A ROUNDTABLE ON THE SOVIET UNION:
KUDA?, KOGDA?, S KEM?

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is a transcript from a meeting entitled "A Roundtable on the Soviet Union: Kuda? (where?), Kogda? (when?), S Kem? (with whom?)" that occurred at the 31st Annual Conference of the Western Social Science Association in Albuquerque, New Mexico on April 29, 1989. The first set of individuals presented papers; the second set participated in the discussion.

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II. ROUNDTABLE ON THE SOVIET UNION: KUDA?, KOGDA?, S KEM?

Donald Chenoweth

The headlines in major U.S. newspapers on April 26, 1989, read "Major Purge in Moscow Leadership Strengthens the Hand of Gorbachev," "Gorbachev Clears 110 Holdovers from Key Panel: List of Resignations Reads Like a Brezhnev-Era Who's Who," and "Gorbachev Expands Power in Central Committee Shakeup." It is intriguing how these headlines are interpreted.

The special plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) resulted in a reduction of the full (or voting) membership of the Central Committee from 301 to 251 members, of the candidate (or non-voting) positions from 158 to 110 members, and of the Central Audit Committee members from 83 to 71. These numbers came about from individuals who were promoted or simply dropped from the leadership and must be considered a massive change.

Mockingly referred to as "dead souls" both in Moscow and the West, and "elderly officials" according to the Dallas Morning News, the former members comprise 19.6% of the total top committee leadership. That is 24.6% of the voting members, 14.1% of non-voting members and 14.6% of the central audit members. Among those forced to resign were former top Communist Party officials of the Brezhnev old-guard, Andrei Gromyko, Mikhail Solomentsev, Nikolai Tikhonov, Vasilli Kuznetsov, Boris Ponomarev, Geidar Aliev, Vladimir Dolgikh, Sergei Sokolov, Karen Demirchan, and Kyamran Bagirov. In addition, nine senior military officials were also released including Viktor Kulikov and Nikolai Ogarkov. A New York Times editorial from April 27, 1989, in referring to the shakeup, commented that the removal of these hardliners from the Central Committee as "a startling demonstration of Mr. Gorbachev's power." However, Gorbachev's defense of the mass resignation is as follows: "Whenever personnel changes become necessary...they must be carried out without the slightest hesitation." This remark is striking in itself.

Partially replacing the full members are 24 former candidate members including the Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic, Yulii Kvitsinsky, the Central Committee's International Department Chief Valentin Falin, and three Vice Presidents of the Academy of Sciences, Yevgenii Velikov, Konstatin Frolov, and Valentin Koptyug. Yet, the action was not quite a complete victory for Gorbachev because only a new congress can elect Central Committee members. Thus, six newly-elected union republican fi...
secretaries (those for the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and for the non-Russian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) and an additional 88 first secretaries of local and regional party organizations will not be installed until the 28th CPSU Congress in 1991, unless an earlier meeting is called. Clearly, though, Gorbachev took one more major step toward, in his own words, "a very serious rearrangement of forces in the party and in society as a whole." This process is not complete.

The policy consequences of this turnover are not without controversy. Many of the speeches at the plenum were quite critical of Gorbachev and his closest advisers. For example, First Secretary of Komi Obkom Vladimir Melnikov, in suggesting that Mr. Gorbachev was out of touch with problems in the country because of his associates' work (specifically Yakovlev and Medvedev), said his aides were "clearly guarding the General Secretary from the severity of the situation." Also, the First Secretary of the Leningrad Obkom, Yuri Solovyev, states "there is no secret that things have gotten to the point where Communist Party members are openly speaking against the party, against its vanguard rule in society, calling for the transformation of the party from one of a party of action to one consisting of numerous clubs. On that fundamental position, our Central Committee is clear, precise, and public!"

Gorbachev did respond to these accusations in a number of very critical statements. He stated, "some have already gone as far as to say that both democracy and glasnost are very nearly a disaster and the fact that people have begun to act, that they no longer wish to remain silent, and insist on their demands, that this is a defect of perestroika. I, for one, comrades, see this as a success of perestroika." Indeed, there is a great deal of controversy within the party.

