986, the operational level of war "requires the commander to answer three questions:

1) What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?

2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?

3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?"\(^4\)

The third question, as it pertains to the Army of Tennessee's cavalry, is addressed here. General Bragg
employed his forces in a manner which allowed him to fail operationally. The consequences of his actions reflected the haphazardness of his planning. Hopefully, a lesson will be learned for future operations and future commanders.
INTRODUCTION

ENDNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 10.

5. Ibid.

6. In this study there are numerous references to the units of the Union and Confederate armies. The Union army began early in the war to number corps and divisions. Corps were most often called by the number assigned to them. Divisions were sometimes referred to by their numbers but most often by the commander's name. In the Confederate army, no attempt was made to number units at any level. Throughout the war, all units were named after their commanders. As the commanders changed, usually the name of the unit changed. References to units in this paper generally use the proper names of the units. Therefore, Confederate units "sizes" are capitalized. Union corps are capitalized when their numerical designation is used. When the commanders name is used to denote the possessive, the unit size is not capitalized, no matter the side or the size.
CHAPTER ONE

American Cavalry Tradition and Tactics

The American cavalry experience is not built upon the European model. There were many reasons that America did not adopt purely European tactics, not the least of which was that this was America, not Europe. The enormous size of the country required units to be spread thinly across it. The settlers simply refused to all band together and go to one fairly easily protected region. The distance from St. Louis to Fort Laramie was greater than from the Atlantic to Berlin, and this was barely halfway to Oregon. Only one country, not numerous principalities, protected this expanse. Also, the vast majority of the population was in the East. The threat was to the west.

Up to the 1840's, the majority of American experience came from terrain that was less conducive to cavalry movement. In the War Between the States, the land east of the Mississippi River was the principle battlefield. In this area, the land was a jumble of dense forests, numerous rivers and mountains, and recurrent swamps and jungles. The large forces of Europe did not repeatedly encounter such diversity of terrain features.

Because the land was so large, the business of resupply was enormous also. Wagons moving enough supplies to provide for large bodies of cavalry formed trains impossibly long due to forage requirements of their own. Unpopulated regions did not allow the availability of provisions or
establishment of supply magazines as was done in Europe. The Revolutionary War provided very limited experience with warfare of the intensity which required such logistical operations.¹

In experience, the American army was essentially a frontier constabulary, a police force. It was accustomed to fighting in the American way, not the enormous European way. This American way of war called for chasing down small bands of Indians, patrolling enormously long trade routes, and performing unending guard duty. In addition, they were not particularly adept at fighting Indians. However, they certainly had even less experience at command and employment of units larger than a company in conventional European conflicts. What they did not need or use, they did not practice or learn.²

Another factor even more involved in American cavalry traditions was that Americans had an intense dislike for large standing armies. Originally, this may have developed from their experience with the large British army stationed in the colonies before the war. Colonists called this army "oppressive" even though it very often was called upon to defend colonial lives against internal (Indians) and external (European) foes. The truth is more likely to be the fact that Americans did not like the cost of a standing army any more then than they do now. They really did not complain about the British until Parliament taxed the colonies to pay for the troops. Standing armies cost money
not only when wars are being fought but, also, when wars are not being fought. To Americans this seemed a waste of good money.

The habit of raising militia armies only when actually at war seemed a lot more sensible economically to Americans. This argument can be further applied to the subject at hand. Mounted units cost decidedly more to equip, train, and maintain than do infantry troops. So, Americans always responded by going the cheaper route. For this reason, the history and experience of American mounted units was as sparse as were the units. The significant point here is that what did not exist could not train itself.

The Europeans probably did not like to pay the enormous costs of the massive mounted corps extant in European armies either. However, these countries and armies were generally ruled by one quite autocratic man who could do as he pleased. He made up his army as he pleased. The poorer people who were called upon to pay the bill were never consulted in Europe. In America, they were consulted and said, "No".

Amateurs commanded most Civil War cavalry units. Volunteers, not regulars, manned these units. These amateurs rushed to make up grand and glorious titles for their units and then made up the drill to go along with the collection of troops. Many of them had their own way of doing things and they were not going to let a fancy, aristocratic, West Pointer tell them how it should be done.
Many of the amateurs were right. The West Pointers did not have much background in cavalry operations, either. History shows that many of the amateurs were extremely successful. As in all arms or branches of the service, apparently some cream rose to the top from the professionals and amateurs alike. Little of this was due to formal tactics and drill.³

One point here must be brought out, though. The armies on both sides of the war were made up of citizen-soldiers who came to fight and then went home after the war was over, if not before. They were not long-term professionals -- careerists. It is arguable, though, that these were professional armies, at least not militia armies, by the middle of 1863. They were certainly not rookies, but rather well-seasoned veterans. By this time in the war, they certainly knew their business, knew tactics and drill, and had weeded out the grossly incompetent commanders, whether they be civilians or professionals.⁴

Because of these and other factors, the U.S. Army developed a distinct cavalry experience. It is quite evident that Americans did not use cavalry in the Napoleonic fashion, but rather, in an American fashion. Napoleon's numerous types of cavalry each had a different function as unique as their distinctive names. However, more often than not, the name and function was subjugated to necessity as dragoons, hussars, carabiniers, grenadiers, Mamelukes, chasseurs, lancers, and cuirassiers all charged together. These units and their mounted charges in battle comprised at
times up to a quarter of the Napoleonic army, 10,000 to 25,000 strong. Weapons, terrain, and requirements governed their usage and their success.\(^5\)

The effective range of a musket was 100 yards. It could be fired no more than 3 to 4 times a minute. Massed cavalry charges afforded a very effective means of routing an army against such limited firepower. Even then, there were defenses against cavalry assaults such as the British square.\(^6\)

If the truth be known, Americans did not spend an inordinate amount of time studying Napoleon's cavalry. However, there were several officers and theorists who did understand the lessons learned. However, many of the experiences did not translate well into the American situation or psyche. Added to the fact that there was little in common between the wars of 1810 Europe and 1860 America, was the fact that technology had brought killing to a more refined and accurate art. The effective range of the new rifled-muskets against individuals was around 500 yards. It was up to 1000 yards against massed targets. Improved technology should have led to revised tactics. However, tactical innovation lagged behind technology in the 1860's, at this crucial point in American history. This fact was not immediately grasped by either the North or the South, but would play a significant part in the evolution of cavalry throughout the war.\(^7\)
The last major experience Americans had with war was against Mexico in 1846-1848. In many ways, this war was a conventional war fought along Napoleonic lines. The officers who fought this war were, in large part, the senior commanders during the 1860's. They experienced their "view of the elephant" in the Napoleonic fashion and they were quite exceptional in their performance. Cavalry charged in the Napoleonic fashion, albeit on a much smaller scale. Units rode, sabers raised, against infantry and artillery lines at the crucial moment of the battle. Kearny at Churubusco and May at Resaca de la Palma achieved overwhelming success. In some minds, this war validated the classic saber charge. This experience lived on in memory even as technology changed."

However, as the War Between the States began, both sides envisioned a short fight with little long term effect. Each side saw a different outcome of this short fight. At first, neither side recruited many cavalry units. The first battles fought were almost solely infantry fights."

When the armies finally organized cavalry units, they did so on the model of the regular U.S. mounted services of 1860. The mounted missions were the collective experiences of the Mexican War and the frontier. The manuals followed by both sides remained those of the pre-Civil War U.S. Army. Saber swinging cavalry charges came during the war, yet both sides discovered other uses for mounted men."
The mounted charge against formed infantry was a hallmark of Napoleonic cavalry. Several units tried mounted charges early in the war with essentially the same results each time — no tactical gain and numerous empty saddles. The 5th U.S. Cavalry lost 60% at Gaines’ Mill while converting their own army’s retreat into a rout. The same type of events occurred at Chancellorsville, Cedar Mountain, and Gettysburg. Critics say the failures were due to the small size of the charging forces. Apologists say failure was due to the increased volume of accurate firepower from the infantry formations, much the same reason given for increased casualties in all facets of combat in this war.12

Another Napoleonic event, which occurred very seldom in this war, was the classic large cavalry-on-cavalry melee. These romantic visions of knighthood were nearly exclusive to the eastern theater and very limited. Without counting battles where cavalry was engaged by opposing cavalry in successive counterattacks secondary to the infantry battle, only three examples are widely known. The cavalry fights at Brandy Station and to the east of Gettysburg in 1863, and the one at Yellow Tavern in 1864 were exclusively mounted fights and degenerated into the classic saber wielding variety.13

The evolution of cavalry tactics caused much ridicule aimed at the mounted arm. A well-known quote that was bantered around the armies usually went something like "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?"14 Again, the infantryman’s
dislike for cavalry was given vociferous acknowledgement in Stephen Crane’s classic novel *The Red Badge of Courage*. The tall soldier was quoted as saying "They say there ain’t hardly any cavalry left in camp. They’re going to Richmond, or some place, while we fight all the Johnnies. It’s some dodge like that."15 In the narration, Crane also says, "Into the unspeakable jumble in the roadway rode a squadron of cavalry. The faded yellow of their facings shone bravely. There was a mighty altercation."16 Cavalry did not get much good press with the armies and was seen as trying to avoid a real fight or just clogging up the road.

Ingrained in the evolution of American cavalry tactics was a new school of thought. First, armies needed units with fast operational mobility. These fast units could provide a strong mounted reserve for the tactical situation when the critical point of battle came. They also allowed the commander to extend his control over a larger field of battle.17

The operational mobility of civil war cavalry allowed the troopers to overwhelm and confuse enemy commanders unaccustomed to such rapid movement. The extra freedom of movement of a significant force provided the using commander another added dimension to the battlefield. Cavalry could usually stay ahead of enemy intelligence gathering. Cavalry could usually get a force in first with enough firepower to hold until relieved or at least to delay an enemy force of infantry.
This tactic was very rapid in execution and facility of maneuvering. A line could literally be thrown down in one place, picked up easily, and moved to the next hot spot. The speed of moving the unit out of a losing situation was just as rapid. Even if each individual action was not a success, a series of such quick blows could throw an enemy off guard as he reacted to all of the minor annoyances.

There was also a new willingness to ride to battle and fight on foot. This happened in America at the same time that Europeans said such tactics were a failure. In his book on European cavalry, Jean Roemer said in 1863, that "it is not likely that any government will again attempt the formation of mounted infantry." He wrote in the United States, but his experiences were all European and that of one who was of "late an officer of cavalry in the service of the Netherlands". As he wrote, he was being proven wrong.

Brigadier General Basil W. Duke described Major General John H. Morgan's dismounted methods as follows:

If the reader will only imagine a regiment drawn up in single rank, the flank companies skirmishing, sometimes on horseback, and then thrown out as skirmishers on foot, and so deployed as to cover the whole front of the regiment, the rest of the dismounted men (one out of each set of four, and the corporals remaining to hold the horses), and deployed as circumstances required, and the command indicated to the front of, on either flank, or to the rear of the line of horses, the files two yards apart, and then imagine this line moved forward at the double quick, or oftener a half run, he will have an idea of Morgan's style of fighting.

Dismounted fighting called for an innovation -- that of horse holders -- touched upon in General Duke's discourse.
Each cavalry unit counted off in groups of four. When fighting dismounted, the number four man held the horses while the other three fought. Many troopers would diligently vie for number four position! They kept the horses at a safe distance but also available for instant use for retreat or pursuit. Also, if needed, these men could provide a local reserve although at the high cost of wandering horses. Horse holding had negative aspects. It required a quarter of available combat power during a fight. There was, also, great confusion if enemy soldiers or artillery fire separated the troopers from their horses at an inopportune time.\textsuperscript{21}

Mounted infantry tactics had its detractors even in the face of its many successes. Many senior officers did not like the habit because they saw training being divided.\textsuperscript{22} Troopers had to be trained as cavalry which was already difficult and time consuming to do. They also had to be trained as infantry which did things differently and more strictly. Some feared that a unit that could not accomplish either infantry or cavalry missions would result. General Forrest and others solved this problem by maintaining a mounted element while most others were dismounted. In Forrest’s case, the mounted element was generally himself and his escort, a light company.\textsuperscript{23}

Other critics said dismounting the cavalry was bad for morale and took away the offensive spirit of the unit. As stated above, they ignored the success of the tactic. There
are plenty of examples of such tactics being used to great success with no degradation of morale or offensive spirit. Forrest's victory at Brice's Crossroads is such an example and one of the classics of the war and American history.²⁴

Frank Batchelor, one of Terry's Texas Rangers, published some of his letters, along with a fellow Ranger. In the work entitled "Batchelor-Turner Letters 1861-1864", he says of the cavalry,

"Their is the duty of scouring the enemy lines night and day and reporting his movements--they are constantly in sight of the advancing foe, fighting him at every favorable position, hurrying up the jaded infantry, obstructing the roads, and often standing under severe fires of his artillery, or resisting the charges of his cavalry."²⁵

In his description of the job of cavalry, Trooper Batchelor touches on many of the remaining missions assigned to cavalry units under the tactics refined in this war. These need to be explained somewhat.

Guard missions were a means of security usually required while the army is on the march. Advance and flank guards kept the commander warned of any interference which could affect his unit. Guard missions also occurred while the unit was engaging an enemy. They allowed a commander the time to react to an enemy flanking movement threatening his line of battle. The rearguard very often concealed an army's poor state of organization from an enemy and protected it from further injury. It could forestall a pursuit by slowing down the enemy. A rearguard action was usually the final act of a battle, allowing the main body to
disengage and get away. Cavalry units quite often conducted rearguard fights from the trenches recently abandoned by the infantry. They were usually quite violent and bloody.

Outposts, another means of security, were generally mounted pickets around an encamped army. These pickets were usually farther out than infantry pickets and provided the security for the army as it rested and reorganized. Cavalry was also quite adept at harassing the enemy pickets because riders could get away rapidly before a larger enemy force could react.

Screening was both a defensive and offensive security mission. Defensively, a screen was used to keep the enemy from using his cavalry to gain information on the friendly army. This allowed the army to move, undetected by enemy intelligence, thus providing an element of surprise. Defensive screening usually required the dispersal of the force, but upon retirement in front of an enemy, the screen became stronger as it collapsed upon itself and its army. An offensive screen was quite probably the opposite. The force consolidated to punch a hole through the enemy screen at a weak point to gain more information. Cavalry screened infantry movements and achieved tactical surprise. Major General Fitzhugh Lee did this quite successfully with a small force dragging brush to indicate a larger movement at the 2nd Battle of Manassas.

Information gathering was another forte of the cavalry. This embraced reconnaissance, which was a strategic use of
cavalry, as well as scout and spy systems. While security was usually a defensive action, information gathering often involved the unit in combat.

The reconnaissance was exemplified most accurately by the rides that Major General J.E.B. Stuart made in the East. During his two rides around the Army of the Potomac, Stuart's mission was to determine the size and disposition of the opposing force. He brought back quite a bit of useful and timely intelligence. This intelligence gathering was much more accurate and valuable than that obtained by most other means of more limited scope. On a strategic reconnaissance, the intelligence gatherers were trained military observers. These observers tended to exaggerate less than civilians, at least on the enemy situation, if not on their own accomplishments. The dangers of such missions became apparent at Gettysburg when glory-seeking replaced mission accomplishment as the purpose of the ride.3

Every army should have a thoroughly planned and executed scout system. Each scout should be specially trained in picking favorable terrain, water crossings, and routes, and in estimating enemy strength and the land's capability to support the army. These troopers needed to be sent ahead of an advancing force to keep the main body's march as free of complications as possible. Generals Forrest and Morgan used an extensive network of scouts. These scouts rode out days or weeks in advance of the main body. The scouts stayed ahead of the column throughout the
operation while sending necessary information back to the main column. Scouts sent duplicate reports back to multiple addressees thereby insuring the information got back to the right place and had not been compromised. Of course, each message stipulated to whom a duplicate had been sent. For such missions, the need for a well-organized network was essential to provide sufficient men and horses to accomplish the tasks at hand.31

Spies were another source of information. While this was not a regular cavalry mission per se, the intelligence retrieved from spies could be transported, verified, and explained by trained officers and troopers. It was essential to verify information by multiple sources to assist in breaking through deception plans. In addition, the commander or headquarters bureau of information needed a trained and informed messenger available and prepared to answer questions regarding the information forwarded. This allowed different reports to be sifted and compared before conclusions were reached. Any commander who acted too hastily, or indeed too slowly, on information gathered, most assuredly made more wrong than correct guesses.32

The raid was one of the premier novelties in the realm of civil war cavalry tactics. The South began the craze and had many experts among its foremost cavalry leaders. Southern raiders of note included Morgan, Forrest, Wheeler, Ashby, and, on a more limited scale, Mosby in Virginia. However, the North learned the uses of a good raid and set
up its own practice. Colonel Benjamin Grierson did well in Mississippi in 1863. Colonel Abel Streight also tried very hard in Alabama and Georgia that same year. Streight's only problem was that he was up against the raiding expert, Forrest, who ran his blueclad troopers to ground. By the end of the war, the Yankees had taken a Rebel idea and refined it into an art form. Major General James Wilson and his 18,000 blue horsemen were the epitome of such, a veritable raiding army.

Raids very seriously disrupted the enemy rear area and logistics bases even though they were also quite destructive of friendly cavalrymen and their mounts. Even though raids very often decimated the force executing them, when a strong enough diversion could be created to cover for them, or if a strong diversion was needed to cover another move, the raid was quite beneficial due to the troubles it caused enemy commanders and their lines of communication.

Pursuits were another strong capability of cavalry units. "Fresh infantry units can pursue defeated infantry, but exhausted infantry cannot. In this case cavalry is necessary." Pursuing cavalry came from a mounted element retained for just such an eventuality. The fresher they were, the more able they were to press the pursuit to its culmination. Armies pursued by nipping at the heels of a retreating enemy. Better yet, by moving parallel to the enemy and hitting his flanks over and over again until he was slowed, the enemy could then be assailed at the head of
his column. This led to his being surrounded and to his
detailed destruction. Commanders pressed pursuits without
allowing the pursuing troopers to stop and loot. They also
exercised tight control so that the pursuit itself did not
become overextended or premature. Cavalry could not ride
away in pursuit of small units before the enemy main body
was defeated in detail and driven from the field. The
classic pursuit was Forrest's chase of Sturgis after the
Union defeat at Brice's Crossroads. "After such a defeat,
there should be no stopping a pursuit and it should be
pushed as far and as long as possible." However, in
general, pursuits were not accomplished well during this
conflict. At Chickamauga, a pursuit was not even attempted.

Confederate Colonel John S. Mosby brought ambushes by
mounted men to a level unmatched by any other unit during
the war. Personal innovation and ingenuity was added by
each practitioner. Forrest used his men and artillery to
ambush, defeat, capture, and then use Union gunboats on the
Tennessee River. He was likely unique in that he was the
only cavalry commander to have a navy, albeit a short-lived
one.

Mounted couriers and aides were a final cavalry chore.
This was one of their non-combat roles which tended to
divide up units and make them much less effective. The
Union cavalry, especially in Virginia, suffered much under
the strain of this type of mission during the first years of
the war. The mounted courier was an integral part of the

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ever-expanding command and control effort which was at loggerheads with the need for a combined cavalry effort and force. The way the Union solved the problem was to mount more soldiers. The South had a more severe problem since it did not have the resources necessary to do this. Its cavalry suffered more as a result.

Some critics claim that cavalry participation in the War Between the States was negligible and not worth mentioning. However, this is a view brought about because tactical usage of cavalry did not conform to the Napoleonic standard. The bloodiest day of the war, at Sharpsburg, led to only 28 Union cavalry casualties. Fredericksburg led to a total of eight, less than one in every 1,500 Union casualties. In three years, only five charges were made in major battles, which was less than what Marshall Ney made in three hours at Waterloo. Yet, for the war at hand, the Napoleonic standard was an inappropriate gauge. Cavalry charges alone were not the answer. Cavalry was not used in the Napoleonic manner but this did not mean that they were immaterial to the prosecution of the war.

The most fitting conclusion to this section on cavalry tactics has already been written. These two quotes are written by men on opposite sides of the issue of cavalry effectiveness during this war, but they end with startlingly similar summations even if differing assessments.

In *Attack and Die*, the authors say:

Civil War cavalry commanders believed that the cavalry arm should have been used aggressively, but the
introduction of the rifle made cavalry attacks against infantry perilous. Infantry armed with the rifle could rapidly empty the saddles of advancing cavalry. Cavalrymen made enough successful saber charges during the war to maintain the saber's reputation, but saber charges were not common. Cavalry often was given semicombat and noncombat assignments, but when it did take a combat role, Civil War cavalry often fought on foot. Dismounted cavalry was used both to defend and attack entrenchments. The Union cavalry, better armed with repeating rifles, was able in the later war period to skillfully combine dismounted and mounted tactics. The Civil War was a period of change in cavalry tactics, and the war left the cavalry arm with an uncertain future.\textsuperscript{42}

More in tune with American, or at least non-Napoleonic afficionados, is British Lieutenant Colonel Denison who said:

\begin{quote}
...in the American Civil War, the contending parties had certainly originated and improved a system of working cavalry that was capable of producing great results. No one can read the accounts of Morgan's raids, of Forrest's expeditions, of Stuart's great sweeping reconnaissances, of Grierson's operations in Mississippi, of Wilson's invading army of cavalry, of Sheridan's turning movements at Petersburg, of his fighting in line of battle, of his pursuits, &c., without feeling that the mounted rifle principle had been wonderfully effective, and that it is the proper method of using horsemen under the improved state of projectile weapons.

The professional cavalry officer in Europe, wrapt up in the traditions of the wars of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, bearing in mind the failure of the dragoon principle in the seventeenth century, and holding it as a fixed principle that cavalry relying upon firearms are necessarily worthless, has never given the proper weight to the teachings of the American Civil War.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}
CHAPTER ONE

ENDNOTES


6 Denison, p.393.

7 Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1982), p. 56.

8 This is a term used during the Civil War period which denoted the first time a soldier went into combat. This term today has been superseded by the term "first blood" or "baptism of fire".


10 Urwin, p.108.

11 Alonzo Gray, Cavalry Tactics as Illustrated by the War of the Rebellion (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1910).


14 McWhiney and Jamieson, p. 133f.

1c. Crane, p. 133.

17. Gray, p. 121.


19. Roemer, Title page.


22. Ibid., p. 176.


30. Gray, p. 118; Griffith, Battle Tactics in the Civil War, p. 183.


32. Ibid.


34. Ibid., pp. 181-186.

35. Griffith, Battle Tactics in the Civil War, p. 183.


37. Ibid.
3. Ibid.


5. Ibid.

6. McWhiney and Jamieson, p. 139.

CHAPTER TWO

Confederate Cavalry

To gauge a unit's effectiveness, one must understand the foundation upon which it is built. The primary building blocks for a military formation include doctrine, organization, armament, and leadership. Each of these blocks contributes significantly to the unit's ability to accomplish the assigned mission. Even though an army can succeed with weaknesses, the strength of its foundation is at the heart of all of its endeavors. Each block must be strong.

The Southern army was the first to put together a cavalry organization of any significant size. This was still a minimal investment given the reasons stated before. However, whereas the Federals only had a regiment or so of mounted combat troops at First Manassas, the Confederate total was seven regiments. In this first major battle of the war, neither side used its cavalry to any constructive purpose.¹

Whether the widely held Southern belief that any one Southerner could whip 10 Yankees is correct or not, the Southern way of life during the antebellum years provided for a more out-of-doors, agrarian lifestyle.² This held true most significantly in the eastern states. Not everyone in the North was a spindly factory worker or store clerk any more than all Southerners were Daniel Boone clones. However, just as slavery was an institution more peculiar to
the South, the requirement to ride, shoot, and fight was more a part of growing up to many Southerners. In this vein, the South practiced the equestrian arts more. This gave the Southern commanders a greater pool of horsemen to draw from when cavalry units became necessary.

One of the major weaknesses of Southern cavalrymen was their affinity for independence. This was an individual as well as a collective phenomenon. Each soldier reacted poorly to military discipline because of his upbringing. As units, they preferred to act independently also. This is seen in their great propensity for and success at raiding. Commanders such as Mosby, Forrest, Morgan, and Stuart were at their best when left to their own devices.

A standard procedure adopted by Confederate cavalry at the beginning of the war required each trooper to furnish his own horse. This procedure remained in effect throughout the army during the whole war. Individual remounting caused some severe problems among Confederate cavalry units but was most likely the only solution available. The South did not have the vast reserves of horses available to the North.

