THE PROSPECTS FOR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL:
A BAD IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?
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B. Thomas Trout, CAPT, USNR

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First, the political framework of the contemporary arms control environment makes consideration of naval issues virtually certain. Second, the substantive naval issues amenable to negotiation within the prevailing balance are in fact few, but those few are important. The author offers two options that offer a more constructive approach to arms control than the present posture of "stonewalling." One option is to take the initiative on "soft" issues (e.g., scheduling annual meetings of senior naval officials of the two sides to discuss issues of common concern without commitment to negotiate). A second, option focuses on the limited range of "hard" naval arms control issues—sea-launched cruise missiles, tactical naval nuclear weapons, attack submarines and related force questions.
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by

B. Thomas Trout
Captain, United States Naval Reserve

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B. Thomas Trout
Captain, United States Naval Reserve

This paper assesses the contemporary prospects for naval arms control based on two principal contentions.

First, the political framework of the contemporary arms control environment makes consideration of naval issues virtually certain. The notion that there ought to be naval arms control is already widespread and will probably prove politically compelling as long as the overall arms control regime continues to develop.

Second, the substantive naval issues amenable to negotiation within the prevailing balance are in fact few, but those few are important. As a consequence, a position of continuing U.S. Navy resistance to consideration of the subject of naval arms control is no longer tenable, and is probably counterproductive. There is not as much to lose as might appear.

The Navy has two options that offer a more constructive approach to arms control than the present posture of "stonewalling."

One option is to take the initiative on "soft" issues (e.g., scheduling annual meetings of senior naval officials of the two sides to discuss issues of common concern without commitment to negotiate). That approach would provide demonstrable evidence that the Navy is not obstinate with regard to reasonable issues of the U.S.-Soviet naval balance. And, it would provide a mechanism to take advantage of a "Navy-to-Navy" framework, likely to be responsive to the nature of naval issues, that would at worst provide access to the naval arms control agenda.

A second, more challenging option focuses on the limited range of "hard" naval arms control issues—sea-launched cruise missiles, tactical naval nuclear weapons, attack submarines and related force questions. The operative questions in such an approach are really just two: (1) What does the U.S. Navy want the Soviet Navy to change?; and, (2) What is the U.S. Navy willing to change in order to accomplish it?

In substantive terms, the answers to those questions produce only limited choices. And, within those choices, the position of the U.S. Navy in potential negotiation is advantageous.

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Introduction

Naval arms control, left largely unattended since the Washington and London Agreements of the interwar period, has emerged as a conspicuous and difficult part of contemporary security considerations. At each phase of recent U.S.-Soviet arms control deliberations, naval issues have gained in prominence and visibility, not only within the context of direct negotiations, but also, and perhaps more significantly, as part of the political maneuvering surrounding them. As a consequence, the question of reducing and restricting naval forces has also become a more salient part of the domestic debate over arms control in the United States.

The origins of this fresh interest in naval issues can be traced almost entirely to Soviet policy developments since the accession to power in 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev. In order to reduce the economic and political burden of Soviet defense, manage Soviet strategic requirements and build both external and internal political backing for his domestic reform programs, Gorbachev has redefined both Soviet foreign policy and Soviet military doctrine. And, as part of that effort, he has actively pursued arms control negotiations across a wide spectrum of strategic and operational issues, including naval forces. In the past five years Soviet
political leaders, senior military officials and a number of commentators have systematically advanced a wide variety of naval arms control proposals that indicate a clear intent to alter the architecture of the maritime balance with the United States.

The effect of this campaign has been to stimulate the discussion of naval arms control in the United States and Europe. In professional naval journals, scholarly writing and the popular press, the subject of limiting naval arms has captured increased attention.¹ Now, consistent with both budget reductions and the apparent direction of international political changes, the United States Congress seems to have taken more interest in the reduction of naval force and the prospects for negotiated limitations as well.² The central issue of the emerging debate at this point is whether there should be negotiated naval arms control and, if so, what should be included.

Proponents argue that the widening framework of arms control negotiations and the shifting military balance in Europe make naval arms control necessary. In reducing U.S.-Soviet arms competition, they argue, the competition at sea is the only "category" not being actively negotiated and therefore needs to be included. More specifically, they hold that consideration of the naval balance is both necessary and fair as part of the overall military equation now being crafted; if the Soviet Union is engaging in or willing to negotiate reduction in its strength on the ground in Europe, then the United States ought to be willing to do the same with respect to its strength at sea (this is the Soviet view as well).
More detailed arguments then address concrete areas of potential negotiation based on an assessment of the naval balance—e.g., sea-launched cruise missiles, attack submarines, tactical nuclear weapons, confidence building measures, etc.

Opponents, largely from within official and unofficial U.S. naval circles, counter that the unique maritime environment and the distinct operating characteristics of navies make naval forces an inappropriate subject for arms limitations. Indeed, they argue that sea power will grow in importance as a result of negotiated reductions in land and air forces in Europe. Therefore, as a matter of prudent planning the basic issues for reducing such forces must be settled before dealing with the separate concerns of the naval balance. Critics characterize the Soviet position variously as transparent propaganda aimed at restricting internationally protected naval activities, as part of a generalized campaign to loosen the coherence of the Western alliance, or as an effort to attain through political means a strategic and operational advantage that has proven unattainable militarily. Because the proposed Soviet measures for naval limitations in this context are self-evidently to the immediate advantage of the Soviet Union and to the clear disadvantage of the United States, naval arms control should remain apart from other arms control issues.

Leaving the merits of these positions aside, the content of the debate indicates that naval issues, whether or not they are not being actively negotiated, have become an inescapable part of the
arms control agenda. It is not surprising to find this view expressed by proponents who assert that "it is time" for the United States to consider naval arms control. More interesting is the extent to which those generally opposed to naval arms control, including naval leaders and professional naval analysts, also recognize naval arms limitations—for better or for worse—as part of the landscape of contemporary security.\(^4\) In December 1989, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, concluded a speech opposing naval arms control by asking rhetorically, "Is naval arms control inevitable?"\(^5\) In April 1990, speaking on the same theme, he concluded by noting that "the issue of naval arms control is not going to just go away" (neither, he stated, would his opposition).\(^6\) It may be, as Admiral Trost has consistently argued (and has been obliged to argue more frequently), that naval arms control is a bad idea. More pertinent for naval planners, however, is whether it is a bad idea whose time has come.

Posing the question is this way is not entirely facetious. Arms control arises from the familiar reality that military power is an expression of political objectives and is subject to politically determined choices in acquiring, maintaining and employing the forces to pursue those objectives. There is, however, an inherent tension in this process for military planning. The political conditions that influence arms control policy usually incorporate considerations beyond the strategic and operational environment. The problem that military planners have with such a framework is that it does not respond to their principal concern,
which is the capacity to prevail in the event of war. From a military perspective it is that capacity that provides both credible deterrence and the assurance that politically determined interests and objectives can be protected should deterrence fail.

Thus, any military approach to the substance of arms control is going to be concerned with preserving advantage or rectifying disadvantage rather than seeking equilibrium. Although arms control may have military value insofar as it alters the level or structure of opposing forces, it does so at a cost to one's own forces and is therefore an objective better pursued militarily than politically. The arms control problem for military planners is to try to influence and adapt to the military consequences of the negotiating positions shaped by political purpose. What is important, and difficult, is to distinguish substantive issues from the broader political context.

Based on that directive, this paper will assess the prospects for naval arms control. It is based on two principal contentions. First, the political framework of the contemporary arms control environment makes consideration of naval issues virtually certain. The conditions demonstrated in previous experience to support arms control—(1) an incentive arising from political and security considerations existing outside of specific arms control issues, (2) a favorable international climate, and (3) a favorable domestic climate—already exist. Second, the political conditions notwithstanding, the substantive naval issues amenable to negotiation within the prevailing balance are in fact relatively
few. That is, the military and technical considerations of arms control—(1) limits imposed by asymmetries in forces and doctrine, (2) the foundation for common understanding of strategic and operational consequences of arms control measures, (3) technological disparities affecting a mutual deterrent posture and (4) the amenability of results to verification ("hard to hide and easy to count")—materially restrict the areas for potential negotiation of naval arms control. But, where these areas are linked to factors affecting the overall balance, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons at sea, the outcome will be consequential.