Even before the turnover announced on April 25, 1989, it was evident that more overwhelming personnel changes were occurring than after the accession to power of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Though information for oblast and superior first secretaryships during the pre-Gorbachev succession are not complete, it is clear that turnover was not as high as for the present period. Data for the 1957-1960 period following Khrushchev's rise shows 76 replacements, and for 1964-1967 immediately after the Brezhnev succession indicates 49 alterations. Yet, during the current period from 1985-1989, the figure rose to 118. The turnover is massive.

It is possible to overgeneralize from this data. Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine more detailed information concerning demographic and career characteristics of the Soviet leadership since the last years of the Brezhnev era. Comparing all Central Committee and Central Audit Committee members elected at the 26th Party Congress in 1981 and at the
27th Party Congress in 1986 yields a less than revolutionary pattern. The leadership at both congresses is remarkably similar with respect to distribution according to gender, nationality, educational level, occupations held, work location by Union Republics, and age. The differences lie in when party membership was conferred. For example, 36% in the post-Stalin era for 26th Congress leaders compared to 53% for the personnel elected at the 27th Congress.

It seems a fair conclusion that a younger, yet self-replicating generation is emerging. This generation is not significantly different, however, at least until the mass "resignations" of April 25, 1989. The current Soviet revision is taking place within the institutions as they change, and not to the outward characteristics of the personnel in the institutions.

A gradual evolution is taking place. Comparing those who first appeared in the leadership in 1981 to those who were removed that year, it is 28% and 23% respectively. This leads to the observation that a new, younger, less experienced generation, comprised of about one quarter of all those in top committee positions, is quite similar to the outgoing group in such significant areas as nationality, education, primary lifetime occupation, work location, and positions as party first secretaries.

Repeating the analysis for 1986 it is clear that what emerges is a significantly younger, more technically trained generation, less subject to Stalin-era influences, and this fact is even more apparent after the April 1989 plenum. For instance, at the 27th Party Congress, only 1% of new members were over 60 years of age, compared to 58% of those removed. Likewise, 46% of the new group were born before the Stalin era, while the figure for those removed was 94%.

If one is looking for the source of changes in specific institutions, change is more prominent in the full membership of the Central Committee than it was with respect to the Central Auditing Committee and candidate members of the Central Committee. Neither was a replica of the previous period of 1981, but they really were not different. That, in itself, is somewhat surprising.

In conclusion, an accurate view of the recent changes in Soviet Communist Party personnel reveals a very mixed picture, containing both inherent caution and apparent radical restructuring. Even the grand strategy for the Gorbachev purges can be debated. Gorbachev's desire for consolidation of power as a clear motivation is possible. Also, maintaining regional party turmoil could be a tool used to keep control at the center by the inability of the non-Moscow leadership to challenge Moscow. On the contrary, it could be seen in the best interest of the General Secretary, the Politburo, and the Secretariat to provide stability for the Soviet political system as a whole, and thus increase the chances of
perestroika, glasnost, and democratization to achieve apparent success, at least as perceived by the most important constituents in the USSR, the Soviet people. The extent of personnel turnover from the Politburo all the way down to the Raikom level at the 28th Party Congress in 1991 will help us to further identify Gorbachev's strategy.

Theodore Karasik

The September 30, 1988 Central Committee plenum represented a milestone in the reorganization of the Party apparatus. At this plenum, a new chapter began in how CPSU affairs are conducted according to the dictates of Gorbachev's political reform efforts. The creation of the six Central Committee Commissions and the reorganization of the Central Committee departments indicated Gorbachev's political strength at that time.

The roots of the reorganization originated in Gorbachev's report to the June 1988 19th Party Conference as he urged a reduction of the party apparatus and the industrial departments. Again, at the July 1988 Plenum, Gorbachev called for the complete relieving of the party apparatus of economic functions and to make it considerably smaller. The resolution from this plenum ordered the Politburo to work out a new structure for the apparatus of the Central Committee.

Thus the removal of the industrial departments began. Several heads of the departments were transferred such as Bobykin and Afonin to become first secretaries of important, industrially based oblasty while others were retired. However, the former head of the Central Committee Machine Building Department and Administrator of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NKAO), Arkadii Volsky, remains a mystery as to his position: He is still listed as a department chief (Zaveduiushchii otdelom), but of what department? Several possibilities exist: 1) Volsky is head of a nationalities department. This must be rejected as Volsky should be completely occupied with events in NKAO. 2) Volsky keeps the title of "Chief" because it is of rank, not office, similar to "General." 3) The Politburo is willing to give the title to important and special adhoc assignments. 4) Volsky is still head of the Machine Building Department and is partially responsible for the conversion of defense industries over to civilian use. Feodor Burlatsky commented recently that this last possibility is correct.