The most significant effect of individual remounting was the absence of many troopers from the ranks at any given time. Hard campaigning was ruinous of horseflesh and necessitated constant remounting. As each trooper lost or wore out a horse, he was of no use to the unit until he found a new one. He would leave the unit to seek this new horse, hopefully from a Yankee, but often at home or in
someone else's barn. The command recognized this need and allowed troopers to go on their hunting trips. This process, though, had essentially the same effect on the unit as desertion because the troopers were not available for battle. Also, many troopers did take advantage of the trip to visit family, plant crops, harvest crops, or just plain desert. They were not always in a rush to return to camp.\(^5\)

Another effect of this policy was the well-known tendency of cavalry units to go "riding a raid". Troopers captured and herded long lines of enemy wagons and mules, as well as large pony herds, to keep Southern armies supplied and Southern cavalry mounted. Commanders with an imminent problem of blown horses often subordinated all other issues, including tactical and strategic needs, to the more thrilling possibilities of plunder and independent operations which came with a raid. Many of the raids may have hurt the Southern cause more than they helped. Some were no doubt made for merely personal gain. But again, there was no other available solution so the detriment could be laid more properly on the doorstep of the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments.\(^6\)

However, there were some benefits of each trooper supplying his own horse which gave the Southern cavalry an advantage. Each trooper took much better care of his own animal's back and hooves during non-campaigning time than would someone who had a government issue mount. To this day, soldiers take better care of their personal vehicles.
than they do of their assigned military vehicles. This happens even though the military vehicle will quite possibly save their lives in a combat situation if it is maintained and understood well. This more lavish care of the animals made it possible for available Confederate cavalry to start out on many campaigns with better conditioned horses. The fact that their animals suffered such heavy tolls during operations only leads one to wonder at the increased losses that would have come from less care before the departure from camp.

Confederate cavalry organization followed the model of the pre-war U.S. Cavalry as closely as possible. Initially, organizations started as individual units and regiments assigned to infantry commands in a supporting role. Army commanders rapidly consolidated these separate units into brigades, divisions, and even corps. Even though they never reached the size of their Napoleonic counterparts, the South did recognize the need for this consolidation some time before the North came to the same conclusion.

Corps, divisions, and brigades varied in size from two to five of their next subordinate commands. The primary building block was the regiment. Regiments were either raised in their entirety or made up by consolidating individual battalions and companies. Ten companies, 80 men per company, generally made up a regiment which was then subdivided into squadrons of two companies each. Therefore, a regiment, staff included, had a little over 800 men. As
attrition took its toll, commanders reduced the number of squadrons as companies were kept up to strength. Finally, even this effort collapsed as units dropped to between 200 and 400 men.10

At the onset of the war, the Southern cavalry had a distinct advantage of organization. Southern states had the beginnings of their mounted units in their organized militia. These units were chiefly social clubs. They required extensive effort to achieve wartime status, but the framework did exist. Morale in Southern mounted units was commensurately higher due to their camaraderie and organization.11

Conversely, prior to the war, Northern militia rolls languished. Many states had not turned in their required rolls to the War Department for several decades. Others had merely turned in lists of all males of eligible ages from the census rolls. There was little organization at all and no mounted units.12

To add to the militia organization, the new Confederate cavalry claimed most of the senior leadership and talent of the old U.S. Cavalry. As their home states seceded from the Union, Southerners in the army resigned their commissions and went home to help the war effort of the states and the Confederacy. Of the five pre-war mounted units, four of the full colonels commanding the regiments went South. Not only was this devastating to the U.S. units, but these officers were educated in and understood cavalry operations as it was
in the U.S Army. They were to use this knowledge to the South's benefit. To make things worse, the one remaining regimental commander, Colonel Philip St. George Cooke of the 2nd Dragoons, was a Southerner by birth and not initially trusted. Two regimental commanders, R. E. Lee of the 1st Cavalry, and Albert Sidney Johnston of the 2nd Cavalry went on to become full generals in the Confederate Army. Even though Colonels Thomas T. Fauntleroy of the 1st Dragoons and William W. Loring of the Mounted Rifles were both general officers with Southern forces, they were by no means as stellar as Lee and Johnson. However, their loss to the Union came at the critical time. This initial list of names and duty positions lends credence to the view that more Southerners were "horsemen" than Northerners were.13

Along with the senior leadership of the mounted units, many junior mounted officers made names for themselves in Southern service. Among those horsemen that gained their rank and fame in Confederate service were Joseph E. Johnston (GEN), E. Kirby Smith (GEN), John B. Hood (LTG/Temp.GEN), Richard S. Ewell (LTG), William J. Hardee (LTG), George Crittenden (MG), Fitzhugh Lee (MG), Dabney Maury (MG), James E. B. Stuart (MG), Earl Van Dorn (MG), Joseph Wheeler (MG), and Henry Sibley (BG).14

The Confederates were the first to accept the need for large numbers of cavalry. This did not translate into the immediate ability to equip and arm large formations or quantities. To a large extent, early in the war, troopers
lacked tack and arms suitable for military use. But, each trooper who brought his horse, usually brought tack and weapons with him. As the war progressed, military purchasing and the "battlefield supply system" provided for some needs. "Rebel ingenuity", spurred on by a sense of urgency and necessity, required constant improvisation.⁵

Confederate cavalry units armed themselves with a myriad of weapons to begin the war. Some of these arms remained the hallmark of Southern cavalry and others fell by the wayside. Many troopers arrived in camp with percussion and flintlock rifles of varying lengths and calibers. They brought fowling pieces and shotguns that had previously accompanied them on hunting trips. They arrived with knives of all sizes up to Bowie knives approaching the length and weight of the Roman short sword. Some brought swords, from past wars, of all types, uses, and utility.⁶

As they learned their trade, troopers quickly realized that not all of these weapons were useful. The long barreled weapons were of little use and hard to carry on horseback. The knives were good as far as knives went for camp life, but were not all that useful for fighting.⁷

Arriving along with uniforms and a more regimented existence were the once-coveted sabres. No matter what their function was in European cavalry units, the Southern troopers knew that sabers were made for roasting ears of corn, meat, and bread over a campfire. Very seldom were these classic symbols of cavalry used for fighting. They
were most assuredly long and sharp knives, but firearms reached farther and hurt more. Troopers very often left sabers in camp.  

The famous Confederate ranger, Colonel Mosby, said his company in the 1st Virginia Cavalry was issued sabers in 1861. His opinion was summed up in his statement:

but the only real use I ever heard of their being put to was to hold a piece of meat over a fire for frying. I dragged one through the first year of the war, but when I became a commander, I discarded it. It was of no use against gunpowder.  

Even the Yankees thought little of the saber. Major General Wilson, the successful Union cavalry commander, fought in both major theaters of the war and finally defeated General Forrest at the end of the war. He said:

I think it is demonstrable, both from the experience of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, as well as that of the Army of the West, that the saber is as much out of date for cavalry in a country like ours as the short sword of the Roman soldier is for infantry. It is in the way and is of no value whatever in a fight, as compared with repeating rifles, carbines, and pistols.

Sabers were used some in the cavalry-on-cavalry battles at Brandy Station and Gettysburg. However, even in these battles, firearms were the weapon of choice for most troopers until they had fired all of their loaded guns. Then, with no firepower left, they resorted to sabers. By the time of the Battle of Yellow Tavern in 1864, troopers almost exclusively used firearms in the melee.  

Many other commanders never said much quotable about sabers, but cast their votes by their actions. General Morgan never even had his men armed with sabers. It was too
much added weight and noise for no useful purpose.\textsuperscript{22} Forrest and his men carried sabers, but rarely used them albeit many modern renditions of Forrest show him wielding a saber ferociously. One of his many wounds was inflicted by a young Union lieutenant with a sword whom Forrest tired of and shot dead with a pistol.\textsuperscript{23}

Firepower did survive the test of combat to become the guiding light of cavalry arms. This was manifest by numbers of shotguns, revolvers, and carbines. At close quarters, these weapons were immensely effective and deadly. At greater distances, the ballistics, accuracy, and reliability were not of the highest order but they provide an impressive rate of fire which sufficed for the job at hand.\textsuperscript{24}

Shotguns were an exclusive weapon of the Southern units. They were useful because they could be loaded with a myriad of available ammunitions, from lead shot to nails and rocks. They were effective against several targets at once when at close quarters.

Carbines came into their own during these times. Initially, troopers cut down longer weapons to be more manageable on horseback. These weapons were usually smoothbore percussion guns. They, too, could use a myriad of ammunition ranging from single bullets to lead shot to the southern innovation called buck and ball. This latter load, a large caliber ball with several shot thrown in for good measure, was as useful at close range as a shotgun.\textsuperscript{25} Later issues included many different types and makes of
breechloading carbines purchased overseas, taken from the battlefield, or copied in Confederate arsenals. Southerners carried models such as the 20-year old Hall’s, the newer Sharps, Burnside, and Maynard models, and even a few captured repeaters such as Spencers and Henrys. Most of these were percussion weapons. The availability of ammunition made them more useful in the South than the brass cartridge repeating weapons the North was beginning to produce.26

The most beloved weapon in the Confederate cavalry was the revolver. First invented by Samuel Colt, it became quite famous with the Texas Rangers. The US Cavalry finally adopted revolvers in the decade before the War Between the States. Colts of the Navy ’51 and Army ’60 models were by far the most plentiful even though the Confederate Ordnance Department did a magnificent job of producing copies throughout the war. One of the most prized possessions of any southern trooper was one of French Doctor Jean LeMat’s formidable .40 caliber, 9-shot revolvers that had an 18-gauge shotgun barrel included. Confederate buyers did their utmost to get large quantities of these weapons home, but unfortunately for the South, they were more often talked about than carried.27

Desiring the firepower provided by the revolver, southern troopers carried as many of them as possible. They had revolvers on their belts, in their pants waist, in their boot tops, slung over the saddle, and in their saddlebags.
Since revolvers were difficult to load, many troopers carried numerous extra cylinders for their weapons. They kept pre-loaded cylinders in special pockets on their shirts, available for a quick changeover. By the time many of them emptied all of their loads, the battle was usually over or their mission accomplished.  

As the war continued, cavalry commanders began to add small batteries of light-weight horse artillery to their organizations. They used these guns with varying degrees of success. The horse artillery confused the enemy as to unit size and makeup. It also played its more common role of providing supporting fire. The two best known artillery commanders of such units were Stuart's gallant Major John Pelham and Forrest's Captain John Morton. Morton took his perilous command throughout the war with Forrest without ever losing one of his guns, no matter how many captured guns he added to his unit.

There were two major theaters of operations during this conflict, the eastern and the western. This study is about the campaigns and battle fought around Chickamauga. These engagements took place in the western theater which had a character of its own, very different from that of the East. See Map 1.

In the western theater of war, cavalry units and tactics took on an even more Southern flavor, if possible. Above and beyond the fact that these men were both Southern and Western, they were a long way from the seat of power.
Map 1. Theater of Operations
Distance and politics both removed them from primary importance in this war. Since they were out of sight and out of mind of the administration in Richmond, they were much more liberal in their interpretation of military standards. They were quite often left to fend for themselves by the central government which had a hard enough time equipping and feeding the armies in the East which defended their capital.\textsuperscript{30}

H. M. Johnstone, a British Lieutenant Colonel of Cavalry and proponent of Southern cavalry, said in his A History of Tactics (1906):

\ldots another good illustration of the admirable fighting qualities of Forrest's Cavalry, and of their ability to act boldly and effectively either mounted or dismounted... may be attributed to the superior intellect of the Southern gentleman of whom his force was mainly composed, men of extraordinary self-reliance and strong common sense; men who knew perfectly well when each system of fighting would be most advantageous, and who had gained their experience of the practical work of war upon the battlefield. It must be admitted that the circumstances in America were peculiar to the continent, and that the same system might not be quite so successful in European armies, filled with peasants of less intelligence than the American citizens.\textsuperscript{31}

This would most assuredly have brought forth numerous belly laughs, guffaws, and strutting from the Tennessee and Alabama troopers who made up Forrest's commands. But, they were good soldiers, well-led, and, by the beginning of 1862, supreme veterans.

They did go about their business in a much less conventional way than did Eastern Confederates. Whereas the eastern army used large bodies of cavalry and they even had
some cavalry melees, such did not occur in the west. Western leaders moved much more rapidly to raiding, scouting, and dismounted fighting. During their first three years in the saddle, western Confederate cavalry played havoc with railroads and had a serious impact on the Union logistic system. There were several instances when Southern cavalry operations delayed or caused Union offensives to be abandoned altogether, such as Grant's problems around Holly Springs and Buell's advance into east Tennessee.32

The leaders themselves were less conventional. Most of the pre-war trained talent went to the East. Cavalry leaders of note in the West were Forrest, Morgan, and Wheeler. Of these, only Wheeler was a man of any military training, much less a West Pointer. Wheeler had a West Pointer's limited education in cavalry but did have a year of experience in the Mounted Rifles.33 His initial service to the Confederacy, though, was in artillery and infantry until, after the Battle of Shiloh, he was made a cavalry commander in July 1862. Forrest and Morgan had no military training whatsoever. They gravitated to cavalry and to command through an innate and inborn ability. Because they had no training, they made up tactics and even drill as they went along. If it worked, good; if it did not work, they did not do it that way again. Unlike the aristocratic eastern vision of cavaliers and knights, these westerners were fighters. Forrest had one simple underlying philosophy of warfare which said "War means fightin' and fightin' means
He did both well. He has been credited with the bastardized saying "Get thar furthest with the mostest". Some biographers say he said it just that way, others say he was not quite so murderous of the English language. All biographers agree that the saying is quite accurate to his train of thought and his actions.\textsuperscript{3}

The western troopers took their Southern individuality personally and to the extreme. They believed that this was the real cause of this war in the first place, the chance to do things their own way. Paddy Griffith in his \textit{Battle In the Civil War} expounded:

They therefore felt free to go home when they felt like it, or to wander away looking for forage, for remounts (often stolen from the Yankees), or for meals (usually from distant cousins resident in the area of operations). This was doubtless a highly agreeable and civilised way to fight a war, but it left the regiments present for duty lamentably weak. The extreme case came in First Tennessee Cavalry, when it unilaterally decided to disband itself completely apart from sixteen men who preferred to stay in camp.\textsuperscript{36}

They merely came and went as they desired. As the war turned against them, "going" got worse. The army made efforts to stem the flow and to round up deserters and stragglers, but these efforts were insufficient.\textsuperscript{37}

The weapons used were essentially the same as in the East with the exceptions already noted. The one notable remaining difference between eastern and western Confederate cavalry was the lack of a notable difference between "Johnny Reb" and "Billy Yank" in the West. The Union troops in the West were of the same rural stock as their antagonists. To a large extent on both sides, soldiers were from the region
in which they fought. The West was on the edge of the frontier all along the Mississippi River. So, the cavalry of the Army of the Tennessee faced Union cavalry which had as strong a claim to equestrian skills as they did. Union organization was not as strong at the beginning of the war, but they finished the conflict in superlative shape.

Three men played a significant role in the use of Confederate cavalry during the period of this study. They were the leaders, the commander of the army and the senior cavalry commanders. General Braxton Bragg had commanded the Army of Tennessee since soon after the Battle of Shiloh in 1862. He had two major cavalry formations which fluctuated in size throughout the campaigns under study. Major General Joseph Wheeler, Jr. commanded a cavalry corps. Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest commanded a division during the initial phases of this study and, later a corps of his own. The careers and personalities of these officers greatly affected the utilization and success rate of the Army of Tennessee's cavalry formations.

Braxton Bragg was born on 22 March 1817, in Warrenton, Warren County, North Carolina. His father, Thomas, was a skilled carpenter and contractor. His mother was Margaret Crosland Bragg. One of his older brothers, Thomas, was the Confederate Attorney General for a four-month period in 1861-1862, and also served as state governor (1855-1859), U.S. senator (1859-1861), and wartime aide to the governor. Another brother, John, served Mobile, Alabama as a
congressman and judge. Others were less distinguished and William, the youngest, died in combat. 10

Braxton entered the U.S. Military Academy at West Point during the summer of 1833, at the age of sixteen. He turned out to be an excellent student by doing well in the subjects taught. Even though he flirted with disciplinary infractions and was almost expelled for playing cards, he remained high in class standing. He was well-respected for his "manliness, independence, and unbending integrity" as remembered by classmate and later opponent, Joseph Hooker, and many others. Even though he fought no duels while at West Point, fellow cadets remembered him for being "reckless and daring" and disputatious. He gave "his opinions on all occasions and all subjects in a most tactless manner". 17

Lieutenant Bragg's first few years in the army were anything but usual for an officer. He guarded his rank against all sorts of perceived personal affronts. He was a very strict and exacting, though thoroughly fair, junior officer towards his troops. On the other hand, he vehemently disliked any attempt to curb his rights and privileges from senior officers. He continued his disputatious ways. He attacked many of his seniors in published writings under a pseudonym. He developed some good ideas for army administration, but all of his writing was done for civilian publications with his goal that of showing how political and incompetent senior officers were rather than seeking improvement of the army. 40

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Bragg discovered his severe lack of good health during his tours with the 3rd Artillery in the Second Seminole War in Florida. His poor health was to continue to affect him for the rest of his life. During much of this time before the Mexican War, he was on sick leave or personal leave taken in an effort to restore his health. Given his weak constitution, his inability to get along with people, and his cantankerous moods, he was exiled to General Zachary Taylor's army in Texas as the border turned turbulent.

The newly promoted Captain Bragg reputedly had the best-trained light artillery battery in Taylor's army. He demanded instant obedience and courage, but he was always with his troops as they fought. He became legendary due to his "Flying Artillery" and his punctiliousness for protecting government property, regulations, and his soldiers. He received several brevets up to lieutenant colonel for bravery at Buena Vista. General John E. Wool delegated him administrative control of the army after General Taylor relinquished command.

Bragg remained very frank and critical in his prolific writing about Buena Vista. Taylor credited Bragg with saving the army by his performance during the battle. Bragg gave the credit to the "artillery", his men and guns, not himself. He argued his dislike for volunteers, especially questioning the courage of Kentuckians who ran at the first shot. He supported only the Mississippians who stood their ground under their West Point commander, Jefferson Davis.
Bragg may have learned some wrong lessons from Buena Vista, also. He did not see that the army came close to annihilation through rashness. He only saw that his mentor, Taylor, had won. He failed to learn the strength of a defensive position. He saw that victory came from offense. He also overrated the contribution of artillery by applying the results at Buena Vista equally to every situation."

After the war, Bragg met and married a rich young Louisiana woman. He trained his battery excellently for three years at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. The army eventually sent him further west, possibly to keep him quiet and away from Washington. This transfer caused conflict between Bragg and his old friend Jefferson Davis, now the Secretary of War. In 1856, tired completely of frontier life, he resigned from the service after nineteen years of active duty."

As a new civilian, he purchased a 1,600-acre sugar plantation near his wife's Louisiana home and went to work. He also entered into minor state politics where he was disgusted with the corruption, graft, and general dishonesty. He was able to assist in the founding of a military college in Louisiana which was to be presided over by an old West Point friend, William T. Sherman."

Even before Louisiana seceded, the governor appointed Bragg to command the state troops. Bragg successfully negotiated the peaceful surrender of the federal arsenals in Baton Rouge. With this seizure, the state legislature voted
Louisiana out of the Union, created a state army and named Bragg its commander with the rank of major general.  

At the beginning of the war, no one on either side had doubts as to Bragg's fitness or abilities. He finally volunteered for Confederate service and was put in command of Southern forces in Pensacola in mid-1861 as a major general. In 1862, he was promoted to lieutenant general in command of the Department of Alabama and West Florida. At Shiloh in April 1862, he commanded the 2nd Corps of General Albert Sidney Johnston's army. When Johnston died at Shiloh, General P.G.T. Beauregard took command but was later relieved by Confederate President Jefferson Davis and replaced by Bragg. Now a full general, Bragg commanded the primary Confederate army in the West. In mid-1862, he began an invasion of Kentucky which went well at first. Then Bragg lost his confidence, won a battle at Perryville and lost the campaign. He retreated into Tennessee where he won another pyrrhic victory at Murfreesboro while losing another campaign. He then backed off to the Shelbyville, Tennessee area and sat until Rosecrans began the Tullahoma-Chickamauga campaigns.

In the time that he had held command of the Army of Tennessee, he continued in his old ways. He argued with superiors and irritated subordinates. He administered the army well and took care of the soldiers even though he remained a strict disciplinarian. Many of his senior subordinates disliked him and conspired against him. Many
anti-Bragg men were Kentuckians who disliked his accusations of rampant cowardice by Kentuckians at Buena Vista and the state in general during his Perryville campaign. 49

Many of the general officers delved deeply into politics. They were anti-Davis men who saw Bragg as a Davis favorite so they were anti-Bragg, also. 50 Bragg was full of indecisiveness that may have stemmed from his old habit of learning the book well and not bending on anything. He started every move with confidence and then seemed to lose confidence and failed to push on to victory. The pettiness of his subordinates and his lack of trust in them probably contributed to his wariness. His units of his army certainly did not work as a team as they headed toward Chickamauga.

Joseph Wheeler, Jr. was born in Augusta, Georgia on 10 September 1836. His father, originally from Connecticut, was a merchant who moved south in 1819 with his first wife who died soon thereafter. His mother, Julia Knox Hull, daughter of the well-known, if disgraced, General William Hull of Detroit surrender fame, was the second wife of Joseph Wheeler, Sr. She had two sons and two daughters, the youngest being Joseph, Jr., before she also died in 1842.

Two of Julia Wheeler’s sisters took young Joe and put him in private schools in their hometown of Cheshire, Connecticut. Upon finishing his schoolwork there, Joe moved to New York to live with his sister. Hull and Wheeler family influence managed to secure him an appointment to the

49
Military Academy at West Point allowing Joe to fulfill his martial ambition.  

Cadet Joe Wheeler began his West Point studies in 1854, under a test-bed five-year program. Wheeler managed to make it through the Academy curriculum, but was never a star. He did well enough in military "deportment", which means he was not a discipline problem. However, his academic grades steadily declined. He graduated near the bottom of his class, 19th out of 22. He does not seem to have done much better in tactical studies, his poorest grades being those in cavalry tactics.  

At the time of graduation, his standing was so low that he was ranked into the cavalry even though it was his worst subject. To compound Wheeler's shame, he was so low that, even in the cavalry, there were no vacancies for him. So, he was only brevetted a second lieutenant of cavalry upon graduation and was assigned to more schooling in cavalry tactics at Carlisle Barracks.  

Several months later, promoted to full Second Lieutenant, Joe Wheeler went west to serve with the Regiment of Mounted Rifles. His service of less than a year with the regiment entailed chasing a few Indians with no more than a platoon in the vicinity of Fort Craig, New Mexico. He did manage to pick up the nickname of "Fighting Joe" during an Indian attack.  

As sectionalism grew, Wheeler had to make his decision on which way to turn his allegiance. Many of his friends
were Northerners. Even though he was born in the South, his education was in Connecticut and New York. He owned no slaves, but his family lived in Georgia. He loved the Union and the army. He was uncertain of replacing either in his life. Yet, he determined to follow Georgia in whatever decision she made. Young Wheeler received help in his decision from his regiment. Its commanders and officers were almost exclusively Southerners.55

Wheeler's brother had a commission waiting for him in Georgia. Even so, as Wheeler made his way east through Pensacola, he offered to help the commanding general, Braxton Bragg, get his artillery organized and trained on the harbor. Wheeler had no artillery experience, but was an engineer. Bragg needed the help and decided to take up the offer. Wheeler never made it to his Georgia troops.56

Wheeler came to the attention of the general right away by doing a good job at his assigned tasks. He soon received help from several prominent Alabamians and accepted a colonel's commission, to which was soon added a regiment. When a north Alabama infantry brigade came to the Mobile area, Wheeler was the only officer assigned with any training or military experience. Soon though, Wheeler's regiment was drilled and trained while the others partied and their officers spent time in town. The 19th Alabama Infantry was soon head and shoulders above the other units in drill and discipline. This fact, of course, brought more favorable attention to their young commander.57 Colonel 51
Wheeler fought his first large-scale battle at Shiloh in April 1862. The 19th Alabama joined a brigade under BG John K. Jackson on the right wing of Bragg's Corps of the Army of Mississippi. As they started the battle, the commanders lost the last of the pre-battle organization. However, Wheeler controlled his regiment well as they participated in the destruction of Union Generals Prentiss' and Hurlburt's units at the "Hornet's Nest" and the "Peach Orchard". His regiment performed well, but lost one-third of its strength in the battle.

