MONGOLIA FACES GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is based primarily on impressions and information gathered firsthand on a visit to the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) during the period 15-24 June 1989. I accompanied a group sponsored by the California Academy of Sciences as study leader. The group came to Ulan Bator by direct flight from Moscow and departed from Mongolia via Irkutsk, where we boarded the Transsiberian railroad to Khabarovsk and then flew to Japan. The time spent in the MPR included five days in Ulan Bator, the capital, and four in the countryside, including extensive excursions in the South Gobi.

Mongolia has been open to Western visitors for some time but still receives relatively few. The Zhuulchin (Mongolian Intourist) Director of Operations in Ulan Bator told me that the country was scheduled to receive 12,000 group tourists—from both communist countries and the West, including Japan—in 1989; of these about 400 were expected to be
from the United States. Still terra incognita for most Americans, the
country will no doubt soon become better known as a result of the
establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of a U.S. embassy
in Ulan Bator. The Mongols are eager to inaugurate educational and
cultural exchanges, increase trade, and gain access to American
technology.

Mongols are acutely aware of their strategic location between the
Soviet Union and China. They have never forgotten that they are Asians
and that several centuries ago they dominated the Eurasian continent,
ruling both China and Russia. Since the establishment of the MPR in the
wake of World War I in what had come to be known as Outer Mongolia,
Mongol communist leaders have always been acutely sensitive and
responsive to political developments in Moscow; otherwise they have not
remained in power for long.

This habit of sensitivity to Soviet developments appears to have
made it almost inevitable that some Mongols would want to please Mikhail
Gorbachev by demonstrating that they could implement glasnost and engage
in perestroika, too. The process was made easier by the replacement of
Yumjagyn Tsedenbal, who had dominated Mongolia for an unbroken 32 years,
by a new leader, Jambyn Batmonh, in 1984. Batmonh rose as a Tsedenbal
lieutenant, so the break was not sharp. The blossoming of new
thinking in Mongolia seems to have picked up momentum only after the
visit of one of Gorbachev's closest associates, Alexander Yakovlev, in
March 1988. Many Mongols had their own reasons for welcoming change,
just as some party members had, and apparently still have, grounds for
fearing it.

The necessity for perestroika was underscored by a major strategic
development: Moscow's announcement in the first week of February 1987

1A full account of the reasons for the change has yet to be given.
Tsedenbal, who had a Russian wife, remained in Moscow and returned to
Mongolia, unannounced, only in October 1988. (U.S. Federal Broadcast
Information Service, FBIS-EAS-88-224) Batmonh gave him brief, rather
equivocal mention in a review of Mongol history at a party plenum in
December 1988, noting that Tsedenbal's activities were "tied both to our
successes and achievements, and to the main shortcomings and omissions."
(FBIS-EAS-89-110-S, p. 13)
that it would withdraw a substantial portion of the up to 70,000 troops it had long maintained in the MPR.\(^2\) This was the beginning of a process of meeting one of China's demands for fundamental improvement in relations between the two communist superpowers. Withdrawals do not seem to have begun on a large scale until the spring of 1989, about the time of Gorbachev's historic visit to Peking. Some 50,000 Soviet troops are scheduled to leave Mongolia by the end of 1990.\(^3\) Mongolia has also announced that it is reducing the size of its own armed forces.\(^4\)

Reduction of Soviet military presence in Mongolia opens up several basic issues in the MPR-USSR relationship. Mongolia has long been acclaimed by Moscow as a model satellite and a successful example of the application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the transformation of a backward country.\(^5\) Visually I found it more prosperous looking and more orderly than neighboring portions of Siberia. Whatever the actual degree of success Moscow has had in guiding Mongolian communists in constructing a new society, the MPR must now go through major political and economic adjustments that could prove traumatic. I offer further speculation on these prospects in the final section of this essay.

I had studied the classical Mongolian language and the country's history in 1949-1950 as a graduate student at Harvard. I refreshed my knowledge in preparation for visiting the country. I also did a great deal of reading on contemporary developments, surveying recent scholarly writing and reviewing both the relatively scanty news reporting and the extensive coverage the U.S. Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) provides of Mongolian press and radio broadcasting. I have drawn on these sources, as well as on conversations with Mongols


\(^3\)FBIS-EAS-89-093.

\(^4\)A Mongolian army veteran was quoted in the press as declaring: "It is senseless for such an economically weak country as Mongolia to maintain such armed forces as it does now. The released... manpower should be instead used for combating crime." (FBIS-EAS-89-029)

and foreigners in Mongolia, in putting this paper together. In addition to describing Mongolia as it appears today, I try to evaluate current trends and point to possible future developments.

FLYING IN

The most practical way to get to Ulan Bator is by air from Moscow; Aeroflot TU-154s fly the route three times a week. Mongolia announced the beginning of its own regular air connection to Peking in May 1988, but flights are less frequent and in the smaller Antonov-24.⁶ There are weekly trains to Peking and more frequent rail connections to Siberia. Our group's flight from Moscow was a good one; what follows is an account of it that I wrote at the time:

Russian days are at their longest in mid-June. The sun is still shining brightly as our Aeroflot TU-154 takes off from Sheremetyevo at 8 in the evening. As we speed eastward the sun stays behind over European Russia and we cross the Urals into Siberia in purple dusk. A strip of red dusk lingers on the northwestern horizon and the broad winding Siberian rivers below us--the Ob and the Irtysh--reflect a pale pinkish light. As darkness settles in, the landscape is dotted with great bursts of flame--gas being flared off the West Siberian oilfields. We land at Novosibirsk, disembark and march into a special foreigners' lounge of the terminal, where trays of cold drinks (all nonalcoholic) and racks of propaganda pamphlets are ready for us. The latest features Gorbachev's visit to West Germany.