The commissions were formed at the September 30, 1988 plenum and the departments of the Central Committee were officially reduced from 20 to 8. The commissions are:
1) The Commission for Questions of Party Development and Cadres Policy

2) The Ideology Commission

3) The Commission for Questions of Socio-Economic Policy

4) The Commission for Agrarian Policy

5) The International Policy Commission

6) The Commission for Questions of Legal Policy

These commissions oversee the remaining eight departments. However, the creation of the commissions were not fully explained until the November 28, 1988 Central Committee plenum.

At the November 28, 1988 Central Committee plenum, a resolution transferred executive authority from the Secretariat to the Commissions and thus, the Secretariat became emasculated. For example, the only appearance to date of any Secretariat work is the condolence announcement of the death of Lev Zaikov’s son on April 5, 1989. The fact that the Secretariat does not meet anymore is confirmed by Gorbachev advisers Georgi Shaknazarov and Feodor Burlatsky, and also Boris Yeltsin in his Komsomol interview.

The resolution from the plenum also stated that the formation of the Commissions should be regarded as an important measure for restoring collective discussion and adopting of decisions within leading party bodies. It can be argued that the portfolios of the senior secretaries became too large: Each secretary, except for Zaikov, is now responsible for only one topic, with Ligachev the only secretary truly affected. (Prior to the reorganization, Ligachev’s portfolio included ideology, foreign affairs, economy, transportation, education, and cadres.) This point is dramatized by the fact that Izvestiia TsK #1 states that a Politburo session on September 8, 1988 discussed the decision to set up the commissions. Ligachev’s involvement in the Andreeva incident, his August 1988 statements on class struggle in foreign policy, and his continued boasting of leading the Secretariat and the party apparatus apparently played a role in the reorganization. Thus, the reorganization may be considered a strike against Ligachev’s power base in the Party hierarchy.
The membership of the commissions originally intended to facilitate the involvement of Central Committee members and candidate members in active work on major domestic and foreign policy initiatives. But the participation of the Central Committee members to date is short on substance as only those leaders who play vital roles in the regime or those commission chairmen on the republic level speak at the commission meetings. This may reflect the fact that the commission's roles are not fully defined. Although the resolution establishing the commissions stated that they would meet when required but not less often than once in three months, four of the six commissions met for the first time more than three months after they were created and two met twice in about one month.

The working sessions of the Central Committee commissions reveal that they are performing little work. However, the departments overseen by the chairman of the commissions indicates massive cadre renewal.

The Commission for Questions of Party Development and Cadres Policy, headed by Gorbachev associate Georgi Razumovsky, held its first meeting on February 28, 1989. Its meeting was organizational in content and prepared a future agenda. This agenda included: 1) Preparations for the 28th Congress; 2) Established that the results from the elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies will be used to build new cadres; 3) Destruction of the nomenklatura system; 4) Opposition to informal groups.

Razumovsky also oversees the commission on the republic level. Here, it is expected that the second secretary of each republic will head the commission. However, what is so unusual is that out of the eight second secretaries identified, five were appointed since the September plenum. These appointments may go against Ligachev's former policy of intrarepublic transfer—cadres are now promoted from within the republics' party apparatus and one is tied directly to Ryzhkov, O.I. Lobov, from Sverdlovsk.

Three Central Committee departments, the Party Organization and Cadre Building Department (POCBD), the General Department, and the Administrator of Affairs are subordinate to this Commission and are thus overseen by Razumovsky. The newly formed POCBD is what remains of the Organizational Party Work Department. Four out of the seven chiefs of the department changed. One appointment that deserves attention is the placement of a Zaikov protege from the Leningrad party apparatus, V.N. Krikhunov, as a deputy chief. Also, Razumovsky is the only Commission chairman to also head a department: Yet, Razumovsky is only a candidate member of the Politburo. It can be argued that one of the senior members of the leadership may be overseeing him and his superior might be Gorbachev. Also, the General Department and the Administrator of
Affairs also appear to be subordinate to Razumovsky since these departments are playing an active role in the elections, and their chiefs, V.I. Boldin and N.I. Kruchina respectively, sit on the commission. Personnel turnover is rare in these departments and Pavel Laptev, an important KGB functionary under Andropov, still retains his position as first deputy chief.