As the Confederates began their retreat to Corinth after the Battle of Shiloh, the responsibility for rear guard operations fell upon Wheeler and his regiment. While at Corinth, Wheeler became a brigade commander. Wheeler's men ended up covering another Confederate retreat, this time from an encircled Corinth, Mississippi.

After Bragg took command of the Army, Wheeler was assigned to command a cavalry brigade. Wheeler used his forces to feint and to harass the Union forces around Nashville as Bragg marched into Kentucky. Wheeler first came in touch and conflict with Nathan Bedford Forrest at this time. Forrest was a brigadier, but was somewhat unorthodox in his style compared to Bragg. Therefore, Bragg kept Wheeler separate from Forrest even though Forrest should have had command of a consolidated cavalry corps. Later in the campaign, relations between Bragg and Forrest deteriorated further. Bragg sent Forrest back to
Murfreesboro and turned the troops over to Wheeler’s command.\textsuperscript{64}

Wheeler showed that he could get the job done, and that he also had patience and the ability to work with and for others. Forrest could get his job done, but had few of Wheeler’s more refined traits. These traits brought Wheeler closer to Bragg while Forrest moved further away. The gulf between Wheeler and Forrest grew as an extension of the Bragg situation. In the long run, this had some dire consequences for the individuals and the army. In the short run, Bragg appointed Wheeler Chief of Cavalry of the newly named Army of Tennessee.\textsuperscript{61}

Wheeler’s strength lay in that “He was always ready to work in the team and play a subordinate part to his commanding general”.\textsuperscript{62} He actually preferred working as part of the team rather than operating on his own. His next mission, though, put him on his own. Bragg sent Wheeler raiding into west Tennessee in conjunction with Forrest to disrupt the enemy lines of communication. They went west of Nashville and destroyed many boats on the Cumberland River and then attacked Fort Donelson hoping to regain this jewel lost a year earlier by the Confederates.

Reports differ on the cause of the disaster there, but the upshot was a violent tantrum by Forrest about the slaughter of his troops in an ill-planned attack he had counselled against. Wheeler, being a soldier first and then a fighter, let the outburst go by without malice or official
report, and then accepted full responsibility for the defeat. Forrest, being a fighter first and then a soldier, kept the grudge and said, "You can have my sword if you demand it, but there is one thing I want you to put in that report to General Bragg. Tell him that I will be in my coffin before I will fight again under your command." Forrest kept his promise throughout the war and the commanders of the army allowed him to get away with it. Wheeler did not appear to have held a grudge even if he did find Forrest hard to work with in the future.

Knowing of this conflict and trying to gain some efficiency in his cavalry, Bragg went along with Forrest's ultimatum and completely separated his cavalry units, giving each commander a separate cavalry corps. Bragg did appear fed up with Forrest's eccentricities, but had little other choice in the matter. Union Colonel Abel D. Streight's raid through Alabama and Georgia helped Bragg's predicament in April of 1863. Bragg sent Forrest to chase down Streight and then put Wheeler in charge with a new promotion.

Wheeler set about consolidating and reorganizing his new corps and remained a constant threat to Union supplies and outposts. He screened the army's front to the south of Murfreesboro. He also set out to correct a deficiency he saw in cavalry tactics. There were no good manuals on cavalry tactics in American use. Even the ones that did exist did not address the Southern habit of utilizing mounted infantry. The result was a manual, written by
Wheeler and published in Mobile in 1863. "A Revised System of Cavalry Tactics for the Use of the Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, CSA" was the first manual which established mounted infantry and abandoned heavy cavalry as a method of fighting. The Confederacy adopted the manual and all users were relatively happy.

Nathan Bedford Forrest was born on 13 July 1821 in then Bedford County, Tennessee near the present-day town of Chapel Hill. His parents were William and Mariam Beck Forrest. His grandfather and great-grandfather, Nathan and Shadrach Forrest, moved into Tennessee in 1806 from North Carolina after Shadrach originally left Virginia in 1740. William moved around several times in Tennessee to keep up with the edge of the frontier. He finally settled down and married in 1820. He lived on the Duck River of middle Tennessee when Nathan Bedford and his twin-sister Fannie were born.

William Forrest was a wandering blacksmith. He owned a small amount of property everywhere he lived but he was not prosperous and he owned no slaves. His wife was a simple but strong woman who strictly ruled her household. She gave William Forrest a total of eight sons and three daughters. After William's death, she was married to a Mr. Joseph Luxton and mothered three more sons and a daughter to him.

In 1834 the family moved to new lands that opened to settlement in Tippah County, Mississippi. It was here that William died and left his pregnant wife and ten children in
dire straits to fend for themselves. Nathan Bedford Forrest, at the age of sixteen, became the man of the house and the bread-winner for this large family.

Bedford Forrest had only about six months of school education, split evenly between Tennessee and Mississippi schools. He was apparently bright but unruly and, given examples of his later personal correspondence, did not absorb much in the classical sense. Bedford did recognize this deficiency in his own life and later, when he was able to, he insured his youngest brother Jeffrey got a full education. Bedford definitely did not receive any military education at all.

His experiences throughout his younger years clearly demonstrate a tenacity and an ability to put his words into action. Even as a young man, he practiced a directness in confronting situations for which he was later to become famous. As a young man, he was industrious and sensible in his efforts to earn a living for his family. Before he was eighteen, he went into a partnership with an elderly uncle. This business proceeded well and allowed Forrest to move his family into better accommodations and give them a better livelihood. Forrest expanded his business into horse and slave-trading and real estate. He became widely known and wealthy though, even in the South, slave-traders were not well regarded.

In 1845, he married Mary Ann Armstrong, a kinswoman of General Richard Montgomery of Revolutionary War Quebec fame.
From this marriage came a son who fought during the war with his father and a daughter who died young. 71

By 1859, he was the owner of two large cotton-producing plantations in Tennessee and Mississippi and part owner of another. He left the slave business as soon as he had made a decent living, even though he did maintain a large number of slaves on his farms. Forrest became very familiar with the local area around Memphis and was a well-respected citizen of the region. The people of Memphis elected him a city alderman. He was known to be very practical and intensely honest. 72

Forrest was a strong proponent of states rights and a Southern Democrat even though he did not seek a political career. He resigned after one term as a city alderman but stayed abreast of the political strife dividing the nation. As secession came to Tennessee in 1861, Forrest rode into the camp of White's Tennessee Mounted Rifles (later part of the 7th Tennessee Cavalry) with his son and his brother Jeffrey to enlist as privates for the war. Bedford Forrest was worth about $1.5 million and was very influential. He did not use this fact to his gain. Instead, he was a private when his state came to him for help. 73

In June 1861, the governor asked Forrest to raise a battalion of cavalry for the Confederacy. The governor promised him command as a lieutenant colonel. By October 1861 he had raised 650 men and equipped them with horses and arms, much of it through his own personal fortune. With
this unit, he won his first victory in December 1861, and moved into Fort Donelson for the dramatic events there.  

He was the senior cavalry leader at Fort Donelson so he took command of all of the 1400 Southern horsemen present. He fought delaying actions against the advance of Grant's army from Fort Henry and then fought well during the short but violent siege at Fort Donelson. When the commanders at Fort Donelson decided to try to find a way out of the encircling Union forces, it was Forrest who cut a hole and held it for the troops to escape. Then the commanders elected not to march out and Forrest got his first taste of military "booklearning". Then he got mad. They decided to surrender! Forrest made it clear that he had not raised this unit and bought its equipment for someone else to give it away to the enemy. He decided to go out through the lines before the surrender. All 1400 cavalrymen rode out safely with him. From this time on, this unit was known as Forrest's "Old Regiment".  

Forrest and this regiment then rode through Nashville and found mobs in control and looting government warehouses. He clubbed the ring leaders and dispersed the crowds. He then shipped as much of the supplies out to the Southern army as he could and dispersed the rest to the population while protecting medical supplies to be used by competent authorities of whichever side was able to use them for their intended purpose. He then rode to Corinth and the gathering army.
His next battle was Shiloh where he saw incompetence in the way troops were handled and led. He found weak spots in the Union flanks but could not get the professionals to act decisively on his information. He reported this as the reason for the Confederate loss and retreat. The army then placed his "Old Regiment" under someone else's command and ordered Forrest into middle Tennessee to recruit a new brigade. He kept only his escort company commanded by his brother, William, and his staff. Forrest recruited in an occupied part of the state but he left for the Kentucky Campaign with a fully armed, and trained brigade of cavalry. By July 1862, he was a brigadier general and covered Bragg's left flank for the invasion of Kentucky.

His brigade performed brilliantly in the Perryville Campaign even though the army beat another ignominious retreat to Tennessee. To top it all off, Bragg ordered Forrest to turn his new brigade over to Joe Wheeler and to go to the Murfreesboro area to raise still another brigade. Quite obviously, Forrest had a reputation for beating Yankees and for recruiting soldiers. Bragg liked his ability to recruit and potential recruits liked the chance to fight with a winner. But, Forrest's old troopers were not happy getting passed to someone whom they found less competent and Forrest was getting tired of using his fortune to raise and equip units for other people to command.

With his money running out but new troops coming in to join him, Forrest found a novel way to mount and equip his
men. He turned to the best outfitter on the continent, Uncle Sam. Forrest went north interdicting Grant's supply lines to Vicksburg with 2,100 men, of whom 1,000 were not armed. Two weeks later, he returned with several victories, one near miss disaster because a subordinate failed to follow orders, more troopers than he took in and every one of them mounted splendidly and armed even better. He also caused Grant to call off an attempt at Vicksburg and to change his supply route to the river rather than the railroad."

For some time after this raid, Forrest served under the command of the Chief of Cavalry of the Army of Tennessee, Joe Wheeler. The story of their raids and conflicts has already been told. Forrest then went to work for Major General Earl Van Dorn but they did not get along well either. Forrest demonstrated that he could not work for anybody very well and that he was not a great team player. Later, a jealous husband killed Van Dorn and Forrest took over.

Because of Forrest's inability to work well under others, Bragg found the perfect opportunity to use his talents. Union cavalrymen, 1,500 strong, under Colonel Abel D. Streight raided through north Alabama headed for Rome, Georgia. Bragg sent Forrest to run them down. It took Forrest five days to literally run Streight's men into the ground with continuous fighting, well-laid plans of encirclement, rest breaks for his own troops, and
mobilization of the countryside. With only 500 men at his disposal, he defeated and captured the entire expedition. His reputation grew and he won the thanks of the Confederate Congress.01

In the four years that he fought, he was wounded seriously four times and much more often less so. He had twenty-nine horses shot out from under him but revelled in the fact that he had personally killed a Yankee soldier for each horse plus one by the time it was all over. There were not very many other general officers who claimed one personal kill, much less thirty of them.02

His one greatest handicap was his violent temper. He was also known to beat his own men and even shoot them for perceived infractions, for disobedience or even for bringing false reports. He always recognized the requirement for discipline and obedience even if he himself was not good at taking orders. He discharged a shotgun into some Confederate troops who were fleeing the battlefield. The survivors went back to their positions. He shot dead an infantry color-bearer who turned to flee. His troops and his friends admired him and they respected him. They all fought hard to stay with him and no other commander was good enough, but they feared him rather than loved him.03

Forrest's education put one thing in his favor. He had never been told he could not do something. He did not do something if it seemed wrong to him or if he had tried it and it did not work. The lack of a formal education
certainly was not a limiting factor for a man like Forrest. Illinois Colonel Robert G. Ingersoll, whom Forrest once captured, said later that colleges were places "where pebbles are polished and diamonds are dimmed." Forrest never opened a book on military tactics before the war but he had a completely matured instinct for war. He said simply, "War means fighting and fighting means killing." His instincts were nearly always correct.

Forrest was an offensive fighter. He did not however like the frontal attacks that were a hallmark of generals of both sides of this conflict. Forrest liked to hit his enemy in the flank, or, as he called it, "hitting 'em on the end." He picked spots the enemy would not expect and he hit them in more than one place at the time. He did like to arrive first and with a decisive force at the point of impact. On such occasions, he yelled his favorite battle cry, "Forward, men, and mix with 'em!"

Forrest's contribution to tactics during this war was in the realm of mounted infantry and raids. His men could fight on horseback but their primary goal was to ride to the point of battle quickly, dismount and fight as light infantry. They were excellent at this type of fighting and even won recognition from the infantry. Forrest also did large amounts of damage on his raids. His were not the fanciful galas of J.E.B. Stuart or the fool-hardy rampages of John H. Morgan. His raids went far behind the enemy lines to occupy an area and defeat any enemy that would come
out to fight him. He did not usually plan hit and run affairs nor did he usually bring his men and horses back totally wiped out and ineffective.  

Forrest concentrated firepower in his tactics. He used pistols for close-in work and when mounted but preferred the short Enfield for his men in their dismounted role. He combined artillery in all of his fights once he learned of its usefulness. He decided to read the artillery manual and learn early in the war. He came to like the range and effect of artillery and was a master at using fires to save his troops' lives if possible.

Forrest was a fighter but a very independent one. He had argued with as many men as had Bragg. He could perform his job better than any other but he was not a team player. As he moved toward the summer and fall of 1863, Forrest was as much a part of the problem as he was the solution.

These three men lead the Army of Tennessee and its cavalry throughout the campaigns addressed in this study. Their influence will be apparent in the missions assigned and the manner in which those missions were executed. The success of the Confederate cavalry at Chickamauga rode on the shoulders of three very diverse soldiers who departed these campaigns with grossly disparate reputations.
CHAPTER TWO

ENDNOTES

1Urwin, p. 108.

2James A. Schaefer, "The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry during the American Civil War" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toledo, 1982), p. 49.


5Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, p. 183.

6Connelly, pp. 15-18.

7This statement is based upon personal experience over 15 years on active duty service in the U.S. Army as a unit maintenance officer and company commander.

8Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, p. 182.

9Johnson, p. 66.


11Schaefer, p. 28.

12Ibid., p. 29.

13Herr and Wallace, p. 88.

14Schaefer, p. 29.

15Ibid., p. 39.

16Davis, pp. 84-87.


18Denison, p. 361.

19McWhiney and Jamieson, p. 131.

20Ibid., p. 131-132.
This is a habit that was learned very rapidly in the cavalry of the western armies. The so-called "Guerilla" shirts worn by Southern troopers had special over-sized pockets that were intended specifically for carrying additional revolver cylinders. This practice is still used today by Civil War re-enactors. Davis, p. 219.


Connelly, p. 17.


Lytle, pp. 109, 124.


Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, p. 183.


Ibid., pp. 35-36.

Ibid., pp. 28, 51.

Ibid., pp. 95-96.

Ibid., p. 87.

Ibid., p. 89.

Seitz, p. 15.

McWhiney, pp. 143-149.

Ibid., pp. 151-152.


Connelly, p. 20.

Ibid., p. 72.

Dyer, p. 12.


Ibid., p. 15.

Ibid.

Schaefer, p. 29.

Wakelyn, p. 434.

Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959), p. 333. Writer's note: The 19th Alabama Infantry Regiment is the unit that my wife's ancestors, the Hughes' family, joined, fought with, died with, and surrendered with from 1861 to 1865.

Dyer, p. 36.

Ibid., p. 39.


5. Gray, p. 12.


23. Ibid., pp. 245-247.

Steiner, p. 331.
Ibid., pp. 331-332.
Johnston, pp. 86-93; Gray, p. 137.
Weller, pp. 228-234.
CHAPTER THREE

Tullahoma Campaign

The Tullahoma Campaign demonstrated the low point to which the Army of Tennessee could sink without actually losing a battle. Rosecrans deceived and then flanked the Confederate army out of its strong defensive position with hardly a murmur of protest. The campaign lasted only fifteen days, 23 June to 7 July 1863, and the Southern cause lost all of Middle Tennessee. Only for short periods of time during the rest of the war would a Southern army control portions of Middle Tennessee, and then, only the ground upon which they stood.

General Bragg encamped his army on the Duck River south of Murfreesboro after withdrawing from that battlefield in January 1863. For six months, he strengthened his lines which spread across seventy miles of countryside from McMinnville to Columbia, Tennessee. At the apex of the arc created by Bragg's army was the Union army of General William S. Rosecrans at Murfreesboro.1

Logistics and geography worked against Bragg's defense. In the vicinity of Bragg's army, numerous roads led from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga. The railroad from Louisville to Nashville continued through the heart of Bragg's defensive area and on from Tullahoma to his base in Chattanooga. Numerous water courses ran east to west across the line of march of Bragg's supply lines, the largest ones being the Duck, the Elk, and the Tennessee Rivers. From
Murfreesboro to the east, the land was covered with steep and rugged mountains covered in forests. Through these mountains ran several roads of dubious quality. The roads wound through the mountains and descended into the valleys in small, winding strips pointed generally in the direction of low spots in the mountains. The local population referred to these low spots as "gaps", but they were certainly not easily identifiable or pronounced terrain features. Given the type of terrain, it is easy to understand why the sparsely settled area had little available provender for an army.\(^2\)

General Bragg's main problem was that the area was so vast that he did not have adequate forces to fortify it all. Rosecrans could outflank Bragg, no matter how far Bragg spread out. The terrain became more difficult the further to the east the army travelled, so no matter how fast Bragg moved his army, the chasing army was always going to catch up faster than he could get away.

Many places existed along the line of communications which could be used to delay or stop an attacking force. As mentioned above, though, most of these places could still be taken by flanking the defending force. Still, these locations along the main avenue could be interdicted and, even if lost, they could be made useless to the invader. Tunnels and bridges on the railroad lines, the constricted gaps over the mountains, and the numerous bridges, ferries,
and fords could be destroyed or damaged to delay the enemy or harrass his supply lines.

General Bragg had another major reason, besides guarding against a Union advance, to spread his army over such a wide front. The Army of Tennessee was very short on food for its men and its animals. The area was not the best land from which to feed an army, so Bragg was forced to put separate parts of the army in different locations for it to be able to sustain itself. Even with these efforts across large areas, the army was still required to collect supplies from as far west as Franklin, Tennessee and south into Alabama. Wide-ranging foraging caused a major taxation of Bragg's weak transportation and draft animal resources. The wagons and animals, already in acute demand, were worn out by the great distances travelled. It seemed that all solutions to his problems only made Bragg's shortages more severe.3

Bragg made his dispositions in accordance with his military and logistics requirements. He maintained his headquarters at Tullahoma, south of the Duck River. His infantry corps fortified the Duck River. Confederate Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk commanded a corps dug in around Shelbyville. His partner, Lieutenant General William J. Hardee, commanded the other corps entrenched in the vicinity of Wartrace. Each corps had a cavalry unit detailed to screen the flanks. Forrest's cavalry division covered Polk's corps on the army's left. From Wartrace to
McMinnville in the east, Wheeler's cavalry corps covered Hardee. Each cavalry screen covered a distance of about thirty miles.

During the time spent in front of Rosecrans' army at Murfreesboro, the Confederate cavalry units were spread thinly. Wheeler's Corps was garrisoning the eastern flank, but was split, and was not concentrating on its screening mission. On the western flank, the command and control changed along with the numerous divisions of the forces. Upon reorganization in February after Murfreesboro, the cavalry appeared to be well set. By early May, they even numbered nearly sixteen thousand effective troopers. However, neither flank was well-manned nor intently dedicated to the job at hand.

General Bragg gave the units their assignments and areas of responsibility around 23 April. These orders were not overly specific, but, by 1863, the cavalry commanders should have known instinctively what was expected of them when given a particular situation. They should have been well aware of the nature of information that would be useful to the army commander. What they actually attempted and accomplished was quite a bit less, and acutely degraded the performance of the Army of Tennessee.

On 6 June, Wheeler received specific orders from General Bragg. These orders said:

The advance is almost certain. Concentrate your whole force...that General Morgan might relieve you and allow your whole command to move round to our front (Shelbyville)...Hurry the movement as we have reports...
of the enemy's advance. To accomplish this mission, Wheeler had only the numbers assigned as shown in Table 1. Wheeler made his troop dispositions between Shelbyville and McMinnville as seen on Map 2. Orders to these units are not specifically detailed in the Official Records as Wheeler made no official report of the campaign, but were probably very generally stated along the same lines as those received from Bragg. His major problems with dispositions came in the form of a command failure at corps and army levels.

Wheeler lost control over his most flamboyant and notable subordinate. As a cavalry division commander, Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan continually caused trouble for Wheeler and the army. He much preferred to operate independently and felt he was being suppressed by being assigned to a subordinate role. Wheeler assigned Morgan's division to picket the army's extreme right flank along the road from Murfreesboro to McMinnville and Nashville to Knoxville. Morgan found this mission totally unfit for his style of war and his ego. He much preferred to leave the main army and conduct a raid into Kentucky. Bragg disagreed with Morgan and kept him on the picket duty, a mission which supported the effort of the army as a whole. Morgan's dislike of this service became quite obvious. He felt he was being maligned by the high command because he was not a professional, a West Pointer, so he let discipline and
Abstract from return of the Army of Tennessee, General Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, commanding, for June 10, 1863.

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Table 1. Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 10 June 1863
Map 2. Area of Interest
diligence slip. Union troops overran his headquarters and captured his wife in April, partly due to his lackadaisical attitude towards Wheeler’s orders. By then, Bragg and his corps commanders began to lose faith in Morgan.¹¹

Finally, the situation degenerated to the point where Wheeler prevailed upon Bragg to allow Morgan his raid. Even though Bragg knew by 6 June that the enemy was planning a move, he still further fragmented his already thinly stretched cavalry by detaching Morgan and 2,500 men on 18 June, less than a week before the Union advance began. Wheeler refused Morgan permission to cross the Ohio River in the raid. Wheeler instructed Morgan to return quickly, but gave no further specific instructions. The command allowed Morgan to leave merely because he was a disruption if he stayed.¹²

To add insult to the injury already inflicted, Wheeler’s corps also lost Brigadier General Philip Roddey’s 1000-man brigade. Bragg sent this unit into Northern Alabama at the same time he allowed Morgan to leave. Wheeler stretched his forces over a wide front with no depth to his positions and, still, his numbers were diminished by over 3000 men. Combined with troop transfers on the left flank, Bragg allowed his cavalry to be frittered away. He boasted only about nine thousand cavalry by late June. His army would pay for this shortsightedness. ¹³

After the loss of troopers, Bragg did not change or focus Wheeler’s orders. Wheeler had fewer troops to
accomplish the same mission. He himself found this mission
a less than glorious occupation. While Wheeler defended the
army’s flanks from Hoover’s Gap eastward, Bragg turned
towards what he felt would be the main Union thrust, the
fortifications at Shelbyville and Wartrace. Since most of
the attention in his own army, and the current
demonstrations of the enemy army, appeared to be in the
vicinity of Shelbyville, Wheeler allowed his attention and
his units to wander almost exclusively to that area without
orders.

In all actuality, Wheeler ignored his original orders
by leaving the eastern flank essentially unguarded once
Morgan left the army. East of Liberty Gap, Brigadier
General Will Martin’s division went to help Forrest on the
left. A single brigade, Harrison’s, from Brigadier General
John Wharton’s division remained to watch from Hoover’s Gap
to Liberty Gap. What proved to be the most critical
location, Hoover’s Gap itself, contained only one of
Wharton’s weakened regiments, the 1st Kentucky, to guard it.
The defenses in the gap were strong, but no adequate
reconnaissance was substantially forward of the entrance to
the gap and the infantry was too far back to respond
immediately to a call for help.14

Wheeler personally commanded only about a division, in
the center of the infantry line. He had little contact with
and no ability to support or reinforce his units to the
east. He focused his attention on the roads into
Shelbyville where a strong Union advance was begun on 24 June.¹⁵

Rosecrans obviously was well-informed on the problems facing Bragg. "Old Rosey" spent quite some time setting his plan and preparing his forces. He incorporated Bragg's extended forces, Bragg's army's condition, and the geography of the land to set up deception plans and ruses to insure success when he finally moved.