Back on the plane we fly into the sunrise and cross the Tuvinian ASSR. It was the "independent" People's Republic of Tannu Tuva before Stalin "annexed" it in 1944. Originally called Uriangkhai, it was old Mongol territory that Chinese emperors claimed as part of their dominions. We look down on thickly forested mountains and a river making its way through a deep valley; it must be the upper course of the Siberian Yenisei. We pass the Mongolian border. The bright sun of the new day shines back blindingly off the surface of an immense lake: Khobsogol, the largest and deepest in Mongolia. We

⁶FBIS-EAS-88-092. Educated young Mongols as well as tourism officials talk enthusiastically of direct flights to Japan, but no plans have been announced, though Mongolia has accepted Japan's offer to expand cultural exchange to include scholars, teachers, and students. (FBIS-EAS-89-120)
begin to descend over the valley of the Orkhon, the ancient home of the Turks, and come in for a smooth landing at Ulan Bator's Buyant Ukhaa (Lucky Field) airport among intensely green hills. Beyond we catch a glimpse of the sprawling city with its staggered rows of white apartment buildings.

I am reminded of flying into Ankara in the mid-1950s, when the Turkish capital, likewise a new city built around an age-old core, had only a few hundred thousand people. It nestled among grassy hills and the air was clean. Ulan Bator's air is also crystal clear in the summer but people complain that winter brings heavy pollution from the two coal-fired heating plants, whose huge chimneys rise high above all other structures in the city. Environmental issues are now being given some weight in Mongolia too. The government recently announced that one of these plants will be closed down in 1990 and rebuilt outside the city.

By the airport clock it is 7:30 a.m., five hours ahead of Moscow. The terminal is clean. Signs are in English as well as Mongolian. Officials smile. They include an attractive uniformed lady. The atmosphere is noticeably more relaxed than in Moscow, though security and customs forms and procedures are an exact duplicate of those the Soviets use. In my first half hour in Mongolia I think I sense an air of pride and independence. How real is it?

A Zhuulchin pamphlet, Welcome to Mongolia, describes the Mongolian People's Republic as the "cradle of ancient Mongols located in the heart of Central Asia...the second socialist state in the world." These simple statements sum up an enormous amount of colorful, controversial, and tragic history. A group led by Buddhist clerics declared Mongolia's independence from the crumbling Chinese empire in 1911. Many Mongols who thought about their future were at that time already more impressed by Japan, in light of its defeat of Russia in 1905, than by either China or Russia, but there was no escaping geography. Lenin, keen "to set the East ablaze" and preserve as much of the Russian empire and its outlying areas of influence as possible, was determined to take no chances on losing Mongolia. With very slender resources to work with, Bolshevik agents engineered a "people's revolution" in 1921.\footnote{Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1955.}
MOSCOW'S OLDEST SATELLITE

Motivated by a combination of traditional Russian imperial concerns and communist zeal, these Bolsheviks locked Outer Mongolia into a relationship that in many ways resembled that of a Soviet Union republic. The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) was set up in 1921 and the Mongolian People's Republic was officially proclaimed in 1924. Mongolian history has paralleled Soviet history ever since. Each sharp policy turn in the Soviet Union has been reflected with remarkable consistency in Mongolia. Some Mongolian changes even preceded those in the Soviet Union. For example, Sukhe Bator, the so-called Lenin of Mongolia, died early in 1923, almost a year before Lenin did. His successor, Horlogin Choibalsan, died in 1952, Stalin in 1953.

Whether by design or otherwise, Mongolia's experience in Sovietization anticipated the ordeals through which most of the countries of Eastern Europe passed as they were communized after World War II. Remarkable similarities can be found between what happened in the MPR at various stages of its evolution and what has happened, or been attempted, in recent years in countries as varied as North Korea, Vietnam, and Ethiopia. The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was the first Third World Marxist-Leninist vanguard party (MLVP). Its history of purges and changes of course includes every feature of the vicissitudes other Third World MLVPs have experienced in the past 30 years.¹

A case can be made that Soviet handling of the MPR—the attempt to build a Third World socialist state—has been more successful (i.e., has produced more impressive results for the USSR) than Moscow's efforts to mold the countries of Eastern Europe into "developed socialist" states, or the attempts Moscow-faithful African and Asian leaders have made to rebuild their societies according to Marxist prescriptions. Even in the era of glasnost and perestroika, Mongolia remains essentially loyal to Moscow.

Mongolia has gained more visible benefits from its status than have other "people's democracies." It is still said to receive over $800 million annually in Soviet aid. On a per capita basis--$400 per inhabitant--this puts it only slightly behind Cuba. There are fewer strains evident than in any other Soviet relationship with an allied Marxist-Leninist state, fewer strains in fact than Moscow is experiencing with several if its own union and autonomous republics--e.g., the Baltics, Moldavia, Armenia, or Georgia, let alone Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia. Why is this? Will internal developments in Mongolia continue to remain so favorable to Moscow's interests? What are Mongols thinking and doing?

ULAN BATOR

Bookstores in the capital sell a large picture-map of "The Capital of Mongolia at the Beginning of the XX Century." Except for the Tola River and the surrounding mountains, it is hard to match it to the modern city. Old Urga consisted of three separate parts, a Mongol settlement, a Chinese trading city, and a Russian-style administrative and residential area. Modern Ulan Bator (Red Hero)--the name was changed in 1924--has merged into a single sprawling city with over 500,000 inhabitants, a quarter of the population of the huge, thinly inhabited country (604,103 square miles). Main avenues are asphalted and broad enough to accommodate ten times the traffic they bear. There has been a great deal of tree-planting, mostly cottonwood poplars. As in Siberian cities, their fluffy seed piles up like snow along curbs in June.

Perhaps as much as one third of the Mongol capital's population still lives in yurts.9 Lashed onto wooden or concrete platforms, they are concentrated in huge fenced-off sectors on all sides of the city. Wooden fences are painted rust, blue, and green. Electric lines lead into these areas. TV antennae are common. Piped water is supplied at water points. Outhouses provide for waste disposal and wooden sheds for

9Yurt is a Turkic word meaning home; the Mongols call their round, domed tent a ger.
storage. Roadways are broad and dusty but clean. Peering through a gate ornamented with a bright traditional design, I spotted a shiny new Zhiguli automobile parked beside its owner's yurt. Others had motorcycles.

Some Mongols consider yurts a shameful survival of old-fashioned ways and apologize for them—they have been imbued with the notion that modern "socialists" should live in apartment blocks. Many, however, cling to yurt life because they find it more congenial and like the yurt's snugness in the harsh winters, when a central pot-bellied stove supplies ample warmth.