The Ideology Commission, headed by Soviet ideologist and Andropovite Vadim Medvedev, met on January 28, 1989, and was the first to do so. The commission set forth an agenda that included: 1) Comments on the role of informals; 2) The role of the mass media as defined by socialist legality.

On the republic level, the Ideology Commission is headed by the secretary of the republic responsible for ideology. Here, no surprises exist except in Uzbekistan where the first secretary, R.N. Nishanov, is chairman of the commission. This might be related to the Islamic revival in the republic. The meetings of the republican-level Ideology Commissions occur most frequently. Six meetings occurred so far at the republican level with the Armenian Ideology Commission releasing the most information on its work. Subjects such as the Nagorno-Karabakh, the problems of using Russian language, and the shutdown of an Armenian AES were addressed.

The Ideology Department contains the former Departments of Propaganda, Science and Education, and Culture. A.S. Kapto, the chief of the Ideology Department, revealed in an interview in Pravda on February 20, 1989 that six subdepartments were formed. These subdepartments mirror those departments previously absorbed: 1) Science and Research; 2) Party Propaganda; 3) Mass Media; 4) Foreign Information; 5) Training and Education; 6) Culture and Arts. Also, six out of eight officials were appointed with many of the new deputy chiefs coming from the dissolved departments appointed after 1987. In addition, the new First Deputy Chief of the department, A.Ya. Degtyarev, is a Zaikov protege from the Leningrad party apparatus.

The Commission for Questions of Socio-Economic Policy, headed by Nikolai Slyunkov, first met on March 19, 1989 and again on April 24, 1989. It discussed the issues of pensions, ecological matters, the implementation of economic reform, and how foreign economic relations should be conducted. The republic level commission is represented by secretaries who come from various departments that were scrapped after the September plenum. In a revealing article in Radianska Ukraina of November 20, 1988, the Chief of the Ukrainian Socio-Economic Department, A.P. Savchenko, indicated that six sectors were established: 1) Economic methods of management; 2) Investment Policy; 3) Social Development; 4) Science and Technological Advancement and Conservation of Resources; 5) Health Care and Social Security; 6) Ecology. These sectors might represent subdepartments on the national level.
The Socio-Economic Department represents the old Economics Department. All other departments, such as those dealing with industry, were eliminated. Personnel within the Socio-Economic Department consist of former defense officials brought in from the party and state apparatuses to administrate over policy directives in the social and economic spheres. The new Chief of the Socio-Economic Department, V.I. Shimko, the former Minister of Radio Industry, might be a Zaikov protege from the state apparatus. Turnover in this department is nearly 100%.

The Commission for Agrarian Policy, headed by Yegor Ligachev and Viktor Nikonov, first met on February 11, 1989. Ligachev appears to be responsible for cadres while Nikonov is responsible for science and technology. This meeting featured more argument over the direction of agriculture in terms of rural development and the continuing debate over the contract and lease system. The commission did not mention Gorbachev’s farm program, but instead emphasized the conservative views of Ligachev. It is interesting to note that this commission and its subordinate departments are intended as temporary measures according to the Gorbachev note published by Izvestia TsK #1. One must ask if Ligachev is on his way out of the leadership.

On the republic level, the commissions are headed by the secretary responsible for agriculture. No turnover exists in the commission appointments except for in the Ukraine (I.G. Grintsov), and also in Uzbekistan, where a Gorbachev protege from Stavropol, D.D. Berkov, was appointed.

The Agrarian Department, headed by I.I. Skiba, is also undergoing drastic changes in personnel. Unfortunately, little information is available on the backgrounds of those promoted so it is difficult to say whether reformers control this department. However, four out of five chiefs are new.

The International Policy Commission is headed by Gorbachev associate Aleksandr Yakovlev. This commission focused on Gorbachev’s three-month-old UN speech, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the continued investigation into Stalin’s crimes during the 30s, 40s, and 50s. Surprisingly, current topics were not addressed. It is also interesting to note that several KGB personnel belong to this commission including the Chairman of the KGB, V.A. Kryuchkov, and a new Deputy Chairman of the KGB, L.V. Shevarshim. Several military personnel were also present including Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Moiscev and Special Adviser to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeev.
The International Department is headed by West European expert Valentin Falin. This department absorbed both the Cadres Abroad Department and the Liaison Department, and six out of the nine chiefs were replaced or promoted. However, Falin stated in a recent interview with Argumenty i Fakti #9 that his department has no authority to conduct foreign policy, as was the case in previous years. According to Falin, standing Committees on Foreign Policy and Military Affairs will be established in the new Supreme Soviet. This move intends to undermine the power of the Party bureaucracy and coincides with Shevardnadze’s statements on state control over military and foreign affairs.