There were several options open to the Union forces in attacking Bragg. Rosecrans knew he could move to the west to threaten Bragg's food supply which was being brought over long distances. He knew also that he had available good routes into Bragg's rear by turning the eastern flank and trapping the Army of Tennessee against the Duck River. Another option for Rosecrans was a head-on movement south from Murfreesboro towards Shelbyville and Wartrace. Any of these routes, if pressed vigorously, would force Bragg to abandon his whole line. Rosecrans came up with a plan that combined all of these avenues of approach.¹⁶

Bragg, on the other hand, had no distinct plan. Bragg was not on good terms with his commanders and took no time to explain his strategy or plan. Being spread so thinly, and with his troops ill-fed, General Bragg believed he was required to stay on the defensive. All of his intelligence sources told Bragg that his enemy was well supplied and filled with reinforcements. He vaguely let it be known that he expected an attack against Hardee at Wartrace. Hardee
was to hold in his entrenchments while Polk marched north from Shelbyville and then turned east to hit the Union flank. Bragg expected very little activity on his army’s flanks. The cavalry was to provide a screen on these flanks and guard the gaps leading into the Southern defenses. Polk and Hardee were confused by the plan and skeptical that Hardee’s line could be held.¹⁷

Rosecrans’ plan incorporated all of his options and maximized their effectiveness by playing on Bragg’s fears. Rosecrans decided to feint toward Columbia to keep the Confederates wondering about their food supply. Bragg expected this and kept Forrest in place to watch for it. Rosecrans made moves at McMinnville to the east early in April to keep Bragg concerned over the right flank. Bragg worried about it and kept Wheeler, with Morgan, in place until all activity stopped in that direction early in June. By June 1863, most of Rosecrans activity had moved back to the center of Polk’s and Hardee’s lines drawing Bragg’s attention to that front. Confederate interest with the flanks was lost.¹⁸

Rosecrans finally made his move on 24 June 1863. He sent his reserve corps under General Gordon Granger and his newly created cavalry corps under General David Stanley straight toward Polk’s infantry at Shelbyville. These forces initiated standard deception practices by making excessive noise and lighting numerous additional campfires to foster the impression that a major advance had been
initiated on this route. General Alexander M. McCook's XX Corps moved behind Granger until they reached the road to Wartrace and then headed toward Hardee's infantry around Wartrace. Bragg's suspicions were coming true but he did not know it.

In the meantime, Rosecrans had two large corps of infantry left. These troops were his true main effort. General George H. Thomas's XIV Corps and General Thomas L. Crittenden's XXI Corps marched east toward Manchester, bowling through Wheeler's light cavalry screen.

As the Union advance developed on 24 June, Bragg entered into a period when he did not know what was happening around him. His screen was so weak to the right that the significant enemy movements there were misread or missed completely. In the center of the Southern line at Shelbyville, Bragg received bad information from Wheeler. Since he had no information from other sectors of the field, Wheeler was convinced that the strong cavalry and infantry advances on his positions which began on 23 June were the main enemy effort. This misreading of the situation may have been a result of Wheeler trying to justify his being out of position contrary to Bragg's orders. He may have been attempting to pat himself on the back for his seemingly brilliant reading of the enemy's intentions to justify his disobedience. Either way, Wheeler was convinced that the advance on the Shelbyville works was the main effort and he passed that conviction on to Bragg. Wheeler was not only
wasting his effort against a feint, but he also missed the main effort. Rosecrans' deception worked beautifully.²¹

In the meantime, the 1st Kentucky Cavalry had remained in Hoover's Gap.²² On the rainy morning of 24 June, Union Colonel John T. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry attacked this regiment and literally ran them out of the Gap. Since this occurred so rapidly, the screen did not have the opportunity to warn the infantry units in support. The nearest infantry support was four miles south near Beech Grove. No one notified this unit, Bate's Brigade of Stewart's Division, until well into the afternoon of the attack. A counterattack late in the afternoon failed to dislodge the then entrenched Union brigade firing Spencer rifles. Outnumbered by manpower alone, Bate was certain he had run into a much larger unit as he and his men were introduced to the rapid firing new weapon. The Confederates lost control of the gap and the cavalry units had hardly even slowed the advance.²³

Harrison's Brigade remained the only cavalry unit facing a determined advance in the vicinity of Hoover's Gap. Wheeler had the sister brigade of Wharton's Division with him in front of Shelbyville. Harrison's men, under Wharton's direct command, began a weak screen of Hardee's Corps in the vicinity of Wartrace to Beech Grove. The main goal of this brigade appeared to be to maintain contact between Stewart's and Cleburne's Divisions so that Hardee's Corps was not split. To accomplish this, Wharton allowed
himself to be pushed back to the west once he was sure he could not hold his line. This, indeed, happened by the evening of 25 June. The primary upshot of falling back to the west was that no force remained to contest a Union advance into Bragg's rear by way of Manchester. Bragg was in danger of being cut off from his lines of communications to Chattanooga. He not only did not know of this danger, but he actively gave orders which facilitated the process.

Initially, the rest of Harrison's Brigade guarded around and in Liberty Gap in front of Cleburne's Division. A brigade of this division, Liddell's, had two of its regiments attacked and thrown back out of the Gap late on 24 June. Bragg's headquarters knew of the events on Cleburne's front as they developed, so his situation was known to the high command, in distinct contrast to Stewart's unrealized predicament. Wheeler also informed Bragg as pressure on the Shelbyville axis diminished. The news from Wheeler and Cleburne, and the lack of news from Stewart, convinced Bragg on 25 June that the Liberty Gap axis was the main attack and he moved to counterattack it in the flank with Polk's Corps. Wheeler's lack of control over all of his thinly spread units still gave Bragg bad intelligence from which to make decisions.

Finally, on 26 June, two days later, Bragg received word of the hazard to his right flank from Stewart. By then, the Union's XIV Corps not only had uncontested possession of the Manchester Pike, but was within six miles
of Manchester in itself. This open door put Union forces across the Duck River, behind Bragg’s army which still fortified north of the river from Shelbyville to Wartrace. Confederate headquarters at Tullahoma was vulnerable, also. Immediately, Bragg recognized his dilemma and called off his plans for Polk’s counterattack. He called for both of his corps to fall back upon the defenses of Tullahoma.  

Wheeler’s cavalry units covered both corps as they pulled out of position. To accomplish this task, Wharton still had only Harrison’s Brigade to protect Hardee’s Corps and screen the army’s right flank from the enemy forces now moving into Manchester. Wheeler had Wharton’s other brigade, commanded by Colonel C.C. Crews, along with Will Martin’s returned division to protect Polk’s Corps and the vast amount of supplies built up in Shelbyville over the six months of relative inactivity. These supplies and the transport allocated to moving them were vital to Bragg’s success and ability to remain in the field. Wheeler held Guy’s Gap in front of Polk. He stayed there with Martin’s Division and Crews’ Brigade to allow Polk time to move his Corps and the supply train across the Duck River at Shelbyville and south to the rendezvous in the Tullahoma defenses.  

Bragg fell completely into Rosecrans’ trap. When Bragg realized his flank was turned, he discarded his previous plan and ordered the army to fall back on Tullahoma. Bragg decided to challenge Rosecrans to a battle from the
Tullahoma defenses. However, it took Bragg's army too long to concentrate into Tullahoma. The day the campaign began, rain started to fall and continued for over two weeks. These rains caused extremely difficult conditions for both armies, but especially slowed Bragg's efforts to establish a defensive line. Eventually, Bragg had his whole army at Tullahoma by 29 June. Union forces were all around his front and flanks, and they severely threatened his rear.29

From his triumphant return to the army after the Streight raid to the beginning of Rosecrans' advance, Forrest's units encountered blueclad troops almost daily. Very little of this skirmishing amounted to more than letting each other know that someone was on guard. Forrest maintained his vigilance and the inviolability of Bragg's flank while the main armies prepared for whatever came next. Even then, Bragg's favorite source of intelligence on enemy operations came from the newspaper of the enemy occupied areas. Nashville and Louisville newspapers were a staple for Bragg, and numerous Southern sympathizers throughout Tennessee and Kentucky sent them to his headquarters.29

Forrest also sent spies and scouts off to his northeast into the vicinity of Murfreesboro and Nashville. He actually even had men inside the cities providing Bragg with his first knowledge that Rosecrans was beginning to move. On 1 June, Forrest informed Bragg that the enemy was preparing to move.30 He was unsure whether they would move forward or backward due to conflicting data, but certainly a
move was imminent. On 2 June, other scouts reported that Rosecrans had cavalry units concentrating at Murfreesboro giving the appearance of a move south. Union officers suspected Forrest of sending two captured spies into the Union camp at Franklin. Rosecrans ordered these men hung after an immediate drumhead court martial "thus placing it beyond the possibility of Forrest's profiting by the information they have gained". The spies never revealed their purpose or the originator of their orders, but Forrest was the first suspect.

As much as Forrest was an active campaigner during this time frame, he was also causing consternation in the Union ranks in a passive way. He became a source of immense irritation to the Northern leaders, all the way up to President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin A. Stanton. They were worried in Washington that Forrest would get away from Rosecrans and fall onto General Grant's Vicksburg operations and communications lines. General-in-Chief Halleck ordered Rosecrans to keep Forrest occupied and present in middle Tennessee. As for Rosecrans, his fear of Forrest kept him constantly demanding more cavalry of General Halleck. The net result was that Rosecrans continued to delay his advance awaiting the cavalry which could protect him from Forrest's depredations.

However, even with daily skirmishing across the screen line, no significant action occurred on the left flank of Pragg's army as the Union advance progressed into 26 June.
Forrest was prepared to cover Polk's northern flank when he turned to hit the enemy advance at Liberty Gap. When Bragg rescinded the order for this counterattack, Forrest was still withdrawing from his picket lines and reconsolidating his division. When he arrived, he found Polk already out of Shelbyville on 27 June. However, events were not to transpire smoothly, but they created another legend for Southern folklore.

Neither Southern cavalry commander completed an official report for the Tullahoma Campaign. Numerous references mention both in the Official Records. Even then, very few pieces of correspondence directly to or from them survived to be included with the records of the Army of Tennessee. However, the story of the fight at Newsom's (or Skull Camp) Bridge in Shelbyville is recounted in every biography of the numerous men involved in the fight as well as in the reports of the Union commanders who were there. The accounts vary depending upon the color of the writer's uniform, but each attaches honor and skill to both sides.

The division with Wheeler covered the enemy movements at Guy's Gap through 26 June. The brigade with Wharton remained as the rear guard for Hardee's Corps at Wartrace. While in the hills north of Shelbyville, Wheeler held off Stanley's cavalry and Granger's reserve corps infantry. Polk received orders on 26 June, after conferring with Bragg, to withdraw. As Polk pulled out of Shelbyville on 27 June, Union forces threw Wheeler out of Guy's Gap.
Wheeler's mission remained to cover Polk's withdrawal and this now became a running fight with Stanley's Cavalry under Colonel Robert H. G. Minty. Even though Stanley and Granger were wary of Forrest's whereabouts, Stanley asked for permission to chase Wheeler's three brigades to the Duck River in Shelbyville. He received permission and Stanley's 4th U.S. Regulars and the 1st Middle Tennessee Cavalry moved in hot pursuit under Colonel Minty.

As he tried to make a stand in the abandoned fortifications north of town, the full force of the reorganized Union cavalry, under brilliant and energetic leadership, hit Wheeler's forces. Minty's charge broke Wheeler's troopers who lost nearly 300 prisoners and retreated to another line fronted by four artillery pieces. The Federals continued their mounted charge and completely broke the Confederate ranks, scattering them in all directions. Most headed across the Skull Camp Bridge to follow Polk's retreating wagons.

Just after Wheeler and his men made it south of the Duck River, Major G. V. Ramant, Forrest's Chief of Commissary, arrived with word of Forrest's imminent arrival upon the scene. Even though no one had been able to find him before this word arrived, Forrest was within sight of Shelbyville as Minty pushed Wheeler across the bridge. Luckily for the Southerners, the Union cavalry still did not have that word and would only learn of the events which transpired next at a later date. Wheeler then made a very
brave and foolhardy decision to attempt to save Forrest. It
cost him dearly in killed and captured.

Wheeler and Martin led the 1st Confederate Cavalry and
two guns back to the north side of the bridge in an attempt
to clear the Federals from the bridge and hold it open for
Forrest. This move cleared the bridge momentarily before it
was inundated by fresh Federals. The Federals chopped the
1st Confederates, who lost their Colonel, Lieutenant
Colonel, and regimental colors as well as up to 500 other
ranks, to pieces. Wheeler turned to the river and gave the
order for the remainder to cut their way out after an
overturned caisson blocked the bridge. Wheeler and Martin, 
along with a handful of others, survived a leap into the
river. Most never got the opportunity to jump or were
drowned in the attempt. Forrest noted the change in the
situation by the noise level and turned to go north. He
crossed the river at another spot. Both Forrest and Wheeler
moved to Polk's rear to guard the wagons enroute to
Tullahoma.

The Federals reveled in their good day's work, but
failed to realize how close and unguarded Polk's wagons were
when they took Shelbyville. They made no further pursuit,
but found few stores left behind. Polk and Wheeler
succeeded in getting away, but Confederate cavalry paid
dearly. Stanley believed and said in his memoirs that the
Army of Tennessee's cavalry "never recovered from the
demoralizing effect which it experienced that day of being ridden down by the Union cavalry."

Meanwhile, Wharton, with Harrison's Brigade, was covering Hardee's retreat to Tullahoma. In so doing, they left the Manchester Pike open to Union opportunity. In this general Union advance, Union cavalry took advantage of their opportunities. On 26 June, Wharton fell back towards Hardee and remained in the vicinity of Fairfield. On 27 June, Wharton arrived at Wartrace as Hardee began his retreat. Wharton found no enemy to his front and reported to Wheeler that he was going to send two regiments to find and attack them. This he failed to accomplish because the enemy was already past him and moving south to Manchester and beyond.

By 26 June, Forrest closed on the army at Tullahoma and was sent toward Manchester. He sent Starnes' Brigade toward Manchester and Dibrell's 8th Tennessee Cavalry toward
Hillsboro. On 30 June, Dibrell’s men caught Wilder’s brigade tearing up track at Decherd after following them from Hillsboro. Even though they arrived too late to save the stores in the railroad depot and some trestle manufacturing equipment, Dibrell’s 8th did manage to rescue the garrison and run Wilder’s men off with only 300 yards of track uprooted.1 Forrest himself used Armstrong’s Brigade and his escort to attempt to cut off Wilder’s retreat to Pelham. With only his escort, he met and passed by Wilder’s advance guard. But before the brigade could get into supporting distance, Forrest ran into Wilder’s whole column and turned around. He quickly cut down the advance guard as he returned. Wilder, with the rest of his unit, was able to get away.2

In the meantime, Starnes with the rest of his brigade ran into the body of Crittenden’s XXI Corps following Wilder on the Manchester Pike axis. Starnes put out a strong skirmish line and advanced to slow the lead units. His actions delayed the enemy advance, but cost him his life. On the evening of 30 June, Dibrell became the brigade commander.3 With enemy forces this near to Tullahoma and held at bay by only a cavalry brigade, Bragg realized his position was untenable. His Chief of Staff, Brigadier General W. W. Mackall kept asking Wheeler for accurate reports on enemy whereabouts and strength on the army’s right.4 When reliable intelligence did not come, Bragg finally bowed to Hardee’s advice5 and ordered a retreat to

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the mountains near Cowan.26 Bragg pulled behind the Elk River, destroyed the bridges over the flooded river, and set a line of battle on 2 July with both flanks anchored on the mountains.27

Wheeler continued to cover the retreat and Forrest covered the right flank and held the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains.28 Again, numerous skirmishes occurred between the two forces' cavalry units. Bragg ordered Wheeler to burn the Allisona Railroad Bridge after crossing the Elk River, which was done.29

Still, by 1 July, the Federal forces crossed the Elk River well north and east of Confederate forces which still put the Southerners in jeopardy of being turned away from their escape route to Chattanooga. However, the last of the serious fighting in this campaign occurred near the Duck River and at the fords of the Elk River before the Confederates pulled out of Tullahoma. By the time Bragg moved south, Rosecrans decided to bring up his whole army and consolidate it. When Rosecrans showed no inclination to attack the Confederate line at the mountains south of Cowan, Bragg ordered a retreat behind the Tennessee River and into Chattanooga at 1:30 A.M. on 2 July.30

Hardee marched his corps through a pass at Brakefield Point, five miles from Cowan, on 3 July.31 Forrest covered him as far as University Place. Dibrell's brigade held the pass until 4 July. Armstrong's Brigade went ahead of the infantry to cover the corps' flank at Jasper, just short of
the river. On 4 July, no enemy showed up in pursuit, so Dibrell followed the infantry to the river. Then, Forrest sent Dibrell’s 8th Tennessee around to the east and north back into the Sparta area north of McMinnville to keep an eye on Rosecrans’ movements. This move again caused a Forrest-induced panic in the Union high command.

Wheeler continued to cover Polk’s Corps as it came over the mountains at University Place. Bragg, through his Chief of Staff, W.W. Mackall, ordered Wheeler to destroy bridges and roads, and to defend the railway. However, as Wheeler’s men moved down the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad out of Cowan, no orders came to seriously block the large railroad tunnel east of town or destroy the railroad bed. Wheeler’s men merely choked the tunnel’s ventilator shafts with debris and moved on. They burned several small bridges, but did not touch the large road or rail trestles. This grave mistake was to allow Rosecrans to resume resupply of his army relatively quickly in front of Chattanooga. Later, in the Atlanta Campaign, General William T. Sherman reaped the benefits of this failure.

Bragg managed to make his full retreat by 4 July with little loss other than to his rear guard cavalry which continued its skirmishing with enemy cavalry. Rosecrans had stopped his main infantry forces and was reorganizing — no longer chasing.
As Polk's men moved toward the river at Bridgeport, Polk sent Wheeler to a point three miles above the mouth of Battle Creek. Polk's road came very close to Hardee's road at that point, and Polk desired that Wheeler reconnoiter the area to keep it safe and trouble free. At 2:30 P.M. on 4 July, Polk released his bridge rights to Hardee and finished his corps' crossing by 4 P.M. Wheeler stayed to cover Hardee's flank until Hardee was completely across the river. Hardee did not use the bridge, but Wheeler still guarded it. Wheeler did not want to destroy the bridge after the army's passage until ordered to do so by the commanding general. In the meantime, on 5 July, he turned the bridge over to Captain George B. Pickett of the engineers while he went to get instructions. Soon after, the Confederates burned the last of Bragg's pontoon bridges. They regretted this act later in the year because it placed limitations on Bragg's options.

By 5 July, the entire army and its cavalry were across the river. The Union cavalry forces pursued to the top of the Sequatchie Mountains, and then stopped. Rosecrans stopped his army in the fortifications abandoned by Bragg in Tullahoma and began to reconstitute his forces. The fifteen day campaign was over. It rained heavily the entire period of the campaign. As one of Hardee's staff officers was asked about the derivation of the name "Tullahoma", he replied "that it was from two Greek words - tulla, meaning 'mud' and homa, meaning 'more mud'". This sobriquet seemed
On 7 July, Bragg ordered Wheeler to picket the Tennessee below Kelly’s Ford and Forrest above it. The expressed intent of the orders was to guard against desertions from the Army of Tennessee.73 Thus ended the Tullahoma Campaign.

Rosecrans had managed a brilliant campaign with total losses of only 560 men. Bragg was deceived and unprepared. He was continually outmaneuvered by Rosecrans and forced to give up about 100 miles of territory and three lines of stout entrenchments. Not only was middle Tennessee lost, but north Alabama above the Tennessee River went with it. Hardee suffered most of the 1700 Confederate losses, most of whom were captured along with 11 guns and tons of much needed supplies.74

The Confederate cavalry fought a valiant rearguard fight during the entire retreat to the Tennessee River. However, this was only after they had failed to discover the Union main effort in front of Shelbyville. They were out of position when the time came that they were needed. Bragg failed to give his cavalry commanders specific instructions which detailed his intent and their missions. Therefore, the cavalrmen were quite often not doing what needed to be done. They failed to be of decisive importance during this campaign.
CHAPTER THREE

ENDNOTES

1 Horn, p. 231.
2 Connelly, p. 113.
3 Ibid., p. 115.


5 Connelly, p. 122.
6 O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 784.
7 Ibid., p. 866.
8 Ibid., p. 943.

9 O.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 615.
10 Connelly, p. 123.
11 O.R., XXIII, part 2, pp. 656, 824.
12 O.R., XXIII, part 1, pp. 817-818.
13 Connelly, p. 125.
14 Starr, p. 240.
15 Connelly, p. 127.
16 O.R., XXIII, part 1, pp. 404-405.
17 Connelly, p. 117.
18 Ibid., p. 116.
19 Horn, p. 235.
20 Ibid.
21 Connelly, p. 127.

22 Many sources list this unit as the 3rd Kentucky Cavalry. "Because of its difficult service in Kentucky during September and October, 1862, it was reduced to a battalion and assigned to the 3rd Kentucky Cavalry." Joseph H. Crute, Jr., Units of the Confederate States Army
This turn of events explains the confusion in the unit designation as the unit maintained both regimental colors and the men referred to themselves by the designation under which they mustered into the service, for reasons of pride, etc.

23 Q.R., XXII:1, part 1, p. 612.
24 Connelly, p. 127.
25 Q.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 618.
26 Q.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 886.
27 Q.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 619.
28 Ibid., p. 584.
29 Horn, p. 234.
30 Q.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 856.
31 Connelly, p. 121.
32 Wyeth, p. 206.
33 Ibid., p. 203.
34 Q.R., XXIII, part 2, pp. 362, 373.
35 Ibid., p. 270.
36 Ibid., p. 886.
37 Starr, p. 242.
38 Q.R., XXIII, part 2.
39 Q.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 557.
40 Q.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 888.
41 Ibid., p. 886.
42 Ibid., pp. 459-461.
43 Q.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 539.
44 Ibid., pp. 556-559.
45 Starr, p. 247.
46 Q.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 558.
47 Ibid., p. 540.
48 Starr, 248.
49 O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 889.
50 O.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 460.
51 Ibid., pp. 460-461.
52 Ibid., p. 461.
53 Jordan and Pryor, p. 293.
54 O.R., XXIII, part 2, pp. 891-892.
55 O.R., XXIII, part 1, pp. 623-624.
56 O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 895.
57 Horn, p. 237.
58 Wyeth, p. 212.
59 O.R., XXIII, part 2, pp. 894-895.
60 O.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 624.
61 Henry, p. 167.
62 Jordan and Pryor, p. 293.
63 Wyeth, p. 213.
64 O.R., XXIII, part 2, pp. 595.
65 O.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 624.
66 Connelly, p. 134.
67 Horn, pp. 237-238.
68 Connelly, p. 133.
69 O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 898.
70 Ibid., pp. 898-901.
71 Starr, p. 249.
72 Henry, p. 517.
73 O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 902.
"Q. R., XXIII, Part 1, p. 409."
CHAPTER FOUR

Chickamauga Campaign

The Chickamauga Campaign is a perfect example of bumbling commanders, wandering armies, and missed opportunities. During much of the time dedicated to the "maneuver" phase of this campaign, 8 July to 17 September, both armies sat back and did very little that was constructive. General Rosecrans did build up his supplies for six weeks before he moved so he was well set for the next phase of his plans. The six weeks required to do this seems excessive given the six months spent doing the same thing before his fifteen day Tullahoma Campaign that was just finished. He should have been able to move directly from one phase to the next. Future events would nearly lead to the starvation of his army in Chattanooga leading one to believe he did not use his time well.¹

While Rosecrans built up his supplies, Bragg fortified Chattanooga. This city was Rosecrans' immediate objective and he wanted to handle its conquest the same way he had won middle Tennessee. His plan was to make Bragg leave the city without a fight. While Rosecrans decided how to go about doing that, Bragg contemplated a return offensive to middle Tennessee. However, given his weaknesses in troop strength and logistics, he soon dropped this idea.²

Confederate cavalry performance during the maneuver phase was less than optimal. Each unit was assigned a mission by the high command of the Army of Tennessee, but
was either assigned the wrong mission, a confused mission, or it failed to carry out the mission correctly, with a sense of urgency. This is not to say that they were doing nothing. The units did keep themselves busy and moving, but again, as at Tullahoma, they did not give General Bragg an accurate picture of what was happening around him.

Once the army was south of the Tennessee River, the cavalry commanders were given areas of responsibility to picket. See Map 3. Bragg assigned Wheeler's Corps the crossings of the Tennessee south of Chattanooga, as well as command of Roddey's Brigade which was further to the east of Decatur, Alabama. Forrest obeyed orders to picket the crossings from Kelley's Ford north to Kingston, where he maintained his headquarters. Assisting in this picket of the river was the Confederate infantry. On 12 July, Bragg ordered Polk to provide a brigade to guard the river from Bridgeport to Shellmound, a stretch of the river within Wheeler's area of responsibility. Brigadier General Patton Anderson's brigade drew this duty with the 3rd Confederate Cavalry Regiment at Bridgeport subject to his orders. However, in Forrest's area, instead of only a brigade, most of the Confederate infantry garrisoned from Chattanooga north to the Hiwassee River. On 20 July, the cavalry submitted the "return of troops" as in Table 2.