These contentions suggest that it is no longer relevant to ask whether naval arms control is "inevitable." The notion that there "ought to be" naval arms control is already widespread and will probably prove politically compelling as long as the overall arms control regime continues to develop. It appears, therefore, as an issue, that consideration of naval arms control is no longer avoidable. The widening public debate in the United States and the persistence of Soviet pressure regarding naval matters have made it so. This point has already been demonstrated in the development of the current START negotiations where the Soviet desire to include and U.S. desire to exclude naval weapons—i.e., sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)—have animated continuing negotiation. Thus, whatever the substance of naval arms control may turn out to be, the United States is already on the "slippery slope" of negotiation that the Navy has sought to avoid.
A position of continuing resistance to consideration of the subject of naval arms control is therefore no longer tenable, and is probably counterproductive. As the visibility of the public debate increases, the pressure to "do something" about naval arms control will increase as well. And that will make the Navy's position, however well reasoned in strategic and operational terms, appear increasingly obstinate and therefore politically vulnerable. By not responding to naval arms control prospects, the Navy runs the risk of yielding the initiative and remaining on the defensive. That position will in turn reduce the capacity for the naval planners to affect those issues that are likely to arise in substantive negotiation. As a number of naval analysts have observed, if professional naval officers do not attend to naval arms control issues, then the agenda will be set exclusively by the political conditions surrounding the talks and that will make the effort to deal with the substance of naval issues more difficult.

Political Conditions Surrounding Naval Arms Control

While it has been an object of interest from time to time for arms control observers, naval arms control is on the political agenda today because the Soviet Union has placed it there. There seems little doubt about the political incentive for the Soviet pursuit of naval arms control. The combined constraints of a stagnant economy, the attendant need to control defense programs, and the broader requirement to manage the external policy setting all support an aggressive Soviet arms control campaign.

Since his accession to power, Gorbachev has addressed arms
control within the context of the shifts in Soviet foreign and defense policy—"new political thinking." Insofar as "new political thinking" argues against the effectiveness of military power in the nuclear age and emphasizes the role of political means to provide security, Soviet strategic development is impelled toward arms control. Gorbachev has addressed the strategic nuclear environment by proposing, in a series of statements, the phased reduction and even the abolition of nuclear weapons altogether. He has characterized as his goal the achievement of the "lowest possible level of strategic parity." And he has recognized the consequences of that position by opening up the development of an arms control posture toward the non-nuclear environment; that is, conventional force reductions.

The active pursuit of arms control, though an uncertain enterprise, has several attributes that appeal to Soviet policy apart from the specifics of particular issues. First, it serves as a means to assert political and diplomatic management over the development of strategy, i.e., policy can shape "the threat" and not simply respond to it. Second, as a corollary, the process of arms control is compatible with economic restraint in the defense sector, i.e., it permits policy to define the conditions of the defense burden by other than strictly military criteria. And, finally, within these constraints, arms control provides a greater prospect for gaining the acquiescence of adversaries in the process of strategic development, i.e., it engages the policy of other nations in the process of defining Soviet security requirements.
Reorienting the International Security Environment. In both a political and military sense, the shift in Soviet policy under Gorbachev has created an atmosphere of uncertainty with regard to the European theater and the purpose and structure of the European alliance systems. The military status and strategic direction of NATO are called into question by the clear indication that the Warsaw Pact is today at best an empty formality, serving little function except to assert bargaining rights for the Soviet Union in the overall disposition of the balance of forces in Europe. That disposition is the subject of direct U.S.-Soviet negotiation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks. But the arena of negotiation is widening to encompass broader determination of political relationships, particularly those surrounding the emergence of a unified Germany, and multilateral consideration of European security issues (including proposals for a pan-European security system).

However uncertain the outcome, the reality of this change is incontrovertible. With unilateral Soviet reductions in Europe, with Soviet forces already withdrawn from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, with the military participation of any of the Warsaw Pact nations in any future strategic or operational planning certainly in doubt, with the future political function of the Warsaw Pact unclear, and with active negotiation of the conventional force balance, it is apparent that a new security regime is emerging in Europe. Both alliances, meeting separately in June 1990, acknowledged the need for a new structure, more
political than military in form. Political resolution of the issues that remain, especially the status of forces and the role of a unified Germany and its position in Europe, will then shape the future of European security. However, the lingering uncertainty of this process and the framework of negotiation surrounding it, raise additional issues that bear on the strategic and operational rationale for maintaining the current disposition of military forces in Europe.

It must be recognized, irrespective of U.S.-Soviet global competition over the past thirty-five years, that the political division of Europe has always been the baseline for military planning on both sides. Soviet planning has been centered against the prospect of war in Europe that would threaten the Soviet homeland. Soviet operational doctrine has been oriented toward the ability to move forces rapidly forward on the ground in Europe, to push NATO forces as far from Soviet territory as possible, and to use nuclear weapons to prosecute a war should the Western forces execute the nuclear option of the NATO "flexible response" strategy. Similarly, U.S. military planning has been centered on the defense of Western Europe. The evolution of U.S. strategy and the structure of American forces—both nuclear and non-nuclear—has been oriented toward the prospect of a Soviet attack in Europe. Although the Pacific theater has occupied a significant part of naval planning (and, ironically, has engaged U.S. forces in two wars), priority in overall U.S. planning priority has gone to the European theater, including the use of naval forces to conduct
alliance warfare and protect the sea lines of communication between North America and the European continent.

The change in Soviet policy and the political realignment taking place in Europe thus seriously disorient the existing foundation for military planning involving European security. From the perspective of U.S. military planning there are far-reaching consequences for both the short and long term requirements for supporting and resupplying NATO.

Two aspects of this new environment must be addressed.

First, what is the overall threat to Europe posed by Soviet forces? The non-confrontational Soviet posture—manifested in changes in defense policy, in the emerging non-communist regimes in Eastern Europe, in the explicit repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, and extended Soviet economic and political contact with West Europe—appears to remove the political foundation for the Soviet threat. Apparent reductions in Soviet force levels, a decline in defense spending and the conversion of some of defense industry to support the consumer sector further indicate a diminished risk of Soviet attack. There is growing consensus therefore that the military threat that has determined the structure and deployment of all Western military forces has lessened substantially.

Second, allowing that even reduced Soviet forces remain a significant factor, what is the warning time that Western forces will have to meet and repel an attack should it occur? Both United States and European officials (including NATO officials) have
declared that the effective warning time for a Soviet attack in Europe is now a matter of months rather than days or weeks. The extension of warning time has enormous implications for the size, deployment and required state of readiness of the forces of both sides. And, in particular, extended warning has implications for the forward deployment and resupply requirements of U.S. forces in Europe.

**Domestic Political Conditions.** The favorable international climate emerging from the changes in Soviet policy and the on-going realignment of European security have also had a domestic impact. In the United States in particular, the shift in Soviet policy, internal as well as external, including the more open and forthcoming Soviet approach to arms control, have changed the view of the Soviet threat. There is a notable improvement in the attitude of the American public toward the Soviet Union (although it is still colored with some skepticism). That attitude has turned even more positive after the changes in Soviet policy that induced a democratic rebirth in Eastern Europe. The Soviet transformation has produced the phenomenon of "threat denial" as a significant factor in the determination of defense policy and military planning in the United States (a Soviet commentator at the 1988 Moscow Summit stated that the Soviet Union was going to do something quite serious: "We are going to take your enemy away from you."). Following the shift in ideological emphasis on the part of the Soviet Union, the United States has undertaken its own reorientation toward assessing an international environment that
has been defined for forty-five years by the Soviet threat.

One important area where the impact of this process has been felt is in discussion of the "peace dividend" that will result from the reduction in military spending commensurate with the end of the Cold War. The peace dividend is probably illusory. The immediate economic benefits of such a "dividend" are unlikely to be significant for either side (although the long-term benefit emanating from a shift in priorities may prove more substantial). But it has become a political fact in deliberations over military spending. More important, with regard to strategic and operational requirements on either side, the budget adjustments are still undirected by strategic choices (especially in the United States where post Cold War strategic development has just begun). That is, the impetus for force structure changes comes from the effort to generate a peace dividend, rather than from carefully crafted strategic adjustments to changed security requirements.

However, that this dividend is undirected with regard to strategic and operational requirements is immaterial. It is the expectation that there will be less military force needed that counts for the climate of arms control. That expectation shifts the weight in the process of evaluating U.S. security requirements to predominantly economic rather than military considerations. An additional part of this process is captured in the concept of "conversion," the reorientation of an economy--U.S. or Soviet--maintained at near wartime levels to one predicated on post war conditions. All of these expectations lend weight to the premises
of arms control as a means to manage security requirements and to save on military expenditures.