By far, the most powerful and important commission is the Commission for Questions of Legal Policy, headed by former KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov. The commission held the most specific meetings to date, one on March 12, 1989, and the other on April 15, 1989. From the two meetings, the commission states specifically that: 1) A law concerning glasnost and those who manipulate it must be implemented soon; 2) That military discipline must be strengthened; 3) That a legal mechanism for nationalities policy is needed; 4) There must be a legal process implemented in regard to the courts; 5) That working groups should be set up for legally safeguarding the activity of internal affairs organs.

On the republican level, the Commission for Questions of Legal Policy appears to be dominated by first secretaries or former Administrative Organs chiefs of those republics where nationalities unrest occurs the most. Several are also tied to commissions that investigate nationalities issues and two are Shevardnadze proteges from Georgia, A.F. Dashdamirov in Azerbaijan and G.V. Kolbin in Kazakhstan. One could also assume that the former Georgian KGB Chief and new first secretary, Givi Gumbaridze, will also become chairman of the Georgian Commission for Questions of Legal Policy.

The State and Law Department, under the leadership of A.S. Pavlov, represents the old Administrative Organs Department. Only one member of the old Administrative Organs Department remains, I.A. Larin, a possible Zaikov protege from Leningrad. This department, and thus, Chebrikov, oversees the Army, the KGB, the MVD, the MPA (Lizichev belongs to the commission and participates in its work), the Procuracy, the Trade Unions, and the Komsomol, in addition to the East European Security Organs and, just recently, nationalities issues. For example, the important subdepartment on Interethnic Relations, formerly part of the PCOBD, was transferred to the State and Legal Department in March, 1989. One could argue that Chebrikov’s Commission may now oversee the preparation for the nationalities plenum.
Lev Zaikov and Oleg Baklanov are the only Central Committee Secretaries not named to a commission. However, they remain in charge of defense industry matters within the Central Committee. The reason why there is not a commission to oversee the defense industry is that this department, along with Agrarian Affairs, might be dissolved sometime in the future and its responsibilities transferred over to the state apparatus. The Defense Department faced little renewal in its cadres and the chief of the Department, O.S. Beliakov, is a possible Zaikov protege.

Several conclusions can be made. First, the emasculation of the Secretariat and the reorganization of the Central Committee apparatus resulted in the neutralization of Ligachev and removed his appointees as he previously supervised the day-to-day activities of the republic and regional party organs. The placement of new officials in the Central Committee apparatus are from second level ranks of the Party apparatus or even outside of it. These people were never part of the Ligachev machine.

Second, there appears to be a possible influx of Zaikov's Leningrad mafia. Zaikov associates sit in almost every department and he may also control personnel appointments within the Central Committee apparatus besides his other duties as First Secretary of Moscow Gorkom and Senior Secretary for Defense Industry. He is most likely “second secretary” because he does not chair a commission and maintains a wide-ranging portfolio—the only secretary to do so. His appearances since the September 1988 plenum would support this notion. For example, he nominated Gorbachev for the Presidency on October 1, 1988, stood in slot number 2 for the November 7, 1988 parade, and chaired the April 21, 1989 meeting honoring Lenin's birthday in which he sat in Gorbachev's place.

Third, Chebrikov's new position is a promotion and not a demotion as some argued. He increased his power dramatically and most likely is the third most powerful member of the Politburo. In addition, Chebrikov oversees the restructuring of the domestic departments of the KGB apparatus. However, it is important to remember that Kryuchkov and Shevarshim sit on the International Policy Commission. Does this indicate that this commission oversees the KGB's foreign intelligence operations?

Fourth, there appears to be a "kinder, more gentle" purge of the local party apparatus underway: Five new second secretaries appointed, many new republic secretaries promoted, and the continued reduction and streamlining of departments on all levels. Overall, a 30-40 percent reduction in the party apparatus.
Fifth, the Party is moving back into strategic thinking, planning, and policy formulation as Lenin wanted. This is a reversal of the entrenched Stalinist political system.