Wheeler was still in Chattanooga on 19 July developing a plan to defend the railroads in the state of Georgia. This he submitted on 19 July. He concluded that a cavalry
Table 2. Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 20 July 1863
division at Rome, Georgia and one at Gadsden, Alabama were called for to defend against Rosecrans’ cavalry. The orders allowing Wheeler to implement this plan and establish his headquarters at Gadsden, arrived on 22 July.

Forrest’s division at first went into camp around Chattanooga to refit and await orders. All of the men were on the east bank of the Tennessee except for Dibrell’s 8th Tennessee, which Forrest sent to watch Rosecrans’ army from the vicinity of Sparta, Tennessee, on Dibrell’s own plantation. Until 24 July, Forrest’s men rested due to the inaction of both sides of the conflict. He then received orders to move north to Kingston, Tennessee. His mission there was to watch the approach to the Tennessee from across the Sequatchie Valley towards Chattanooga and to watch Burnside as he moved his XXIII Corps on Knoxville.

Between the end of the Tullahoma Campaign on 7 July and the beginning of the Chickamauga Campaign on 16 August, Rosecrans kept a busy schedule for his troops. Before he could move forward, he needed to secure his lines of supply and communications. He needed to repair the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad as far as Stevenson, Alabama, so that a free flow of supplies would exist. The roads were nearly impossible to traverse with the amount of supplies required by the Army of the Cumberland, so the railroad was essential. The area between Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Tracy City became a huge supply depot which was needed to ensure continuous supply of the army. Union engineers
rebuilt the Elk River Bridge by 13 July and the main line to Bridgeport was open by 25 July. They completed the branch to Tracy City on 13 August, one day after the special engine required to negotiate the steep switchbacks on this line arrived. When this line opened, Rosecrans began his advance. 11

Rosecrans experienced no problems reinforcing or resupplying his forces. As has been recounted earlier, Bragg's army retreated through the area so rapidly that very little destruction had been accomplished on the lines of communication, roads, and railroads. Rain fell so hard for so long that bridges that were set afire by Forrest's and Wheeler's units simply would not burn. Wheeler left the railroad tunnel in the mountains near Cowan intact in the rush to leave. Bragg may have had hopes of its use to supply future Southern moves. Since the Confederates did so little damage, all of the routes required to supply the Federal campaign against Chattanooga were fully operational by 25 July, all the way to the Tennessee River. 12

Bragg was still having a difficult time supplying his army. He sat at the railroads of Chattanooga directly north of the great depot in Atlanta and still he could not get food for his army. The cumbersome Confederate Subsistence Department supplied General R. E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia from this area. Bragg had to go elsewhere, outside of his own area of operations, for subsistence. Bragg also believed that his 35,000 men were facing an army of 100,000
Unionists being reinforced by troops now released from their successful Vicksburg siege. To solve his military problems he needed more troops, but these troops only added to his mounting logistics problems.  

Rosecrans knew that Chattanooga was too well defended for him to be able to take it by assault. He had no desire to give battle to take Chattanooga if he could turn Bragg's flank again and accomplish the same purpose. Therefore, he had to decide whether to go north or south of the town to cross the river and come in behind Bragg's army in its defenses. If he got behind Bragg, he would at least force Bragg out of Chattanooga. He might even cut Bragg off from his only supply line to Atlanta.

Rosecrans set about making his plans and decisions. If he went north, he would have to cross the Cumberland Mountains and Walden's Ridge, but his flanks would be covered by General Ambrose E. Burnside's army moving to capture Knoxville. This route provided several places to cross the river and march south along good routes into Chattanooga. If he went south, he would have to provide his own flank security and his units would be widely separated at distant crossing sites. He also would have difficult terrain to cross in approaching Chattanooga itself. This same difficult terrain, though, would allow him to get far into Bragg's rear even while splitting his own forces.

Rosecrans decided to operate south and west of Chattanooga. He would be able to directly supply his forces
by railroad rather than having to climb the tenuous gaps in Walden's Ridge. He believed, though, that he needed to convince Bragg that the northern sites were to be used so that surprise would allow him to get his army east of the Tennessee River. Again, Rosecrans used excellent deception and the lack of Confederate reconnaissance to his benefit.

Bragg pulled his army into Chattanooga. Major General Simon B. Buckner's army of 9,000 abandoned Knoxville in early September as Burnside approached. These men then reinforced Bragg's army. The additional men were needed, but the resultant loss of Knoxville and its railway direct to Virginia would hurt the cause very soon. Burnside stayed northeast of Chattanooga. General Joseph E. Johnston's army in central Mississippi also reinforced Bragg with 11,500 troops. On the flank north of town, Forrest's cavalry provided a screen on the east side of the river. Wheeler's corps did the same south of Chattanooga.

During this lull in the active campaigning, Wheeler had his orders to picket the river. He did not accomplish this mission very ably. Rather than putting his whole effort into watching the river, he left a very thin screen across many miles of river and pulled his units back to relax. Bragg's Chief of Staff, W. W. Mackall, informed Wheeler at Trenton on 9 July, that Bragg considered information on Rosecrans' movements vital. Wheeler was responsible for the Union right and Forrest would cover the left flank of the enemy. A small force of scouts was
required to gather this information. Forrest had Colonel Dibrell with the 8th Tennessee at Sparta. Lieutenant J. A. McFerrin covered Wheeler's front. He ranged far and wide to watch Rosecrans and bring in supplies. He remained west of the river until six days after Rosecrans began his advance.¹³

Wheeler spread his corps out quite a long distance from the Tennessee River. From Wharton's Division, Wheeler left Colonel W. N. Estes and the 3rd Confederate Cavalry to picket the river from Bridgeport to Guntersville. The rest of Wharton's Division moved to Rome, Georgia. From Martin's Division, only Colonel W. B. Wade's 8th Confederate Cavalry picketed from Guntersville to Decatur. Martin and the remainder of his division quartered themselves near Alexandria, Alabama. General P. D. Roddey's separate brigade, the so-called District of Northern Alabama,¹⁷ was attached to Wheeler's Corps and operated from Decatur west as far as Corinth, Mississippi. Roddey's headquarters was near Tuscumbia, Alabama. The 4th Alabama was detailed to General Gideon Pillow on 15 July to aid in conscription duty.²⁰ Wheeler claimed in his report that he detailed an additional regiment to this duty, but there is no other evidence of this.²¹

As Wheeler garrisoned the western flank, news of the Morgan raid began to filter back to the army. After disobeying orders and crossing the Ohio River, General John Morgan raided into Indiana and Ohio. He ran into much more
difficulty then he had expected because there was no local Copperhead uprising or offer of assistance at any point. Union forces chased him unmercifully. After three and a half weeks of raiding and running, these Union forces captured Morgan and most of the remnant of his 2,500-man raiding force near New Lisbon, Ohio on 26 July. Very few of his men made it back to friendly lines. The cavalry assigned to Buckner in east Tennessee absorbed those that did. One whole division of Wheeler's Corps ceased to exist.

Wheeler kept his units spread out and, to some extent, they were refitting and remounting. In many cases, they were merely relaxing and maintaining an undisciplined lifestyle. The Army of Tennessee itself complained about the way the cavalry units behaved. In all cases mentioned in the reports, these units were under Wheeler's command, not Forrest's. On 30 July, Bragg sent an "information" message to Wheeler apprising him of the problem. Bragg was quite obviously telling Wheeler to take control of the two units mentioned in particular, Breckenridge's Regiment (one of Morgan's survivors) and R. D. Allison's Squadron, and all of his command in general. Further mention of misbehavior is not noted, but Wheeler still exercised only loose control, as made obvious by the amount of time he required to gather his units later in the campaign.

Forrest arrived at his location in Kingston and established contact with Buckner's Department in Knoxville.
by 30 July. At this time, Buckner ordered his primary cavalry commander, Brigadier General John Pegram to keep in constant communication with Forrest. The two organizations began to work together in the first link-up between the Army of Tennessee and the Department of East Tennessee. Later, on 6 August, the Department of East Tennessee became the 3rd Corps of Bragg's army. Numbers and organization of the Army of Tennessee and Department of East Tennessee cavalry units on 31 July are noted in Tables 3, 4, and 5.

Until the Union army began its advance from the vicinity of Tullahoma, there was little activity along the river to the north or south of Chattanooga. Numerous slight skirmishes and reports of contact occurred, but enemy movements provided very little information at this time. General Anderson did report on several occasions that enemy cavalry was seen riding and marauding near the river at the mouth of Battle Creek and Bridgeport as early as 24 July. The whole country appeared to be alive with small scouts of cavalry troops, but the Confederates discerned no pattern from Union efforts.

Forrest and Wheeler quite legitimately then used this time to rest and refit their units. As in many other branches of the army, the cavalry allowed its men to go home to acquire new outfits of clothing, equipment, and horses. The cavalry simply took greater liberties with the number of soldiers absent and the length of time they were gone.
Abstract from return of the troops in Department No. 2, General Braxton Bragg commanding, for July 31, 1863; headquarters Chattanooga, Tenn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Present for duty</th>
<th>Effective total</th>
<th>Aggregate present</th>
<th>Aggregate present and absent</th>
<th>Aggregate present term.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General staff (Chattanooga, Tenn.)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Polk's corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>12,838</td>
<td>18,604</td>
<td>17,708</td>
<td>25,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>215</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>970</td>
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<td>Total Polk's corps</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>14,775</td>
<td>14,508</td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>26,433</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hill's corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>12,408</td>
<td>12,186</td>
<td>16,434</td>
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<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>137</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>877</td>
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<td>Total Hill's corps</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>13,057</td>
<td>12,949</td>
<td>17,675</td>
<td>24,385</td>
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<td>Jackson's brigade:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
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<td>1,285</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>1,850</td>
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<td>145</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>201</td>
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<td>Total Jackson's brigade</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>2,604</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Reserve</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>328</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry with Artillery Reserve</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>283</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>711</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pickett's company Sappers and Miners</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>161</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Bragg's cavalry escort</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler's corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>6,901</td>
<td>6,504</td>
<td>8,078</td>
<td>15,228</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>303</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forrest's division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2,587</td>
<td>2,538</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>6,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>6,501</td>
<td>6,079</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>16,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Army of Tennessee</td>
<td>5,409</td>
<td>40,222</td>
<td>39,950</td>
<td>52,450</td>
<td>80,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Northern Alabama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provost Battalion, Atalanta</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total Department No. 2</td>
<td>5,462</td>
<td>40,377</td>
<td>39,568</td>
<td>52,661</td>
<td>81,204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 31 July 1863
### CAVALRY CORPS

**Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler.**

**Wharton's Division.**


**First Brigade.**

| 7th Alabama, Col. J. C. Malone, Jr. |
| 4th Georgia, Col. I. W. Avery. |

**Second Brigade.**

| 3d Confederate, Col. W. N. Ezell. |

**Artillery.**

Tennessee Battery, Capt. B. F. White, Jr.

**Martin's Division.**


**First Brigade.**

| 1st Alabama, Maj. I. H. Johnson. |
| 5th Alabama, Capt. T. H. Haas. |
| 5th Confederate, Capt. J. B. Field. |

**Second Brigade.**

| 1st Confederate, Capt. C. H. Cox. |

**Artillery.**

Wiggins' (Arkansas) battery, Lieut. A. A. Blake.

**Morgan's Division.**

**First Brigade.**

| 1st Kentucky, Maj. J. E. Webber. |
| 3d Kentucky, Col. J. Warren Greig. |
| Ward's (9th Tennessee) regiment, W. W. Ward. |

**Second Brigade.**

| 8th Kentucky, Col. E. B. Clark. |
| 10th Kentucky, Col. A. H. Johnson. |

**Artillery.**

Kentucky Battery, Capt. E. P. Byrns.

**District of Northern Alabama.**


| 5th Alabama Cavalry, Maj. J. W. Bennett. |

**Forrest's Cavalry Division.**


**First Brigade.**

| 3d Arkansas, Col. A. W. Holcomb. |
| McDonald's battalion, Maj. Charles McDonald. |
| Escort company, Capt. John Bradley. |

**Second Brigade.**

| 10th Tennessee. |

**Artillery.**

Tennessee Battery, Capt. E. L. Freeman.

**Table 4. Confederate Cavalry Order of Battle, 31 July 1863**

**Army of Tennessee**

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111
Abstract from field return of the Department of East Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner commanding, for July 31, 1863; headquarters Knoxville, Tenn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Present for duty</th>
<th>Effective total present</th>
<th>Aggregate present</th>
<th>Aggregate present and absent</th>
<th>Aggregate present and absent last return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>7,022</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>9,747</td>
<td>18,754</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>5,331</td>
<td>5,781</td>
<td>6,202</td>
<td>10,427</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sappers and Miners</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>14,194</td>
<td>15,835</td>
<td>17,814</td>
<td>35,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


First Cavalry Brigade (headquarters Ebenezer, Tenn.).

Brig. Gen. JOHN PEGRAM.

1st Georgia, Col. J. J. Morrison.
6th Georgia, Col. John R. Hart.
1st Tennessee, Col. J. E. Carter.
Rucker's Legion, Col. E. W. Rucker.
Huwald's battery, Capt. Gus. A. Huwald.

Second Cavalry Brigade (absent in Kentucky).

Col. JOHN S. SCOTT.

10th Confederate, Col. C. T. Guadie.
5th Tennessee, Col. G. W. McKenzie.

Table 5. Abstract from Return and Cavalry Order of Battle, 31 July 1863
Department of East Tennessee
Because of this fact, neither commander kept an overly large number of soldiers or units engaged at picketing.

While cavalrymen were at home or relaxing in the mountain rivers near their camps, the Confederate army was having a difficult time with desertions. Several times the cavalry commanders received orders to round up and return deserters. During the lull, guarding against deserters was apparently Bragg's priority mission for his cavalry. East Tennessee and North Carolina units lost so many troops that the only way to stem the tide was to transfer them to another theater. The Army of Tennessee offered a general amnesty for any troops, and officers, who would return to their duty stations. Since the cavalry commanders were more generous with time away, more often than in the case of foot soldiers, mounted men did eventually return to their units. However, assigned strengths never matched present for duty strengths and desertions from cavalry units would be rampant throughout this campaign. (See Tables 1 through 9.)

While his men were recuperating, Forrest himself was hatching a plan to get away from Bragg and the Army of Tennessee. He so detested a subordinate role that he offered a plan, both through and outside of the chain of command, to the Confederate high command at Richmond that would take him west to an independent command. He even offered to leave most of his division to the leaders he detested if he could only get away to execute his plan. He
### Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee and Department of East Tennessee, 10 August 1863

**Command.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Present for duty</th>
<th>Effective total present</th>
<th>Approved present</th>
<th>Approved total present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>7,973</td>
<td>7,973</td>
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<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>8,905</td>
<td>9,035</td>
<td>9,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>1,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rappah and Miners</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>18,330</td>
<td>18,377</td>
<td>18,377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Walshall’s brigade, which appears in Withers’ division as “present for duty,” is at Atlanta. Effective total, 2,091; aggregate, 2,035.*

1 This only includes the forces of General Boscawen’s command and will be made separate.

**Table 6.** Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee and Department of East Tennessee, 10 August 1863
Table 7. Confederate Cavalry Order of Battle, 10 August 1863
Army of Tennessee
Abstract from return of the Department of Tennessee, General Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, commanding, August 20, 1863; headquarters Chattanooga, Tenn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Present for duty</th>
<th>Effective total</th>
<th>Aggregate present</th>
<th>Aggregate present and absent</th>
<th>Pieces of artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General headquarters:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>928</td>
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Table 8. Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 20 August 1863

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wanted to go to the Mississippi River and organize a division of troops to harrass the enemy on the river. He was sure he could raise and arm the units with little help from the government (at least the Confederate government) and maintain them in the region above Vicksburg and Memphis. Since the Mississippi River had recently been lost with the fall of Vicksburg, he felt he could interdict it from both banks to the detriment of the Union cause. Richmond and Bragg looked upon this proposal favorably and they were convinced Forrest was the man to succeed in such a bold venture. However, Forrest's direct communication was sent three days after Rosecrans began his move toward Chattanooga. Bragg's endorsement of the official request went forward only two days before Rosecrans' move. However, the condition and dire straits of the Army of Tennessee did not allow the attempt when Forrest advocated it. The plan was overcome by events.

Rosecrans began his move on 16 August. His first troops to make contact were Minty's cavalry who ran into Dibrell's men still at Sparta on 17 August. Dibrell's men had maintained a watch on the Union forces while they refitted themselves and any new recruits they received. These forces jostled the week before and continued to vie against each other all the way to the river. The difference in the strength of the assaults on 17 August from the previous minor skirmishes confirmed in Dibrell's mind that a major advance was in effect. Dibrell managed to maintain
his unit integrity, but was steadily pushed back onto Forrest's supporting units which began arriving at Bon Air. Dibrell kept his unit to the west of the river until called back when Forrest began to move south with Buckner.

To keep Bragg deceived as to his plans, Rosecrans sent mounted units north along the river while he sent Crittenden's XXI Corps straight at Chattanooga. The mounted troops were to provide deception by lighting fires and pretending to build boats for crossing the river. Crittenden's men were to demonstrate in front of, and fire artillery into, the town. Bragg fell right into the trap again as he had no concrete intelligence from the enemy side of the river. While the deception went on, Rosecrans proceeded with his main effort.36

On 17 August, Wheeler received his first order of the new campaign. The enemy began its approach to the river on 16 August, and the scouts began to move back across the Tennessee. The army suffered acutely from desertions and Army Headquarters ordered Wheeler to redouble the efforts of his pickets in stopping unauthorized travelers. Bragg's headquarters refused any more absences into areas under enemy control and restricted all other departures. Leaves were valid only if signed at Army headquarters itself. Wheeler began this campaign the same way he ended the last -- looking for deserters.37

Wheeler realized he would be falling back from the river sometime soon after the advance began. He asked for
instructions on the "removal of negroes, &c., from the Tennessee River". Wheeler's orders said to bring the able-bodied Negroes with him, destroy supplies such as cotton if necessary, and to keep good records of all such actions.  

While Dibrell was fighting the only action west of the Tennessee River, Rosecrans' corps continued their advance to the river. Thomas' XIV and McCook's XX Corps moved south of Chattanooga to the river at Stevenson. Crittenden's XXI Corps moved directly at Chattanooga with Colonel Wilder's Lightning Brigade leading. The Union army arrived at the river on 20 August and announced its arrival loudly on the 21 August by bombarding the city and sinking some boats. Confederate President Jefferson Davis had declared Friday, 21 August, 1863 a Day of Fasting and Prayer for the Confederacy. As the officers and citizens were at prayer in the churches of the city, Wilder's guns lobbed a few shells into the town. Very little physical damage was sustained, but the effect upon General Bragg's and Southern morale in general was extensive. Wilder then pulled back and commenced operations aimed at deceiving Bragg as to Rosecrans' intentions. 

Up to the day that the Federals took the west river bank, Confederate scouts remained on the west side of the river and up in the mountains to ascertain Union movement. They gathered information, helped move foodstuffs to Bragg, and generally policed the bushwhackers and "tories" in the
mountains. By 22 August, though, they had been recalled to the east bank by Lieutenant Colonel George Wm. Brent, Bragg's Assistant Adjutant-General, and set to acting as scouts and couriers along the river. As Forrest recalled Dibrell to the east side of the river at about the same time, the Army of Tennessee had no remaining presence on the west bank thereafter. Bragg was then in the dark about Rosecrans' true intent and his deceptions.

Even with the increase in activity along the river and the shelling of Chattanooga on 21 August, Wheeler still failed to call his units forward to the river. He sent Major Wm. E. Hill southwest of Rome to Centre, Alabama with the "Elite" Battalion as late as 23 August. Major Hill was sent seventy miles away from the river to encamp his command. Wheeler gave no rationale for the move. Not until 27 August did Wheeler call Martin's Division forward from Alexandria, Alabama, eighty miles away. This division was totally unfit for field duty and mustered only 1200 men. On 30 August, except for one regiment that is mentioned later, Martin's Division went back south to Round Mountain, Alabama, to pull itself together and await further orders. Not until 29 August did Wharton receive orders to move forward the seventy miles from Rome, Georgia. His unit's condition was poor, also, as little supervision had been exerted by Wheeler or his headquarters over the last six weeks. Wharton's summons did not even come from Wheeler,
but instead from Bragg's headquarters. Wheeler kept his headquarters in Gadsden.

Wharton reported to General D.H. Hill near Chattanooga on 29 August. On 1 September, he had still not arrived. Martin's first unit, 500 men of Lieutenant Colonel T. H. Mauldin's 3rd Alabama finally arrived in Lookout Valley on 29 August, but were too late to accomplish much.

As the XXI Corps demonstrated to the north of and across from Chattanooga to keep Bragg's attention, Rosecrans moved XIV and XX Corps south to cross the Tennessee River west of Chattanooga. Bragg received word that troops were along the river to the south, but believed this was a diversion because he also believed he had enemy to the north. He had decided the northern route was where the enemy would cross.

On 29 August, the enemy crossed the river ten miles below Bridgeport and forced Colonel Estes' pickets of the 3rd Confederate Cavalry away from the river. Colonel Estes reported this crossing, by a large cavalry force, to Wheeler on the day it happened. However, the word first got to Bragg from a civilian. A Union column crossed near Stevenson at Caperton's Ferry and climbed the steep road towards Lookout Mountain. On 2 September, Bragg knew the demonstrations north of Chattanooga were a deception and that the major crossing was to the south. Wheeler began to get control of his units, but still they were not stopping, slowing, or reporting enemy movements.
On 31 August, Wheeler's only force in contact with the enemy was Mauldin's 3rd Alabama. Mauldin was in Trenton and reported enemy cavalry all around him on Sand and Lookout Mountains. He also reported that Colonel Estes' command was completely scattered. The whole line into Lookout Valley was open to the enemy.\(^2\)

Since infantry pickets reached from Chattanooga to the Hiwassee River, Forrest was mainly responsible for watching the river north of the Hiwassee to Kingston. Once Buckner was faced with Burnside's advance and the possibility of being cut off from Bragg by Crittenden, the entire 3rd Corps began a withdrawal south of the river at Loudon on 30 August.\(^3\) Forrest and Pegram had been cooperating since 24 August, but Buckner wanted to make sure he kept his cavalry covering his corps.\(^4\) Forrest received orders through Buckner's Headquarters for the cavalry screen to fall back with the corps from Knoxville.\(^5\) This Forrest did. Buckner consolidated all of his corps' cavalry at Lenoir's Station except for Scott's Brigade, which he placed subordinate to Pegram, but left to cover the last bridge across the Tennessee at Loudon.\(^6\) All of the large cavalry organizations north of Chattanooga were concerned with covering Buckner's withdrawal. This withdrawal continued south of the Hiwassee River to the vicinity of Charleston, Tennessee, beginning the evening of 30 August.\(^7\)

While the movement of Buckner's Corps toward Chattanooga was in progress, orders came from Bragg to
consolidate all of the cavalry units north of Chattanooga into one corps organization with Forrest in command. As of 3 September, Forrest added to his division the brigades of Pegram, Scott, and Hodge under Pegram as division commander. The three brigades were consolidated into two. Included with these men were the remnants of General John H. Morgan's men who had ridden into destruction in Ohio during June and July.

During the week that Buckner was returning from Knoxville, Bragg still had in mind that the deception operations north of Chattanooga were the advance of the enemy's main effort. He knew quite well of the enemy's appearance south of the city on 21 August and of the crossings beginning on 28 August, but still he regarded these as the feint. By 4 September though, Bragg was finally convinced that Rosecrans had two corps south of the river below Chattanooga. He did come up with a plan to catch the enemy off guard now that he knew their whereabouts. He wanted to cross Hill's Corps (formerly Hardee's) north of the city by riding them across on Forrest's horses. Hill's Corps would then fall upon Crittenden's men while they were separated from the remainder of the Union army. Interestingly enough, Bragg seriously considered moving infantry across the river by horseback even after he had previously denied access to the west bank to this same cavalry due to problems of crossing the river. The effort came to no avail, though, because
Rosecrans again did not do what Bragg expected. From 1 to 4 September, Rosecrans crossed his main body over the river and struck out to the east into the mountains to flank Bragg's lines of communications.