Huge apartment blocks painted white, cream, and occasionally pale blue, sometimes decorated with frescos and tile mosaics, now house two-thirds of the city's people. Most of these apartments appear to be of higher quality than comparable housing in the USSR. The center of the city is filled with multistoried, solid, imposing buildings housing ministries, offices, institutes, museums, theaters, and the university. Russian influence is apparent in most of them. A rather elegant classical style was popular in the Stalin/Choibalsan era with colonnaded porticos and plastered facades painted in subdued red, gold, gray or green. More recently modern functionalism has prevailed in a Children's Palace, an exhibition hall, and a circular theater modeled on the new Moscow circus.

The only significant old buildings which survive are the palace complex of the Bogdo Gegen (the Mongol religious leader whose status was comparable to that of the Dalai Lama in Tibet), the Gandan Monastery, and another former monastery which serves as an antireligious museum. I did not see a great deal of new construction in Ulan Bator, but one large complex on the west side of Revolution Square cannot fail to attract the visitor's attention. Said to be a cultural center, its tower will be the tallest building in the center of the city. There are several sections to the complex, but the most striking feature is the tower, which combines modern and indigenous styles, adapting many architectural features of traditional monastic buildings.
Just as Lenin's severe red granite tomb dominates Red Square in Moscow, an angular modern tomb in red and black granite dominates one side of Ulan Bator's huge central square. The tomb contains the remains of Sukhe Bator. He is doubly honored with a heroic statue in the center of the square. Officially, Sukhe Bator played the unique catalytic role in the Mongolian revolution that Lenin played in Russia, but he remains a shadowy figure. He died in February 1923 at the age of 30, poisoned, his official biography claims, by the Bogdo Gegen, who served as the nominal head of state of Mongolia until his own death the next year.10

Most of the others who were associated with Sukhe Bator during the early days of the establishment of People's Mongolia were erased from the country's official history—with one exception: Choibalsan, the Stalin of Mongolia. He had his ups and downs in the 1930s, but ended up doing in most of his associates and ruled as Moscow's satrap until his own death in 1952. A city in eastern Mongolia still bears his name, and his statue still stands in front of MPRP headquarters in the capital. When I stopped to photograph it, my Mongol escort observed that it was a good idea, for it might not be there next year. The advent of glasnost has made Choibalsan a legitimate and convenient target for criticism, but the party leadership does not yet seem to have decided how far the process is to go in spite of the fact that current Party Chairman Batmonh declared in a lengthy report in December 1988 in which he began by equating Choibalsan to Stalin:

It is simply impossible to recount everything. I shall cite just one fact. After the 9th Party Congress in 1934 11 people were elected to the Party's Central Committee Presidium. By 1940 Choibalsan was the sole survivor.11

Minister of Public Security Major General Jamsranjab included more specifics on Choibalsan in an interview printed in Unen (the Mongolian Pravda) during the same month:

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Choibalsan was simultaneously a member of the [party] Presidium, first deputy prime minister, minister of war, commander in chief of the armed forces, minister of internal affairs, adopted the title of marshal and had himself referred to as "esteemed leader." Having concentrated enormous power in his hands, Choibalsan...began the mass annihilation of cadres...and in subsequent years spread the repressions to thousands of completely innocent citizens. Even people loyal to Choibalsan squealed on one another and were destroyed.12

Sukhe Bator still seems to be as necessary for Mongolian revolutionary mythology as Gorbachev feels Lenin to be for that of the Soviet Union. If some Mongols are beginning to question his role—as has begun to happen with Lenin in the Soviet Union—they are not yet publicizing their thoughts or sharing them with foreigners.

Unlike the modern history sections of most museums in Soviet Central Asia, which are blocked by barriers with signs such as "Closed for Repairs," the architecturally ultramodern Museum of the Mongolian revolution is still very much in business. Platoons of school children were being taken through on tour when we visited it late one morning. It is technically more modern in its arrangements than the capital's Natural History and Fine Arts museums, but its exhibits are going to need a good deal of "repair and reorganization" when Mongols finally feel free to begin filling in the enormous blank spots in their post-1920 history.13

Not far from the imposing brick-red opera house with its portrait of Lenin, a large statue of Joseph Stalin occupies a high pedestal in front of Ulan Bator's main library. Conversation with a Mongol intellectual:

"So Stalin is still favorably regarded here?" I ask.

"There is a debate about him among us. We recognize that he made a great many mistakes and that most Russians think that

12FBIS-89-057.
13For a measure of how extensive these blank spots are, see Charles R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1968, esp. Ch. 7 and 8.
he did damage to their country. But some people here say that he did no great harm to Mongolia. He protected Mongolia and helped us build up the country. So why should we take down his statue?"

"It raises questions about perestroika here--is Mongolia really serious about it? When you leave a statue like this in a prominent place in your capital visitors get the impression your leaders do not really believe what they say and are simply trying to flatter Gorbachev. What would he say if he came here and saw it?"

"That is exactly what a visiting Russian asked me a few weeks ago."

"What did you say?"

"I told him our leaders would probably have it taken down the night before he arrived. You know, some of our journalists have spoken up about the statue. A few months ago one wrote an article in our leading paper arguing that the statue was an insult to Russian-Mongol friendship which should not depend on the record of Stalin and Choibalsan. He said both did people a lot of damage."14

ANOTHER SOVIET REPUBLIC?

When Mongolia applied for UN membership in 1946, the objection was raised that it was not really an independent country. China still claimed sovereignty but equally serious was the widespread belief in the West that it was just as much a Soviet republic as Azerbaijan or Tajikistan. The country finally gained UN membership fifteen years later, in 1961. Until then, only communist countries had embassies in Ulan Bator, the Soviet embassy in the center of the city not surprisingly being the most impressive.

Britain established an embassy in Ulan Bator in 1963 and began sending a few Mongols to study in England each year. Most of the Mongols who speak good English now tell you proudly that they studied in England, often at the University of Leeds. Japan maintains an embassy which is becoming increasingly active.