Finally, for discussion, here are the basic divisions within the Politburo:

"FAST" REFORMERS— (1) Argue for radical political, military, economic, agricultural and foreign policy reforms. (2) See need for glasnost in culture and the press though limits must be put on slander against the Soviet state. (3) Ideological speeches.

Gorbachev
Medvedev
Shevardnadze
Yakovlev

TECHNOCRATS— (1) Can side with either "Fast" Reformers or "Slow" Reformers. (2) Argue for political, military, economic, agricultural reforms; are willing to experiment. (3) Criticize informal groups (4) Want some limits on glasnost. (5) Lack of ideology in speeches.

Nikorov
Ryshkov
Slyunkov

"SLOW" REFORMERS— (1) Can side with either technocrats or neo-conservatives. (2) Argue for economic and agricultural reform. (3) Criticize informals. (4) Want more stringent limits on glasnost than technocrats. (5) See foreign threats as real.

Chebrikov
Zaikov

NEO-CONSERVATIVES— (1) Can side with "slow" reformers. (2) Want minimum reforms in agriculture with emphasis on ideology. (3) Criticize informals. (4) See foreign threats as real. (5) Orthodox party apparatchiki
Kenneth Ciboski

We can look upon perestroika as both a leadership and management challenge having as its ambitious goal the revival of a sluggish economic system, extending out to the basic human unit—the worker, who comes to expect the “gifts” of the state without seeing a real connection to these gifts or rewards. The task of Gorbachev’s leadership can be analyzed perhaps at two levels: The broad, system-wide challenges and the challenges relating more directly to the enterprise level and the worker. From the Western perspective, one might say that leadership skills are most appropriate to Gorbachev’s system-wide task, and management skills are those needed at the enterprise level. The two levels meet, however, in that one of Gorbachev’s goals is to create or facilitate the climate for management of production.

One way to focus on Gorbachev’s self-proclaimed task is to see leadership as “doing the right thing” and management as “doing things right.” The task is to instill in people a taste of independence and responsibility. This will be acted out in workplace democracy, where, among other things, directors are to be elected by labor collectives. Much needs to be worked out in this regard, including the question of will workplace democracy will flourish when technical expertise is essential to the management and viability of the work unit.

Given the overall goal of perestroika, just what are some of the elements of the challenge facing Gorbachev? What is the “right thing” to do? The following are suggested as important for whatever developments might arise:

1) Gorbachev must maintain the support of those groups who put him in power. Ups and downs are a certainty, and he must convince his supporters of the ultimate, realizable value of the measures he is seeking to implement. Continuity in his leadership, of course, relates directly to his supporters’ “constituencies” and the sense that their material well-being and other factors are improving.
2) Gorbachev must be able to communicate clearly his vision, and to do this in such a way that he persuades influentials to continue along with him an extended focus. To do this, he must make effective use of the mass media, carry on a dialogue at the grass roots level, make his vision of Soviet society pervasive, compelling, and understandable, so the results eventually match up with expectations, and, the most challenging of them all, he must make certain that the vision is not clouded by nationalities demands unleashed by glasnost.

3) In his leadership role, Gorbachev needs to be able to delegate educational and implementational tasks to strategically placed officials in lower levels of the Party and state units.

4) His program must be able to establish a system acceptable within a socialist framework to stimulate and reward managers.

5) He must be able to reduce or, perhaps, reshape the bureaucracy in some way, so that its nonproductive drain on the economy will be lessened.

6) Gorbachev must lead the way for defining the tolerable limits of glasnost-inspired spontaneity at the time glasnost inspired initiative is sought and regarded as essential. And he must make this acceptable within Leninist guiding principles.

7) He will need to deal effectively with credibility questions. If the past is not entirely true, as Soviet citizens now are being told, what about the present?

8) Finally, if Gorbachev is to succeed, he must accomplish these tasks in a particular environment which includes a gap between the available technical, material, and personnel resources, and the opposition and resistance within the Party and bureaucracy in a system poorly prepared to deal with glasnost, and, finally, the unresolved conflict between spontaneity and control in contemporary Soviet society.