When Bragg realized his predicament, he again called upon his cavalry to give him some information in the southern sector. The oft-repeated "cry in the wilderness" from General W. W. Mackall went to Wheeler again on 2 September. Mackall and Bragg were both "uneasy about the state of affairs". They deemed it vitally important that Bragg have full and correct information as to enemy location and intent. The failure to receive such information was potentially fatal. Colonel Mauldin's weak picket on Lookout Mountain was the same type of thin line that was so easily breached at the river and on Sand Mountain overlooking the river. Mackall worried that this line would also be broken and that the enemy would set up a screen which would not allow the Confederates to discover the Union intent at all. He was begging for help from the man who had let them down before.

Wheeler decided to answer the call this time. He even made allowance for the rapid transfer of information to all concerned parties. On 2 September, Wharton's division picketed all of the passes over Lookout Mountain from Will's Valley. Wharton patrolled the whole mountain from the Tennessee River in the north to Gadsden, Alabama, in the south. One of Wharton's brigades was to be headquartered
at LaFayette, the other at Alpine. Wharton headquartered at Summerville. Wheeler ordered all cavalry unit commanders to report information at least three times a day. If enemy contact or movement was made, reports were due every hour or less. Reports went to headquarters, Army of Tennessee, commanders of the bridges at Resaca and Etowah, as well as Cavalry Headquarters.

General Martin’s men came forward, also, on 2 September. Martin called in all of his far-flung detachments and scattered troops to rally between LaFayette and Dalton. The only portion of Martin’s division left detached in the field was half of the 3rd Alabama under Mauldin. These 250 men were picketing from the left of the infantry down the river to Kelly’s Ferry, across Will’s Valley to Lookout Mountain near Davis’ Mill. At Davis’ Mill, Mauldin linked up with Wharton’s mountain screen. Mauldin received the same instructions for report procedures.

The last outposts in the line formed a fishhook to the west from Lookout Mountain along the Coosa River toward Gadsden. With Lookout Mountain completely picketed east of the enemy, a line south of the enemy would ensure that any advance toward Rome or the Army of Tennessee’s supply lines would be intercepted. These outposts consisted of small detachments of troops scattered among the communities between Alpine, Rome, and Gadsden for refitting and remounting. They also included the so-called “Elite”
Battalion under Major Hill. These detachments garrisoned numerous gaps such as Henderson's, Tap's, Standifer's, Buck's, Davis', Baker's, and Blue Pond with anywhere from three men to a company. They reported to the commanding officer at Alpine and General Wharton at Summerville all they could gather on enemy strengths, locations, and the names of general officers commanding.\textsuperscript{33}

From the reports he received, Wheeler concluded that the enemy was moving two divisions of cavalry and McCook's corps over Sand Mountain by the Caperton Road. His units kept the Federals under observation and denied them possession of the summit of Lookout Mountain. On 4 September, Wharton reported enemy pickets at Winston's Gap.\textsuperscript{34} Wheeler redoubled his efforts and had his pickets in the gaps blockade each gap at several different spots to slow the enemy's progress. He insisted upon maintaining observation on the enemy at every moment.\textsuperscript{35}

Instead of turning south into Alabama, Rosecrans turned his two corps east toward Bragg's supply lines. Again, Bragg was to be run out of his position without a fight. On 6 September, Bragg wrote out orders to evacuate Chattanooga, and, on 7 September, ordered them executed at dawn on 8 September. These orders included Buckner's Corps and brought the entire army south of Chattanooga. To cover Buckner's movement, Scott's Brigade chased two Union regiments back to Philadelphia, Tennessee and cleared the
Charleston, Tennessee area of Union forces on 7 September. The rear of the army was covered.46

Bragg moved his army to LaFayette, Georgia, but Rosecrans was sure Bragg would retreat all of the way south toward Rome or even to Atlanta. After Bragg moved his whole army south, Crittenden crossed the river and occupied Chattanooga. Both sides lost contact. For the next few days, the armies maneuvered without knowing where each other was or where each other was headed. Both commanders made uninformed decisions and left themselves wide open to attack by an alert enemy. Only the other side's ignorance saved each army.

Rosecrans split his forces and sent them after the enemy army across a forty to sixty mile front. Rosecrans' assumptions about Bragg's retreat were wrong, so he had ignorantly led his army into positions from which its corps were not mutually supportive. None of his widely separated corps could assist another within a two day period. They were effectively three separate armies for several days. The army was subject to defeat in detail. Bragg only needed to take advantage of this dispersal before it was corrected.

Mauldin's 3rd Alabama was attached to Pegram's Division of Forrest's Corps when the army evacuated Chattanooga on 8 September.47 Mauldin stayed for only one day, working with Colonel Edmund Rucker in protecting the rear of the army. On 9 September, General Bragg moved Mauldin to the front of McLemore's Cove. At the same time, while Forrest rode south
toward Rome with part of Wharton's division, Martin received orders to occupy McLemore's Cove from across Pigeon Mountain. Any enemy force in McLemore's Cove would therefore be caught between the two cavalry screens. Bragg hoped to find the remainder of the Union army in this vicinity.\textsuperscript{70}

On 8 September, Bragg ordered Wheeler and Forrest to consolidate their units at LaFayette. Forrest left Pegram's Division to cover the rear of the army. With the remainder of his unit, he assumed control of 300 of Wharton's men and moved to retard the enemy advance on Rome. Forrest moved out immediately to lead the army as it marched south away from Chattanooga. Forrest's orders were to slow the enemy. In addition, Forrest determined on his own volition that he was going to go dig them out of their hiding places, if the enemy did not advance to meet him.\textsuperscript{71}

While Forrest rode toward Rome, Wheeler's units went in other directions looking for the enemy. Bragg knew the enemy was headed south and east, but he still had no exact enemy locations or intention to plan against. Wheeler was ordered to drive into the valleys to meet the enemy pickets. Bragg wanted to know enemy "designs, strengths, and position".\textsuperscript{72} Bragg moved Mauldin and Martin into McLemore's Cove. Wharton's Division had Crews' Brigade in Will's Valley at Winston. All of these units were looking for the enemy. When Bragg combined information from all of these scouting parties with that gathered by Forrest at Alpine, he
finally understood what Rosecrans had accomplished, and more importantly, how far out on a limb the Union commander was.  

With Rosecrans' army widely divided, Bragg had the perfect opportunity to strike. Situations such as this did not occur very often during this war. General Bragg actually rose to such a situation twice during the time that Rosecrans' army was split. However, Bragg could not capitalize on the opportunities, chiefly due to the atrocious command climate in his army. His corps commanders had very little faith in Bragg or in his plans. His orders were frequently contradictory and lacking in specifics and directness. Too often Bragg left too much open to his subordinates' discretion. In the instances which presented themselves in this phase of the Chickamauga campaign, this command climate led to failure.

On 10 September, Bragg ordered a concerted effort to destroy General Thomas' advance division in McLemore's Cove. Hesitation, faulty coordination, and requests for clarification all replaced decisiveness and ingenuity. Bragg's subordinates allowed an enemy reinforcement and retreat before a blow was struck.

On 10 September, Wheeler himself moved to Summerville to assist in discovering the "designs, movements, strength, and position of the enemy". McCook came over the mountains with greater force and pushed Wharton's men back. On 11 September, Wheeler moved back north to Trion and reported
that no enemy appeared headed in the direction of Rome. Instead, the enemy cavalry turned toward the north and was just short of Summerville itself. The two forces had screen lines facing each other just west of Summerville.75

Rosecrans had Crittenden's corps occupying Chattanooga after Bragg abandoned the city. Thomas' corps extended itself into McLemore's Cove. Forrest found McCook's corps south near Alpine. Twenty miles separated the two southern corps. It was thirty more miles on to Chattanooga. Rosecrans was overextended and ripe for defeat in detail. Finally, Bragg knew what was going on and how to handle the situation. The question was, could he make it happen?

By the night of 9 September, Bragg assigned Forrest back to the north to cover the army's rear against Crittenden who had occupied Chattanooga that day. Forrest sent Hodge's Brigade back to Cleveland, Tennessee to watch for any movement from Burnside out of Knoxville. Scott's Brigade went to Ringgold to watch the railroad south out of Chattanooga to discover any Union movement in that direction. Pegram guarded the rear already and continued to watch in the vicinity of Pea Vine Church. The remaining brigade belonged to General Armstrong. It remained for Polk near LaFayette to cover the massed infantry there. Forrest controlled this far flung corps from Dalton, where he camped with his escort.76 Polk extended his line and ordered Colonel Rucker from Pegram's Division to cover this advance and report every contact.77
Also on 10 September, Pegram and the 6th Georgia Cavalry met the skirmishers of Palmer’s Union division of Crittenden’s corps in the vicinity of Graysville. The 6th Georgia captured fifty-nine prisoners before retiring toward Rock Springs. Crittenden’s corps was on the railroad, about a day’s march east of Chattanooga and thereby totally exposed to attack and defeat in detail. Forrest reported the enemy’s exposed position and called for infantry support from both Polk and Bragg. Again, Bragg planned a move against one of the isolated portions of Rosecrans’ army. He turned north to attack Crittenden’s corps near Lee and Gordon’s Mill on the Chickamauga Creek. However, again Bragg’s subordinates were slow and failed to carry out the plans.

Forrest prepared for a battle on the next day as he was certain of infantry reinforcement. However, he heard no response to his reports. Finally, at midnight on 10 September, he personally rode to discover the problem. Bragg had been attempting to get Polk to assist in a move on Thomas in McLemore’s Cove, but confusion over the orders kept Bishop Polk from moving his corps. By 13 September, this opportunity was lost. Bragg tried repeatedly to get Polk to attack, but for one reason or another, the infantry attacks never took place.

Frustrated as he was, Forrest went back to hamper Crittenden as much as possible with his own units. He brought Scott into the fray on 11 September against Wilder’s
Brigade. This unit pushed Scott back from Ringgold to Tunnel Hill until reinforcement came from Dibrell's Brigade. Forrest himself was wounded slightly in this fight, but it did not remove him from the battle. On the morning of 12 September, Crittenden began to move his corps toward a rendezvous with Thomas in the vicinity of Lee and Gordon's Mill. Scott continued to harrass the enemy rear as it moved south. At the same time, Pegram engaged Wilder's Brigade leading this force near Leet's Tanyard. Pegram again had the 6th Georgia and Rucker's Legion with him. The fighting was quite literally hand-to-hand as they fought the advancing enemy corps. Bragg received immediate word of the move toward Thomas, the portent of a consolidation of Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland.

By 12 September, Wheeler's men could no longer keep the enemy back. On that date, McCook's infantry and Stanley's cavalry threw Colonel Isaac W. Avery and his 4th Georgia troopers out of Alpine. Bragg ordered Wheeler to develop the situation even if it required sacrificing troops. Wheeler's men had a positive identification of Federal forces and their locations for Bragg, but the Federal forces ruptured the Southern screen line to the west. This rupture isolated the units west of Alpine and Lookout Mountain from the Army unless they moved all the way to Rome and then north. This doubled the length of the lines of communication for the scouts.
As Avery pulled back, Wheeler brought seven regiments of Wharton's Division back toward LaFayette. Martin continued his move into McLemore's Cove. He marshaled his division on the Cove road parallel to Lookout and Pigeon Mountains on his sides. He sent scouts to his front and to his rear to watch all possible routes down off of Lookout Mountain. He had scouts who had visual contact with Union troops near Stevens' Gap, Thomas' XIV Corps. From 12 to 17 September, Wheeler's forces skirmished daily with enemy patrols and units. They made contact with enemy cavalry in McLemore's Cove on 13 September as Wheeler pulled back out of the Cove, leaving two regiments to keep watch on the enemy.

Colonel W. C. P. Breckinridge and his 9th Kentucky Cavalry, one of the units which had been causing trouble in the infantry camps prior to the start of the campaign, had since moved to Guntersville, Alabama. From that location, Bragg received messages warning him of the approach of Union reinforcements through Huntsville. Conflicting reports from second hand sources placed thousands of new troops moving to Rosecrans' succor. Bragg answered such reports on 15 September, by ordering Wheeler to have Roddey increase his demonstrations to draw off enemy reinforcements to the west. To some extent, the scout and deception plans were beginning to work for Bragg.

On 13 September, Rosecrans had Crittenden headed south toward Thomas and he ordered McCook to head north. He
wanted to consolidate his army in McLemore's Cove and move against Bragg's forces. It took three days to get his army together in McLemore's Cove with Crittenden in the north around Lee and Gordon's Mill. With little coordinated action coming from Bragg's army, he had a safe opportunity to bring his army together. Rosecrans had been lucky. 

Bragg had misgivings about the earnestness of his cavalry's effort. On 16 September, his General Order Number 179 weighed heavily on his cavalrymen. He had individual troopers and small scouting parties spread all over the LaFayette Road and to the west. Still, his order empowered any officer of the army to stop any cavalryman not with his unit, confiscate the trooper's horse, and ship the man off to headquarters for infantry assignment. Individuals doing their jobs received the same treatment as bonafide stragglers. Bragg's influx of situation reports dropped significantly when this "no straggler" order went into effect. Again, Bragg had not thought the problem through all the way and made provision for his mission. Another one of his policies worked to his own detriment. 

Meanwhile, back on the cavalry screen, Scott's Brigade moved to the north toward Ringgold to watch Granger's Reserve Corps outside of Chattanooga. His first contact came on 17 September, when Union forces again advanced from Graysville. The 2nd Tennessee Cavalry attacked this force in camp at midnight, 17 September, and stirred up quite a bit of confusion before returning to their own camp.
unmolested. They accomplished the same again at Red House on 18 September."1

Also, on 17 September Wheeler forced his way into McLemore's Cove by Dug Gap and out again by Catlett's Gap.2 He intended to grab some prisoners from the enemy masses in the Cove and then move on to Glass' Mill. He fought through the gaps and pressed the enemy until he determined that there were overwhelming numbers of blueclad infantry in the cove. Wheeler's men then guarded the passes as Hill's Corps prepared to move north of McLemore's Cove to get between the enemy and Chattanooga. When Hill moved his corps, Wheeler protected the corps' rear.3

Throughout the Chickamauga maneuver phase, Confederate cavalry again failed to be aggressive in its search for the enemy. Though some efforts were made to find and harass the enemy on the west side of the Tennessee River, these efforts were generally weak and ineffectual. Cavalry commanders either did not have specific instructions or they did not seek clarification of the commander's intent. In too many cases, the cavalry was out of position and not accomplishing the tasks that were assigned. These failures point to a lack of control and initiative among the commanders involved. There were plenty of assets available for the cavalry to accomplish some good for the Army of Tennessee, but the hierarchy did not pursue a common and clear goal.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ENDNOTES

1Horn, pp. 281-282.


3O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 902.

4Ibid., p. 907.

5Ibid., p. 911.

6Henry, p. 169.

7O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 920.

8Ibid., p. 916.

9Ibid., p. 925.

10Jordan and Pryor, p. 293.

11O.R., XXX, part 1, p. 50.

12Ibid.

13O.R., XXIII, part 2, pp. 688-689, 700, 702, 759-760,

770-772.

14O.R., XXX, part 1, pp. 51-52.

15Connelly, p. 163.

16O.R., XXIII, part 2, pp. 948, 952; O.R., XXX, part 4,

pp. 529, 530, 531, 538, 540, 541, 631.

17O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 902.

18Ibid., p. 904.

19Ibid., p. 944.

20Ibid., p. 913.

21O.R., XXX, part 2, p. 520.

22O.R., XXIII, part 1, 644.

23Ibid., p. 633.

O.R., XXIII, part 2, p. 938.

Ibid., p. 940.

Ibid., p. 954.

Ibid., pp. 941-946.

Ibid., p. 928.


O.R., XXX, part 4, pp. 502, etc.

O.R., XXIII, part 2, pp. 952, 964-965.

O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 489.

Ibid., p. 507-509.

O.R., XXX, part 2, p. 528.

O.R., XXX, part 1, pp. 51, 445-446.


Ibid., p. 505.


O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 508.

Ibid., p. 529.


O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 535.

Jordan and Pryor, p. 298.

O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 540.

Connelly, p. 170.

O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 567.

Ibid., p. 565.

Ibid., p. 567.
"Connelly, p. 170.
O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 574.
Ibid., p. 564.
Ibid., p. 569.
Ibid., p. 546.
Ibid., p. 570.
Ibid., p. 586.
Ibid., p. 570.
Ibid., p. 591.
Ibid., p. 594.
Ibid., p. 584.
Ibid., pp. 584-585.
Ibid., p. 586.
Ibid., p. 585.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 586.
Ibid., p. 595.
Ibid., p. 601.
Ibid., pp. 621-623.
Ibid., p. 611.
Ibid., pp. 629-630.
Ibid., p. 628.
Ibid., p. 602.
Ibid., pp. 629-630.
Ibid., p. 634.
Ibid., p. 636.
O.R., XXX, part 2, pp. 523-524.
Polk "briefly attended the Univ. of N.C. (his father had been one of its founders) before entering West Point. He was converted while a 1st Classman (senior), after three "lively years," and resigned six months after graduation to study for the Episcopal ministry. Ordained a deacon in 1830, he was named Missionary Bishop of the Southwest in 1838 and Bishop of La. in 1841. He was active in the establishment of the Univ. of the South and laid its cornerstone at Sewanee (Tenn.) in 1860. His friend and classmate Jefferson Davis prevailed upon him to accept a commission, and he was appointed Maj. Gen. 25 Jun '61, more as a symbol than as a military leader...He was killed by a Parrott gun during the Atlanta campaign on 14 June '64 at Pine Mountain. Not an outstanding combat leader, he was a large man with an impressive military bearing and a commanding manner. Although Jeff Davis said the Confederacy had sustained no heavier blow since Stonewall Jackson was killed, S.G. French expressed the opinion of many when he said, 'Thus died a gentleman and a high Church dignitary. As a soldier, he was more theoretical than practical.'"


Ibid., pp. 640-645.


O.R., XXX, part 1, p. 446.

O.R., XXX, part 2, pp. 528-530.

O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 602.

O.R., XXX, part 2, p. 520.

O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 642.

Ibid., p. 647.

Ibid., p. 648.

Ibid., p. 652.

O.R., XXX, part 1, pp. 54-55.

O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 656.

O.R., XXX, part 2, p. 531.

O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 657.

Ibid., p. 663.
The Battle of Chickamauga was the deadliest battle fought by the western armies throughout the war. Glenn Tucker has called it the "Bloody Battle in the West". When taken as a two day battle, its tally delivered the bloodiest two day period of the conflict. The irony of the situation is that the battle was not required for Rosecrans to accomplish his objective.

The goal of Rosecrans' maneuvering was to take the city of Chattanooga. He moved out of Murfreesboro and outmaneuvered Bragg, necessitating the latter's retreat to Chattanooga. After the six weeks wait, Rosecrans again maneuvered his forces in such a way as to compel Bragg's retreat from Chattanooga. He accomplished this with very little fighting and minimal casualties. Rosecrans did allow his army to become isolated, but with skill and luck, he had solved that problem without disaster. He had more than accomplished his goals and had enormously satisfied the desires of the administration in Washington. Up to this point, Rosecrans was the war's foremost hero for the north due to his skill and planning. He certainly did not want the battle that was looming on Chickamauga Creek.

Bragg, on the other hand, decided that he needed to fight. Given Rosecrans' location centered around Lee and Gordon's Mill on the LaFayette Road, Bragg's prize was the road itself north of the mill. Possession of the LaFayette
Road would separate Rosecrans from his Chattanooga base and leave him vulnerable to further attack and defeat. (See Map 4.) Rosecrans would be sorely pressed to resupply his army over the mountains from his railhead at Stevenson, Alabama. With that in mind, Bragg marched part of his army north to strike Rosecrans' flank on the LaFayette Road at Lee and Gordon's Mill. The Confederate Order of Battle for the 2 day Battle of Chickamauga is shown at Table 9.

Unfortunately for the Southern cause, Rosecrans maneuvered also. He marched Thomas' soldiers north of the mill and they arrived on the Chickamauga Creek as Bragg's army attempted to cross.

Forrest moved his headquarters from Dalton to Ringgold on 17 September, and then forward toward Pea Vine Creek on 18 September. As Forrest arrived near Pea Vine Creek, Brigadier General Bushrod Johnson received orders to cross Reed's Bridge and establish a camp on the west side of Chickamauga Creek. Forrest provided cover for Johnson's front and right flank as the column marched from Ringgold. The few troops Forrest had with him at the time were the ones who had been with him at Dalton. These were some of Morgan's men under Lieutenant Colonel Martin and Forrest's Escort Company. Forrest moved these men forward steadily until they arrived at Pea Vine Creek.

The battle opened accidentally on 18 September, when Southern forces unexpectedly encountered Union forces north of the mill. Federal mounted units under Minty were in
Map 4. Battle of Chickamauga
Table 9-1. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Woff's Brigade</th>
<th>Polk's Brigade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th Alabama</td>
<td>1st Arkansas, Col. John W. Coley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Frederick A. Aldord.</td>
<td>3d Confederate, Col. J. A. Smith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th Alabama, Col. E. B. Breedlove.</td>
<td>5th Tennessee, Col. William D. Bell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Alabama Battalion:</td>
<td>8th Tennessee, Col. William D. Bell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. John H. Gibson.</td>
<td>40th Tennessee, Col. Benjamin J. Hill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deesler's Brigade |
| Col. George Q. Miller. |

18th Arkansas | Lieut. Col. A. S. Hutchison. |
36th Arkansas | Lieut. Col. T. W. Scott. |
1st Texas Infantry | Col. Edward B. Childress. |
10th Texas Infantry | Col. William P. Wilke. |
11th Texas Infantry | Col. James J. Hinds. |
12th Texas Infantry | Col. E. H. Van Zandt. |
14th Texas Infantry | Capt. John T. Coit. |
24th Texas Infantry | Maj. W. H. Wills. |

Artillery |
| Maj. T. R. Houtkamp. |
| Capt. Henry C. Smith. |

Colwell's (Arkansas) Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Key. |
Dunlap's (Texas) Battery, Capt. James P. Hall. |

BEAUREINGE'S DIVISION |

Foulis' Company Mississippi Cavalry, Capt. H. L. Foulis. |

Helf's Brigade |
| Col. Joseph H. Lewis. |

51st Alabama, Col. Martin L. Stanfield. |
52nd Kentucky: |
4th Kentucky: |
Col. Joseph P. Neukro. |
Maj. Thomas W. Thompson. |
8th Kentucky: |
Col. Joseph H. Lewis. |
82nd Kentucky: |
Col. John W. Caldwell. |

Adams' Brigade |
| Col. Randall L. Gibson. |

23d Alabama, Maj. John C. Eubanks. |
24th Alabama, Col. Louis E. Gibson. |
18th Louisiana, Col. James E. Dillard. |
25th Louisiana, Col. Daniel Cofer. |
19th Louisiana: |
Maj. J. E. Armstrong. |
Maj. J. E. Armstrong. |
14th Louisiana Battalion, Maj. J. E. Armstrong. |

Bennett's Brigade |

1st Florida: |
Col. William S. Gilchrist. |
3d Florida, Col. W. L. L. Bowen. |
4th Georgia: |
Capt. William S. Phillips. |
Capt. Joseph E. Cook. |
60th North Carolina: |
Capt. James Thomas Weaver. |

Artillery |

Colwell's (Kentucky) Battery, Capt. William Colwell. |
Preston's (Kentucky) Battery, Lieut. E. M. Stedman. |
Skerritt's (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. C. H. Silver. |

Table 9-2. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863 | 144
Table 9-3. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863

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Table 9-4. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863
Table 9-5. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863
Table 9-6. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863

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CAVALRY.


Wharton's Division.


First Brigade.

Col. C. C. Crews.

Malone's (Alabama) Regiment, Col. J. C. Malone, Jr.
2d Georgia, Lieut. Col. F. M. Ison.
3d Georgia, Col. R. Thompson.
4th Georgia, Col. Isaac W. Avery.

Second Brigade.

Col. Thomas Harrison.

3d Confederate, Col. W. N. Estes.
8th Texas, Lieut. Col. Gustave Cook.
11th Texas, Col. G. R. Reeves.
White's (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. B. F. White, Jr.

Martin's Division.


First Brigade.

Col. John T. Morgan.


Second Brigade.

Col. A. A. Russell.

1st Confederate, Capt. C. H. Conner.
J. H. Wiggins (Arkansas) Battery, Lieut. J. P. Bryant.

Table 9-7. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863

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FORREST'S CORPS.
Brig. Gen. NATHAN B. FORREST.