In short, in the domestic context, the arms control issues are less than an effort to realize economic and societal trade-offs. The domestic attraction of arms control is its apparent ability to effect those trade-offs through negotiation. That perception promotes a favorable domestic climate for arms control that both reinforces and is reinforced by the perception of favorable international conditions.

**Arms Control in the Maritime Sector**

In military and operational terms, the environment of contemporary naval arms control is more limited than these surrounding political considerations make it appear. The obstacles to arms control in the maritime arena arise chiefly from two sources. One is the asymmetrical development of the respective force structures of the United States and the Soviet Union. In fundamental terms this question revolves around the predominantly continental character of the Soviet defense problem and the maritime character of the U.S. problem. A second and related source of obstacles to naval arms control is the non-synchronous maritime doctrine within national strategies of the two countries. The United States and the Soviet Union have designed their navies to do different things within the context of different operational environments.

**The Nature of Naval Arms Control.** In most general terms, arms control refers to any restraint or regulation of armaments or
military activities. There are just two categories of naval arms control. One is the restriction of naval operations or naval activity (usually referred to as operational restraints). The other is the restriction of naval forces or naval weapons (usually referred to as structural restraints). Although other approaches, such as confidence and security building measures, are generally treated as separate categories, their impact on navies still falls into one of these two areas. Thus, a confidence building measure, such as a requirement to announce a naval exercise, is in actuality a form of restriction on naval activity. Similarly, procedures necessary for implementing restrictions in one category (e.g., intrusive verification of the presence of sea-launched cruise missiles) may also constitute restrictions in the other (e.g., limiting naval activity by restricting the weapons mix).

The character of the maritime setting distinguishes it from other forms of arms control. On the one hand, military operations at sea are clearly an extension of national strategy and appear therefore to be subject to the same limitations that would apply throughout the military balance. Yet, because of its unique characteristics, the sea is also a distinct operational environment. Naval operations are by their very nature less restricted physically, legally and politically than other forms of military activity. Thus differences arising from the nature of the maritime environment and the nature of naval missions present a special set of circumstances in approaching arms control negotiation. These differences are reflected in the contemporary
The Structure of Contemporary Naval Forces. The structure of contemporary naval forces tends to set them apart from some of the essential prerequisites of broader U.S.-Soviet arms control. The concept of parity, for example, has played a critical role in the negotiating limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear forces. It is also part of the current posture of "defensive sufficiency," adopted by the Soviet military in expressing Gorbachev’s concept of "reasonable sufficiency." The acceptance of this admittedly (and purposefully) indeterminate artifact set the political basis for the calculation of the structure of the strategic forces of the two sides and thereby established a common framework within which to conduct negotiations. That is, parity acknowledged that the strategic nuclear weapons on both sides possess roughly equivalent capabilities and comparable performance characteristics. And, despite differences in employment, the nature of the weapons and their use determined doctrines that were sufficiently similar to permit discussion of whatever asymmetry existed between the two forces. Arms control, in fact, served to regulate and to some extent reduce those asymmetries.

But parity is more difficult to apply to U.S.-Soviet forces in the maritime arena. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, the naval operating forces of the two countries reflect a disparate strategic and operational orientation and are consequently different in most—but not all—militarily relevant characteristics. In this regard, it is important to note that the contemporary arms control
environment is not comparable to the interwar negotiations of naval arms control—the Washington and London Naval agreements. At the time of those agreements, capital ships were considered to be the leading weapons of the prevailing strategic environment, the role that strategic nuclear weapons perform today. The principals in the negotiations were maritime powers addressing like weapons that played a like role in their respective national strategies. Those agreements were comparable to the strategic nuclear arms negotiations of today, not to the more complex issues that govern the disposition and characteristics of naval forces.

Although there is a naval component—the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—within strategic arms negotiations, naval arms control considerations between the United States and the Soviet Union today arise from other than central strategic concerns. The issues involving naval forces in the U.S.-Soviet balance are largely a function of the operational consequences in a maritime context of the balance of forces in the European theater. But, while those theater issues are virtually the sole determinants of the posture of the Soviet Navy, they are only one (albeit an important one) of considerations of global maritime power that affect the U.S. Navy. That means that the operational foundation for calculating potentially negotiable issues is not common to the two parties. In real terms, naval arms control affects issues of the overall military balance that are not primarily naval. That is, it is not the naval balance that is at issue, so much as it is the impact of the naval balance on the
changing military balance. The United States and the Soviet Union have differing viewpoints on just what that impact is.

This problem is further complicated because the size and disposition of naval forces are not circumscribed by political or physical features in the same way as ground forces. For one thing, there are no easily demarcated maritime frontiers that can be used to define clearly a naval force balance such as those used in attempting to calculate the conventional force balance in Europe. Naval operations are simply not conducted in a manner that makes the disposition of force on one side or another of a line, assuming such a line could be determined, a useful measure. The inherent mobility, versatility and flexibility of naval operating forces make them less theater specific regardless of their size and disposition at any given time. Instead, provided that there are no geographic or political impediments, naval forces operate in a potentially global domain that is three-dimensional and virtually unbounded. However, in the case of the U.S. and Soviet navies it is the proviso to that observation that is most relevant. Insofar as it is operationally relevant, the Soviet Navy is bounded by geographical and political impediments in a way that the U.S. Navy is not. And that difference applies directly to the potential for negotiation.

Finally, more generally, the characteristics of naval forces and naval weaponry also make them far less amenable to verification measures, intrusive or non-intrusive, than strategic or theater forces. This results from the operating characteristics that
distinguish navies from other military forces. Naval forces are designed to be self-contained and independent. A single naval vessel is a combination of weapons systems, designed to fight in the multi-dimensional maritime environment which dictates a distinctive military approach to the use and control of space. It is by definition mobile and intended to be operationally flexible. Combined naval forces share the same qualities. Their mobility allows them to move relatively quickly, again with little political impediment or, given access to the open sea, geographical restraint. The benefits of the possession of naval forces tend to come from capitalizing on the unpredictability that their versatility and mobility provide. However, once more, the United States and Soviet navies do not share these benefits in equal, nor for the most part, in comparable measure.

**Soviet Naval Orientation.** Soviet naval development has been generally secondary to the demands of the larger strategic and operational arenas of Soviet defense policy. Naval forces have been an integrated element of Soviet military planning principally concerned with land operations (if not always willingly so). Despite an obvious professional and institutional identity within the Soviet Union, highlighted in the 1970s under the leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy has thus been a far less independent entity than its American counterpart. It has been treated within the Soviet concept of "combined arms operations" as an extension of the overall strategic and operational requirements dominated by ground forces. The Soviet Navy has not, does not and
probably will not stand as a separate element of Soviet strategic development.

However, in the context of its land-oriented strategic and operational requirements, the Soviet Union considers itself to be almost continuously vulnerable from the sea. Soviet military planning directed at naval development has focused on the threat that U.S. and NATO naval forces represent to the strategic balance and to the prosecution of war on the central front in Europe. That has left Soviet military planners with two choices.

One is to extend the sea frontier militarily, to establish a forward naval deployment in order to engage the enemy as far away from the European land mass as possible. There are, however, clear geo-strategic, logistical and economic reasons that suggest that such a choice is not an attractive one for the Soviet Union. It is doubtful that it ever was, even though the past two decades witnessed a steady increase in the size, the scope and tempo of operations and the capability of the Soviet Navy. Despite the increased capacity for Soviet naval forces to operate beyond the sea approaches to the Soviet homeland, they are not well structured to do so, they do not have command and control systems fully to support such operations and they have not been extensively exercised in such operations. Soviet ships are designed to provide great striking power quickly, but with limited cruise ranges and limited reload and replenishment capability. They are unsuited to an extended conventional war at sea.