Thus, the big, unanswered question is this: Can Gorbachev sustain the vision while these realities are being addressed?
Steve Mazurana

Some of the commission changes may reflect the need for a different kind of manager. If, in fact, growth managers, or also “fast” reformers are needed, you will see a different type of individual placed within these departments and commissions to oversee political development. Some managers are pushing growth and relieving bottlenecks and forcing personnel changes. Other managers flourish in a declining or stable economy and could survive under regimes such as Brezhnev’s. Both may not be different in terms of backgrounds, but they might possess skills related to economic and political development and also assist in cadres and personnel turnover.

Another thought here is the need for careful evaluation of information coming out of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev is saying that things are improving. Yet, in a recent poll taken in Moscow in March, 1989, about 23% of those polled felt that things are getting better, that perestroika is resulting in change. However, about 27% said things are getting worse and at least two thirds see that as glasnost, perestroika, and democritization continue, more opposition will appear and things will not get better for a long time. So, what some might be able to see in the reorganization is a need for better information from people close to Gorbachev. These people must be technically competent to go through figures and to find out what is really happening.

Interests, individuals, institutions, and issues all play a role in the current Soviet political landscape. It will be interesting to see how Soviet leaders who lost in the recent election to the Congress of People’s Deputies are removed—quickly, slowly, or not at all. But certainly this must be an embarrassment to the leadership. After all, if the party is going to and needs to build support for perestroika, and if the party wants to be recognized for the successes, personnel must be seen as winners. It will be interesting to see whether there will be further changes.

Interest group conflict is also present. For example, the published attacks upon Zaslavskaya and other economists associated with mass change remind readers that she is responsible for poor decisions. This is certainly the type of action occurring when criticism arises from conservatives who attack “fast” reformers for relying on economists who make mistakes. This same type of activity is present when the leadership attacks people such as Yeltsin, who represents ultra-reformers. Thus, Gorbachev may be resigned to a slower change. Some argue that if the Moscow public represents the rest of the Soviet Union, the public does not expect great changes. People are still afraid of change.
I agree with Theodore Karasik's divisions of leadership in terms of fast reformers, technocrats, slow reformers, and neo-conservatives. It would probably be a good idea to keep these divisions as they are. There are some issues that Gorbachev realizes can receive Party support and it is worth it to move slowly in order to maintain order. However, there are other issues where Gorbachev believes that you must listen to the people. On these issues you might need to slow down radical change so people can adjust. There might also be cases that the demand to slow down economic and political revisions might exist in the Politburo as well. If Theodore Karasik's labels are applied, then they probably act as an economic constraint.

Valerie Assetto

An excellent predictor of what is occurring now can be found in a book entitled "Politics of Developed Socialism" by Kelly. He argues that the Party is at a crossroads; the scientific and the technological revolution is passing them by, and now they are struggling to catch up. Kelly states that a new type of manager is needed.

The discussion today seems to be filled with motives. If we do not know the motives we will not know what the outcome will be. There are two different angles here. First, a reaffirmation of democratic centralization is occurring in all of its aspects. Gorbachev is using basic methods of power consolidation and it is comparable to how Stalin achieved control over the party apparatus. The placement of new cadres in key positions proves this point. However, what is new is that debate is now allowed over the means and the end specifically on a non-macro level. This appears to be more democratic in the process but Gorbachev is not getting rid of centralism and he said this on several occasions. Second, democratic centralism remains a central principle in organization. Gorbachev is consolidating his own power because his agenda does not trust others though it allows people at non-political levels to seek their own equilibrium as Kelly predicted.

The presentations suggest that Gorbachev is centralizing and reducing the number of individuals in the party apparatus. This can be seen in other ways besides a power grab. Under an organizational theory point of view, this can be interpreted as rationalizing the party structure—as streamlining the party in the same way as the economy. The party was set up in a decentralized manner, but why have a Politburo and a Secretariat? Here, you are fragmenting authority in order to prevent dictatorship. Gorbachev is bringing the administrative and policy arms of the party together and, thus, it is not fragmented between
so many individuals. Decisionmaking becomes easier and it makes sense in terms of organizational theory. If he promotes reform and he wants it to go as quickly as possible, he must beat the public's timetable. Gorbachev must produce a decisionmaking structure that can implement changes as quickly as possible and get them working properly. You cannot do that with a fragmented party structure. The restructuring of the Soviet political system might actually be the implementation of organizational ideas related to rationalization of the structure and to streamline. But, at the same time, a possible cult of personality may be developing.