ESCORT.
Jackson's Company Tennessee Cavalry, Capt. J. C. Jackson.

ARMSTRONG'S DIVISION.
Brig. Gen. FRANK C. ARMSTRONG.
Armstrong's Brigade.
Col. JAMES T. WHEELER.
3d Arkansas, Col. A. W. Robson.
18th Tennessee Battalion, Maj. Charles McDonald.

Forrest's Brigade.
Col. GEORGE G. DIBRELL.
9th Tennessee, Col. Jacob B. Biffle.
10th Tennessee, Col. Nicholas Nickleby Cox.
Shaw's Battalion, O. P. Hamilton's Battalion, and R. D. Allison's Squadron (combined), Maj. Joseph Shaw.
Huggins' (Tennessee) Battery (formerly Freeman's), Capt. A. L. Huggins.
Morton's (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. John W. Morton, jr.

PEGRAM'S DIVISION.
Brig. Gen. JOHN PEGRAM.
Davidson's Brigade.
Brig. Gen. H. B. DAVIDSON.
1st Georgia, Col. J. J. Morrison.
6th Georgia, Col. John R. Hart.
6th North Carolina, Col. George N. Folks.
Huwald's (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. Gustave A. Huwald.

Scott's Brigade.
Col. JOHN S. SCOTT.
10th Confederate, Col. C. T. Goode.
5th Tennessee, Col. H. M. Ashby.
5th Tennessee, Col. George W. McKenzie.
N. T. N. Robinson's (Louisiana) Battery (one section), Lieut. Winslow Robinson.

Table 9-8. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863

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place in front of Reed’s Bridge to contest the advance of the Confederate infantry. Martin’s command dismounted and a spirited fight kept up all the way to Reed’s Bridge across the west Chickamauga Creek at about noon on 18 September. Pegram’s Division joined Forrest at this place. The fight for the bridge was not complete as Johnson could not move troops across the intact bridge in the face of Minty’s continued resistance. Forrest then sent part of his command to a ford above the bridge. This force flanked Minty’s men who retired to the west about a mile. Johnson marched his men across the creek. Major General John Bell Hood came upon the scene, took command of the forces at the bridge and turned them all south to march up the west side of the creek. Pegram’s Division, with Forrest present, spent the night of 18 September behind Hood’s troops near Alexander’s Bridge. Not only was the opening of the battle unexpected, but Bragg’s grand strategy of enveloping Rosecrans’ left flank was lost.

Bragg gave orders for the movement of his army north of the Union force and across the Chickamauga Creek. Walker’s Corps was to cross at Alexander’s Bridge or Byram’s Ford. Buckner was to cross his corps at Thedford’s Ford. Polk was to move north of Lee and Gordon’s Mill and cross at the earliest opportunity. His force was led by Armstrong’s cavalry.

Armstrong’s Division was with Polk keeping that corps commander informed and secured. Armstrong reported enemy on
the road to Chattanooga between Anderson's and Lee and Gordon's Mill. He spent the evening of 17 September picketing in the Crawfish Valley as far north as Glass' Mill. Armstrong moved out on 18 September, leading Polk's Corps with a regiment ahead of each of Polk's divisions. Two regiments moved forward of the corps to hold the ford at Glass' Mill. To provide security and cover the flank, Armstrong placed a brigade at Worthen's Gap. By 12:30 P.M., Armstrong's men had found the enemy immediately opposite Lee and Gordon's Mill. The Southerners crossed the creek, but had not made it to the LaFayette Road, much less enveloped the Northerners on that road. Both sides continued to shift forces throughout the night of 18 September.

When General D.H. Hill moved his corps north on 18 September, Wheeler's troopers moved to guard Owens' Ford while still leaving guards in the gaps. At almost noon that day, Martin passed a message that the enemy were moving north out of McLemore's Cove. Wheeler attacked to delay the enemy, but lost Owens' Ford to the Federals, who used it to cross their infantry west of the Chickamauga Creek. At 2 P.M. on 19 September, the enemy's cavalry came out of McLemore's. Wheeler attacked the column vigorously and drove the divided enemy column in both directions.

On 19 September, Thomas' corps on the Union left moved against Confederate forces on the west bank of the river. Each side fed troops into the battle, causing a see-saw effect back and forth across the lines of battle. Both
sides fed troops into the battle as divisions which met in succession, never in a concerted effort. The fight raged first in the north, then proceeded to the south. By the end of 19 September, neither side had gained any real supremacy.

During the night of 18-19 September, Bragg again ordered Wheeler to guard all of the passes and fords on the army's left flank. He was to attack the enemy at every opportunity. Headquarters told Wheeler that the Grand Wing on the left was to be commanded by James Longstreet and that he should lend support when required. Wheeler concentrated his force at Glass' Mill for whatever was to come the next day.13

The early morning of 19 September, found Pegram's Divisions, directly under Forrest's command, near Alexander's Bridge and Armstrong's Division still with Polk near Anderson's House, two miles from Lee and Gordon's Mill. Forrest was ordered to move back toward Reed's Bridge and develop the situation. Brigadier General Davidson's brigade encountered the enemy in the vicinity of Jay's Mill, just short of Reed's Bridge. Rather than outflanking the blueclad army by marching way north, Bragg had allowed his own flank to be exposed by a night march to the north by Thomas' corps. Crittenden was no longer the northernmost Union force at Lee and Gordon's Mill. Instead, Thomas had marched behind and around Crittenden in the dark of 18 September. Forrest found the leading elements of this unit just prior to them flanking Bragg's army. Forrest's
troopers were no longer facing similarly equipped cavalry forces, but, instead, steady, long lines of blue infantry."

A mounted charge by Rucker’s Legion held the enemy at bay long enough for Forrest to react.

Forrest dismounted all of Pegram’s men and formed a line of battle. He recognized immediately that Pegram was not strong enough to hold alone, so he requested return of Armstrong’s Division from Folk. Lieutenant General D. H. Hill’s Corps was closing up on Polk’s left flank so only a gap on his right was unsecure. He protected this flank with one brigade, that of Crews, and sent Dibrell’s Brigade to Forrest. As soon as Dibrell arrived at Jay’s Mill, Forrest dismounted him and put his men in line with Pegram’s forces. This combined force held the enemy advance until Forrest personally found and commandeered infantry brigades to take up the fight. As each side threw in reinforcements as they became available, the tide of the battle swept back and forth on this right flank of the army.

Around one o’clock in the afternoon, Armstrong arrived with his other brigade and covered the extreme right flank. A dismounted cavalry charge was made to cover the retirement of the infantry after the entire weight of Thomas’ left flank was brought to bear. Forrest assumed temporary command of the infantry in his vicinity as well as his cavalry until Major General Walker, Bragg’s reserve corps commander, arrived. Forrest used his artillery under Major John Rawle, Freeman’s Battery, along with Dibrell’s...
dismounted brigade to cover the infantry’s flanks and their retirements. Even though the infantry and dismounted cavalry under Forrest took numerous guns away from the enemy, they were unable to bring any of the guns home, due to a dearth of live Union horses. They did manage to save all of their own guns, even though they had lost numerous horses of their own. The Confederates finally fell back towards Jay’s Mill, where they had begun the fight in the morning and held against the Union divisions of Baird and Brannan. Fighting was so severe that Union Colonel Ferdinand Van Derveer, commanding a brigade in Brannan’s Division, thought he had faced two divisions of Longstreet’s troops. Instead, he had only fought three brigades, one of infantry and two of dismounted cavalry.

When Forrest fell back to Jay’s Mill Road about midafternoon, the fighting slackened for both of Forrest’s divisions. Forrest placed both of his divisions, consolidated under their own commanders, holding the road across Reed’s Bridge and south in front of Jay’s Mill toward Alexander’s Ford. He reported there were no further engagements with the enemy on 19 September. Scott’s brigade continued reconnaissance toward Rossville.

For the next day’s fight, both sides made plans to continue from where they were. Both forces continued to rearrange their dispositions, but the line remained the same. Rosecrans decided to remain in place and on the defensive. He prepared defensive positions to meet any
attack. Bragg decided to attack. His units were to attack from north to south in a zipper-like effect, still attempting to turn Rosecrans' left flank and cut off the Federal line to Chattanooga. His plans went awry again.\textsuperscript{19}

Bragg reorganized his army due to the arrival of Lieutenant General James Longstreet on the field from Virginia. Folk and Longstreet commanded the wings of the army. Bragg dispatched orders to all commanders for the morning attack, but not everyone received their orders. Bragg hoped Folk would roll up the Federal left, separate them from the LaFayette Road and then Longstreet could apply the coup de grace on the Federal right.\textsuperscript{19}

On the next morning, 20 September, Forrest, working directly for Bragg, acted upon orders to move forward on the army's right and to keep his alignment on General Breckenridge's Division. Forrest sent Pegram's Division, still mounted, into a reserve position on the far right. Armstrong's Division was dismounted, except for the 6th Tennessee and McDonald's 18th Tennessee Battalion.\textsuperscript{20, 21} Armstrong's Division, especially Dibrell's Brigade, fought all day long, side by side with the infantry. As the infantry attacked, the two mounted units moved across the LaFayette Road where they captured many prisoners and a hospital.\textsuperscript{22}

Due to command problems and various delays, the dawn attack did not begin until after nine in the morning. Rosecrans' men barricaded themselves behind stout defenses,
but even so, Polk's attack progressed nicely, causing distress in Thomas' left flank. Due to a misunderstanding, Rosecrans pulled a division out of his line to strengthen Thomas' defense. Before he filled the gap with Union forces, the Confederates filled it.

At the most opportune time and in the precisely correct position for the Confederates, Longstreet sent a heavy column of divisions crashing into the gap left by the departing division. This column caught the moving Union forces in the flank and shattered them with five attacking divisions of Longstreet's wing. The shattered forces fell back toward Thomas' corps and either fell into their defenses or retreated all the way back to Chattanooga along routes other than the LaFayette Road. Along with these retreating men and units went division and corps commanders as well as the army commander, General Rosecrans, himself.

At about this same time, 11:00 AM, Pegram sent word, from the extreme right, that Union Major General Gordon Granger was approaching from Rossville with part of Rosecrans' Reserve Corps. The advance of this unit, Steedman's Division, compelled Armstrong's mounted units to leave the hospitals while the dismounted units turned to face the foe. Forrest's artillery and Pegram's mounted units harassed Granger as the Union soldiers marched south toward Kelly Field. Between the harassment on his left flank and the fortified road to his front, Granger had enough information to cause him to leave the LaFayette Road and move
cross-country to link up with Thomas on Snodgrass Hill. Forrest's forces were not stout enough to completely stop Granger, but they inflicted a two-hour delay upon the relieving Union forces.23

Thomas' corps had been involved in the heaviest fighting on both 19 and 20 September. Still, they were the only troops to hold. Along with units which fell in on their lines, they held long enough to be reinforced by the Union Reserve Corps under General Gordon Granger.

Forrest's report made no further mention of action on the Confederate right flank after Granger's relieving divisions went around his blocking position.24 Indeed, a lull of a couple of hours occurred all across the northern part of the field in the midafternoon. General Longstreet pressed his attack from the south, but Polk's wing applied no further pressure until nearly four o'clock.

While Forrest and his men fought resolutely on the right flank, Wheeler moved his available force, dismounted, and attacked a sizable enemy force on the army's left with artillery hoping to draw off some reserves from Longstreet's front. The fight went back and forth quite a bit with little change in the situation until the Southerners hit the enemy hard and drove them back toward Crawfish Springs. Once again mounted, Wheeler's men charged the Federal troops at about the same time Longstreet broke through the center of the Union line.25
As the center of the Union line collapsed, the enemy's right wing melted away to the north toward Chattanooga. Longstreet called Wheeler to Lee and Gordon's Mill to attack Union cavalry in that area. At about 3 P.M., Wheeler's men arrived and immediately attacked into the Union troops. The Federals did not stand for long before they retreated up the Dry Valley Road toward Chattanooga. At about 5 P.M., Bragg's staff informed Wheeler of the apparent good fortune of the army in its victory. A few minutes later, General Longstreet got a message through to Wheeler for him to ride down the Dry Valley Road to cause as much havoc as possible within the ranks of the retreating enemy. Longstreet saw an opportunity for a limited pursuit and he sent Wheeler to accomplish the task. By the time Wheeler got involved in it, the darkness began to come on. The pursuit lasted for two hours after dark.

Still, in their attacks near Lee and Gordon's Mill, Wheeler's troopers picked up about one thousand prisoners, twenty wagons, five large hospitals, large amounts of weapons, ordnance, medicines, camp equipment, as well as all of the wounded enemy and about 100 doctors. The spoils of the battlefield did provide some feed for the horses. When the pursuit ceased for the night, Wheeler's men camped on the battlefield.

On the Confederate right, the infantry finally moved forward again at about 4 P.M. Forrest agreed to take and hold the LaFayette Road. Forrest and his men went forward
dismounted, in line of battle with the infantry, one more
time to accomplish this task. All along the line, the
advance was made with the cavalry securing the flank,
Dibrell still hanging on to the infantry. Sharp fighting
continued until Dibrell reported that the infantry was
stopped. Within their exposed position, the 4th, 8th, and
9th (Biffle’s) Tennessee Regiments sustained severe
casualties, but still held their line after the infantry
units melted away. Forrest himself ran to the right-most
infantry units and rallied them with help from their own
officers.

A renewed effort carried the Federal lines. Bragg did
not employ a reserve nor did he have a plan to exploit his
unexpected success. The delay allowed Thomas to hold until
night fell and then he gave the order to retire to his
blueclad troops. He extricated all of the units with his
corps back toward Chattanooga.

The Confederates on the army’s right flank did not
organize a pursuit as the enemy left enroute to Chattanooga.
No commander, at any level, ordered a pursuit. They watched
the enemy leave and then, infantry and cavalry alike,
bivouacked upon the ground they had just taken. Forrest and
his men and horses suffered, much like the rest of the army,
from a lack of water, rations, and forage.

The next morning, Monday, 21 September, Forrest mounted
his weary units and moved down the road toward Chattanooga.
He gathered up prisoners and discarded equipment as he went.
and shipped it back in captured wagons. He found some of Minty's cavalry entrenched in the Rossville Gap, but could not dislodge them with Dibrell's old 8th Tennessee and his artillery. He camped on the tip of the southern portion of Missionary Ridge that night and moved into the valley the next morning.\textsuperscript{31,32}

On that same day, Bragg ordered Wheeler to detail two regiments to pick up weapons from the battlefield and to round up stragglers, whether blue or gray. By 9 A.M., another unit was sent up the road toward Chattanooga to determine enemy locations.\textsuperscript{33} Wheeler had about 1,700 men left with him when his men discovered dust clouds to the south coming out of McLemore's Cove. Also, a reinforcing column appeared to be coming south out of Chattanooga. Wheeler vowed to keep these units separated and marched to meet them.\textsuperscript{34}

The force coming south out of Chattanooga was hit first and pushed back toward Chattanooga. Wheeler left the 8th Texas Rangers under Lieutenant Colonel Gustave Cook with Wheeler's own escort company to keep this force bottled up to the north. Wheeler then personally led the remainder of his force south to engage the remnants of Union cavalry coming out of the cove. Wheeler's troops broke the enemy defensive line and drove them back until all semblance of order was lost. Wheeler's men captured about four hundred prisoners on the road, as well as the entire wagon train of about ninety wagons. More arms and weapons added the total
haul for Wheeler's units in two days to over 2000 prisoners, 100 wagons and teams, mounds of other property, and eighteen unit colors.39

On 22 September, Bragg ordered Wheeler to push the enemy on the left because the rest of the army was applying pressure toward Chattanooga on the right. The enemy was still south of the river and available for attack and disruption. By late that evening, Wheeler received orders to move into the mountains and cross the river on the left to get behind Rosecrans' army and into its lines of supply and communications as well as to cut their line of retreat.39 Wheeler moved to within one and a quarter miles of Chattanooga keeping the enemy forces pushed in on each other. Before he completely developed the situation and the enemy defenses, Bragg stopped him and pulled him back on 23 September, to concentrate at Chickamauga and Tyner's Station. He left units to cover the flank and watch the enemy near the river and another unit to clear the top of Lookout Mountain to Chattanooga. Bragg ordered Wheeler not to cross the river. The battle was over for Wheeler's Corps.37

Back on the northern portion of the battlefield on 22 September, cavalry units forced the enemy out of their position and Forrest camped on Lookout Mountain, with a screen line running to Silvay's Ford on the Tennessee. On 23 September, Forrest took McDonald's Battalion again and reached the point of Lookout Mountain. There the infantry
relieved him. Forrest ordered his men to cook rations while he prepared his forces for further use. On 25 September, Bragg ordered Forrest and his men back to east Tennessee to guard against Burnside's forces, finally moving south out of Knoxville. Forrest and his units left the battlefields of Chickamauga and moved on to further duties.¹⁶³

The Union army withdrew into the Chattanooga defenses, but retreated no further. Most Confederate commanders wanted to pursue Rosecrans after the battle ended, but they could not get Bragg's agreement. Bragg appeared remote and lethargic. Instead, Bragg occupied Missionary Ridge and laid siege to the forces bottled up in Chattanooga. Bragg had won a great tactical victory due to the great fortune that accompanied Longstreet's advance. However, his failure to provide a general reserve for destruction and pursuit deprived him of a victorious campaign. The Confederate command wasted this battlefield victory.

At the Battle of Chickamauga, the Confederate cavalry gained additional laurels for its crown. Due in large part to the efforts of Bedford Forrest and his corps, there was a heightened respect for the cavalry among the infantry of the Army of Tennessee. Even though this fight was not necessary to Rosecrans, it was fought and was of profound impact upon the war effort of both antagonists. The cavalry of Bragg's army began the battle and fought with distinction throughout both days of the gruelling fight. Both cavalry corps were gainfully employed to a great extent and to great benefit.
Though neither had the opportunity to conduct a grand pursuit, they had been ready and able to do so if unleashed in a coordinated effort by the army commander. The failure to carry through with this attempt did not rest upon the troopers, but with their leaders.
CHAPTER FIVE
ENDNOTES

1Glenn Tucker, Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West (Dayton: Morningside Bookshop, 1984), Title page.

2O.R., XXX, part 1, pp. 54-56.

3O.R., XXX, part 2, pp. 31-32.


5Ibid.

6O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 663.

7O.R., XXX, part 2, pp. 45-46.

8O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 666.

9O.R., XXX, part 2, p. 520.

10Ibid.

11Henry, p. 182.

12Jordan and Pryor, p. 318.


14Ibid., pp. 524-525.

15O.R., XXX, part 1, p. 428.

16O.R., XXX, part 2, p. 525.

17Jordan and Pryor, p. 332.

18O.R., XXX, part 2, pp. 32-33.

19Ibid.

20Forrest called the 6th Tennessee, the 1st Tennessee in his report. According to Crute, p. 281, the 6th Tennessee was formerly called Wheeler's 1st Tennessee Cavalry after its former regimental commander, Colonel James T. Wheeler, who was its brigade commander during the battle.

21The 18th Tennessee Battalion was made up of four companies from the 3rd Tennessee Cavalry Regiment. This was Forrest's "Old Regiment". The battalion was also known
variously as the 26th Battalion, Russell's 4th Alabama, Balch's Battalion, and McDonald's Battalion. Crute, p. 277.

2O.R., XXX, part 2, p. 525.
2Ibid.
2Ibid.
2Ibid., p. 520.
2O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 675.
2O.R., XXX, part 4, pp. 674-675.
2O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 682.
2O.R., XXX, part 4, pp. 694-695.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions

Today's army organizes cavalry, more properly called armored cavalry, for the specific purposes of surveillance, reconnaissance, and security. Commanders assign cavalry units to one or more of these missions according to FM 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*, depending upon the military factors known to the army as METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). These are much the same missions that Bragg should have assigned to the Confederate cavalry during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. In addition, today, much like during the Battle of Chickamauga itself, cavalry units may become decisively engaged and fight furiously on foot or mounted. Cavalry units are to develop the situation rather than become decisively engaged.¹

However, effectiveness of cavalry units depends greatly upon the state of readiness of men and equipment, training and cohesiveness of the troops, skill and organizational abilities of leaders at all levels, and logistical support given to the units. Probably the most important element listed here is the leadership of the units. History in general, and the War Between the States in particular, is replete with instances of highly motivated troops, having nothing left but leadership, coming forth as victors. The opposite is quite true also. Many examples abound of fully trained and equipped soldiers who lost ingloriously because
their leaders failed them. To extend this train of thought, there were instances when Civil War units equipped with the most modern weapons of the day did well. However, with truly inspired leadership, they may have achieved a level of effectiveness never before envisioned.

During the campaigns and battles addressed in this study, Confederate cavalry units trailed their Union counterparts in nearly every measure. The key factor in this case, though, was leadership, because they had always trailed in most of the other measures. This time, however, they did not make up for the tangible deficiencies with their intangible assets. Good leadership was available to the Confederates during the Chickamauga campaigns. However, during this time frame, Confederate leadership did not function well. There were no "team" leaders. The best cavalry in the world could have functioned very little better with such uninspired leadership.

When looked upon as a part of a team, the Confederate cavalry did not render a stellar performance during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. The units were commonly out of position, combat ineffective, or performing missions that did not focus on the goals of the army as a whole.

Again, it cannot be said that Confederate cavalry did nothing during these periods. As seen in Appendices A and B, of the frequent skirmishes listed as principle events during the campaigns, cavalry was involved as a player.
not alone, in the vast majority of these encounters. These units did perform scout, delay, and security missions throughout the Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia terrain of these campaigns. The men, as individuals and as units, performed superbly throughout.

During the operational or maneuver phase, the length of time permitted many mistakes to accumulate. The major mistakes made during this phase included a failure to maintain contact with the enemy, picketing the wrong side of the Tennessee River, using too few troops to accomplish the picket, dispersal of foraging units, bad orders, command confusion, and a failure to obey orders or react with speed and initiative. There were many things which could and did go wrong. The extenuating circumstances which exacerbated the situation included the great distances involved, the numerous crossing sites on the river, the compartmentalized terrain, the condition of the cavalry units, and the Confederate supply system.

The Battle of Chickamauga itself did not present many cases of misuse of the cavalry. Instead, the major failing on the battlefield was the lack of prosecution of an aggressive and coordinated effort. Forrest's units engaged the Federals most heatedly on the Confederate right but there were numerous missed opportunities on the left. Wheeler was slow during the battle, even though he was actively involved. The cavalry suffered from a lack of specific orders and no single coordinating point with the
army command. This seems to have been a fact with nearly the whole Confederate army during the battle. The fact that there were two cavalry commanders rather than one increased the problems. Professionals, or even normal adults, should have been able to work out their problems.

In many actions, the Confederates simply used their cavalry incorrectly. They were inefficient with their cavalry on even more occasions. However, given their condition, the cavalry corps did render hard service and on numerous occasions slowed the enemy advance. It is significant to note that Rosecrans did not know any more of Bragg's whereabouts than Bragg knew of Rosecrans'. Hard service kept the cavalry units engaged in constant fighting with the advancing Union forces from in front of Shelbyville all the way to the Tennessee River. Skirmishing was a daily occurrence for them before and after the retirement from the Duck River. It was even dismounted cavalry which fought some of the heaviest encounters of the first day of the battle itself, fighting as if they were infantry brigades.

So, was poor use of Confederate cavalry during this campaign criminal? Such a charge would be hard to prove at best. Forrest most assuredly believed Bragg's handling of his cavalry deserved some punishment, even his own personal threat of death. The credit for the successes of the cavalry units must go, though, to the same person who takes the blame for their failures. Bragg certainly failed to capitalize on the forces available to him, but somehow
managed to win at Chickamauga Creek anyway. Bragg dedicated his entire being to the Southern cause and he constantly strove to do his best for that cause. He had some strong personality quirks which clouded his judgment and, consequently, affected his actions and the actions of his subordinates. He was not, however, the only one to blame. Even though he gave the appearance of incompetence during many phases of the campaign, he was probably not guilty of criminal negligence.

Who or what was then to blame for any misuse? Of each aspect in the course of events, history can assess blame or credit to a different person, event, or condition. History can place the blame or credit on one person for the overall showing once it tallies the ramifications of the major events. At that time the one true test, how history remembers the event, can be weighed. Again, Bragg was in command and is therefore responsible. However, who were some of the other players and what events played a part, in the generally dismal showing of Confederate cavalry? Do certain parallels exist today?