The second choice for Soviet planners is to attempt to protect
strategic assets and to prevent naval access to vulnerable areas. That has been the prevailing naval strategy followed by the Soviet Union, though challenged by the naval leadership of Admiral Gorshkov. The primary operational role of the Soviet Navy, other than its responsibility for the sea-based leg of the Soviet strategic force, has been sea denial of the maritime approaches to Soviet territory. Its claims to traditional power projection objectives and to a forceful overseas naval presence have therefore remained tenuous in practice. The Soviet maritime strategy is subordinate to the dictates of the land battle on the continent. The Soviet Navy has therefore had two basic wartime missions: (1) to ensure Soviet strategic strike capability and to provide the necessary support for it (referred to as "combat stability" in Soviet literature); and (2) to support Soviet combat operations by countering opposing naval forces at sea and participating in actions in other theaters of military operations.

The doctrine defining the Navy's strategic mission is to defend protected bastions for Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Soviet SSBN's appear to be regarded as a strategic reserve, a force held in the event of conflict to assure retaliatory capability and thus retain some continuing control over the outcome.¹² The existence of such a force and such a concept is also consistent with the more recent de-emphasis of nuclear war, which underscores a survivable strategic capability, and with that part of Soviet "reasonable sufficiency" doctrine that retains a role for strategic nuclear weapons at reduced levels of parity.
Continuing force modernization (nearly one-third of all Soviet ballistic missile warheads are on SSBNs) seems to support the view that SSBNs will play an increasingly important role in Soviet strategic considerations. While those considerations are subject to the outcome of strategic arms negotiations, impending reductions will place a higher premium on SSBN protection.

The second basic mission for the Soviet Navy—-to provide seaward defense and support for other theaters--is even more directly related to the policy consequences of Gorbachev's "new political thinking." This mission is necessarily a function of the perceived threat posed by opposing forces. That threat has included both deployed U.S. SSBNs and the U.S. carrier battle groups. In the first instance Soviet naval forces have concentrated on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. In the second, naval forces and Soviet Naval Aviation have focused on Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) strike operations that will engage U.S. carrier battle groups away from Soviet military theaters. In designing and deploying naval forces for this mission the Soviet Union has relied heavily on tactical nuclear weapons, carried aboard surface combatants and attack submarines (SSN) in both ASW and ASUW roles.\textsuperscript{13} Exercises involving such operations have been concerned especially with the northern approaches (access to the Norwegian Sea through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap) and (less extensively and less frequently) the Pacific approaches to Soviet territory.

\textbf{U.S. Naval Orientation.} American naval thinking, though
global in expression, has been predicated on the Soviet threat and is therefore antithetical to Soviet concerns. The U.S. Navy articulated its current doctrine in the mid-1980s and formalized it in 1986 as "The Maritime Strategy." Development of this strategy was an effort to assert a clear direction for naval employment in response to a shifting political environment for defense policy. It synthesized post war U.S. naval thinking and applied it to promote the need for a 600-ship navy to support U.S. military requirements, principally in the European theater. Although presented as an effort by the Navy to define its own strategic role within the U.S. national strategy, the Maritime Strategy in fact did the reverse; it redefined national strategy in maritime terms and constituted itself as an autonomous element of U.S. strategic doctrine.

In its relative strategic autonomy, the U.S. maritime posture is distinct from that of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the Soviet Navy, the strategic orientation of the U.S. Navy is only marginally concerned with the retaliatory deterrent role represented by the American SSBN force (which, with access to the open sea and long range, increasingly accurate SLBMs, does not require the protection of bastions). Instead it concentrates on development of an active posture of deterrence by denial through offensive naval operations. U.S. naval spokesmen repeatedly state that the Navy does not deploy weapons intended for strategic use (other than the SLBMs). But, in the evolving implementation of the Maritime Strategy, naval nuclear weapons--specifically the nuclear
variant of the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N)--have been incorporated in a counterforce doctrine based on the objective of defending and retaining the navy as a fighting force in the event of conflict. The purpose of this posture is to provide a compartmented, sea-based deterrent that concentrates on the security of naval assets.

The reasoning that underlies implementation of this doctrine is relevant to the naval arms control problem and therefore worth reviewing. The Maritime Strategy is based on the premise drawn from the development of Soviet doctrine that, in order to exploit its advantage in conventional forces and to prevent nuclear war, the Soviet Union prefers not to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Soviet Navy will not use nuclear weapons at sea unless they have been committed to the land battle. However, Soviet naval vessels are heavily armed with nuclear weapons. To prevent Soviet military planners from employing those weapons exclusively at sea, the U.S. Navy carries land-attack nuclear weapons that threaten the land theater. The TLAM/N is thus a deterrent to nuclear war at sea. In other words, the Maritime Strategy holds the presumed Soviet interest in avoiding a nuclear conflict as a hostage against Soviet use of nuclear weapons at sea against U.S. naval targets.

In its war-fighting components, the U.S. Maritime Strategy postulates global warfare at sea, but is directed chiefly to Soviet forces in the European theater. It is predicated on the ability to eliminate or neutralize the Soviet naval threat swiftly. To accomplish that purpose the Maritime Strategy relies on forward
deployment intended to position naval forces as close as possible to opposing forces and, in the event of conflict, to take the offensive very early. As initially presented the objective of that offensive was to gain "war-termination leverage" through the rapid destruction of the Soviet fleet, including Soviet SSBNs, thereby removing the Soviet strategic reserve force and persuading the Soviet Union to conclude the war quickly.19 Should nuclear weapons be employed because of decisions taken in the land theaters, then the naval nuclear land-attack weapons--sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)--would also be available to support U.S. combat operations ashore (the Follow-on Forces Attack doctrine of striking against those Soviet forces deployed to follow the main Soviet attack forces and therefore take away the Soviet ability to prosecute the war). Finally, using attack submarines and ASW forces, the U.S. Navy would ensure that sea lines of communication to Europe would remain open against the threat of interdiction by Soviet submarines.

Efforts to keep the Maritime Strategy current with the changes taking place in the European theater have produced a more generalized expression of its objectives, but have not altered its substance. In a recent statement, Admiral Trost catalogued the enduring components of that strategy as deterrence (including theater deterrence provided by the nuclear land-attack SLCM), forward defense and coalition warfare. Acknowledging changes in the nature of the Soviet regime and Soviet defense policy, he indicated nonetheless that the U.S. Navy would "continue to gauge
our strategy and war-fighting capabilities against this least likely, but ultimately most potent threat."\textsuperscript{20} In defending the continuing validity of the Maritime Strategy, Trost also included less specific attributes, such as its flexibility as "a general frame of reference" and the soundness of its principles "even as our political and economic surroundings change."\textsuperscript{21} He emphasized that the continuing foundation of the Maritime Strategy is the maintenance of maritime superiority.

\textbf{Institutional Perspectives.} The institutional position of the respective navies contributes to the problems of asymmetry and doctrinal incompatibility. Although the rhetoric accompanying the Maritime Strategy has been muted, resistance to Soviet arms control proposals by the U.S. Navy is still predicated on the threat upon which that strategy is based. And, while there may be some movement toward reevaluating U.S. naval doctrine in the face of economic and bureaucratic pressure, no new doctrine has yet appeared publicly. Until such time as a more flexible doctrinal position emerges it is unlikely that there will be an opportunity of gaining institutional support for arms control within the Navy.

The Soviet Navy has not been any more receptive to operational restraint than the United States Navy. Soviet naval spokesmen have expressed their awareness of the implications of the doctrine of "defensive sufficiency." For them, that concept is simply the current expression of the same issue with which the Soviet Navy has contended for two decades. Thus, \textit{The Navy: Its Role, Future Development and Employment}, a book published in 1988 amidst signs
of controversy (with a preface signed by Admiral Gorshkov) continued to advocate naval roles that were clearly out of step with "new political thinking" and a defensively oriented posture.\textsuperscript{22} And the current Soviet Naval Commander in Chief, Admiral Chernavin, recently reacted sharply to a characterization of the new Soviet aircraft carrier, \textit{Tbilisi}, as a "defensive weapon," objecting that the concept was inappropriate in the context of naval operations.\textsuperscript{23} Like the U.S. Navy, the Soviet Navy appears to operate with its own strategic culture. The difference is in the relative degree of autonomy enjoyed by the former.

\textbf{Approaches to Naval Arms Control}

From an arms control perspective, neither the orientation nor the configuration of the forces of the U.S. and Soviet navies provide much basis for matched reductions. That is, in any negotiated security regime that meets the criterion of maintaining a mutual deterrent posture, the two forces would need to be limited or reduced in unlike rather than like systems. The objective of naval arms control for the Soviet Union would be to restrict those naval systems that most threaten the Soviet military perspective, one that is \textit{not predominantly naval}. However, those forces--e.g., U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles (especially the nuclear-armed land-attack variant), aircraft carrier battle groups and ASW capability--are precisely the systems advocated by United States strategy, one that is \textit{contingent upon naval forces}, as necessary to meet the Soviet threat. Where there are similar naval force elements--e.g., attack submarines or tactical nuclear weapons--
there are dissimilar doctrines of employment.