14See FBIS-EAS-88-227, "Journalist Demands Removal of Stalin Monuments."
The newest embassy is that of the United States, which opened for business in the first week of June 1989.\textsuperscript{15} It was not easy to find, for its two resident officers are working in a ground floor apartment in a residential district while they look for a permanent chancery. But they have been warmly welcomed by MPR officials and intellectuals, who are eager to expand trade and contacts, want English-language books on many subjects, and say they are eager to have Americans come to Mongolia as English teachers, and technicians.\textsuperscript{16} Might Mongolia be the next communist country, after Hungary, to welcome the U.S. Peace Corps?

Conversation with a young Mongol engineer wearing a University of Utah T-shirt:

"Have you been to Utah?"

"No, but I have hopes to go. You are American? You know Utah?"

His English is halting. I shift to Russian. "Yes I am American. I know Utah, but I do not live there."

"I am so happy to greet Americans here and talk to you. We want more Americans to come to Mongolia. Of course I speak Russian. It is easy for me, but you must excuse me. I do not want to speak Russian. My English is not so good, but I want to speak English with you because I study hard to learn it well."

"Where have you studied?"

"I was sent to Moscow for my professional education because I was one of the best students in my vocational high school.

\textsuperscript{15}The U.S. ambassador accredited to Mongolia, Richard L. Williams, presented his credentials to Mongolian leader Batmonh on 13 September 1988 and visited Ulan Bator again in early July 1989, but he remains resident in Washington. In light of the fact that the United States maintains resident ambassadors in many countries of less import for U.S. foreign relations and in some instances in a much less hospitable atmosphere than that which currently exists in Mongolia, the logic of this arrangement is not readily apparent.

\textsuperscript{16}Regarding trade expansion, Foreign Trade Minister Ochirbat proudly announced on returning from a trip to the UK and the United States in mid-July 1989 that Mongolia is now trading with "about 30" firms in Great Britain and the United States. (FBIS-EAS-89-142)
here. I had basic training in engineering in Moscow. I came back five years ago and got a good job here, but I am not satisfied with that. I need to know English to make progress in my field. I study it myself, from Russian books. It is valuable to know English because English opens the door to the most advanced technology in the world today."

"Can you get books to read in English?"

"Not enough. We need more books and journals from America. We will make very good use of them. America and Japan are the leaders in science and technology in the world. Mongolia needs closer contacts with your countries. The Russians have nothing more to teach us. If we stay tied to them, we will be backward like them."

"Are you having glasnost and perestroika here? How do the Russians feel about wider contacts for Mongolia? Are your leaders in favor of them?"

"Our leaders talk about change and about the mistakes of our former leaders. But they are not doing much. They keep the statue of Stalin. They are afraid to take down the statue of Choibalsan. They are afraid for their own positions if they move too fast or change too much. So they try to do what Gorbachev is doing but there is more talk than action. Many of us would like to see more action than talk."

"How do you expect things to develop?"

"Most Mongols are patient. It is hard to change things that have existed for more than 50 years. I understand that but I am not so patient. I do not want to wait forever. Mongolia is an Asian country. We are proud to be Asians. The Russians have not made us into Russians. Our leaders have to understand that too. If they do not work harder to develop contacts with Japan and America and India, and other Asian countries, we will see that new leaders replace them."

Though soldiers are departing, Russian advisers and technicians and their families are everywhere in Ulan Bator. There are said to be 20,000 of them in the country. Russian couples stroll in parks in the evening. During the day blond young women push baby carriages in residential areas that appear to be reserved for Russians.
Shops in the center of Ulan Bator were doing good business with young soldiers buying souvenirs and consumer goods before returning to the Soviet Union. There is more clothing for sale in Ulan Bator than in most Soviet cities, including good-quality locally made cashmere sweaters. Food is more plentiful than in Siberia, though in comparison to American or European shops—or even those of much of the Third World—the range is extremely limited.

Russians and Mongols mingle everywhere but the atmosphere is different from a Soviet republic. All the signs are in Mongolian. There are very few in Russian. Mongols are clearly in charge everywhere: police, officials, clerks in shops. Russian advisers stay in the background. Most appear to be mindful of Mongol feelings. Only in the Aeroflot office did I hear a Russian woman brusquely ordering Mongols around. All this is very different from Tashkent or Alma Ata, where the basic atmosphere and the attitudes of a majority of the resident Russians are still colonial.

THE MONGOL PAST

Until after World War II, the Mongolian language was written in its own distinctive alphabetic script, which had been in use with little change since the thirteenth century. In tandem with alphabet changes in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced in the late 1940s and classical spelling drastically altered. The Cyrillic alphabet has become well established and literacy in it appears to be widespread, but the old script has not died out.

In fact, the old script is experiencing a renaissance. Written from top to bottom, left to right, it is elegant and decorative. I was surprised to see it frequently used in gold in signs on public buildings. It is now taught in the 7th and 8th grades in schools, and a television series to enable adults to familiarize themselves with it has been announced for the fall of 1989.

I was happy to find the old script still in use and attempted to read the first signs I encountered. When I asked our Zhuulchin guide for confirmation of the correctness of what I read, he (a man in his early 40s) answered apologetically, "You know our old script better than I do. I cannot read it, but I am going to study it this winter and watch the television programs. Everybody is doing this."

Concern for the old language is only one facet of a vigorous and now quite overt interest in a revival of Mongolian culture and history, both ancient and recent. Mongolia experienced an even more disruptive and confusing process of distortion of its history during the Stalin/Choibalsan era than most ethnic republics in the Soviet Union.¹

Mongolian history is now to some degree open to revision, though Mongol scholars will probably be cautious, having gone through wrenching changes of party line in the past. The present leadership has endorsed open discussion and reexamination of past "mistakes" in history-writing, and Batmonh has called for the production of a new history of the MPR. Some Mongols are taking advantage of the opportunity to talk frankly about their recent history.

As early as the 1920s, Mongol communists had difficulty coming to terms with the legacy of Chinggis Khan; the Russians did not make it easy for them, for they were eager to stamp out all interest in Chinggis Khan among Buryat Mongols in the USSR. Soviet ideologues tried repeatedly to denigrate him or relegate him to a minor niche in history.

In 1962, however, a group of MPR scholars were given MPRP approval to celebrate the 800th anniversary of Chinggis Khan's birth. A monument was built at his birthplace in northeastern Mongolia. Commemorative celebrations, publications, and scholarly meetings were arranged and a special series of stamps honoring the anniversary was issued.