General Bragg, as the commander of the Army of Tennessee, was ultimately responsible for the evolution of the campaigns. This responsibility included the proper use of his cavalry. The unimaginative performance of his army and his cavalry, therefore, reflected a command failure on Bragg's part. Bragg must accept the blame for the failures which occurred during these campaigns.
More often than not, Bragg misused his two cavalry corps. During all three time periods addressed in this study, cavalry units failed to provide adequate early warning and reconnaissance. Bragg lacked information to make essential decisions and dispositions of his forces. Again, it is certainly not implied that the cavalry units were shirking combat or danger by staying away from the enemy. They were nearly always in contact with the enemy. They provided, however, very little useful intelligence to the general headquarters.

During the Tullahoma phase, Bragg sent Forrest's division to perform its picket duty to the west of the army. This it did with fervor. Forrest himself sent scouts into enemy territory to report on activities in the enemy camp. At the beginning of June, these reports were so vague as to render little assistance to General Bragg. However, Bragg and his subordinate commanders and staffs should have at least been alert to imminent moves by the enemy. They were no more prepared to react to an enemy withdrawal than they were to an enemy advance. By the time Forrest attained more concrete evidence of an advance by the enemy, the situation moved so rapidly that it left Bragg always trying to catch up with the situation.

Still, with the failure to properly read and prepare for enemy courses of action, Bragg could have saved or ameliorated the situation had Wheeler been in position according to his orders. Wheeler's corps failed to discover
the Union movement on Bragg's right flank. Wheeler had fairly well deserted the area in which that advance was made. He was too busy elsewhere. Bragg took no steps to remedy this situation. The lack of warning on this flank most assuredly sped up the collapse of Bragg's defensive position.

A major condition that pervaded all actions of the Army of Tennessee was the unsatisfactory command climate in the army. Nearly every subordinate commander he had disliked Bragg. The one major exception was Wheeler, one of his proteges. Whether Bragg was at fault or was even guilty of the myriad of things he was accused of has little relevance. Those with whom he needed to work most closely despised him. Every step he made was scrutinized and dissected. He castigated commanders to the point where they were picayune about details in their orders. Both sides of the squabble looked for fault in the other.

The subordinate commanders were a mixed lot of useful and worthless officers. Apparently, the most important issue in the Army of Tennessee was personal status and ego. If Bragg was guilty of incompetence, then his subordinates were not selflessly committed to solving the problem, either. Each officer had his own agenda. Each had an excuse to foment discontent. Unfortunately for the South, petty bickering among the many wounded egos always interfered with military duties. The higher in rank the officer, the more culpable he was since he not only allowed
the dissent, but, in most cases, actively participated himself. The hardest thing to swallow for the "hard-luck" Army of Tennessee must have been that it had to put up with commanders who did not do it justice.

Bragg also allowed the departure of the one subordinate commander he had who truly understood terrain and how to maximize its advantages. General Hardee moved west into some relatively insignificant jobs working for General Joe Johnston. He could have been much more valuable with the major army in the field, especially if Bragg would listen to him. Bragg recognized some of the pitfalls of the terrain, but had little knowledge of how to correct the problems. While he realized his precarious position in Chattanooga should the enemy occupy the bank opposite the city, without Hardee's help Bragg did nothing to preclude the enemy's occupation. Left with no apparent options, Bragg waited and was then forced out of Chattanooga without a fight, just as he knew he would be.

Bragg must be found guilty for the bad orders he issued and the improper use of his cavalry force. Most of his orders were inexact and discretionary. Many were contradictory. These orders left room for interpretation. In some cases, what he wanted done was impossible, given the assets available. Wheeler's corps could not patrol from Chattanooga to Decatur given the corps' condition and size. However, no large amounts of infantry came to assist in the assigned mission. Bragg also did not make Wheeler account
for his lackadaisical efforts. Forrest busied himself to
the north, picketing the river and watching an enemy not yet
in place. He could have actively conducted reconnaissance
against the primary threat, Rosecrans' army.

Bragg should also take the blame for not believing or
acting upon intelligence brought to him. When McCook was to
the south around Alpine, a Lieutenant Baylor reported this
fact to Bragg, through Wheeler. Bragg called the lieutenant
a liar because, in his own mind, he had decided that the
whole Union army was in McLemore's Cove. It accomplishes
little for a commander to have an intelligence network if no
one interprets the material or acts upon its findings. The
commander must consider all intelligence sources and sift
all information with an open mind. Bragg did not have such
a network and much information was lost upon him.

Bragg failed to keep a significant screen on the enemy
side of the Tennessee River. Even though the cavalry
commanders did keep some forces to the west, the army was
not well served by long-range surveillance. Bragg's own
scout network was falling apart. There were numerous
excuses for not leaving large forces on the other side. The
cavalry units were worn out. They had little means to
sustain themselves in the barren country of the Cumberland
Mountains. There was no readily available courier service
set to return information to the south side of the river.
However, given the all-important need to delay and maintain
contact with the enemy to ascertain his intentions, Bragg

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should have found ways to alleviate these problems. Small units could have evaded enemy detection and sent messengers back and forth to picket points along the river. Given Forrest's success rate with most intelligence missions, all he needed was an order and he surely would have created a system. Forrest operated behind the lines enough to know how to get the job done. Instead, Bragg gave Forrest other missions. Bragg, contrary to Sun Tzu's teachings, never made an effort to get to know his enemy.  

Bragg's headquarters sent numerous messages for cavalry units to go here, there, and everywhere during early to mid-September. Headquarters pulled Wharton's Division back and forth, as they did Martin's. They ordered units to consolidate, but issued other orders, on the same day, to send sub-units off on missions. These orders did not always go through the corps commanders, but, instead, sometimes went directly to division and lower commanders. After finally accepting the fact that McCook's corps was not with Thomas', Bragg "consolidated" both of his cavalry corps at LaFayette and then sent Forrest south towards Alpine to find McCook. Part of Wheeler's unit went with Forrest on this scouting mission. Since Wheeler had been operating in the south and Forrest had forces maneuvering in the north, this decision seems overly confusing. Eventually, the cavalry corps intermixed and rode in all different directions, across each others' paths. They were unable to get much accomplished in any direction before they were pulled off to
do something else. Again, Bragg's confusion and inability to develop and follow through on a plan were quite evident.

Interestingly enough, Bragg may deserve some credit for ingenuity. From the numerous accounts of deserters recorded in Union reports, a web of inaccuracies and misconceptions took root in Rosecrans' plans. Some accounts claim Bragg planted these deserters himself, while other sources claim the men were merely tired of Bragg and his constant retreating. While reading the official reports of Union officers, the level of detail and the development of thought seems to be greater than that normally expected of privates in an army. The openness in divulging the movements and plans of the army exhibited by these "deserters" tends to lend credence to the argument that they were coached before leaving the Southern camps. If these men were not individually coached, there at least may have been an active "rumor mill" fed by the Confederate command which realized the inevitability of desertions taking place. Such is the make-up of singular events in the deception plans developed by the Soviets in World War II and advocated by the U.S. Army today. If these desertions were intentional or even merely capitalized upon, then Bragg deserves kudos for a job well done.

Unfortunately for the Confederates, personality conflicts present in this battle continued to manifest themselves long after the battle was over. Courts-martial
and charges flew rampant. Bragg removed several senior commanders from command. He reorganized units and transferred commanders, including Forrest, away from the Army of Tennessee. When Bragg later resigned from command of the army after the disaster at Missionary Ridge, he went to work in Richmond as the president’s senior military advisor. In this position, he continued to suppress the careers of his enemies, most notably that of Forrest. In 1877, at Forrest’s funeral, a grieving Jefferson Davis admitted that Forrest’s contributions were kept from him until too late by jealous and self-serving officers. Bragg may have hurt the cause more than he planned just by holding back officers who could have made a difference.

So, is Bragg to blame? General Bragg is quite obviously guilty of being in a command beyond his talent for combat operations, both infantry and cavalry. He failed to use his cavalry properly in any of the roles which were then and are now accepted as the domain of cavalry units. These roles were as legitimate in 1863 as they are in 1990, so history need not be afraid of castigating Bragg for merely not being farsighted and ahead of his time. Rather, he was not well-advised or learned about cavalry operations and usages of his own days. Certainly, this is the failure on his part. However, even if he must accept this blame due to his position as the commander, he was not the only one to contribute to the failure.
In this vein, when someone disobeys orders, the blame lies directly at the feet of the violator. As accepted in today's thought, there are two categories of reasons to violate orders. The first involves the unlawful order which is enmeshed in violations of the law of war and violations of human rights. This category did not arise in this study. The second category involves the "judgment call", which is hard to govern. It can place all orders in question if taken to the extreme. If the commander on the scene sees a situation which was unknown to a senior commander issuing orders, then the on-scene officer is required to include all relevant information in his decision to carry out his orders. Obey or not, the commander needs to always be prepared to justify and defend his decisions. During these campaigns, it is this category of disobedience that is present.

The primary instances of disobedience or disregard of orders occurred in Wheeler's command. For example, General Morgan became bored performing picket duty because it was not very glamorous. He pressed for permission to go raiding into Kentucky and, finally, after much whining, received it. In his instructions, he was told not to go north of the Ohio. However, he did go north, he accomplished little, and he got his unit shot up and captured. His loss hurt the Confederacy as a whole, and Bragg's army in particular. He tried later to justify his disobedience. He was not overly successful."
In another instance, Bragg assigned Wheeler to picket the Army's right at Tullahoma. After sending Morgan off on his raid, Wheeler left insufficient forces on the flank and took the majority of his forces towards the center where the enemy was closer to the front. He was not where he was needed when the enemy came into his army's flank. He apparently was also looking for glory and suppressed the critical duty of defending his army and his country. Again, disobedience was not justified.

Also, it has been seen that the cavalry units suffered tremendously during the retreat to the Tennessee River. After withdrawing south of the river, Wheeler's men needed to rest and recuperate. Rather than shuttling or rotating units to refit areas so that he could effectively accomplish the job of watching the river, Wheeler again left a skeleton crew to watch small sections of the river. He then took most everyone else too far back, for an abnormally long rest break. Wheeler positioned his headquarters poorly and caused undue and extended trips for reports of action along the river. Rather than being placed to effectively control his troops, gather information, and pass reports, he was the cause of delayed reports and inaccurate interpretation of events. It was about six weeks from the end of the Tullahoma campaign to the time when Union forces crossed the river. When Union forces crossed, Wheeler had no more troops on guard than he did that day, six weeks earlier.
when he crossed the river. He failed to do as ordered, again, with no justification.

Even when Bragg called him forward to scout and guard against Union forces south of the river, Wheeler was slow and lacked initiative. He almost seemed to be looking for excuses to fail or to cover his failures. He most certainly failed to consolidate and move forward with any speed when the situation and orders demanded it.

One of Wheeler's legitimate excuses was common to all Southern cavalry units. Cavalry was on the wrong end of the Southern supply line. Absences plagued cavalry units' roll calls while troopers scavenged for remounts, clothing, and food. The problem was symptomatic of the South and was the fault of the Southern supply system. If another viable option existed in the South, then those responsible for allowing this system to continue were to blame. Given the situation, though, a viable alternative was hardly possible. Even in retrospect, no other options come to mind today.

Certain sources criticized Wheeler for not going back into the Lookout Mountain passes when ordered to go forward to find and observe the enemy. He had previously obstructed the same passes against enemy movement. When these orders arrived on 5 and 6 September, Wheeler wrote a lengthy report as to what he knew and how he knew it. He explained that he saw no reason to go back into the passes and clear them so that his cavalry could move about freely. He defended his decision skillfully and built a solid case showing that he
could learn nothing more from this additional labor than what he already knew. He also explained that he would be exposed to enemy flanking since the obstruction did little to restrict the movement of foot soldiers which were his primary threat. In this case, Wheeler had a solid reason for not following orders. These orders were not based on a current assessment of the situation."

Major General Wheeler was a conventional cavalryman who was adept at protecting the army, and fighting in the more conventional battles of the eastern theater of the War Between the States. His career shows him to have been poorly inclined toward independent operations or operating outside of direct control. When he was not being watched, Wheeler was not very diligent in the performance of his missions. He was able, but not always willing.

Discontent was not restricted to the army as a whole. Even within the cavalry chain of command, problems existed. Due to personality conflicts between Wheeler and Forrest, Bragg split his cavalry forces. This left Bragg with two points of contact and no one person below the Army commander coordinating cavalry operations. The lack of a unified cavalry command kept the Confederate army tardy in responding to events as they unfolded. At a time when accurate and timely information was needed, a full view of the whole picture could not be gathered because units were not working together while their commanders feuded. Again, the blame for this predicament lay with all involved. Bragg
did not lay out rules and mandate coordinated action. Wheeler was too unsure of himself to assert effective control over all cavalry units and their commanders. Forrest was so intent on maintaining his independence that he did not work as a member of the team for the greater good of all.28

However, Forrest should bear the primary blame for internal cavalry discontent. While Wheeler did his best to get along with everyone, Forrest spent most of the war not getting along with any of his superiors. He failed to work well as a part of a unified plan because he always felt he had a better plan. During the summer of 1863, he was not even concentrating on his present mission. All of his energy was being expended trying to go west to the Mississippi River.

Because of his inability to work well as a team member, he was often left to take care of problems himself when he should have been assisted. When he was busy delaying Granger’s column along the La Fayette Road, it would have been very easy for the Confederate command to have assisted him and defeated the whole Union column. However, due to the command relationship resulting from Forrest’s inability to work with others, there was no organized effort to reinforce or support Forrest and the enemy marched on to Snodgrass Hill after bypassing Forrest. His abilities were certainly evident, but nevertheless, he was a thorn in the
side of every commander he ever had, and he sometimes caused flaws in the planning and execution of the overall effort.

However, when there was a fight, Forrest and his men were always in the thick of it. On day two of the Battle of Chickamauga, they fought so hard as dismounted cavalry (as infantry!) that they won a singular compliment from Lieutenant General D. H. Hill. Hill was a staunch infantryman who had a reputation in the Army of Northern Virginia for having no use for cavalry. He admitted to being prejudiced against cavalry and had publicly claimed to have never seen a dead cavalryman. However, during this fight, when informed that the unit fighting so fiercely beside him was not infantry but rather Forrest’s cavalry, he made a personal and deliberate effort to seek out Forrest and compliment his command. Forrest accepted this praise and went back to the fight. Hill’s reports of the battle recount this fight as well as several other references to Forrest and his troopers as gallant and gentlemanly officers and men who did yeoman’s work during this fight. Forrest certainly left his impression on the battlefield.21

Brigadier General Forrest then was not a team player. He was highly competent as illustrated by his many exploits. He was just as good in a head-to-head fight as he was at raiding and other independent actions. The Battle of Chickamauga exemplifies this fact quite well. His major problem was his personality. He very much wanted to fight for and win Southern independence, but he was not overly
enthusiastic in doing this if it meant working for someone else. He was certain that the professionals and West Pointers were against him because of his lack of schooling. However, he was just as prejudiced against them as he believed they were against him. He was just as hard to work with as the worst of them. He certainly shared the blame for any personality conflicts he ran into with commanders and peers.

The failure then for the Army of Tennessee's cavalry was one of leadership. Bragg did not have a thoroughly conceived plan. He had picked his commanders well but did not adhere to the principle of war calling for "Unity of Command". He allowed petty differences between subordinates, and some involving himself, to detract from his army's success. His operational experiences were tainted by his actions.

The Confederate doctrine existed for the proper use of his cavalry. The officers in cavalry commands during these campaigns were well-versed in the proper execution of those cavalry missions. These commanders were highly competent and, today, are looked upon as heroes and the masters of the art. But, they each had their failings and demonstrated many of these failings during this campaign.

This campaign was lost at the operational level by poor leadership, pure and simple. Petty jealousies led to failures to give properly detailed instructions with the commander's intent clearly specified. There were failures
to aggressively carry out the orders given using proper doctrine. The Confederate cavalry could have been much more effective than they were but the troopers were let down by their leaders.

What can all of this teach us for the present and future U.S. Army? The primary maneuvering element of this war in 1863 was the army. Today, it is the army corps. The Army of Tennessee had its two cavalry units, Wheeler’s and Forrest’s, while today’s corps have armored cavalry regiments (ACR). These regiments are much larger than the regiments of 1863. They were more of the size of the so-called cavalry corps of that day. The ACR is used by the commander to conduct security and reconnaissance operations. They are self-contained to provide decisive combat power where it is needed. They can be an economy of force element or a covering force. They are offensive as well as defensive. General Bragg needed such a force operating on his front and flanks. He did not have it.

What he did have was an organization more like the Divisional Cavalry Squadron existent in 1990. This squadron is organized to fight under divisional control. It is equipped very lightly with no inherent sustaining firepower. Its mission is to be solely one of reconnaissance. It is too weak to engage in combat and it is too small to provide a screen or guard mission of any length or duration. As is seen in Figures 1 and 2, the current divisional squadrons, H- and J-Series, are much lighter armed and manned than are
Figure 1. Regimental Armored Cavalry Squadrons
Figure 2. Divisional Cavalry Squadrons
the regimental squadrons. They cannot match the power consolidated at the corps level. They are not capable of accomplishing the myriad of missions required or desired at the division level. They are constantly over-tasked whether the lesson is being taught during a field exercise or in today's Command and General Staff College classroom. Each cavalryman that serves in today's divisional squadrons feels the same kind of over-extension felt by the Southern horsemen during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns. Also, like these horsemen, today's cavalrymen get tired and roughly used. They too need to fall back to refit, recoup, and relax. Given the light, single-tiered cavalry force available today, the vital mission performed by these modern cavalrymen will go undone until they are reconstituted and ready to move forward again. The division will be unprotected and in much the same straits as General Bragg's Army of Tennessee was in 1863.

This campaign history shows how vital cavalry is to keeping an army or corps informed and protected. General Bragg had time to recover from his failure to properly use and control his cavalry. Given its current depleted state and the propensity of today's budget-cutting army, a weaker and weaker cavalry force is in the cards for the U.S. Army's future. It is quite frightening to speculate on the ramifications of a defunct cavalry arm on any future battleground. Today, as in the 19th Century, it takes a long time to train and equip cavalrymen and leaders in such
a vital function. Hopefully, someone in charge, the leadership, will learn from the lessons of the past before they go down in disgrace, like General Bragg did after his failures. We must hope that leadership is never again the reason for the failure of an American army.
CHAPTER SIX

ENDNOTES


^This fault rests upon the shoulders of everyone involved. The Confederate High Command knew of the problem but failed to act. When they did act after the Battle of Chickamauga, the President merely sidestepped the issue trying to diffuse it. O.R., 1, XXX, part 4, p. 742, 744-745. Bragg and his subordinates were grossly guilty of letting personal feelings overshadow the needs of the army.


6. Ibid., p. 165.

7. Ibid., p. 164.


10. O.R., XXX, part 4, p. 596.


13. O.R., XXX, part 4, op. 634, 642.


15. O.R., XXX, part 3, p. 179.


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21 Q.R., XXX, part 2, pp. 145-146.

APPENDICES
JUNE 23 -- JULY 7, 1863. -- The Middle Tennessee, or Tullahoma, Campaign.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

June 23, 1863. -- Advance of the Union Forces.
    Skirmishes at Rover and Unionville.

24, 1863. -- Skirmish at Middleton.
    Skirmish near Bradyville.
    Skirmish at Christiana.
    Skirmish at Big Spring Branch.

24-26, 1863. -- Skirmishes at Hoover's Gap.

24-27, 1863. -- Skirmishes at Liberty Gap.

25, 1863. -- Skirmish at Guy's Gap.
    Skirmish at Fosterville.

26, 1863. -- Skirmish at Beech Grove.

27, 1863. -- Action at Shelbyville.
    Skirmishes at Fosterville and Guy's Gap.
    Skirmish at Fairfield.
    Occupation of Manchester by The Union Forces.

28, 1863. -- Skirmish at Rover.

29, 1863. -- Skirmish near Hillsboro.
    Skirmish at Decherd.

29-30, 1863. -- Skirmishes near Tullahoma.

30, 1863. -- Confederate forces evacuate Tullahoma.
July 1, 1863. -- Occupation of Tullahoma by the Union forces.

Skirmish near Bethpage Bridge, Elk River.

Skirmish near Bobo's Cross-Roads.

2, 1863. -- Skirmish at Morris' Ford, Elk River.

Skirmish at Rock Creek Ford, Elk River.

Skirmish at Estill Springs.

Skirmishes at Pelham and Elk River Bridge.

3, 1863. -- Skirmish at Boiling Fork, near Winchester.

4, 1863. -- Skirmish at University Depot.

7, 1863. -- Army of Tennessee (Confederate) encamps around Chattanooga.

Source: Q.R., XXIII, part 1, p. 399.
APPENDIX B

August 16 -- September 22, 1863. -- The Chickamauga Campaign.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

August 16-17, 1863. -- General advance of the Army of the Cumberland.

17, 1863. -- Skirmish at Calfkiller Creek, near Sparta, Tenn.

21, 1863. -- Skirmish at Maysville, Ala.

Action at Shellmound, Tenn.

Bombardment of Chattanooga, Tenn.

22-24, 1863. -- Expedition from Tracy City, Tenn., to the Tennessee River.

24, 1863. -- Skirmish at Gunter's Landing, near Port Deposit, Ala.

26-27, 1863. -- Skirmishes at Harrison's Landing, Tenn.

27-28, 1863. -- Skirmish at the Narrows, near Shellmound, Tenn.

28-31, 1863. -- Reconnaissance from Stevenson, Ala., to Trenton, Ga.

29, 1863. -- Skirmish at Caperton's Ferry, Ala.

30-31, 1863. -- Reconnaissance from Shellmound toward Chattanooga, Tenn.

31, 1863. -- Skirmish at Will's Valley, Ala.

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September 1, 1863. -- Skirmishes at Will's Creek and at
Davis', Tap's, and Neal's Gaps, Ala.

3, 1863. -- Skirmish near Alpine, Ga.

5, 1863. -- Reconnaissance from Winston's Gap
into Broomtown Valley, Ala.
Skirmish at Lebanon, Ala.
Skirmish near Alpine, Ga.
Destruction of salt-works at Rawlingsville, Ala.

6, 1863. -- Skirmish at Steven's Gap, Ga.

6-7, 1863. -- Skirmishes at Summerville, Ga.

7, 1863. -- Skirmish at Stevenson, Ala.
Reconnaissance toward Chattanooga
and skirmish in Lookout Valley, Tenn.

8, 1863. -- Skirmish at Winston's Gap, Ala.
Skirmish at Alpine, Ga.

9, 1863. -- Chattanooga, Tenn., occupied by the Union forces.
Skirmish at Friar's Island, Tenn.
Skirmish at Lookout Mountain, Ga.

10, 1863. -- Reconnaissance from Alpine toward Rome, La Fayette, and Summerville, Ga., and
skirmish at Summerville.
Skirmishes at Pea Vine Creek and

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near Graysville, Ga.

11, 1863. -- Reconnaissance toward Rome, Ga.

Skirmish near Blue Bird Gap, Ga.

Skirmish at Davis' Cross-roads (or Davis' House), near Dug Gap, Ga.

Skirmish near Rossville, Ga.

Skirmish near Ringgold, Ga.


12, 1863. -- Skirmish at Alpine, Ga.

Skirmish at Dirt Town, Ga.

Skirmish near Leet's Tan-yard, or Rock Spring, Ga.

Skirmish on the La Fayette road, near Chattooga River, Ga.

13, 1863. -- Reconnaissance from Lee and Gordon's Mills toward La Fayette, Ga. and skirmish.

Reconnaissance from Henderson's Gap, Ala., to La Fayette, Ga., and skirmish.

Skirmish near Summerville, Ga.

14, 1863. -- Skirmish near La Fayette, Ga.

15, 1863. -- Skirmish at Trion Factory, Ga.

Skirmish at Summerville, Ga.


17, 1863. -- Reconnaissance from Rossville and skirmish at Ringgold, Ga.

Skirmish at Neal's Gap, Ala.

Skirmish at Owen's Ford, West Chickamauga Creek, Ga.

18, 1863. -- Skirmishes at Pea Vine Ridge, Alexander's and Reed's Bridges,

Dyer's Ford, Spring Creek,

and near Steven's Gap, Ga.


21, 1863. -- Skirmishes at Rossville, Lookout Church, and Dry Valley, Ga.

21-22, 1863. -- Army of the Cumberland retreats to Chattanooga, Tenn.

22, 1863. -- Skirmishes at Missionary Ridge and Shallow Ford Gap, near Chattanooga, Tenn.


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