As the differing orientations toward naval forces indicate, the presence of naval arms control on the agenda is a product of Soviet rather than American concerns. Because the Soviet Navy is an integrated component of the overall Soviet view of military operations, whatever strategic and operational import is attached to arms control in general would be expected to include naval forces as well. That is, arms control in the maritime sector is as necessary to validate the soundness of "reasonable sufficiency" as it is in other sectors.

It is therefore not surprising that the Soviet Union has intensified its interest in naval arms control coincident with the introduction of "new political thinking" and "reasonable sufficiency." If Gorbachev is going to follow through with military restraint, then the Navy will be affected as well. There are already signs that this is the case. The overall operating tempo of the Soviet Navy has been reduced. The last large-scale exercises in either the northern or Pacific sea approaches were held in 1985. Based on the expressed objectives of domestic reform, Soviet military planners will need to consider how to accomplish those naval missions determined to be necessary with reduced resources. The naval arms control arena must therefore address issues of respective force structures.

Soviet Naval Arms Control and Regional Stability. In this environment the Soviet Union has introduced a wide range of initiatives in a variety of contexts. The most general proposals
fall into the category of restricting naval activities and operations. Gorbachev, supported by other Soviet spokesmen, has proposed the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet naval vessels from selected maritime regions, prohibition of naval activity in areas such as international straits and shipping lanes, establishment of zones where anti-submarine warfare activity would be prohibited, creation of "nuclear free zones" at sea and restrictions on the movement of naval vessels carrying nuclear arms.24 Soviet spokesmen refer to this array of proposals, especially those contained in Gorbachev's public statements, as a "concrete program."25

It is evident, however, that these proposals are more supportive of the political thrust of Soviet foreign policy--emphasis on stability, reliance on political measures and the effort to reduce confrontation--than a foundation for naval arms control at a strategic or operational level. Gorbachev has publicly proposed restrictions on naval activity in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the "Arctic region" (North, Norwegian and Greenland Seas). Each was contained in a speech directed to regional actors in those areas that also included opportunities for wider political, economic and scientific cooperation (although the United States was the one nation most certain to be affected by the outcome of the naval restrictions).26

It is difficult to address these proposals in naval terms. They are best seen instead in the context of Gorbachev's overall political agenda of promoting greater regional stability on the
Soviet periphery.

In addition to being politically opportunistic, however, these regional proposals do reveal Soviet strategic and operational concerns. If adopted, they would enhance the continuing development of "bastions" for the deployment of Soviet strategic submarine forces under alert conditions or the outbreak of conflict. As a consequence, there would be some measurable enhancement of the survivability and therefore the stability of the SSBN force. The proposed restrictions would also provide an important buffer in the critical sea approaches to the Soviet Union thereby easing the more immediate problems of Soviet naval planning for defense. They would extend the Soviet defense perimeter by extending the time, distance and difficulty for NATO forces penetrating areas of Soviet operations and by affording Soviet attack submarines some measure of sanctuary. For the same reason, they would push U.S. operating areas to the limits of SLCM range and at least delay the ability to use those weapons against reduced theater forces.

The Soviet approach to restrictions on naval forces and naval weapons reflect the same concerns in more concrete proposals. The Soviet Union has called for limits on the range and deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), reciprocal adjustments to the force balance (such as a proposal to reduce the Soviet submarine force in exchange for a similar reduction in American aircraft carriers), the inclusion of naval forces in both the negotiations on force reductions in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) talks, an "open seas" regime for the free exchange of information about naval activities, and continuing emphasis on establishing confidence-building measures to regulate naval exercise activity and other naval movements.27

The Strategic and Operational Context. These proposals indicate that the naval arms control agenda will continue to revolve around naval issues of strategic and operational interest to the Soviet Union. From a strategic perspective the Soviet naval arms control objective is to assure the protection of survivable sea-based strategic systems consistent with Gorbachev's stated goal of achieving the "lowest possible level of strategic parity." That means the survivability of the Soviet SSBN force, especially if that force is reduced under the START regime. In extending the range of its SLBMs, the Soviet Union made it possible to deploy its SSBN force in home waters where it could be protected. Although an anti-SSBN mission against U.S. assets no longer seems feasible for the Soviet Navy given extended SLBM ranges and access to open ocean areas by U.S. SSBNs, an anti-Soviet SSBN mission by U.S. forces in Soviet waters does. Taking account of the U.S. naval posture, the Soviet Union must address the defensibility of its protected SSBN bastions. Thus, the Soviet Union will seek to limit the operational effectiveness of U.S. naval forces against its SSBN assets.

From an operational perspective, the Soviet objective is to protect land operations from U.S. sea-based offensive systems. The
Soviet Navy is subject to the concept of "combined arms operations." The services are integrated within regionally oriented commands designated as theaters of military operations. If these commands are to be oriented toward defensive operations below the nuclear level ("reasonable sufficiency"), then from a Soviet perspective, the maritime threat is part of the equation. Soviet understanding of the newly adopted defensive doctrine is expressed as forces that do not threaten the other side with offensive capability, especially the capability to conduct a surprise attack. Virtually every expression of the Maritime Strategy emphasizes offensive operations aimed not only at naval targets but at land targets as well. Hence, while accepting the reality of the land-sea balance as a strategic guideline, the U.S. Maritime Strategy rejects the notion that it is an equation. Soviet concern over this issue is manifested in statements surrounding the recent unilateral Soviet conventional force reductions and in the proposed reductions in CFE Talks.

The deployment of U.S. SLCMs in particular moves the problem of the naval balance to bear on the disposition of force in land theaters of military operations for the Soviet Union, especially in the nuclear land-attack variant. Leaving aside other considerations regarding SLCM deployment, this nuclear capability represents Soviet strategic vulnerability. Although the U.S. denies that it is a strategic weapon, the Soviet Union considers any weapon capable of striking Soviet territory as strategic. The U.S. naval nuclear land-attack SLCM is identified as the threat of
surprise attack that the Soviet Union considers to be the difference between offensive and defensive doctrine in attempting to define "reasonable sufficiency." Elements of this concern are again evident in the Soviet efforts to incorporate SLCMs into both the START negotiations and the CFE talks.\textsuperscript{28}

The operational perspective toward the naval balance is thus directly linked to efforts to negotiate the conventional force balance in Europe. In both content and context, the Maritime Strategy is designed specifically to bring to bear the naval advantage of the United States against the ground-force advantage of the Soviet Union. The addition of SLCMs makes this threat even more formidable for Soviet planners, for cruise missiles extend the U.S. strike capability farther from the reach of available Soviet defenses. Since the European theater is the focus of conventional force reductions, the status of the northern sea approaches would be central for Moscow in addressing reductions in Soviet force levels. The conditions for accomplishing naval missions with reduced resources is obviously for the Soviet Union complicated by this situation. Thus, the issues created in the naval arena are precisely those that make arms control a necessary option for Soviet policy.

The Maritime Strategy must be understood to jeopardize the Soviet ability to craft a security regime that would allow the reduction of Soviet forces while retaining requisite strategic parity. The incorporation of SLCMs clearly raises the ante in trying to operationalize the meaning of "reasonable sufficiency"
and challenges the foundation for realization of the military
conditions of "defensive sufficiency." In the current Soviet view
of the disposition of naval forces, the U.S. is acknowledged to
have superiority. Thus the criteria routinely set by Soviet
military spokesmen--strategic and military parity, the capacity to
maintain conventional quality and reciprocity in determining the
balance of forces--are not met unless naval issues are addressed
together with the other reductions associated with changes in
Soviet military doctrine. And, as the more prominent arms control
problems are resolved, as appears to be the case, then the naval
issues will appear to become increasingly important.