Then, at the end of the summer, the whole undertaking went into reverse, the publications were stopped, and the stamps withdrawn. Officials associated with the celebrations were disgraced and the next

year a large Soviet delegation, headed by a CPSU theoretician, came to Ulan Bator to reimpose a negative line.\(^{19}\) Just as Marshal Demid's mysterious death on the Transsiberian Railroad in 1937 appears to have been prompted by the Great Purges in the USSR and his connection with Tukhachevsky,\(^{20}\) the cancellation of the Chinggis Khan observances must have been a reflection of tensions generated by the Sino-Soviet split, for the Chinese communists were encouraging a Chinggis Khan cult among the Mongols of their Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region during this same period.\(^{21}\)

Mongol national feelings have gradually reasserted themselves, and the reemergence of Chinggis Khan now seems irreversible.\(^{22}\) The Chinggis Khan anniversary stamps are on sale in souvenir shops. Foreigners are unwise to make irreverent remarks about the twelfth-century conqueror in Mongolia today.

A section of the National Museum devoted to the origins and early history of the Mongol nation centers on Chinggis Khan. His battle standards and weapons are on display. Guides point to them with pride and call visitors' attention to the enormous cast-iron hub of a wheel from his war chariot. Paintings by Mongol artists recreate his battles, and giant portraits of his sons and grandsons dominate a succession of rooms depicting Mongol accomplishments in subsequent centuries. A proud curator lectures before a map of Mongol conquests:

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\text{You see that Mongol armies conquered China and Russia and ruled them for hundreds of years. The sons and grandsons of Chinggis Khan conquered Central Asia and Persia and extended their control into Asia Minor. The Golden Horde was also a}\]

\(^{19}\)See Bawden, op. cit., pp. 417-418.

\(^{20}\)Marshal Demid was commander-in-chief of Mongolia's armed forces. En route to Moscow, he died on the Transsiberian Express in August 1937. His death was attributed to food poisoning and his corpse was received with honor. In October 1937 Choibalsan "revealed" to the Party Central Committee that Demid had been part of a conspiracy supported by Japan dating back to 1932! For discussion of this affair, see Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 138-140; and Bawden, op. cit., pp. 336-342.


Mongol state. The Mongols of Central Asia went on to conquer India. There they were known as the Moguls--that simply means Mongols, you know--or did you? They developed a brilliant civilization there as they did in China from the time of Kubilai Khan onward.

The gift shop at the Hotel Bayangol sells a black scroll printed in gold with a portrait of Chinggis Khan at the top and provides a slip with an English translation of the patriotic poem that is lettered in the ancient script:

My sacred Lord--the great emperor born by the will of the lofty eternal blue sky:
Even were I to relax, let my powerful nation never be disunited,
Even were I to repose, let my nation firmly established ever be disturbed.
Let me myself retire if needs be, but the existing nation not be disunited.
Let me my whole self suffer if needs be, but my nation now united never be more troubled.

One reflects. It is indeed astonishing: pastoral nomads, riding out of the forest into the steppe and conquering much of the known world. Today there are only two million of them here in the Mongolian People's Republic and, at the very most, only two million more in China and the USSR. How many were there at the time of Chinggis Khan? It seems unlikely that they could have been any more numerous than they are now. Most of those who went out in Mongol armies must have been absorbed into the populations of the countries they conquered.

I remember a few years ago climbing down into the basement of the old mosque in Amasya, south of the Black Sea in north-central Turkey, and gazing at the fourteenth-century mummies of the Mongol rulers of that region preserved in glass-covered coffins. The features were distinctly oriental. It is hard to find any other trace of Mongols in Anatolia now.
After the Manchu conquest of China the Mongols fell into decline, failed to preserve a united state, and did not progress economically. This period, into the twentieth century, was long stressed by communists at the expense of all the rest of Mongol history and all the negative features of it exaggerated. A modern historian, Ser-Odjab, condemns this approach in no uncertain terms:

It is no secret that even today there are those who have not parted with the time-worn position of forever being ready to besmirch our own roots for the benefit of others. Self-criticism is not self-flagellation. I cannot understand why Asia is regarded as being cruder than Europe or why prerevolutionary Mongolia is seen as the most backward nation in Asia. How did we come to accept all this so mindlessly? The Mongolian state has been in existence for 2000 years. It was the Mongols who gave Europe many gifts, beginning with the stirrup. 1200 years ago we recorded on stone our own history in our own script. And Mongolia experienced a renaissance almost at the same time as Europe.23

ART AND RELIGION

I expected a heavy dose of socialist realism in the Fine Arts Museum in Ulan Bator, but found very little of it. The rooms are arranged in chronological order. Our visit was exciting for what it revealed about Mongol attitudes toward religion and history as well as art.

The first exhibits feature examples of very early stone grave monuments and inscriptions from the period when nomadic princes had their deeds inscribed in Turkic runes. Next come photographs and copies of the cave art of the Uigur empire, which flourished in what is now Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) in the eighth and ninth centuries AD.24 There were Nestorian Christians and Manicheans among the Uigurs but

24Some of the best of these paintings, books, and inscriptions were taken to Germany at the beginning of this century but remarkable examples of painting and sculpture can still be seen in Western China in the area of Turfan and in the Caves of the Thousand Buddhas at Dunhuang. Peter Hopkirk, Foreign Devils on the Silk Road, John Murray, London, 1980, provides a good account of the discovery and partial removal of these materials to Europe. The best of them in Germany were reproduced
their civilization was predominantly Buddhist and so is the art. Modern Mongols see their own civilization as deriving directly from this tradition.

When did Buddhism come to Mongolia itself? It was known, it seems, before the time of Chinggis Khan, but he was not a Buddhist and there is little evidence of Buddhism among the Mongols who rode into Russia. All of the Mongol successor states adopted Islam. Mongolia was beyond the edge of areas directly accessible to Islamic conquerors.