Chris Kuehl

At the moment, the Soviet reforms are under the control of Gorbachev, but it is important to remember that what is happening in the People's Republic of China (PRC) could happen in the Soviet Union as well where the momentum could be taken away from the party. As of now, the reforms in the Soviet Union are from the top; however, reforms might also begin from the bottom. This brings up a second aspect— When you decentralize on any level you will see people who will seize the moment and begin to push. This is evident in the behavior of Soviet foreign trade officials who now "freely" establish contacts with Western businesses.

Terry Clark

Lenin postulated a social-political society with a steering mechanism that would be provided by the party and it could establish the limits and the boundaries. But it would not direct every small detail of the society. Today, this is the Soviets' vision. Gorbachev constantly refers to this idea as does Pravda when discussing the New Economic Policy (NEP). The model stipulated by the NEP is a party that is purged and streamlined with ideas based on democratic centralism. It is also a society where economic ideas are given greater latitude.

Chris Kuehl

This is consistent with what some lower level officials are arguing. The only problem is do they run a risk of losing control and how do you stop it before if it gets out of hand?
Terry Clark

The question becomes how broad are the limits? How do you maintain those limits?
The Baltics appear to be an example where they are operating within the existing system whereas in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, you have the manifestation of violence that the regime must stop.

Chris Kuehl

There is also the whole issue of how are the Soviets paying attention to the reforms in Eastern Europe. Hungary was turned loose and is experiencing chaotic transformations.

Donald Chenoweth

The question also becomes if party personnel appear to be too new in their positions, then is rapid turnover in personnel highly counterproductive to the reform process?

Valerie Assetto

It depends. If the people who were previously in charge cannot manage in the style that can be used, then it will never happen. But if the new appointees make minimal mistakes they can learn under a new management style. They are not promoting people with no experience at all; they are promoting those with a different style who are more technocratic. The leadership wants these people to look only at policy and let someone else implement it. The people coming in are more qualified to make this type of judgement. Between the “reds” and the “experts,” the experts are appointed. We might think that this is a problem because experts tend to think there is only one solution. But now, the danger is that they do not try. They might realize that several solutions are possible.

Steve Mazurana

The experts over time will learn more by their experience on the job. They will be accepted as experts and will carve out a greater share of the power in the future. This power might be shared between the party and the state.
Theodore Karasik

There seems to be quite a transfer of power from the party apparatus to the state. While there is a decline in the prestige and number within the Central Committee, the new Supreme Soviet, when elected, will have far reaching powers that will rival or even surpass the Central Committee in some cases. Several bodies, such as those to oversee military and foreign affairs, will be extremely powerful within the state apparatus. It is important to remember that Gorbachev has two sets of advisers—one set for the General Secretary, the other for the President. This development might indicate that we are at a point where decisionmaking is shared in almost a check and balance situation.

Valerie Assetto

This could also be called a separation of functions. As long as one is the policy maker and the other implements then it flows in a rational sense. But you must get the party to the point where it limits the agenda and the goals. In Yugoslavia, they have been trying to do this for 20 years and somehow it is not working.

Yuan-li Wu

I am looking at this from the Chinese experience. The Soviets, under Gorbachev, are going about reform in a different way. In the PRC, the effort was made to purge the party to get rid of the radical elements. This was not done efficiently. This might reflect the types of managers that were placed in important positions. However, an important event will take place on May 15, 1989 when the Sino-Soviet summit occurs. They will have much to talk about, specifically about their own experiences with domestic reform and not so much about bilateral relations.

Dora Burton

There is another source of resistance to Gorbachev’s desire to succeed. This resistance is not found in the Soviet Union but in the West. Soviet experts constantly give Gorbachev “so many” years of survivability. Why?
Western scholars see many threatening attacks upon Gorbachev by the conservative opposition. For example, last spring there was a conservative attack against Gorbachev brought about by the Andreeva letter. In August, 1988, Ligachev began making statements on the issue of the class struggle in Soviet foreign policy. In December 1988, while Gorbachev was on a "vacation," Shcherbitsky, Ligachev, and Vorotnikov pontificated about agricultural policy. While these attacks indicate that Gorbachev does not enjoy uniform support, his ability to remain in power despite these stringent attacks suggests his resiliency.