The Prospects for Naval Arms Control

The changes in Soviet policy have altered international
political conditions and, together with the need for economic
constraint and shifting domestic priorities, provide sufficient
incentive to try to shape a negotiated security regime. Those same
factors are reflected in a rapidly and probably radically
transformed defense agenda for both sides. For the moment, the
shift from the bipolar strategic-military relationship based on the
U.S.-Soviet and NATO-Warsaw Pact balance remains fluid and
uncertain. But the direction of change toward force reductions on
each side--unilateral as well as negotiated--and a transformation
of the prevailing alliance system in both military and political
terms is assured. In this process, the trend of negotiated arms
control is toward disaggregation of issues affecting the central
balance into discrete elements for purposes of negotiation. And
the structure for negotiation continues toward broader, multilateral arrangements. Both of these trends, combined with the importance of naval issues for Soviet security, make naval arms control appear to be an inescapable subject for direct negotiation.

Two further considerations are likely to raise the salience of naval arms control for the United States. First, if it is in the U.S. interest to encourage reductions in Soviet force levels politically and to support the arms control process in general in order to promote further Soviet reform (a position advocated within the State Department but not the Defense Department), then the Soviet position with regard to naval arms control must be taken seriously. That is, based on the structure of the prevailing military balance, at some determinable point in the process of pursuing a framework of negotiated security with the Soviet Union, naval issues will either have to be addressed or the overall process will be held back (drawing further attention to naval issues).

Second, the extent to which the Soviet position is attuned to the European political situation will become increasingly germane to U.S. interests. European political realignment will certainly play a role in the evolving structure of security and, if the trend toward widening the framework of negotiation continues, that may place critical defense issues affecting the United States into the already murky atmosphere of multilateral negotiation over the economic and political future of Europe (including such suggestions as a pan-European security organization). That is clearly not a
hypothetical concern; there have already been expressions of European interest in a new structure of security and in naval arms control.

However, the military conditions for U.S.-Soviet naval arms control negotiation must be considered less than compelling. In the first place, the stimulus for negotiating naval arms control at this point emanates almost exclusively from the Soviet side. It is the persistence of the Soviet Union in attempting to limit U.S. naval forces that presses the issue rather than considerations arising from the mutual deterrent posture of the two sides. Nor can the multitude of proposals that have been advanced by the Soviet Union or are being discussed elsewhere be considered by themselves as negotiating positions. They simply represent a menu of options. An objective assessment of that menu promises little potential benefit to be gained by the U.S. Navy from a negotiated naval arms control regime. But there is no reason to consider the options presented to be equally serious nor equally valid in content. Arms control negotiation is a tougher business than that.

Restrictions on Naval Operations. The Soviet proposals for restricted zones of one kind or another—especially nuclear-free zones in the Baltic, North and Norwegian Seas and the Pacific Ocean—cannot be counted among feasible options for bilateral negotiation. However, despite that infeasibility, the potential political impact of the Soviet initiatives must be acknowledged. Soviet policy makers did not select either the topic or the location for proposing such operational restraints randomly. In
each of these areas there is a precedent of regional interest in naval arms control. That is especially true in Scandinavia—which has a longer record of neutrality than of alliance—and in the South Pacific region where the Soviet Union is certainly responding to recent expressions of concern over the presence of nuclear weapons aboard naval vessels. Those expressions have been focused specifically on the U.S. policy to "neither confirm nor deny" whether its ships are carrying such weapons. The opportunity to generate political support for Soviet interests within these regions was without question a consideration in proposing such restraints.

But the outcome is unattractive from an American naval perspective. As long as nuclear weapons are deployed at sea and considered to be operationally significant, then any regime that requires disclosure of the presence or absence of such weapons aboard specific vessels or that prohibits free access of those vessels to international waters in normal conditions would constitute a restraint on their operation that serves only Soviet interests. Similarly, by themselves, such restrictions as ASW-free zones would under normal circumstances simply disadvantage the freedom of operation of U.S. naval forces with no commensurate gain from shifts in the disposition of Soviet forces. Under abnormal circumstances--crisis or conflict--such restrictions would become immediately inoperative. Those proposals that restrict naval operations and activities provide no basis for mutual benefit with the current balance of naval forces.
Moreover, regional operational restraints could not realistically be negotiated apart from larger issues of substantive force reductions. This point is best illustrated in the critically important northern region of Europe. The Scandinavian nations have expressed some interest in operational restrictions on naval forces.\textsuperscript{29} If they were to pursue that interest in response to current Soviet proposals, however, it would be certainly be necessary to address the concentration of Soviet forces in the region (assuming that an agreement restricting Western but not Soviet forces would be unacceptable). The Soviet Union has extensive military capability based in the Kola Peninsula area, described as "the largest military basing complex in the world," which accounts for sixty-two per cent of the Soviet SSBN force and significant Soviet Naval Aviation deployments (including a number of recent transfers of aircraft associated with the CFE negotiations).\textsuperscript{30} Any adjustment to these forces would in turn require that the Soviet Union also confront the disposition of U.S. naval forces and therefore be contingent upon determination of the impact on the U.S.-Soviet naval balance. It is unlikely, in other words, that the force reductions necessary to implement the proposed operational restraints could be accomplished independent of negotiation of the maritime balance with the United States.

Nor could such restraints be realistically negotiated outside of the broader political framework. In order to use the kinds of operational restraints that the Soviet Union has proposed to build regional stability, it would be necessary first to resolve the
uncertainty in European security relationships, including the current and future role of the respective alliance systems. That would mean resolution of the consequences of German unification either through the CFE talks, or through some wider framework. Assuming that such resolution were feasible and acceptable and that the broader framework of European security would also resolve itself, then the regional restrictions on naval operations may be negotiable. However, should such a broad political-military resolution on the central front be accomplished, restraints on naval forces through arms control would then probably be unnecessary.

Another effort promoted by Soviet spokesmen--to provide stability to the naval balance through a structure of confidence and security building measures (CSBM)--also shows limited promise in the maritime operating environment. For reasons noted earlier, the movement of naval forces is not comparable to the movement of ground forces. That such measures are intended to build confidence and security may make them attractive as a side issue, but reasonably effective CSBM applied at sea would be tantamount to operational restraints and therefore undesirable for naval forces. The specific Soviet interest in these measures is to be informed of U.S. naval exercises (most Soviet exercises occur in adjacent waters). But, under the operational doctrine and deployment of the two forces, that would once again mean restricting U.S. forces with little commensurate limitation in the conduct of Soviet forces. It does not seem to offer a basis for mutual benefit.
What is more, in terms of the practical objectives associated with CSBM for naval operations, there are measures already in place that effectively provide the conditions that the Soviet Union seeks. First, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which naval forces alone, without any other indicators, would be used to launch a preemptive strike. Second, the overall surveillance capability of each side permits early detection and observation of impending large-scale operations by the other. Third, observation of exercises that occur on the high seas is protected by international law. Both navies observe and track one another's naval movements on a regular basis and have done so for some time. Fourth, as consequence of such operations, the two navies negotiated the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) in 1972. This agreement, praised by both sides for its effectiveness, specifies rules of conduct for the two navies when in close proximity at sea (and in the air over international waters) and provides a navy-to-navy basis for communication, including an annual meeting to discuss implementation of the agreement. The USSR now has such an agreement with most NATO nations. Finally, insofar as there is naval participation in land force exercises, the 1986 Stockholm Accords and the 1989 agreement for the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities include navies in their provisions for advance notification and regulation of activity. Apart from the action of such ground forces in Europe, naval exercise activity does not seem relevant.

These measures do suggest one area for fruitful development
that could be categorized as a confidence building measure. Building upon the success of INCSEA structure, which both navies consider to be useful because of its navy-to-navy character, there is room for expanded contact between officials of the two sides. Such meetings would not constitute an arms control measure (neither, strictly speaking, does the Incidents at Sea Agreement). But it would provide a basis for discussion of common concerns agreed upon in advance. Following the Incidents at Sea model, which carries no sanctions, such contacts could be carefully tailored to address naval issues apart from (though obviously not free of) the larger political context. The meetings would not be public (the INCSEA meetings are not widely publicized) nor would the two sides be obliged to address any subject that it was unwilling to address. The opportunity for such an exchange would signal the degree of stability sought in CSBM.

Restrictions on Naval Forces and Weapons. Given the respective naval force structures and employment doctrines of the two sides, the range of negotiable options for reducing or controlling naval forces is limited. Nevertheless, the surrounding conditions pressing toward naval arms control make it important to identify and examine those areas within the maritime balance that offer a constructive basis for negotiation. The resulting issues, arising from the correlation of land and sea operations in the European theater, are few but consequential.