Buddhism became firmly established in Mongolia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It came directly from Tibet. The population embraced it enthusiastically. Tibetan Buddhist personal names, which are still widely used in Mongolia today, became popular during this period. Monasteries were established in both the desert and forest regions of the country and Urga became one of the major religious centers of the Buddhist world. The Living Buddha of Urga, whose reincarnation was regularly "discovered" in Tibet, gradually came to exercise a great deal of secular authority.25

By the early twentieth century, Lamaist Buddhism was a predominant element in Mongolia's culture and way of life. When Mongols declared their independence from China in 1911, they declared the Living Buddha of Urga, the Bogdo Gegen, their king. His palace compound and residence, filled with a remarkable collection of relics ranging from Buddhist scrolls to stuffed African animals, is now a popular place for both Mongols and foreign tourists to visit. Parts of it are currently undergoing careful restoration.

During the 1930s and 1940s the Soviets drove Mongolia's communist party to undertake a determined effort to eradicate Buddhism from the life of the country. Buddhism was blamed for every shortcoming in Mongolia's past. The severity and intensity of the effort rival any other similar campaign in the communist world, including the assault on

in a publication of the Metropolitan Museum, Along the Ancient Silk Routes: Central Asian Art from the West Berlin State Museums, New York, 1982.

Tibetan Buddhism which the Chinese launched during the Cultural Revolution. The aim was a state without religion, like contemporary Albania.

Hundreds of monasteries were closed and destroyed, their material wealth and their animal herds often turned over to newly established state and collective farms. More than 100,000 monks were forced into secular existence.\textsuperscript{26} By the end of World War II the Buddhist Church had visibly ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{27}

Someone saw to it, however, that the treasures of Buddhist art that Mongolia's monasteries had accumulated were not all destroyed. A splendid collection is now housed in several large halls in the Fine Arts Museum. Paintings on wood and canvas, embroideries on silk, sculpture in metal, stone, and wood, all in excellent condition, are displayed in large rooms with good light. Mongols, young and old, were viewing them with even keener interest than foreign visitors. Other sections of the Fine Arts Museum are devoted to other kinds of Mongol popular painting, including religious, secular, and historical themes.

Scenes of daily life reveal a distinct kinship with popular Buddhist art in other parts of Asia. This type of painting is called zurag. "The traditions of Mongol zurag were neglected in the years of stagnation," an article in the English-language bimonthly Mongolia of Spring 1989 declares, "however it is not too late to correct this mistake." Correction of the mistake seems to have begun some time ago, for the MPR State Publishing House in 1986 issued a carefully prepared, lavishly illustrated volume entitled \textit{Development of the Mongolian National Style Painting "Mongol Zurag."} Over half its color plates are devoted to religious themes. It sells for $25 in Ulan Bator's equivalent of the Soviet \textit{Beriozka} shops.

\textsuperscript{26}Bawden, op. cit., pp. 359-373.

\textsuperscript{27}Batmonh condemned these actions as "distortions of revolutionary legality" in his December 1988 plenum speech: "...the spread of the personality cult of H. Choibalsan led to such tragic consequences as mass unfounded repressions of innocent party, state, military, cultural, and economic cadres and of ordinary citizens and lamas and believers; the demolition of monasteries, which were considered to be centers of counterrevolutionary forces; and the destruction of our priceless cultural heritage." (FBIS-EAS-89-110-S, pp. 31-32)
Has all this been done only to impress foreigners? Hardly; the motivation seems to be the same as in the Soviet Union, where books on religious art and architecture, encouraged in gingerly fashion by the state for a long time and justified as cultural history and a means of earning foreign exchange from tourists, can now be seen—whatever the communist bureaucracy originally intended—to be an expression of genuine and widespread popular interest in religion itself.

Religion in Mongolia is far from dead. It is experiencing a resurgence. Soviet policy following World War II, when Mongolia (like the Buryat Mongols of the USSR) was permitted to play a carefully contrived and controlled role in communist efforts to entice Buddhists in other Asian countries to support "peace" movements and initiatives, provided a framework within which a single major religious establishment, the Gandan Monastery in Ulan Bator, could undergo reactivation. It is the official residence of the Hamba-Lama, who holds the title of Head of the Buddhist Church of Mongolia and is President of the Asiatic Buddhist Peace Conference.

Two visits to this monastery on separate days at different hours demonstrated that it has become much more than a showplace maintained for foreign Buddhists and tourists. Three temples are in operation, with daily services. The red- and orange-robed monks include many young men as well as graying oldsters.

Mongols of all ages frequent the monastery, participating in the endless prayer services, bathing in the smoke of incense from shrines in courtyards, chatting with monks, queuing up at a sales window to buy incense to take home and grain to feed the myriads of pigeons who flutter around the courtyards. I watched young boys as well as old men spinning prayer wheels, and young couples writing prayers on slips of paper and dropping them onto charcoal braziers to be consumed and sent to heaven.

28 Izvestia in Moscow featured an interview with him on 19 June 1987, "The Most Valuable Thing on Earth Is Life."
Dress was as varied as age. Families in smoky brown homespun and well-worn leather boots with turned-up toes--apparently in from the country--sat under shade trees watching shapely young ladies in stretch pants and flaming pink blouses ambling by. Old women in colorful traditional silk dels helped grandchildren in bright modern clothes feed the birds.

Important stupas and statues of Buddhas are equipped with a row of slightly inclined cement platforms in front for the use of those who wish to kneel and prostrate themselves. Both men and women were making good use of them. Little in the way of religious literature seemed to be available, though inside the temples officiating monks read prayers from splendid block-printed, wood-covered volumes while others read responses from Tibetan script in their neatly written notebooks. Painting and repairs were under way on walls and several buildings in the monastery compound.

We drove out to Manzhir in the pine-forested Bogdo-Ola range south of Ulan Bator to visit the ruins of a monastery destroyed in the antireligious frenzy of the 1930s. As we arrived in the high mountain basin where the monastery was situated, our guide gave a moving description of its former glory:

Look up among the rocks of the mountainside. You can see the ruined walls of the monastery buildings. They are the color of the earth now, brown, but the buildings used to be painted white. More that 1000 lamas once lived here. They prayed and studied and worked. The monastery had many valuable manuscripts, books, and paintings. It is very sad that everything was destroyed and the monks were driven away.