For the Soviet Union, in addition to protecting its SSBN assets, stabilization of the central front requires defense of land
targets against sea-based strikes. The Soviet naval arms control objectives are to limit U.S. systems considered threatening to that requirement. Those systems would include sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical naval nuclear weapons. For the United States, stabilization of that front requires the ability to project and sustain its naval forces in support of deployed land forces, including the assured resupply of those forces by protecting the sea lines of communication. The United States would benefit from limitations on Soviet systems that threaten that ability. Those systems would include Soviet attack submarines and land-based maritime strike forces (Soviet Naval Aviation). Within that framework the issues that appear potentially negotiable are sea-launched cruise missiles, tactical nuclear weapons at sea, attack submarines and land-based strike forces.

Due to Soviet persistence, the question of SLCMs is by now well-known. Soviet interest in addressing all SLCMs began with the protocol to the unratified SALT II Treaty. Since then, SLCMs have been almost continuously a subject of negotiation. Although the United States position has been to keep the subject a side issue, the preliminary arrangements regarding the forthcoming START agreement (a "declaratory" limit of 880 nuclear SLCMs for each side) appear to concede to the Soviet Union its long-standing contention that these weapons are part of the strategic equation and refute the U.S. Navy's protestation to the contrary. However, given the breadth of expressed Soviet concerns, the narrow focus of that arrangement suggests also that the issue will remain open.
Based on past conduct, in the absence of favorable negotiation, the Soviet Union will try to rectify an obvious technological imbalance that exists today with SLCMs through the development and deployment of comparable systems. Thus the Soviet Union is developing its own SLCM variants—the SS-N-21 and the SS-N-24—together with associated submarine platforms.

Like the MIRV issue in strategic arms negotiations, this may become a "pay me now, or pay me later" situation. If the United States is willing to see 880 deployed Soviet long-range nuclear SLCMs (with the understanding that successful Soviet deployment would be more accessible to U.S. coastal targets than U.S. deployment is to Soviet targets) then the issue is moot. But if such deployment presents a new dimension in the strategic balance, with potential risk to the United States, then it may be better to begin negotiation now rather than after the fact. In entering negotiation over this issue the immediate objective would then be to terminate an impending Soviet SLCM capability.

A second issue open to substantive negotiation is the continuing deployment of "non-strategic" nuclear weapons at sea (because of their range and the U.S. Navy's characterization of their role, it is difficult to classify these weapons within the familiar categories of "tactical" or "theater"). This issue is virtually inseparable from larger questions of the nuclear correlation of forces being considered in negotiations both over strategic nuclear weapons and over the balance of forces in Europe. If the strategic context continues to narrow the focus toward
sharply reduced strategic nuclear levels, "the lowest possible level of strategic parity," then the deployment of longer-range, "non-strategic" nuclear weapons will certainly be questioned. This is already the case with the continuing discussion of the TLAM/N within the START framework.

In negotiation over theater force levels, the role of nuclear weapons will be affected by the changing perceptions of both the capacity and the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Europe. The acknowledged extension of warning time for such an attack has already begun to alter European views about the need for tactical nuclear weapons. If the theater context supporting the requirement for nuclear weapons at sea changes as a result of negotiations of the European balance, then it is unlikely that the maritime sector can remain isolated.

There seems to be sufficient interest on both sides to consider the elimination of "non-strategic" naval nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has again pressed this issue. These weapons affect the Soviet Union in ways already outlined. They challenge the stated goal of reducing, if not eliminating the nuclear component of the overall military balance. In the Tomahawk nuclear land-attack SLCM and in the nuclear capable attack aircraft aboard U.S. aircraft carriers they jeopardize the force reductions in land theaters of military operations.

For the United States such weapons present a dilemma. They have been justified as an essential part of the Navy's deterrence posture at the theater level to ensure that the Soviet Navy does
not use its nuclear weapons at sea unless willing to use them in the land battle. They are also justified as necessary to compensate for increased Soviet capability to threaten carrier battle groups by spreading U.S. nuclear response capability to other surface and sub-surface platforms. But the theater requirement for nuclear weapons appears to be receding (and, again, is being addressed separately in the START arrangements concerning the nuclear SLCM). The justification for naval tactical nuclear weapons then seems to isolate them to use at sea. However, it is the unattractiveness of that prospect that justified their presence in the first place. In both U.S. and Soviet reasoning on this issue there is a practical basis for negotiation.

Consideration of the issue of SLCMs and naval tactical nuclear weapons would provide currency to address additional elements of maritime balance. In particular, it would provide for development of an agenda that would include those elements of the Soviet posture that threaten U.S. naval concerns. Candidates for this agenda include Soviet long-range air strike forces (Soviet BACKFIRE bombers carrying air launched anti-ship cruise missiles) and the anti-surface capability of its attack submarines. A meaningful reduction in either or both of these Soviet capabilities would enhance U.S. ability to meet its maritime objectives in the European theater at relatively lower levels of force.\textsuperscript{32}

Attack submarines present one of the few areas where there are like forces at issue, though with differing operational impact. The Soviet Union is preponderant in attack submarines (the two
sides are relatively balanced with regard to nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN)). That preponderance poses a potential threat to the sea lines of communication to Europe in the event of crisis or conflict, although that threat is probably operationally remote because of the priority attached to protecting the SSBN bastions. The Soviet Union would have an incentive to consider reductions in attack submarines based on the latter priority. The United States would have an incentive to consider reductions based on protection of its sea lines of communication. However, any effort to negotiate reductions in submarine capabilities is certain to raise the question of ASW capability as well.

Negotiation of any of these issues would have to overcome serious obstacles in finding verification measures acceptable to both sides. Verification of force or weapons reductions at sea is difficult at best, although advances in the methods and effectiveness of ocean surveillance would aid in developing an acceptable verification regime. The verification problem is particularly applicable to the SLCM. The long-range SLCM can be deployed in a conventional variant that is indistinguishable from the nuclear variant (the United States, for example, has both a conventional land attack and conventional anti-ship variant of the Tomahawk). This raises several concerns. Assuming that verifiable limits (as opposed to declaratory limits) were negotiated, it would be necessary to distinguish between conventional and nuclear variants. In doing so, the verification regime would then run the risk of constituting an operational restraint as well. Other
questions concerning the reliability and effectiveness of a verification regime in the flexible maritime environment will certainly arise.

Nevertheless, the situation is not impossible. Determination of an acceptable verification regime is subject to two considerations. The first is whether or not there is the technological capability to develop verification systems. Today there is a range of possibilities that suggests that the technological ability to verify naval arms control is attainable even with regard to a difficult issue such as the SLCM.33 The second consideration is whether or not any given verification regime is acceptable. The history of arms control demonstrates clearly that verification is a part of the negotiation process, often one of the most difficult parts. If the proposed verification is unacceptable, then so is the substantive limitation. In other words, verification is not something that gets imposed after the fact of substantive negotiation.

Finally, it should be observed that the easiest verification regime to develop is one directed at elimination rather than reduction. The elimination of either SLCMs or tactical naval nuclear weapons or both could provide ancillary benefits for naval planning. First it would help to ease the political problems presented by the "neither confirm nor deny" doctrine. These problems are being exploited in Soviet proposals for operational restraints and, in the changing security environment may well become more difficult. Second, since the justification for the
SLCM has been in part the effort to disperse attack capability to platforms other than the aircraft carrier because of the increased Soviet threat, the elimination of those weapons would then reinforce the continuing importance of the aircraft carrier battle group.

Ultimately the most challenging problem in any prospective U.S.-Soviet naval arms control negotiation, remains how to resolve the different roles that naval forces play in the respective national strategies of the two sides. Any arms control regime directed at Soviet concerns over U.S. naval forces in the European theater would be unacceptable if it restricted the ability of the U.S. Navy to meet broader United States security objectives. The U.S. must account for its global interests in terms of maritime power. That is as much a reality for U.S. military planners as continental land defense is for the Soviet Union. The maritime posture of the United States is not comparable to that of the Soviet Union. And that posture itself, as opposed to specific issues surrounding its application, should not be negotiable. It is already the case that in the next decade U.S. naval forces will certainly be reduced. The U.S. Navy will operate with fewer aircraft carriers, a smaller fleet and a diminished mission profile. But the maritime requirements of United States security represent a floor below which U.S. naval forces cannot go. That floor, however indeterminate it may be, is considerably above the point at which the Soviet Union would like to see those forces.
Conclusion

Although the international politics of arms control has not been considered to be the Navy's business, institutional reality today suggests that this is an unwise course. If the trend toward the disaggregation of U.S.-Soviet security issues continues, then naval arms control will occupy an increasingly prominent place. At this point, there has been no sign of lessening Soviet interest in this subject, while there have been signs of mounting political interest both within Europe and the United States and of increased attention from security specialists and naval professionals as well.34

The climate of strategic development and concern in the United States is clearly changing. In the absence of an articulated alternative to the Maritime Strategy, the capacity to keep naval issues isolated from the general framework of arms control negotiations will be come more difficult. Consequently, the Navy is likely to become the object rather than subject of arms control. The relevant question, then, is not whether there will be naval arms control, but rather what course it will take and who will determine the outcome.

So far the Navy's position has been to "stonewall."35 This position is defended by the inappropriateness of arms control in the maritime arena, the inequitability of Soviet proposals and continuing support from the political leadership. The advantage of "stonewalling" is that the passage of events may simply obviate the basis for a negotiated security regime altogether. That is,
arms control will not be necessary if there is no reasonable basis for the Soviet Union to sustain its military posture and the international setting becomes manageable because of the resultant absence of a credible threat of war. Arms control under those circumstances would then be unnecessary. However, again, the likelihood of this outcome within a reasonable length of time compared to the mounting pressures to negotiate naval issues is low.

This position is becoming untenable in the face of the changes occurring in the international and domestic political environments. First, in the absence of a maritime strategy that conforms to the realities of the emerging international situation, the rationale behind "stonewalling" will increasingly appear to be predicated on conditions that do not obtain. Based on that defense, the arguments presented by the Navy against arms control will become more and more vulnerable. Continuing espousal of the need for U.S. "maritime superiority" in what is emerging as a arena of substantially reduced threat may be stated as a reason for, not a defense against, naval arms control. Second, as a consequence, the agenda for naval arms control will become more, not less subject to the political process. Recent Senate Hearings seem to reinforce that prognosis. There is a risk that the naval arms control agenda will be determined elsewhere with little or no participation by naval professionals. Finally, an objective assessment of the limited range of negotiable options indicates that the position of the U.S. Navy in potential negotiation is advantageous. There is
not as much to lose as might appear.

That position suggests that the Navy has two options that offer a more constructive approach to arms control. One is to seize the initiative with regard to "soft issues." By scheduling annual meetings of senior naval officials of the two sides, for example, to discuss issues of common concern no commitment would be made to negotiate. The Navy has expressed repeatedly that, even by discussing naval arms control, it fears finding itself on the "slippery slope" of negotiations and thereby without control over the determination of its force structure and its employment. As noted above, however, exactly the opposite could be argued. The advantages of this approach would be two. First, it would provide demonstrable evidence that the Navy is not obstinate with regard to reasonable issues of the U.S.-Soviet naval balance. Second, it would provide a mechanism to take advantage of the "Navy-to-Navy" framework for discussions. In effect it would co-opt the Soviet Navy, likely to be responsive as an institution to the nature of naval issues, into a framework that would at worst provide access to the naval arms control agenda.

A second, more challenging option is to address the limited range of "hard issues" of naval arms control--sea-launched cruise missiles, tactical naval nuclear weapons, attack submarines and related force questions. The implied disadvantage for the Navy would be the loss of control of naval issues to broader political concerns. That is a risk, however, that the situation already presents. Economic constraints, the absence of a clear national
Regardless of the cause of validity of that uncertainty, the prospect of naval arms control, and not the reverse, in a period of strategic uncertainty maritime power cannot be overstated; efforts for naval arms control, and not the reverse. In a period of strategic uncertainty, that strategy should guide the approach to the negotiations. The operative questions are really just two. First, what is the U.S. Navy willing to change in order to accomplish it? Second, what does the U.S. Navy want the Soviet Navy to change? Negotiation, the operative questions are really just two. First, not, and neither other have over the substance of issues would again give the Navy a measure of control that it does not, and neither other have over the substance of issues that such occurrence is likely. Approaching the hard strategy and the rapidly changing international environment already presents a challenge to the naval planners. As the extremely limited experience of the interwar naval arms agreements clearly demonstrated, arms control is not an effective instrument to shape strategy; indeed, it is a constraint on strategic development. Therefore, it is a constraint on strategic development. The prospect of naval arms control, however limited, presents only limited choices for negotiation.
Notes:


2. In May 1990, the Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense of the Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on naval arms control that included appearances by Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, military advisor to Gorbachev and consistent advocate of naval arms control as well as the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.


4. See, for example: Golightly, p. 122 ("the naval rams control genie is not likely to stay in its bottle . . . ."); and Eberle, p. 76 ("Now is the time to start.").


8. Ibid.


10. A common reference for Soviet military spokesmen is a statement by Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Yazov. In political terms he reiterated Gorbachev's position that "reasonable sufficiency" meant that, while not seeking military supremacy, neither would it "tolerate someone else's" nor "accept less security." In military terms, he stated that: "The decisive factor... is the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO." He defined sufficiency for strategic forces as "not permitting an unpunished attack with nuclear weapons under any circumstances" and for conventional forces as "a quantity and quality that reliably guarantees the peaceful work of the Soviet people and the... collective defense of the socialist community." Pravda, February 8, 1988.

11. It is also worth noting that, although responding to international and domestic political influences, the interwar naval agreements did not conform to the long-term strategic requirements of any of the parties. They constituted an obstacle to strategic and operational planning and ultimately failed because none of the parties was able to meet its security objectives within the constraints that the agreements imposed.


17. There is an illogic to this position. If the Soviet Union is not going to commit to nuclear war, then it seems unlikely that its planners would jeopardize that decision by attempting to use nuclear weapons only at sea. If they have decided to use nuclear weapons then it is unlikely that they would restrict their use to the maritime battle or be deterred simply because there are sea-borne nuclear weapons capable of striking land targets.

18. Articulation of the Maritime Strategy has consistently included as one of its objectives the ability "to deny an opponent the option of a single-theater strategy in a global war" (Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s," p. 99), meaning that the Pacific theater would also be subject to the same provisions. This posture engages long-standing Soviet concern for a two-front conflict, presumably as a further deterrent.


21. Ibid., p. 100.


"... what does defensive mean? Some people understand this simply and primitively. They consider that once we adopted such a doctrine then we ought to be passive, to defend ourselves should a conflict break out in the depths of our territory. But contemporary war--whether on land, sea or in the air--is a war of maneuver. How can a warship fight today "sitting in trenches?" A submarine ought to find the enemy and destroy him. The aim of a surface ship consists of delivering missile attacks on the opponent without waiting until he enters our territorial waters."
24. A number of the proposals in this category have historical antecedents in Soviet policy development. Under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev the Soviet Union periodically interjected calls for the control of naval operations into the political and strategic negotiations with the United States. Khrushchev sought to limit naval activity in the Middle East in 1957 and proposed a nuclear-free Mediterranean in 1963. (See: Barry M. Blechman, The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities, (Washington, DC: 1975), pp. 39-41.) On several occasions Brezhnev sought mutual limitations on naval forces in both the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and, in 1982, suggested a more general "mutual limit on the operations of naval fleets" (Pravda, March 17, 1982).


26. The proposals for the Pacific were presented at Vladivostok in July 1986 (followed up by an interview with the Indonesian journal Merdeka) and repeated at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988 and Beijing in May 1989; the Indian Ocean proposals (a long-standing Soviet posture) were stated by Gorbachev at New Delhi in November 1986 and again repeated at Krasnoyarsk; and the Mediterranean proposals were presented in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in March 1988 and in Rome in November 1989; the Arctic proposals were delivered in Murmansk in October 1987.


28. While not effective as a large-scale prompt counterforce strike due to the lengthy flight times, the SLCM is capable of surprise attack. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze emphasized this concern at the 1989 Vienna meeting that preceded commencement of the CFE Talks (Pravda, March 7, 1989):

"As ships are equipped with long-range cruise missiles, which can perform strategic tasks even though conventionally armed, attack capabilities of naval fleets will be even more powerful than they are now. Surface ships and submarines are becoming ideal offensive weapons, best fit for surprise attack."


32. Although carefully identified as a personal view, Marshal Akhромеев suggested that the Soviet Union may be willing to consider reductions in maritime air-strike forces. Sergei Akhромеев, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 8, 1990.


35. Trost, "A Case for Stonewalling."
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