A modest museum has been built at the site. When we entered, the director brought us to a small window and urged us to look through. We saw the same rocky mountainside we had viewed on driving in but on it stood the monastery buildings gleaming white in the sun! It was a cleverly constructed diorama with a model of the monastery positioned outside the museum with the mountainside behind so as to give the impression--through the glass--that it had been fully restored. Ultimate intentions?
A well-worn path led to the ruins through meadows rich with clover, buttercups, and orange anemones. The area is a wildlife preserve and deer were grazing on the grassy slopes above the tree line. It is evident that the site of Manzhir is still felt to be holy. Several large boulders carry Tibetan inscriptions. On the slope above the ruins other rock outcroppings have carvings of Buddhas that are freshly painted in glowing colors. The next day I recognized a photograph of one of these carvings on a Zhuulchin poster with the inscription: "We invite you to Mongolia, a land of pristine natural beauty, unique culture and religion." Yes, religion!

In the south Gobi, we spent three days visiting sand dunes and a saxaul forest in the desert, climbing down a glacier into a gorge in the Gobi Altai, and viewing birds and wild animals and the site of Roy Chapman Andrews's dinosaur discoveries. The evening before we were scheduled to leave, I gave our cheerful driver a generous tip for his good service. He returned half an hour later and pressed a commemorative coin with a portrait of Karl Marx into my hand, then took a gold-painted statue of Buddha out of his pocket and placed it on top of the coin, and chuckled.

MONEY AND THE ECONOMY

In Leningrad and Moscow we had become accustomed to the troops of young Russians who gather outside hotels and tourist sites and press foreigners to change money or sell clothes. We were surprised to find that young Mongols are even keener unofficial money changers. It is a form of employment for the unemployed, who seem to constitute a sizable proportion of young males.

Mongolia's currency is called the tugrik and the subordinate unit the monge. No sooner had we boarded the airport bus into Ulan Bator than the baggage boys were offering six tugriks to the dollar. The official rate is T2.97/$1. But the baggage boys' rate, we soon discovered, was sheer robbery. By the end of our first day we had had

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29 The prevailing rate in June 1989 was 10 rubles to the dollar.
repeated encounters with the young men who swarm around the Bayangol Hotel offering to change money. Conversations often went something like this:

"You want to change money. I give you 10 tughriks for one dollar."

"No, thank you."

"I give you 15."

"But I don't need any money now. Maybe later."

"How about 20? I give you 20 for one dollar."

The foreigner turns to walk away, speeding up his pace: "I don't need any Mongolian money now."

The young man runs alongside him: "Look," he waves several 100 tughrik notes in his hand, "I need dollars--I give you 25 tughriks for one dollar, I give you 30, 35!"

I heard offers as high as 45 in Revolution Square. At this rate the black-market tughrik is essentially at parity with the black-market rate of the ruble—twelve to fifteen times less than the official rate. Mongolia seems to have an even livelier unofficial dollar economy than the USSR. Not only do hotel bars and dining rooms as well as government "duty-free" shops deal in dollars, street traders selling souvenirs accept only greenbacks. The same is true of artists selling their water colors, sand paintings, and occasional oils outside of museums and places of tourist interest. In the Hotel Bayangol's restaurant and bar, change was routinely made with U.S. coins.

But, like the USSR, Mongolia is no paradise for foreigners with hard currency, because hard-currency hotel and transport charges for foreigners are high, calculated at something close to the official exchange rate and, no matter how favorable the unofficial rate, there is practically nothing to be bought with tughriks, except postage stamps, occasional trinkets, and books. With very few exceptions books are only in Mongolian or Russian. The stamps are spectacular, colorful, varied,
and in triangular and diamond shapes as well as the more conventional ones.

Mongolia's problem of surplus currency in circulation is a miniature version of that of the Soviet Union. An article in the party daily Unen in March 1989 acknowledged that "the income of the population clearly exceeds the supply capability of the retail trade and paid services" and quoted a local economist as declaring: "If this situation continues, inflation will be unavoidable." It is an understatement.

Like the Soviet Union, Mongolia also has a serious problem of suppressed inflation. During the period 1983-1987, "dead" capital at the disposal of the public is said to have increased from 5 million to over 100 million tughriks.\(^{10}\) The problem is rapidly worsening and the authorities know it. They are trying to do exactly the same things the Soviets are trying to do: get a handle on the situation without devaluing or raising prices. The result is likely to be equally unsuccessful.

"Socialism" has had the not surprising effect of stifling initiative and resourcefulness in the most basic traditional sector of the Mongolian economy. Batmonh cited some earthy examples in his December 1988 report:

Insofar as everything was made the responsibility of the state, it became the rule rather than the exception to expect everything to be done for you.... Mongols always made the equipment and harnesses for their animals themselves. Now this art is being lost and, in some places, even forgotten. Recently there have even been cases where farms have asked that these things be supplied by the state.... On the other hand, there are some agricultural organizations which truly deserve support, for they demonstrate initiative and are now beginning to process skins, sew warm clothes, and produce various harnesses for animal husbandry purposes.\(^{31}\)

\(^{10}\)FBIS-EAS-89-055.
\(^{31}\)FBIS-EAS-89-110-S, p. 20.
The MPRP has announced measures which parallel almost all those that have been taken in the Soviet Union: encouragement of private cooperatives "to supply the population with consumer goods and foodstuffs and to improve public services and develop subsidiary farms...in order to help people effectively spend their leisure"; opening of markets where individuals may bring produce to sell, and encouragement of leasing arrangements to expand agriculture.

On our trip to Manzhir our guide called attention to areas in the countryside where people were cultivating or raising animals privately. It was apparent from the tone of his voice that after years of efforts to stamp out the very concept, the word private here, as throughout the communist world, has acquired an almost excitedly positive connotation.

HERDING AND AGRICULTURE

From ancient times the Mongols' principal occupation has been livestock raising. In 1930, a population only one third as large as at present was managing about 25 million head of camels, horses, yaks, cattle, sheep, and goats, and herds were increasing. Collectivization of herders, confiscation of the monasteries' herds, and their distribution to hastily formed "socialist" livestock-raising units reduced the country's livestock population to 16 million. Fifty years later, in spite of strenuous exertions and endless exhortations on the part of MPRP officialdom, the livestock loss has yet to be made up. Establishment of hay-cutting stations to provide winter feed and construction of shelters to protect animals from winter blizzards, up until recent decades often the cause of periodic mass losses, has merely kept herds stable.

\[^{12}\text{FBIS-EAS-88-062.}\]

\[^{13}\text{Completely accurate figures are difficult to obtain. The best summary of available sources is contained in Gerard M. Friters, \textit{Outer Mongolia and Its International Position}, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1949, p. 18.}\]
Unen reported in early 1988 that the country's livestock population had increased by a modest 95,700 head in 1987, to a total of 22,740,000. "Agrarian stagnation" has become a major preoccupation of the leadership. The problem is a classic one in "socialist" agriculture. Some 66,660 herdsmen's families belong to 225 cooperatives with an average of 70,000 head of animals per cooperative, one fifth of which are privately owned.

Herding families concentrate their attention on their private animals, live primarily off their milk, meat, and wool and earn enough from sale of animal products to buy available consumer goods. Camel herders' yurts we visited in the South Gobi were comfortably furnished and had sewing machines and radios. But the prices they receive give herders little incentive to do more. Memories of oppression of the most successful herders in the 1930s are still alive and serve as a disincentive for expanding and taking risks.

The party is now conducting a campaign to persuade herders to retain and raise young livestock (rather than slaughtering them for their own consumption or sale) and thus expand herds, but the outcome of this effort is problematic. An MPRP Central Committee official recently did samokritika and gave a frank analysis of some of the basic problems. Solutions prescribed are a carbon-copy of Gorbachev's approach in the USSR both in terms of language and substance:

[There has been] a discrepancy in the correlation of property and the owner. The cause of it lies in the administrative method of managing the herds. There are difficulties in the way out of this situation. The major way of ensuring production growth and bringing the owner and the product closer together is the leasing, contracting and renting method.

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34 FBIS-EAS-88-008.
35 FBIS-EAS-88-035.
36 FBIS-EAS-89-129.
Mongols traditionally were not cultivators. Ever since the 1930s a great deal of effort has been put into developing farms for raising grain and vegetables, all as government undertakings. Flying over the rolling grasslands of northern and central Mongolia, every now and then you see that the landscape below is marked by great squares and strips of plowed land, and even in the Gobi, where there are natural springs or in locations where water can be pumped, we saw fields planted with potatoes and tomatoes.

Agriculture is said now to provide 80 percent of the country's food supply and 90 percent of raw materials used for industry and to account for 50 percent of the country's exports. Some 832,000 hectares were said to be under cultivation in 1988. A target of one million tons of grain has been set for the near future. If state farms in Mongolia suffer from the same problems as their counterparts in the USSR and elsewhere in the communist world, this goal will take some time to materialize, but glasnost has permitted the problem to be defined and publicized. The party newspaper Unen declared in 1988 that increasing "the economic efficiency of grain production is the paramount task in today's conditions when the party is deciding the policy of renewing the economy and introducing a new form of economic management."  

HOW FAR WILL PERESTROIKA GO?

Flying out of Mongolia proved to be more difficult than flying in. The problem was not in Mongolia but in Irkutsk. Its airport has been undergoing a long, drawn-out reconstruction and usable runways were all muddy from recent heavy rain. Mongol Airlines' pilots are fearless and highly efficient at landing on the raw surface of the Gobi, but they cannot land on mud so we had to wait until Irkutsk had a couple of dry, sunny days.

37FBIS-EAS-89-129. Most of the rest of Mongolia's exports consist of minerals, particularly copper, produced at the giant Soviet-built mining and processing complex at Erdenet, said to be one of the 10 largest copper-smelting operations in the world.  
38FBIS-EAS-88-091.
As we flew over forested mountains still dotted with patches of melting snow and then descended over the southern end of Lake Baikal, I reviewed my impressions of Mongolia. The people had been extraordinarily warm and friendly, the country has an impressive physical infrastructure, and has made a good beginning at emerging from the cruelties and inanities of communism. A good deal of glasnost is evident in the press and in private talk and perestroika has begun, but people are cautious.

Mongols have begun to sort out their past and can again openly take pride in it. They are no longer locked into a tight Soviet grip. A broad cultural agreement has been concluded with Japan. Recent high-level official visits have provided a basis for broadening relations with India and China. Border trade with China is said to be expanding rapidly. Mongols talk about playing a role in Asia and want a share of the action in Pacific Rim affairs. The country faces no burdensome demographic or natural problems. So much for some of the positive factors.

But what is termed "command-administrative" communism has left a heavy burden that has only begun to be dealt with. For all the brutality it has experienced, Mongolia has benefited from steady economic largesse from the Soviet Union. The reduction of Soviet aid over the coming decade appears inevitable.

The withdrawal of a major portion of the troops the Soviets have maintained in the country is an economic mixed blessing. Soviet military installations have been a source of income and employment for Mongols and their existence has provided incentive for the Soviets to expand and maintain Mongolia's roads, utilities, and service facilities. The Soviets are pressing the Mongols to begin paying their own way.

Is present Mongol leadership going to be able to take advantage of the opportunities now open to the country? Can both the leaders and the population at large escape from habits of thought and action made routine by decades of Soviet paternalism? There are hopeful signs but the answer to this basic question cannot be expected soon.39

There is more glasnost and more talk of perestroika in Mongolia than in many of the hard-line Marxist-Leninist states--e.g. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, North Korea, Ethiopia, Cuba--but there also seems to be less popular push behind the changes that are taking place. Change is still coming mostly from the top and is a manifestation of an outlook that was forced down the throats and into the very bones of Mongol communist leaders from the 1920s onward by tight--brutal when necessary--Soviet management of their affairs.

Where else can one find a statement such as that made by Public Security Minister Jamsranjab this past summer in which he bemoans the lack of protest organizations in Mongolia and urges citizens to be more active in agitating and demonstrating?

Unlike in other socialist countries, there are no informal organizations in Mongolia. Public organizations should be more active and come out for making progress in the sphere of human rights.... Meetings with those people who earlier in January this year distributed leaflets in public places have shown that they were coming out for more intensive renewal of Mongolian society and were not anti-governmental groupings.40

40FBIS-EAS-89-10.